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This project focuses on the intersection of Roman Imperial politics and Christian theology in the 4th 
century AD. I argue that during the transition to Christianity under Constantine and his successors, 
Christian theology became the principal realm in which political structure and theory were debated. 
Through close readings of political and theological sources, I contend that emperors such as Constantine 
and his son Constantius should be seen as active, engaged theological protagonists, while bishops 
should be given their due as creative and consequential political thinkers and actors. In Chapter One, I 
argue that the Emperor Constantine possessed a consistent theological viewpoint centered on the 
justification of his legitimacy in religious terms, as a charismatic “Man of God” appointed by a 
monarchical deity to supreme rule of the Empire and the world. This theology in later stages was 
developed in dialogue with that of Eusebius of Caesarea, profiled in Chapter Two, which posited a chain 
of monarchical powers extending from heaven to earth. Chapter Three provides a narrative of the reign 
of Constantine’s son and successor Constantius II, whose theological and political interventions focused 
on the urgent need to repair the failing Constantinian settlement and justify his rule against dynastic and 
episcopal rivals. The final four chapters focus on the development, by an alliance of bishops including 
Athanasius of Alexandria, Lucifer of Cagliari, and Hilary of Poitiers, of a consensus “Nicene” theology 
centered on the assertion of equality among divine and human persons and a theory of legitimacy 
whereby bishops, not Emperors, represented the divine in human society. The victory of this system was 
aided by Constantius’ forcible efforts at religious unification, which enabled his opponents to employ 
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him as an unifying antagonist for the episcopate as a whole. As described in the Epilogue, this conflict 
ultimately gave way to a new, more collaborative settlement under Theodosius I, while altering the 
conceptualization of political power by requiring the Emperor to construct his legitimacy not as a 
privileged agent within a fixed cosmic order, but as a holder of essentially temporary, “secular” power 




























































While it is de rigeur in historical studies to deprecate the efforts of past scholars, whatever originality is 
present in this study would have been vastly more difficult to arrive at, explicate, and defend without 
developments in the previous decades of Constantinian and 4th century scholarship. My overt reliance 
on various scholars will become clear in the foregoing chapters, but here I wish to specially highlight the 
work of Khaled Anatolios, T.D. Barnes, H.A. Drake, Richard Flower, Aaron Johnson, Sonia Laconi, Noel 
Lenski, Muriel Moser, and Sara Parvis. Without their work—and that of many others—this study would 
not have been possible. Likewise, the help, encouragement, and criticism of my tireless academic 
advisor James Rives and the other members of my PhD committee, Zlatko Pleše, Noel Lenski, Warren 
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This study centers on two subjects: the Roman Emperor and Christian theology. These may 
seem rather incompatible topics. On the one hand, we have a now-defunct office held by a succession of 
men over nearly five centuries some two thousand years ago, an office marked by both enormous 
privilege and the enormous burden of governing a vast Imperial state structure extended through what 
is now Western Europe, North Africa, Egypt, and the Middle East. On the other hand, we have a vast, 
heterogenous set of abstract intellectual discourses tied to a specific religious system beginning in the 
1st century AD, adhered to in the present day by well over two billion people, and expressed in 
numerous texts by authors of different groups intent on understanding the nature and properties of a 
divine being. What could these categorically different subjects possibly have in common? 
 The basic import of this study, taken as a whole, is that in the context of 4th century Roman 
society, these two entities, practical and theoretical, abstract and concrete, historical and 
contemporary, “religious” and “political,” possess a great deal in common indeed, and are deeply, 
inextricably connected, such that to fully understand one it is necessary also to at least attempt to 
understand the other. 
It is by no means original to say that politics and statecraft in every period, including our own, 
have a great deal to do not only with the allegedly practical questions of how to most efficiently manage 
resources and effect political goals, but also with more human and value-laden concerns shaped by the 
social and cultural contexts within which political actors operate. These have included at nearly every 
period, including our own, questions of philosophical and religious import. 
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 The burden of this study is that this general claim is true in a special way and to a special degree 
in the Roman Empire of the 4th century AD, a society marked at every level by social, religious, and 
political transformation. Studies of the underlying structures of the Roman Imperial system in the 4th 
century, under Constantine and his successors, are not wanting.1 For the most part, these studies have 
relied on the older traditions of pagan Rome, in conjunction with the modern “secular” traditions of 
post-Enlightenment and post-19th century politics, to explicate and understand rule and governance in 
Late Imperial Rome. As a number of these studies have noted, historical studies of Late Imperial Rome 
are hampered to a remarkable degree by a lack of explicit theoretical discussion of politics and 
governance in the historical source base.2 Questions central to modern political theory—on the nature 
of governance, its goals and methods, and its bases of legitimacy—leave, seemingly, little direct impact 
on 4th century sources, replaced by the formal conventions and clichés of the proliferating genre of 
Imperial panegyric. This absence of the explicit political theorizing and debate so prominent in the 
authors of the Late Republic and Early Empire has led at times to harsh, deprecating views of the Late 
Empire in general, and the 4th century in particular, as an age of unquestioning despotism, political 
decline, and social decay, of which the prototypal account remains the famous (and still widely read) 
work of the English Whig Parliamentarian Edward Gibbon, The History of the Decline and Fall of the 
Roman Empire. Yet recent scholarship on the “Late Antique” world has, quite correctly, pushed back 
against this viewpoint, emphasizing the popular vitality visible in art, architecture, and political and 
social life during this period, as well as the presence of underlying political-theoretical beliefs, 
 
1 For Constantine, see in particular the bibliography of Lenski 2014. For the Roman Imperial system of the 4th century, see in 
addition the bibliography of Lenski 2016, Moser 2018, etc.  
2 See the theoretical discussions of e.g. Wardman 1984, Drake 2000, Lenski 2016, Omissi 2018. Omissi notably instances an 




structures, and conflicts both apart from and within the allegedly “decadent” contexts of panegyric and 
Imperial ritual.3 
 As part of this scholarly reappraisal, more and more attention has been paid to that feature of 
4th century life most distasteful to the urbane Whiggery of Gibbon: the transformation of the Roman 
Empire and its social structures under the influence of the Christian Church, which was accompanied by 
decades of intense and occasionally violent theological conflict. As the Constantinian scholar H.A. Drake 
has argued, visible in these conflicts is a degree of popular political and social participation without 
parallel in the earlier history of the Empire.4 In keeping with this basic principle, recent 4th century 
scholarship has come to more and more acknowledge the specifically political importance of inter-
Christian theological factions, alliances, and debates.5  
Even within this scholarly trajectory, however, relatively little attention has been directed to the 
content of these debates: Christian theology itself. Beyond the narrow field of Constantinian studies it is, 
alas, still all too common for the content and conflicts of Christian theology to be dismissed, as Gibbon 
would have it, as obscure and trivial in themselves, even if consequential in their effects on other, more 
properly “political” constructs and events.  
My fundamental thesis, then, can be simply stated: the alleged absence of explicitly political 
theorizing in 4th century texts is in fact the result of the (partial) migration of these discourses from the 
 
3 The primary architect of the change in the perception of “Late Antiquity” has been Peter Brown, whose works are too 
numerous to cite here. For the recent drastic revaluation of the role and political significance of panegyric in Late Antiquity, see 
in particular MacCormack 1981, Nixon and Rodgers 1994, Vanderspoel 1995, Swain 2013, Omissi 2018, esp. 42-67. 
4 See Drake 2000, esp. 123-132, 316-317: “Popular involvement in theological issues suggests that they were not as irrelevant 
as they now seem; on the contrary, that they were a key component of the renewed vitality of popular interest in government. 
And if, as everyone in the fourth century believed, God’s favor was the most important determinant of success, then the 
bishops traveling from council to council were in fact conducting the government’s most important business” (317). 
5 See e.g. the work of Noel Lenski (esp. Lenski 2002 and Lenski 2016), T.D. Barnes (esp. Barnes 1981 and Barnes 1993), and H.A. 
Drake (esp. Drake 2000).  
4 
 
realm of “secular” politics to that of public Christian theology, where questions fundamental to political 
theory and practice were examined, analyzed, interrogated, and fought over in more far-reaching and 
consequential ways than ever before. When 4th century bishops and Emperors alike wished to discuss 
and debate the pressing questions of legitimacy, succession, hierarchy, equality, unity, diversity, and 
political power, they did so largely in and through Christian theology. If we, then, as 21st century 
persons, wish to understand how 4th century political and social actors actually thought about the basic 
issues of political structure and practice, it is reasonable, and to some extent necessary, to turn to the 
theological sources. When these theological sources are properly incorporated into our picture of Late 
Imperial political and social life, the 4th century reveals itself as a period of profound political, social, and 
religious ferment, in which ideas and structures fundamental to the history of the following millennia 
were both developed and contested. 
  From this emerges a secondary thesis whose influence will become clear throughout the 
following historical-theological narrative: namely, that because of the immediate political valences of 4th 
century theology, Roman Emperors themselves, including especially Constantine and his immediate 
dynastic successor Constantius II, should be seen as true theological interlocutors, with their own 
interests, viewpoints, and goals pursued rationally and consciously in this realm as much as in other 
areas of Imperial administration. Likewise, 4th century bishops and theologians should be seen as not 
only theological or ecclesiastical actors, confined within the narrow, private post-Enlightenment sphere 
of “religious belief,” but as fundamentally public and political actors and theorists, often of a much more 
creative and radical bent than has typically been acknowledged. 
As there is no absence of historical studies on the political structures and concerns of the reign 
of Constantine, so too there is no absence of explicitly theological studies of 4th century conflicts and 
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controversies written from both Christian and secular perspectives.6 What these two bodies of 
scholarship—political and theological—have largely shared in common, however, is a consistent 
downplaying of the role of the Roman Emperors of the 4th century in both ecclesiastical and political 
conflicts and directly theological debates. Despite the clear and indeed decisive importance granted to 
Constantine, the first Christian Emperor of Rome, by surviving theological sources, there has been 
consistent resistance in scholarship to viewing him as a properly theological thinker in his own right. 
Most portraits of this famous figure, with a few notable exceptions,7 have either depicted a Constantine 
focused naturally on purely secular and utilitarian affairs, with his occasional engagement with Christian 
theology little more than a (perhaps overtly cynical) means to those unimpeachably secular ends,8 or 
else portrayed the Emperor as a sincere believer who nonetheless because of his lack of expertise and 
exaggerated awe for Christian clerics found himself easy prey for the theological agendas and 
manipulations of charismatic priests and bishops.9  
This latter characterization, it should be said, dates back in some form to the 4th century, and is 
neither as neutral nor as natural as has been imagined. The idea of the Emperor as constitutionally 
incapable of possessing a meaningful theological viewpoint and therefore easily manipulated by bishops 
good or bad is quite straightforwardly the polemical and theological creation of 4th century Christian 
bishops of the Nicene party, in particular Athanasius and Hilary of Poitiers, and later 5th century 
 
6 For general surveys of the course of the “Arian controversy” and accompanying theological debates, see in particular 
Simonetti 1975, Hanson 1988, Ayres 2004, S. Parvis 2006a, Anatolios 2011. 
7 In particular, Lenski 2016 is exceptional for its highlighting of the importance of theological concepts for Constantine’s self-
understanding as well as of Constantine’s own agency in ecclesiastical affairs.   
8 In this tradition, the fundamental study remains Burckhardt 1853, who was among the first to argue forcefully for 
Constantine’s fundamental religious insincerity, the necessary consequence of a fundamental orientation towards political 
power above all else.  
9 This is perhaps the most common picture in recent English-language scholarship, including (with different emphases and 




historians such as Theodoret and Socrates Scholasticus. As I will argue, for Athanasius and Hilary this 
interpretation had both straightforward theological valence—emphasizing the preeminent status of 
bishops as the sole interpreters of divine knowledge on earth while denying any religious competence or 
authority to the Emperor—and also eminently personal advantage, since it helped to explain away the 
consistent opposition of multiple Emperors to themselves and their preferred theologies. Explaining 
away contrary rulings through claims of the inexperience of the ruler and the manipulation of personal 
enemies was certainly not a new phenomenon in the ancient Mediterranean, and should rarely be taken 
at face value. 
On the other side, the picture of an unimpeachably secular Constantine dedicated to 
unimpeachably secular political rule is straightforwardly a creature of modern political theory and the 
post-Enlightenment division between “religion” and “politics” or “Church” and “State.” Yet by the 4th 
century AD political rule in the Mediterranean had been for millennia understood and justified in 
“religious” terms, with reference to the cosmic order and the divine realm, so pervasively and 
ubiquitously that it rarely makes sense to posit a clear divide between the “secular” and “religious” 
aspects of political authority in antiquity. Politics in the ancient world was straightforwardly a religious 
activity. Likewise, over the course of the 3rd century, the instability of the Roman state had led to a far 
greater emphasis on the directly divine mandate for the Roman Emperor and the Roman Imperial 
system as a whole, one that had, among other things, helped justify the rise of the Tetrarchy and laid 
the groundwork for the most severe attested persecutions of Christians as inextricably religious and 
political malefactors.10  
Still, however natural it is that Constantine and his immediate successors would have portrayed 
themselves and their activities in religious terms, the question of how they actually understood their 
 
10 For the religious reforms of the Tetrarchy, see e.g. Rees 2004, 57-71, Kolb 2004.  
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own relationship not only with the divine realm and cosmic order in general, but also with the 
discourses of Christian theology and the religious hierarchy connected with them, is necessarily more 
complex and difficult. My overall argument in this work is that detailed engagement with Christian 
theology was both natural and, to an extent, necessary for the Emperors of Rome upon their entrance 
into Christianity,11 and that this postulate is in fact borne out pervasively in the extant sources 
emanating from Constantine and his successors.  
The theological discourses of Christian bishops in the 4th century, I will argue, were far from 
obscure, technical debates on distant philosophical topics. They were, rather, at every level deeply and 
inextricably bound up with practical questions of political ideology and structure. This was, to a degree, 
a distinctive of the new Christian system, characterized at every level by the inextricable linking of 
ethics, metaphysics, and ritual to practical and powerful systems of social organization and resource 
distribution. A pagan philosopher was, at the end of the day, only one social elite among many. 
Whatever arguments he might make about the structure of the cosmos and its consequences for the 
human realm, he could be ignored with little immediate or practical risk. A Christian bishop, however, 
was by the very nature of his office a prominent public official with a power base extremely difficult to 
dislodge thanks to its strong local concentration, penetration across ordinary lines of class, 
independence of Imperial power structures, explicit claims to divine authorization and authority, and 
 
11 Here it should be clear that, while I straightforwardly second the contention of Drake 2000 that “the fact that the 
organization involved [...] is a religious one does not prevent the use of political tools to analyze the problem,” I very much 
differ from his repeated claims that “the Christian message [...] is by definition a personal and spiritual one” that “would have 
been the same whether or not Christianity became an established and powerful institution” (30), and therefore need not be 
taken into account in analyzing the public interactions of institutions and actors in the 4th century. This claim is particularly 
remarkable given Drake’s otherwise accurate and polemical challenge to anachronistic modern assumptions about the 
separation between religion and politics in operations and motivations in Antiquity (e.g. 16-17). While the underlying attempt 
to defend Constantine from the charge of religious insincerity in his failure to take the political actions supposedly demanded 
by Christian belief is commendable, the issue with such accounts is in their simplistic treatment of theology and politics alike, 
not their suggestion that there might be a connection between the two. In fact, it is Drake’s own inconsistent treatment of 
religion as inherently a private matter of personal belief neither impacting nor impacted by public, institutional, or political 
considerations, not the supposed harms resulting from “bond[ing] belief and policy” (20), that represents a conceptual 
anachronism in dealing with the 4th century. 
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links to networks of contact and influence extending, potentially, throughout the whole of the Roman 
Empire and beyond. As the historical narrative of the following chapters aims to demonstrate, the claims 
made by such a person about the nature of society, political authority, and divinity, and their practical 
consequences for the moral duties of subjects and rulers alike, would be ignored at the ruler’s own peril.  
More fundamentally, however, Christian theological discourses related to questions of Imperial 
rule not only in terms of their structural embeddedness in the world of Late Antique social and political 
power, but also in terms of their actual content. As I will argue in examining different theological and 
Imperial authors, talk about God, the cosmos, and divine beings was in the 4th century closely and 
pervasively associated with talk about social and political power in general and the Roman Emperor in 
particular. This association, which will be explored in great depth in the following pages, can be boiled 
down to three basic headings. First, there is what may be called the rhetorical level of association, by 
which terms and figures used in speaking of God (or the Emperor) are then applied to the Emperor (or 
God) by the same author, without, however, it being made clear precisely what relationship, besides the 
merely verbal, is imagined to exist between these two usages. Second, there is what may be called the 
cosmic level of relationship, by which particular paradigms or structures, whether social or metaphysical 
or both, are explicitly argued to constitute the relationships within or between the divine and human 
realms and therefore to underly the political authority of the Emperor. Thirdly, and finally, there is the 
properly metaphysical relation, by which an argument is made about the fundamental nature of, e.g. 
being, personhood, divinity, humanity, in a way applicable (with appropriate metaphysical differences) 
to both human and divine instances. In the first category falls e.g. the highly rhetorical treatment by 
Athanasius in Ad Constantium of the Emperor Constantius as a perfect equivalent by nature of his dead 
brother, without explicit appeal to his own Nicene theology of a singular nature shared in by multiple 
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persons but in clear reference to it.12 In the second category falls e.g. Eusebius of Caesarea’s detailed 
treatment of the Son’s monarchy over the cosmos as both the model or paradigm and also the direct, 
structural basis for Constantine’s monarchy over humanity.13 In the third category, finally, falls e.g. 
Hilary of Poitier’s insistence on the precise meaning of metaphysical terms such as “similarity,” 
“equality,” and “substance,” meanings applicable in analogous ways both to divine Father and Son and 
to many instances of human experience, including Imperial power.14 Since these basic categories are, 
however, in practice almost always used in tandem, little effort has been made to clearly delineate 
particular instances in the following text. Each of these uses of theology to shape politics, and politics to 
shape theology, had in the right hands truly revolutionary implications for both Church and Empire. 
As the structures and beliefs of Christianity grew ever more pervasive and powerful in the 
Roman Empire, Imperial engagement with theology would eventually become a relatively normal and 
unexceptionable part of governance. All this, it should be noted, is generally recognized in scholarship 
when dealing with the Byzantine Empire, a society defined by Christian ritual and belief where 
theological controversies were tied to, among other things, long-standing rebellions in the Empire’s 
most populous provinces and where multiple controversial theological positions were directly originated 
and propagated by the Emperor in his own name.15 In the society of the Medieval Latin West, similarly, 
theological and ecclesiastical claims and factions are frequently seen as impinging directly on both the 
 
12 See section 4.4 below. 
13 See section 2.5 below. 
14 See section 6.2 below. 
15 See in particular Dagron 2003 for the complex political-theological role of the Emperor in Byzantine society. In terms of the 
Emperor’s role in theological controversy, Justinian I played a dominating role in the theological controversies surrounding the 
Second Council of Constantinople; the religious claims of “Monothelitism” were largely originated by the Emperor Heraclius; 
the phenomenon of “Iconoclasm” was shaped and driven by the concerns and decrees of multiple Emperors; et cetera. 
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conceptualization of political power and its practical regulation.16 It is largely in the Roman Empire of the 
4th century AD that such engagement has been seen, at times, as impossible to credit.  
I would argue, however, that it is in the 4th century in particular that such theological claims 
bore special relevance for both bishops and Emperor. In the formation of a drastically different social 
system, to be grounded as never before in a drastically different form of religion, the place of all parties 
within Roman society and Empire was, as it rarely would be again, fundamentally in question. Bishops 
had always had to justify their authority in religious terms—but now this authority was itself being both 
drastically increased and incorporated to a greater degree than ever before into the larger, pre-existing 
systems of Roman Imperial rule, dramatically altering their social status and their relationship with their 
flocks, their fellow clerics, and the Emperor and his officials. The Emperor, on the other hand, ostensibly 
the monarchical ruler of the Roman Empire and human civilization, found himself inextricably bound to 
a developed, more-than-Empire-wide religious system independent of Roman authority to a degree 
never before seen and capable of effectively supporting or challenging the religious and cosmic basis of 
his authority and hence his legitimacy as ruler. As I will narrate, in the 4th century theological positions 
were used as the basis for both full-throated support for particular Imperial persons and policies and as 
the justification for clear acts of rebellion and treason. Finally, Christian theology itself was being tested, 
debated, and called into question as never before, precisely because it was now being used as the 
pervasive basis of the social, political, and ritual life of the Roman Empire. To fail to participate in 
theological discourse was to risk being written out of the cosmos altogether. 
 
16 For a recent study of the overriding impact of theology on both political theory and practice in Medieval France, see e.g. 
Jones 2017. Among other instances, the so-called “Gregorian Reform,” which pitted Emperors, Popes, and bishops against one 
another over the course of centuries and fundamentally transformed the social and political life of the High Middle Ages, 
centering on theological claims over the nature and relationship of clerical and lay authority and institutions. 
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Given the importance of claims of theological truth and orthodoxy to political and social 
structure, it is hardly surprising that 4th century Emperors and bishops alike made copious use of the 
well-worn polemical tools of ancient rhetoric, as well as the complimentary traditions of Christian 
heresiology, to understand, label, denigrate, and discredit their opponents. While I do not regard either 
polemic or heresiology as intrinsically or intentionally dishonest, contemporary scholarship has rightly 
become more and more aware of the ways in which such narratives and terminology have distorted 
objective understanding of the beliefs, actions, and alliances of 4th century figures.17 In the present 
study, focused precisely on the unweaving of the content and the socio-political contexts of 4th century 
theology, I have taken great care with both my presentation and terminology. First, I have deliberately 
structured my narrative around the close examination of multiple figures from different “sides” of 4th 
century debates, in an effort to understand the interrelationships between the theologies and 
theologians of this period with as much accuracy as possible. The majority of the main text is 
consequently written from the perspective of, or at least in sympathy with, the primary historical figure 
or text presently being profiled. This generally extends to terminological usages and characterization of 
groups and parties, including the use of value-laden terms like “orthodox,” “heretical,” “Catholic,” etc 
where appropriate. To understand the perspective of 4th century figures, it is necessary to attempt, to at 
least some degree, to see the world as they themselves saw it, and to present the world as they 
presented it. For Eusebius of Caesarea, his own views and status were eminently “Catholic” and 
“ecumenical”: for Lucifier of Cagliari, they were fundamentally and damnably “heretical.” To leave out 
the importance and meaning of these terms for these persons would be to fail to grasp the fundamental 
 
17 All the works on the political and/or theological history of the 4th century so far cited could be evinced here also, but see the 
recent lament of Williams 1996, 335-339 on the continuing prevalence of heresiological terms and classifications in scholarship 
and the difficulties with proposed “secular” alternatives. 
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purpose of their theology: the determination of truth and falsehood, social belonging and exclusion, for 
themselves, the Christian Church, and the cosmos as a whole. 
Nevertheless, while, as stated, I do not regard heresiology and related historical scholarship as 
per se illegitimate, the present study is self-consciously not written from a polemical or heresiological 
standpoint. In this study’s main narrative, then, I have taken care to avoid all terminology with primarily 
polemical or heresiological import. This includes most notably the loaded term “Arian,” which, while it is 
still frequently employed in a colloquial sense by historical scholars, is in both origins and general usage 
a term whose raison d'être is the negative characterization of certain thinkers and beliefs under the 
intrinsically Christian and theological rubric of “heresy.” In attempting to characterize different 
theological and political viewpoints from the broader, more neutral perspective of the study as a whole, 
I have made use of hopefully more neutral terms such as “Nicene,” “Eusebian,” “Imperial,” 
“homoousian,” and the like. I freely acknowledge, however, that even these terms contain their own 
implicit narrative values and assumptions, and as such are frequently contested in scholarship. 
Terminology can never be a wholly neutral affair, and it would be a mistake to assume otherwise. 
Christians of the 4th century labeled both themselves and their rivals according to their own beliefs, 
while furiously contesting those labelings among themselves. Later scholars both Christian and secular 
have created their own, allegedly superior terms to add to the pile, and then furiously contested these 
also, but not yet escaped the fundamentally value-laden nature of human language. I certainly do not 
claim to have done so.  
As this study argues, episcopal disdain for the allegedly poor theological abilities of the 
Emperors of the 4th century, and modern scholarly disdain for the importance of theology writ large, is 
itself to a great degree responsible for the neglect of the political valences of theology in the 4th century. 
The question of how “good” or “bad” Constantine and his dynastic successors were at theology is, at 
least historically speaking, far less important than the accompanying questions of what they themselves 
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thought about their own religious status and expertise, and how they viewed and participated in the 
theological controversies of their reigns. It is these questions I will aim to explicate. 
The basic claim of Chapter One of this study is that Constantine possessed a consistent 
theological viewpoint, expressed in different ways at different times but closely connected to and with 
clear consequences for the theological controversies of his lifetime.18 This theological viewpoint was 
centered on the justification of his own legitimacy as ruler in explicitly cosmic and religious terms, as a 
charismatic “Man of God” appointed by a monotheistic deity to supreme rule of the Empire and the 
world. Over time, I argue, this set of concerns led to an alliance with a faction of clerics associated with 
the controversial Arius of Alexandria, and the development of a distinctive theological perspective based 
around a cosmic hierarchy of precedence in existence, causation, and command. This theology seems to 
have been developed to at least some degree in dialogue with that of Eusebius of Caesarea, the 
episcopal scholar and polymath examined in Chapter Two. If Constantine is to be seen as a theological 
thinker and actor, this would apply even more naturally to his successor Constantius, who, as I argue in 
Chapter Three, played a strikingly proactive and decisive role in the ecclesiastical events of his lengthy 
reign and hence in the emerging shape of Christian Trinitarianism, with his frequent interventions 
focused on the urgent need to justify his rule against dynastic and episcopal rivals. The next four 
chapters focus on the development, by an alliance of Latin and Greek bishops out of favor with Imperial 
power, of a consensus “Nicene” theology grounded on interpersonal equality among divine and human 
persons and a theory of legitimacy whereby bishops, not Emperors, stood as the immediate authorized 
representatives of divinity in human society. As I argue, this consensus position was greatly aided by 
 
18 In this, I broadly concur with the judgment of Drake 2000, 201, that “the question that needs to be asked now is not ‘Did 
Constantine become a Christian?’ but ‘What kind of Christian did he become?’” Answering this question will in turn go a long 
way towards answering Drake’s other primary concern, namely how “to account for the active role Constantine began to 
assume in Christian affairs and the powers he began to assign to Christian bishops.” My efforts in these areas are not, naturally, 
intended to be comprehensive, but to add to the efforts of Drake and other scholars.  
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Constantius’ efforts at religious unification from the top down, which enabled his opponents to employ 
him as an unifying antagonist for the episcopate as a whole. The figure of Constantius that emerges in 
the polemics of Lucifer of Cagliari (Chapter Five), Hilary of Poitiers (Chapter Six), and Athanasius of 
Alexandria (Chapters Four and Seven)—an eschatologically wicked violator of the divine sacrosanctity of 
the Church and opponent of all human and divine society—played, in tandem with the political events of 
Julian’s revolt and subsequent Imperial dynasties, a key role in cementing the ultimate victory of a 
consensus Nicene theology and accompanying episcopal networks. As described in the Epilogue, finally, 
this polemical conflict ultimately gave way to a new, more collaborative settlement with the Imperial 
regime, exemplified by the “Nicene” ruler Theodosius I, while fundamentally altering the 
conceptualization of political power by requiring the Emperor to find and construct his status and 
legitimacy not as a privileged actor within a fixed cosmic order, but as a holder of essentially temporary, 
“secular” power within the structures, rituals, and networks of the Christian Church. 
This may all seem academic enough, and well distanced from anything that 21st century secular 
persons would consider “political.” Yet this basic set of concerns—even these specific questions in 
politics and theology—are by no means absent from the 21st spheres of politics and religion. Before 
turning to the world of the 4th century, the reader will hopefully pardon a brief excursus in 
demonstration of this reality. 
In 1922, the prominent Weimar German jurist Carl Schmitt19 published a slim volume, Politische 
Theologie: Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souveränität, in which he decisively challenged the prevailing 
legal interpretations and theories of the time in favor of a new theory of sovereignty conceptualized in 
explicitly theological terms. Under this system, political authority was to be grounded, not in a self-
contained body of codified law, but in the precedence of one will over all others, a “sovereign” whose 
 
19 For a relatively full account of Schmitt’s life, career, and later impact on European political thought, see Müller 2003. 
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power came from the intrinsic necessity of deciding and acting on the exceptions within which codified 
statutory law by definition no longer operated.20 While this theory did not necessarily require a literal 
monarchy, its authoritarian valences were and remain clear; and within ten years, Schmitt himself had 
applied it to a full-throated endorsement of the new Nazi regime, headed by a sovereign Fuhrer whose 
legitimacy came via a perpetual legal state of exception.21 At the heart of Schmitt’s legal theorizing was 
a concept which Schmitt himself dubbed “political theology”:22 namely, the direct analogy between 
monotheistic deity in heaven and political sovereign on earth, an analogy which according to Schmitt 
had underlain all political theory without exception before the modern period. While Schmitt himself 
had by this point in his career consciously and publicly apostatized from the Catholic faith of his youth, 
the analogy between the transcendence of creation ascribed to ruling deity and the transcendence of 
codified law ascribed to political sovereign remained of great importance for his trajectory over the 
remaining decades of his career, if anything increasing with his growing estrangement from organized 
religion.23  
At the very height of Schmitt’s public career, when he had become known across the world as 
the “Crown Jurist” of the Nazi regime,24 his scholarship found itself under attack from a rather unlikely 
direction: Erik Peterson, a theology professor, sometime acquaintance of Schmitt since about 1919, and 
 
20 Schmitt 1922. 
21 For various treatments of Schmitt’s relationship with Naziism, to which he came late thanks to his advocacy instead for a 
Presidential dictatorship, but which he supported by numerous theoretical and practical efforts, including pro-Imperial, anti-
Western, and anti-Semitic historical theorizing, see Bendersky 1983, Müller 2003, 24-47, Gross 2007, Altenburger 2019. 
22 While Schmitt would later claim to have coined the phrase, Schmitt seems to have initially intended it as a deliberate 
reference to the (critical/polemical) usage of the term by the anarchist philosopher Mikhail Bakunin in an 1871 essay (Bakunin 
1871), as well as on analogous terminology going back to Antiquity (Müller 2003, 156, 275 n. 1, Meier 1992). There can be little 
doubt, though, that Schmitt is largely responsible for popularizing the term in modern scholarship.  
23 For Schmitt’s estrangement from Catholicism, brought about initially by his failure to gain an annulment after divorce and 
remarriage but increased by political, social, and intellectual factors, see e.g. Müller 2003, 19-24. 
24 Müller 2003, 39-41. The designation was given by the Catholic anti-Nazi intellectual Waldemar Gurian. 
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convert from Lutheranism to Catholicism.25 In what Schmitt would later recognize as a clear attack on his 
theory, his person, and the Nazi regime itself, Peterson in 1935 published a short tract, Der 
monotheismus als Politisches Problem, in which he argued that “political theology” in Schmitt’s sense 
was rendered impossible by the basic Trinitarian Orthodoxy confessed by all Catholics, and virtually all 
Christians, since the 4th century debates around the Council of Nicaea. While Hellenistic Jews and pagan 
philosophers had made much of the analogy between God and sovereign, Peterson argued, and while 
this position had been upheld in the 4th century by “Arian heretics” like Eusebius of Caesarea, the social 
Trinity of equal persons transcendently separate from creation worshiped by Catholics prevented a true 
analogy between the divine realm and the world of human politics. Because of this, the Catholic Church 
then and now was and would remain resolutely opposed to any form of political authoritarianism or 
absolutism—such as that contained in the present Nazi regime.26  
While Schmitt (after waiting decades until shortly after Peterson’s death) eventually responded 
to this challenge with the withering Politische Theologie II, in which the aging jurist combined the 
exposition of an eccentric Trinitarian theology of enmity within the Godhead with deeply personal 
invective against Peterson’s allegedly simplistic treatment of theological sources, contemptible 
conversion to Catholicism, and dishonest apoliticism,27 Peterson’s work would go on, predictably, to find 
far more purchase in the broader world of Christian theology than Schmitt’s legal scholarship, even 
while remaining relatively marginal thanks to the fatal damage done to his academic career by his 
 
25 For Peterson’s life and contacts with Schmitt, see Nichtwieß 1992, Nichtwieß 1994. 
26 See Peterson 1935, translated in Peterson 2011.  
27 See Schmitt 1970. As Müller 2003, 156-158, notes, Schmitt himself avowed the highly personal nature of his anger at 
Peterson, calling the writing of the invective “cathartic” and comparing it to “removing an arrow that had been stuck in his flesh 
for almost forty years” (157). Even after this, a mere mention of Peterson’s name was purportedly enough to provoke a heart 
attack in the aging Schmitt in 1972. 
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adherence to Catholicism and political activities.28 Schmitt himself would spend the post-Nazi phase of 
his career struggling with the negative reputation brought on by his support of Hitler’s regime—without, 
however, in any way disavowing his earlier work or his support for that regime.29 
This debate, however, would go on to have long-standing effects, and is by no means concluded. 
After decades of being treated as taboo, the scholarship and legal theories of Carl Schmitt have 
experienced an overwhelming and unprecedented resurgence in English-language jurisprudence over 
the past several decades, particularly following the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001 and the 
American elections of 2016.30 With the present unsettled state of jurisprudence and theology alike, 
Schmitt’s Nazi associations remain a potent point of debate.31 Meanwhile, Erik Peterson’s theological 
works would inspire a brilliant young priest-scholar,32 who would go on to self-consciously further his 
mentor’s theses over the course of a decades-long career in Catholic theology and ecclesiastical affairs—
most directly, perhaps, in Die Einheit der Nationen, in which Schmitt’s theory of political theology was 
 
28 This has been acknowledged by multiple recent treatments (see e.g. Ratzinger 2010, Geréby 2008, Cooper 2017). Although 
first published in 1951, his theological tractates were first translated into English only in 2011 (Peterson 2011). There has, 
however, been a significant increase in interest in Peterson among theologians over the past few decades, visible in e.g. Gereby 
2008, Ratzinger 2010, Cooper 2017, Padusniak 2018, Passos 2018. 
29 For this phase of his career, see esp. Müller 2003, 48-196. As Müller notes, Schmitt consciously refused any form of de-
Nazification, preferring to remain in exile while building a counter-network of far-right reactionary contacts. Likewise, “[h]e 
never made a single statement admitting his complicity in the crimes of the Third Reich, nor did he ever express any empathy 
for its victims” (58). Indeed, his anti-semitism seems in some ways to have intensified during this period, as even his 
posthumuously published diaries “are characterized by a profound anti-semitism” (58). While Schmitt remained influential 
among far-Left and far-Right European thinkers, his associations with Naziism rendered him all but anathema in English-
language scholarship until relatively recently. A full translation of his Politische Theologie into English was not published until 
1985 (Schmitt 1985). 
30 For various recent uses of Carl Schmitt within the field of jurisprudence, see e.g. Chehab 2007, Vermeule 2009, Posner and 
Vermeule 2017, Howland 2018, Von Bogdandy 2020. Reflecting his growing importance as a legal and political figure, the 
voluminous Oxford Handbook of Carl Schmitt (Meierhenrich and Simons 2017) was recently published in 2017.  
31 See e.g. Altenburger 2019. 
32 See Ratzinger 2010, where Ratzinger states that his first reading of Peterson’s theological tractates in 1951 inspired his own 
theological career and trajectory: “in it I found the theology I was seeking.” 
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once again attacked by means of the theology of Origen of Alexandria.33 This career culminated in 2005 
in the election of Joseph Ratzinger to the office of Pope and head of the billion-strong Catholic Church. 
The political valences of theology in general, and 4th century theology in particular, have by no 
means ceased to exist in the modern era. Global political power and Christian authority are still only a 
few steps removed from 4th century Trinitarian theology.  
While the present study is by design a work of history, not theology and certainly not political 
advocacy, I am by no means unaware that it will possess for many readers implications, valences, and 
associations with contemporary political and religious events and issues. While my goal is historical 
understanding, I do not believe such readings are in principle illegitimate, any more than the complex 
debates of 4th century actors—many of which, as we will see, involved the repeated reinterpretation and 
recontextualization of events past and present. My own viewpoints on politics, theology, Christianity, 
and related issues, which I have been careful to keep separate from my presentation of history but from 










33 Ratzinger 1970. See also Padusniak 2018, where the influence of Peterson on Ratzinger 1968, perhaps his most popular and 
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 Ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ ἄνθρωπος 
The Political Theology of the Emperor Constantine 
1.1: 
Usurpation and the Church 
 When the roughly thirty-year-old Illyrian soldier Constantine1 assumed office as imperator in AD 
306, after an alleged deathbed appointment by his father followed by a military acclamation, the 
legitimacy of his position was far from beyond question. By the time he assumed sole rulership of the 
Roman Empire in 324, after an extorted (partial) concession from a senior Emperor presaged twenty 
years of bloody civil wars in which every rival and colleague was eliminated one after another and the 
entire Tetrarchic system undermined and finally annihilated, this fundamental weakness had only grown 
more obvious. By the most immediate standard, Constantine was a usurper—if not to the Imperial office 
as such, certainly to the position of sole Augustus and ruler of the entire Roman Empire.2 
 
1 For an overview of the background of Constantine’s family and his parentage, see in particular Barnes 2011, 27-45. The date of 
Constantine’s birth has long been a matter of debate in scholarship. The majority belief, based on the explicit statements of 
Eusebius of Caesarea in Vita Constantini 1.8, 4.53, has Constantine in his sixties at his death in 337, thus placing his birth 
sometime in the 270s (cf. Barnes 1982, 39-40, forcefully restated in Barnes 2011, 2-4, 35-38, where a more precise date of 27 
February 273 is argued for), while a minority viewpoint, based on a few allusions (e.g. Vita Constantini 2.51.1) that refer to 
Constantine as a young man in the 300s, places his birth as late as 288, making him only eighteen years old at his accession (cf. 
Seek 1922, 435-436). 
2 For a recent recounting of these events that emphasizes their fundamental nature as usurpation, see Omissi 2018, 103-152, 
cf. Wardman 1984, 233: “However paradoxical it may seem Constantine was certainly a usurper in his first approach to empire 
[...]  and would certainly have been classified as one had he failed against Maxentius or Licinius.” For a contrary account that 
argues (on the basis of a somewhat unclear theory of Roman Imperial legitimacy) that from 306 “Constantine’s legitimacy as an 
emperor was [...] indisputable” and that “had he not been a fully legitimate emperor from the start, Constantine could never 
have become master of the whole Roman Empire,” see Barnes 2011, 56-74, 80-85, 89-91, 97-106, though Barnes at the same 
time makes clear that in the war with Licinius that brought him to sole power “Constantine was the aggressor” (101) inspired by 
a “desire for control over the whole Roman Empire” (105). 
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In the context of the Late Roman Empire, however, this was nothing unusual. Scholarship on 
Roman power has increasingly come to terms with the fundamental role usurpation played in the 
ordinary functioning of the Imperial office and the Imperial system over the course of its history. As 
Adrastos Omissi has summarized the issue, “Roman imperial power can only properly be understood in 
the context of usurpation,” since “[f]rom the death of Commodus in AD 192 to the accession of the child 
emperor Valentinian III in the West in 423, no decade was without civil war and conflict over the 
imperial succession, and virtually no emperor reigned who did not have to face military challenge to his 
rule.”3 Indeed, from 27 BC to AD 337, of the sixty persons recognized as imperator, “an astonishing 
forty-one were either murdered by their soldiers, by a court conspiracy, by a rival emperor, or else killed 
themselves in the wake of an unsalvageable political defeat,” so that in the most practical sense 
“regicide was the expected end for a ruler, not an occasional aberration.”4 In keeping with this perilous 
life expectancy of Imperial claimants, from the accession of Augustus in 27 BC to the Sack of Rome in AD 
455 a total of 103 usurpations or attempted usurpations can be chronicled, “an average of slightly fewer 
than one every four and a half years.”5 Per Alan Wardman, usurpation thus represented “an essential 
part”6 of the late Roman Imperial system, “built into the Roman way of handing on power”7 inasmuch as 
“theories of legitimacy were on the whole weak or absent.”8 While the methods of asserting one’s claim 
to Imperial status— acclamation as imperator by Roman soldiers, claimed (if often fictitious) connection 
 
3 Omissi 2018, 3-4. 
4 Omissi 2018, 17. 
5 Omissi 2018, 21, Fig. I.2. As Omissi notes, the rate of usurpation increased drastically at the end of the 2nd century AD, with an 
average of one usurpation every two and a half years from the years 192-455.  
6 Wardman 1984, 228. Cf. Omissi 2018, 20: “Usurpation became so common as to be plausibly described as a fundamental 
feature of Roman imperial government.” 
7 Wardman 1984, 326. 
8 Wardman 1984, 225. 
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to past Imperial dynasties through blood or marriage, wearing of purple garments, distribution of 
images of oneself through the media of statues and coins, claims of preeminent virtue expressed in 
panegyrics or other propaganda, and in the later Empire some sort of claim to divine patronage9—were 
clear and established and as such pursued in similar terms by numerous would-be Emperors throughout 
the third and fourth centuries, the main factor that distinguished legitimate Emperors from demonized 
tyranni was the elusive factor of success, either in extorting recognition from more senior Imperial 
claimants or, more commonly, in wresting power away from them by force. In an Empire of nearly two 
million square miles, with perhaps half a million professional soldiers10 ready and able to not only guard 
the frontiers but also serve as the material basis for attempts on the throne, becoming and remaining 
Emperor was no easy task.  
In terms of the general history of the Roman Empire, Constantine was no more than one more 
questionable claimant to Imperial power in a history full of them. At no point in his long reign, in fact, 
could Constantine rely on a clear, established political system as the moral basis of his rule. In terms of 
the Tetrarchic system which Diocletian had labored for decades to establish, he was simply a 
revolutionary—and Constantine certainly had no ready-made system to take its place. Like many 
usurpers, Constantine seems to have been constantly and painfully aware of the insecurity of his 
position, an insecurity made very visible in the numerous civil wars and internecine conflicts that 
marked the first twenty years of his reign. Unable to appeal to legitimacy within a collegial system to 
 
9 Wardman 1984, 225-226. Omissi 2018, 16-20, points out in detail the issues with each of these factors: far from stabilizing the 
Imperial office, the fiction of the Emperor’s preeminence in virtue was “favourable to the deposition of monarchs deemed 
unsuitable” (17); as numerous cases, including that of Constans prove, “dynastic ties might help bring a man to the throne but 
they were a poor tool to help him keep it” (19); the practice of military acclamation created an “absence of objective criteria by 
which one accession might be marked out from another” (17); although theoretically restricted, purple garments could be 
easily acquired by any would-be Emperor (17-18); and “since each emperor claimed to be the highest religious authority in the 
state [...] appeals to the religious sphere had little independent force as a vehicle for distinguishing emperors from one 
another” (18).  




protect his status and authority against fellow Emperors, Constantine again and again was brought to 
appeal to the test of force. Here, he prospered—but without some source of supremacy greater than 
arms, stability would be intrinsically unattainable. After the peaceful interlude of the Tetrarchy, a ruling 
imperator dependent for his status solely on victory in battle would logically signal the resumption the 
Roman Imperial system of the 3rd century, which had featured numerous short-lived and partial 
claimants to the Imperial throne reliant for their longevity on the loyalty and success of the individual 
armies and soldiers under their command. Yet neither Constantine nor his subjects would have desired a 
return to the constant instability, division, and bloodshed that had marked those decades.11 If 
Constantine was to rule, some alternative means would have to be found to sanction his authority in the 
eyes of his subjects and potential rivals alike.  
It is hardly surprising, then, that, like many rulers throughout history risen to power apart from 
established structures of succession, the source of legitimacy Constantine actually chose to appeal to 
was one beyond those legal structures altogether—the very one, in fact, that had been employed by 
Diocletian, one more unsteady Imperial claimant in a century full of them, to legitimize first his own rule 
and then his novel system of the Tetrarchy.12 This method was religion.  
In both cases, the choice possessed a basic, undeniable logic. As Diocletian had demonstrated, 
however contrary to established legal or political norms the new political order might be, it could 
nonetheless be presented as legitimate according to a higher set of norms grounded in the order of the 
cosmos as a whole, presided over by the divine realm. However straightforwardly grounded in civil war 
and violence the Emperor’s rule might be, the valence of such bloody events could be entirely reversed, 
 
11 The lesson of the inherent volatility of relying on military power alone, without a broader source of legitimacy, would have 
been driven home to Constantine early in his reign, when in 310 the retired Augustus Maximian managed to cajole or bribe a 
significant portion of Constantine’s own army in Gaul into supporting him in a bid for power against his son-in-law. 
12 For the religious policies of Diocletian and the Tetrarchy, see e.g. Rees 2004, 57-71, Kolb 2004. 
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presented as signs of divine favor and therefore security and legitimacy rather than usurpation and 
illegitimacy. This was especially true in the Roman world of the late 3rd and early 4th century, where 
contemporary scholarship has argued for a growing cultural religiosity, one that by the time of 
Diocletian had made such appeals to divine patronage and status more widely persuasive than ever 
before, even where largely decoupled from existing legal and political institutions.13 This gradual 
transformation, it should be noted, while it certainly increased the cosmic standing of the Imperial 
office, also seems to have had a broadening effect on the bases of Imperial power, separating the 
Emperor from his traditional, more collegial relationship with civic and regional elites and allowing for a 
more direct relationship between ruler and the bulk of the population, one mediated through religious 
veneration and ceremonial rather than social structure.14 
It is unclear at what point and under exactly what circumstances Constantine chose to publicly 
associate himself with the formerly proscribed Christian religion and its adherents.15 That he eventually 
did so is, however, beyond doubt. While much scholarship has been dedicated over the centuries to 
adjudicating the sincerity or insincerity of Constantine’s religious conversion and devotion, recent work 
has largely attempted to move beyond this dichotomy, generally emphasizing a complex but 
meaningfully Christian Constantine with fundamental continuities between his pre-conversion and post-
 
13 Drake 2000, 61, 123-132: “In the late empire, Imperial prestige was redefined once yet again, with the emperor required to 
demonstrate access to an even higher patron, a divine comes, or companion, whose favor, negotiated by the emperor, 
protected the empire from its increasingly powerful enemies. [...] [T]here was a simple rule of thumb for demonstrating this 
connection: winning battles” (61). The connection between political power and religion was a very ancient one in the 
Mediterranean, with ample precedent in the Roman Empire in previous centuries and in Hellenistic kingdoms and Persian 
dynasties, but seems to have been greatly increased by the instability of the third century Empire, the increasingly court-based 
structure of Roman government, and specific reforms adopted by Diocletian and his successors (see Smith 2007, esp. 172-179). 
14 Cf. Drake 2000, 125: “The problem was that lower orders lacked an institution that could focus their sentiments as clearly as 
the Senate had done for the aristocracy. To supply the loss, emperors increasingly substituted ceremonies and acclamations for 
more substantive methods of interaction. [...] No longer princeps, [...] the emperor was now a figure for all to adore and 
venerate.” For further discussion of the central importance of Imperial ritual, see Smith 2007. 
15 For two conflicting accounts of Constantine’s adherence to Christianity and its consequences throughout his reign, see in 
particular Barnes 1981, Drake 2000. For a recent (rather polemical) discussion of the state of scholarship on the question see 
Barnes 2011, esp. 13-26, 80-89. 
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conversion viewpoints. For the purposes of the present study, it should be emphasized that in dealing 
with Constantine’s conversion I will not be appealing to the models of private, intimate, psychological 
experience so emphasized in scholarship derived ultimately from the German Protestant tradition. 
Whatever Constantine’s psychological relationship with Christianity, he naturally approached the 
practices, beliefs, and structures of his chosen religion as not just another private citizen, but an 
Emperor. His association with Christianity, I will argue, can consequently be treated and analyzed in 
intellectual and political terms, in terms of Constantine’s own rational ideas and goals. That these 
rational ideas and goals, existing within the tumultuous worlds of 4th century Christianity and Imperial 
politics alike, would necessarily involve Constantine in questions of ecclesiology and theology in the 
fullest sense of those terms is one of my primary theses.  
It should likewise be emphasized at the outset that Constantine’s choice of Christianity bore a 
certain straightforward logic. The Tetrarchy had based its legitimacy on the divine order of the cosmos, 
but in a distinctively pagan manner, with the introduction of court ceremonial and iconography derived 
from the solar ruler cults of the Eastern Mediterranean16 combined with the direct, pervasive drawing of 
analogies, in art and propaganda alike, between the two senior Emperors, Diocletian and Maximian, and 
the figures of Jupiter, king of the gods and monarchical ruler of the divine realm, and Hercules, the 
human son of Jupiter tasked with achieving godhood through heroic labors on earth.17  It was in part this 
emphasis on pagan religiosity as the immediate basis for usurped Imperial power that had led to the 
bloodiest attempt to ensure religious uniformity in the Empire’s history, the Persecution of Diocletian, 
which constituted nothing less than an attempt at the total elimination of Rome’s Christian communities 
 
16 See in particular Smith 2007, MacCormack 1981. 
17 Cf. Barnes 1981, 11-12, Barnes 2011, 56-57. As Barnes points out, the junior Caesars Galerius and Constantius I seem to have 
cultivated, in addition to the “family” association with their senior Augustus’ tutelary deity, associations of their own with the 
god Mars (for Galerius) and Sol/Apollo (for Constantius). 
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as centers of rebellion against the order of the cosmos.18 As H.A. Drake has convincingly argued, this 
attempt, and the consequent political violence on all levels of society it occasioned, seems to have 
backfired, producing widespread sympathy for Christians and Christianity and opposition to the 
underlying logic of Imperial religious policy among not only Christians but the pagan populace at large.19 
Under these circumstances, some kind of official tolerance for Christianity was, if not a foregone 
conclusion, at the very least a shrewd political move.20 As we will see, Constantine was very consistent, 
throughout his public works and acts, in his expression of disgust and anger at the Persecution of 
Diocletian and his use of its alleged irrationality to discredit the previous political and religious system 
and justify his own alternative rule. Given such a dramatic reversal from systematic persecution to 
official tolerance, it would have been difficult, at the least, for Constantine to avoid some form of public 
association with Christianity. Similarly, given Constantine’s clean break from the Tetrarchy in terms of 
political structure, an accompanying break from the religious and theological bases of that system had 
its uses. A straightforward, continuing appeal to the divine pairing of Jupiter and Hercules might well 
raise awkward associations with the former rulers, and the former system of collegial Imperial rule, 
associated with those deities.21 If Constantine was to succeed in founding a new dynasty and a new 
 
18 For an excellent recent study on the religious background to the Persecution of Diocletian, see in particular Digeser 2012. For 
more speculative discussion of the relationship between the persecution and intrigues over the Imperial succession, see Barnes 
2011, 56-57 (cf. Barnes 1981, 18-22).  
19 Drake 2000, 147-153. As Drake argues, “whenever a ruling group appears to violate its own principles, to act with blatant 
injustice, sentiment in the community can swing in support of groups that previously had been ignored or even scorned” (150). 
Such a swing in support, it should be noted, would have been a great help to a Constantine tasked with finding some way to 
delegitimize the relatively stable and successful Tetrarchic system which he himself had helped to overturn.  
20 As Drake 2000, 158, argues, “Given the religious basis for legitimate rule, given a sizeable group that could not recognize a 
legitimate ruler on that basis, given the failure of an effort to compel them to do so, what alternatives were open not merely to 
Constantine but to anyone who was going to rule Rome in 312?” While somewhat hyperbolically stated, this underlying reality 
is shown clearly by an extant decree from the Emperor Galerius, one of the main architects of the initial persecution, in which 
he rescinds all anti-Christian measures due to their failure to achieve their objectives (from Lactantius, De morte persecutorum 
34.3-5). As Drake 2000, 152, points out, such a direct admission of failure is practically unheard of in Imperial legislation. 
21 As Bruun 1976 notes, this was the strategy adopted by Constantine’s ally/rival Licinius, who consistently used Jove on his 
coinage, seemingly as a way to assert his alleged status as the most senior of the new Augusti against the legal realities of the 
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Imperial system, it would benefit from an at least notionally distinct form of cosmic and religious 
backing. 
Neither of these factors in themselves, however, constitute sufficient justification for the public 
endorsement and enormous material support offered by Constantine for the rulers, practices, and 
beliefs of the Christian religion. Paganism, even in its most politicized Tetrarchic forms, was certainly 
broad enough to allow for religious tolerance, and this breadth could provide, as it had before, more 
than enough deities, symbols, and systems to allow one ruler and one dynasty to be distinguished from 
another. Indeed, based on available evidence it seems that prior to his embrace of Christianity 
Constantine and his father had both participated enthusiastically in the solar ruler cult of Sol Invictus, a 
set of practices and symbols capable of being syncretized with, but nonetheless clearly distinct from, the 
traditional religious practices and symbolism around Jupiter as king of the gods emphasized by 
Diocletian.22 The pagan religious system of the third century certainly possessed within itself ample 
resources to allow an Imperial usurper to justify his position in religious terms. 
Constantine’s status as a usurper, his political need for legitimacy, and the general instability 
produced by the Persecution of the Diocletian all serve to provide the grounding and context for 
Constantine’s choice to adhere to Christianity. They do not, however, in my judgment constitute the 
sufficient cause for that choice. For the purposes of this study, however, Constantine’s underlying 
reasoning is less decisive than the fact of that choice and its accompanying consequences. Constantine’s 
 
existing Tetrarchic system (10). Constantine’s public association with the monarchical Sol Invictus should be seen as an 
alternate strategy towards the same basic goal.  
22 A solar figure, referred to as Sol or Sol Invictus, appears on Constantine’s coinage, while Constantine himself is given the title 
of Invictus, from about 308 until the early 320s (see Bruun 1958, as well as Lenski 2016, 32-33, 38-40, 48-52; Barnes 1981, 36-37 
points out the use before this period of the god Mars as Constantine’s tutelary deity on coinage, and connects the shift to the 
attempted usurpation of Maximian), well after his public embrace of the Christian religion—a religious stance that reflects 
continuity between Constantine and his own father, Constantius II (cf. Drake 2000, 181-183, 189-191, Gillman 1961, 200-201, 
Barnes 1981, 11-12). Likewise, Constantine’s son Crispus is referred to in a surviving inscription as Crispus Invictus, another sign 
of continuing devotion in the family (Pohlsander 1984, 1979). 
29 
 
embrace of Christianity, however much it was made on the basis of his previous religious ideas and 
goals, by the 4th century AD at least necessarily involved something that can only be referred to as 
belief—that is, conscious adherence to a religious, philosophical, moral, symbolic, and social system that 
was itself self-consciously comprehensive and totalizing.23 Whatever combination of circumstances and 
reasoning led Constantine to make this choice, his decision to publicly sanction and take part in Christian 
beliefs, practices, and structures necessarily led to a far different state of affairs than any mere change 
of religious practice or policy within the world of paganism. This choice produced a radically different 
state of affairs for both Constantine and the pre-existing leaders of the Christian Church, with both 
dramatic opportunities and dramatic dangers for both sides.  
1.2:  
Imperial-Episcopal Collaboration in the Reign of Constantine 
 Chief among these opportunities and dangers was the straightforward fact that Christianity, 
faced from its beginnings with varying degrees of opposition from the Roman Imperial system, had by 
the early 4th century developed a remarkably uniform and centralized system of social structure and 
authority. Like the Empire itself, the Christian Church claimed for itself total universality, and, in parallel 
with Imperial structures, had set up in virtually every city of the Empire a central ruling magistrate, 
assisted by subordinate officials and advisors and acting normatively in close communication and 
coordination with other such magistrates in other cities throughout the Empire, to oversee its properties 
and preside over its judicial, economic, and cultic operations. Roman Emperors had long been suspicious 
of this uncanny shadowing of Imperial power by a suspect and at times prohibited organization that in 
basic structure seemed to resemble a political conspiracy far more than a religio in the traditional sense 
 
23 The model of belief as a rational process of commitment or adherence to a religious system is here deliberately preferred to 
the overtly psychologizing and idealized concept of “conversion” prominent in scholarship since the influential works of William 
James (James 1902) and A.D. Nock (Nock 1933). This is not to say that such models are without their uses, only that they rely on 
an extrapolation from available evidence that is not necessary for the purposes of this study.  
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of a cult dedicated to one particular deity among others. Very much unlike the choice to associate with 
one pagan deity or cult among others, then, Constantine’s embrace of Christianity would have to involve 
an acceptance, not just of a set of philosophical principles or a machinery of cultic worship, but of a 
political and social power structure, one that had operated independently of and even in opposition to 
the legal structure of the Roman Empire for practically the entirety of its existence. 
 On the other side, the Christian bishops of the Empire had long grown used to managing their 
own affairs in sufficiently autocratic fashion, with little interference—other than active opposition—
from the ruling Emperor or his officials. Throughout the first three centuries of Christianity, bishops met 
with vastly varying degrees of success in regulating the moral behavior, beliefs, and activities of their 
flocks, but nonetheless faced little direct competition in their unique status as at once teachers of a 
totalizing philosophical and ethical system and regulators of extensive networks of cultic practice, social 
organization, and material distribution.24 Certainly, no bishop had ever before faced competition in his 
role as ruler and teacher from an authority as universal and forceful as the Roman Emperor.25 The 
Emperor, by the very nature of his office, was a difficult figure to fit into any pre-existing schema or 
structure of authority. It is not surprising, then, that many bishops seem to have responded to the new 
state of affairs brought about by Constantine’s adhesion to Christianity with a mix of confusion and 
trepidation. An Emperor attempting to insinuate himself into this system in a preeminent role, only a 
 
24 As Drake 2000, 73, notes, “over the centuries, bishops displayed a remarkable ability to absorb every kind of distinction into 
their corporate identity,” thus “prevent[ing] the Christian community from splintering into ever more diverse and independent 
traditions” by serving as “carriers of continuity” and “the glue that held the movement together.” See e.g. Drake 2000, 132-136, 
for discussion of the essentially unprecedented corporate networks of charitable giving and resource distribution built up by 
early Christian communities under the direct control of bishops. 
25 Indeed, as Drake 2000 notes, to an extent the opposition of the Emperor had its advantages for the bishops’ authority over 
their flocks, since “it was the resilience of the episcopal organization and the leadership skills of bishops which kept whole 
communities from cracking” (108-109) while the threat of persecution helped to cement ties between dioceses and so 
“provided bishops with an intelligence network that often functioned more efficiently than the government’s” (109), its onset 
gave them opportunities to represent their communities in dealings with local Imperial officials, and its aftermath required 
them to “decide[] rewards and penalties” (109) for martyrdom and apostasy—such that “it is conceivable that, without 
persecution, the power of the bishop would never have developed so rapidly or become so extensive” (85).  
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little while after other Emperors had done their best to destroy it root and branch, could hardly be seen 
as automatically trustworthy.  
 It must be emphasized, however, that the possibility of collaboration between bishops and 
Emperor presented not only challenges, but also enormous positive opportunities for both parties. 
Unlike certain traditions of scholarship, I do not view it as a foregone state of affairs either that 
Constantine would be able, with his Imperial power, to capture the structure of the Church and coopt its 
leaders,26 or that the leaders of the Church, on the basis of their religious authority, would be able to 
capture the structure of the Empire and coopt its rulers. Both systems had functioned effectively for 
centuries without any such thing occurring, even during periods when the Church had managed to build 
robust institutions and networks throughout the Empire or the Empire had brought its full weight to 
bear against the Church. If bishops and Emperor in the 4th century chose to collaborate and, to a real but 
frequently exaggerated degree, even to integrate their two systems, it was because such an 
arrangement was seen as advantageous to both parties—advantageous not merely in terms of material 
abundance or power, but according to the pre-existing goals and ideas of each system. It was on the 
basis of these shared goals and mutual benefits above all else that Constantine was able to lay the 
groundwork for a new, more collaborative power structure for the Roman Empire as a whole.27  
 
26 Drake 2000, 24-27, has presented a devastating critique of accounts which treat “the church as no more than a passive 
recipient of [Constantine’s] decisions, a blank tablet on which he writes the future of Western history” (24). As he argues, “by 
attributing all decision making to one central figure who is always fully in control” (24), such accounts leave no room even for 
the necessary interaction with subordinates and functionaries characteristic of every political system, let alone the obvious 
“possibility of the church, or various churchmen, actively pursuing their own agendas” (26) and “much less the possibility that 
Christians might have been as much divided among themselves over the question of Imperial policy as they were over 
questions of theology and doctrine” (26). The bulk of this study, it should be said, is devoted to explicating just such active 
pursuit of agendas by churchmen very much divided both in theology and in their relationship with the Emperor.  
27 As e.g. Lenski 2016, 12, has correctly noted, however, not even in his interactions with his non-episcopal subjects did the 
Emperor in fact constitute “a static and essential agent, a sort of unmoved mover,” but rather a figure whose “power derived 
from intersubjective processes” as “a matter of negotiation and mutual agreement.” Of course, as I will argue in the following 
pages, both Constantine himself and some Christian bishops did, in fact, attempt to create theological frameworks where the 
Emperor did constitute, in a very real sense, an “unmoved mover” as untouched as possible by any truly intersubjective 
interaction. Such systems, however, should never be allowed to obscure the inherently more complex realities of Imperial rule 
in the fourth century and elsewhere. 
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 For Constantine himself, H.A. Drake in particular has argued strongly and persuasively for the 
rational political goals pursued by Constantine by means of his collaboration with the bishops. As he 
argues, Christian bishops represented a new class of authorities within Roman society, with power bases 
extending across social classes28 thanks to their direct election by socially heterogenous flocks,29 and 
therefore of great interest to a reforming Emperor dedicated to accessing the populace as directly as 
possible while bypassing existing social networks and even, at times, his own Imperial bureaucracy. 30 
 
28 See in particular Gilliard 1984, who argues that, in contrast to the eventual practice of later centuries, in the totality of the 
fourth century only two bishops can be reliably identified as belonging to the Imperial senatorial class. As Gilliard points out 
(173-175), these two bishops, Ambrose of Milan and Nectarius of Constantinople, are both from the latter part of the 4th 
century, and both were appointed to politically influential dioceses under some degree of duress—a sign that even in so 
favorable an atmosphere as the post-Constantinian Empire, Christians among the Empire’s elite “would not easily have rejected 
mos maiorum and the infulae honorum” (174) and its accompanying ideologies of honor and leisure in favor of a difficult and 
burdensome clerical career requiring at least the appearance of strict personal moral standards, the laborious and tedious 
responsibility of presiding over episcopal courts (see e.g. Lamoreaux 1995), and the highly practical ability to marshal and 
maintain support throughout social classes and the Empire-wide episcopate. As Drake 2000 notes, for bishops, “spiritual 
qualities completely displaced traditional criteria of nobility or fortune, opening the leadership to classes disenfranchised” (107) 
by the existing Imperial system. The fact that Christian bishops were normatively elected by their flocks also “gave bishops a 
power base among the citizenry which few civic officials could match” (105). 
29 The classic studies on the theory and practice of episcopal elections in the 4th century remain Gryson 1979 and Gryson 1980. 
As Gryson argues, while in the 3rd century it is clear that bishops were normatively chosen by a concourse of the people of the 
diocese together with the clergy, in the 4th century this rule, while retaining its basic force, was increasingly modified by the 
development of a conciliar system that granted more importance to broader networks of bishops, by the effects of doctrinal 
conflict, and by increasing Imperial intervention. Even this transformation, however, seems to have differed significantly 
between the Eastern and Western halves of the Empire, with all these trends significantly accelerated in the East. At the 
beginning of this century, however, such processes were as yet in their infancy, as the canons of the Council of Ancyra in 314 
made it clear that a bishop not formally accepted by the people of his diocese could under no circumstances legitimately serve 
as bishop (see esp. Canon 18), thus ensuring that “la volonte du peuple reste donc [...] souveraine” (Gryson 1979, 302).  
30 See in particular Drake 2000, 321-346, for a discussion of Constantine’s interest in and frustration with the appeals process in 
the Roman Empire, with its large, outstanding issue of favoring rich over poor litigants, which led to a remarkable flurry of laws 
throughout his reign, including attempts to forbid all appeals, forcibly mandate appeals by all litigants who had suffered 
injustice, require judges to hear only the appeals of the innocent, and, most strikingly of all, multiple attempts to increase or 
even mandate appeals from subordinate officials to himself as Emperor, climaxing in an open-ended declaration issued in 325 
that any person could at any time appeal to him from any other official and would be rewarded if their case was found just 
(Codex Theodosianus 9.1.4). The most interesting laws on this subject, however, are without a doubt two issued in 318 (Codex 
Theodosianus 1.27.1) and 333 (Collectio Sirmondiana 1) that together allow appeals on all secular issues from Imperial to 
episcopal courts and forbade appeals from episcopal judgments to Imperial officials. These laws, as Drake argues, show both a 
clear respect for the sacrality of episcopal judgment, and a more mundane concern for justice in the appeals process, which 
could be greatly increased by the possibility of immediate appeal to the bishop as a local official whose rulings were both 
presumably more just and not subject to further appeals to distant Imperial magistrates in larger jurisdictions (cf. Lamoreaux 
1995, 152-153, Lenski 2016, 197-200). As Lamoreaux 1995, esp. 150-156, points out, such laws, in tandem with the basic 
advantages of the developing episcopal court system in comparison to its Imperial counterpart—including its explicitly religious 
sanction, far greater flexibility in crafting judgments and informal settlements to save face for both parties, the absence of 
torture and other extreme investigative methods and punishments increasingly common in Imperial law (cf. MacMullen 1986), 
and perhaps most importantly the absence of the court fees and pervasive expectation of bribery that made Late Antique 
Imperial courts financially untenable for poorer litigants—seem to have rapidly led to episcopal arbitration becoming an 
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Likewise, for Constantine himself, the bishops represented a class of peers and a base of politically and 
socially experienced personnel not unlike the Senatorial class of Rome, which Emperors had long relied 
on in their governance of the Empire.31 On top of all this, contemporary sources clearly attest to the 
religious and ethical reverence Constantine bore for those he regarded as divinely graced teachers of 
the truth, as well as the degree to which he seems to have come to regard bishops as in some sense his 
peers and models for his own role as divinely-appointed ruler at the will of God of the human world. As I 
will argue, too, Christian cosmology and symbols would have provided for Constantine himself a system 
of ideas, practices, and expert knowledge by which he could seek to describe and interpret his own 
experiences and beliefs, especially his attachment to monotheism, his continual assertion of a personal 
divine mission, and his dramatic and bloody rise to power. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, close 
association with and sanction by a class of persons with both extensive social networks and a widely-
accepted claim to divine authority could go a long way towards providing a tangible institutional basis 
for Constantine’s own shaky claims to legitimacy.  
 For the bishops, the benefits that Constantine’s new status as a Christian could bring to 
achieving their own existing goals are in some ways more obvious, but in others far more obscure. To 
begin with, the fact of Constantine’s massive funding of Christian dioceses32 and building projects,33 
together with the legal privileges granted to both Christian communities and clergy,34 are massive and 
 
extremely popular alternative to Imperial litigation, fundamentally transforming the social position of bishops and coming to 
constitute perhaps the most time-consuming and burdensome of their many responsibilities. 
31 See Drake 2000, esp. 35-71. 
32 See in particular Lenski 2016, 175-177, who points out both the massive extent of the funds made available by Constantine to 
bishops for the support of their clergy and poor and the dramatic reduction of these funds under later Emperors. 
33 See Lenski 2016, 179-196 (cf. Barnes 2011, 85-89), who argues convincingly that this would have marked perhaps the most 
immediate and dramatic shift for the Church under Constantine, expending unprecedented funds to move Christian church 
buildings from marginal to central and permanent parts of the architectural landscape of cities across the Empire. 
34 See Lenski 2016, 197-206, who catalogues four principal legal privileges granted to clergy: legal sanction for episcopal 
judgment, the right to legally manumit slaves and endow them with citizenship, the right to use the cursus publicus to travel to 
Church councils and for other official Church business, and exemption from curial service. In all these instances, as Lenski notes, 
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undeniable factors that have been rightly emphasized in scholarship.35 These large factors have, 
however, in my judgment somewhat obscured the other goals, as well as concomitant dangers, to be 
achieved through collaboration with the Emperor, and consequently have led at times to rather one-
sided pictures of bishops in the 4th century as mere functionaries of a Roman Reichskirche kept quiet by 
regular applications of Imperial money and power. Against such pictures, the truly independent and 
popular bases of power possessed by bishops should be emphasized, bases that could certainly be aided 
by a new infusion of wealth, influence, and institutional freedom, but could not easily be made entirely 
dependent on the Emperor.36 Given their established history of maintaining and increasing their power 
apart from the Imperial system, and given the dangers posed by reliance on Imperial largesse and 
submission to Imperial authority, both individual bishops and the episcopal system as a whole required 
 
Constantine’s initial grants of privileges seem to have been somewhat extreme, and were dramatically curtailed by later 
Emperors. Barnes 1981, 50-51, argues that clergy may have also been at least partially exempt from taxation, and points out 
that while some of these privileges have precedent in those granted to pagan priests and (especially) Imperial soldiers, their 
extent, combination, and religious justification were in a real sense unprecedented in Roman law. Barnes 2011, 131-140, 
meanwhile, gives a somewhat longer list of Christian privileges and Christian-influenced legislation, including the important 
legal right of Christian clergy to act as transmitters of Imperial largesse for building projects and charitable support and the fact 
that, as discussed in detail in section 1.3 below, “[a]lone among the inhabitants of the Roman Empire Christian bishops enjoyed 
the privilege of trial by their peers” (133), after which they were normatively punished with, at worst, deposition and exile in 
lieu of the capital sentences common in the Late Empire. 
35 These factors can, however, be easily overemphasized in both their extent and in their actual effects on basic Christian 
practice. See in particular Shepherd 1967, esp. 59-67, 70-75, who points out that most of the institutional innovations 
commonly associated with the Constantinian Church (the Church as large institutional landowner; its possession of prominent, 
elaborately-decorated buildings; the increasing use of ornate decorations and musical forms in liturgy; the calling of large 
councils encompassing multiple provinces; appeal to the Emperor for the enforcement of ecclesiastical sentences; even basic 
institutional recognition by the Imperial administration) actually date from the 3rd century, while most of the eventual 
assimilations of Christian aesthetics in e.g. episcopal dress to Imperial models are 5th century developments, with the only 
clearly dateable innovation of Constantine’s reign itself being the adoption of the basilica form as the basis for the many new 
Christian places of assembly constructed during this period. While there can be no question that the degree of material 
patronage and (as this study will focus on) direct Imperial involvement in ecclesiastical governance and theology dramatically 
increased under Constantine, Shepherd’s conclusion that, at least in its direct impacts on Christian liturgical and institutional life 
and practice, “Constantine's favor of Christianity was not a revolution, but an evolution” (66) is correct.  
36 This is correctly and clearly argued by Drake 2000, especially 398-402. As Drake emphasizes, bishops “were never fully 
dependent on the resources [Constantine] had placed at their disposal” (399), thanks to the “intangible assets unique to their 
office” (399), such as their lifetime tenure, ability to directly interact with their flocks through preaching and liturgy, and, 
perhaps most importantly, the fact that “bishops [...] differed from other types of officials with which the emperor dealt in not 
being primarily accountable to him” (399), but rather to their “base of popular support” grounded on their direct elections by 
the local populace and the “popular involvement in theological issues” that helped to “provide[] an outlet for popular activism 
such as had not existed since the end of the republic” (400). 
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additional reasons to cooperate with the Emperor besides monetary gain. Most relevantly for my 
purposes, like Constantine himself, they required religious and theological sanction for collaboration 
with the Emperor,37 as well as assurances that their own independent goals could be pursued more 
easily and effectively by means of rather than apart from such collaboration. Many of the following 
pages will be taken up with analysis of theological discourses by bishops reflecting on precisely these 
two issues: the ultimate divine basis of Imperial-episcopal collaboration, and the positive or negative 
impacts the Emperor’s participation had had on pre-existing Christian goals. These discourses were far 
from the simple, one-sided justifications that scholarship has sometimes made them. 
1.3: 
Case Study: The Imperial-Episcopal Judicial System 
 The above summary is necessarily extremely broad, taking into account numerous 
considerations stretching across the entire areas of ecclesiastical and political life in the 4th century. For 
the purposes of the present study, however, a few more directly social and systemic advantages of 
Imperial-episcopal collaboration should be emphasized at the outset. One that is in my judgment 
absolutely central to the dynamics of the 4th century is the establishment for the first time, in 
collaboration between Constantine and various factions of bishops, of what can for the first time be 
treated as a true episcopal justice system.  
Given the local power bases and relative independence possessed by individual bishops, the 
problem of how to deal with abusive or heterodox bishops had long been an extremely thorny one for 
the episcopal system as a whole. Christianity was unique among ancient religious systems for both the 
 
37 This represents my most significant disagreement with Drake 2000, who asserts that, while most likely Constantine “did [...] 
sincerely believe that Christianity was a superior path to personal salvation” (200), the choice of both bishops and Emperor to 
cooperate in religious and political activities and common projects was “a matter of politics, not religion” (201). In fact it is 
difficult to think of any time in history or any two groups more in need of explicit religious justifications for cooperation than 
Christian bishops barely escaped from a bloody Imperial persecution and a usurper Emperor presiding over an Imperial system 
that had only recently viewed Christians as a potent threat to public order living in a century where belief in the need of divine 
sanction for political legitimacy was pervasive. 
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ideology of uniformity in belief and practice found throughout its different groups and its close, 
totalizing connection between religious practice, belief, and individual moral behavior. The legitimacy of 
the overall episcopal system thus depended, far more than any pagan priestly or political structure, on 
both theological uniformity among bishops and on their individual moral probity. A single rogue bishop 
could hence do incalculably more harm, both to Christian networks and structures and to the prestige of 
Christianity in the broader society, than any pagan priest or philosopher. 
The establishment of the norms of superior, “metropolitan” bishops and of regular provincial 
synods had gone some way toward resolving this issue, but this system lacked both the possibility of 
true uniformity on a scale as large as the Empire and any real means of enforcement other than the 
social and voluntary. Likewise, councils were by their very nature a complex and difficult mechanism to 
manage, extremely prone to manipulation based on their exact makeup and proceedings and capable in 
principle of being countered by other synods put together on the basis of other networks. Thus, by the 
3rd century at the very latest, various attempts seem to have been made to make use for this purpose of 
the superior prestige and authority possessed over and above the metropolitan level by such dioceses as 
Rome, Alexandria, and Antioch. The bishops of these dioceses could provide unity and cohesion over 
much wider areas than individual provinces while, by means of their universally-acknowledged 
authority, also helping to bring about enforcement of sentences even in the face of recalcitrant local 
opposition.38 Even this, however, was in truth a rather double-edged sword, since such important 
 
38 See e.g. Cyprian of Carthage, Epistula 68, where the bishop of Carthage in North Africa writes to the bishop of Rome Stephen 
asking him to send a letter to the Church of Arles in Gaul by which its local bishop, who had already been the subject of a 
hostile petition to Rome from rival bishops in Gaul and whose request for communion had consequently been rejected by the 
bishops of North Africa due to his alleged association with the Novatianists, might be formally excommunicated, deposed, and 
replaced in Arles itself, after which the Church in North Africa would await letters from the bishop of Rome as to the identity of 
the legitimate bishop with which to hold communion. This extraordinary document shows both the extraordinary intensity of 
the Christian and episcopal demand for unity and uniformity across geographical bounds, and the importance of the bishop of 
Rome in coordinating disciplinary action and intercommunion within the episcopate. Among other things, Cyprian’s hope is 
clearly that the bishop of Rome’s authority will bring about in Arles what his (and those of his fellow North African and Gallican 
bishops) had not, and actually effect within the local congregation the deposition of the bishop in question, his replacement, 
and the transfer of the properties of the local Church to the new officeholder. 
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dioceses themselves frequently faced internal conflicts for leadership without, again, any possibility of 
final settlement or enforcement other than the social or voluntary, conflicts that thanks to the greater 
importance of these dioceses could spread far more widely than those afflicting ordinary sees. The mid-
3rd century saw the Novatian controversy, in which a dispute for leadership of the Church of Rome, 
thanks to that church’s prominence and claims to authority, led to the formation of an Empire-wide 
counter-network of bishops that would continue indefinitely, despite all attempts by the majority to 
dislodge them, for centuries to come. The early 4th century similarly saw a leadership dispute within the 
diocese of Alexandria lead to the formation of a counter-network of Melitians throughout Egypt, while 
North Africa was riven by a similar conflict centered in rival leaders of the metropolitan diocese of 
Carthage.  
 According to Eusebius of Caesarea, even prior to Constantine’s conversion the episcopal system 
had responded to these challenges by appealing for enforcement of their sentences, logically enough, to 
the main source of legal and judicial enforcement in the Roman Empire: the Emperor himself.39 Yet so 
long as individual Emperors continued to relate to Christianity largely on the basis of ad hoc attempts at 
persecution or toleration, such appeals could hardly form part of a regular system. With the accession of 
Constantine, however, the ground was laid for a new system that for the first time could be both truly 
comprehensive and actually enforceable. Such a system, it should be emphasized, would have been 
equally beneficial from Constantine’s point of view, since it would pose obvious dangers to both the 
stability of the Imperial system and his own power to rely on bishops as allies and officiaries, granting 
 
39 According to Eusebius’ Historia Ecclesiastica 7:27-30, the two synods that deposed Paul of Samosata in 264 and 268/9 (for 
which see e.g. Millar 1971, 11) were followed, when it became clear that Paul had no intention of surrendering either his 
position or the properties of his diocese, by an appeal to the Emperor Aurelian. Aurelian, according to Eusebius, referred the 
case to the judgment of the bishops of Italy and the bishop of Rome, but enforced their decision with Imperial power, driving 
Paul and his supporters from the disputed buildings by force (30.18-19). While this is the only narrated instance prior to 
Constantine of the enforcement of an episcopal sentence by the Emperor, Millar 1971, 14-16, correctly points out that such an 
appeal by a private organization to the Emperor, and its decision according to the established procedure of that organization, 
followed regular Imperial practice.  
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them vast new degrees of wealth, power, and influence, without clear checks on the possible abuse of 
this power and these resources. Perhaps even more important, the bishops as a class could not possibly 
serve as a source of divine unity and legitimacy for Constantine’s reign if they were themselves disunited 
and lacking moral authority. 
 In the following pages, I will attempt to give a broad historical sketch of the development of this 
novel system, focusing on the interactions of Constantine with various bishops expressed through 
letters preserved in the writings of contemporary bishops and later ecclesiastical historians. Some of the 
uses to which these individual Christian authors put these documents, as well as their theological and 
ecclesiastical agendas, will be covered in later chapters, but here I have attempted as much as possible, 
by removing these documents from their original polemical contexts and making concurrent use of 
documents preserved by writers of different, opposed agendas, to get at the intentions of Constantine 
himself. As I will emphasize throughout this study, the Constantinian episcopal-judicial system 
developed not through a straightforward plan of Constantine himself, but through a complex series of 
interactions between bishops and Emperor that over time created patterns of behavior and legal 
precedents that would be imitated and innovated on in turn over the years and decades and centuries 
to come.  
Not long after his victory over his Imperial rival Maxentius in AD 312, Constantine wrote to the 
bishop of Rome Miltiades proposing a collaborative effort aimed at resolving the difficult problem 
presented to both Church and Empire by the Donatist controversy. For the Church, the threat posed by a 
schism in some of the most populous Christian provinces of the West was obvious; for the new Western 
Emperor, not only were there concerns about the unity and peace of his domains, threatened by the 
possibility of civic discord and violence, but also the pressing question of just who among the various 
competing Christian bodies was to receive the Imperial largesse and privileges that Constantine was 
clearly, in the aftermath of his victory, interested in bestowing on his new co-religionists. Still, while a 
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convergence of interests was definitely present between the bishop of Rome, the acknowledged leading 
bishop of the newly-united Western Empire, and the new Christian Emperor of those regions, such 
convergence of interests did not, in itself, require any form of direct cooperation in judicial proceedings. 
It was Constantine, seemingly, who instigated such direct cooperation, for reasons that, as we will see, 
were at once political and eminently theological.40  
As the letter acknowledges, the bishop of Rome would traditionally have taken a leading role in 
the resolution of an episcopal conflict within the Church of North Africa; and indeed, in a sense the 
letter is nothing more than a helpful prompting for Miltiades to “decide in whatever way is right to judge 
the beforementioned case most suitably and conclude it according to what is just”41 (Eusebius, Historia 
Ecclesiastica 10.5.20).42  Even Constantine’s proposal that all of the bishops involved sail to Rome to be 
heard and judged there, after he himself has provided the bishop of Rome with the greater amount of 
evidence available to him as Emperor, could easily be read, in basic principle, as mere material 
assistance for the task of the ecclesiastical judges, who are to act, not in accord with Roman Imperial 
 
40 While Constantine’s decision was in response to appeals made by the Donatists in Carthage, as e.g. Drake 2000, 217, notes, 
his dramatic decision to actually grant these appeals and personally arrange an episcopal council to hear these complaints 
seems to have been driven more by his personal sense of his own Imperial duties and distrust of subordinates than any 
immediate practical concern. In fact, in his initial round of largesse to the Church in North Africa, Constantine had simply 
restricted funding to the “Catholic” party already accepted in communion by the bishop of Rome and the bulk of the Latin 
episcopate (see e.g. Drake 2000, 214-217, Barnes 1981, 56-57). There was, then, no absolute need to respond to the Donatists’ 
appeals at all, let alone in so dramatic a fashion—apart, as I will argue, from Constantine’s own theological sense of divinely-
granted responsibility for the unity of the Christians within his domain. As Girardet 1998, 86-92, has argued, a basic 
responsibility for sacred and divine things and the pax deorum had always been a basic part of the duties of the Imperial office, 
one clearly assumed by Constantine himself in his actions here and elsewhere. 
41 In this study, all Greek and Latin quotations are translated by the author, while the original text is given generally in a 
footnote. A small number of Greek and Latin theological terms have, however, been allowed to stand in the original language. 
This is done only where translation would have an obscuring effect and/or where the meaning of the terms in question is 
precisely what is under debate. 
42 δοκιμάσει ὅντινα χρὴ τρόπον τὴν προειρημένην δίκην ἐπιμελέστατα διευκρινῆσαι καὶ κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον τερματίσαι 
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precedent, but rather according to established, internal Christian practice, “as you may understand to 
be in accord with the most holy law” (10.5.19).43  
 This clearly asserted legal reality is, however, somewhat belied by the other details of the letter. 
To begin with, Constantine has taken it on his own initiative, before consulting with the alleged 
presiding judges, to not only gather evidence, but also summon all parties to Rome along with three 
other bishops whom Constantine has personally chosen to judge the case along with the bishop of Rome 
and has “ordered to hurry to Rome for this purpose” (10.5.19).44 The bishops in question, from 
Constantine’s former domain of Gaul, seem to have been selected, not on the basis of any kind of 
ecclesiastical precedence, let alone any connection with the bishop of Rome or the parties to the case in 
North Africa, but solely because of past, personal contacts between themselves and Constantine45—thus 
creating, at a stroke, a drastically new standard for assigning duties, powers, and concomitant status to 
bishops within the overall episcopal system. Then, of course, as Emperor, Constantine’s summons to the 
feuding North African bishops to appear in Rome at an ecclesiastical trial possessed far greater weight, 
backed as they were by direct force, than any similar summons issued by the bishop of Rome, or any 
other bishop, on his own authority. So far as the political authority of Constantine could reach, the 
bishops charged with wrongdoing would be brought, in chains if necessary, to Rome to be judged.  
 In this letter, the essentials of the new judicial system that would emerge over the coming 
decades have emerged. This system would be essentially collaborative, involving Christian bishops as 
 
43 ὡς ἂν καταμάθοιτε τῷ σεβασμιωτάτῳ νόμῳ ἁρμόττειν. 
44 τούτου ἕνεκεν εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην προσέταξα ἐπισπεῦσαι 
45 As Drake 2000, 218, argues, all three were from prominent cities where Constantine, as ruler of the westernmost part of the 
Empire, had spent significant time over the last decade. The selection by the Roman Emperor of bishops from Gaul to sit on a 
council in Italy to judge a case in North Africa represented an event without precedent in previous Christian practice. Miltiades 
seems to have responded to this irregularity by summoning fifteen bishops of his own from Italy to render negligible the 
influence of the three Gallic interlocutors (cf. Drake 2000, 218-219), a move that would have called into question the actual 
theological and legal basis of Constantine’s intervention and the rights of the bishop of Rome to determine the judicial process 
on his own authority. 
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privileged actors with special powers and immunities, chief among them the right to be judged only by 
their own peers and according to a code of law clearly distinct from that of the Roman state as a whole. 
These were no small privileges in the 4th century Roman Empire. On the other hand, the Emperor would 
be actively involved in all such judicial processes as both facilitator and enforcer, at his own pleasure, of 
ecclesiastical trials and their operations. 
This incipient system, however, possessed certain weaknesses and ambiguities that would have 
to be remedied by later efforts. Its chief ambiguity was, I will argue, an essentially theological one: 
namely, the questions of what actual structure of authority underlay these operations, and from where 
this authority was ultimately derived. Put simply, did the bishops judge as officials of the Emperor, at his 
pleasure and under his authority, or did they possess some sanction of their own, independent and 
inviolable even to him? Constantine’s actions in the initial stages of the Donatist controversy could well 
be read in both ways. From the perspective of the bishop of Rome, Constantine might well be welcomed 
in his assistance with the thorny, perennial issues of the gathering of evidence and the enforcement of 
summons and sentences in a process still fundamentally identical to those carried out prior to his reign, 
a Christian case judged according to Christian law by Christian bishops under the immediate sanction of 
God. At the same time, Constantine’s actions could just as easily be seen as a straightforward example 
of the Emperor’s supreme authority within the Empire to grant special privileges and favors to his 
subordinates46 while nevertheless retaining for himself the final say in the conferral of office and 
privilege and the enforcement of sentences, subject to ultimate appeal to himself. It is likely, in my 
 
46 As Drake 2000, 42-43, correctly notes, in the traditional Roman system of patronage, one that “surviv[ed] all the other 
changes that will occur between Augustine and Constantine” (43) essentially unchanged, “the act of conferring prestige 
augmented, rather than diminished, the prestige of the giver” (43) since by such conferrals on subordinates he “simultaneously 
reinforced their prestige and bound their interests to his own” (43).  
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judgment, that at least at this early stage, Constantine himself did not possess a clearly held or 
articulated position on these issues. At least at first, none would be necessary.  
 This would inevitably change, however, as the theological and legal ambiguities involved shortly 
produced very real results. After the bishop of Rome and his associates ruled against Donatus and his 
supporters, the losing side immediately adopted the more beneficial interpretation for their own case, 
and appealed to Constantine. Frustrated, the Emperor summoned a larger council of bishops at Arles in 
Gaul to once again try the case,47 which predictably ruled in the same way as the bishop of Rome while 
writing to him with apologetic deference to second his judgment and lament his absence.48 Even more 
predictably, the defeated party once again appealed to Constantine, who seems to have responded with 
a remarkable document49 that straightforwardly decided the ambiguity in favor of his own lack of 
authority to hear appeals on ecclesiastical cases:  
If indeed they had been willing to keep this fact before their eyes, they certainly would not have 
made this appeal! They demand my judgment, although I myself am waiting for the judgment of 
Christ! For I say, as is undoubtedly true, that the judgment of priests ought to be considered as if 
the Lord himself were judging in person: for it is permitted for them to judge nothing but what 
they themselves have been taught by the teaching of Christ. [...] Abandoning heavenly things, 
they appeal to secular things. O rabid shamelessness of their madness! As is accustomed to 
happen in the cases of the Gentiles, they have interposed an appeal. What are these detractors 
of the law, who in rejecting heavenly judgment have thought to demand mine?50  
 
47 See in particular the letter titled in manuscript Constantinus Augustus Aelafio, given originally in the documentary appendix 
to Optatus, Contra Donatistos and edited in Von Soden and Von Campenhausen 1950 (more recently reprinted in Maeier 1987). 
48 See Epistola concilii Arelatensis ad Silvestrum Papam, also from Optatus’ documentary appendix, edited in Munier 1963 
(reprinted in Maeier 1987). 
49 Epistola Constantini Imperatoris ad Episcopos Catholicos Post Synodum Arelatense, also originally from Optatus’ documentary 
appendix, edited in Von Soden and Von Campenhausen 1950 and reprinted in Maeier 1987.  
50 Qui utique si hoc ante oculos habere voluissent, minime hoc ipsud interposuissent! Meum iudicium postulant, qui ipse 
iudicium Christi exspecto! Dico enim, ut se veritas habet, sacerdotum iudicium ita debet haberi ac si ipse dominus residens 
iudicet; nihil enim licet his aliud iudicare nisi quod Christi magisterio sunt edocti. [...] Perquirunt saecularia relinquentes 
caelestia. O rabida furoris audacia! Sicut in causis gentilium fieri solet, appellationem interposuerunt. [...] Quid hi detractores 
legis, qui renuentes caeleste iudicium meum putaverunt postulandum? 
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The force of this principle was, however, somewhat undercut by the fact that, not long after, 
Constantine was brought to again grant the appeal of Donatus and his partisans, summoning all parties 
to his court for interviews and then attempting to hold a botched trial in Rome, after which, clearly 
frustrated, he declared his intention to personally, without any episcopal middlemen, travel to North 
Africa to investigate the case and give his own, final decision.51 Yet after publicly promising to do so, 
Constantine seems to have never made the trip to North Africa that would have allowed him to establish 
the truth. If a formal trial in the presence of the Emperor ever did take place, it took place not in North 
Africa, but in Northern Italy, and resulted in little more than a reaffirmation of the decision taken years 
before by Miltiades.52 
The final result of Constantine’s intervention into the Donatist controversy seems to have been 
both theologically and legally ambiguous, to say the least. This ambiguity is reflected first and foremost 
in Constantine’s behavior, which shows anything but a clearly developed master plan of Imperial 
involvement in ecclesiastical cases. It is reflected secondly in the real-world outcome of the case, which 
belied almost entirely the premises of the initial Imperial and episcopal collaboration. After an initial 
period of harsh Imperial repression aimed at assuring union, Constantine, stymied with Donatist 
intransigence and preoccupied by other matters, declined to enforce any further legal restrictions on 
the partisans of Donatus, not even to the point of punishing acts of violence against the “Catholic” 
minority or handing over disputed churches seized by force from the party that he himself had declared 
to be theologically and legally legitimate.53 In the end, the winning party in the new Imperial court could 
 
51 See in particular the documents Epistola Constantini Imperatoris ad Episcopos Partis Donati and Epistola Constantini 
Imperatoris Ad Celsum Vicarium Africae, both given in the appendix to Optatus and edited in Von Soden and Von 
Campenhausen 1950 and reprinted in Maier 1987, as well as the other documents given by Maier 1987, 171-198. 
52 As Barnes 1981, 58-60, notes in regard to his own speculative narrative, “the known events [...] cannot (it appears) be 
combined to form a coherent narrative.” 
53 Cf. Drake 2000, 220-221, Lenski 2016, 253-256, Barnes 1981, 60-61, Barnes 2011, 105. 
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lay claim to no better result than that granted by the original episcopal judges—or likely even worse, 
since Constantine’s harsh but ineffective reprisals had only sparked further fervor in the followers of 
Donatus and increased their numbers by playing into their self-image as a “Church of martyrs” while his 
later policy of Imperial forbearance meant that the “Catholics” could not even successfully petition the 
Emperor on such mundane matters as redress of stolen property. While Constantine’s forbearance is 
justified in existing communications in terms of the Christian principle of patientia and reliance on divine 
providence,54 it was also, and almost certainly more decisively, based on the fact that the Christian 
followers of Donatus constituted a significant and intransigent group in provinces with which the 
Emperor, naturally, wished to retain positive contacts, particularly during a period when civil war with 
Constantine’s co-Emperor Licinius was drawing ever closer. The interests of the Emperor qua Emperor 
had introduced into the realm of episcopal judgment a new, and in this case decisive, set of concerns, 
concerns that could easily conflict with pre-existing episcopal commitments to doctrinal and moral 
uniformity. Donatus could not persuade the bishop of Rome or the bishops at Arles to side with him in 
the interests of ecclesiastical purity—but he could sway the Emperor in the interests of his personal and 
institutional commitments to public redress and order. Appeal to the Emperor, then, clearly had its 
advantages, especially for a party otherwise at a disadvantage in episcopal influence or ecclesiastical 
precedent.  
However controverted the theological grounding and even the practical results of this case, for 
the public purposes of Roman law this precedent was more than sufficient to decide the essential issue: 
episcopal decisions could be appealed against to the Emperor. Even this, however, possessed some 
basic advantages for the bishops of the Roman Empire, providing, as it did, for the first time a truly final 
court of appeal for ecclesiastical cases, and one, moreover, standing clearly apart from the networks of 
 
54 See in particular Lenski 2016, 255-256. 
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influence, faction, and status within the episcopate itself. This system might lack, at least for the 
moment, a clearly Christian theological basis; but as we will see, it was in principle just as capable of 
being explained and justified theologically as its alternative. Bishops derived their authority, privileges, 
and immunities from Christ and God—but so did Constantine. The relationship between the two claims 
might be unclear, but they were not obviously contradictory.  
With his accession in 324 to sole rulership of the Empire, Constantine was immediately 
presented with a dramatic new challenge for his barely sketched system of Imperial-episcopal judgment. 
Constantine’s accession to the office of sole Augustus came with significant political challenges, as the 
Latin-speaking, thoroughly Western Emperor was now forced to attempt to integrate the Empire’s most 
populous Eastern provinces into an overall Imperial administration headed, for the first time in more 
than thirty years, by a single man. In the political sphere, this was accomplished through the large-scale 
appointment of loyal Western officials to high office in the East, replacing Licinian officials with 
Constantinian ones, creating entirely new offices to be granted to loyal officials, and incorporating 
further offices into a single, comprehensive cursus honorum based around a single system of Imperial 
patronage and favor.55  
Such methods were, however, at least in this point in Constantine’s career, neither ideologically 
appropriate nor at all practical for the task of integrating another class of office-holders with past ties to 
Licinius: the bishops of the Christian Church in the East. Faced, then, with a large and growing conflict 
between two of the most prominent bishops in his new domains—Eusebius of Nicomedia, bishop of 
Licinius’ former Imperial court in Asia Minor, and Alexander of Alexandria, acknowledged leader of the 
 
55 See in particular Moser 2018, esp. 19-28, where this phenomenon is clearly described and numerous examples are provided. 
While Moser is primarily focused on this move as an indication of Constantine’s positive relationship with the Roman Senate, 
the proactive imposition of these offices and officeholders on the Eastern Empire can also be seen as an extension of the civil 
war itself and as part of a larger effort to unify the Empire on a somewhat autocratic model. 
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Church in the vitally-important province of Egypt—Constantine was able in short order to produce two 
distinctive innovations, both aimed at preventing a repeat of the earlier trouble and embarrassment of 
the Donatist controversy. These innovations were the use of Imperial resources to summon larger 
episcopal assemblies, and the use of targeted Imperial coercion to assure uniformity through the 
deposition and exile of individual episcopal and clerical malefactors.  
In the first place, faced with a controversy encompassing numerous Eastern dioceses, including 
the traditionally privileged ones of Alexandria and Antioch, Constantine bypassed an initial trial entirely 
and summoned a council of unprecedented size, encompassing not only the local provinces of Egypt, 
Palestine, and Asia Minor, but the entirety of the Roman Empire, and including participation from all 
traditionally important dioceses, including Rome. The decisions of such a gathering could well claim 
divine sanction to a new degree—and now, they would be backed up by a more precisely calibrated 
form of Imperial force than the indiscriminate repression dealt to the followers of Donatus. Those 
bishops who refused to go along with the majority at the council were now faced with the threat not 
only of repression or loss of office, but also of exile at the hands of the Emperor and his officials.  
The choice of exile as the appropriate punishment for bishops was no doubt carefully 
considered, and operated according to an unimpeachable logic. Bishops guilty of crimes against divine 
law might well be seen as liable to physical chastisement or even death, but this would almost certainly 
lead to uncomfortable comparisons (as it had among the Christians of North Africa) with the sufferings 
of the martyrs and the executions of bishops carried out under the Tetrarchy. Such extreme measures 
would no longer be necessary, however, now that similar goals could be achieved by other means. By 
their very nature, bishops were officials dependent for their power almost entirely on local and regional 
networks. Displaced to a province far from their city and region and linguistic community, kept under 
careful guard by Imperial officials, episcopal losers would find it all but impossible to retain the power 
bases and influence that might allow them to resist judgments against them. In this way Constantine 
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and his advisors were able to ensure both the unanimity of the assembly and the finality of its decisions. 
Almost as importantly, the Emperor’s public ratification of a council’s decisions, expressed in such 
decrees of exile and in the case of Nicaea also by the Emperor’s personal presence at the deliberations, 
ensured that any appeal to his judgment against that of the council would be rightly seen as both 
useless and superfluous.56 
Based on his actions at the council and afterwards, it is unlikely that in making these decisions 
Constantine was thinking in terms of anything more than the immediate resolution of a controversy 
threatening broader efforts to cement his authority within domains recently acquired through civil 
conflict. Nonetheless, as Emperor, Constantine’s public decisions naturally bore legal and systemic 
consequences that would shape further decisions by both the Emperor himself and the bishops now 
bound to him by ever-closer ties. As with all judicial systems, the meaning and import of particular 
precedents, even those as revolutionary as those established at Nicaea, would prove extremely slippery, 
subject to constant interpretation, reinterpretation, and contestation over the coming decades. Still, for 
all the ambiguity and conflict occasioned by this new system, its basic logic would endure for a very long 
time to come, and must be seen as a primary achievement of the Constantinian settlement. Faced with 
a new degree of unity made possible by the newly certain and unanimous punishment of episcopal 
malefactors, many bishops seem to have viewed the new system with satisfaction, and eagerly taken 
part in its operations.  
 
56 This point would likely have been underscored by a gesture recorded in the 5th century ecclesiastical historians (Socrates, 
1.8.18–19; Sozomen 1.17.4; Theodoret 1.11.4–6) whereby Constantine publicly burned various petitions of grievances against 
bishops that had been presented to him at the Council. The purpose of this gesture, if genuine, was likely twofold: to 
underscore the finality of the settlement to be reached in his presence at Nicaea, and, as Lenski 2016, 266, notes, to “dispense[] 
with the decorum of civic interchange by asserting the supremacy of his autocratic authority.” S. Parvis 2006a, 82-83, asserts a 
possible third motive: to protect Eusebius of Nicomedia, who may have enjoyed the Emperor’s favor at the time, from the 
charges brought against him by the much larger pro-Alexander faction. Similarly, Barnes 1981, 219, points out Constantine’s 
unprecedented decision to add to the traditional synodal letters produced by the bishops with multiple letters of his own 
personally announcing the results of the Council and carried by Imperial officials throughout the Empire, thus “deliberately 
emphasiz[ing] his role as Christian emperor bringing unity and concord to a divided church” and lending to the decisions of the 
council the force of Imperial authority. 
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Even as thus constructed, however, this incipient system bore several obvious weaknesses, 
which would be borne out in obvious ways during the remainder of Constantine’s reign. First, in 
fundamental continuity with earlier episcopal justice systems, ecclesiastical councils proved an 
inherently difficult and unstable process, relying as they did on internal cohesion and unanimity to 
achieve all goals. Not only were bishops, as local officials with local power bases scattered throughout 
the Empire, difficult to assemble in any large numbers, but the outcome of councils, as already 
mentioned, depended entirely both on the makeup of the council and on its actual operations. Conciliar 
decisions, it turned out, were both extremely difficult to predict and subject to certain obvious 
manipulations. Influential bishops could gather councils of likeminded allies to depose enemies and 
proclaim their favored doctrines, while more heterogenous assemblies could simply fail to come to any 
consensus at all. What one council had done, another council could just as easily modify or undo, even if 
some of the bishops at the latter council had also taken part in the former. The ability to summon 
greater and more representative assemblies was a useful one, but not every crisis or accusation could be 
met with an Empire-wide gathering—and there was in principle little to prevent even such an Empire-
wide gathering from being freely contradicted and modified by other, smaller councils. 
Given these factors, the ability of the Emperor to guarantee attendance and so control the 
composition of councils, enforce unanimity within councils through threats of exile, and then enforce 
their decisions with coercive force could hardly fail to take on greater and greater importance. In this, 
however, lay the other great weakness or ambiguity of the system as constructed by Constantine. For if 
the system relied at every point on the decisions made by the Emperor in gathering, controlling, and 
enforcing episcopal decisions, then the Emperor’s attention and negligence, choices and changes of 
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mind in relation to all these things would naturally have profound consequences for the outcome of 
ecclesiastical cases and controversies.57  
In a more peaceful, stable time, perhaps these ambiguities would not have been tested. The 
reign of Constantine was by no means such a time, as developments in the years after Nicaea illustrate 
particularly well. Less than three years after that purportedly divine council had ended in a decisive 
defeat for Eusebius of Nicomedia and his priestly ally Arius, the sentences against them had been 
cancelled by the Emperor himself on his own authority. Meanwhile smaller councils were called that 
deposed and exiled, often on unclear charges, many of the leaders of the episcopal faction that had 
allegedly been vindicated at Nicaea.  
The main instigator of this reversal, I believe, was Constantine himself. As I will argue in the next 
section, the proximate cause of this systemic change seems to have been a personal exchange of letters 
and remarks between Constantine and the leader of the defeated theological party, Arius, in which Arius 
was able to convince Constantine to grant his appeal, reopen his case, and clear him of all charges. 
While for Constantine himself, the essential theological ambiguity of the new judicial system seems to 
have been resolved in favor of his own right to act as supreme appellate court for clerical cases, this 
right was by no means so clear for the episcopate at large. Several letters are extant from Constantine 
to, successively, the bishop of Alexandria Alexander and his successor Athanasius, demanding, on the 
basis of his own judgment, the reception of their errant priest back into the fold. The first surviving 
letter, from Constantine to Alexander, makes it very clear that the bishop of Alexandria had responded 
to Constantine’s unilateral action with the ruffled feathers to be expected from one of the most 
 
57 As Drake 2000, 53, notes in regard to the extra-legal structure of the earlier Principate, “any system that depends on the 
whim of a single man is inherently unstable, no less so if his whim is to play by the rules than if it is not.” This would be 
particularly true in a system such as the new collaborative episcopal-Imperial judicial procedure where the rules were 
themselves unclear to most or all participants and developing through active conflicts in real time—leaving even more to be 
determined through individual decisions of the Imperial will.  
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traditionally prominent bishops of the Christian Church on finding his own judgment summarily 
overruled: “Does your [i.e. Alexander’s] all-accursed envy even now bark back with unholy sophistries 
aimed at delay? What then is to happen at present? Are we in fact ‘decreeing things contrary to those 
things decided by the Holy Spirit through’ you, most honored brother?” (Gelasius, Historia Ecclesiastica 
3.15.1).58 Constantine’s response to Alexander’s objection, grounded in a direct appeal to God’s granting 
of authority in the Church to bishops, relies not only on the fact that Arius has declared that he now 
accepts the Creed of Nicaea, but also, and much more decisively, on the fact that “I spoke with these 
men, in the presence of very many, about the Word of Life; I myself am the man who has offered my 
own mind with pure faith to God; I am your fellow-servant,59 who has taken upon myself all care about 
<...> unanimity” (3.15.3).60 This is as straightforward a claim to religious authority as could possibly be 
made. In Constantine’s presentation, his authority is at least as great as that vested in the hallowed 
bishop of Alexandria, and entitles him to make, not merely requests, but actual commands to him: “I 
have sent this letter, then, not only to call these things to your mind, but to require that you receive 
these men who are suppliants” (3.15.4).61 The only hope offered to the leader of the faction that, only a 
few years before, had decisively triumphed within the largest episcopal council ever held is that this 
requirement is not, for the moment at least, enforced with any of the more direct powers at 
 
58 Καὶ νῦν ἄρα ὁ παμμίαρος φθόνος ἀνοσίοις ὑπερθέσεως σοφίσμασιν ἀνθυλακτήσει· τί οὖν πρὸς τὸ παρόν; ἕτερα παρὰ τὰ 
ὑπὸ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος δι’ ὑμῶν κεκριμένα δογματίζομεν, ἀδελφὲ τιμιώτατε; 
59 Lenski 2016, 76-78, correctly highlights the importance of this title of συνθεράπων, employed here and elsewhere in 
communications with bishops, for Constantine’s own self-understanding of his role in relationship to the Church and bishops—
one where “on some level, he considered himself to be a bishop” (76), albeit one with certain highly Imperial privileges denied 
to the bishops as a class.  
60 διελέχθην οὖν αὐτοῖς παρόντων πλειόνων περὶ τοῦ λόγου τῆς ζωῆς. ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐκεῖνος, ὃς τὸν νοῦν τὸν ἐμαυτοῦ 
μετὰ πίστεως εἰλικρινοῦς ἀνέθηκα τῷ θεῷ· ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ ὑμέτερος συνθεράπων, ὃς πᾶσαν τὴν περὶ τῆς ἡ ... καὶ ὁμονοίας 
ἐπανῄρημαι φροντίδα. 
61 ἀπέστειλα τοιγαροῦν οὐ μόνον ἀναμιμνήσκων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀξιῶν ὑποδέξασθαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἱκετεύοντας. 
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Constantine’s command. Not even the bishop of Alexandria, commander of a vast network of bishops 
within Egypt, could refuse such a request without fear.    
As it turned out, however, Alexander’s envy was no more mollified by this appeal than by any 
previous ones—nor was Athanasius, Alexander’s eventual successor and a key advisor in the conflicts 
with Arius going back to before the Council of Nicaea. By the time of Athanasius’ accession, 
Constantine’s patience had clearly reached its limits, and so, in a fragment of a communication later 
quoted by Athanasius himself and placed by him at the very beginning of his episcopal reign, he makes 
claim, not to any alleged religious authority, but simply and solely to the force available to him as 
Emperor:62 “Since you have knowledge of my will (βούλησις), provide unimpeded entry for all those 
wishing to enter the Church. If I come to know that any of them has claimed to have been impeded or 
obstructed from entrance into the Church, I will immediately send someone to depose you at my 
command and remove you from your position” (Athanasius, Apologia contra Arianos 59.6).63 The judicial 
authority of the Emperor, it seems, no longer requires any episcopal aid in judging and deposing bishops 
for whatever reason—at least in the language of threats.  
In practice, however, clerical cases continued to be carried out via episcopal councils, albeit with 
far more direct Imperial involvement and with the pervasive presence of the Imperial will as facilitator 
and final court of appeals. Even for a Constantine willing to clearly and publicly assert his own religious 
authority and right to overrule episcopal judgments, episcopal councils possessed natural, practical 
utility for implementing commands in the tumultuous, highly resistant world of the episcopate at large. 
 
62 Even this appeal to force, however, was buttressed by a subtle piece of political negotiation. As Lenski 2016, 273, notes, 
Athanasius’ election had been challenged by the Melitians and other rivals within and outside of Alexandria, but endorsed by 
Constantine himself. His demand thus reflected a form of “quid pro quo politics” (Lenski 2016, 273) whereby the weak new 
bishop of Alexandria was expected to exchange reconciliation with Arius for Imperial support for his locally unstable position. 
63 Ἔχων τοίνυν τῆς ἐμῆς βουλήσεως τὸ γνώρισμα ἅπασι τοῖς βουλομένοις εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν εἰσελθεῖν ἀκώλυτον παράσχου τὴν 
εἴσοδον. ἐὰν γὰρ γνῶ ὡς κεκώλυκάς τινας αὐτῶν τῆς ἐκκλησίας μεταποιουμένους ἢ ἀπεῖρξας τῆς εἰσόδου, ἀποστελῶ 
παραχρῆμα τὸν καὶ καθαιρήσοντά σε ἐξ ἐμῆς κελεύσεως καὶ τῶν τόπων μεταστήσοντα ... 
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However firm Constantine’s belief in his own uniquely favored status, the acceptance of such a belief by 
bodies of bishops required both sophisticated justification in theological terms and practical 
enforcement within the complex networks of episcopal alliances and rivalries that made up the Church 
at large. This was not something that could be managed by force of arms alone: it required, clearly, the 
aid of prominent bishops adept both at theology and ecclesiastical management. It is, I believe, in this 
light first and foremost, as the answer to an eminently practical question of episcopal management, that 
Constantine’s increasing association after 327 with the bishops Eusebius of Caesarea and Eusebius of 
Nicomedia should be seen.  
In the end, it would take at least two consecutive episcopal councils, part of a larger 
investigative process with which the Emperor himself seems to have been intimately involved,64 and 
finally a direct trial before the Emperor before the recalcitrant Athanasius was deposed and exiled in 
336, nearly ten years after Constantine’s initial threats to Alexander.65 Efforts to have Arius accepted by 
 
64 See for instance the three letters also preserved in Athanasius’ Apologia contra Arianos 61-62, 68, and 70, in which 
Constantine at various points offers his personal support to both Athanasius himself and one of his accusers who had publicly 
recanted. See Lenski 2016, 273-276 (cf. Barnes 1981, 231-235), for a plausible reconstruction of the process involving first a trial 
in Constantinople in 331/332 at which Athanasius was vindicated, followed by a proposed council in Caesarea led by Eusebius 
of Nicomedia to be held in 334 that was stymied by Athanasius’ (understandable, given the location of the council and its 
presiding bishop) refusal to attend.  
65 Athanasius would later claim in Apologia contra Arianos 87-88 that Constantine had not formally deposed and exiled him, but 
rather put him in some form of “protective custody” in Gaul to protect him from the Eusebians, with every intention of 
eventually restoring him to his see. Athanasius bases this claim on a quoted letter (87) from Constantine II (discussed below in 
section 3.4) ordering Athanasius’ return from exile following the death of his father on the purported grounds that the elder 
Constantine had always intended to restore him to Alexandria but had been unable to do so due to his untimely death. 
Constantine II’s fictionalized attempts to justify the en masse return of those episcopal exiles banished by his father while 
maintaining legal continuity aside—a fiction that would shortly be directly contradicted by Constantius, while even in Apologia 
contra Arianos Athanasius acknowledges that Constantine had banished him after growing angry and refusing him a hearing—
there is no reason to accept this polemical thesis as at all historically valid, not even to the point of asserting (as e.g. Barnes 
1981, 240, and other scholars following him have done) that Constantine refrained from formally deposing Athanasius and so 
he technically remained in possession of his see. While Constantine seems to have been knowledgeable enough about 
Athanasius’ local power base to not immediately replace him with another bishop, his intention in forcibly removing one of the 
most powerful bishops in the Empire from his see and relocating him far from his supporters in the West could not have been 
clearer, and was reinforced by letters written to both the Church of Alexandria and the ascetic Anthony, referred to in 
Sozomen, Historia Ecclesiastica 2.31, in which Constantine refused to restore Athanasius to his see and attacked him in harsh 
terms as a condemned man and cause of discord and sedition. In an episcopal judicial system that had come to depend on the 




the other bishops of the Roman Empire similarly seem to have taken a great deal of time and numerous 
councils to have widespread effects. While Constantine had publicly proclaimed Arius’ orthodoxy as 
early as 327, it would not be until 335 and the Council of Jerusalem that he was able to gather—with the 
clear help of Arius’ former allies Eusebius of Caesarea and Eusebius of Nicomedia—a significant number 
of bishops willing to publicly associate with the disgraced priest and share communion with him.  
Around the same time as the restoration of Arius and his allies to prominence,66 Eustathius of 
Antioch, one of the leaders of the anti-Arian faction both before and at Nicaea, was deposed from his 
see, traditionally, along with Alexandria, the most prominent and influential in the East,67 under 
extremely unclear circumstances and on a charge that is, to say the least, difficult to determine with 
certainty.68 Sara Parvis has suggested, plausibly given the evidence, that Constantine himself was 
 
66 See note 158 in section 1.4 below. 
67 According to the 5th century Antiochene historian Theodoret, who is naturally interested in the career of the great 
Antiochene bishop and quotes numerous documents by him, this may have included a significant degree of favor with 
Constantine, as in his account of the Council of Nicaea in Historia Ecclesiastica 1.7 Eustathius is the first bishop to speak, 
preceding Constantine’s first address to the council with a panegyric in honor of the Emperor (1.7.10). This is partially 
corroborated by Eusebius’ earlier eyewitness account in Vita Constantini 3.11, where a panegyric address by “the one of the 
bishops who was presiding over the ranks (τάγμα) on the right” is mentioned prior to Constantine’s first speech, but the bishop 
in question’s name is not given—thus also, given Eusebius’ practice in Vita Constantini of straightforwardly highlighting his 
career as panegyricist wherever possible, contradicting the anachronistic account in Sozomen, Historia Ecclesiastica 2.19, which 
has Eusebius himself delivering the address. As Johnson 2014, 21, notes, such a prominent address by Eusebius would have 
been particularly strange given that Eustathius himself had, at the recent Council of Antioch, provisionally suspended Eusebius 
from his office, while Eustathius’ name stands second after Hosius of Cordoba’s on the existing list of signatories at Nicaea. 
According to Barnes 1981, 215, 380 n. 61, manuscript chapter headings give the name of the bishop in question as Eusebius of 
Nicomedia, which seems equally unlikely given the circumstances but may reflect some form of personal favor from 
Constantine. Given that Eustathius was the bishop of Antioch and hence the primate of the region in which the council took 
place, given that he had been recently appointed to his position with the active collusion of Constantine’s envoy Hosius of 
Cordoba (see e.g. Chadwick 1958), and given Eusebius’ and Eustathius’ constant and bitter rivalry, Eustathius seems to me the 
most likely candidate by far for this bishop granted one of the places of highest precedence within the ordered seating 
arrangement of the council, well enough known to the Emperor and/or Hosius to be granted the honor of greeting Constantine, 
and embarrassing enough to Eusebius to have his name suppressed. If this hypothesis is correct, it would make both Eustathius’ 
sudden fall from grace and his rival Eusebius’ later career as favored episcopal panegyricist even more of a dramatic reversal. 
This would also support the thesis of S. Parvis 2006a that Eustathius’ fall may have been a significant cause of Constantine’s 
seemingly “inexplicable volte-face [...] only two years or so after Nicaea” (107) from supporting the Alexandrian faction to 
supporting their rivals (but see my own discussion of Constantine’s motivations in section 1.4 below). 
68 The two non-exclusive options, both of which appear in ancient sources, are a doctrinal charge of Sabellianism (e.g. Socrates, 
Historia Ecclesiastica 1.33) and some form of personal misconduct, either sexual in nature (Theodoret, Historia Ecclesiastica, 
1.21, ascribes Eustathius’ deposition to Eusebius of Caesarea and his allies presenting the Council of Antioch with a woman 
willing to swear under oath that Eustathius had fathered her child) or, somewhat more mundanely, that of insulting the 
Emperor’s mother Helena (Athanasius, Historia Arianorum 4). In my judgment, the general aporia of the ecclesiastical historian 
Socrates Scholasticus, Historia Ecclesiastica 1.33, is difficult to avoid. Though the documents available to Socrates, which do not 
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intimately involved in this deposition, which may in fact have been carried out, as the Emperor had 
threatened with Athanasius, without the usual public trial before an episcopal council.69 Her 
accompanying suggestion that theological considerations played no role in Constantine’s intervention 
does not, however, necessarily follow from this.70 While it seems likely that Eustathius was charged with 
some form of personal misconduct, his deposition was preceded by a lengthy theological pamphlet war 
with the prominent ally of Arius Eusebius of Caesarea, in which Eustathius had been accused, not of 
personal misconduct, but rather of eminently theological crimes. While it is unlikely at this stage that 
Eusebius of Caesarea possessed any significant amount of influence with the Emperor, it is probable that 
the forthrightness of Eusebius’ theological attack on the prominent bishop of Antioch was emboldened 
by the fact that, as I will argue in the next section, not only Arius himself, but also his theology had 
already been publicly rehabilitated by the Emperor. Given Constantine’s established interest in the 
theological issues under debate between Arius’ supporters and opponents, it is not improbable that 
Constantine himself might have perused these pamphlets and been influenced by their content. 
Surviving letters from Constantine at this time, one to the diocese of Antioch itself, another to a council 
called there after Eustathius’ deposition to lay the groundwork for a purge of his followers in 
surrounding regions and appoint a bishop to take his place, support these suppositions.  
 
seem to include the actual deposition itself but do include a letter from Eusebius’ ally George of Laodicea, indicate a charge of 
Sabellianism, the historian himself expresses doubts about this possibility, and even more doubts about a charge of sexual 
misconduct, which he finds incredible but whose circulation he ascribes to the general practice of imputing personal 
misconduct to bishops deposed for other reasons. S. Parvis 2006a, 101-107, has recently argued, compellingly albeit on the 
basis of relatively little clear evidence, that the confusion in our sources should be taken as a sign that the deposition itself was 
carried out quickly and in relative secrecy, with Eusebius and his allies successfully able to convince Constantine, known to be 
wary of publicly revealing bishops’ scandalous conduct, to remove Eustathius on a charge of adultery without the usual public 
trial. 
69 S. Parvis 2006a, 101-107. 
70 Parvis’ dating and characterization of events in 327/328 is based on the supposition that it was evidence of Eustathius’ 
personal misconduct that led Constantine, based on personal shock and revulsion, to turn against the Alexandrian faction and 
begin to support instead bishops associated with Arius. Yet by this time Constantine had likely already engaged in theological 
discussion with Arius and rehabilitated him, so that the rehabilitation of his foremost allies is itself perfectly plausible (as 
Eusebius and Theognis’ petition itself argues). 
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In his first letter, addressed to the people of Antioch, Constantine congratulates them in the 
very strongest of terms on the recent wisdom shown in their belated acceptance of the fait accompli of 
his deposition and exile of their bishop: “That the unanimity among you is gratifying to the unity and 
wisdom of the cosmos, and that you love me with a deathless friendship, I myself, brothers, have 
recognized, since I was called forth by your law and by your manner of life and by your efforts” 
(Eusebius, Vita Constantini 3.60.1).71 Yet for Constantine no more than for any other Christian of this 
century is unity a straightforward concept free of theological bases and bias. Given the fact that 
Eustathius’ deposition, and the refusal of a significant body of the clergy and people of Antioch to accept 
it, would ultimately lead to a schism lasting nearly seventy years, these exaggerated praises of harmony 
and concord may appear rather tone-deaf. Yet for Constantine, as much as for any other Christian 
thinker of the 4th century, concord and harmony are both grounded in and de-limited by theological 
truth: “I would not wonder, therefore, if I should say that the truth is more the cause of salvation than of 
hatred” (3.60.2).72 To say this is not, of course, to say that the truth is not also the cause of hatred—only 
that, whatever hatred or enmity or division results from it, salvation and unanimity can only be 
established, finally, on the basis of truth. With this claim practically every bishop of the 4th century 
would have concurred. 
Constantine was personally involved not only in the deposition of Eustathius, but also in the 
choice of his replacement. In both this letter and an accompanying one sent to a council assembled at 
Antioch (Vita Constantini 3.62) for the purpose of purging Eustathius’ remaining supporters and 
appointing a replacement, Constantine rejects their initial choice of Eusebius of Caesarea, since such a 
choice would violate the canon of the Council of Nicaea forbidding episcopal translation. Nonetheless, 
 
71 Ὡς κεχαρισμένη γε τῇ τοῦ κόσμου συνέσει τε καὶ σοφίᾳ ἡ παρ’ ὑμῶν ὁμόνοια, καὶ ἔγωγε ὑμᾶς, ἀδελφοί, ἀθάνατον φιλίαν 
φιλεῖν ἔγνωκα, προκληθεὶς τῷ τε νόμῳ καὶ τῷ βίῳ καὶ ταῖς σπουδαῖς ταῖς ὑμετέραις. 
72 οὐκοῦν θαυμάσαιμι ἄν, εἰ τὴν ἀλήθειαν σωτηρίας μᾶλλον ὑμῖν ἢ μίσους αἰτίαν φήσαιμι. 
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even in rejecting his claim to one of the most important dioceses in the Christian East, Constantine 
praises highly Eusebius’ theological knowledge and participation in the conciliar processes around 
Eustathius’ deposition. As he acknowledges in a letter sent to Eusebius himself (3. 61), the council had 
consulted him on the decision (3.61.3), as the result of which he had written to them “at the instigation 
of the Divinity” (προτροπῇ τοῦ θείου, 3.61.3) to directly overrule their selection. In his letter to the 
council, Constantine goes so far as to propose candidates that would be acceptable to him (3.62.2), 
while conceding that he would be willing to accept other candidates provided that their selection is “in 
accord with the tradition of the Apostles” (3.62.3).73 As Noel Lenski has recently noted, in this document 
Constantine makes pervasive use of the terminology and legal structure of Imperial civil cases and 
appeals and applies them, without modification, to the ecclesiastical task of choosing a new bishop for 
Antioch, a task overseen in this instance not only by a council of bishops but also by Imperial officials.74 
This wholesale adoption of the terminology and structure of Roman civil law in the appointment of a 
bishop represents an enormous innovation when compared to the conformity to ecclesiastical norms 
present ten years before in the trial before Miltiades, and a significant step beyond the complex 
dynamic of Imperial-episcopal collaboration present at the Council of Nicaea only a few years before. 
Ecclesiastical cases can now be treated straightforwardly as a subset of Imperial civil law, directly subject 
to the Emperor’s legal authority and overseen by Imperial officials, while bishops themselves can be 
treated as officials appointed in consultation with the Emperor and under his ultimate authority. The 
cause of this transformation, as I will argue, is not merely legal—a “secularization” of the episcopal 
office under the interests of a “secular” Emperor—but theological. In these letters, Constantine’s 
intervention into the process of episcopal selection is based straightforwardly on the claim that the 
 
73 τῇ τῶν ἀποστόλων παραδόσει σύμφωνα 
74 Lenski 2016, 267-272. As Lenski notes, this move at once “subordinated ecclesiastical governance to the legal superstructure 
of the empire” in a clear and unambiguous manner by “adopting the forms and structures of the civil law system to deal with an 
ecclesiastical matter,” and “co-opted the power of the state to add strength and legitimacy to the actions of the bishops” (271).  
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same God traditionally believed to be present and active in the direct election of bishops by local 
populations now works, in a specially privileged way, through Constantine himself. As a political ruler, 
the intervention of the Emperor might be curtailed by other political and spiritual powers—but not even 
bishops believed themselves competent to curtail the interventions of God. 
These dynamics, present in the process against the bishop of the traditionally powerful Church 
of Antioch, would be even more clearly present in the process against his foremost ally in the anti-Arius 
faction. The Council of Tyre, summoned by Constantine in 335, had among its tasks the disciplining of 
the powerful bishop of Alexandria Athanasius, and was presided over by Eusebius of Caesarea and 
Eusebius of Nicomedia, longstanding allies of Arius dating back to well before Nicaea and hence 
longstanding rivals of Athanasius and his predecessor Alexander. As if to make the outcome even more 
obvious, the council seems to have deliberately excluded bishops from Egypt, Athanasius’ own province, 
in favor of those from regions friendly to his rivals.75 The Council of Antioch had earlier mandated that 
bishops be judged by their own ecclesiastical province;76 and the bishop of Rome Julius would later claim 
the exclusive right to judge the bishop of Alexandria.77 In the present instance it is clear, however, that, 
regardless of the ecclesiastical precedents involved, the power of the synod to pass judgment on the 
ecclesiastical leader of Egypt derived from the Emperor himself, the only authority in the Empire capable 
of guaranteeing the deposition and exile of such a regionally powerful cleric.  
 
75 My reasoning here should be read in tandem with the further evidence presented by Sara Parvis in S. Parvis 2006a, 123-127, 
S. Parvis 2006b, 97-99, for the heavily politicized operations of this council, which as we will see relied on threats from 
Constantine to ensure attendance by the few “unpopular” bishops such as Athanasius and Marcellus of Ancyra, consisted 
almost solely of bishops known to be allies of Eusebius of Nicomedia or from areas that had been sympathetic to him prior to 
Nicaea, and, most importantly, lacked any but the most token representation from Athanasius’ own province of Egypt or the 
other provinces sympathetic to him that had possessed significant representation at Nicaea. As Parvis concludes, “Eusebius of 
Caesarea attempts to present Tyre/Jerusalem as a second Nicaea, but its members were a great deal more carefully selected—
and it was Eusebius of Caesarea’s friends who drew up the guest-list” (S. Parvis 2006b, 99). 
76 See the canons of the Council of Antioch 328 which are reproduced in Joannou 1962-1965 v.2, 104-126. 
77 See the letter of Julius to the Dedication Council of Antioch preserved given in Athanasius, Apologia contra Arianos 21-35 and 
as Letter 2 in the recent edition of Thompson 2015, esp. 35.3-5/22.  
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In writing to the leaders of the proposed council—including most notably Eusebius of Nicomedia 
and Eusebius of Caesarea—Constantine could hardly have been clearer in his approbation of their 
intentions:  
Since some people, driven by the goad of unhealthy rivalry (for I would not say that they are 
living unworthy of themselves), have taken it on themselves to mix everything up, a thing which 
seems to me to have surpassed every disturbance, because of this I urge you forward, although 
you are already running for this very purpose, to run together without any delay for this same 
purpose, to fill up the council, to aid those who are longing for help, to heal your brothers who 
are in danger, to lead the divided parts of the body into harmony, to set straight those who are 
out of step with the rest, until the proper time comes for you to produce for such great regions 
a fitting harmony, a harmony which the pride of worthless men (alas for this discord!) has 
destroyed (Eus. Vita Constantini 4.42.1-2).78 
Though Constantine does not here indicate the “worthless men” the council has been called to 
punish, it can hardly be imagined he was unaware that the primary purpose of the council was the 
judgment of Athanasius of Alexandria—whose guilt and moral worthlessness is here declared well in 
advance of the trial. Indeed, in this letter Constantine shows himself well aware both of the goals of the 
leaders of the council and of the means necessary to efficiently achieve them. The problem is 
disharmony among the bishops, caused by worthless men. The goal is the restoration of complete 
uniformity through the correction and punishment of the miscreants brought to trial at Tyre and the 
enforcement of unity on the body of bishops as a whole. The means is the forcible assembling of 
precisely those bishops, and only those bishops, whose presence will produce, under appropriate 
Imperial supervision, the proper result:  
I have done everything which you pointed out to me in writing. I have sent letters to those 
particular bishops whom you wanted, so that by making themselves present they may share 
with you in the deliberations; I have sent Dionysius, a man of consular rank, to remind them that 
they are obligated to attend the synod along with you, and to be present as my chosen 
 
78 ἐπεὶ δ’ οὐχ ὑγιοῦς φιλονεικίας οἴστρῳ τινὲς ἐλαυνόμενοι (οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἴποιμι βιοῦντες ἑαυτῶν ἀξίως), τὰ πάντα συγχέειν 
ἐπιχειροῦσιν, ὅπερ πάσης συμφορᾶς ἐπέκεινα κεχωρηκέναι μοι δοκεῖ, τούτου χάριν θέοντας ὑμᾶς, τὸ τοῦ λόγου, προτρέπομαι 
χωρίς τινος ὑπερθέσεως εἰς ταὐτὸ συνδραμεῖν, πληρῶσαι τὴν σύνοδον, ἐπαμῦναι τοῖς χρῄζουσιν ἐπικουρίας, τοὺς ἀδελφοὺς 
ἰάσασθαι κινδυνεύοντας, εἰς ὁμόνοιαν ἐπαναγαγεῖν τὰ διεστῶτα τῶν μελῶν, διορθώσασθαι τὰ πλημμελούμενα, ἕως καιρὸς 




inspector (κατάσκοπος)79 of the good order (εὐταξία) of what is done. For if someone (which I 
do not expect), even now tries to evade our order and is unwilling to be present, someone will 
be sent by us from here who will cast him out by Imperial command and will teach him that it is 
not right to resist the decrees of the Sovereign set down for the sake of the truth (Vita 
Constantini 4.42.3-4).80 
A dramatic shift has taken place, if not in the overall shape of the system established by the 
Emperor in tandem with the bishops, then at least in its execution. A Constantine now much more 
experienced in the workings of synods operates in tandem with small groups of favored episcopal allies, 
who select, based on their own expert knowledge of episcopal networks, precisely those bishops to be 
invited, including both the accused and those who can most efficiently bring about their conviction. Both 
the summoning of the council and its actual proceedings are overseen, not only by these favored 
bishops, but also by an Imperial official with the authority to see to the council’s proper operations. 
Perhaps most strikingly of all, the Imperial punishment of deposition and exile is now reserved not just 
for those bishops found guilty by their peers, but for any bishop whatsoever guilty of failing to obey the 
Emperor and attend a summons to a council issued on his authority. This latter innovation, it should be 
 
79 That Constantine chooses a term for his observer so similar to (and essentially synonymous in basic meaning with) ἐπίσκοπος 
(“bishop”) can hardly be a coincidence. This episcopal assembly is to be closely watched by a singular “katascopic” inspector 
with full authority to direct the bishops into the desired arrangement (τάξις). Dionysius’ presence and intervention in the 
council’s operations would later be made a key objection by a council of eighty bishops summoned by Athanasius in Alexandria 
in 338, which asserted that Dionysius had not only presided over the council, but “he spoke and those present were silent, or 
rather obeyed the comes [...] he gave orders, we were dragged in by soldiers, or rather, when Eusebius and his party gave the 
orders, he meekly put their decisions into effect” (Apologia contra Arianos 8.3). While this account may be exaggerated for 
polemical effect, the complaint of Timothy Barnes, in his overtly hostile treatment of Athanasius’ defense, that such claims of 
Imperial coercion represent a “total travesty of the facts” (Barnes 1993, 38)—“facts” which he derives somewhat inconsistently 
from the same letter’s account of the council—is overstated, since this letter of Constantine makes clear both that Dionysius 
was intended to exercise broad and (in light of the threat of deposition) directly coercive powers in guiding the council to a 
largely predetermined conclusion, and that he was expected to coordinate closely with Eusebius of Nicomedia, Eusebius of 
Caesarea, and their favored allies in doing so. While Dionysius was later brought to write a letter to the council denouncing 
them for failing to follow his instructions (quoted in Apologia contra Arianos 59), it is likely that the letter in question was 
simply an attempt at public documentary self-exculpation after Constantine’s displeasure with the proceedings at Tyre became 
known. 
80 πάντα μοι πέπρακται ὅσα γράφοντες ἐδηλώσατε. ἐπέστειλα πρὸς οὓς ἐβουλήθητε τῶν ἐπισκόπων, ἵνα παραγενόμενοι 
κοινωνήσωσιν ὑμῖν τῶν φροντισμάτων, ἀπέστειλα Διονύσιον τὸν ἀπὸ ὑπατικῶν, ὃς καὶ τοὺς ὀφείλοντας εἰς τὴν σύνοδον 
ἀφικέσθαι μεθ’ ὑμῶν ὑπομνήσει, καὶ τῶν πραττομένων ἐξαιρέτως δὲ τῆς εὐταξίας κατάσκοπος παρέσται. ἐὰν γάρ τις, ὡς ἐγὼ 
οὐκ οἴομαι, τὴν ἡμετέραν κέλευσιν καὶ νῦν διακρούσασθαι πειρώμενος μὴ βουληθῇ παραγενέσθαι, ἐντεῦθεν παρ’ ἡμῶν 
ἀποσταλήσεται, ὃς ἐκ βασιλικοῦ προστάγματος αὐτὸν ἐκβαλὼν ὡς οὐ προσῆκεν ὅροις αὐτοκράτορος ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀληθείας 
ἐξενεχθεῖσιν ἀντιτείνειν διδάξει. 
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emphasized, is to a degree logical given the necessity for any judicial system of ensuring attendance by 
the accused and other necessary parties; yet the harshness and finality of the punishment of deposition, 
and its extension to any bishop guilty of noncompliance, is by any measure extremely notable. Taken 
together with the other innovations present here, the procedures laid out in this letter represent a 
substantial shift in the overall tenor of episcopal judgment. The prospects for evasion and counterattack 
presented by local and regional power bases and networks of influence within the episcopate have been 
carefully curtailed, in favor of a clearer, more direct, and inescapably Imperial mandate. The bishops 
might still technically judge their own—but only at the command of the Emperor and under his 
observation and control. A bishop summoned to account by such a council could well be forgiven for 
approaching with trepidation.  
Still, even under such a modified system, one great means of escape remained for the accused: 
appeal to the Emperor. Unable to have his Egyptian supporters admitted to the council, faced with a set 
of proceedings overseen by personal rivals and designed to end in his deposition and exile, Athanasius 
made one last, desperate move, fleeing to Constantinople to appeal, in person, to the Emperor himself. 
The resulting scene, with Athanasius surprising the Emperor by personally accosting him without 
warning in the middle of the road outside of Constantinople, was vividly described by Constantine in a 
letter sent to the now-superseded bishops of the Council of Tyre (preserved in Apologia contra Arianos 
86). 
Given Athanasius’ flair for the dramatic, 81 it would be easy to overemphasize the actual 
disturbance occasioned by this unexpected appeal in the overall context of the 330s. Like many before 
him, including his rival Arius, Athanasius had simply appealed from the judges appointed by the Emperor 
 
81 As Drake 2000, 6, notes, it is clear even from Constantine’s description that this performance was to some extent arranged in 
advance in coordination with political allies of Athanasius within the Imperial court. In a judicial system where all depended 
ultimately on the individual will of the Emperor, such manipulation of psychological conditions could pay dividends. 
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to the Emperor himself; and his appeal, like Arius’, was granted. That Athanasius had managed to 
escape from a council arranged and overseen by an Imperial official, present himself directly to the 
Emperor, and successfully wear down his resistance until an appeal was granted are certainly testimony 
to his unusual influence and persistence—but they were not, in fact, sufficient to save him. Athanasius’ 
appeal ended relatively quickly in a straightforward victory for the leaders of the Council of Tyre, 
Eusebius of Nicomedia and Eusebius of Caesarea among them, who were quickly able to persuade the 
Emperor, in closed-door sessions, to ratify their sentence and depose their opponent for good, exiling 
him to Gaul well beyond the range of his networks of support within Egypt and the Christian East.82 For 
our present purposes, the facts of the appeal and its outcome are less notable than the justifications 
offered by Constantine himself, not just for the granting of Athanasius’ appeal, but for the 
accompanying direct intervention into and overruling of an episcopal council:  
But while he said again and again that it was right for him to be heard, and I again and again 
refused and almost ordered that he ought to be dragged away, with even greater boldness of 
speech he claimed from us rightly nothing other than your arrival, so that with you all present 
he might be able to bitterly lament the things he had suffered under compulsion. Since this 
appeared to me to be reasonable and fitting for the times, I have gladly ordered these things to 
be written to you, so that everyone who has filled up the council that took place in Tyre might 
hurry to the army camp of my Gentleness in order to clearly demonstrate by your works the 
purity and undistorted quality of your judgment in my presence—since you would certainly not 
deny that I am a true servant of God (Athanasius, Apologia contra Arianos 86.8-10).83 
In the years since the Donatist controversy, Constantine has overcome any lingering discomfort 
over the idea of appeals from an episcopal judgment to himself as a superior authority.84 In relation to 
 
82 As Drake 2000, 313-314, suggests, part of the success of Athanasius’ accusers seems to be due to the fact that they had to 
some degree anticipated his move, arriving in Constantinople only eight days after Athanasius himself to conduct their case in 
person and cut short any attempts to gain influence.  
83 ὡς δὲ ἐκεῖνος μὲν ἀκουσθῆναι ἠξίου, ἐγὼ δὲ παρῃτούμην καὶ μικροῦ δεῖν ἀπελαύνεσθαι αὐτὸν ἐκέλευον, μετὰ πλείονος 
παρρησίας οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἑαυτῷ παρ’ ἡμῶν ἢ τὴν ὑμετέραν ἄφιξιν ἠξίωσεν ὑπάρξαι, ἵνα ὑμῶν παρόντων ἃ πέπονθεν 
ἀναγκαίως ἀποδύρασθαι δυνηθῇ. ὅπερ ἐπειδὴ εὔλογον εἶναί μοι καὶ τοῖς καιροῖς πρέπον κατεφαίνετο, ἀσμένως ταῦτα 
γραφῆναι πρὸς ὑμᾶς προσέταξα, ἵνα πάντες, ὅσοι τὴν σύνοδον τὴν ἐν Τύρῳ γενομένην ἀνεπληρώσατε, ἀνυπερθέτως εἰς τὸ 
στρατόπεδον τῆς ἐμῆς ἡμερότητος ἐπειχθῆτε τοῖς ἔργοις αὐτοῖς ἐπιδείξοντες τὸ τῆς ὑμετέρας κρίσεως καθαρόν τε καὶ 
ἀδιάστροφον ἐπ’ ἐμοῦ δηλαδή, ὃν τοῦ θεοῦ εἶναι γνήσιον θεράποντα οὐδ’ ἂν ὑμεῖς ἀρνηθείητε. 
84 Cf. Drake 2000, 312: “It also, incidentally, indicates that Constantine had none of the doubts raised by modern scholars about 
his right or ability to judge the proceedings of a church council.” Yet the stridency of the assertions and arguments in favor of 
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the episcopal justice system set up by him, he is now, publicly and manifestly, the supreme authority, 
with full power not only to arrange trials and appoint judges for particular cases, but also to oversee 
those judge’s actions, review their decisions, and if necessary overturn them. This change is no doubt 
due in part to a far greater degree of familiarity with the complex and frequently sordid operations of 
episcopal councils—but in this letter, at least, it is justified not in procedural, but in directly theological 
terms. Constantine has the right to judge and overrule the divinely-sanctioned judgments of bishops 
because he has been granted by God the authority to do so. He is the “Servant of God,” a title with 
Mosaic, Apostolic, and Christological resonances,85 and used here to express the direct grant of 
authority made to him by God for just such purposes. Indeed, most of the length of this letter is taken 
up, not with discussion of the details of Athanasius’ case, but rather with an extended justification of 
this God-given authority, which cannot fail to render a just judgment inevitable: 
Indeed through my service of God everything everywhere has been made peaceful, while even 
the barbarians, who until now were ignorant of the truth, truly bless the name of God: it is clear 
that whoever is ignorant of this truth also does not recognize God. Besides this, nevertheless, as 
I said before, even the barbarians now recognize God and have learned to praise him because of 
me, the true Servant of God, since they perceive from the facts themselves that he shields me 
and provides for me everywhere. They, then, know God, whom they praise because of their fear 
of us, but we, who are reputed to set forward (for I will not say ‘to guard’) the Holy Mysteries of 
his beneficence, we, I say, do nothing other than what pertains to division and hatred, and (to 
speak plainly) what relates to the destruction of the human race (86.10-12).86 
 
this authority in the letter, like the extraordinary efforts and threats in summoning the council, is a clear sign that Constantine 
was aware that this right and ability was not beyond question or challenge by individual bishops or the bishops as a group. 
85 The general title of servant/slave of God is used frequently in the LXX in contexts read by early Christians as Christological 
(e.g. the “Servant songs” of Isaiah) and in the New Testament as a title for Apostles (e.g. Romans 1:1), but the specific 
terminology employed consistently by Constantine throughout his writings (ὁ θεράπων τοῦ θεοῦ, as opposed to ὁ παῖς/δοῦλος 
τοῦ θεοῦ) is that used of Moses in the LXX, granting a certain priority to this reference. As Lenski 2016, 73-75, notes, this title is 
first attested as used by Constantine in his letter to the Council of Arles in 314, and for the first time by Eusebius of Caesarea in 
book ten of Historia Ecclesiastica, making somewhat unclear which of the two men actually originated the title and/or 
associated comparison with Moses, “or even whether the two might have developed the notion in written or verbal dialogue 
with one another” (75).  
86 τοιγαροῦν διὰ τῆς ἐμῆς πρὸς θεὸν λατρείας τὰ πανταχοῦ εἰρηνεύεται καὶ τῶν βαρβάρων αὐτῶν τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ὄνομα γνησίως 
εὐλογούντων, οἳ μέχρι νῦν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἠγνόουν· δῆλον δὲ ὅτι ὁ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἀγνοῶν οὐδὲ τὸν θεὸν ἐπιγινώσκει. πλὴν ὅμως, 
καθὰ προείρηται, καὶ οἱ βάρβαροι νῦν δι’ ἐμὲ τὸν θεοῦ θεράποντα γνήσιον ἐπέγνωσαν τὸν θεὸν καὶ εὐλαβεῖσθαι μεμάθηκαν, 
ὃν ὑπερασπίζειν μου πανταχοῦ καὶ προνοεῖσθαι τοῖς ἔργοις αὐτοῖς ᾔσθοντο· ὅθεν μάλιστα καὶ ἴσασι τὸν θεόν, ὃν ἐκεῖνοι μὲν 
διὰ τὸν πρὸς ἡμᾶς φόβον εὐλαβοῦνται, ἡμεῖς δὲ οἱ τὰ ἅγια μυστήρια τῆς εὐμενείας αὐτοῦ δοκοῦντες προβάλλεσθαι (οὐ γὰρ 
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Constantine here straightforwardly equates himself with the bishops of the Christian Church in 
his status as one tasked with publicly setting forward and expounding the “Holy Mysteries” of God’s 
mercy. His clearly superior authority in respect to the bishops, however, comes not just from service of 
God in the generic sense, but from specifically and uniquely Imperial accomplishments: the bringing of 
universal peace through an “evangelization” of barbarians accomplished by fear of Roman arms and a 
divine favor demonstrated through victory in battle. Such plaudits, it should be clearly noted, were by 
definition not possible for any Christian bishop—yet it is precisely these that demonstrate that 
Constantine is in fact the “Servant of God” with full authority to review and overturn episcopal 
judgments and depose bishops at his will. A bishop might well object (and indeed, as we will see, 
bishops could and did object) that such accomplishments in themselves provided no clear expertise or 
authority in either Christian theology or Christian law. For Constantine, however, the rightness of his 
eventual judgment is guaranteed by the obvious degree of favor shown by God’s providence towards 
him, which will naturally extend to this and any other similar case: “But it will be the work of Divine 
Providence both to put a stop to the evils of this love of strife that have been clearly detected, and to 
expressly reveal to us if you in assembling together in that place have taken any thought for the truth 
and if you have judged what you judged without any favor or enmity” (86.3).87 It is this special care of 
divine providence for Constantine himself, expressed in his Imperial accomplishments and status as the 
true, unique Servant of God, that should give confidence to all parties to the case that, in the presence 
of the Emperor, justice and truth will prevail.  
 
ἂν εἴποιμι φυλάττειν), ἡμεῖς, φημί, οὐδὲν πράττομεν ἢ τὰ πρὸς διχόνοιαν καὶ μῖσος συντείνοντα καὶ ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν τὰ πρὸς 
ὄλεθρον τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου γένους ἔχοντα τὴν ἀναφοράν. 
87 ἀλλ’ ἔσται τῆς θείας προνοίας ἔργον καὶ τὰ τῆς φιλονεικίας ταύτης κακὰ φανερῶς ἁλόντα διασκεδάσαι καὶ ἡμῖν διαρρήδην 




For an entire judicial system to rest ultimately on the unfailing ability of divine providence to 
reveal the truth to the Emperor as God’s unique servant might well appear remarkable. Yet as 
Constantine himself implicitly points out in this letter, his entire career as Emperor, from its beginnings 
in outright usurpation through its climax in multiple civil wars, had relied even more on divine favor and 
providence to produce its (extraordinarily unlikely) results. If the rule of the Empire and the peace of the 
world depended ultimately on the goodwill of divine providence expressed through Constantine, why 
not that of the Church? 
1.4:  
The Theology of Constantine 
By Constantine’s own testimony, his behavior not only in this incident but in relationship with 
the episcopal judicial system and the Christian episcopal system as a whole is defined by a directly 
theological belief in the privileged relationship between himself and God, the accompanying status 
granted to him in the overall cosmic order, and the consequences of these alleged realities for his 
relationship with the rulers of the Christian Church. As we will see, this is far from unusual in the corpus 
of letters and writings of Constantine preserved for us in the Christian authors of the 4th and 5th 
centuries. Many of these documents have not been widely employed by historians, both because of 
their preservation in more theological texts and because of the overt complexity and difficulty of the 
texts themselves. When read consistently in the light of the larger theological and political issues of the 
time, however, I strongly believe that they have much to offer to any scholar interested in interpreting 
Constantine’s motivations and public relationship with the Christian Church.  
As I will argue, the main consistent theological concern of Constantine, from the beginning of his 
reign, related closely to the problem of his own legitimacy. For Constantine to rule stably as Emperor, 
the overall order of the cosmos would have to be stable as well. For him to rule alone, the overall order 
of the cosmos would ideally be monarchical as well. For him to rule in the absolute manner required not 
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only by the Imperial system itself, but especially by his own more revolutionary methods of gaining and 
employing power, a clearly hierarchical cosmic order, where the power of God clearly sanctioned the 
supremacy of certain persons over others, was required. For him to rule legitimately, finally, despite his 
rule resting straightforwardly on usurpation and civil war, the cosmic order would have to be one where 
God’s providence could and did manifest itself dramatically and decisively, through favored agents and 
seemingly tumultuous events, in history and the human realm. This set of basic concerns manifested 
themselves theologically in rather different ways at different points in Constantine’s reign, but the basic 
concerns themselves never altered. 
 Constantine’s initial engagement with the events of the Arian controversy, discussed cursorily in 
the section above, took place in the background of far more tumultuous political events. The civil war 
between Constantine and his co-Emperor Licinius ended in September 324 with total victory for 
Constantine, who now found himself sole Emperor and ruler both of his previous Western domains and 
of Licinius’ former territories in the Eastern Mediterranean. In the aftermath of this victory, Constantine 
seems to have written a letter (Eusebius, Vita Constantini 2.48-60) to his new domains in which he 
explained his recent victory in religious and theological terms, as the response by divine providence to 
the savage and inhumane persecution of Christians (2.48-55). In terms of religious policy, Christianity 
would now be not only freed from persecution but publicly sanctioned and favored by the Emperor, 
while the pagan religious practices of presumably the majority of his new subjects would be disfavored, 
but not (at least for the moment) abolished (2.56, 59-60).88 To all his subjects, however, Christian or 
 
88 The question of whether Constantine attempted at any point in his reign to ban or criminalize pagan sacrificial practice has 
long been a point of debate among scholars. The decree of Licinius issued in 313, and colloquially referred to as the “Edict of 
Milan,” explicitly granted free toleration and practice to all religious beliefs and practices in the Empire. While Eusebius asserts 
that Constantine later banned pagan rites and temples (Vita Constantini 2.44-45, 4.23, 4.25), the only Constantinian document 
he quotes in favor of this point says precisely the opposite (the letter quoted in the main text from 2.48-60). Likewise, as 
Bradbury 1994, 122-123, notes (cf. Lenski 2016, 234-240), while Eusebius is equally sweeping in his assertion of Constantine’s 
destruction of pagan temples (3.1.5), he cites only four instances (3.26-27, 3.55, 3.56), all but one of which are clearly related to 
profanation of Christian holy sites or opposition to ritual prostitution, placing Constantine’s actions well within the bounds of 
the ordinary regulation of cultic activity and public morality carried out by pagan Emperors. The 4th century pagan orator 
Libanius, on the other hand, would later in the 4th century assert that Constantine had taken no legal efforts against sacrifice 
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pagan, Constantine desires to make one fact clear: 89 his own status as a devoted worshiper and agent of 
the single monotheistic deity, dedicated alike to the defense of the Church and the unity and peace of 
the Empire: 
I ask these things of you not unreasonably, O Despot of All Things, Holy God: for by your 
guidance I have begun and finished salvation-bringing deeds. Setting your sign before me I have 
 
whatsoever (Orationes 30.6). Similarly, there is a great deal of extant evidence of Constantine’s numerous positive contacts 
with cities and Imperial officials publicly dedicated to continuing pagan practice (see e.g. Lenski 2016, 209-229). While the 
earliest decree against pagan sacrifice in the Codex Theodosianus (that of Constans and Constantius II in 341, 16.10.2) cites a 
law by Constantine as precedent, no such decree is included in the collection and it may be that the reference is to 
Constantine’s individual anti-pagan actions (such as his forbidding under threat of punishment any further sacrifice on the site 
of the Temple of Aphrodite, shortly to be demolished and replaced with a church, at the Christian holy site of Mamre; see Vita 
Constantini 3.53) and is intended to provide the cover of precedent for what was in fact a novel action. The main scholarly 
proponent of a clearly anti-pagan Constantine, who issued and enforced in 324 a sweeping law against all blood sacrifice, has 
been T.D. Barnes: see in particular Barnes 1981, 210, Barnes 1984, Barnes 2011, 13-26, 109-111, with, however, the important 
caveat of Barnes 2011, 142-143 that such laws were enforced differently in different parts of the Empire and that “individual 
pagans could still flourish and prosper in the newly Christian Empire of Constantine without abandoning their traditional belief” 
(143). This position has been generally supported by Bradbury 1994, perhaps still the fundamental study on anti-pagan 
legislation in the 4th century, which limits the focus of the decree of 324 specifically to the rite of blood sacrifice and argues 
that, like later similar legislation, it was intended more as a moral exhortation than a widely-enforceable law. Errington 1988 
also argues for the decree’s existence, but also for its almost immediate rescinding c. 325 when it proved impossible to enforce. 
Gaudemet 1990, 450-455, on the other hand, dismisses any such laws on the basis of their lack of inclusion in law-codes and 
Constantine’s otherwise-attested practice of toleration (including the construction of a temple for the Imperial cult), but notes 
intensified legal efforts, in keeping with past Imperial concerns, against the practice of divination and other forms of “magic.” 
Similarly, Lenski 2016, 231-234, acknowledges these efforts against magic and their precedent in previous Imperial practice, 
and suggests that, while a law against sacrifice most likely was issued, it was likely either ambiguously-worded or poorly 
enforced, and did not militate against Constantine’s general religious flexibility and tolerance. Frezza 1989, 53-58, emphasizes 
not only Constantine’s commitment to religious toleration, but also the novelty of Constantine’s use of the legal concept of true 
versus false religion, which laid the groundwork for the stronger anti-pagan measures of Constantius II. Finally, in a similar vein, 
Drake 2000, esp. 286-287, 402-404, 515 n.37, effectively rejects the existence of overtly anti-pagan laws, at least in any 
meaningfully enforced manner, while noting the largely voluntary confluence of Christians and pagans towards the rejection of 
blood sacrifice in the 4th century. In my judgment, while the extant evidence for universal anti-sacrificial measures is weak 
enough that hypotheses should not be constructed solely based on their alleged existence, the cautions of Bradbury 1994, both 
on Constantine’s consistent public denunciations of blood sacrifice and the pseudo-legal force such remarks would possess and 
on the general complexity of the enforcement of 4th century Imperial decrees in general remain essential to a proper 
understanding of Constantine’s reign and 4th century religious dynamics. Likewise, as Brown 1997, 645, has argued, even laws 
against blood sacrifice can be understood as a “a mercifully delimited measure” designed primarily not to suppress paganism, 
but to protect Christians, particularly those in public life, from the risk of demonic profanation associated with a rite that had 
come to assume a central imaginative place in Christian thought. There is, however, much more evidence for Eusebius’ claim 
that Constantine systematically violated the traditional sanctity of temple wealth through widespread appropriation of temple 
funds and statuary for the Imperial res privata and other projects such as the decoration of Constantinople (see Lenski 2016, 
168-175). 
89 See in particular Drake 2000 for an extensive and largely persuasive (if one-sided: see in particular Lenski 2016 for a 
somewhat more balanced approach) argument on Constantine’s religious policies, which he argues sought to bring about 
consensus between Christians and pagans in the rejection of violent religious persecution and the emphasis on a common 
religious belief, acceptable in principle to both Christians and pagans, in an ultimately monotheistic cosmos with a special tie to 
the Constantinian dynasty. While I largely agree with Drake’s conclusions, he is not in my judgment as perspicuous in 
acknowledging the hegemonic overtones of Constantine’s approach, which, while mostly refraining from outright banning of 
rites, destruction of property, or murder of dissidents, nonetheless showed no hesitation in applying the coercive force of the 
Imperial office toward crushing dissent and emphasizing within Christianity and paganism alike precisely those features most 
beneficial to Constantine’s unchallenged authority. 
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everywhere led an army gloriously victorious. And whenever any necessity of the people 
summoned me, following the standards of your virtue I went forth against the enemy. Because 
of these things I have offered to you my own soul, imbued with pure desire and fear. For I love 
your name truly, and I fear your power, that power which you revealed by many proofs and so 
made my faith stronger. I myself hasten therefore to apply my own shoulders to the rebuilding 
of your most holy house, which those polluted and impious men defiled by the abomination of 
demolition. I desire that your people remain without civil disturbance for the common good of 
the inhabited world (οἰκουμένη) and the benefit of all people (2.55.1-2.56.1).90 
If, as he asserts in this letter, Constantine had been brought to power by God precisely to bring 
peace to the Church, and if the unity (expressed in the absence of civil discord or στάσις) of the Church 
is itself the necessary means for the common good of the οἰκουμένη, the totality of human civilization, 
then internal divisions within the Church are of cosmic importance. It cannot have been long after this 
letter was sent that Constantine heard about the dramatic presence of στάσις in the Church of his 
Eastern domains, and responded precisely according to the logic laid out here. Just as he had brought 
peace to the Empire as a whole through aggressive military intervention in the Eastern Empire, so now 
Constantine set himself the task of bringing peace to the divided Eastern Church, writing an unsolicited 
letter to the chief disputants indicating the fulfillment of his declared intention to set on his shoulders 
the heavy task of ecclesiastical unification.  
 In this remarkable document, Constantine wastes no time in straightforwardly linking his recent 
military interventions with his present ecclesiastical activities, both outgrowths of a purpose that is 
inextricably both political and theological: “For I desired first to unify the statements of all the nations 
about the Divinity into one system and condition, and secondly to revive and bring into harmony the 
body of the common inhabited world (οἰκουμένη), suffering as it was as though from some painful 
 
90 καὶ ταῦτά γε αἰτῶ οὐκ ἀπεικότως, ὦ δέσποτα τῶν ὅλων, ἅγιε θεέ· ταῖς σαῖς γὰρ ὑφηγήσεσιν ἐνεστησάμην σωτηριώδη 
πράγματα καὶ διήνυσα, τὴν σὴν σφραγῖδα πανταχοῦ προβαλλόμενος καλλινίκου ἡγησάμην στρατοῦ· κἄν πού τις τῶν 
δημοσίων καλῇ χρεία, τοῖς αὐτοῖς τῆς σῆς ἀρετῆς ἑπόμενος συνθήμασιν ἐπὶ τοὺς πολεμίους πρόειμι. διὰ ταῦτά τοι ἀνέθηκά 
σοι τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ ψυχὴν ἔρωτι καὶ φόβῳ καθαρῶς ἀνακραθεῖσαν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὄνομά σου γνησίως ἀγαπῶ, τὴν δὲ δύναμιν 
εὐλαβοῦμαι, ἣν πολλοῖς τεκμηρίοις ἔδειξας καὶ τὴν ἐμὴν πίστιν βεβαιοτέραν εἰργάσω. ἐπείγομαι γοῦν καὶ τοὺς ὤμους αὐτὸς 
ὑποσχὼν τοὺς ἐμοὺς τὸν ἁγιώτατόν σου οἶκον ἀνανεώσασθαι, ὃν οἱ μυσαροὶ ἐκεῖνοι καὶ ἀσεβέστατοι τῷ ἀτοπήματι τῆς 
καθαιρέσεως ἐλυμήναντο. Εἰρηνεύειν σου τὸν λαὸν καὶ ἀστασίαστον μένειν ἐπιθυμῶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ κοινοῦ τῆς οἰκουμένης καὶ τοῦ 
πάντων ἀνθρώπων χρησίμου. 
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wound. In taking thought for these goals, I reasoned about the one with the ineffable eye of my 
understanding, but the other I attempted to set right by the authority of the hand of my armies” (Vita 
Constantini 2.65.1-2).91 The Constantine that appears in this letter is one who regards his military and 
political tasks as inextricably bound up with, and to a degree even subordinate to, the directly 
theological task of establishing a unified religious system for the totality of the human race. Even from a 
political perspective, this link is eminently logical. If Constantine wishes to unify the whole Roman 
Empire under himself as sole ruler, a broadly-accepted, singular, stable religious and theological system 
would be of great utility in legitimizing that effort. On the other hand, if Constantine wishes to unify the 
religious and theological thought of the Roman Empire, such a goal would doubtless be aided by its 
political unification under the force of arms. In both these efforts—public military campaigns and 
ineffable reasonings on divine theology—Constantine himself is, naturally, the principal actor.   
It is on this basis—as an expert in the practice of theological and political unification—that 
Constantine chooses to make his introduction to the feuding Christian clerics of his new domains. 
Constantine’s self-presentation, while assertive, is by no means at this point a dominating or imperious 
one. Rather, in writing to the traditional protagonists of Christian teaching and governance, Constantine 
takes care to acknowledge their own privileged status as religious experts and, therefore, natural 
collaborators in his efforts at unification:  
For since the power of the light and the law of the holy divine worship, emitted by the 
beneficence of our Superior as though from the heart of the rising sun, has illuminated with its 
holy light at the same time the whole of the inhabited world (οἰκουμένη), I was attempting by 
 
91 Πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἁπάντων τῶν ἐθνῶν περὶ τὸ θεῖον πρόθεσιν εἰς μίαν ἕξεως σύστασιν ἑνῶσαι, δεύτερον δὲ τὸ τῆς κοινῆς 
οἰκουμένης σῶμα καθάπερ χαλεπῷ τινι τραύματι πεπονηκὸς ἀνακτήσασθαι καὶ συναρμόσαι προὐθυμήθην. ἃ δὴ προσκοπῶν 




the command of my soul and the working of my eyes to seek you out, acting reasonably, since I 
trusted that you would be the Originators (ἀρχηγοί) of the salvation of the nations (2.67).92  
Here, the Christian revelation is singled out as a dramatic and indeed unprecedented 
intervention of divine providence into the human realm—one closely connected to the work of 
Constantine himself. The rhetorical connections between Constantine and Christianity here are 
extensive. First and foremost, both Constantine’s efforts at unification and the revelation of the 
Christian “light,” “law,” and “cult” are aimed, not just a particular people, but at the totality of the 
οἰκουμένη. Then, too, both interventions are presented in notably dramatic terms, and both feature 
internal, doctrinal elements in tandem with external structures of law and authority. Because of this 
essential unity between Constantine’s goals and methods and those of the Christian bishops, 
collaboration between the two is perfectly natural—and indeed, as Constantine acknowledges, he had 
previously recognized this by first undoing bans on Christian synods put in place by his rivals and then 
personally sending Christian bishops to bring peace to a North Africa riven by internal conflict (2.66).  
Now, however, both the natural collaboration between Emperor and bishops and the divine 
work of unification itself have been threatened by conflict among bishops. This is for Constantine a 
highly distressing and paradoxical situation, precisely because “the divisions among you all are in need 
of still greater healing—you, from whom I had expected there to be healing for the rest!” (2.68.1-2).93 
Division is by definition a greater evil among Christian clerics than among the rest of the body of society, 
precisely because these clerics are, like Constantine, by virtue of their office divine means of unification 
for the remainder of humanity. As one cosmic unifier to another, then, Constantine declares his 
intention of bringing an end to this destructive quarrel in the Church.  
 
92 Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἡ τοῦ φωτὸς δύναμις καὶ ὁ τῆς ἱερᾶς θρησκείας νόμος, ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ κρείττονος εὐεργεσίας οἷον ἔκ τινων τῆς 
ἀνατολῆς κόλπων ἐκδοθείς, ἅπασαν ὁμοῦ τὴν οἰκουμένην ἱερῷ λαμπτῆρι κατήστραψεν, εἰκότως ὑμᾶς, ὥσπερ τινὰς ἀρχηγοὺς 
τῆς τῶν ἐθνῶν σωτηρίας ὑπάρξειν πιστεύων, ὁμοῦ καὶ ψυχῆς νεύματι καὶ ὀφθαλμῶν ἐνεργείᾳ ζητεῖν ἐπειρώμην. 
93 πλείονος ἤδη τὰ καθ’ ὑμᾶς μέρη θεραπείας δεῖσθαι, παρ’ ὧν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὴν ἴασιν ὑπάρξειν ἤλπισα. 
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Having taken it upon himself (as an established expert in the study and unification of religious 
doctrine) to “reason about the cause and the basis of these things,” Constantine can now confidently 
declare that the theological difference involved is “very paltry and in no way worth of so great a 
contention” (2.68.2).94 The reason for this lack of importance is not so much the issue itself as its 
impacts on the necessary work of unification. Since their quarrel involves abstruse and ambiguous topics 
and terminology that the people at large could not possibly understand (2.69), and since “the pretext of 
your quarrel neither depends upon any important one of the commandments in your law, nor has any 
new heresy about the divine worship of God arisen among you” (2.70),95 there is no reason whatsoever 
why Arius and Alexander might not differ privately while continuing to live at peace with one another 
(2.70-71). The uniformity aimed at by Constantine, then, is not incompatible with the presence of 
differences and contrarieties. As he notes, “neither do we all will one and the same thing in everything, 
nor is one nature (φύσις) or judgment (γνώμη) lived out (πολιτεύειν) among us” (2.71.6-7).96 Human 
persons differ naturally in their wills, their opinions, and even their basic natures. What they all can and 
must share, however, is a single, common orientation towards their cosmic superior: “About the Divine 
Providence, then, let there be one faith among you, one union, one covenant with our Superior” 
(2.71.7).97 What is absolutely essential is that the Christian people act in accord with their divine 
superior, obedient to the commands of his law and united in carrying out the divine worship mandated 
by him. It is this submission to their superior, not mutual agreement among themselves, that actually 
establishes unity and peace on earth.  
 
94 διαλογιζομένῳ δή μοι τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν τούτων ἄγαν εὐτελὴς καὶ οὐδαμῶς ἀξία τῆς τοσαύτης φιλονεικίας ἡ 
πρόφασις ἐφωράθη. 
95 οὐδὲ γὰρ ὑπὲρ τοῦ κορυφαίου τῶν ἐν τῷ νόμῳ παραγγελμάτων ὑμῖν ἡ τῆς φιλονεικίας ἐξήφθη πρόφασις, οὐδὲ καινή τις 
ὑμῖν ὑπὲρ τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ θρησκείας αἵρεσις ἀντεισήχθη 
96 μηδὲ πάντες ἐν ἅπασι ταὐτὸν βουλόμεθα, μηδὲ μία τις ἐν ἡμῖν φύσις ἢ γνώμη πολιτεύεται. 
97 περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς θείας προνοίας μία τις ἐν ὑμῖν ἔστω πίστις μία σύνεσις μία συνθήκη τοῦ κρείττονος 
71 
 
The practical implications of this principle for Arius and his opponents here and now are clear: 
they must cease threatening the unity of obedience and divine service by their quibbling over obscure 
philosophical questions. Inasmuch as they do so, they are enemies of the Divine Providence applied to 
the government of the human realm, while Constantine himself, “having called upon the Divine 
Providence as my helper for this business, am reasonably bringing myself into the middle (μέσος) of 
your facing off against each other, as the Presider over peace” (2.68.2-3).98 Constantine, then, offers 
himself as mediator and supreme agent of peace, not merely for the Roman Empire and the inhabited 
world, but for the Church and the episcopate as well. While this mediation consists, for the moment, 
merely of exhortations to unity, Constantine’s expressed beliefs on the topic, both about the 
requirements of Christian unity and his own foremost place in establishing and maintaining them, are 
directly expressed and forcefully urged.99 Coming from the sole ruler of the entire Roman world, they 
could hardly be ignored. 
This effort at resolution expressed in the letter to Arius and Alexander suffers unquestionably 
from a naivete in theological matters that, while perhaps to be expected from a traditional Roman ruler, 
proved all but fatal to any claim to authority within the Christian Church—a fact it cannot have taken 
Constantine long to realize. As Constantine was soon to learn, in the totalizing system of intertwined 
divinity, morality, philosophy, and social action as it had developed under the governance of bishops for 
the past centuries, effective Christian authority required effective Christian theology. By the simple 
expedient of ignoring Constantine’s well-intentioned attempts at mediation, the Christian clerics 
 
98 τήν τε θείαν πρόνοιαν καλέσας ἀρωγὸν τῷ πράγματι, μέσον τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὑμῶν ἀμφισβητήσεως οἷον εἰρήνης 
πρύτανιν ἐμαυτὸν εἰκότως προσάγω 
99 Thus it should be clear that I do not entirely agree with the common scholarly assertion, expressed in e.g. Drake 2000, 241, 
that this letter shows “a Constantine more concerned for unity than theology.” While Constantine is clearly concerned with 
unity, his primary goal in this letter is to define and contrast, in both political and theological terms, the unity he considers 
desirable from the perverse concepts of unity possessed by his interlocutors. The debate, here as at many other points in our 
study, is between different models of unity expressed in social and theological terms. 
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involved quickly succeeded in convincing the Christian Emperor that their theological dispute did, in fact, 
possess enough consequences for divine law and worship to be worth more dedicated attention. The 
Council of Nicaea summoned shortly thereafter seems to have functioned in large part as a public 
showcase for the theological, philosophical, and personal authority of Christian bishops, expressed alike 
in the missing eyes and limbs of confessors and the logical disputations of philosophically-educated 
clerics.100 The audience for these displays was not merely the Christian or pagan public at large, but also 
the Emperor, who, according to all existing accounts, seems to have taken enthusiastic part in the 
theological discussions of the Council.101 While in my judgment the hypothesis that Constantine himself 
provided the key term ὁμοούσιος for the final creed should be rejected, it is extremely likely that 
Constantine’s involvement, in tandem with numerous bishops, in the conciliar process and presence at 
the discussions would have granted him a new understanding of the long-standing and intimate 
connections within the Christian Church between seemingly abstruse philosophical and metaphysical 
doctrines, divine worship and ritual, and the allocation and regulation of power in the human realm. 
While we possess only second-hand reports of Constantine’s actual role in the council, these 
descriptions are extremely suggestive, and would seem to show, I would suggest, the gradual, and at 
 
100 These features are found in all existing accounts, but several related anecdotes recorded in the 5th century ecclesiastical 
historians may be mentioned here. Socrates Scholasticus (Historia Ecclesiastica 1.8.15-17) notes that in the leadup to the 
council some of the more educated bishops began engaging in public logical disputations, both as a preparation for the 
council’s deliberations and as a sort of public display to the many Christian laypeople and pagans attracted by the Council—only 
to be rebuked for their showiness by a lay Christian confessor. Sozomen (Historia Ecclesiastica 1.17.7-1.18.7) features a rather 
more positive version of the same tale, in which the logical disputations attract the positive attention of the public and the 
Imperial court, but are disrupted by the intervention of pagan philosophers interested in ridiculing Christian learning—only for 
an uneducated lay Christian confessor to intervene to dispute with and convert on the spot one of the pagan philosophers, 
while elsewhere Alexander of Alexandria miraculously silences another philosopher set to argue with him. Theodoret (Historia 
Ecclesiastica 1.7.3-6), on the other hand, a bishop himself, pointedly ignores the philosophical disputations but highlights the 
miraculous powers and grotesque physical maiming of specific bishops present, making the council appear to be “the people of 
the martyrs assembled together” (δῆμον μαρτύρων κατὰ ταυτὸν συνθροισμένον, 1.7.6). All of this highlights well nature of 
Nicaea as a public showcase for the new religion and the various means of authority possessed by its leaders.  
101 Cf. e.g. Barnes 2011, 120-126, who emphasizes Constantine’s likely influence over the councils’ decisions to codify a single 
date of Easter for the whole Empire (that used in the West over which he had formerly governed) while also suggesting that the 
council may also have been a key moment in the development of the practice of a forty-day Lent, a formerly Western custom 
extended into the East perhaps by Constantine himself. 
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first tentative, extension of the Constantinian theological principles already discussed into the more 
controversial and difficult question of the theological relationship between divine Father and Son.  
In a letter written immediately following the events of the council, the polymath bishop and 
member of the pro-Arius episcopal alliance Eusebius of Caesarea was brought to digress at length on the 
Emperor’s alleged interpretation of the word ὁμοούσιος (“the same in οὐσία”). While the key 
theological debate in the early Arian controversy seems to have been over how to construe the 
eternality of the Son relative to the Father, this conflict would find expression at Nicaea and afterwards 
through the lens of the Son’s possession of either one and the same or a different οὐσία from the 
Father. This term οὐσία, though in basic meaning denoting little more than “existence” (a concept 
naturally highly relevant to discussions of eternal versus non-eternal existence), had also borne since 
Aristotle the additional, technical sense of an entity’s substance or essence as opposed to its 
attributes.102 As reported by Eusebius, Constantine’s interpretation of this key terminology was, to say 
the least, ambiguous: 
He interpreted the term like this, saying, ‘The Son should not be said to be ὁμοούσιος according 
to the passions of bodies, nor should he be said to be a ὑπόστασις according to division nor 
according to any separation of a part from the Father. For the immaterial and noetic and 
bodiless nature is in no way able to submit to any bodily passion, but it is fitting to understand 
such things with divine and ineffable reasonings.’ Our most wise and pious Emperor 
philosophized such things. But they, with the pretext of the addition of the ὁμοούσιος, wrote 
the following creed (7).103 
Constantine’s “philosophizing” here is straightforwardly in line with the basic monotheistic 
“common sense” about the simplicity, immateriality, and total lack of passivity in the highest divinity 
shared by Christians and pagans alike in the 4th century. It is also, I believe, broadly consonant with later 
 
102 See Brill Dictionary of Ancient Greek 1506, cf. e.g. Aristotle, Metaphysics 1003b. 
103 ὃ καὶ αὐτὸς ἑρμήνευε λέγων· ὅτι μὴ κατὰ τῶν σωμάτων πάθη λέγοιτο ὁμοούσιος <ὁ υἱός>, οὔτ’ οὖν κατὰ διαίρεσιν οὔτε 
κατά τινα ἀποτομὴν ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς ὑποστῆναι· μηδὲ γὰρ δύνασθαι τὴν ἄυλον καὶ νοερὰν καὶ ἀσώματον φύσιν σωματικόν τι 
πάθος ὑφίστασθαι, θείοις δὲ καὶ ἀπορρήτοις λόγοις προσήκειν τὰ τοιαῦτα νοεῖν. καὶ ὁ μὲν σοφώτατος ἡμῶν καὶ εὐσεβέστατος 
βασιλεὺς τοιάδε ἐφιλοσόφει. οἱ δὲ προφάσει τῆς τοῦ ὁμοουσίου προσθήκης τήνδε τὴν γραφὴν πεποιήκασιν· 
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discussions of theological issues from Constantine himself, and in this sense perfectly plausible as a 
remark of Constantine himself. As an indication for how to actually understand the term ὁμοούσιος, 
however, it is, not particularly perspicuous. Far from having originated the term, Constantine’s quoted 
remark is read more naturally as a straightforward criticism of its use at all. Or, on the other hand, it can 
be read as a clear rejection of the preferred metaphysical terminology of Eusebius of Caesarea himself, 
who consistently throughout his career designated the separate, hierarchically-distanced οὐσίαι of Son 
and Father as ὑποστάσεις.104 The term ὑπόστασις, originally used to denote a physical sediment or 
foundation and hence an underlying reality as opposed to appearance,105 had in the Neo-Platonic 
philosophy of Plotinus been used in a novel sense to designate the three fundamental underlying 
principles of reality, One, Intellect, and Soul.106 Following this usage, Origen of Alexandria seems to have 
been the first Christian theologian to use the term as a proper designation for the individualities of 
Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.107 In the period prior to Nicaea, language of multiple divine ὑποστάσεις, 
while fiercely contested by some members of the anti-Arius alliance,108 had been prominently employed 
not only by Arius and his allies,109 but also by their Origenist rival Alexander of Alexandria.110 Given 
Constantine’s earlier treatment of the issues under debate, this remark is best read as a deprecation of 
 
104 See the discussion of Eusebius’ theology in Chapter Two below. 
105 See Brill Dictionary of Ancient Greek 2232. 
106 See e.g. Plotinus, Enneads 5.1.  
107 See e.g. Origen, Contra Celsum 8.12, Commentarium in evangelium Matthaei 17.14, Commentarii in evangelium Joannis 
1.34.243, 1.39.292, 2.10.75, 2.23.49. For a recent elaboration of Origen’s novel use of ὑπόστασις to denote the three 
“individual substances” of the one Christian Godhead, see Ramelli 2012. 
108 Most notably Marcellus of Ancyra and Eustathius of Antioch: see S. Parvis 2006a, 50-75. 
109 See especially the creed of Arius himself sent to Alexander and quoted in Athanasius, De synodis 16, where Arius 
straightforwardly asserts that “there are three ὑποστάσεις” (τρεῖς εἰσιν ὑποστάσεις, 16.4).  
110 See in particular the document known as ἡ φίλαρχος (preserved in Theodoret 1.4) where Alexander refers to Father and Son 
as “natures that are two in ὑπόστασις” (τὰς τῇ ὑποστάσει δύο φύσεις, 15).  
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the preferred theological formulas of both sides in favor of a vaguer position aimed at ensuring those 
theological principles most prized by Constantine himself.  
For now, then, the heart of Constantine’s theological perspective is a strong philosophical 
monotheism grounded in the refusal to ascribe to the singular divinity any division or plurality 
whatsoever, making him the crux and model of the monarchical unity so important to Constantine’s 
political goals. As part of this picture, God, as absolutely supreme ruler of the cosmos, must be 
absolutely free from any πάθος, any passive state of being affected by another. God must be, first and 
foremost, independent of all others, and therefore, in the strongest possible sense, sovereign over 
them.  
To effectively defend this basic theological stance, however, mere vagueness was no longer 
possible. Set in the middle of an assembly of argumentative bishops, the Emperor has been compelled 
to wade into their theological debates and there assert his own viewpoint using the complex 
metaphysical terminology appropriate to such a setting. If the immediate reaction of Eusebius of 
Caesarea, himself perhaps the most highly educated of the many bishops present, is to be held typical, 
Constantine managed this task with at least some level of competence. 
A similar valence is given by another remark reported by Eusebius in his discussion of the 
council. In regards to the Nicene Council’s seeming ascription of eternal, uncaused existence to the Son 
along with the Father, Eusebius cites a possible clarification offered by Constantine himself, namely that 
“even before he was begotten in activity, he existed in an unbegotten fashion within the Father, since 
the Father exists eternally as Father, just as he exists as an eternal Emperor111 and an eternal Savior, 
 
111 Readers with knowledge of Greek may notice that in the present study I consistently translate βασιλεύς and its derivatives, 
even in theological and Scriptural contexts, with the English “Emperor,” “Imperial,” etc. Βασιλεύς was by the 4th century the 
most common title of the Roman Emperor employed in Greek, the direct equivalent not of the (rare) Latin rex but of the 
commonplace imperator. Translating βασιλεύς as “Emperor” in Eusebius’ description of Constantine while translating it as 
“King” in Constantine’s actual remarks represents, I believe, an unnecessary obfuscation of the immediate connotations such 
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being all things in potentiality, and eternally existing in the same way” (16).112 This remark is striking for 
its connection of the Father’s potential for creation and begetting with his titles of Emperor (βασιλεύς) 
and Savior (σωτήρ), both longstanding Imperial titles.113 
Read in tandem with Constantine’s theological remarks immediately after Nicaea (see below), it 
is likely that by this line of argument Constantine was beginning to hone in on the nature of the Son as a 
mere internal substrate only metaphorically “begotten” in the activity (ἐνεργεία) of the singular 
divinity—but in the context of Eusebius’ own highly tendentious interpretation of Nicaea, Constantine’s 
argument also helps to provide a key interpretative principle for a more Eusebius-approved position on 
the Son’s caused and so non-eternal existence. In the initial stages of the conflict, Alexander had 
charged Arius and his allies with denying the eternal fatherhood of God, since logically God could not 
eternally be a Father prior to the begetting of a merely temporal Son.114 Alexander’s position, in 
contrast, would make God’s fatherhood eternal—but not his Imperial and salvific status, existing 
logically only in relation to (as yet nonexistent) created things. Now, however, both issues are answered, 
seemingly, by the human Emperor himself. God is eternally Emperor because, even if created things do 
not exist eternally in reality, the one God with the potential to create them does; and likewise God is 
eternally Father because, even if a notionally distinct Son does not exist eternally in reality, the one with 
the potential to beget him does.115 Thus is preserved, not merely the eternal existence and qualities of 
 
language would have possessed, even or especially when used to describe God. That the same basic terminology was 
normatively applied to both God and Roman Emperor is one of the key groundings of this study. 
112 καὶ πρὶν ἐνεργείᾳ γεννηθῆναι δυνάμει ἦν ἐν τῷ πατρὶ ἀγεννήτως, ὄντος τοῦ πατρὸς ἀεὶ πατρὸς ὡς καὶ βασιλέως ἀεὶ καὶ 
σωτῆρος ἀεί, δυνάμει πάντα ὄντος, ἀεί τε κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντος. 
113 For the term σωτήρ in particular, see Nock 1951, as well as note 218 in section 1.5 below. 
114 See in particular the encyclical letter of Alexander, widely-believed to have been ghost-written by Athanasius (see note 7 in 
section 4.2 below), known as ἑνὸς σώματος and preserved in Athanasius, De decretis 35. In this document, 
Alexander/Athanasius accuses Eusebius of Nicomedia and his followers of having asserted that “God was not always a Father, 
because there was a time when God was not a Father” (Οὐκ ἀεὶ ὁ θεὸς πατὴρ ἦν, ἀλλ’ ἦν ὅτε ὁ θεὸς πατὴρ οὐκ ἦν, 7). 
115 This position, notably, has sometimes been treated as a key innovation of the ally of Arius Asterius in the period after Nicaea 
(cf. Spoerl and Vinzent 2017, 21-22, Kopecek 1979, 31-32, cf. Asterius, fr. 14). Athanasius himself would later reply to this 
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God, but far more his status of total precedence in relation to all other beings and the cosmos at large. 
This is, once again, fully compatible with the emphases already found in Constantine’s theology. For God 
to be seen as creator, father, or even Emperor does not necessitate any form of reciprocal relationship 
between him and his inferiors, but rather implies the exact opposite, since they are dependent on his 
power, while he, to be God, must be truly independent of them.  
By the conclusion of the council, one of the two ecclesiastical factions involved had been 
decisively defeated, its leaders banished by Constantine himself.116 In the preceding section, I argued for 
the systemic and legal valences of this decision—yet for the majority of the participants in this process, 
including most likely Constantine himself, the theological import of Arius’ defeat would have been 
naturally far more significant. It should not be surprising, then, that these punishments seem to have 
been accompanied by highly theological documents emanating from the pen of the Emperor himself and 
designed to make clear to key parties not only precisely why these malefactors had earned his wrath, 
but also how he himself, the ruler of the Roman Empire, had come to interpret the theological doctrine 
proclaimed at Nicaea. If his comments during the Council’s deliberations show an Emperor overtly 
interested in shaping the assembly’s decisions in line with his own theological priorities, these 
documents show an Emperor equally interested in shaping the reception and interpretation of those 
decisions after the fact. 
 
argument in Oratio contra Arianos 1.29 (cf Anatolios 1998, cf. 117-120), asserting that while someone could be rightly called a 
creator so long as they possessed the potential of creating (expressed most cogently in the existence of the divine Word as 
offspring/archetype), a father could not be a father prior to the actual existence of his son.  
116 If, as Drake 2000, 253, plausibly suggests, Constantine’s initial plan for the council was to “play on the sentiments of the 
majority of the bishops present, who were not vested in either side of the theological controversy,” then this plan had clearly 
failed—though like Sara Parvis, I regard the existence of this supposed great middle of theologically and politically “centrist 
bishops” (Drake 2000, 253) or “moderate Origenists” (S. Parvis 2006b) as one of the great myths of modern 4th century 
scholarship. After all, the model of unification found at past episcopal councils had been normatively based around the defeat 
and exclusion of one of the theological parties, while Constantine’s model was not, as further events proved, remotely 
inconsistent with the exclusion of dissidents. 
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Not long after the close of the council,117 Constantine wrote a letter (Epistula ad Nicomedienses) 
to the diocese of Nicomedia, an influential city in the Eastern Empire thanks to the presence of a 
Tetrarchic Imperial court, explaining precisely why he had chosen to depose and exile their formerly 
respected and influential bishop.118 The assertion of his own status as a privileged agent, in tandem with 
the Christian Church, for the forcible bringing of the world into unity of belief and government, has not 
changed since his earlier letters, but now is joined to a new awareness of his relationship with, and care 
for, the Church itself:   
You are not ignorant that I am your fellow-servant, you are not ignorant of the stronghold of 
your salvation, the care for which I have truly taken upon myself, and through which we have 
conquered not only the weapons of our enemies, but also have compelled those still living in 
their souls to show forth the true Faith of love for mankind (Athanasius, De Decretis Concilii 
Nicaeae 41.6).119 
Once again, Constantine deplores in the strongest terms the contradiction of Christians, and 
especially Christian bishops, serving as causes of discord rather than unity. Now, though, in the 
aftermath of Nicaea, it is clear that his belief on the reason for this calamity, and its relationship with 
allegedly obscure theological doctrines, has drastically changed:  
We are Christians, and we are divided, a bitter condition. Is this our Faith, is this the teaching of 
the Most Holy Law? But what is the cause because of which the destruction of the present evil 
 
117 The precise dating of the letter in 325 depends on whether or not Eusebius is seen as having been exiled immediately after 
the council or three months later, as some scholars have proposed. For this issue, see note 66 in section 2.3 below. 
118 This document, known often as like the following one, is preserved in full in the documentary appendix of Athanasius of 
Alexandria’s De decretis Nicaenae synodi. While both documents have been cited in recent scholarship and I have been unable 
to locate any disputes of their authenticity, I have also been unable to find any continuous analysis of them as textual wholes. 
This lack of attention is, as I have already suggested, most likely due both to their presence in a work of Athanasius more 
typically read by theologians and to the difficulty of reading and interpreting their contents. 
119 οὐκ ἀγνοεῖτέ με τὸν ὑμέτερον συνθεράποντα, οὐκ ἀγνοεῖτε τὸ τῆς ὑμετέρας σωτηρίας ὀχύρωμα, οὗ τὴν φροντίδα γνησίως 
ἐπανῄρημαι, καὶ δι’ οὗ τῶν ἡμετέρων ἐχθρῶν οὐ μόνον τὰ ὅπλα κατεμαχεσάμεθα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ζῶντας ἔτι τὴν ψυχὴν 
συνκαθείρξαμεν πρὸς τὸ τὴν τῆς φιλανθρωπίας ἀληθῆ πίστιν ἐκφάναι.  
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has arisen? [...] What is the horror of this band of robbers that has appeared, which denies that 
the Son of God has come forth from the undivided οὐσία of the Father? (41.8).120 
 Thanks to the Council of Nicaea, Constantine has become convinced that there is, in fact, a 
direct connection between specific points of theological doctrine, obedience to the divine law, and 
earthly unity and division. The miscreants who, before and at the council, dared to deny the unity of the 
singular divine οὐσία have also shown themselves to be agents of division in human affairs. In particular, 
Eusebius of Nicomedia, the leader of the episcopal faction associated with Arius before and at Nicaea, 
has been revealed at one and the same time as a teacher of false doctrine and a treasonous enemy of 
the Empire: “I ask you, who is the one who taught these things to so innocent a people? Clearly it is 
Eusebius, the savage co-initiate of [Licinius’] tyranny” (41.9).121 Not only had Eusebius, as the bishop at 
the court of Licinius, lent his active support to this alleged tyranny, but he had even, according to 
Constantine, stooped so low as to actively spy on Constantine on Licinius’ behalf during their civil war 
(41.10) and participate in the persecution of his fellow Christians and the murder of his fellow bishops 
(41.9). It was only natural, then, that such a determined agent of chaos would preach the dangerous 
doctrine of a divided cosmos while making every effort to divide the Church by supporting the disgraced 
Alexandrian priest Arius (41.13). As Constantine now is able to acknowledge with regret, however, his 
main means of gaining influence and escaping the judgment of his fellow bishops had, at least for a 
time, been Constantine himself. At some point in the past, presumably either just before or during the 
Council of Nicaea,122 Eusebius had used his influence as bishop of Nicomedia to gain access to 
 
120 Χριστιανοί ἐσμεν καὶ οἰκτρᾷ διαθέσει διχονοοῦμεν. αὕτη ἄρα ἐστὶν ἡ ἡμετέρα πίστις, αὕτη ἡ τοῦ ἁγιωτάτου νόμου 
διδασκαλία;   ἀλλὰ τίς ἐστιν αἰτία δι’ ἣν ὁ τοῦ παρόντος κακοῦ ὄλεθρος ἐξεγήγερται; [...] τίς ἡ τοῦ λῃστηρίου τούτου 
ἀναπέφανται δεινότης, ἣ τὸν τοῦ θεοῦ υἱὸν ἀρνεῖται ἐξ ἀμερίστου τοῦ πατρὸς οὐσίας προεληλυθέναι; 
121 ἱκετεύω, τίς ἐστιν ὁ διδάξας ταῦτα οὕτως ἄκακον πλῆθος; Εὐσέβιος δηλαδὴ ὁ τῆς τυραννικῆς ὠμότητος συμμύστης. 
122 Drake 2000, 263, suggests that this reflects overtures made to Constantine prior to Nicaea, which led to concessions to the 
pro-Arius alliance and the moving of the council from Ancyra to Nicaea, while S. Parvis 2006a, 81-83, goes farther in asserting 
Constantine’s overt partiality toward Eusebius and his allies before and during the council, which was allegedly instrumental in 
their escape from the censure of the majority of bishops present. Somewhat more mundanely, Barnes 1981, 214, suggests that 
the transfer of the council to Ancyra and Constantine’s personal involvement served to deflect attention from his sudden 
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Constantine, “sending secretly to me partisans of his to make claims on his behalf, and asking from me 
an alliance, so that although already convicted of so great a crime he might not be cast out of the office 
that then belonged to him” (41.14).123 Even more remarkably, these efforts had, apparently, succeeded: 
“God himself is my witness, who continues as a lover of the good for you and me, although that man 
seduced and shamelessly cheated me also, a misfortune you also will recognize on your own part. 
Everything then was done just as he desired, since he was concealing every one of the evils of his 
intentions” (41.14).124 Now, however, Constantine has come to recognize the personal, political, and 
theological crimes of this miscreant and his allies, and has “ordered them to be seized and exiled as far 
away as possible” (41.17).125 Playing for influence with the Emperor, it seems, can be a rather dangerous 
game, even for so powerful a bishop as Eusebius. 
 What makes this letter so interesting, however, is not merely its discussion of one of the more 
important and enigmatic bishops of the 4th century, but also its forthright declaration of both Eusebius 
of Nicomedia’s theological errors and the theological position endorsed by Constantine himself. Indeed, 
it is this theological explanation, rather than any criticism of Eusebius, with which the letter actually 
opens—with Constantine choosing thereby to draw as directly as possible the link between his present 
actions and the theological unity of the cosmos.126 Constantine’s actual theology here is, however, 
rather singular, in both senses of the term: 
 
decision to execute his captive rival Licinius after promising him safety, as well as to marshal Christian support in regions of the 
Empire that may well have been on the verge of rebellion. 
123 ὑποπέμπων μέν μοι διαφόρους τοὺς ἀξιοῦντας ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ, ἐξαιτούμενος δὲ παρ’ ἐμοῦ συμμαχίαν τινά, ὅπως μὴ ἐπὶ 
τοσούτῳ ἐλεγχθεὶς πλημμελήματι τῆς ὑπαρχούσης αὐτῷ τιμῆς ἐκβάλλοιτο; 
124 μάρτυς ἐστί μοι τούτου ὁ θεὸς αὐτός, ὃς ἐμοί τε καὶ ὑμῖν φιλαγάθως ἐπιμένοι, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐμὲ ἐκεῖνος περιέτρεψε καὶ 
ἀπρεπῶς ὑφήρπασεν, ὃ καὶ ὑμεῖς ἐπιγνώσεσθε. πάντα μὲν γὰρ ἐπράχθη τότε, καθὼς αὐτὸς ἐπόθει πᾶν ὁτιοῦν κακὸν ἐπὶ τῆς 
ἑαυτοῦ διανοίας ἀποκρυπτόμενος. 
125 ἁρπαγέντας γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἐκέλευσα ὡς πορρωτάτω ἐξορισθῆναι. 
126 Surprisingly, the opening of this letter is quoted at length by Barnes 1981, 242-244, in defense of his thesis that in the 
ecclesiastical conflicts of his lifetime Constantine consistently operated “as one conversant with philosophy and theology who 
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You all, beloved brothers, know accurately that the Master God is clearly also the Savior Christ, 
that he is both Father and Son, the Father, I say, being without ἀρχή, without end, the Begetter 
of the αἰών itself, but the Son—that is, the will (βούλησις) of the Father, which has not been 
taken up through any reflection nor for the completion of his works has it been comprehended 
through any οὐσία sought out for this purpose (41.1).127  
This passage is extremely difficult both to translate and to understand.128 What is relatively 
clear, however, is a presentation of the unity of Father and Son that would seem, from the perspective 
both of later non-Nicene and Nicene thinkers, to be straightforwardly heretical in its assertion of a total 
identity between Father and Son, with the Son himself not in any sense another person, ὑπόστασις, or 
οὐσία begotten by and existing alongside the Father, but merely the internal, undivided process of 
willing of the singular God. In league with this basic position, Constantine is concerned above all else to 
 
nevertheless believes the conversion of the Roman Empire to worship of the Christian God far more important than a precise 
(and potentially exclusive) definition of the intellectual content of Christianity” and “might have been able to impose genuine 
unity if he had been willing to use force to compel acceptance of his own views” but in fact “did not try” (244) to do so. To use 
in defense of this thesis a document in which Constantine justifies the forcible deposition of a bishop on his own authority 
through an extended defense of a highly precise and unique theological viewpoint and a harsh condemnation of differing views 
is, to say the least, paradoxical. 
127 Τὸν δεσπότην θεὸν δηλαδὴ καὶ σωτῆρα Χριστὸν ἀκριβῶς ἅπαντες ἴστε, ἀγαπητοὶ ἀδελφοί, πατέρα τε καὶ υἱὸν εἶναι, πατέρα 
φημὶ ἄναρχον ἄνευ τέλους γονέα τοῦ αἰῶνος αὐτοῦ, υἱὸν δέ, τοῦτ’ ἔστι τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς βούλησιν, ἥτις οὔτε δι’ ἐνθυμήσεώς 
τινος ἀνείληπται οὔτε πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἔργων αὐτοῦ τελεσιουργίαν διά τινος ἐξεζητημένης οὐσίας κατελήφθη. 
128 As Barnes 1981, 47, 73-74, rightly argues, the assumption among some scholars that Constantine was uneducated is 
contradicted by the bulk of the evidence, as there would have been ample opportunity for him to become acquainted with 
Greek philosophy in his youth at Diocletian’s court, through his relationship with the trained rhetor and philosopher Lactantius 
(who was set to tutor Constantine’s son in Trier), through personal reading of Latin translations of philosophical texts, and 
through contacts with Christian bishops such as Hosius of Cordoba. From the extant sources (see e.g. Eusebius, Vita Constantini 
3.13, 4.32, 4.35), it seems that Constantine, a native Latin speaker, preferred to operate in Latin than Greek in reading and 
delivering orations on theological topics. On the other hand, as Muriel Moser has argued, it is likely that Constantine’s choice to 
overtly favor Latin over Greek in legal and rhetorical contexts was in part a political move designed to emphasize Constantine’s 
Western origins and the subordinate status of the conquered Eastern Empire rather than a reflection of a total inability to 
function in Greek (Moser 2018, 77-81). From the extant sources it seems clear that Constantine’s engagement with philosophy 
and Christian theology, especially at the Council of Nicaea and afterwards, was almost entirely in terms of those traditions in 
Greek rather than (less prestigious and more limited) Latin equivalents. While this basic contradiction between linguistic 
preferences and theological and philosophical context could generally be obviated by the use of interpreters and scribes, this 
would have been more difficult, I would suggest, in theological writing involving original thoughts of Constantine himself 
expressed in highly technical language than in the legal and rhetorical genres more commonly employed by Emperors. All this is 
reflected in the almost uniquely difficult style of Constantine’s theological texts, which make copious use of highly technical 
Greek philosophical and theological terms, often without obvious Latin equivalents but often embedded in suspiciously Latinate 
grammatical constructions, and very much without the definition, clarity, and fluency to be found in writers trained in 
theological and philosophical Greek. Because of these strange features, I believe, Constantine’s theological writings should be 
seen (cf. note 180 in section 1.5 below) not as either Greek compositions or simple Greek translations of straightforward Latin 
originals, but as essentially hybrid compositions. Constantine was far from alone among Latin theological thinkers in the 4th 
century either in struggling with the gap between the two languages or in being forced to awkwardly transpose Greek terms 
and concepts into Latin and vice versa. 
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deny the position of Arius and Eusebius that the will of the Father required or made use of, for the 
creation of the world, a separate and lower οὐσία of a truly distinct Son: “Whoever thinks and will think 
this, he will endure every kind of unceasing punishment” (41.1-2).129 First and foremost, Constantine is 
concerned to make clear that the Despot God is one, singular, and solitary person, requiring no 
assistance from anything besides his own supreme and incomprehensible will.  
With this position set forward directly, if perhaps not perspicuously, Constantine goes on to 
explain how the merely internal will of the Father can be called a “son” or be said to be “begotten” by 
the Father. His explanation is, again, dense almost to the point of incomprehensibility:  
But the Son of God Christ was begotten as the Craftsman (δημιουργὸς) of all things and the 
Chorus-leader of Immortality itself, he was begotten inasmuch as it pertains to the Faith in 
which we have believed—but rather he himself, the one who always exists within the Father, 
came forth for the setting in order of the things created by him—he was begotten therefore in 
an indivisible coming-forth. For the will (βούλησις) at the same time is fixed in its own dwelling-
place and also both does and administers those things which are in need of special care, 
according to the properties of each one (41.2-3).130  
According to Constantine, then, the terms “Son” and “begetting” traditionally employed by 
Christians are, in essence, little more than metaphors for the relationship between a single person and 
his will. While the will can be said to “go forth” or even “be begotten” from the person in performing 
actions relating to external realities, it nevertheless remains an internal operation of the individual 
person, not an external reality: “For the fulfillment of deeds has received by perception the command of 
the Will (βούλησις), but it has not separated out a will divided from the οὐσία of the Father” (41.3-4).131 
The will of a person is the necessary means by which he or she performs actions and gives commands, 
 
129 ὃς γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ νοεῖ καὶ νοήσει, οὗτος ἕξει πρὸς ἅπαν τιμωρίας γένος ἀκάματον ὑπομονήν. 
130 ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ υἱὸς Χριστὸς ὁ τῶν ἁπάντων δημιουργὸς καὶ τῆς ἀθανασίας αὐτῆς χορηγὸς ἐγεννήθη, ὅσον πρὸς τὴν 
πίστιν ἀνῆκεν ᾗ πεπιστεύκαμεν, ἐγεννήθη—μᾶλλον δὲ προῆλθεν αὐτὸς ὁ καὶ πάντοτε ἐν τῷ πατρὶ ὢν ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ 
γεγενημένων διακόσμησιν—ἐγεννήθη τοίνυν ἀμερίστῳ προελεύσει· ἡ γὰρ βούλησις ὁμοῦ καὶ τῷ οἰκητηρίῳ ἑαυτῆς ἐμπέπηγε 
καὶ ταῦθ’, ἅπερ διαφόρου δέεται τημελείας, κατὰ τὴν ἑκάστου ποιότητα πράττει τε καὶ διοικεῖ. 
131 αὕτη γὰρ ἡ τῶν πραγμάτων συμπλήρωσις αἰσθήσει παρείληφε τὸ τῆς βουλήσεως πρόσταγμα, οὐχὶ δὲ μερισθεῖσαν ἐκ τῆς 
τοῦ πατρὸς οὐσίας τὴν βούλησιν διέστησεν. 
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but it is precisely through these operations that it becomes clear that the will is in fact an expression of 
the person in question, not a separate reality or another person in itself. Constantine could hardly be 
more strident in his assertion of the absolute identity of Father and Son: “What distance, therefore, is 
there between the God who is both Father and Son? Clearly none at all” (41.3).132  
On the other hand, if Constantine is anxious to assert the identity of Father and Son within the 
one God, thus making as clear as possible, as he had argued at the Council of Nicaea, the total unity, 
independence, and lack of passions or relations of the supreme ruler God, he is equally concerned to 
create a greater separation between the divinity of the divine will and its contact with human nature, 
physical reality, and suffering in the Incarnation:  
Who is there who has feared the suffering (πάθος) of Christ my Master because of reverence 
rather than stupidity? Does the divinity suffer, then, because the habitation of the revered body 
is the cause of the recognition of its own holiness, or does it undergo touch although separated 
from the body? Or did it not separate itself from that which was derived from the baseness of 
the body? Are we not still alive, even when the glory of  the soul issues a summons to the body? 
Why, then, does the blameless and simple Faith receive the charge of ambiguity for this reason? 
(41.4-5)133 
Just as a person’s will can make use of external objects without taking on their properties, so too 
the indivisible will of God can make use of the human body of Christ without being besmirched by the 
base qualities of that body or undergoing the passions and sufferings endured by it. After all, if even the 
human soul continue to live after its death—failing to share in this less-than-pristine quality of the 
body—how much more could the supreme divinity operate through a human body without suffering any 
diminishment? As to why the omnipotent Will of God chose to make use of such an unfitting instrument 
 
132 τί οὖνἐστι μεταξὺ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ πατρὸς καὶ υἱοῦ; οὐδὲν δηλαδή. 
133 τίς ἐστιν, ὃς τοῦ Χριστοῦ τοῦ ἐμοῦ δεσπότου πάθος δι’ αἰδῶ μᾶλλον ἢ μωρίαν δέδιεν; ἆρ’ οὖν πάσχει τὸ θεῖον, ἐπειδὰν ἡ 
τοῦ σεμνοῦ σώματος οἴκησις πρὸς ἐπίγνωσιν τῆς ἰδίας ἁγιότητος ὁρμᾷ, ἢ ὑποπίπτει θίξει τὸ τοῦ σώματος ἐκκεχωρισμένον; ἆρ’ 
οὐχὶ διέστηκε τοῦθ’ ὅπερ ἐκ τῆς τοῦ σώματος ἀφῄρηται ταπεινότητος; οὐχὶ δὲ ζῶμεν, κἂν πρὸς θάνατον ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς εὔκλεια 
τὸ σῶμα προσκαλέσηται; τί τοίνυν ἐνταῦθα ἡ ἀβλαβής τε καὶ εἰλικρινὴς πίστις ἄξιον ἀμφιβολίας κατείληφεν; 
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for the attainment of its purposes, Constantine, again, is ready with an explanation that cuts to the 
heart of the new Christian religion as he himself seems to have viewed it:  
Or do you not see that God chose a most holy body, through which he intended to reveal the 
proofs of the Faith and the indications of his own excellence and to undo the destruction of the 
human race, previously troubled by destructive deception, and to give the new teaching of 
divine worship and to purify the unworthy deeds of the mind by the indication of chastity, and 
then to dissolve the torment of death, and to proclaim beforehand the rewards of immortality? 
(41.5)134 
 The one, indivisible Despot God, then, has by means of his inseparable will made use of a human 
body to achieve his purposes—purposes that are, as expressed here, very much in accord with the goals 
of Constantine himself. Thanks to the new teaching of divine worship communicated by the Will of God 
through the body of Christ, Constantine himself has been enabled to bring unity and peace to the 
Roman Empire and the world at large. Although these goals have been threatened by the teaching of 
the heretics Arius and Eusebius of Nicomedia, who dared to divide God, the Church, and the Empire 
alike, God himself has provided for the remedy of this evil, as for so many others, through Constantine 
himself. In keeping with its overall tone, Constantine’s letter ends with what is straightforwardly a 
threat, one expressed, however, in highly theological terms: “If anyone unwisely dares to continue 
remembering or praising these men, who are corruptors, he will be immediately checked in his 
shamelessness by the efforts of the Servant of God—that is, me” (41.17).135 
 The theology expressed in this letter is highly distinctive, and cannot simply be ascribed to the 
influence of one or other of the bishops present at Nicaea. While the basic position of emphasizing the 
unity of God by treating the Son as primarily an internal intellectual constituent of the Father and 
 
134 ἢ οὐχ ὁρᾷς ὅτι σεμνότατον σῶμα ὁ θεὸς ἐπελέξατο, δι’ οὗ τὰ τῆς πίστεως τεκμήρια καὶ τὰ τῆς οἰκείας ἀρετῆς ὑποδείγματα 
ἔμελλεν ἐμφανίζειν καὶ τὴν ἤδη συγκεχυμένην ὀλεθρίῳ πλάνῃ τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου γένους ἀπώλειαν ἀποσείσασθαι καινήν τε 
θρησκείας διδόναι διδασκαλίαν καὶ τῷ τῆς ἁγνείας ὑποδείγματι τὰς ἀναξίας τοῦ νοῦ πράξεις καθαίρειν, ἔπειτα δὲ τὴν μὲν τοῦ 
θανάτου βάσανον ἐκλύειν, τὰ δὲ τῆς ἀθανασίας ἔπαθλα προαναφωνεῖν; 
135 εἴ τις δὲ ἢ πρὸς μνήμην τῶν λυμεώνων ἐκείνων ἢ πρὸς ἔπαινον ἀπρονοήτως ἐξαφθῆναι τολμήσει, παραχρῆμα τῆς ἰδίας 
τόλμης διὰ τῆς τοῦ θεράποντος τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦτ’ ἔστιν ἐμοῦ ἐνεργείας ἀνασταλήσεται. 
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deemphasizing the idea of “begetting” is similar to that of Marcellus of Ancyra, it bears several clear 
differences as well: most visible in Constantine’s treatment of the Son, not as the λόγος or internal 
reason of the Father, but rather as his βούλησις, or will expressed in the issuing of commands.136 This 
emphasis on will and activity over reason and contemplation reflects, I would suggest, a distinctively 
Imperial and Constantinian anthropology. In contrast, Constantine’s Christology, in its apparent 
“Apollinarian” emphasis on God’s contact-less operation of a human body in place of a rational human 
soul, straightforwardly contradicts Marcellus of Ancyra’s and Eustathius’ strong emphasis on the 
complete humanity of Christ, which seems at times to have come close to an outright assertion of two 
persons, human and divine, within Christ.137 While this Christology is much more similar to the position 
eventually adopted by Eusebius of Caesarea, Constantine’s overall theology here is so distant from 
Eusebius’ own, and so close to the caricatured “Sabellianism” that consistently served as its polemical 
antithesis, that it makes far more sense to deny, at least at this point, any direct influence. Most notably 
of all, perhaps, this theology bears little or no resemblance on any of these points to the Origenist 
theology of the victorious Alexander of Alexandria, or to that of his secretary and successor Athanasius 
of Alexandria,138 in the appendix to whose work it is preserved.  
 
136 Cf. S. Parvis 2006a, 30-37. 
137 For Marcellus and Eustathius on these points, see in particular S. Parvis 2006a, 55-57, 64-66. As Parvis sums up, “the one 
who sits at God’s right, for Marcellus, therefore has a human will and soul—attributes he [...] certainly does share with the 
Christ of Eustathius of Antioch” (65). 
138 Athanasius’ later theology will be covered in detail in Chapters 4 and 6 below. For summaries of his general theology in 
tandem with that of his predecessor and mentor Alexander, see S. Parvis 2006a, 52-57, 60-65, Anatolios 2011, 79-86, 99-156. 
The generally Origenist Alexandrian theology shared by both, based on a much stronger emphasis on the distinction of Father 
and Son to the point of, in the hands of Alexander, quite comfortably speaking of Father and Son as multiple ὑποστάσεις, stood 
in strong tension with the emphasis on monadic unity in Marcellus of Ancyra, let alone the even stronger emphasis on total 
indistinguishability between Father and Son-βούλησις found in Constantine’s post-Nicaea writings. In an instructive 
comparison, Athanasius in Orationes ad Arianos 2.2 can refer in passing to the Son as “the living βουλή [will, determination, 
counsel] of the Father,” but precisely in the context of a larger argument for the Son’s status as a true, distinct offspring 
eternally fulfilling the fruitful, generative essence of the Father only contingently and derivatively manifested in the creation of 
the world through particular external acts of divine willing (designated by Athanasius by βούλησις) (cf. Anatolios 1998, 119-
123). While for Athanasius the Son/Logos constitutes the eternally full and distinct grounding for external divine activity, for 
Constantine he can be simply equated with that activity itself. 
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 Not long after,139 Constantine also seems to have written an “open letter” of sorts to Arius and 
his remaining supporters (Epistula ad Arium et Arrianos), criticizing them in similarly harsh terms and 
calling on them to give up their opposition and accept the truth. This letter seems to have been written 
in response to some sort of appeal or petition from Arius himself, including a confession of faith, 
complaints about his present state, assertions of continuing broad support, and a request for return 
from exile and readmittance to the ranks of the clergy (see e.g. De decretis Nicaenae concilii 40.8-11, 
40.13-14, 40.20, 40.32, 40.36, 40.39). This document Constantine proceeds to quote and attack with a 
mix of personal, political, and theological polemic, all designed to assert both Arius’ personal 
disobedience and the blasphemous and seditious nature of his theology. On the former topic, 
Constantine is particularly incensed by Arius’ assertion that “’we have the multitude,’” (40.6).140 In 
regards to this alleged populism, expressed in Arius’ famous use of musical compositions to spread his 
ideas (40.15), Constantine is openly contemptuous: “But I wish that, as you are seen to be applauded 
most of all by the crowds, in the same way it would seem good to you to excel in piety towards Christ!” 
(40.6).141 In theology, it is piety towards one’s divine superior, not the support of the masses, that is 
decisive. 
As to Arius’ confession of faith, Constantine finds parts of it compatible with his own beliefs, 
particularly in Arius’ forthright assertion of monotheism, belief in an internal constitutive λόγος within 
God, and acceptance of the Son’s use of a human body to carry out his tasks in the Incarnation. Where 
the two part company, however, is in the conclusions Arius believe follow from these principles: “You 
think, holding a wicked faith, that it is necessary to place under God a ‘foreign ὑπόστασις,’ but I 
 
139 For the dating of this document, see Appendix B below. 
140 «πλήθη», φησίν, «ἔχομεν». 
141 ἀλλὰ γὰρ εἴθ’ ὡς τοῖς ὄχλοις ἄριστα συνεκροτῆσθαι δοκεῖς, οὕτω σοι τῇ περὶ τὸν Χριστὸν εὐσεβείᾳ προσῆκε ἀκμάζειν. 
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recognize that the fulness of the power (δυνάμις), transcending and pervading all things, of the Father 
and Son is one οὐσία” (40.14-15).142 The core of Constantine’s objection to Arius’ theology is precisely 
power (δυνάμις), which here is treated practically as a synonym for the key metaphysical terms 
ὑπόστασις and οὐσία. For the divine power to be truly divine, it must be totally full, totally 
transcendent, extending into all things, and—most important of all—fundamentally one. The flaw of 
Arius’ theology, then, is that by detracting from the absolute oneness of divine power by asserting a 
second, subordinate ὑπόστασις, this rogue Alexandrian populist has also, inevitably, come to detract 
from the absoluteness of all other divine qualities as well, as well as their indispensable presence in the 
human realm:  
If, then, you are taking away from that one, from whom it has never been possible to separate 
out anything, not even in the understanding of idle talkers, you are both characterizing him by 
the form of addition and entirely separating the signs of philosophical inquiry from the one to 
whom he has given from himself the entirety of eternity and his indestructible intention 
(ἔννοια), and through himself and through the Church has dispensed the Faith of immortality 
(40.15).143  
The argument of this (again, dense and confusing) passage is twofold. First, and most 
importantly, by asserting a second divine ὑπόστασις, Arius has characterized divinity by way of number, 
more and less, addition and subtraction, and therefore made its unity, power, and other qualities less 
than totally absolute. Secondly, by doing this, he has also denied the means of philosophical inquiry by 
which God is known to be absolutely transcendent, simple, etc, at least insofar as they apply to the Son, 
who (although in every metaphysical sense identical with God himself) is the direct means by which the 
eternal divine will and therefore the Christian faith in immortality are communicated to human beings. 
In separating divine Father from divine Son, then, Arius has denied at one and the same time the 
 
142 σὺ μὲν «ὑπόστασιν ξένην» ὑποτάττειν οἴει δεῖν κακῶς δήπου πιστεύων, ἐγὼ δὲ τῆς ὑπερεξόχου καὶ ἐπὶ πάντα διηκούσης 
δυνάμεως τὸ πλήρωμα τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ υἱοῦ οὐσίαν μίαν εἶναι γινώσκω. 
143 εἰ τοίνυν σὺ ἀφαιρεῖς μὲν ἀπ’ ἐκείνου, ἀφ’ οὗ χωρισθῆναι οὐδὲ διανοίᾳ τῶν ἐρεσχελούντων δεδύνηται οὐδεπώποτε οὐδέν, 
προσθήκης δὲ χαρακτῆρας εἰδοποιεῖς καὶ ὅλως γνωρίσματα ζητήσεων διορίζεις ἐκείνῳ, ᾧ ὁλόκληρον μὲν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ τὴν 
ἀϊδιότητα δέδωκεν, ἀδιάφθορον δὲ τὴν ἔννοιαν, ἀθανασίας δὲ δι’ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἐκκλησίας ἔνειμε πίστιν. 
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absolute unity and fullness of divine power and the two interrelated means by which that power is 
actually known and participated in by human beings: philosophical inquiry and Christian faith. He has, 
implicitly but effectively, cut off the human realm from the singular divine power. 
Far from the babblings of a theological novice, this is in fact a highly sophisticated and 
perspicuous critique of the theological system put forward by Arius—one, however, from a highly 
distinctive perspective, not precisely identical with that of any of the anti-Arian theologians of the time. 
Indeed, Constantine’s fundamental criticism of the assertion of a second ὑπόστασις in God, both in 
terms of theology and epistemology, would apply to an extent also to the theology of the primary 
Alexandrian theologians Alexander and Athanasius, and even more so to the developed Trinitarian 
systems of later Nicene theologians. 
As Constantine acknowledges, Arius’ reasons for making this disgraceful move are in fact 
derived from piety of a sort:  
’Away with it!’ he says, ‘I do not want God to be seen to be subject to the suffering (πάθος) of 
violence (ὕβρις).’ And for this reason, I gather and imagine, are these amazing things in respect 
to the Faith, namely that God, by making the newly-begotten and newly-born οὐσία of Christ, 
has prepared help for himself, as it seems to me. ‘For whatever,’ he says, ‘you have taken away 
from him, by this much have you made him less’ (40.29).144 
 As portrayed by Constantine, Arius’ motivations for his bizarre theology are in fact almost 
identical to his own. Both are fundamentally concerned, in identical terms, with the threat to the 
absoluteness of divine unity and power posed by any detraction or subtraction from the singular divine 
οὐσία and ὑπόστασις. The fundamental difference is from where this threat is seen to emanate. For 
Arius, the primary threat of detraction from divine power comes from God’s direct, unmediated 
involvement in the world, expressed most cogently in the Incarnation and in Christ’s subjection to 
 
144 «ἄπαγε», φησίν, «οὐ βούλομαι τὸν θεὸν ἐγὼ ὕβρεων πάθει δοκεῖν ἐνέχεσθαι». καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ὑποτίθεμαι καὶ πλάττω 
θαυμάσιά γε τῇ πίστει, ὡς ὁ θεὸς νεογενῆ καὶ νεόκτιστον οὐσίαν Χριστοῦ ποιησάμενος βοήθειαν ἑαυτῷ παρεσκευάσατο, ὥς 
γέ μοι δοκεῖ. «ὃ γὰρ ἄν», φησίν, «ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ ἀφέλῃς, τούτῳ ἐλάττονα πεποίηκας». 
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passive suffering and violence. For Constantine, however, it is precisely Arius’ subtraction of these 
allegedly lesser activities from the direct purview of the divine will and operation (that is, of the Son 
conceived of once again as divine willing or activity) that poses the truer threat to divine power:  
He dares to circumscribe you within the circle of a bounded throne. For where is your presence 
not? Or where is it that everyone does not perceive, from your laws pervading all things, your 
own activity (ἐνέργεια)? For you yourself surround all things, and it is not lawful to invent either 
place nor any other thing that is outside of you. In this way your power (δύναμις) with activity 
(ἐνέργεια) is without limit (40.27-28).145 
Here, then, is a resolutely monarchical model of the cosmos, with clear political valences. The 
monarch is monarch precisely because his rule is by nature unbounded and without limit. God is present 
everywhere in his creation precisely because his activity, which for Constantine is identical to the Son 
and is visible most clearly in the laws of nature, the Empire, and the Church, is everywhere. It is for this 
reason that Arius’ attempt to interpose between God and creation a second divine ὑπόστασις is so 
directly offensive. By assigning essential monarchical operations—including the communication and 
legislation of divine law and presence throughout his realm—to a Son truly separate from the Father, 
Arius has necessarily subtracted those operations from the one God, and so circumscribed his limitless 
power. A God reliant on the help of a subordinate to actually carry out his duties, pass and execute laws, 
and be present to and operate in the totality of his realm, is not truly Emperor at all. The divine Emperor 
relies on no one outside himself, and nothing besides his own will and activity, to govern the cosmos. 
As for the objection that assigning the suffering of the Incarnate Christ to God involves outrage 
to the dignity of the divine nature, Constantine fully accepts this premise, but counters it, once again, 
with his own unique Christology. Christ came, not as a man, but rather “in the form of a body” (μορφῇ 
σώματος) (40.32). Constantine is quite explicit that to say that “God is present in Christ” (τὸ ἐν Χριστῷ 
 
145 σὲ τῆς ἀφωρισμένης καθέδρας κύκλῳ περιγράφειν τολμᾷ. ποῦ γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ σὴ παρουσία; ἢ ποῦ τὴν σὴν οὐ πάντες 
ἐνέργειαν ἐκ τῶν ἐπὶ πάντα σου διηκόντων νόμων αἰσθάνονται; πάντα γὰρ αὐτὸς περιέχεις, καὶ ἔξω σου οὔτε τόπον οὔτε ἄλλο 
οὐδὲν ἐπινοεῖσθαι θέμις. οὕτως ἡ σὴ δύναμις μετ’ ἐνεργείας ἐστὶν  ἄπειρος. 
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παρεῖναι τὸν θεόν, 40.33) does not in principle involve any stronger claim than the assertion of God’s 
presence in any other part of the universe. Precisely because (as discussed above) God’s “presence” in 
his creation is by means of will, activity, and law, to say that God is present in the bounded spatial entity 
of the cosmos does not involve ascribing any spatial qualities or limitations to God (40.32). Likewise, 
“each day without question sins happen in the cosmos. And all the same God is present and the 
requirements of justice are not delayed. How, then, is he diminished by this if the greatness of his power 
is perceived everywhere? Not at all, I think” (40.33).146 The fact that a ruler is present throughout his 
realm by means of his laws and activities, including the punishment of wrongdoing, does not mean that 
the ruler is somehow tainted by association with the inferior qualities and sins of his subjects. Just 
because God has chosen to operate by means of a human body in carrying out his laws and activities, 
including the punishment of wrongdoing, does not mean that God himself is tainted by association with 
the sufferings and death of that body. This is simply what the Son, and therefore Christ, is. As 
Constantine in his letter to Nicomedia had described the Son as the Will of God, so now he offers 
another, similar definition for the benefit of Arius: “Christ is the entire law (νόμος) of God, through him 
possessing limitlessness and endlessness” (40.34).147 God acts, operates, passes and executes laws, 
without any limits or boundaries at all, without the aid of any subordinate, throughout the whole 
cosmos subject to him—but remains self-sufficient and alone. 
Another means by which God operates on earth, besides the human body of Christ, is 
Constantine himself. Not only has he taken it upon himself to exile Arius and then write this theological 
open letter to the disgraced Alexandrian priest, he has also taken it upon himself to threaten and punish 
his followers until they are brought to a proper faith in God (e.g 40.39-41). The correctness of this faith 
 
146 καθ’ ἑκάστην δήπουθεν ἡμέραν ἁμαρτήματα ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ γίνεται. καὶ ὅμως ὁ θεὸς πάρεστι καὶ τὰ τῆς δίκης οὐχ ὑστερίζει. 
τί οὖν παρὰ τοῦτο ἐλαττοῦται, εἰ τὸ μέγεθος αὐτοῦ τῆς δυνάμεως τὰ πανταχοῦ διαισθάνεται; οὐδέν, οἶμαι. 
147 ὅλος δὲ θεοῦ νόμος ἐστὶ Χριστός, δι’ αὐτοῦ τὸ ἄπειρον ἅμα καὶ ἀτελεύτητον ἔχων. 
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is grounded, not in the authority of the Council of Nicaea (which in fact is never mentioned in this 
letter), but rather in the preeminent theological abilities of Constantine himself, expressed in a rather 
startling assertion and analogy: “Do you recognize that I, the Man of God, have already understood 
everything?” (40.38).148 Once again, Constantine assigns himself a title associated both with Moses (e.g. 
Deuteronomy 33:1) and the Apostles (1 Timothy 6:11), pairing it with a direct assertion of his own 
preeminent authority in the theological questions under debate. The Apostolic (and therefore episcopal) 
valences of this claim are made even stronger by the following sentence: “But I am in doubt whether it is 
right to remain or depart: for I am no longer able to look upon this man, and I despise this sin, O Arius, 
yes, Arius” (40.38).149 Here, Constantine paraphrases and makes his own, in a somewhat more 
aggressive vein, the famous discourse of the Apostle Paul, torn between duty to his flock and the desire 
to die and be with Christ (Philippians 1:20-26). It is this assertion of his own theological competency and 
authority that buttresses the surprising conclusion of the letter, where Constantine, after condemning 
Arius in the very harshest of terms, in fact grants his request for an appeal and promises to judge his 
case, personally, once again:  
Come to me, come, I say, to a Man of God. Believe that by my own inquiries I will look into the 
unspeakable things of your heart: and if any madness is recognized to exist in you, by calling 
upon the Divinity I will heal you more beautiful than before, making an example of you. But if 
you are shown to be sane in the things of your soul, I will acknowledge the light of truth in you 
and give thanks to God and rejoice with myself in your piety (40.42).150 
This final offer cannot help but cast the preceding letter in a radically different light. To grant the 
appeal of a bishop charged with violent crimes was one thing—to personally grant the appeal of a cleric 
 
148 ἆρα γε συνίης ὡς ἅπαντα ἤδη ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ ἄνθρωπος ἐγὼ ἐξεπίσταμαι; 
149 ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἀπορῶ, πότερον μένειν ἢ ἀπιέναι δεῖ· οὔτε γὰρ βλέπειν εἰς τοῦτον ἔτι δύναμαι καὶ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν ἐπαισχύνομαι, ὦ 
Ἄρειε δῆτα Ἄρειε. 
150 ἧκε πρὸς ἐμέ, ἧκε, φημί, πρὸς θεοῦ ἄνθρωπον. πίστευσον, ὡς ταῖς ἐμαυτοῦ πεύσεσι διερευνήσομαί σου τὰ ἀπόρρητα τῆς 
καρδίας· κἂν μέν τι μανικὸν ἐνεῖναι δόξῃ, τὴν θείαν ἐπικαλεσάμενος χάριν παραδείγματός σε κάλλιον ἰάσομαι. ἐὰν δὲ 




charged precisely with false, heretical teaching was quite another. For Constantine to serve as the final 
court of appeals in such cases would require, not just a technical juridical supremacy, but also a clear 
and obvious supremacy in knowledge of God. This supremacy is itself inescapably theological, and can 
be justified only in theological terms. Taken as a whole, then, the primary purpose of this letter is not to 
condemn Arius or his doctrine, but rather to demonstrate the Emperor’s theological skill and 
consequent ability to make a final and correct judgment on the theological disagreements which had 
divided the episcopate of the East for years and barely been brought to an ambiguous conclusion at 
Nicaea. Even more strikingly, Constantine here claims the ability to judge, not just abstract claims of 
theology, but also the secret thoughts of the hearts of theologians, and the grace to heal and restore the 
erring–all powers well beyond those normally claimed by bishops in judging their fellows.151 Although 
quoted in Athanasius’ defense, nearly three decades after the fact, of the decrees of Nicaea, in this 
letter, Constantine claims, tentatively but definitely, not just a general status as an agent of divinity, like 
Moses or the Apostle Paul, but a preeminent status in law and theology alike, one capable of overruling, 
if necessary, any bishop and any episcopal council. Like the monarchical God spoken of in his letter, 
Constantine requires the help of no subordinates, not even bishops, to frame his laws and enforce them 
in every part of his domain. 
Given the theological position laid out in this letter—based on significant, acknowledged points 
of agreement—it is should not be too surprising that this appeal turned out very well indeed for Arius. 
As discussed in the section above, the disgraced priest’s rehabilitation on the personal authority of the 
 
151 This is perhaps the clearest contradiction of the assertion of Drake 2000, e.g. 266, that in theological matters Constantine 
showed no real interests in the issues involved, since “the rule of consensus does not allow for a litmus test” or for “prying [...] 
in the secret custody of [...] minds and hearts,” and consequently “lip service [was] sufficient” for acceptance by Constantine. In 
fact Constantine, as this letter shows, was both extremely interested in the underlying theological issues and perfectly willing to 
apply litmus tests and pry into the secret thoughts of heart. The preeminent litmus test, however, is not here the creed of the 
Nicaea, but the personal, divinely-favored abilities of the Emperor himself. As Lenski 2016, 79-80, notes in reference to this 
passage, “Constantine thus conceived of himself as the final arbiter of holiness” (80) with the God-given ability to “discern 
Arius’s inner relationship with the divine and to remedy the unholy contagion with which Arius was afflicted” (80). 
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Emperor would result in the end in his acceptance by a significant portion of the Eastern episcopate. The 
preserved documents of the Council of Jerusalem (Apologia contra Arianos 84.2-4), summoned by 
Constantine to inaugurate the new complex of church buildings constructed by the Emperor at vast 
expense in Jerusalem, show very clearly Constantine’s status as the driving force behind the council’s 
acceptance both of Arius and of his theology. As the synodal letter, acknowledges, both this 
unprecedented building project and the accompanying council had been assembled “by the efforts of 
the Most God-loving Emperor Constantine” (84.3)152 while its ecclesiastical agenda and outcome had 
been mandated in advance, on the basis of Constantine’s unique ability to examine theology and 
theologians, in person, and so discern the orthodoxy of their beliefs: 
The grace of God has given us very great joy—a joy which the most God-loving Emperor himself 
caused through his own letters, urging us, as was right, to exile all envy from the Church of God 
and remove all malice far away153 (malice through which the members of God have for a long 
time before this been divided), and with simple and peaceful souls to receive Arius and his allies, 
men whom this good-hating envy had for a little while caused to be put outside the Church. And 
the most God-loving Emperor through his letter bore witness to the Orthodoxy of the Faith of 
these men, a Faith which he himself, after he had learned about it from them and heard it from 
their own mouths, had accepted and had made known to us, attaching to his own letter the 
orthodox teaching of these men in writing (84.3-4).154 
For Constantine himself to believe that he possessed the divine favor to authoritatively discern 
the secrets of Arius’ heart and theology alike was one thing; for this belief to be publicly endorsed by a 
 
152 σπουδῇ τοῦ θεοφιλεστάτου βασιλέως Κωνσταντίνου 
153 The use of terms for “exile” and “removal” almost certainly possesses a double meaning here, with the “envy” and “malice” 
standing in for the envious and malicious persons—people unwilling to accept the rehabilitation of Arius—whom the synod was 
expected to exile and banish. In keeping with Constantine’s practice during this period, the council’s results were not only 
clearly mandated in advance, but backed up by Imperial force that would depose and exile any dissenters from these 
necessarily “unanimous” decisions. The first victim of this policy was Marcellus of Ancyra, who refused to communicate with 
Arius and was publicly condemned by the council and then deposed and exiled by another council summoned by Constantine 
not long after (see e.g. Sozomen, Historia Ecclesiastica 2.33). 
154 πλείονα θυμηδίαν ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ χάρις πάρεσχεν, ἣν ἐποίησεν αὐτός τε ὁ θεοφιλέστατος βασιλεὺς διὰ γραμμάτων οἰκείων 
τοῦθ’, ὅπερ ἐχρῆν, παρορμήσας πάντα μὲν ἐξορίσαι τῆς ἐκκλησίας τοῦ θεοῦ φθόνον καὶ πᾶσαν μακρὰν ἀπελάσαι βασκανίαν, 
δι’ ἧς τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ μέλη πάλαι πρότερον διειστήκει, ἡπλωμένῃ δὲ καὶ εἰρηναίᾳ ψυχῇ δέξασθαι τοὺς περὶ Ἄρειον, οὓς πρός τινα 
καιρὸν ὁ μισόκαλος φθόνος ἔξω γενέσθαι τῆς ἐκκλησίας εἰργάσατο. ἐμαρτύρει δὲ τοῖς ἀνδράσιν ὁ θεοφιλέστατος βασιλεὺς 
διὰ τῆς ἐπιστολῆς πίστεως ὀρθοτομίαν, ἣν παρ’ αὐτῶν πυθόμενος αὐτός τε δι’ ἑαυτοῦ παρὰ ζώσης φωνῆς αὐτῶν ἀκούσας 
ἀπεδέξατο ἡμῖν τε φανερὰν κατεστήσατο ὑποτάξας τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ γράμμασιν ἔγγραφον τὴν τῶν ἀνδρῶν ὀρθοδοξίαν 
94 
 
council of bishops was quite another. The Council of Nicaea, however much it had relied on Constantine 
for the resources necessary to summon such a large gathering, and however much it may have bent to 
his will in terms of location, agenda, and his own presence and participation in its debates, had not 
allowed him to simply dictate its outcome in advance—let alone boasted about it afterwards.  
As I have argued, that the bishops of the Christian Church would come to accept a quasi-
religious authority for the Emperor was by no means an inevitable outcome of the existence of a 
Christian Emperor. This end had been achieved, as previously emphasized, by means of the efforts of 
bishops who had once been, along with Arius himself, objects of Imperial wrath: including not only 
Eusebius of Caesarea (whose theology and career will be covered in the following chapter), but even 
more importantly a bishop already depicted, in Constantine’s own words, as a persecutor of fellow 
Christians, ally of tyranny, and agent of cosmic disorder: Eusebius of Nicomedia. There can be little 
doubt that Eusebius represented the largest single beneficiary of the reversals of this period, from the 
depths of Imperial disapprobation to the heights of Imperial favor.  
Unfortunately, relatively little is known about either the career or activities of this Eusebius, 
who, although throughout his life one of the most powerful and influential bishops in the Eastern 
Empire, shied away from written controversy, leaving to other authors (and a few fragmentary letters) 
the accounting of his viewpoint and activities. Having begun his career as bishop of Berytus in Syria, by 
the time of the Arian controversy he had already managed, through unclear means, to transfer to the 
influential episcopate of Nicomedia in Asia Minor, the seat of the Eastern Imperial court of Licinius.155 
During the series of episcopal conflicts leading up to Nicaea, he was consistently treated as the main 
 
155 See e.g. the encyclical letter of Alexander known as ἑνὸς σώματος and preserved in Athanasius, De decretis 35, where 
Athanasius, ghost-writing on behalf of his bishop Alexander (see note 7 in section 4.2 below), accuses Eusebius of metaphorical 
adultery inasmuch as “although he deserted Berytus and laid lustful eyes on the Church of Nicomedia he has not been punished 
for this” (καταλείψας τὴν Βηρυτὸν καὶ ἐποφθαλμίσας τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ Νικομηδέων [καὶ] οὐκ ἐκδεδίκηται κατ’ αὐτοῦ, 35.4).  
95 
 
leader of the faction supporting Arius against Alexander, far eclipsing all others, including Eusebius of 
Caesarea.156 Most notably, a letter of appeal from Arius to the bishop of Nicomedia as a friend, fellow 
disciple of the Antiochene martyr Lucian, and possible advocate is extant (from Epiphanius, Refutatio 
69.6), as is a fragment of an affirmative reply from Eusebius to Arius (from Athanasius, De synodis 17), 
and, most notably, a full letter addressed to Paulinus the bishop of Tyre (from Theodoret, Historia 
Ecclesiastica 1.6.1-8), likely representative of a large number of similar letters sent to bishops across the 
Eastern Roman Empire, in which Eusebius of Nicomedia lays out his theological case and canvasses for 
his fellow bishop’s support against Alexander.157 Following the Council of Nicaea, however, and 
Constantine’s unprecedented personal denunciation of him to his former flock in Nicomedia, the leader 
of the defeated party had found himself out of power and favor with both Emperor and episcopate, with 
little hope of regaining either his position or his former Imperial influence. Such desperate hope as 
remained would shortly be rewarded many times over.  
A letter is extant from within a few years of Nicaea, in which Eusebius, together with his fellow 
exile Theognotis of Nicaea, formally retracts his objections to the Creed of Nicaea and the ὁμοούσιος 
and asks for his fellow bishops to intercede with the Emperor for his reinstatement (from Socrates 
Scholasticus, Historia Ecclesiastica 1.14.2). This same document acknowledges that Arius himself had by 
this time already been recalled from exile by the Emperor and readmitted to communion by at least 
 
156 See again the encyclical letter of Alexander known as ἑνὸς σώματος, where Eusebius of Caesarea is not even mentioned, but 
where Eusebius of Nicomedia is singled out as the one who, “because he has decided that the affairs of the whole Church 
belong to him [...] has made himself leader of these apostates and undertaken to write letters everywhere in support of them” 
(νομίσας ἐπ’ αὐτῷ κεῖσθαι τὰ τῆς ἐκκλησίας [...] προίσταται καὶ τούτων τῶν ἀποστατῶν καὶ γράφειν ἐπεχείρησε πανταχοῦ 
συνιστῶν αὐτούς, De decretis 35.4). 
157 As Kopecek 1979, 45-47, comments, this letter, “while not exceedingly original, was a forceful statement of the early Arian 
position” (46), focusing on the Son’s unknowable generation from God’s will, not his οὐσία, and therefore his possession of a 
“perfect similarity to the disposition and power of the one who made him” (τελείαν ὁμοιότητα διαθέσεώς τε καὶ δυνάμεως τοῦ 
πεποιηκότος) while remaining nonetheless “absolutely different from him in nature and power” (ὁλοσχερῶς ἕτερον τῇ φύσει 
καὶ τῇ δυνάμει, Theodoret 1.6.3). 
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some bishops. With the reinstatement of Arius, that of his foremost ally was not long in coming.158 From 
his restored position as bishop of the Imperial court at Nicomedia, now home, not to Licinius, but his 
former rival Constantine, Eusebius seems to have rapidly regained his influential position with both the 
Emperor and the bishops of his region. Apart from the grudging acceptance of the language of the Creed 
of Nicaea contained in this petition, there is no evidence that he had in any way altered his fundamental 
theological viewpoint159—or his leadership of an episcopal faction that would, in the years ahead, 
succeed in having many of their opponents deposed and exiled at the command of the Emperor.  
Some of the depositions during this period of bishops from among Arius’ formerly triumphant 
opponents have been already covered, and more will be treated in the next chapter. What is clear in my 
judgment, however, from all the evidence covered so far, including the rehabilitation of Arius and 
Eusebius and the depositions in relatively short order of their enemies Eustathius, Marcellus of Ancyra, 
and the new bishop of Alexandria Athanasius, along with numerous others,160 is that, in the ecclesiastical 
 
158 It is clear that the recall of Eusebius from exile occurred around the same time as the deposition of Eustathius of Antioch, 
but ancient and modern historians have long disagreed on both the dating and the order of the two events, besides generally 
placing them in either 327 or 328. For a recent, and in my judgment convincing, account which places Eustathius’ deposition in 
the fall of 327 and Eusebius’ recall in mid-328, see S. Parvis 2006a, 101-107. 
159 See in particular the purported “Council of Nicomedia” at which, according to the Eunomian historian Philostorgius (Historia 
Ecclesiastica 2.7), Eusebius of Nicomedia upon his return to his diocese summoned a large council of 250 bishops that 
promulgated a creed intended to replace that of Nicaea and formally anathematized the (perhaps already dead) Alexander of 
Alexandria, Eustathius of Antioch, and the ὁμοούσιος. While Philostorgius’ evidence is here as elsewhere open to question, the 
existence of this council is plausible and has been supported by scholars (see e.g. Hanson 1988, 174-178, Bleckmann 1996, 105, 
who see it as in some sense a continuation of Nicaea supported by Constantine himself, and similarly Simonetti 1975, 120-124, 
Barnes 1981, 229, who date the initial reception of Arius back into communion here, prior to the recall of Eusebius of 
Nicomedia himself, versus S. Parvis 2006a, 111-118, who sees it as a smaller assembly called by Eusebius of Nicomedia on his 
own authority following his return from exile). Whatever its precise nature, it is possible that Constantine himself attended the 
council and directly approved its results (see e.g. Barnes 1981, 229, Lenski 2016, 272-273). 
160 Athanasius in Historia Arianorum gives the names of nine bishops besides himself, Eusthatius, and Marcellus who in his 
judgment were exiled unjustly by the “Arians” during the reign of Constantine (see note 50 in section 7.3 below). Many of 
these, as S. Parvis 2006a, 109-110, notes, seem to have come from Syria and Phoenicia, and likely reflect a purge of Eustathius’ 
supporters in these provinces by the new administration in Antioch, carried out in part on the basis of the vastly expanded 
powers granted to Metropolitan bishops by the Council of Antioch in 328 (the council which also attempted to appoint Eusebius 
of Caesarea bishop of Antioch). This council made unprecedented innovations in existing ecclesial practice by requiring that all 
bishops be chosen and ordained by the provincial metropolitan in the presence of the majority of the bishops of the province 
while denying the validity of any appointment made in the local diocese alone (Canones 16, 17, 19, 23 cf. Gryson 1979, 306-
309)—thus providing the basis for a centralized takeover of key provinces starting with Antioch. Chadwick 1958, 298-300, also 
argues for the exile sometime before 343 of one Paulinus of Adana, a bishop found in extant lists of the Council of Antioch in 
324 and the Council of Nicaea, on charges of witchcraft and adultery. In general, the opinion of S. Parvis 2006a, 110, that the 
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balance of the Eastern Church, Constantine had decisively thrown his support behind the faction of 
bishops that had lost at Nicaea against their rivals.161  
The question of why this shift in alliances took place is naturally a complex one, for which many 
hypotheses have been proposed, from the deleterious influence of eunuchs at the Imperial court 
(championed much later by Athanasius in Historia Arianorum) to the conniving of Constantine’s 
allegedly “Arian” sister Constantia (favored by 5th century Nicene historians) to disillusionment brought 
on by the alleged misbehavior of prominent bishops of the Nicene party162 to the manipulation of an 
Emperor with too much faith in the sacred authority of bishops and not enough confidence in his own163 
to the logical result of Constantine’s efforts at achieving religious unity across differences of theological 
 
successful capture of the prestigious Church of Antioch by allies of Eustathius’ rival Eusebius of Nicomedia should be seen as 
perhaps the most important shift in the ecclesiastical balance of power in the Eastern Empire prior to the death of Constantine 
seems to me justified (though her conclusion that the result was that “the alliance which had been defeated at Nicaea would 
control ecclesiastical events in the East [...] for the next thirty years” is somewhat hyperbolic). The point of Lenski 2016, 272, 
that the absence of a single widely-respected bishop for the Christian community in Antioch over the next decades led both to a 
reduction in the overall prestige of the city and made it “a locus for outside power plays by super-regional leaders who 
exploited its ataxia in order to boost their own power,” is also apropos.  
161 The transition between Constantine’s attacks on Arius and his overt support for Arius and his closest allies corresponds 
temporally to the shift in Constantine’s public images and acts argued for by Lenski 2016, 42-45, c. 330, in which Constantine 
gradually “detached himself from direct involvement with army affairs and focused instead on the instruction of his ministers 
and subjects in Christian principles using both word and deed” (45), including didactic orations on Christian topics (including 
Oratio ad coetum sanctorum) and public programmes aimed at “projecting the image of a divine monarch” (43).  
162 This is the position of S. Parvis 2006a, 106-107, who sees Constantine’s “otherwise utterly inexplicable volte-face [...] only 
two years or so after Nicaea” (107) as the direct result of the successful secret proceedings brought to Constantine by Eusebius 
of Caesarea and his allies against the prominent Antiochene bishop Eustathius, an event that succeeded in convincing 
Constantine that Eustathius was in fact guilty of sexual misconduct and so (in tandem with the withdrawal or dismissal of the 
previously influential bishop Hosius  of Cordoba) led him “to doubt the whole Nicene settlement” (106). 
163 This is broadly the position of Barnes 1981, who asserts that “the twelve years after Nicaea are a sad tale of how enduring 
enmities thwarted Constantine’s desire for peace and concord within the Church.” The veracity of Barnes’ narrative of the years 
following Nicaea is in my judgment fatally compromised by his belief that “Constantine did not fail because he attempted to 
impose a theological solution of his own by force,” but because “[h]e acquiesced too often in the hasty verdicts of partisan 
councils—and he was totally unwilling to depose a bishop on his own authority” (225). As should be clear, I firmly believe that, 
his general desire to preserve the basic model of episcopal judgment notwithstanding, Constantine did in fact believe strongly  
both in his own ability to judge theological matters in a manner equal or superior to bishops, and in his own authority depose 
bishops (whether by means of councils or directly following appeals). 
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opinion.164 After examining Constantine’s actions and stated beliefs during this period, however, I 
believe that a somewhat simpler narrative can be constructed.   
In the first place, it is certainly true that Constantine’s alliance with the pro-Arius episcopal 
faction was undergirded by a confluence of interests between Constantine and the skilled episcopal 
operators Eusebius of Caesarea and Eusebius of Nicomedia. It is, I believe, no accident that, in the 
conflict between the anti- and pro-Arius alliances prior to Nicaea, the leaders of the former group had 
been the bishops of Alexandria and Antioch, traditionally prominent sees within the episcopal system, 
while the leaders of the latter faction were bishops whose prominence derived from other, more novel 
means. Eusebius of Nicomedia’s prominence both before and after Nicaea derived not only from his 
own abilities, but from the fact of his diocese containing the newly-established Tetrarchic Imperial court 
of Diocletian, Licinius, and finally Constantine. Eusebius of Caesarea, on the other hand, derived his 
influence not only from the metropolitan status of his see, but also from his deserved fame as a 
 
164 This is broadly the position of Drake 2000, 258-272, 309-321, etc. Though Drake’s attacks on models of Constantine’s 
behavior during these years that “make him appear either Machiavellian or inept, [...] inconstant or feckless, subject to 
whatever dominant personality saw him last” (258) accounts which fail to “take into account [...] the novelty of the conciliar 
arrangements being worked out between Constantine and the bishops” (258-259) and “depend on unspoken assumptions 
about what Constantine must have intended” (259) are very apt, his own proposal of a Constantine consistently driven by 
nothing more than a desire for consensus fails to in any way account for the copious evidence of Constantine’s own theological 
interests and so cannot fully explain why Constantine would have thrown his favor so decisively behind what was clearly (as of 
Nicaea) an unpopular minority faction. Drake is correct that “only a sincere commitment to the elusive goal of religious unity 
can explain his persistence in the face of singular and mounting political costs” (271), and he is correct likewise that 
“Constantine sought unity in order to achieve the traditional imperial goal of peace and legitimacy,” so that the bishops’ “idea 
of unity was not identical to Constantine’s” (320), but here as elsewhere he fails to take into account either the social 
complexity or the theological valence of attempts to create (or impose) unity in the 4th century Church and Empire alike. Most 
fundamentally, his reconstruction, based largely on modern stereotypes about politics and religion, of a Constantine whose 
model of unity insisted that “all members must be preserved intact” and “called for the inclusion of the greatest possible 
number as a goal in itself” and on the other hand of a singular episcopal faction whose model of unity expressed a value system 
where “right belief” was paramount and “purity was more important than wholeness,” such that “they insisted on raising the 
threshold for their definition of monotheism to the point where even variant Christian belief would be excluded” (320), bears 
little resemblance to the positions on unity that have been sketched out so far and will be sketched in the chapters to come. As 
I have already argued, Constantine’s idea of unity was focused nearly as much as his episcopal allies and opponents on the 
importance of right belief and was certainly compatible with the ruthless exclusion of opposition, precisely because its primary 
goal was not consensus among the greatest possible number of equal citizens but rather on his own preeminent position as 
ruler and bringer of unity, peace, and justice, by will and command, enforced by force if necessary, to his multiple, inferior 
subjects both good and bad. It is precisely, I would argue, Drake’s lack of attention to theological matters that is responsible for 
his misapprehension of Constantine’s ideal of unity and his substitution of beliefs more compatible with modern post-
Enlightenment political ideals. 
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theologian, chronologist, historian, and guardian of the extensive library assembled at Caesarea by 
Origen of Alexandria. The influence of Alexander, Athanasius, and Eustathius, in other words, depended 
predominantly on their presiding over extensive, pre-existing episcopal networks developed over the 
preceding centuries of illicit Christian activity. The two Eusebiuses, on other hand, had to gain such 
influence by other means, through personal reputation, intelligence, and, clearly in the case of Eusebius 
of Nicomedia, active access to the centers of Imperial power.165 For a Constantine interested in inserting 
himself in a preeminent position within the existing episcopal system, such bishops would be natural 
allies166—while the leaders of traditionally prominent sees, representatives of networks of episcopal 
power that had for centuries proven intractable to hostile Imperial intervention, would be, to an extent, 
natural enemies. Bishops seeking a new center of prominence and unity within the episcopate were met 
by an Emperor seeking to be just such a center.167  
 
165 See Drake 2000, 393-397, who contrasts Eusebius of Nicomedia and Athanasius as practitioners, respectively, of an “insider 
politics” focused on private access to power and an “outsider politics” based on “making up for in numbers what he lacked in 
access” (397). This definition of outside versus inside, however, would itself in the 4th century involve a theological claim, since, 
as we will see, the question under dispute between these different episcopal factions was to a large degree what the legitimate 
sources of power and authority for both bishops and Emperors actually was. Athanasius would eventually (see chapter 6) come 
to argue decisively that his reliance on direct divine authority based on popular support and networks of prominent dioceses, in 
contrast to access to the alleged “center” of earthly and divine authority in the person of the Emperor, in fact reflected the true 
“insider” norm of power within the Church.  
166 This reasoning is designed in part to bypass traditional scholarly constructions of Constantine as being under the influence of 
particular “ecclesiastical advisors” (which typically have included Hosius  of Cordoba, Eusebius of Nicomedia, Athanasius of 
Alexandria, and/or Eusebius of Caesarea) who held more or less official and dominating positions of influence and so were able 
to direct the Emperor’s policy towards their preferred outcomes. The challenge of Warmington 1988 against such 
constructions—namely, that very little evidence exists either for such quasi-official positions or for the direct influence of 
bishops on Constantine’s religious acts and policies, which generally follow his own idiosyncratic reasoning processes—remains 
in my judgment highly compelling. To argue that Constantine in pursuing his own theological and ecclesiastical goals would 
have consulted bishops as experts on particular points of theology or practice and allied himself with those who shared 
compatible goals is emphatically not to ascribe Constantine’s acts or policies to the dominating influence of one episcopal 
advisor or another. 
167 This principle helps to provide a structural grounding for the overly personal construction of the triumph of the Eusebian 
faction in terms of Imperial favor given in Drake 2000, 258-272. No more than Athanasius was Eusebius of Caesarea ultimately 
willing to “place peace at a higher value than quibbling over abstract terms” (265). As I will show in the next chapter, Eusebius 
of Caesarea certainly placed a higher value on theological correctness and the triumph of his own faction than on peace in the 
sense of the absence of conflict. Where he and his party did distinguish themselves, I would suggest, is precisely their 
willingness to cooperate with the Emperor, in a clearly hierarchical fashion, in the carrying out of his purposes in the Church, 
foremost among them the deceptively simple one of assuming “effective leadership of such an organization” (Drake 2000, 268). 
This was in part (as I will argue) for theological reasons, and in part precisely because as a minority network the pro-Arius 
alliance had fewer institutional commitments, allies, and bases of power to restrict their actions. As the presider over a vast 
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Still, this relatively self-interested explanation has, in my judgment, clear limits. An Emperor 
merely seeking power for himself within the Christian Church had other strategies to pursue, strategies 
that need not involve overseeing episcopal councils, engaging in theological debate and discussion with 
exiled priests, aiding favored bishops in their conciliar projects, or exiling leaders with powerful local 
bases of support and so instigating civil unrest in significant portions of the Empire. More logical for 
many Imperial purposes was the strategy pursued later by Julian, who tolerated and even encouraged 
Christian squabbles from a safe distance in such a way as to break down episcopal networks of power in 
favor of his own. The outcome of Constantine’s overall theological policies ended up having rather 
opposite effects, since, as H.A. Drake puts it, “Constantine devoted considerable personal resources to 
achieving Christian consensus and in the process weakened considerably his own capacity for 
independent action—his own, and that of his successors.”168 By immersing himself so completely in the 
episcopal system and its theological debates, Constantine, as I will show in later chapters, had involved 
the Emperor in new and burdensome responsibilities, and created new vulnerabilities for his authority 
and those of his successors. The sheer expense, time, and difficulty of Constantine’s efforts, combined 
with their eventually deleterious effects on the stability of the Empire, is a significant indicator of a basic 
sincerity.  
Fundamentally, I believe that the shift in support from the anti- to the pro-Arius faction of 
bishops in the years after Nicaea can most simply and cogently be explained by the hypothesis that, in 
his personal interview(s) with Arius and eventual close contacts with Eusebius of Nicomedia and 
Eusebius of Caesarea, Constantine was in fact, to a significant degree, persuaded by the theological 
 
network of bishops within Egypt with close ties to other traditionally prominent sees, Athanasius simply could not be as pliant 
to Imperial wishes, particularly in matters with significant factional importance for his own flock and his episcopal allies, as 
could relatively unattached bishops like Eusebius of Caesarea and Eusebius of Nicomedia—without, that is, risking his personal 
and institutional prestige and therefore his basic position and authority. 
168 Drake 2000, 316. 
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claims of these men.169 Given the theological ability, clear and comprehensive knowledge of Arius’ own 
theology, and lack of reference to the decrees of Nicaea in Constantine’s post-Nicaea letters, I consider 
any scenario that involves Constantine being somehow tricked by Arius, Eusebius, or their allies on the 
basis of their presumed agreement with the theological beliefs of the dominant faction to be 
monumentally unlikely, however closely it conforms to the later polemical Nicene assertion of the 
theological incompetence of Emperors as such in relation to clerics. In fact, given the clear interest in 
Arius’ theology found in Epistula ad Arium et Arrianos, which singles out the common points in Arius’ 
and Constantine’s theology while presenting Arius with specific objections which would have to be 
surmounted to gain Constantine’s confidence, the most likely scenario for Arius’ rehabilitation is simply 
that the exiled priest, in his eventual interview with Constantine,170 not only signed the Creed of Nicaea, 
but also successfully answered the Emperor’s distinctive critiques. Given Arius’ own theological ability 
and charisma—given the Emperor’s clear confidence in his own ability to correctly discern and judge 
individuals and theologies alike—and especially, as I will argue in later chapters, given the clear ability of 
this theology to be retailored in a distinctively monarchical and Constantinian fashion—Arius was able to 
bypass the Council of Nicaea entirely by appeal to the one authority more powerful even than the 
assembled bishops of the world: the Christian Emperor himself. With the acceptance of the orthodoxy of 
Arius, his close allies—even ones so formerly hated as Eusebius of Nicomedia—could be summoned 
from exile to act as authoritative interpreters of Christian orthodoxy and allies in the management of 
 
169 While extremely rare in modern scholarship, the most prominent scholar to have supported this basic position is Timothy 
Barnes (Barnes 2011, 140-142), who while avoiding direct argumentation states that “by the criteria employed by Athanasius 
and his ecclesiastical allies, the emperor Constantine was an ‘Arian’ and it is an offense to history to pretend that his personal 
beliefs were orthodox in the later sense of that term” while harshly criticizing the failure of modern scholars to recognize this 
“obvious truth”: “If we wish to understand Christianity in the Roman Empire, we must respect ancient evidence, not ride 
roughshod over it because of our own predilections” (141). 
170 There is another letter from Constantine to Arius, preserved in Socrates Scholasticus, Historia Ecclesiastica 1.25.7-8, in which 
Constantine expresses his surprise that Arius has not yet responded to his earlier offer of a private appeal, and offers him public 
Imperial transportation to court. 
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the Church, with their first task the implementation of the Imperial rehabilitation of Arius and his 
theology in the episcopate at large. 
This hypothesis explains with relative simplicity the basic facts of the years after Nicaea, which 
are not in question: namely, Constantine’s public rehabilitation of Arius; his multiple attempts, through 
letters and episcopal councils, to enforce acceptance of this rehabilitation over the course of nearly ten 
years from 327 to Arius’ death in 336; his increasingly close association with Eusebius of Nicomedia, 
culminating in his baptism on his deathbed by the bishop formerly castigated as a treasonous heretic;171 
his seeming endorsement of Eusebius of Caesarea’s theological positions expressed in speeches and 
tracts; and his participation in numerous processes overseen by the two Eusebiuses and resulting in the 
deposition of prominent bishops of the party that had opposed them before Nicaea.172 
As I will argue in the next chapter, the prominent ally of Arius Eusebius of Caesarea developed, 
on the basis of numerous theological and social concerns dating back to the beginning of his career in 
the late 3rd century, a clear, comprehensive theological system that, while based clearly on the 
inferiority, separation, and subordination of the Son to the Father, also claimed to establish a single, 
universal system of monarchical authority for the cosmos as a whole. Eusebius’ system, moreover, was 
fully compatible with the basic concerns for unity, hierarchy, and stability characteristic of Constantine’s 
theology, and would have provided a clear response to every one of the objections formulated to the 
theology of Arius by Constantine after Nicaea.  
 
171 For Constantine’s baptism by Eusebius and its treatment in both contemporary accounts and later mythology, see in 
particular Fowden 1994, Yarnold 1993. 
172 In addition to these points of evidence, it is worth mentioning the claim of the 5th century Eunomian historian Philostorgius 
that Constantine in fact went so far after his rapproachment with Arius as to “send letters everywhere in which he tore apart 
the ὁμοούσιος and maintained the ἑτεροούσιος” (γράμματα πανταχοῦ διαπέμψαι τὸ μὲν ὁμοούσιον διασύροντα, κρατύνοντα 
δὲ τὸ ἑτεροούσιον) (2.1). While no such letter is preserved in any of our sources (not even in Philostorgius, who survives only in 
epitomes from which any documentary evidence has been excised), Constantine’s attested proclivity for discussing theology in 
epistolary form grants the account a basic plausibility. 
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In 336, in the aftermath of the Council of Jerusalem, where Arius had been rehabilitated and 
shared communion with a vast body of bishops, the Council of Tyre, which had led to the exile of 
Athanasius after a failed appeal to the Emperor, and the Council of Constantinople, where the 
prominent anti-Arius bishop Marcellus of Ancyra had been deposed after another failed appeal to the 
Emperor,173 Constantine appointed Eusebius of Caesarea—a prominent architect and participant in all 
three of these councils and condemnations—to deliver a properly Christian panegyric on the occasion of 
the thirtieth anniversary of his reign.174 In this panegyric, examined in detail in Chapter Two, Eusebius 
set forth a system of cosmic monarchy in which everything—including not only the order of the cosmos 
itself but also Constantine’s holding of Imperial power—hinged on the separation and subordination of a 
clearly inferior Son. By Eusebius’ own (admittedly self-interested) account, Constantine reacted to this 
presentation with enthusiastic agreement. However suspect Eusebius’ portrayal of his relationship with 
Constantine may be, he has, nonetheless, preserved Constantine’s reaction to an earlier written 
catechetical text that is very consonant with such enthusiasm for Eusebius’ theology:  
It is the greatest undertaking, greater than all the power of discourses, to speak worthily the 
mysteries of Christ [...] for it is impossible for human beings to worthily describe the divinity, 
even for those who are able to contemplate him. Nonetheless I have felt great wonder at you 
for your love of learning and love of honor and have read your book with pleasure, and have 
ordered, as you yourself wanted for your book, that it be given out to the many who truly 
devote themselves to the service of the divinity. Seeing, therefore, with how great delight we 
receive gifts of this sort from Your Sagacity, devote yourself to giving us joy with succeeding 
discourses, for which you confess that you were trained (Vita Constantini 4.35.1-3).175 
 
173 As S. Parvis 2006a, 128-129 (cf. S. Parvis 2006b 99-101) notes, the Council of Constantinople, at which Constantine was 
personally present, seems to have been no more a representative assembly than that of Tyre. As she argues, not only is it 
possible to correlate up to fifteen of the bishops present with prominent allies of Eusebius of Nicomedia, but the council’s 
membership almost totally excluded bishops from the provinces of central Asia Minor in the vicinity of Ancyra, the region 
where Marcellus had for twenty-two years been one of the most important and influential bishops. There can in my judgment 
be little doubt that these details were once again arranged by Constantine himself, in conjunction with his now-favored 
episcopal allies, to achieve an essentially pre-determined result. 
174 As Lenski 2016, 44, notes, the very fact that the emperor offered the task of delivering the keynote oration on this 
quintessentially political occasion to a Christian bishop constitutes a powerful indicator of the image he was then striving to 
project”—one which bound together political concerns with Christian theology as never before. 
175 Τὸ μὲν ἐγχείρημα μέγιστον καὶ πάσης λόγων δυνάμεως κρεῖττον Χριστοῦ μυστήρια κατ’ ἀξίαν εἰπεῖν τήν τε τοῦ πάσχα 
ἀντιλογίαν τε καὶ γένεσιν, λυσιτελῆ τε καὶ ἐπίπονον τελεσιουργίαν, ἑρμηνεῦσαι τὸν προσήκοντα τρόπον· τὸ γὰρ θεῖον 
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  Given what I have established concerning Constantine’s interest in Christian theological issues, 
his own ability to understand and discourse on these topics, his forthright belief in the importance of 
these theological distinctions for divine service and political order alike, and his willingness to argue with 
and severely punish malefactors against theological truth, it is hardly plausible that on all these 
occasions he could have simply failed to detect the contradictions between Eusebius’ strongly and 
pervasively subordinationist theology and his own initial belief in a total monadic unity of Father and 
Son. The far more plausible conclusion, in my judgment, is that Constantine was in fact persuaded by 
Eusebius on these controverted points, just as he had earlier been persuaded by Arius’ responses to his 
own theological objections. In Eusebius’ hierarchical theology of cosmic monarchy and political order, 
Constantine had found words with which to express his own more inchoate thoughts on the divinity.  
1.5: 
Oratio ad Coetum Sanctorum 
“Oration to the Saints” 
Still, for this theological and historical case to be clearly established requires a text where 
Constantine himself is found, not only endorsing the theological position of someone else, but 
expressing similar beliefs in his own terms. In fact, just such a text has survived:176 Oratio ad coetum 
 
ἀνθρώποις ἀδύνατον κατ’ ἀξίαν φράσαι, καὶ τοῖς νοῆσαι δυνατοῖς. πλὴν ὅμως ὑπερθαυμάσας σε τῆς φιλομαθείας τε καὶ 
φιλοτιμίας, αὐτός τε τὸ βιβλίον ἀνέγνων ἀσμένως, καὶ τοῖς πλείοσιν, οἵ γε τῇ περὶ τὸ θεῖον λατρείᾳ γνησίως προσανέχουσι, 
καθὰ ἐβουλήθης, ἐκδοθῆναι προσέταξα. συνορῶν τοίνυν μεθ’ ὅσης θυμηδίας τὰ τοιαῦτα παρὰ τῆς σῆς ἀγχινοίας δῶρα 
λαμβάνομεν, συνεχεστέροις ἡμᾶς λόγοις εὐφραίνειν, οἷς ἐντεθράφθαι σαυτὸν ὁμολογεῖς, προθυμήθητι· (θέοντα γάρ σε, τὸ 
τοῦ λόγου, πρὸς τὰ συνήθη σπουδάσματα παρορμῶμεν), ὅπου γε καὶ τὸν εἰς τὴν Ῥωμαίων τοὺς σοὺς πόνους μεταρρυθμίζοντα 
γλῶτταν οὐκ ἀνάξιον ηὑρῆσθαί σοι τῶν συγγραμμάτων ἡ τοσαύτη πεποίθησις δείκνυσιν, εἰ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα τὰ καλὰ τῶν λόγων 
ἡ τοιαύτη ἑρμηνεία ὑφίστασθαι κατ’ ἀξίαν ἀδυνάτως ἔχει. 
176 The survival of this text in particular is not, of course, an accident—it was deliberately appended by Eusebius of Caesarea to 
his Vita Constantini along with his own De laudibus Constantini (analyzed in section 2.5 below). Although the two speeches 
differ substantially in style, orientation, and theological terminology—more than enough to deny the thesis that Eusebius has 
forged or altered the original theological presentation of Oratio ad coetum sanctorum—they possess in common, as I will argue, 
a distinctively subordinationist and monarchical theological viewpoint on the relations between Father and Son. Barnes 1981, 
271, is thus almost certainly correct that Eusebius’ goal in appending these particular speeches was to “establish two crucial 
theses: Eusebius is the authoritative interpreter of the Constantinian empire, and emperor and bishop agree on fundamental 
theological issues” (271).  
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sanctorum, an extended discourse delivered by Constantine to a Christian audience and preserved in its 
totality as an appendix to Eusebius of Caesarea’s Vita Constantini. While the dating and precise occasion 
for this speech has long divided scholars,177 in my judgment the most convincing hypothesis is that of 
H.A. Drake, who, noting the complexity of the various positions and the lack of solid internal markers of 
chronology, argues for its nature “as Constantine’s version of the stump speech that gets modified as 
needed to suit a particular audience or occasion,” which “Constantine kept reworking over an extended 
period of time and delivered over and over in different versions,” with the extant text being the latest 
version found by Eusebius of Caesarea in preparing Vita Constantini in the closing years of Constantine’s 
reign.178 Consonant with position, I would argue that the similarities between the theology of Father and 
Son contained in this speech and those of Eusebius of Caesarea, Eusebius of Nicomedia, and other 
theological allies of Arius, and the direct contradiction between it and the theology of divine unity 
present in the immediately post-Nicene letters I have examined mean that the work in its final form 
should be placed later in Constantine’s reign, at least after 327 when the initial rapprochement with 
Arius and his theology began—though it remains a possibility both that large parts of the present text 
remain unchanged from previous periods and that the initial reason for the composition was the lead-up 
to Nicaea, when Constantine would have been expected to demonstrate his theological interests and 
expertise to groups of clergy for the first time.  
Whatever its exact provenance, Oratio ad coetum sanctorum is without question the fullest and 
most comprehensive expression of Constantine’s theological perspective in existence. As H.A. Drake has 
again noted, from contemporary sources Constantine seems to have been relatively unique among 
Roman Emperors in his interest both in taking part in public discourse on philosophical and theological 
 
177 In addition to the argument here, see the further chronological discussion in Appendix B. 
178 Drake 2000, 295-296. 
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topics and in delivering public speeches himself, an interest Drake connects logically with a desire to 
emulate or even “compete with” the popular power of episcopal preaching to directly “shape the 
thinking of his community” and “to ensure the success of the type of Christianity which he favored.”179 
Such a speech, then, delivered on a public occasion in the presence of Christian faithful and clerics, 
would serve as perhaps the most potent form of direct Imperial endorsement of favored theological 
positions, coupled with rejections of unfavored ones, available to Constantine. Indeed, for an Emperor 
otherwise confined to letters and torturous conciliar proceedings to make his will known, they would 
constitute one of the few opportunities to speak in his own name on topics with profound effects on 
both his own fortunes and those of the most prominent clerics of the period.180  
The speech opens, after an announcement of the occasion and an address to his listeners, the 
“most beloved teachers, and all the other beloved men” (1.1),181 with a denunciation of pagan idolatry, 
making use of existing traditions of philosophical critique but shaping them into a distinctively Christian 
and Constantinian form. In arguing for the inferiority of “nature the mother of all” (παμμήτειρα φύσις) 
to a single monotheistic creator God, Constantine contends both that God through Christ has 
 
179 Drake 2000, 276-289. Drake 2000, 284. 
180 As Barnes 1981, 73-76, notes, while it has sometimes been doubted by scholars whether Constantine could have actually 
written and delivered such a speech, “[b]y the standards of his time, Constantine was an educated man, and there is nothing in 
the Speech which he cannot have written or dictated himself.” Barnes’ attempt, however, to blame some of the difficulties and 
obscurities of the present text on the translators blurring of a straightforward Latin original (74) is, however, I think better 
explained by the process of composition of the text itself. As discussed above in note 128 in section 1.4, Constantine’s 
theological writings generally show a complex hybrid of Latin grammar and Greek philosophical and theological terminology 
almost certainly reflective of the Emperor’s engagement with Greek philosophy in Latin and imperfect grasp of the Greek 
language itself. It seems highly probable to me that, while no doubt Constantine’s participation in the process of composition 
was overwhelmingly in Latin, the final version of Oratio ad coetum sanctorum is more than just a Greek translation of a Latin 
original, but rather a somewhat unique (and challenging) form of hybrid composition: an oration written by a Latin-speaker in 
conjunction with Greek interpreters and assistants to be delivered in Greek to an audience trained in Greek theology. Barnes’ 
suggestion (74) that the consistently anti-Arius bishop Hosius  of Cordoba might have aided in the process of composition is, 
however, entirely ruled out by the speech’s clearly Eusebian theology. Even significant help or editing by Eusebius of Caesarea 
or Eusebius of Nicomedia is in my judgment made unlikely by the failure of the speech to abide by some of the strict 
terminological and theological distinctives of these men’s theology (see below). Overall, however, the conclusion of Barnes 
1981, 74, is correct: “Although he may have incorporated ideas and expressions from others, in uttering them publicly the 
emperor made them his own.” 
181 ὦ προσφιλέστατοι καθηγηταί, φίλοι θ’ οἱ λοιποὶ ξύμπαντες ἄνδρες. 
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accomplished greater things for the cosmos than nature, and that God is likewise “the cause of all 
things, even of the οὐσία” of nature herself (1.2),182 inasmuch as “he himself set you in order (κοσμεῖν), 
since the life according to nature is the order (κόσμος) of nature” (1.2).183 God is the direct cause, then, 
both of the existence of the world and of that fundamental ordering of things that constitutes the 
cosmos as a unified whole. Despite the clear evidence of God present in this cosmic ordering, “no one 
has worthily worshiped the God of all, and they have thought that all things were united not due to 
providence (προνοία), but as though happening by chance, without arrangement and discordantly” 
(1.2).184 Because of this fundamental lack of belief in the cosmic order and its origins in divine 
providence, human beings ignored the inspired proclamation by the prophets of the truth of divine 
providence and future events (1.3) and suffered in their societies from political disorder, “because the 
judgment of the rulers assisted the impulses, conceived without forethought, of the vulgar common 
people, and their judgment itself led the people’s irrational madness” (1.3).185 By following their subjects 
rather than leading them, and commanding their subjects in a manner out of accord with the rational 
order of the cosmos, the rulers of the human realm produced disorder so great that it could be resolved 
only by extraordinary, divine intervention: “But immediately, when the adventus186 of the Savior shone 
out, justice was established in the place of unjust deeds, calm in the place of all-encompassing turmoil, 
 
182 ὁ τῶν πάντων αἴτιος καὶ τῆς σῆς οὐσίας 
183 οὗτος γάρ σε ἐκόσμησεν, ἐπεὶ κόσμος φύσεως ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ζωή. 
184 τὸν τῶν πάντων θεὸν κατ’ ἀξίαν σέβειν μηδένα, νομίζεσθαί τε μὴ ἐκ προνοίας ἀλλ’ ὡς ἔτυχον ἀτάκτως τε καὶ πλημμελῶς τὰ 
πάντα συνεστάναι 
185 ὅτι τῇ τῶν χυδαίων δήμων ἀπροόπτῳ φορᾷ ἡ τῶν δυναστευόντων γνώμη συνελάμβανε, μᾶλλον δὲ τῆς ἀκαίρου μανίας 
αὕτη καθηγεῖτο. 
186 The term used here, ἐπιδημία, is the normal Greek equivalent of the Latin adventus in referring to an Imperial visit to a 
particular city within the Empire.  
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all things which had been spoken beforehand through the prophets were fulfilled” (1.4).187 The purpose 
of this Imperial visit to these turbulent domains was to see to the creation of a proper cultus, by 
establishing “a holy temple of virtue, the Church on earth, eternal, indestructible, in which both the rites 
proper for the most preeminent God the Father and those fitting for himself might be performed with 
piety (1.4).”188  
Already in this introduction, clear differences have emerged from the theological picture given 
in Constantine’s earlier works. Not only are God the Father and the Son clearly distinguished, but this 
distinction is extended even to the rites and honors appropriate for each one. This emphasis on ritual, I 
would argue, reflects a distinctive quality of Constantine’s own theology, where divine worship on the 
one hand, and divine law on the other, consistently serve as the primary categories through which 
Christianity and religion in general are conceptualized. Constantine’s earlier belief in the total unity of 
the Father with his Son-βούλησις was grounded at least in part on the dual propositions that God’s laws 
had been expressed and legislated through the Son Incarnate in Christ (and therefore to be truly divine, 
such laws could be the result only of the unmediated divine will) and that the Son was normatively in 
Christian liturgy and worship paid divine honor and service along with the Father (and therefore could 
only be a name or aspect of the divine monadic unity)—both of which, it should be noted, would 
continue to be primary arguments of pro-Nicene thinkers throughout the 4th century, responded to in 
numerous ways by various thinkers opposed to the Son’s full divinity.189 It is extremely notable, then, 
 
187 ἐπιλαμψάσης δὲ παραυτίκα τῆς τοῦ σωτῆρος ἐπιδημίας, δίκη μὲν ἐξ ἀδίκων ἔργων, ἐκ δὲ παντοδαποῦ κλύδωνος γαλήνη 
συνίστατο, καὶ πάνθ’ ὅσα διὰ προφητῶν προείρητο ἐπληροῦτο. 
188 ἱερόν τινα νεὼν ἀρετῆς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς [...] ἀίδιον, ἄφθαρτον, ἐν ᾧ τά τε τῷ ἐξοχωτάτῳ πατρὶ θεῷ δέοντα τά θ’ 
ἑαυτῷ καθήκοντα ἐτελεῖτο μετ’ εὐσεβείας. 
189 See for instance my own discussion of the concept of the Son as “image” of the Father in Eusebius of Caesarea’s mature 
theology in section 2.6 below, which is largely designed to explain how the Son can be referred to as “God” and honored 
accordingly if he is not, in fact, God in the fullest sense. The concept of the Son as image does not, however, appear at any point 
in Constantine’s extant theological works. 
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that in coming to accept a greater separation between Father and Son and a less exalted status for the 
Son, Constantine is brought to accept at the same time a distinction between the rites and modes of 
worship appropriate to each. This reference to divine worship is, in fact, the first clear acknowledgement 
of any distinction between Father and Son in this discourse, a distinction which is thus established first 
and foremost, not through metaphysical terminology, but through worship.  
After concluding his anti-pagan proem with a brief reference to the persecutions of the Church, 
occasioned by the malice of the devil in a futile attempt to destroy the perfect temple of divine worship, 
Constantine overtly signals his intentions to turn to more important (and religiously exclusive) matters: 
“But now we must speak of the things pertaining to theology (θείος λόγος)” (1.6).190 The Emperor of 
Rome, it seems, is going to do theology.191 As he immediately acknowledges, his listeners, both the 
“ship-captain in possession of chaste virginity”192 (presumably the local bishop) and the rest of the body 
of assembled, pious Christians,193 might well regard this attempt as somewhat beyond his sphere of 
expertise (2.1). In justification for this daring, he offers his own “sanctifying piety” (τῇ τῆς καθοσιώσεως 
εὐσεβείᾳ, 1.1) and “inborn (ἔμφυτος) love for the Divinity” which “overpowers even reverence itself” 
 
190 ἡμῖν δὲ νῦν τὰ προσήκοντα τῷ θείῳ λόγῳ ῥητέον. 
191 That it is theology that Constantine is doing, aimed at a Christian and at least partially clerical audience alert for possible 
errors and expected to understand its technical language is made clear both by Constantine’s introduction and by the general 
complexity of the work, but has not always been recognized by scholars—such as H.A. Drake, who refers to the lengthy and 
technical discussions of creation, religious belief, and divine procession in the work as “what is best described as a fourth-
century version of ‘pop philosophy’” (Drake 1985, 335), thus indicating a remarkably high evaluation either of modern 
philosophical popularizers or of the general philosophical knowledge of 4th century Romans. 
192 ἁγνείας παρθενίας τ’ ἐπήβολε ναύκληρε 
193 As Barnes 2001, 33-34, correctly notes, while scholars have often seen the speech as addressed to an assembly or council of 
bishops, the references to audience in the work itself would seem to fit more naturally with a local presiding bishop (in Barnes’ 
hypothesis Eusebius of Nicomedia) together with his subordinate diocesan clergy and people. As Drake 2000, 295-296, 
however, correctly points out, all such references are vague enough that they could serve equally well on essentially any 
occasion when a significant body of Christians might be assembled together with a local presiding bishop or metropolitan to 
listen to an address by their Emperor—occasions that may well have been relatively frequent in Constantine’s reign. 
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(1.2) and so gives him the courage to speak on his own authority about properly theological matters.194 
This inborn piety and love, however, is merely the medium for the true source of his theological 
authority: direct divine inspiration. “May the very great inspiration of the Father and of his beneficent 
Son be present to aid us as we utter these things, itself bestowing the wording and understanding. [...] 
Truly for those who have at any time obtained the Divine Inspiration, there is no need to shrink back or 
hesitate” (2.3).195 Still, Constantine is not quite as all-sufficient as his earlier presentations might have 
suggested, as he actively solicits the help and even the correction of his clerical audience, “men well-
versed in the Divine Mysteries” (2.2).196 In theological interpretation, as in episcopal judicial processes, 
bishops can be employed as natural and at times indispensable helpers without undermining the 
Emperor’s own authority or inspiration. 
It should perhaps come as no surprise, then, that the theological presentation of Father and Son 
in this speech bears numerous direct points of agreement with that argued for elsewhere by Eusebius of 
Caesarea and broadly shared in by Eusebius of Nicomedia and Arius.197 The separation and inferiority of 
the Son is expressed through his possession of a separate οὐσία and his essential status as caused by the 
Father, while his divinity is expressed most clearly in his active role as subordinate monarch and “Savior” 
for the created cosmos as a whole, which he pre-exists and within which he infallibly carries out the will 
of his superior Father. Still, despite this partially borrowed theology, Constantine’s presentation evinces 
 
194 τῆς δὲ τόλμης τὴν πρὸς τὸ θεῖον στοργὴν ἔμφυτον αἰτιῶμαι. αὕτη γὰρ καὶ τὴν αἰδῶ βιάζεται. 
195 ἐπίπνοια δ’ ἡμῖν μεγίστη τοῦ πατρὸς παιδός τε ἀγαθοεργοῦ παρείη φθεγγομένῳ ταῦτα, ἅπερ ἂν αὐτὴ φράσῃ καὶ διανοίᾳ 
προσάψῃ. [...] οὐ μὴν κατοκνητέον οὐδὲ μελλητέον τοῖς εὐτυχήσασι πώποτε τῆς θείας ἐπιπνοίας. 
196 τοὺς ἐπιστήμονας τῶν θείων μυστηρίων 
197 This has been clearly recognized for some time by scholars (see e.g. Rist 1981, 155-158, Davies 1991, Barnes 2001, 34-36, S. 
Parvis 2006a, 83). The contention of Davies 1991, however, that the clarity of this Eusebian theology is the result of 
interpolation by Eusebius of Caesarea is belied both by the inextricability of this theological picture to the speech’s structure 
and argument and by the few, but very real differences between Constantine’s presentation here and the theology of Eusebius 
and his allies (see below). 
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the same theological distinctives noted earlier: a focus on the overall unity and stability of cosmic order, 
its expression in the human realm through dramatic displays of divine will and providence, and, finally, 
Constantine’s own unique role in the carrying out of that providential will. 
Key to this theological transformation in comparison to his anti-Arian writings is a new sense, 
not just of the unity or power of God, but of his absolute transcendence and its necessary consequences 
for his relationship with all other things: “The good which all things aim at, the God always existing 
beyond οὐσία itself, has no origination (γένεσις), and therefore no ἀρχή at all. For he himself is the ἀρχή 
in the origination (γένεσις) of all things” (3.1).198 As will be discussed in later chapters in regards to the 
theology of Eusebius of Caesarea and his successors, the key term here is ἀρχή, with its intertwined 
connotations of temporal precedence (“beginning, origin, first element”), logical or metaphysical 
causation (“principle, first cause“), and political authority (“power, Empire”).199 In this picture, God is 
God because in the nexus of essentially asymmetrical relationships constituting the cosmos there is 
nothing and no one with any claim to have preceded him, caused him, or ruled over him.  
The same, however, cannot be said for the Son of God. Constantine had once charged Arius with 
the foolish view that God’s direct engagement with the created order would detract from his 
transcendence, a view that had led Arius to in turn detract from God’s supremacy by interposing a lower 
οὐσία between divinity and creation. Now, however, Constantine clearly shares this basic viewpoint:  
But the one who possesses the means of ascent (ἀναφορὰ) toward that one is again united to 
him, since his separation and association alike do not originate by means of place, but 
intellectually. For what is begotten was not brought together by some loss occasioned by the 
Father’s emotions, as is indeed the case for things produced from seed, but by the ordering 
 
198 Ἀγαθὸν οὗ πάντα ἐφίεται, ὁ ὑπὲρ τὴν οὐσίαν θεὸς ὢν ἀεί, γένεσιν οὐκ ἔχει, οὐκοῦν οὐδ’ ἀρχήν· τῶν γὰρ ἐν γενέσει πάντων 
αὐτὸς ἀρχή 
199 Cf. Brill Dictionary of Ancient Greek 310. 
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(διάταξις) of his constructive Providence he set down a Savior for the visible cosmos and for 
those within it (3.1).200 
Far from being the Father’s inseparable βούλησις, the Son is now clearly himself a distinct, 
lower product of that divine will and providence. As he had (allegedly) at the Council of Nicaea, 
Constantine is anxious to make clear that the Father’s production of the Son involves no passivity 
whatsoever, as does procreation on earth, but is solely the result of the Father’s supreme will. As 
Eusebius of Caesarea had already argued prior to Nicaea, to possess emotions or passions implies an 
ability to be affected by another, while any relationship with another not based solely on preexistent 
causation and unconditioned will necessitates mutual relationship and therefore interdependency—all 
qualities completely impossible for the supremely transcendent deity. This set of concerns had once 
been answered, for Constantine, by the purely intellectual nature of God’s Son-βούλησις, which allowed 
him to produce and direct all others without in any way being associated with or affected by the things 
produced or directed. This basic concern has not been contradicted, but rather heightened, by the 
insertion of an actual separate οὐσία of the Son between the necessarily self-sufficient operations of the 
divine will and the rest of the cosmos. These concerns for the independence and supremacy of divinity, 
however, now apply in the fullest degree to the Father alone. As Constantine explains later in his 
address, the Son is not only clearly caused and originated, but also clearly dependent and subject, a 
separate, inferior οὐσία produced by a separate, superior divinity:201  
 
200 ὁ δὲ ἐξ ἐκείνου ἔχων τὴν ἀναφορὰν εἰς ἐκεῖνον ἑνοῦται πάλιν, ἐκείνῳ τῆς διαστάσεως συγκρίσεώς τε οὐ τοπικῶς ἀλλὰ 
νοερῶς γινομένης· οὐ γὰρ ζημίᾳ τινὶ τῶν πατρῴων σπλάγχνων συνέστη τὸ γεννηθέν, ὥσπερ ἀμέλει τὰ ἐκ σπερμάτων, ἀλλὰ 
διατάξει προνοίας ἐπιστάτην [σωτῆρα] τῷ τε αἰσθητῷ κόσμῳ καὶ τοῖς ἐν αὐτῷ μηχανωμένης. 
201 S. Parvis 2006a, 83, somewhat implausibly suggests that the clear usage here and elsewhere throughout Oratio ad coetum 
sanctorum of “the technical terms of Eusebian theology” can be ascribed to the innocence of a theologically incompetent 
Emperor “unaware quite how tendentious the terms he was using actually were,” such that “it is possible [...] that his Greek 
theological translator [...] imported technical terms with malice aforethought into a rather blander Latin original.” Yet as I will 
argue, the Eusebian theological perspective of this speech is far from simply a matter of a few technical terms, but pervasively 
structures the work as a whole. As she acknowledges, though, the theological perspective in the speech seems particularly out 
of place in the immediate lead-up to Nicaea “shortly after Eusebius of Caesarea and his friends had been condemned at Antioch 
for some of this very language” (83) and when “Constantine himself had admonished Arius and Alexander six months earlier 
that such philosophical minutiae should not be discussed in public at all” (83). But this issue is far better resolved by moving the 
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Plato himself,202 the gentlest one above all other philosophers, pointed out a first God, the one 
over οὐσία itself, in this acting correctly, and he arranged under (ὑποτάσσειν) this one also a 
second, and distinguished two in the number of οὐσίαι, although there was one completeness 
(τελειότης) for both, and the οὐσία of the second God had its subsistence from the first. For the 
one is the craftsman and administrator of all things, clearly superior, but the other, positioned 
after that one and assisting (ὑπουργεῖν) his commands (προστάξεις), refers back the cause of 
the unity of all things to him. [...] Up to this point Plato was wise (9.4).203 
In his challenge to Arius, Constantine had argued that the positing of a separate, lower οὐσία to 
assist God in his activities necessarily detracted from God’s complete supremacy and power. Now, 
however, that objection is answered—at least in Constantine’s mind—by the assertion of the supremacy 
and superiority of the Father over the Son, the Son’s derivation of both his power and his very existence 
from his superior, and the Son’s constant, perfect referring back of all his own actions to the ultimate 
source of the Father’s will. The concomitant advantage of such a system, as Arius had once argued and 
as Eusebius of Caesarea was to argue at greater length and with far more sophistication, was that by 
acting through an inferior and derivative subordinate, the absolute transcendence and independence of 
God could be more clearly established and protected from any suggestion of an interdependent 
relationship with the material cosmos. As explained by Constantine, the existence of the Son as 
subordinate ruler and “savior” of the cosmos provides an additional layer of separation between God 
and his domains:  
 
speech out of a time when it makes little sense, not by attempting to muddle a theological presentation as straightforward in its 
basic import as any in the 4th century.  
202 As Barnes 1981, 74-75, notes, in Oratio ad coetum sanctorum, “the equivalence of Platonic and Christian theology is 
consistently asserted” (75), with many details of Constantine’s treatment of divinity clearly derived from Plato’s Timaeus 
(perhaps by means of the Latin translation and commentary of the 4th century philosopher Calcidius) and the 2nd century 
philosopher Numenius of Apamaea. Eusebius of Caesarea’s thought on these topics has also been compared by scholars to 
Numenius’ (see note 146 in section 2.5 below). 
203 αὐτός τε ὁ ὑπὲρ πάντας τοὺς ἄλλους ἠπιώτατος Πλάτων [...] πρῶτον μὲν θεὸν ὑφηγήσατο τὸν ὑπὲρ τὴν οὐσίαν, καλῶς 
ποιῶν, ὑπέταξε δὲ τούτῳ καὶ δεύτερον, καὶ δύο οὐσίας τῷ ἀριθμῷ διεῖλε, μιᾶς οὔσης τῆς ἀμφοτέρων τελειότητος, τῆς τε 
οὐσίας τοῦ δευτέρου θεοῦ τὴν ὕπαρξιν ἐχούσης ἐκ τοῦ πρώτου· αὐτὸς γάρ ἐστιν ὁ δημιουργὸς καὶ διοικητὴς τῶν ὅλων 




Someone might swiftly say: ‘Where does this name of Son (παῖς)204 come from? Of what sort is 
this origination, if there is one God alone, and this one is foreign to every kind of association?’ 
But it is necessary to consider origination (γένεσις) in two ways, the one that is well-known, 
from conception and birth, but the other from an eternal cause (αἰτία), the rational basis of 
which whoever among men is his friend perceives by means of the Providence of God. For 
whoever is wise will know the cause (αἰτία) of the ordering (διακοσμήσις) of all things. Indeed 
since nothing exists without a cause, it is necessary that the cause of what exists pre-exist 
(προϋπάρχειν) it. Therefore, since the cosmos exists and the things in it exist and their salvation 
exists, it is necessary that the savior of all things should pre-exist (προϋπάρχειν) them; it is 
necessary that Christ be the cause (αἰτία) of this salvation, and the salvation of what exists be 
the thing caused (αἰτιατὸν), just as the Father is cause (αἰτία) of the Son, and the Son is the thing 
caused (αἰτιατὸν) (11.8).205 
It is difficult to conceive of a clearer or more perceptive summation of the essential thesis 
argued for by Arius, Eusebius of Nicomedia, and Eusebius of Caesarea both before and after Nicaea. To 
be truly and properly God, the Father can be involved in no “association” (μίξις) with another. 
Therefore, he must precede the Son in causation and existence just as the Son in turn precedes and 
causes the material cosmos.206As the Father is to the Son, so the Son is to the visible cosmos and its 
 
204 As Ison 1987 has noted, Constantine’s Oratio ad coetum sanctorum is essentially unique among surviving 4th century 
theological texts for its consistent use of the term παῖς in preference to υἱός as the title of the Son in relation to the Father. 
While this may be no more than a quirk of the translator, David Ison has reasonably argued (Ison 1987, esp. 416-419) for the 
employment this term as possessing both apologetic (as the ordinary term for a “child of a god” employed by pagans for 
centuries) and specifically Imperial (as the normal term for Imperial offspring) valences. As a further suggestion, I would point 
out that unlike υἱός, παῖς bore immediate connotations, not merely of descent, but of immaturity, and as such was also 
frequently used to mean “servant” or “slave” (a sense employed prominently in the LXX for the “Servant Songs” of Isaiah). In 
both ways παῖς contains much more direct implication of temporal and hierarchical subordination, in a manner appropriate to 
Constantine’s later theology. In Constantine’s theological letters from the period of Nicaea (quoted above in section 1.4), in 
contrast, the term υἱός is exclusively employed. 
205 τάχα δ’ ἄν τις εἴποι· πόθεν ἡ προσηγορία τοῦ παιδός, ποία δὲ γένεσις, εἴπερ εἷς μόνος ὢν θεὸς τυγχάνει, πάσης δὲ μίξεως 
οὗτός ἐστιν ἀλλότριος; ἀλλὰ τὴν γένεσιν διπλῆν τινα νοεῖσθαι χρή, τὴν μὲν ἐξ ἀποκυήσεως τὴν συνεγνωσμένην ταύτην, ἑτέραν 
δὲ τὴν ἐξ ἀιδίου αἰτίας, ἧς τὸν λόγον θεοῦ προνοίᾳ θεᾶται καὶ ἀνδρῶν ὃς ἐκείνῳ φίλος ὑπάρχει· σοφὸς γάρ τις τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς 
τῶν ὅλων διακοσμήσεως εἴσεται. ὄντος τοίνυν ἀναιτίου μηδενός, προϋπάρχειν τῶν ὄντων τὴν αἰτίαν αὐτῶν ἀνάγκη. ὄντος ἄρα 
κόσμου καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ οὔσης τε αὐτῶν σωτηρίας, τὸν σωτῆρα τῶν πάντων προυπάρχειν ἀνάγκη· ὡς εἶναι τὸν μὲν Χριστὸν 
τὴν τῆς σωτηρίας αἰτίαν, τὴν δὲ σωτηρίαν τῶν ὄντων τὸ αἰτιατόν, καθάπερ αἰτία μὲν υἱοῦ ὁ πατήρ, αἰτιατὸν δ’ ὁ υἱός. 
206 There is admittedly some tension between this passage and the assertion almost directly thereafter that in the Incarnation 
the Son received “a temporal beginning for an eternal (αἰώνιος) nature (φύσις)” (11.9). In my judgment, however, this passage 
should be read in light of the consistent Neoplatonic distinction of Plotinus (Enneads 3.7.3), based on the hierarchical account 
of successive levels of imitation of divine eternity in Plato’s Timaeus, that strongly distinguished the term αἰώνιος (“perpetual” 
“always existing,” “existing throughout the αἰών”) from the absolute ἀίδιος (“eternal” in the strongest sense). In keeping with 
this basic distinction, in Oratio ad Coetum Sanctorum, Constantine is comfortable applying the term αἰώνιος even to the human 
soul as part of the larger class of intellectual (νοητός) entities produced by God, distinguished from those bodily and material 
realities destined to pass away (9.6). While the term ἀίδιος, appearing in Oratio ad Coetum Sanctorum nine times (6.8, 9.6, 
11.8, 12.2, 14.1, 15.4, 21.4, 23.3, 26.2), is used in a fairly loose sense and often in synonymous constructions with αἰώνιος, it is 
never applied to the Son—though it is employed once, in a less than Neo-Platonic manner, to describe the rotation of the 
planets (6.8). While Constantine’s use of these terms is clearly more generic than philosophically precise, there is in my 
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salvation, and vice versa. In this basic metaphysical picture, the universe can be reduced to a simple 
ordering of (immaterial) causes, where each cause precedes its effect, and therefore is truly and 
properly independent of it. Cosmos cannot exist without Son, and Son without Father—but God the 
Father can and did exist without the Son. So Arius had argued, and had been condemned at Nicaea for 
arguing. Now, however, he has found an eloquent advocate for his position in the Roman Emperor 
himself. 
In Constantine’s presentation, this position has as much political as metaphysical valences. Far 
from undermining the divine monarch’s self-sufficiency as Constantine had previously feared, the 
interposition of an inferior and separate assistant οὐσία has made the sole monarchy of God stricter and 
more apparent than before. As Constantine concludes in his initial introduction of Father and Son, 
“what, then, is this argument intended to make clear? That there is one first in status (προστάτης) over 
all things in existence, and that all things have been ordered under the despotism of that one alone, 
both those in heaven and those on earth, both natural and instrumental bodies” (3.2).207 The 
preeminent status of the first is not detracted from, but in a sense emphasized by, the existence of a 
clear second in status, a singular, privileged inferior, deriving all his power and status from his superior 
and so, by his very existence, serving to make as clear as possible the fact that the universe is guided not 
by numerous equal, feuding powers, but by a single ordered regime, in which at every level monarchy 
takes precedence over multiplicity. 
 
judgment no contradiction but rather clear consonance between the position that the Son as cause precedes the material 
cosmos in existence and the position that as caused he is preceded in existence by God. In fact, as this passage makes clear, 
both are coterminous conclusions of the same set of premises. See note 112 in section 2.4 below for more discussion of the 
similar principle in Eusebius. 
207 τί οὖν δηλοῖ ὁ λόγος; τῶν ὄντων ἁπάντων ἕνα εἶναι προστάτην, καὶ πάνθ’ ὑποτετάχθαι τῇ ἐκείνου δεσποτείᾳ μόνου, τά τ’ 
οὐράνια τά τ’ ἐπίγεια καὶ τὰ φυσικὰ καὶ ὀργανικὰ σώματα. 
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This new vision of a monarchical cosmic order is in a sense the theological complement of the 
gradual, but revolutionary changes in Imperial administration that began in the third century and 
extended through the reigns of Diocletian, Constantine, and his successors, in which the Emperor was 
increasingly aided by a vastly expanded Imperial administration characterized by regional division and 
multiplication of offices.208 This administration increasingly became the sole locus of social and political 
advancement in the Empire, incorporating within itself the traditional distinctions of civic, provincial, 
and Roman aristocracies.209 At the summit of this newly vast and centralized Imperial administration sat 
an Imperial court designed to act as an extension of the Emperor himself, travelling with him from place 
 
208 See e.g. Teall 1967 for a discussion of these administrative innovations, which, driven in large part by Constantine’s frequent 
civil conflicts, “brought into being a large, new-model  army supported by a proliferating bureacracy” (24) grounded to an ever-
greater extent in a hereditary principle and leading to “an imperial building monopoly in many of the cities” (28) of the Empire, 
with the Emperor himself assuming responsibility for architectural renovations and building projects from the local elites 
traditionally tasked with such benefactions. Likewise, see the account of Barnes 2011, 153-165, who offers an important 
caution about the difficulty of dating particular administrative innovations to the reign of Constantine itself and emphasizes 
that Constantine’s attested innovations (in particular his multiplication of the office of praetorian prefect from one official to a 
college of five) relate less to any developed plan of administrative reform than to the dynastic concerns that also led to the 
multiplication of the office of Caesar in the latter part of his reign. As I argue in this study, such multiplication of offices served 
in the theological-political system of Eusebius as the primary means to denote inferiority in relation to monarchical authority.  
209 While Salway 2014 highlights the effect of administrative changes on those honored with the Roman consulship under 
Constantine, many aspects of this transformation were tied to Constantine’s founding of a “second Rome” Constantinople—a 
new capital associated indelibly with himself and his dynasty—and populated by a new elite drawn populated not just from the 
existing Senatorial class, but also from new recruits drawn from civic and provincial aristocracies, an arrangement that, as 
Heather 1994 has pointed out, was politically beneficial inasmuch as such “’[n]ew men’ [...] owe everything to their sponsor and 
so ought, in principle, to be more loyal” (Heather 1994, 17). As Skinner 2013 has pointed out, however, this development, 
which was confined almost entirely to the aristocratic stratum extending “from the lower end of the curial spectrum to the 
apex of senatorial rank” (32), by no means constituted a method of “social mobility” in the modern sense, as it “had no direct 
bearing on the lives of some 99 per cent of the population” (37). This trend represented, then, not so much the creation of an 
entirely new elite as “the reorientation of provincial aristocratic aspirations towards the prospects afforded by an imperial 
regime whose increasing administrative ambition had never been paralleled west of the Tigris” (50). Moser 2018, 47-81, 
similarly, emphasizes the continuity shown in Constantine’s overt preference for Western officials personally known to him, 
especially members of the Roman Senate that had aided his rise to power, over Eastern equivalents, although she also notes 
the extension of lower honors to Eastern curials and the creation of the entirely new high honor of Imperial comes tied to direct 
service to Constantine himself. These trends, extended much further under Constantius II, would eventually lead to a situation 
where “senatorial status ceased to designate so much a body of men marked out by descent and wealth [...] becoming instead 
the ultimate distinction available to all participating in different imperial career structures” (Heather 1994, 13). This increasingly 
direct and pervasive linkage of class and status with Imperial service created an essentially novel class of honorati, produced 
through participation in a vastly expanded Imperial bureaucratic service (18-21), and serving not only as “professional 
politicians ambitious for power in Constantinople” (26), but also as “the new leaders of local society” (27) whose influence 
came from “their privileged access to governors” and their “much stronger position [...] when it came to dealing with members 
of the representatives of the imperial administration” (28), and whose presence throughout the Empire “fostered political and 
cultural unity, and even facilitated the collection of revenues” (32). Together with the “increased Imperial exploitation of the 
wealth of the cities, made possible by closer control of their finances” (22) begun by the Tetrarchy and continued under 
Constantine, this constituted an unprecedented and revolutionary centralization of power and honor within the Roman Empire. 
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to place along with the Imperial treasury and central bureaucracy and serving as the stage for public and 
private rituals of power in which the Emperor was both central focus and main officiant.210 Similarly, the 
pervasive emphasis throughout Constantine’s theology on the Imperial will as the unconditioned source 
of laws and regulations for his people reflects an even more fundamental shift in the legal apparatus of 
the later Empire, one where the traditional method of Imperial governance, whereby the Emperor 
responded reactively to petitions generated by cities and citizens, was increasingly supplemented by a 
more proactive model in which the Emperor sought to implement his own favored policies by actively 
soliciting petitions in accord with his policy designs and then publicly rewarding those petitioners that 
conformed their requests to his pre-existing will.211 It is an even more natural compliment of the novel 
emphasis in Constantine’s own reign on the dynastic principle as the over-arching basis for Imperial rule 
and legitimacy, one in which those connected by blood with Constantine himself, and especially those 
sons directly produced by Constantine and so constituting his naturally privileged inferiors, came to be 
appointed in greater and greater numbers to positions of power within the Empire212—a development 
that, as Noel Lenski has argued, was itself likely related to Constantine’s growing sense of himself as “a 
divine monarch” whose “rulership was the manifestation of some supernatural ordering of the cosmos” 
and whose divinely favored dominance could be more clearly established by “see[ing] to it that his 
entire extended family be given a share in the empire.”213  
In keeping with this set of concerns, in Oratio ad coetum sanctorum the treatment of the Son as 
subordinate God forms part of a larger argument for the necessary governance of the cosmos under a 
 
210 For the late Roman court in general, see the excellent and comprehensive study of Smith 2007.  
211 This is one of the principal arguments of Lenski 2016, esp. 87-130. 
212 See Lenski 2016, 60-65. 
213 Lenski 2016, 65. 
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single authority, a unity that is not so much monotheistic in the metaphysical sense as directly political 
and monarchical:  
For if the lordship of these innumerable beings happened to belong, not to one, but to many, 
allotments and distributions of elements and ancient myths and envy and jockeying for 
advantage, each ruling over one another according to power, would confuse the harmonious 
unanimity of all things, while the many administrators would govern the parts assigned to them 
each in a different fashion, taking no care that the whole cosmos continue always the same and 
in the same way. [...] Anger and civil conflict (στάσις) and destruction would result, since the 
many, acting independently, would also not be satisfied with what had come to them because of 
their jockeying for advantage, and in the end the confusion of all things would result. It is clear 
that this civil conflict (στάσις) would completely unsettle the things under heaven and on earth 
(3.2, 3.4).214 
For the cosmos to exist and be united, a clear, monarchical order is necessary, with many 
subordinate administrators ultimately commanded by one God. A key issue for systems like those of 
Arius or Eusebius of Caesarea, and one clearly noted by Constantine in his anti-Arian writings, was how 
to explain, in a monotheistic framework, what gave the Son the right to be called God (θέος) and 
honored as such while nonetheless remaining separate from and inferior to the monotheistic divine 
power itself. As we will see, Eusebius of Caesarea would devote considerable effort towards this 
question, ultimately producing a system of careful distinctions, in which the Son could be called “God” 
(θέος) but not “the God” (ὁ θέος) thanks to his status as Image of the Father bearing within himself a 
preeminent if imperfect reference to the nature and qualities of his superior. There is no trace of either 
of these concepts in Constantine’s theology, where the Son is referred to quite naturally as ὁ θέος and 
no reference is made to the concept of image at all. As to why the Son can still be referred to as God 
despite his inferiority and lack of the totality of divine qualities, the answer would appear to be rather 
simpler and, to the typical Christian theology of the 4th century, more startling. For Constantine, the Son 
 
214 εἰ γὰρ ἡ τούτων ἀναριθμήτων ὄντων κυρία οὐχ ἑνὸς ἀλλὰ πολλῶν οὖσα ἐτύγχανεν, κλῆροι ἂν καὶ στοιχείων διανεμήσεις 
καὶ μῦθοι παλαιοὶ καὶ φθόνος καὶ πλεονεξία κατὰ δύναμιν ἐπικρατήσαντα τὴν ἐναρμόνιον τῶν πάντων ὁμόνοιαν διεσάλευε, 
πολλῶν διαφόρως τὴν λελογχυῖαν ἑκάστῳ μοῖραν διοικονομουμένων, τοῦ δὲ ἀεὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτά τε καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχειν τὸν 
σύμπαντα κόσμον ἀμελούντων. [...] ὀργὴ δὲ καὶ στάσις καὶ ὄνειδος, ὡς μὴ ἰδιοπραγούντων μηδ’ ἀρκουμένων τοῖς ἐπιβάλλουσι 
διὰ πλεονεξίαν, καὶ τὸ τελευταῖον ἡ πάντων σύγχυσις ἐπηκολούθησεν ἄν. [...] δῆλον ὡς ἡ τῶν οὐρανίων στάσις τὰ ὑπὸ τὸν 
οὐρανὸν καὶ τὰ ἐπίγεια διελυμήνατο <ἄν>. 
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is God primarily because he plays, from a human standpoint, the role of a god in receiving prayers and 
worship, granting requests, and exercising power. This essentially functional reasoning is visible in a 
famous passage in which Constantine argues for monotheism in human and practical terms, as the only 
cosmic system capable of ensuring the usefulness of religion for a human life beset by constant crises:  
To whom would prayers and requests be made first or last? In serving whom freely would I not 
act impiously towards the rest? Or perhaps in asking for some worldly thing, in recognizing the 
favor of the one who helped me, I would also be blaming the one who opposed me? After I 
prayed, would I expect that I had correctly recognized the cause (αἰτία) of the crisis and so 
obtained deliverance? Or what if we rush to be answered by prophetic responses and oracles, 
but these things were under their own authority and under the care of another god? What 
mercy, then, what providence of god towards man would there be—unless one god, possessing 
a more philanthropic disposition, should help me in opposition to another god having no such 
thing? (4.4)215 
This presentation of religion has clear biographical valences.216 If the purpose of human religion 
is to access the divine realm for the benefit of human life, a divine realm as beset by division and conflict 
as the human political and social world of Constantine’s lifetime would render religion, and therefore 
divine care for humanity, simply useless. As Constantine had argued and would argue again, the political 
crises and divisions of the human realm had been resolved by the reestablishment of a single monarchy 
under himself—and the solution for the divine realm is the same. This set of concerns, it should be 
emphasized, requires not so much an absolute, metaphysical unity as proper political order under a 
single ruler at least as supreme as Constantine himself.  
In such a cosmos, a single inferior Son capable of reliably receiving the prayers of subjects, 
reliably relaying them to his own monarch, and reliably fulfilling that superior’s commands may as well 
 
215 εὐχαὶ δὲ καὶ λιτανεῖαι πρὸς τίνα πρῶτον ἢ τελευταῖον; τίνα δὲ θεραπεύων ἐξαιρέτως οὐκ ἂν περὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς ἠσέβησα; ἢ 
τάχα δ’ ἂν καὶ δεόμενος τῶν βιωτικῶν τινος τῷ μὲν συναραμένῳ χάριν ἔγνων, τῷ δ’ ἀντιπράξαντι ἐμεμψάμην. τίνι δὲ 
προσευξάμενος τὴν αἰτίαν <ἂν> τῆς περιστάσεως γνῶναι τῆς τ’ ἀπαλλαγῆς τυχεῖν ἠξίουν; θῶμεν δὴ λογίοις καὶ χρησμοῖς ἡμῖν 
ἀποκεκρίσθαι, μὴ εἶναι δὲ τῆς ἑαυτῶν ἐξουσίας ἄλλῳ τε ταῦτα ἀνήκειν θεῷ· τίς οὖν ἔλεος, ποία δὲ θεοῦ εἰς ἄνθρωπον 
πρόνοια; εἰ μὴ ἄρα βιαίως ὁ φιλανθρωπότερον πρὸς τὸν μηδεμίαν ἔχοντα σχέσιν διατεθεὶς ἐπεκούρησεν. 
216 As Drake 2000, 190, notes, “the pragmatism and concern for clear lines of authority displayed here seem a good reflection of 
the way Constantine approached problems” and so “may well reflect the reasoning process that led Constantine himself first to 
monotheism and ultimately to Christianity.” 
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be called God as his more absolutely independent and transcendent Father. Indeed, in a sense, the term 
God is more applicable to the Son, precisely because of his more direct involvement with the actual 
cosmic and cultic tasks and relationships with which Constantine is so concerned. As Constantine argues 
tellingly in regard to a Sibyline Oracle speaking of the birth of Christ and praying for his aid, “how could 
this be thought to have been spoken about a human birth (γενεά)? For nature is the servant of divine 
ordering (προστάξις), not a workman subject to human command. [...] And [...] to pray that the end of 
life be put off [...] is an identifying mark (σύμβολον) of invocation of divinity. For we are accustomed to 
claim life and salvation from God, not from a man” (21.1).217 If the only God were the absolutely 
transcendent and supreme Father, with no partially-transcendent Son under him to hear prayers and 
actively intervene in creation, it is difficult to see how this basic religious system could be maintained—
not least for the benefit of Constantine himself, reliant precisely on such dramatic interventions for his 
own rise to power. If Arius, Eusebius of Nicomedia, and Eusebius of Caesarea have succeeded in 
convincing Constantine of anything, I would suggest, it is not primarily their own speculations on the 
precise relationship between Father, Son, and absolute metaphysical divinity: it is, rather, the 
straightforward claim that a separation between superior Father and inferior Son does not threaten 
either the overall unity of divine power or the necessary cultic relationship between singular ruler and 
singular deity, but rather is the only approach that can make such a relationship coherent in a cosmos 
fundamentally characterized by asymmetric relationships of precedence and transcendence. If the Son 
can still be called God despite his lack of total supremacy, it is precisely because, as an intermediate 
ruler and deity linking earthly cultus and power with absolute divine independence, he serves as the 
indispensable link reconciling the human need for direct divine rule and cult with the metaphysical and 
 
217 πῶς ἂν νοηθείη λεχθὲν ἐπὶ γενεᾶς ἀνθρωπίνης; ἡ γάρ τοι φύσις θείας ἐστὶ προστάξεως διάκονος, οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνης 
κελεύσεως ἐργάτις. ἀλλὰ καὶ στοιχείων χαρὰ θεοῦ κάθοδον, οὐκ ἀνθρώπου τινὸς χαρακτηρίζει κύησιν, τό τε εὔχεσθαι [...] τοῦ 




political demands of absolute transcendence and monarchy. Prayers and supplications for the good 
order of the human realm are to be made to the Father through the Son, maintaining the order and 
unity of these two θεοί in power and will, and thereby ensuring the order of cosmos and the Roman 
Empire alike.  
The Son’s purposes in the cosmos, however, are not confined to aiding divine transcendence or 
religious cultus: he also has other numerous more directly political purposes summed up in the title of 
σωτήρ. This title had been for centuries applied not just by Christians to Christ, but even more 
commonly by the members of the Roman state to the Emperor, the preeminent source of the blessings 
of material health, abundance, safety, and security.218 For the cosmic Son, this salvation comes first and 
foremost through the fact that it is he, and not the Father, who is the direct cause of the actual 
existence of the material cosmos: “Therefore for all things which are contained under the cosmos, the 
cause of their existence and their life is from him. And from him also is the soul and all perception and 
their instruments” (3.2).219 Throughout this discourse, Constantine is consistent in ascribing the creation 
of the cosmos, its providential direction, and the work of its salvation to the Son as direct agent (see e.g. 
5, 11), acting, however, as the effect and under the will of God the Father. In this way is created a 
cosmic paradigm that is distinctively Imperial. The absolutely singular and supreme God, by the free 
command of his own absolutely sovereign will, has brought into existence a single Son to serve as 
delegated ruler of all other things: “For you do not understand anything good, not even the first 
command (πρόσταγμα) of the great God, the one who arranges (διατάσσειν) things for the human race 
 
218 The title of σωτήρ is earliest attested as an epithet of gods, especially Zeus (see e.g Pindar, Odes 5.17), but could also be 
applied as a functional designation for human benefactors; it was later employed by Hellenistic ruler cults as a royal title and 
from there became in the Eastern Mediterranean as a honorific applied regularly to the Emperor and (more rarely) to favored 
Imperial officials (see e.g. Nock 1951).  
219 τοιγάρτοι πᾶσιν, ὅσα περιείληπται ὑπὸ τοῦ κόσμου, ἡ αἰτία τοῦ εἶναι καὶ ζῆν ἐκεῖθεν· ἐκεῖθεν δὲ καὶ ψυχὴ καὶ πᾶσα 
αἴσθησις καὶ τὰ ὄργανα, δι’ ὧν τὰ σημαινόμενα ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἀποτελεῖται. 
122 
 
and assigns to his Son the governance of their life, so that those who have lived rightly and prudently 
according to the judgment of the Son may obtain a second, blessed and happy life” (11.7).220  
It is in the light of this connection between salvation and monarchical power that Constantine 
portrays the Incarnation. The Son’s sojourn on earth has two purposes, both consonant with that found 
in an Imperial adventus: the bestowing of benefits (εὐεργέτεια) on his subjects,221 and the 
reinforcement of his rule through direct, sensible presence. The emphasis for Constantine is markedly 
on the first of these two intentions: “The will of his descent, as the prophecies spoke beforehand, is his 
care for all things: for it is necessary that the craftsman should care for his works” (11.9).222 As the result 
of this, the Christ who had pre-existed the cosmos “associated with a cosmic body” (σώματι κοσμικῷ 
πλησιάζειν, 11.9), was born of a virgin, and after receiving “an Imperial anointing consonant with the 
unity of all things” (11.11),223 set about doing good for his subjects, granting “swift and unimpeded 
confirmation of their prayers” (11.11)224 and providing for all both directly material safety and benefits 
(such as miraculous healing, resurrection, and food) and “a teaching that teaches not prudence, but 
wisdom, with those who visited him learning not what are called the political virtues, but the paths 
leading to the noetic cosmos, completing the initiation of the kind that continues always in the same 
 
220 οὐ γὰρ ἴστε ἀγαθὸν οὐδὲν οὐδὲ τὸ πρῶτον τοῦ μεγάλου θεοῦ πρόσταγμα, διατάσσοντός τε τῷ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένει καὶ 
ἐπισκήπτοντος τῷ παιδὶ τὸν τούτων διακυβερνᾶν βίον, ὅπως οἱ δεξιῶς καὶ σωφρόνως βιώσαντες κατὰ τὴν τοῦ παιδὸς κρίσιν 
δεύτερον βίον μακάριόν τε καὶ εὐδαίμονα λαγχάνωσιν. 
221 For the epithet εὐεργέτης as a functional designation for human and divine benefactors and a “formal predicate” (137) of 
the Roman Emperor, see Nock 1951. 
222 ἡ μὲν προαίρεσις τῆς καθόδου, καθὼς οἱ προφῆται προεθέσπισαν, κηδεμονία τῶν ὅλων ἐστίν· ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸν δημιουργὸν 
τῶν ἔργων αὐτοῦ κήδεσθαι. 
223 βασιλικὸν χρίσμα ὁμόψυχον τῆς πάντων συνέσεως 
224 εὐχῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ταχεῖα καὶ ἀνεμπόδιστος βεβαίωσις 
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way and practicing contemplation of the greatest Father” (11.11).225 This Christ is in essence a higher 
sort of Emperor, bestowing material benefits miraculously rather than through earthly beneficence, and 
training his subjects in the philosophy and virtue of the higher world of his cosmic kingdom and his own 
transcendent superior, not those of the human world and political society. Constantine’s summation of 
the advantages of this divine adventus is straightforward: “Indeed there is no measure to his 
beneficences (εὐεργετήματα): instead of blindness, sight; instead of sickness, health; instead of death, 
resurrection to live again” (11.12).226  
These beneficences, however, possess two purposes: not only the genuine benefit of Christ’s 
subjects, but also the reinforcement of his rule among a weakened humanity previously either unable or 
unwilling to recognize that power and live in accord with it. “For he knew that while some people by 
their prudence and their intelligence contemplated his power, others, having become like irrational 
animals in their nature (φύσις), devoted themselves to sense perception. For this reason, he brought 
happiness and marvelous healing before their eyes manifestly, so that no one would be able to doubt, 
neither the good nor the worthless” (11.15).227 As a wicked subject might fail to observe the laws or 
recognize the Emperor’s authority in the absence of manifest material beneficences or the splendor of 
the Imperial presence, so the wicked among the human race required for their amendment equally 
direct and visible signs of God’s power. As Constantine asks rhetorically, “what better method, and what 
more effective effort could there be for making evil men prudent than for them to directly address 
 
225 διδασκαλία τε οὐ φρόνησιν ἀλλὰ σοφίαν διδάσκουσα, τῶν φοιτητῶν οὐ τὰς πολιτικὰς λεγομένας ἀρετὰς μανθανόντων 
ἀλλὰ τὰς εἰς τὸν νοητὸν κόσμον ἀτραποὺς ἀγούσας, τήν τε τοῦ ἀεὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ἔχοντος γένους ἐποπτείαν πονούντων καὶ τὴν 
τοῦ μεγίστου πατρὸς ἔννοιαν ἀσκουμένων. 
226 τὰ γέ τοι τῶν εὐεργετημάτων οὐ μέτρια· ἀντὶ μὲν τῆς πηρώσεως ὅρασις, ἀντὶ δὲ παρέσεως εὐεξία, ἀντὶ δὲ θανάτου πάλιν 
εἰς τὸ ζῆν ἀποκατάστασις. 
227 ᾔδει γὰρ τοὺς μὲν τῶν ἀνθρώπων φρονήσει καὶ νῷ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ δύναμιν θεωροῦντας, τοὺς δὲ ἅτε τοῖς ἀλόγοις τῶν ζώων 
ἀπεικασμένους τὴν φύσιν μᾶλλον ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἐπιβάλλοντας· διὸ φανερῶς, ἵνα μηδεὶς ἀμφιβάλλοι μὴ σπουδαῖος μὴ 
φαῦλος, τὴν εὐδαίμονα καὶ θαυμαστὴν θεραπείαν ὑπ’ ὄψιν ἦγεν. 
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him?” (12.1).228 This emphasis on direct presence of the ruler to the ruled as the greatest possible 
method of teaching and governance is, here and elsewhere, distinctively Constantinian: “Did not he 
himself, present and visible, teach the cosmic way of life? If, then, the proclamation of God present 
accomplished nothing, what benefit could there be from him absent and unheard?” (12.1).229 The 
Constantine who had summoned accused bishops to his presence, confident in his ability to perceive the 
secrets of their hearts and convert them, is matched by a divine ruler equally interested in making his 
presence felt as directly as possible throughout his domains.  
As discussed, Constantine had previously been concerned with the potential threat to divine 
self-sufficiency and supremacy posed by Christ’s sufferings in the body. Now, however, these issues 
loom far less large, for a simple reason: because the absolutely independent and transcendent God 
himself is no longer directly involved with the events of Christ’s life. While God himself cannot take part 
in any association or any passion, the Son both directly associates himself with and directly makes 
himself present to the human race. This reflects, I would argue, a coherent progression in Constantine’s 
theological thought over time, based on consistent concerns that are inextricably both political and 
theological, but also somewhat in tension with each other. In his theological writings, Constantine is 
concerned to maintain the absolute supremacy and self-sufficiency of the ruler—but also, just as clearly, 
concerned with the ruler’s need to be directly involved in the operations of his kingdom at every level, 
with the power to bypass potentially dangerous or unreliable subordinates to settle issues and provide 
benefits with his own more trustworthy intentions and his own more effective presence. These 
concerns, it should be noted, are present just as clearly in Constantine’s political management of the 
Empire and the Church—visible, for instance, in his management of ecclesiastical cases, as well as in the 
 
228 τίς οὖν κρείσσων μέθοδος ποία δ’ ἐπιχείρησις ἀνυτικωτέρα πρὸς τὸ τοὺς κακοὺς σωφρονισθῆναι τῆς ἑαυτοῦ προσρήσεως; 
229 οὐκ αὐτὸς παρὼν καὶ ὁρώμενος ἐδίδασκε τὸν κόσμιον βίον; εἰ οὖν ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ παραγγελία παρόντος οὐδὲν ἤνυσεν, τί ἂν 
ἀπόντος καὶ μὴ ἀκουομένου ὠφέλησεν; 
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legal efforts chronicled by contemporary scholars.230 Constantine’s early theology of divine unity and 
activity through inseparable intellectual βούλησις is one attempt to resolve this basic tension; the 
presentation of Father and Son in Oratio ad coetum sanctorum is another, contrasting attempt to 
achieve the same goals.  
The primary objection acknowledged by Constantine in dialogue with both Arius and Eusebius of 
Nicomedia was the threat posed to divine transcendence by God’s direct involvement, by way of the 
divine βούλησις present in the Incarnate Christ, in earthly life and earthly suffering. Attempts to insulate 
divine independence through bare assertions of divine omnipresence and independence have now, 
however, given way to a rather more complex system, where the Father’s βούλησις operates through a 
single dependent subordinate possessing both divine and monarchical qualities, albeit in a less than 
absolutely transcendent manner. The Son still manifests the βούλησις of the Father—so that he can be 
referred to, not only as Son and λόγος, but also as “the greatest Providence of the great Father”231 
(11.13)—but now as a clearly separate, subordinate product of that will, who both infallibly carries it out 
and refers back to it all his own direct actions. This is, among other things, a tempting fantasy of rule for 
a human Emperor practically forced to make use of subordinate officials but clearly distrustful of their 
unreliability and potential threat to his power and so eager to rule his domain as directly and completely 
as possible.232 For all the obvious differences between the two Constantinian theological systems 
sketched in this chapter, and for all their possible influences from Christian bishops and clerics before 
and after Nicaea, they share at their heart a clear, and distinctively Constantinian, core.  
 
230 See Drake 2000, 321-346, as well as Lenski 2016 and Teall 1967. 
231 μεγάλου πατρὸς μεγίστη πρόνοια 
232 This need for totally trustworthy subordinates would have been felt especially acutely following the execution of 
Constantine’s son and heir-apparent Crispus on unclear charges in 326 (see note 13 in section 3.2 below)—a figure who in 
Eusebius of Caesarea’s early writings is compared directly to the Son as a singular, totally trustworthy and obedient assistant to 
his father’s commands (see Historia Ecclesiastica 10.9, discussed in section 2.2 below). 
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Still, even in Oratio ad coetum sanctorum, Constantine remains concerned with the negative 
optics produced by the earthly suffering, in an assumed body, of his cosmic ruler the Son. Freed from 
the direct pressure of maintaining absolute transcendence, however, Constantine can use Christ’s 
sufferings and death as part of a more complex moral picture of sovereignty and virtue:   
Indeed some mindless and impious men say that our Christ was punished and that the cause of 
life for the living was himself deprived of life [...] This fact surpasses every stupidity, namely that 
they seem to have persuaded themselves that indestructible God had violence done to him by 
man or that cruelty was made ruler (ἐπικρατής) over philanthropy, and did not comprehend 
that magnanimity and patience were not turned aside from their intentions by hubris, nor were 
they separated from their natural firmness by evil treatment, but always <...> it managed to 
shatter the ferocity of its attackers with the prudence of reasoning and magnanimity (11.5).233 
Christ, then, did in fact suffer evil—but by enduring it patiently and not being moved from his 
own beneficent will and purposes, he nonetheless triumphed over it rather than being in any way 
overcome, violated, or deprived by it. This complex picture is both clearly incompatible with 
Constantine’s initial vision of absolute divine transcendence, and far more useful as an actual practical 
moral example for human beings and human rulers. Indeed, in Constantine’s picture, one of Christ’s 
primary goals in the Incarnation was to not only teach but model higher moral behavior, including 
appropriate honor for God, care for the poor and the lowly (15.2), and, above all else, the patient 
endurance of evil: “He praised moderation accompanied by reason and prudence, and he commanded 
(προστάσσειν) the noble and patient bearing of every kind of violence and contempt, teaching that such 
things were the investigation (ἐπίσκεψις) of the Father, so that those who bore what happened to them 
 
233 φασὶ δή τινες ἀνόητοι καὶ δυσσεβεῖς ἄνθρωποι, δικαιωθῆναι τὸν Χριστὸν ἡμῶν καὶ τὸν παραίτιον τοῦ βίου τοῖς ζῶσιν αὐτὸν 
τοῦ ζῆν ἐστερῆσθαι [...] ἐκεῖνο δὲ πᾶσαν ὑπερβέβηκεν εὐήθειαν τὸ δοκεῖν πεπεικέναι ἑαυτοὺς ὑπ’ ἀνθρώπου θεὸν ἄφθαρτον 
βεβιάσθαι, ἢ τὴν ὠμότητα ἐπικρατῆ γεγενῆσθαι τῆς φιλανθρωπίας, μηδ’ ἐννοεῖν ὅτι τὸ μεγαλόψυχον καὶ ἀνεξίκακον οὔθ’ ὑπὸ 
ὕβρεως διατρέπεται, οὔθ’ ὑπὸ προπηλακισμοῦ τῆς φυσικῆς στερρότητος ἐξίσταται, ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ ... γίγνεται τῶν ἐπεμβαινόντων 
τὴν ἀγριότητα λογισμοῦ τε καὶ μεγαλοψυχίας φρονήματι θραύουσα. 
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magnanimously would always conquer” (15.2).234 This moral lesson, visible in the recent sufferings of 
the martyrs (e.g. 12.3-5, 22.3), Christ himself had not only taught but also explicitly demonstrated:  
We have learned this by experience, through the victory of God, who in fulfilling his Providence 
over all, although treated outrageously by the injustice of the impious, received no harm at all 
from what he suffered, and crowned himself with the greatest signs of victory against 
wickedness, even with an eternal crown, in this way bringing to fulfillment the will (προαίρεσις) 
of his Providence (προνοία) and his love for the just, since he had worn out the cruelty of the 
unjust and the impious” (15.4).235  
The greatness of Christ in his passion is that, despite suffering violence from evil men, he did not 
allow his supreme and beneficent will to be in any way altered by such opposition. This paradigm 
follows from, but modifies, the paradigm of supremacy and freedom already present in the relations of 
Father and Son. As supreme ruler, the Father demonstrates his preeminence by being and willing totally 
prior to and unconditioned by the existence of his subordinates, even the Son. The subordinate ruler 
Christ, on the other hand, demonstrates a more limited preeminence by willing in a manner 
unconditioned by the opposition and personal violence of his subordinates and hence incapable of being 
altered by them. In this way, Constantine creates a moral ideal applicable not only to human beings in 
general, but especially to human rulers such as Constantine, tasked with seeing to the good of his 
subjects despite insults and resistance.236 Such use of Christ as a moral model for human rule and human 
 
234 ἐπῄνει δὲ τὸ μετὰ λόγου τῆς φρονήσεως μέτριον, φέρειν τε γενναίως καὶ ἀνεξικάκως παντοίαν μὲν ὕβριν παντοίαν δὲ 
καταφρόνησιν προσέταξε, διδάσκων ἐπίσκεψίν τινα τοῦ πατρὸς εἶναι τοιαύτην, ὥστε ἀεὶ νικᾶν τοὺς μεγαλοψύχως φέροντας 
τὰ προσπίπτοντα 
235 πείρᾳ δὲ τοῦτο μεμαθήκαμεν ἐκ τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ νίκης, ὃς τὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν πάντων πρόνοιαν ποιούμενος ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν ἀσεβῶν 
ἀδικίας ἐμπαροινηθείς, μηδεμίαν ἐκ τοῦ παθήματος καρπωσάμενος βλάβην, μέγιστα νικητήρια καὶ ἀίδιόν τινα στέφανον κατὰ 
τῆς πονηρίας ἀνεδήσατο, ἐπὶ τέλος μὲν ἀγαγὼν τὴν προαίρεσιν τῆς αὐτοῦ προνοίας καὶ στοργῆς τῆς περὶ τοὺς δικαίους, 
συντρίψας δὲ τὴν τῶν ἀδίκων τε καὶ ἀσεβῶν ὠμότητα. 
236 The Theodosian-era orator Libanius (Orationes 19.19) recounts an incident illustrating Constantine’s own conformity to this 
ideal: after being subjected to insults and invective by the Roman people during his adventus in 326, Constantine refrained 
from punishing the offenders while issuing a public edict declaring that such behavior, although treasonous, was better 
responded to with Imperial laughter than punishment. The point of this incident and the general principle expressed in Oratio 
ad coetum sanctorum is not so much an incipient ideal of free speech as the assertion of the immunity of the will of the 
Emperor (whether Christ or Constantine) from being affected by the actions or disobedience of subjects, and therefore its true 
priority and superiority in relation to those over whom it rules. 
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life in general, it should be said, is one of the chief practical advantages gained by this system over 
Constantine’s previous ones. A Christ necessarily incapable of being affected by another and therefore 
of any suffering could not teach endurance of suffering; nor could a Christ who was nothing other than 
divine βούλησις operating through a human body himself model obedience to the higher βούλησις of 
the Father. Most fundamentally, a Christ incapable of any association with those beneath him could 
hardly serve as an effective model for the sort of involved, present framing of laws, granting of petitions, 
and teaching and modeling of moral behavior so crucial to Constantine’s picture of Imperial rule. 
However exalted and transcendent Constantine might wish to be as Emperor, a purely transcendent 
ruler, not only making use of no subordinates, but incapable in principle of any passion or association, 
would be a rather poor model. Perhaps even more to the point, a God incapable of any association with 
another would serve as a rather poor divine comes, the deity tasked in Late Roman understanding with 
hearing and responding to the rulers’ prayers, modeling his status, inspiring his actions, and intervening 
decisively in their results.237 A partially-transcendent Christ who had himself sojourned on earth and 
won victories there against opposition was far better than a distant God characterized only by the 
absoluteness of his power. 
Even the moral ideal presented by the partially-transcendent, incarnate Christ, however, is not 
without its paradoxes for a Constantine tasked with ruling the Roman Empire and opposing its enemies 
by force of arms:  
It happened that he found that one of those who kept company with him, armed with a sword, 
was attempting with his sword to protect himself, as though the aid of the Savior was not 
present for him: he ordered this man to remain at rest and to sheath his sword, accusing him of 
being in despair over his refuge in him, explicitly making it a law (νομοθετεῖν) that every person 
initiating unjust force or attempting to commit injustice in response to one who had initiated it 
and so making use of a sword would perish violently [cf. Matthew 26:52] (15.3).238 
 
237 For the important concept of the divine comes in Late Antiquity, see e.g. Nock 1947. 
238 ἐτύγχανε δ’ ἐκεῖνος ξιφήρη τινὰ ἐπιφοιτῶντα ἑαυτῷ ξίφει πειρώμενος ἀμύνεσθαι, ὡς μὴ παρούσης αὐτῷ τῆς τοῦ σωτῆρος 
ἐπικουρίας· τοῦτον δὴ μένειν κατὰ σχολὴν ἐκέλευσε καὶ μεθιέναι τὸ ξίφος, ἐγκαλῶν ὡς ἀπελπίσαντι τῆς πρὸς αὐτὸν 
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 It is, to say the least, ironic for Constantine, the Emperor of Rome responsible at different times 
in his long reign both for initiating multiple public civil wars and also perhaps for the murder of his own 
wife and son,239 to quote this verse and apply it as a universal divine law. There can be little question, 
however, about the directness of the claim in this context:  
This is truly heavenly wisdom, to choose to suffer injustice rather than to commit injustice, and 
even when necessity is at hand to willingly be able to suffer evil rather than to do it: for since 
the greatest evil is to commit injustice, not the one who suffers injustice, but the one who does 
it receives the greatest punishment (15.4).240 
 Christ’s stark proverb is here interpreted in a manner fundamentally in accord with the Greco-
Roman philosophical tradition stretching back to Plato’s Republic, losing little of its inherent 
forcefulness. This legislation is nonetheless saved from total pacifism by the clarification that it is unjust 
violence or force that is infallibly punished by divine law. The determination of whether individual 
applications of force were just or unjust, however, was certainly not a simple or straightforward one—
particularly when applied to the public acts of an Emperor tasked by virtue of his office with punishing 
malefactors and waging war. The starkness of Christ’s statement, which Constantine reads 
straightforwardly as a universal legislation of the cosmic ruler, might well give any human Emperor 
pause. 
  As quickly becomes clear, however, Constantine himself believes he has in fact found his way 
out of this uncomfortable bind through the straightforward expedient of divine aid and favor: “But for 
the one who is the obedient subject of God, it is possible to neither commit nor suffer injustice, since 
 
καταφυγῆς, νομοθετῶν δὲ διαρρήδην πάντα τὸν ἀδίκων χειρῶν κατάρξαντα ἢ πρὸς τὸν καταρξάμενον ἀδικεῖν ἐπιχειρήσαντα 
ξίφει τε χρησάμενον ἀπολεῖσθαι βιαίως. 
239 See note 13 in section 3.2 below. 
240 ἥδε ἐστὶν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἡ οὐράνιος σοφία αἱρεῖσθαι τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι πρὸ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν, καὶ γενομένης ἀνάγκης ἑτοίμως ἔχειν 




this person has confidence in the patronage (προστασία) of the God who is always present and assisting 
him, intending that none of his obedient subjects come to harm” (15.4).241 Only a few sentences after 
quoting Christ’s seemingly pacifistic dictum, Constantine has turned to discussing battles: “How would 
that obedient subject take counsel fittingly for himself, or how, after asking for the aid of God, would he 
think that it was necessary to help himself? But a battle is between two parties, and it is in doubt which 
will have the victory: and no one who was thinking soundly would choose what is doubtful instead of 
what has been determined” (15.4).242 With this turn towards doubtful military campaigns made certain 
by divine power, discussion of abstract moral principles takes on inescapably autobiographical qualities 
for an Emperor who at every stage of his career had relied on the outcome of military campaigns both 
for his own survival and for the gaining of ever greater and more unchallenged power:  
How would the person who has had experience of such great things, who has been in danger 
and has always been easily saved from these terrible things by the nod of God alone—the 
person who has walked through the sea, cast down and now providing at the command of the 
Savior a firm path to his people crossing over—be about to be in doubt about the presence and 
aid of God? (15.4).243 
It is precisely this constant experience of the favor of God, visible in military victories as 
dramatic as Moses’ victory over Pharaoh at the Red Sea,244 that has been in this recounting responsible 
 
241 τῷ δ’ ὑπηκόῳ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐξῆν μήτε ἀδικεῖν μήτε ἀδικεῖσθαι, θαρρήσαντι τῇ προστασίᾳ τοῦ παρόντος καὶ ἐπικουροῦντος ἀεὶ 
θεοῦ πρὸς τὸ μηδένα τῶν ὑπηκόων αὐτοῦ βλαβῆναι. 
242 πῶς δ’ ἂν αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ τὰ κάλλιστα συνεβούλευσεν, ἢ οἷον παραιτησάμενος τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ βοήθειαν ᾠήθη δεῖν αὐτὸς 
ἑαυτῷ βοηθεῖν; μάχη δ’ ἦν μεταξὺ δυοῖν καὶ ἀμφίβολον τὸ τῆς νίκης·  οὐδεὶς δ’ εὖ φρονῶν τὰ ἀμφίβολα πρὸ τῶν ἀραρότων 
προαιρεῖται. 
243 πῶς δὲ ἔμελλε περὶ τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ παρουσίας καὶ βοηθείας ἀμφιβάλλειν ὁ τοσούτων μὲν ἐν πείρᾳ γενόμενος κινδύνων ἀεὶ δ’ 
εὐχερῶς ῥυσθεὶς ἀπὸ τῶν δεινῶν μόνῳ θεοῦ νεύματι, ὁ διὰ θαλάσσης ὁδοιπορήσας παραγγέλματι τοῦ σωτῆρος 
καταστορεσθείσης καὶ στερεὰν παρασχομένης ὁδὸν τοῖς διαποντίοις δήμοις; 
244 Cf. Gillman 1961, who (correctly in my judgment) asserts that in the context of the 4th century Constantine “cannot be called 
theologically ignorant” (201), but rather reflects in his public works and addresses a pervasive early Christian concept of 
“Christus Victor” that emphasized Christ’s conquest of death and demons through the sign of the cross over more pietistic 
concerns. It should be said, however, that in applying this concept so directly to Imperial military victories, Constantine is in fact 
innovating significantly, in line with a personal focus on victory that, as Lenski 2016, 52-56, has pointed out, remained a 
constant at every stage of his career, and was frequently associated by Constantine himself, not just with Christ, but with the 
pagan goddess victoria. All of the 4th century episcopal theologians I will examine make ample use of the trope of Christ’s 
victory, but all apply it normatively not to Imperial military victories, but rather to the sacramental and salvific processes over 
which they presided as bishops. Even Eusebius of Caesarea, who generally acknowledges the cosmic importance of the 
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for Constantine’s coming to faith, for his more and more confident expectation of divine aid in military 
campaigns, and, finally, for that enduring presence of God within his own intellect responsible, among 
other things, for his discernment of theological questions: “For when this disposition is in our soul, God 
himself takes his seat within our understanding. And since this one is unconquerable, neither will the 
soul which possesses his unconquerability be ruled in its own understanding by surrounding evils” 
(15.4).245 Like Christ himself, Constantine will suffer no harm from the injustice of others, and will not be 
swayed from his own understanding and his own beneficent will, no matter who opposes him.246   
While Christ may be the preeminent teacher of the moral system held up and exemplified by 
Constantine, he is not the only or perhaps even the most useful model available. By the end of his 
discourse, the cosmic monarch Christ has given way to another analogue for Constantine: the Hebrew 
prophet Moses, who, like Constantine but very much unlike Christ, wielded arms, led armies, and won 
military victories through divine aid while acting as political ruler of a vast and heterogenous people 
over whom he had been appointed, in suitably dramatic fashion, by God himself. Constantine’s narrative 
of praise for Moses could hardly be more fulsome or more directly parallel to Constantine’s career in his 
own eyes:247  
 
Emperor’s military victories, still deemphasizes them in favor of Constantine’s greater victories over pagan idolatry and 
Christian disunity. This reflects, I suggest, a basic and consistent divide between episcopal and Imperial theology in the 4th 
century. 
245 ταύτης γὰρ τῆς ἕξεως ἐγγενομένης τῇ ψυχῇ, ἵδρυται κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν ὁ θεός· ἀήττητος δ’ οὗτος, οὐδὲ ἡ ψυχὴ ἄρα τὸ 
ἀήττητον ἔχουσα κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτῆς διάνοιαν ὑπὸ τῶν περιεστώτων κακῶν κρατηθήσεται. 
246 Somewhat remarkably, Drake 2000, 298-305 (cf. Drake 1989), argues that these passages and similar constitute an implicit 
argument for religious toleration against Christian and pagan extremism. While the overall tenor of Constantine’s remarks 
would certainly militate against private sectarian violence, they come in the larger context of a justification of Constantine’s 
own role in military campaigns which he presents as divine vengeance against pagan persecutors.  
247 All this, it should be said, constitutes a clear contradiction of the thesis of Drake 2000, 376-377, that in emphasizing Moses 
as a parallel for Constantine, Eusebius of Caesarea was in some way acting at variance with Constantine himself, who preferred 
to be seen as an analogue for the Apostle Paul. In fact, while analogies with the Apostle Paul are clearly present in 
Constantine’s corpus, direct citations of Moses are also quite common and arguably more direct. The purported contrast is in 
any event minimal, since Moses, in addition to being seen as a model for an inspired ruler, was also regularly employed as a 
model and exemplar for bishops (cf. e.g. Rapp 1998).  
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Moses, according to the divine command (πρόσταξις), shattered the pride of Pharaoh, the most 
powerful man of that time: he destroyed his army, formerly victorious over many and great 
nations and now set in order for battle, not by the shots of arrows or by the force of javelins, but 
by his holy prayer and gentle request alone. No people has ever been or could ever be more 
blessed than his people, if only they had not voluntarily in their souls renounced the Holy Spirit. 
What can anyone say that is worthy of Moses? He led a disordered people into order (τάξις), 
and brought into order (κατακοσμεῖν) their souls by persuasion and by his own reverence, 
established freedom in the place of slavery, made them joyful instead of gloomy, and led their 
souls into such greatness that, because their reversal of fortunes was so great, and because of 
the good fortune found in their successes, the minds of these men became rather arrogant 
(16.2-17.1).248 
 In Constantine’s telling, not only was this divinely-inspired prophet a conqueror of armies and 
the greatest of all rulers, bestowing unmatched favors on the nation subject to him, but he was also the 
greatest of all philosophers and theologians, “who so far surpassed those before him in wisdom, that 
even those who are praised by the Gentiles as wise men and philosophers became imitators of his 
wisdom” (17.2).249 The claim that Plato and Pythagoras, among other ancient philosophers, had known 
about and derived their own thought from Moses had long been a commonplace of Jewish and early 
Christian apologetics.250 In Constantine’s hands, however, this claim takes on a rather startling valence, 
in the portrayal of a monarchical ruler so blessed with divine assistance and inspiration as to be capable 
of operating as the supreme actor in military, political, and intellectual spheres alike. It is no surprise 
that such a man should have received, from God, the highest political office.  
As Constantine acknowledges, however, such claims of preeminent favors and their granting in 
active conflict with the evil will and ignorance of others are at least potentially in conflict with the 
 
248 Μω<ϋ>σῆς κατὰ τὴν θείαν πρόσταξιν τὴν τοῦ δυνατωτάτου τότε Φαραῶνος ὑπεροψίαν κατέθραυσε· τόν τε στρατὸν αὐτοῦ 
πολλῶν καὶ μεγίστων ἐθνῶν νικηφόρον πεφραγμένως τε καθωπλισμένον οὐ βελῶν τοξεύμασιν οὐδ’ ἀκοντίων ῥιπαῖς μόνῃ δ’ 
ὁσίᾳ προσευχῇ καὶ ἡμέρῳ λιτανείᾳ καθεῖλεν. Οὐδεὶς δ’ ἂν ἐκείνου τοῦ δήμου μακαριώτερος γεγόνει πώποτε ἢ γένοιτο, εἰ μὴ 
τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν ἑκόντες τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος ἀπεκήρυξαν. τί δ’ ἂν εἴποι τις ἄξιον περὶ Μωϋσέως; ὃς ἄτακτον δῆμον εἰς τάξιν 
ἀγαγών, πειθοῖ τε καὶ αἰδοῖ τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν κατακοσμήσας, ἀντὶ μὲν αἰχμαλωσίας ἐλευθερίαν αὐτοῖς περιεποιεῖτο, ἀντὶ δὲ 
σκυθρωπότητος φαιδροὺς ἐποίει, καὶ εἰς τοσοῦτον τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτῶν προηγάγετο, ὥστε τῇ λίαν ἐπὶ τἀναντία μεταβολῇ τῇ τε 
τῶν κατορθωμάτων εὐτυχίᾳ ἀλαζονέστερον τῶν ἀνδρῶν τὸ φρόνημα γενέσθαι· 
249 ὃς τοσοῦτον ὑπερῆρε σοφίᾳ τοὺς πρὸ αὐτοῦ, ὥστε καὶ τοὺς ἐπαινουμένους ὑπὸ τῶν ἐθνῶν ἤτοι σοφοὺς καὶ φιλοσόφους 
ζηλωτὰς τῆς ἐκείνου σοφίας γενέσθαι. 
250 See e.g. Justin Martyr, Apologia prima 44, Clement of Alexandria Protrepticus 6. 
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assertion of divine governance and cosmic unity found in his arguments for monotheism. It is for this 
reason that Constantine is brought to offer a remarkably lengthy and strident defense of human 
inequality and its origins in the overall cosmic order.251 As the Emperor concedes, “some people have 
acted like children, blaming God also in this: ‘Why then, did he not will and then create one and the 
same nature (φύσις) for those in existence, but rather gave the command to beget most things different 
and contrary to one another in nature (φύσις)? This is the origin also of the differences in our characters 
and our wills. For perhaps it would have been better both for obedience to the commands of God and 
for accurately understanding him and for strengthening the faith of each person, if all people were of 
one and the same moral character (ὁμότροπος)? But this deed would be possible for God’” (13.1).252 
Although seemingly logical and benign, Constantine recognizes immediately the threat, not just to 
religion, but to the entire cosmic order contained in such speculations: “The people who say this seem 
to be blaming the ordering (διακοσμήσις) of all things” (13.1).253 Since “God framed the whole cosmos 
out of contrary elements” (13.1),254 the cosmic order, both in its totality and in every part, depends on 
difference, opposition, and hierarchy, so that what such people are doing is in effect to blame the sun 
 
251 Somewhat strangely, Drake 2000, 301-305 (cf. Drake 1989) reads the argument of these passages as directed against 
“Christians pressing for revenge and retribution” (302) against pagans and therefore as concluding with the necessity of 
religious toleration. Drake reaches this conclusion only by reading φύσις as virtually equivalent to “religious affiliation” and 
therefore “diversity of moral character” as equivalent to “diversity of belief” (303). While Constantine certainly argues here for 
a human society containing persons of morally opposed character, and while in the broader context of Oratio ad coetum 
sanctorum this reality serves to explain, among other things, the conflicts that had defined much of his career to that point, 
these characters are hierarchically arranged and properly distinguished by the coercive punishments and rewards visible most 
immediately in Constantine’s military campaigns and judicial acts. This could just as readily serve as a premise for religious 
violence as religious tolerance, and in fact, when Constantine elsewhere argues for such tolerance, he does so in entirely 
different terms, based on the transcendence of divinity and the inappropriateness of coercion as a means of ensuring belief 
(see e.g. the Decree to the Eastern Provincials). Most of all, here as elsewhere, Drake fails to take into account that Constantine 
pervasively presents his military campaigns against rivals precisely as acts of justified religious violence. 
252 Ἤδη δέ τινες καὶ ἐν τῷ μέμφεσθαι τὸν θεὸν νεανιεύονται. τί δή ποτε βουληθεὶς οὐ μίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν τῶν ὄντων φύσιν 
ἐτεκτήνατο, ἀλλὰ διάφορα καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα ἐναντία τὴν φύσιν ἐκέλευσεν ἀπογεννᾶν; ὅθεν καὶ ἡ διαφορὰ τῶν ἡμετέρων ἠθῶν 
τε καὶ προαιρέσεων. ἦν γὰρ ἴσως ἄμεινον, καὶ πρὸς τὸ πειθαρχεῖν τοῖς κελεύσμασι τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀκριβῆ κατάληψιν 
αὐτοῦ καὶ πρὸς τὸ βεβαιοῦσθαι τὴν καθ’ ἑκάστου πίστιν, ὁμοτρόπους εἶναι πάντας ἀνθρώπους. δυνατὴ δὲ καὶ ἡ πρᾶξις ἅτε δὴ 
θεοῦ. 
253 οἱ ταῦτα λέγοντες ἐοίκασι μέμφεσθαι τῇ διακοσμήσει τῶν ὅλων. 
254 τὸν μὲν γὰρ σύμπαντα κόσμον ἐκ διαφόρων στοιχείων ὁ θεὸς ἐτεκτήνατο. 
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for setting, or the sea for tolerating the existence of mountains and woodlands in addition to itself, “and 
altogether they destroy with their words all those products of nature that are different” (13.1) 255 
precisely because in their impiety they “think that it is right that absolutely all persons be of one form 
(μορφή)” (13.1)256 and “want there to be one and the same value (ἀξία) for all things” (13.1).257 
Constantine’s judgment on such ideas could not be harsher: “As these things are manifestly the product 
of drunkenness, so to think it right that all people be of the same moral character (ὁμότροπος) is 
altogether laughable” (13.1).258  
Not only have these miscreants failed to recognize the necessary qualities of cosmic order in 
general, but they have also failed to register the key difference between different, hierarchically 
arranged levels of this order, such that they “do not understand that the ordering (διάταξις) of the 
cosmos and of the things in the cosmos (κοσμικός) is not the same, nor are natural (φυσικός) things 
ὁμοούσιος with ethical things, nor are the things experienced by the body the same as the passions of 
the soul” (13.1).259 This one, solitary appearance of the key Nicene term ὁμοούσιος (“of the same 
οὐσία”)  in Constantine’s corpus is all the more striking for its seeming independence from the direct 
question under debate at Nicaea and afterwards. I would suggest, however, that this usage is not quite 
as unrelated as it might first appear, and should be seen as indicating, at the very least, doubt on 
Constantine’s part about the appropriateness of Nicaea’s language. Here, after all, it is not even a 
question of oneness in οὐσία across the divide between divine Father and divine Son, but rather among 
 
255 καὶ ὅλως πάντα <τὰ> διάφορα τῆς φύσεως ἀποτελέσματα σὺν ταῖς προσηγορίαις αὐτῶν ἀναιρεῖν. 
256 καθάπαξ πάντας μιᾶς μορφῆς ἀξιοῦν εἶναι. 
257 μίαν τε καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀξίαν πάντων χρημάτων εἶναι θελόντων. 
258 καὶ ταῦτα μὲν φανερῶς ἕωλα, τὸ δὲ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους πάντας ὁμοιοτρόπους εἶναι ἀξιοῦν, κομιδῇ γελοῖον, 
259 μηδὲ ἐννοεῖν, ὅτι οὐχ ἥπερ ἡ τοῦ κόσμου διάταξις αὕτη καὶ τῶν κοσμικῶν, οὐδὲ τὰ φυσικὰ τοῖς ἠθικοῖς ὁμοούσια, οὐδὲ τὰ 
τοῦ σώματος παθήματα τοῖς τῆς ψυχῆς πάθεσι τὰ αὐτά. 
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different parts and different levels of the overall cosmic order, and even among different parts and 
different levels of a single human person, composed, like the cosmos itself, of the conflicting and 
contrary elements of natural body and ethical intellect. If the body and soul of a single human person 
are not ὁμοούσιος with one another, it seems hardly reasonable that the two οὐσίαι of a Father and 
Son, differing both in degrees of transcendence and in fundamental cosmic roles, could be described as 
such.  
For Constantine, even in the case of an allegedly singular human person, the contrarieties and 
differences are extreme enough. The human body itself is not a singular entity but a complex 
microcosm, such that “the differences and variety of the different bodily powers have been provided by 
necessity for the good of the overall order (κόσμος)” (13.1).260 In the case of the human soul, on the 
other hand, “he made man a rational animal and gave him the knowledge of good and evil so that he 
might flee the one but pursue the other, and, giving to him the things necessary for some wisdom of this 
sort, he left him in his own power and turned over to him the judgment of ordering his own life: and 
these things are on an equal footing (ἐξ ἴσης) for all persons” (13.1).261  
Paradoxically, it is precisely this equality in the possession of free will and reason that is the 
basis of the hierarchy and opposition that correspond, within the human world, to the conflict of 
contrary principles within the cosmic and natural orders. For within the human world, as Constantine 
argues, all divergences and hierarchies in value and honor are based ultimately on the skillfulness with 
which the individual rational person dominates their lower, bodily passions, a situation compared, in 
directly Platonic fashion, with a charioteer handling an unruly team of horses: “For anger does not 
 
260 διαφορῶν γὰρ οὐσῶν τῶν σωματικῶν δυνάμεων διάφορα καὶ παντοδαπὰ πρὸς τὴν χρῆσιν τοῦ κόσμου ἐπορίζετο ἐξ 
ἀνάγκης. 
261 τὸν δὲ ἄνθρωπον λογικὸν ἐποίησεν ζῶον γνῶσιν τ’ αὐτῷ κακῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἐδωρήσατο, ὅπως τὰ μὲν φύγοι τὰ δὲ 
μεταδιώκοι, δούς τ’ αὐτῷ τοιαύτης τινὸς σοφίας ἐπιτηδειότητα αὐτεξούσιον αὐτὸν εἴασεν καὶ τὴν κρίσιν τῆς διατυπώσεως 
ἐπέτρεψεν τοῦ καθ’ αὐτὸν βίου, καὶ  ταῦτα ἐξ ἴσης πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις. 
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provoke only a little, and desire is violent, and they unseat those who are stupid whenever they prevail 
over the reason” (13.1).262 On the other hand, “when, like some good charioteer, someone draws tight 
the reins of this disordered (ἀτάκτος) and insane yoke-team” (13.1)263 the result is “faith and piety 
towards God and justice and prudence and the happiness of every sort of virtue” (13.1).264 These 
fundamental moral differences, grounded on the maintenance of a properly strict hierarchy of the 
differing elements within the human person, produce in the end a clear hierarchy of value and honor 
within human society at large: 
These things and the things like them, the perfections of souls, lead to the holy judge those 
souls who will not be judged nor brought to shame for their sins, but rather given those honors 
which he himself has promised beforehand to those who have lived in the best way. But for 
those impure souls who have been carried off by bodily pleasures, punishment, which brings 
them to their end (τέλος) and declares the just sentence of God, drives them by force (βίᾳ), 
lamenting, to the justice appropriate for them (13.1).265 
Moral difference, then, has formed within human society a cosmos of its own, composed of the 
contrary elements of persons differing thanks to their free choice to maintain or not maintain the order 
of their own internal cosmic hierarchies, and itself brought into proper, hierarchical order by the 
rewarding and punishing will of the one divine sovereign. To recognize and honor this properly cosmic 
order, established within human individuals and human society as a whole, is to be pious towards the 
God who has created it, while “the argument of those who feel hatred for the differences of what is in 
existence and want there to be one and the same value (ἀξία) for all things is impious” (13.1). This is no 
 
262 ἐρεθίζει γὰρ οὐ μικρῶς ὁ θυμός, βιάζεται δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία, καὶ τοὺς ἄφρονας ἐκτραχηλιάζουσιν, ὅταν τοῦ λόγου 
περιγένωνται. 
263 ἡνίκα δίκην ἀγαθοῦ τινος ἡνιόχου σπάσῃ τὰς ἡνίας τῆς ἀτάκτου καὶ μανιώδους συνωρίδος. 
264 ἐνθένδε ἡ πίστις, καὶ ἡ πρὸς τὸν θεὸν εὐσέβεια δικαιοσύνη τε καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ παντοίας ἀρετῆς εὐδαιμονία συνέστη. 
265 ταῦτα δὴ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τὰ τῶν ψυχῶν κατορθώματα ἄγει πρὸς τὸν ὅσιον δικαστὴν αὐτὰς οὐ κριθησομένας οὐδ’ ἐπὶ τὸν 
τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων ἔλεγχον ἀχθησομένας ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τὰς τιμάς, ἃς αὐτὸς ταῖς ἄριστα βεβιωκυίαις προϋπέσχετο. τὰς δ’ 
ἀκαθάρτους καὶ σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν ἐμφορηθείσας ὠθεῖ βίᾳ ὀδυρομένας ἐπὶ τὴν προσήκουσαν δίκην ἡ τιμωρία ἐπὶ τέλος 
ἄγουσα καὶ ἐκδικάζουσα τὴν δικαίαν τοῦ θεοῦ ἀπόφασιν. 
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ordinary impiety, however, but a rebellion against divine order so extreme that even the pagans are 
innocent of it, since “it is recognized even by the impious that it is unjust for the honors of those who 
are inferior to be treated as more honorable” (13.1). To prefer equality to superiority on any level of the 
cosmic order, divine, natural, or human, is to be a rebel, not against man, but against God. 
It is only, finally, through the maintenance of this proper moral and cosmic order within human 
society that “the race of man is not without its share in the divine goodness” (13.1).266 In accordance 
with the strict hierarchy it oversees, this divine goodness, along with the honors attached to it, is 
attainable in the last balance only by the very best and most dedicated among men, since “it does not 
belong simply to everyone to obtain this, but only those who earnestly investigate the divine nature and 
choose (προαιρεῖσθαι) the preeminent necessity for life: the knowledge of divine things” (13.1).267 It 
belongs to these morally upright theologians, the highest among men precisely because they have 
recognized the intrinsically higher nature of divine over natural and human things and acted accordingly 
(14.1-2), to “cause the understanding to ascend towards steep and heavenly things” (14.3)268 so that 
“from this undertaking there results that victory which is preferable to many good things” (14.3).269 It is 
this moral system, Constantine argues, that is in the final balance “the cause of the differences of what 
exists, both in value (ἀξία) and in the distinction of power (δύνασθαι)” (14.3).270 Within the cosmos 
Constantine has constructed, recognition of and adherence to this hierarchical system is itself a moral 
duty and is therefore not at all optional: “Those who think well obey this system (λόγος) and give thanks 
 
266 τῆς θείας ἀγαθότητος οὐκ ἄμοιρον τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος 
267 οὐκ ἁπλῶς πάντων οὐδ’ ὡς ἔτυχε, μόνων δὲ τῶν τὴν θείαν φύσιν ἐξιχνευσάντων καὶ τὸ προηγούμενον ἐπιτήδευμα τοῦ βίου 
προελομένων, τὴν τῶν θείων ἐπίγνωσιν.   
268 τὴν διάνοιαν ἐπὶ τὰ ὄρθιά τε καὶ ὑψηλὰ ἀναβιβάζειν 
269 ἐκ γάρ τοι τῆς ἐπιτηδεύσεως ταύτης τὸ νικᾶν ἀντὶ πολλῶν ἀγαθῶν, φησί, περιγίγνεται. 
270 ἡ τοίνυν αἰτία τῆς τῶν ὄντων διαφορᾶς κατά τε τὴν ἀξίαν καὶ ἐν τῇ τοῦ δύνασθαι παραλλαγῇ. 
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for it exceedingly, but those stupid men who are displeased by it receive the worthy punishment for 
their pride” (14.3).271 
 As his discourse nears its end, all these more or less abstract concerns and more or less implicit 
analogies give way to explicit narratives of Constantine’s own life and direct assertions of the 
preeminent divine favor and inspiration responsible for his rise to supreme power through bloody civil 
war:272 “I myself declare that the cause of my own good fortune and of all my deeds is your [i.e. God’s] 
favor. To this fact witnesses the accomplishment of all I have done through prayers, my manly deeds, 
my victories, the trophies set up in triumph against my enemies” (22.1).273 The very success of 
Constantine’s campaigns and undertakings is a proof of divine favor, since the rewarding of virtue and 
the punishment of vice is, for Constantine, an ordinary part of the beneficent cosmic order:274 “For it is 
because of the kind of life lived by human beings and according to their value that things befall us, since 
 
271 τοῦτον [...] τὸν λόγον, ᾧ πείθονται μὲν οἱ εὖ φρονοῦντες καὶ εὐχαριστοῦσιν ἐξαισίως, οἱ δ’ ἀχαριστοῦντες ἠλίθιοι τὴν ἀξίαν 
τῆς ὑπερηφανίας κομίζονται τιμωρίαν. 
272 The basic claim that Constantine’s civil warfare had been divinely inspired is found in many public acts of the reign of 
Constantine, including most notably the inscription on the Arch of Constantine that ascribed Constantine’s victory over 
Maxentius to “the inspiration of divinity” (instinctu divinitatis)—a phrase that, as Hall 1998 has pointed out, would have had 
strong resonances both with pagan divination and the revolution against the kings that had established the Republic (cf. Florus, 
Epitome 1.3.9.1-2, Cicero, De divinatione 1.12.1–10, 1.34.7–12, 1.66.1–4). As Lenski 2016, 56-60, argues, “earlier emperors, 
including the tetrarchs, had also made claims to providentially inspired rule, but these were never as persistent nor their 
implications as personal and elaborate as Constantine’s” (59) which “became more rather than less common” (59) with his 
increasing association with Christianity and consistently proclaimed the Emperor’s “publicly stated belief that he had direct 
contact with the divine and that this had been the key to his success” (56). 
273 Ἐγὼ μὲν τῆς εὐτυχίας τῆς ἐμαυτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἐμῶν πάντων αἰτιῶμαι τὴν σὴν εὐμένειαν. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ ἡ ἔκβασις τῶν κατ’ 
εὐχὰς ἁπάντων, ἀνδραγαθίαι, νῖκαι, κατὰ τῶν πολεμίων τρόπαια. 
274 In this, Constantine appeals to a long-standing principle of Roman visual propaganda, which, as Wallace-Hadrill 1981 has 
argued, communicated “not that the emperor has the right human qualifications to suit him for the job, but that he has the 
necessary almost mystical powers and gifts (or that he enjoys the divine favour required) to grant his people what they needed” 
(316). As Wallace-Hadrill also emphasizes, this message stood in some contrast to a more philosophical emphasis that “only 
virtue in the moral sense, not power or wealth or fortune elevated men above the level of the human” (316) and therefore 
made them worthy rulers. Such conflicting messages, however, were not so much a reflection of elite versus popular concerns 
as “two different aspects of the emperor that may be labelled the 'rational' and the 'charismatic' [...] two different ways of 
looking at the emperor that may overlap even within the same or similar contexts” (317).The cosmic-moral-religious system put 
forward in Oratio ad coetum sanctorum represents a particularly intimate binding together of these two strands of Imperial 




plagues and civil discords and both sterility and fertility following close after each other manifestly and 
clearly, only without an audible voice, say that all such things have been made to correspond to our 
manner of life” (6.3).275 Not only are his victories in themselves proofs of divine favor, but also the 
enemies against which such campaigns were fought, tyrants who had directly opposed their cosmic 
superior Christ by persecuting the Church.276 However complex the calculation of the just and unjust 
deeds of rulers may be in general, this savage violence against helpless innocents is so clearly evil as to 
admit no question about the justness of its punishment at God’s and Constantine’s hands (22-25). 
Constantine’s description of the horror of such widespread violence against fellow Romans and citizens 
(25) and of the blasphemous folly of treating the killing of innocents as a religious duty (22) could hardly 
be stronger; and it is the fact of this irrational violence against the innocent, more than any simple 
ascription of victory to divine favor, that is ultimately responsible for Constantine’s proclaimed 
confidence in the unimpeachable divine legitimacy of his rule.277 
But truly both the cries uttered to God by those who were being oppressed and were longing for 
their inborn freedom, and the praises uttered in thanksgiving to God after their deliverance 
from these evils, when their freedom and mutual association with justice had been returned to 
them, how do these things not declare in every way the Providence of God and his love for 
men? Whenever they praise my own service in this, a service which has its ἀρχὴ from the 
inspiration of God, do they not strongly affirm that God is the cause of my manly courage? Yes 
indeed, most of all (25.5-26.1).278 
 
275 διὰ γὰρ τὸν ποιὸν τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίον καὶ τὸ κατ’ ἀξίαν ἐπαρτᾷ, λοιμῶν ἔσθ’ ὅτε καὶ στάσεων ἀφορίας τε καὶ εὐφορίας 
ἐπακολουθούντων φανερῶς τε καὶ διαρρήδην μόνον οὐχὶ φωνὴν ἀφιέντων, ὅτι πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα τοῖς ἡμετέροις βίοις 
ἐφήρμοσται.   
276 As Lenski 2016, 33-36, notes, Constantine himself seems to have been responsible for “engineering a linguistic revolution” 
(33) by which “the notion of ‘tyranny,’ first used as a generic slur against political rivals, comes to refer more specifically to 
persecutors of the Christian faith” (36) based on an underlying logic which “equated the welfare of the church with the welfare 
of the state” (36) (cf. Barnes 1996a). 
277 As Barnes 1981, 75-76, dryly notes: “As so often, Constantine’s religious prejudices neatly coincided with his political 
interest.” 
278 ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ αἱ πρὸς τὸν θεὸν ἐκφωνήσεις τῶν πιεζομένων καὶ τὴν ἔμφυτον ἐλευθερίαν ποθούντων, καὶ οἱ μετὰ τὴν 
ἀπαλλαγὴν τῶν κακῶν τῆς εὐχαριστίας πρὸς τὸν θεὸν ἔπαινοι, ἀποδοθείσης τῆς ἐλευθερίας αὐτοῖς καὶ τῶν μετὰ δικαιοσύνης 
συμβολαίων, πῶς οὐ παντὶ τρόπῳ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ πρόνοιαν καὶ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους στοργὴν χαρακτηρίζουσιν;  Ὅταν δὲ 
τὴν ἐμὴν ὑπηρεσίαν ἐπαινῶσιν, ἐξ ἐπιπνοίας θεοῦ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχουσαν, ἆρ’ οὐ τῆς ἐμῆς ἀνδραγαθίας τὸν θεὸν αἴτιον εἶναι 
διαβεβαιοῦνται; πάντων γε μάλιστα· 
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The cosmic order established in the rest of the discourse is now brought home, for Constantine’s 
listeners, to the earthly Emperor present before their eyes. If God is the cause of the Son, who in turn 
became cause of the salvation of the cosmos through his dramatic, personal intervention into the 
human world, so Christ has now made Constantine the cause of the Roman Empire’s safety and 
prosperity through similarly dramatic events. By acknowledging his cosmic superiors, by punishing the 
guilty and rewarding the worthy, Constantine has established on earth and in the Roman Empire a 
worthy instantiation of the order of the cosmos as a whole—an order produced by and ultimately 
grounded in the asymmetrical monarchical relationship in heaven between absolutely transcendent 
Father and cultic savior Son. This Imperial theological discourse ends, then, with the strongest possible 
affirmation of Constantine’s unique status as the one favored by God and tasked by him with bringing 
peace and prosperity to the Roman Empire and the Church:279  
Indeed all people have understood that the most holy service of these hands is due to a faith in 
God that is spotless and most pure, and that everything which has been accomplished 
advantageously, at least by these hands, turns out successfully by prayers and supplications, 
since a private and public prosperity has arrived that is as great as each person could have 
prayed for to the benefit of himself and those dear to him. They have observed my battles, and 
they have witnessed especially that war in which the Providence of God ruled in favor of the 
victory of his people, and they have known that God favors our prayers (26.2).280  
 All the foregoing theology, metaphysics, and history finally center on and culminate in a single, 
decisive theological and political claim about Constantine and his rise to supreme power through civil 
 
279 As Lenski 2016, 41-42, correctly notes, this Constantinian self-image “as the sole ruler who had secured exclusive dominion 
over the Roman Empire by acting as the Christian god’s agent” (41) appears “in a variety of sources linked directly and indirectly 
to Constantine himself” (41) and therefore constitutes “the clearest and most consistent self-portrait  of the emperor” (41-42) 
as well as “perhaps the best attested and most fully articulated” (42) of the public personae presented to his subjects 
throughout his reign. This persona, as I have argued and will continue to argue through the remainder of this study, is also 
necessarily and intrinsically a theological one, dependent on theological claims, and was understood as such by Constantine’s 
Christian interlocutors.  
280 καὶ ἐπίστανταί γε πάντες ἄνθρωποι τὴν τῶνδε τῶν χειρῶν ἁγιωτάτην λατρείαν ὀφείλεσθαι τῷ θεῷ πίστει καθαρᾷ καὶ 
εἰλικρινεστάτῃ, καὶ σύν γε ταῖς χερσὶν εὐχαῖς τε καὶ λιτανείας πᾶν, ὅσον ἤνυσται ὑπὲρ συμφέροντος, κατορθοῦσθαι, 
προσγενομένης ὠφελείας ἰδίᾳ τε καὶ δημοσίᾳ τοσαύτης, ὅσην ἂν ἕκαστος αὐτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς φιλτάτοις ηὔξατο. ἱστόρησαν δὲ καὶ 
τὰς μάχας, καὶ ἐθεάσαντο [καὶ] τὸν πόλεμον, τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ προνοίας τὴν νίκην τῷ δήμῳ βραβευούσης, καὶ εἶδον τὸν θεὸν ταῖς 
ἡμετέραις εὐχαῖς συναιρόμενον· 
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war. If Constantine and his cosmic theology is correct, his status as Emperor of the Roman world as a 
whole is not only legitimate, but far more stable and reliable than that of any Emperor or dynasty before 
him.281 Come to power through acts of divine assistance as publicly manifest as the miracles of Christ or 
Moses’ passage through the Red Sea, Constantine, thanks to the presence of God in his understanding 
and the infallible security of his pious prayers, is, like Christ and Moses, at once the beneficent provider 
of material goods and the teacher of theological wisdom and virtue for his people. Secured at once by 
the absolute transcendence of God the Father and the beneficent supremacy of God the Son, the 
Empire of Constantine cannot fail. 
1.6:  
Summary and Conclusion 
 The Emperor Constantine’s rise to power through civil war, and consequent absence of stable 
legitimacy, provides the basic contextualization for his relationship with Christianity and Christian 
theology throughout his reign. The relationship between Emperor and bishops was defined, not by one-
sided dominance or dependence of either party, but by active collaboration for the purposes of mutual 
benefit. Through their claimed divine sanction and imposing institutional structure, the bishops of the 
Christian Church could help stabilize and legitimize Constantine’s rule, while Constantine in turn could 
offer the bishops numerous forms of practical aid expressed in material resources, legal privileges, and 
the building of churches. However, for the relationship between Emperor and bishops to be willingly 
entered into by both parties, it would have to be justified in directly theological terms.  
 
281 That establishing Constantine’s legitimacy within a larger theological structure for the benefit of a Christian audience is in 
fact the main purpose of Oratio ad coetum sanctorum has been recognized by, e.g. Drake 1989, 48-49, who correctly points out 
that, far from constituting a “Good Friday Sermon,” Constantine’s address “never returns to the subject of Easter” (48) after its 
brief (and easily interchangeable) opening words, while “its explicit theme is not Easter but Providence, πρόνοια, a keyword in 
the Oration, one which occurs no fewer than 25 times, in every major section” (48) and its purpose is “to associate Providence 
with [Constantine] himself” (49), thereby “us[ing] deity as a source of legitimacy” and “giving proof of his claim to Christian 
leadership” (49).  
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 A case study for this basic relationship and the advantages offered to both parties is the gradual 
development under Constantine of a true Imperial-episcopal judicial system. With its totalizing ideology 
of moral probity and doctrinal uniformity, the Christian episcopal system had always been uniquely 
vulnerable to the challenge of heterodox or immoral prelates. While systems of episcopal primacy and 
conciliarity had been developed as a response to this issue, they were hampered by the lack of 
resources possessed by bishops and had no real means of enforcement other than the voluntary. By 
offering his services as facilitator of episcopal processes and enforcer of episcopal decisions, Constantine 
was thus in a position to provide an immediate, practical benefit to his new allies. Both the basic 
underlying justification and the practical norms for this collaborative system were, however, from its 
beginning ambiguous, developed through ad hoc actions in response to particular crises. In particular, 
Constantine’s participation in the Donatist controversy laid bare the basic questions of from where the 
authority to judge bishops ultimately derived and hence whether or not appeals were possible from 
episcopal councils to the Emperor. The case of Arius at Nicaea and afterwards only increased this 
ambiguity, as Constantine for the first time backed up the sentences of the council with Imperial decrees 
of exile—thus providing a new norm whereby bishops could be sentenced to exile but not to capital 
punishment—but then quickly reversed course within a few years, returned Arius from exile, and 
personally cleared him of all charges. While in the post-Nicaea period Constantine apparently came to 
believe in his own authority to act as the final court of appeals for clerics on both criminal and 
theological charges, his attempts to have Arius readmitted to communion proved in the short term 
fruitless. In this context, Constantine again turned to episcopal councils, but now in a framework 
whereby the Emperor collaborated with favored bishops in selecting those bishops who would attend, 
enforcing their presence with threats of deposition and exile, and overseeing the councils with Imperial 
officials. In this way the Emperor created a new, streamlined conciliar process whose processes and 
outcomes could be managed with far greater certainty. As the events following the Council of Tyre 
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showed clearly, however, Constantine still believed in his own ultimate ability to hear appeals even from 
such councils and deliver sentences on his own final authority.  
 In many of these dealings, Constantine justified his assumption of authority over bishops by 
appeals to his own unique status as the “Servant of God” or “Man of God” gifted with direct divine 
inspiration and hence capable of deciding cases with infallible security. Throughout Constantine’s 
theological writings, this assertion is justified by appeal to the dramatic events that had brought him to 
power, including unlikely victories over “tyrannical” opponents and the rescue of the Christian Church 
from persecution. The directly theological form in which this basic picture was presented, however, 
varies significantly over Constantine’s reign. In his initial introduction to his Eastern subjects, 
Constantine expressed only a vague monotheistic faith in a God who was not only directly responsible 
for his victories but had also tasked him with the rebuilding and unification of the Christian Church as 
the divinely-chosen means for the unification of the Empire and the human realm as a whole. In keeping 
with basic perspective, in his first letter to the feuding bishops of the “Arian controversy” Constantine 
presented himself as an analogue to the Christian bishops, defined by a divinely-inspired expertise and 
responsibility for political, religious, and cosmic unification, and castigated the bishops for their 
abandonment of this task in favor quibbling debates over theological terminology.  
Constantine’s attempt to defend his existing perspective and beliefs at the Council of Nicaea led 
necessarily to more direct engagement with Christian theological terminology, even as he continued to 
focus on the preservation of a bare monotheistic belief defined by the independence and priority of the 
one God as monarchical ruler of all things. In the aftermath of the Council of Nicaea, this perspective 
was elaborated on in two letters sent, respectively, to the Church of Nicomedia and to Arius and his 
followers, in which Constantine laid out in detail a distinctive theology centered on the absolute, 
monadic unity of the one God. In this theology, the Son was presented as the will (βούλησις) of the 
Father, only metaphorically “begotten” in activity external to the Godhead. Requiring the aid of no 
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subordinates or assistants whatsoever, this monarchical deity possessed the ability, through this will, to 
make himself present and carry out activity in every part of his creation. While clearly troubled by the 
association with physicality and suffering implied by the Incarnation and Passion of Christ, for 
Constantine at this stage this puzzle was resolved by the assertion that God’s presence in Christ was no 
more defiling than that in any other part of his creation. While God had made use of a soul-less human 
body as an instrument in making his presence known to his subjects, he himself had suffered neither 
diminishment nor death. In both documents, Constantine showed clear, accurate knowledge of the 
theology of Eusebius of Nicomedia and Arius, and challenged it for its alleged detraction from the power 
of God through the existence of a subordinate οὐσία.  
Constantine’s letter to Arius closed, however, with a remarkable personal invitation to the 
disgraced priest, inviting him to come to court to personally present his case to the Emperor. In his own 
characterization, such personal presence would allow Constantine, through divine inspiration, to read 
the secrets of Arius’ heart, discern the truth or falsehood of his theology, and so either cure him of his 
moral and theological errors or else embrace his theology as the truth. 
It is in the light of this remarkable offer that I argue the acknowledged change in fortunes for 
Arius and many of his allies in the years after Nicaea should be explained. While numerous hypotheses 
have been proposed to account for Constantine’s seeming change of allegiance from the bishops 
triumphant at Nicaea to their opponents—including the restoration from exile of both Arius and 
Eusebius of Nicomedia, explicit approbation offered to the theology of Eusebius of Caesarea, and his 
direct participation in the depositions of many of their episcopal opponents—the most cogent 
explanation in my judgment is simply that Arius and his allies were successful in convincing Constantine 
that their theology was correct.  
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As evidence for this hypothesis, Constantine’s Oratio ad coetum sanctorum, the only address by 
Constantine on Christian topics preserved in its entirety, offers a full exposition of a theological 
perspective very much in keeping with, but nonetheless distinct from, those of Arius and Eusebius of 
Caesarea. In this speech, the Son is declared to be a separate, lower οὐσία created by the monadic God 
consequent to his own existence and appointed by him as the direct creator and ruler of the cosmos. 
This presentation of the Son as an only partially-transcendent monarchical deity allows Constantine to 
draw far more numerous and direct comparisons between the Son’s status and activities and his own. 
Both the Son and Constantine are in essence salvific rulers who govern by making themselves as present 
as possible to their ignorant and rebellious subjects in order to communicate and enforce the distant 
will and laws of their own cosmic superior. In so doing, however, Constantine and Christ demonstrate 
their own superiority precisely through their absolute refusal to allow their wills to be in any way 
conditioned or altered by the turbulent, violent opposition of their subjects. In this way, a cosmic order 
is established based around the imposition of a single, superior will over numerous, competing inferior 
wills forceful so as to bring into order a universe defined by conflicting elements and moral characters. 
In the closing portions of his speech, Constantine employs this cosmic picture to argue that his victory 
over the tyrants responsible for the Persecution of Diocletian was the result of divine inspiration and 
direct, miraculous aid. Taken together, then, Oratio ad coetum sanctorum thereby offers a directly 












Ἀμφὶ βασιλείας αὐτῆς 
Eusebius of Caesarea and the Three Emperors 
2.1: 
Eusebius 
Eusebius of Caesarea (born c. 260, assumed the episcopate of Caesarea most likely in 312 or 
313, died 339/3401) is without a doubt one of the most intriguing and colorful figures in the 4th century 
Roman Empire. Over a remarkable three-decade career as Christian cleric, theologian, historian, public 
speaker, and alleged Imperial advisor, very few people in the Roman Empire, Christian or non-Christian, 
could hope to rival Eusebius in any of the various fields to which he made contributions, let alone all of 
them together.2 As bishop of Caesarea in Palestine, Eusebius considered himself the primary successor 
in the 4th century of the famous 3rd century Alexandrian philosopher and polymath Origen,3 who had 
 
1 See e.g. Johnson 2014, 18-24, Pietri 2013, 9-10. The date of Eusebius’ accession as bishop is based on the death of Eusebius’ 
predecessor Pamphilus in 310, after which it would presumably not have been possible to appoint a successor until the 
cessation of persecution upon the victory of Constantine and Licinius in 312/313. As Eusebius himself confirms (Historia 
Ecclesiastica 10.3.4-10.4.1), he was a bishop by the time he delivered a panegyric for Paulinus of Tyre c. 314-320 (Historia 
Ecclesiastica 10.4, cf. Johnson 2014, 21), and likewise must have been a bishop by the time of the outbreak of the ecclesiastical 
conflicts over Arius c. 318-324 (see note 60 in section 2.3 below). 
2 See Perrone 1996 for an overview of Eusebius’ own conception of the task and status of the Christian scholar-teacher, which, 
while shaped by his training under Pamphilus in Caesarea, also showed significant originality through its extension into diverse 
literary spheres. Perrone, correctly in my judgment, argues that despite the great diversity of Eusebius’ writings in genre and 
context, “the corpus of his writings is to a large measure a well-planned and connected whole” (520), a task made possible by 
Eusebius’ “remarkable capacity for large projects, which was nourished technically by the habits of hard and meticulous work 
acquired under the guidance of Pamphilus and ideologically by a quite compact and steady outlook” (519).  
3 For Eusebius’ self-conscious status as a literary and theological heir to Origen, see e.g. Johnson 2014, 17-18 (“Through 
Pamphilus’ mediation, Origen had found an heir to preserve, modify and extend his intellectual project”), as well as, from 
Eusebius himself, the lengthy apologetic vita of Origen in Historia Ecclesiastica 6.1-32 and the full-throated defense of Origen 
and the direct connection Eusebius draws between his own theology and that of his Alexandrian predecessor in Contra 
Marcellum 1.4. For an excellent direct comparison between Origen and Eusebius as Scriptural commentators and theologians 
that highlights both the fundamentally Origenian cast of Eusebius’ theology and the numerous clear breaks from his 
predecessor in theological positions and methodology, see Barnes 1981, 94-105. 
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settled in Caesarea after departing Alexandria due to conflicts with his bishop Demetrius.4 Eusebius is 
most known to history, however, not as a pupil of Origen (in whose defense he composed early in his 
career, in tandem with his predecessor Pamphilus, the Apologia pro Origene), but rather as the first 
ecclesiastical historian, the source for a sizeable portion of all scholarly knowledge of the first centuries 
of Christianity, and as an ally, panegyrist, and biographer of the first Christian Roman Emperor, 
Constantine. 
Like many other Christians of his generation, Eusebius’ early career was defined by the 
persecution of Diocletian that began in 303 and continued in one form or other for the next decade. This 
persecution raged most fiercely in the Eastern provinces where Eusebius made his home, in close 
proximity to the primary seat of Imperial power at Nicomedia. What part precisely Eusebius played 
during this persecution, in addition to the role of eyewitness claimed in Historia Ecclesiastica, is difficult 
to ascertain. There can be no doubt, however, that this event had a lasting effect on both his literary and 
clerical activities. The sudden onset of persecution after a lengthy period of peace and prosperity, the 
accompanying collapse of the Tetrarchic system into dissension and civil war, with both trends 
culminating in the sudden, seemingly miraculous promotion of Christianity to legality and Imperial favor 
under the new Emperor Constantine—this basic narrative, and the lessons allegedly learned from it, 
recurs as a leitmotif throughout his career as cleric and writer, and strongly distinguishes Eusebius from 




4 Kalligas 2001, 584-98 (cf. Johnson 2014, 13, 39-40) also argues for the thesis that the episcopal library at Caesarea had 
inherited the extensive philosophical library brought to Caesarea by the pagan philosopher Longinus who, like Plotinus and 
Origen himself, had studied under the influential Alexandrian Ammonius Saccas—an indication of the multiple intertwined 






By the time Constantine summoned the bishops of the Empire to meet at Nicaea in 325,5  
Eusebius had most likely put the finishing touches on the work that would grant him his lasting fame, 
not only in the context of 4th century Christianity, but throughout Late Antiquity, the Middle Ages, and 
into the contemporary world.6 
The project of writing a comprehensive history of the Christian Church up until his own day was 
an ambitious one by any standards, and it is unclear what exactly occasioned Eusebius to take it up. 
Eusebius’ work would certainly have been aided by the new freedom and prosperity granted to 
Christians and Christian bishops under Constantine—and indeed, the work in its final form presents a 
deliberately teleological narrative designed to culminate in the golden age of the Church under 
Constantine. At the same time, Eusebius’ work would have been inconceivable apart from the earlier 
efforts of Christian writers such as Irenaeus of Lyons, Tertullian, and Clement of Alexandria to explicate 
Christianity’s historical basis and the orderly succession of bishops in its leading sees. Most of all, it 
would have been inconceivable apart from the efforts of the man Eusebius self-consciously viewed as 
his own literary and theological predecessor, Origen of Alexandria, and the copious projects, many 
undertaken at the episcopal library at Caesarea, in which he had sought to apply the full power of 
ancient literary, textual, and philosophical science to the explication of Christian teaching.  
 
5 For a discussion of the dating and redaction of Historia Ecclesiastica, see Appendix B. 
6 Cf. Johnson 2014, 85: “it marks an innovative and exploratory advance in the conception of the task of history-writing itself, 
one that would make an immense impact on history as a literary genre.” Reflecting the immediate importance of the work is 
the fact that effectively started a new genre, the “ecclesiastical history,” which would proliferate throughout the late 4th and 5th 
centuries, with all of the authors in the genre basing themselves explicitly on Eusebius’ work and posing their own works as 
continuations of his own project into later periods.  
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Still, the construction of a single historical narrative, presented in a single work, is never without 
its distinctive underlying purpose, made visible in numerous acts of decision, selection, and 
characterization. Eusebius tells the story of ἡ ἐκκλησία, “the Church,” as a coherent whole, stretching 
over three centuries; his narrative has its beginning, middle, and end, its scope and arc and telos,7 and 
all these are constructed finally around the dual events that dominated Eusebius’ early life as a Christian 
and a cleric: the disastrous Empire-wide persecution of Christianity under Diocletian, and the 
unexpected sanctioning and sponsorship of Christianity under Constantine.8  
This telos determines Eusebius’ selections to a degree even in the early books of the Historia 
Ecclesiastica. In his apologetic introduction to the work as a whole, the Father is presented as the “All-
Ruler” (πανηγεμών) (1.5), while Christ is the pre-existent “Lord and God and Emperor of all things which 
have come into existence” (1.3),9 who “assists (ὑπουργεῖν) his Father’s commands” (1.5)10 and to whose 
eschatological Empire the Hebrew prophets once looked forward with hope (e.g. 1.2.24-25). The nature 
 
7 None of this should be taken as an attack on Eusebius as a historian or a declaration that such narrative and teleological 
concerns (pervasive in both ancient and modern historiography) represent a falling away from an imagined pure, objective 
method of historiography. As Johnson, 2014, 96, correctly argues, “historians have never been able to write an objective 
account of a period, event or movement from a location devoid of moral, ideological, historiographical, theological or 
philosophical sets of assumptions,” so that in evaluating Eusebius it is necessary “to move beyond the scholar/apologist 
dichotomy.” Likewise Cameron 1997, 155: “If ever there was an author unsuited to a positivist critique, that author is 
Eusebius.” In this, it should be noted, I strongly differ from the view of e.g. Drake 2000, 360-362, that in such features “Eusebius 
differed substantially” from the tradition of pagan historiography, particularly in an alleged penchant to treat wrongdoing “as 
an offense against God, a sin,” naturally leading to retribution and so employed “as a motive force to explain historical events,” 
while pagan historians “rarely went beyond stock appeals to Fate or Fortune which owe as much to the influence of the 
dramatists as to a philosophy of history” (361). For a fuller argument for the explicit use of divine vengeance for human 
wrongdoing as a central principle of historical explanation in the tradition of ancient pagan historiography, see my own 
previous work on the “Father of History” Herodotus (Smolin 2015). There can be no doubt, however, that as Trompf 1983 
argues, Eusebius’ concept of divine providence, expressed both in benefactions and in divine vengeance, represents an 
innovation of such models in its emphasis on “the efficacy of a personal God who is intimately concerned for the whole 
universe, and especially for his own people” (140). 
8 See Droge 1992 for a discussion of the strikingly and pervasively “progressive” shape this gives Eusebius’ view of history, in 
strong contrast with other ancient cyclical and decline-based models but somewhat similar to that contained in the Athenian 
orator Isocrates, particularly in the importance granted to the λόγος in the development of civilization. While Droge notes the 
apologetic function of this narrative structure for Christianity as a whole (506-507), it should be noted that this narrative also 
inevitably functions as an apologetic for the Constantinian settlement. 
9 τὸν τῶν γενητῶν ἁπάντων κύριον καὶ θεὸν καὶ βασιλέα 
10 ταῖς πατρικαῖς ἐπιτάξεσιν ὑπουργοῦντα 
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of this eschatological kingdom, its grounding in the hierarchical relationship of Son and Father, and its 
manifestation on earth and human history, will remain key themes and overriding preoccupations of 
Eusebius throughout his entire corpus.  
The Empire of Christ, visible most immediately in the early books of Historia Ecclesiastica in the 
Church, has also for Eusebius a natural and necessary relationship to the more directly political order of 
the Roman Empire. By the fourth century, the deployment of written lists of episcopal successions, 
extending back to the Apostles, had long been a primary historical feature of Christian writers.11 
Eusebius begins with this data, but combines it with information on the reigns of Roman Emperors to 
create a single, combined narrative of succession for both Imperial and ecclesiastical authority.12 This is 
perhaps the key innovation of Eusebius as a teller of the Christian past, and its implications should not 
be underrated. The Christian historical imagination had long relied, and would long continue to rely, on 
the Jewish tradition and various treatments of the life of Christ and the Apostolic age, a corpus brought 
into dialogue with the Greco-Roman present and past by numerous early Christian writers. A full 
combination of Roman-Imperial and Christian-ecclesiastical pasts into a single narrative chronology, 
however, was something well beyond the capability of most early Christian authors, and also in strong 
tension with their apologetic emphasis on the superiority of the Jewish and Biblical traditions over their 
Roman and Greek equivalents.13 No author prior to Eusebius had so fully bridged that gap.14  
 
11 See e.g. Irenaeus of Lyons, Adversus Haereses 3.3, Tertullian, De Praescriptione Haereticorum 20, 21, 32. 
12 As Johnson 2014, 89-90, notes, however, the structure of Historia Ecclesiastica grants clear priority to the reigns of the 
Roman Emperors, whose accessions and deaths form the boundaries of distinct annalistic units within which Eusebius then 
“insert[s] reports on the deaths of bishops and the names of their successors at the appropriate moments” (90). In this, I side 
with Johnson against Drake 2000, 358-367, who in a more traditional manner emphasizes the centrality of the Church over and 
against the Roman Empire to Eusebius’ narrative. As Johnson 2014, 96-97, points out, in both general scope and specific points, 
Eusebius’ project parallels that of the Jewish-Roman historian Josephus. 
13 See in particular Tatian, Oratio ad Graecos, Clement, Protrepticus. 
14 In this, Historia Ecclesiastica is dependent on, but distinct from, Eusebius’ earlier Chronicon, a voluminous work representing 
a “revolution in chronographic composition” (Croke 1982, 196-197) in which the reigns of the rulers of numerous different 
pagan nations and Empires were comprehensively collated with the “years of Abraham” and Biblical data on the reigns of the 
151 
 
In presenting this single narrative, Eusebius takes special care to highlight incidents where 
figures from the early Christian tradition interacted with kings and Emperors, such as the legendary 
exchange of letters between Christ and the King of Edessa (1.13), the purported reaction of the Emperor 
Tiberius to Pilate’s report of the crucifixion of Christ (2.2), and the account of Domitian’s persecution of 
descendants of the Apostle Jude (3.20). The last on this list, however, belongs more properly to the 
much larger set of accounts of interactions between Christians and Roman Emperors and officials on 
which Eusebius focuses throughout his history: martyrdom narratives. It is these repeated accounts of 
persecutions that for Eusebius constitute the primary narrative (as opposed to chronological) means by 
which the history of the Church is connected to that of the Roman Empire and its rulers. While naturally 
stories of the conflict between Roman persecutors and Christian martyrs paint the former in a negative 
light, this negativity is not applied universally to the Empire or Roman Emperors, even those under 
whom persecutions occurred. Nero (2.25) and Domitian (3.17, 3.20), two of the “bad Emperors” of 
traditional Roman historiography, are also castigated by Eusebius as persecutors of the Church, while 
Tiberius (2.2), Vespasian (3.17), Trajan (3.33), Antoninus Pius (4.13), and Marcus Aurelius (5.5)15 are 
credited with refraining from or at least easing persecution, or even (in the case of Tiberius) actually 
accepting the divinity of Christ. By these means, Eusebius succeeds in creating not only a combined 
narrative of Roman Empire and Christian Church, but also the rudiments of a new system of evaluation 
for Roman rulers, one where “treatment of Christians” finds its place within the pre-existing Roman 
array of virtues and vices by which Emperors are to be judged.16 
 
Jewish kings—culminating by the end of the work, however, in the elimination of all chronologies, including the Jewish, except 
for the reigns of the Roman Emperors, the Olympiads, and the year of Abraham (see e.g. Johnson 2014, 86-89, Croke 1982). 
15 Though as Heyne 2010, 328-330, has recently noted contra Grant 1980, this generally positive characterization of Marcus 
Aurelius does not extend to actually falsifying the documentary evidence presented in Historia Ecclesiastica of persecution and 
martyrdoms during his reign.  
16 Cf. Drake 2000, 384-387. 
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All this comes into full flower in the last books of Historia Ecclesiastica, where Eusebius finally 
introduces on stage both the worst of all Emperors—those responsible for the persecution of 
Diocletian—and the best of all Emperors in political virtue and treatment of Christians alike: 
Constantine. 
Prior to these recent persecutions, Eusebius presents an idyllic picture of the late 3rd century as 
an era in which Church and Empire existed at peace with one another, a harmony made manifest in the 
favor shown by Emperors towards Christians and especially Christian clerics:  
The friendly attention shown by the rulers towards our people would be evidence of this; they 
were even entrusting to us governorships over nations, while releasing us from every anguish 
about sacrifice because of the great friendship which they maintained towards our dogma. Why 
is it necessary to speak about those in the Imperial palaces and those who rule over all, who 
were yielding to the members of their household, wives and children and servants, who spoke 
openly before their faces about the Divine Word and the Divine Life, all but permitting them to 
boast openly about the freedom of their faith? [...] It was possible to see the rulers of every 
Church honored with the favor of all the procurators and all the governors (8.1.2-3, 5).17 
As evidence of this harmony, Eusebius highlights the careers of a number of Christian clerics 
notable for their participation in philosophy, rhetoric, and political affairs (7.32): in particular the 
Antiochene priest Dorotheus, respected for his knowledge of both the Christian Scriptures and Greek 
παιδεία, and also an Imperial official honored with membership in the Emperor’s household and 
management of the Imperial dye-works at Tyre (7.32.2-3, 8.1.4). Such close, indeed intimate, association 
between the Roman Imperial system and the Church is for Eusebius a natural ideal: one, however, 
cruelly interrupted by the sudden and unprovoked onset of persecution, which consigned Dorotheus 
and his fellow Christian officials in the Imperial household to an untimely death (8.6.1). 
 
17 τεκμήρια δ’ ἂν γένοιτο τῶν κρατούντων αἱ περὶ τοὺς ἡμετέρους δεξιώσεις, οἷς καὶ τὰς τῶν ἐθνῶν ἐνεχείριζον ἡγεμονίας, τῆς 
περὶ τὸ θύειν ἀγωνίας κατὰ πολλὴν ἣν ἀπέσῳζον περὶ τὸ δόγμα φιλίαν αὐτοὺς ἀπαλλάττοντες. τί δεῖ περὶ τῶν κατὰ τοὺς 
βασιλικοὺς λέγειν οἴκους καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἀρχόντων; οἳ τοῖς οἰκείοις εἰς πρόσωπον ἐπὶ τῷ θείῳ παρρησιαζομένοις λόγῳ τε 
καὶ βίῳ συνεχώρουν, γαμεταῖς καὶ παισὶ καὶ οἰκέταις, μόνον οὐχὶ καὶ ἐγκαυχᾶσθαι ἐπὶ τῇ παρρησίᾳ τῆς πίστεως ἐπιτρέποντες· 
οὓς ἐξόχως καὶ μᾶλλον τῶν συνθεραπόντων ἀποδεκτοὺς ἡγοῦντο [...] οἵας τε καὶ τοὺς καθ’ ἑκάστην ἐκκλησίαν ἄρχοντας παρὰ 
πᾶσιν ἐπιτρόποις καὶ ἡγεμόσιν ἀποδοχῆς ἦν ὁρᾶν ἀξιουμένους. 
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Eusebius’ description of the chaos caused by the publication and implementation, without 
warning, of Imperial decrees against Christianity is derived, as he asserts, in part from firsthand 
experience (e.g. 8.9) and is presented with an extraordinary degree of pathos. Eusebius highlights, in 
addition to the deaths of prominent Christian clerics (8.13.1-7), the sufferings of Christians previously 
favored with political office or Imperial favor, such as the members of the Imperial household 
Dorotheus, Gorgontius, and Peter (8.6.1-5), an anonymous official in Nicomedia who tore down the 
Imperial decree on its publication (8.5), the Alexandrian magistrate Philoromus (8.9.7), and the Phrygian 
καθολικός Adauctus (8.11.2). In all these accounts, the willingness of Imperial officials to favor their 
allegiance to Christ over their Roman responsibilities is both highlighted and praised.  
Still, even in the midst of such grotesque description of conflict between Church and Empire, 
Eusebius largely refrains from personal criticism of Diocletian and the other Emperors responsible for 
this initial persecution—apart from a rare flash of anger in response to the alleged philanthropy shown 
in the later decision by the Tetrarchs, “after they had finally fulfilled the utmost of evils and had grown 
weary of killing and achieved fullness and satiety in their thirst for blood” (8.12.9),18 to reduce the 
punishment for Christianity from death to maiming.19 For the most part, the persecutions are ascribed, 
not to the malice of particular Emperors, but rather to the wickedness of the Christians of Eusebius’ 
earlier life, visible most of all, Eusebius asserts, in their lack of unity and shameful internal conflicts 
(8.1.7-9). The persecution itself is compared, meanwhile, to a civil war, a cause of general destruction 
not just for Christians, but for pagans as well (e.g. 8.10.12, 8.15.1). 
 
18 “ὅτε δὴ λοιπὸν ἀπειρηκότες ἐπὶ τῇ τῶν κακῶν ὑπερβολῇ καὶ πρὸς τὸ κτείνειν ἀποκαμόντες πλησμονήν τε καὶ κόρον τῆς τῶν 
αἱμάτων ἐκχύσεως ἐσχηκότες 
19 Eusebius also gives a moralistic description of the death of Galerius (8.16.2, 8.17), and in some manuscripts the deaths of the 
other persecuting Tetrarchs are narrated briefly in an appendix (8.app). 
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All these painful narratives, however, lead up to the moment when, as Eusebius dramatically 
puts it, “a revolution occurred throughout the whole Empire and altered everything” (8.13.10).20 In the 
end, Eusebius devotes almost as much space to this political revolution, beginning with Diocletian’s 
abdication and ending with the victory of Constantine over Maxentius, as to the suffering of the martyrs. 
Eusebius’ portrayal of the civil wars in which Constantine would ultimately emerge victorious 
relies, like his earlier treatment of Emperors, on an intimate joining between pre-existing Roman ideas 
of virtue and vice in rulers with a Christian martyrological and apologetic tradition focused on Imperial 
treatment of Christians. This focus makes Eusebius’ political narration overwhelmingly moralistic, 
focused on the systematic depiction of great virtue or horrific vice, its origins, and its outcomes in each 
Emperor of the newly-divided Roman state. This division, which Eusebius portrays as entirely due to the 
voluntary retirement from public life of Diocletian, the true “first in status” (τῷ πρωτοστάτῃ) (8.13.11) 
among the Tetrarchs, is treated in hyperbolically negative terms, as “an occurrence not at all at any time 
ever before passed down in memory” (8.13.11).21 It is the fundamental lack of unity caused by this 
sudden absence of a true primate among the various members of the Tetrarchic Imperial college that 
grounds Eusebius’ portrayal of the unprecedented wickedness of Constantine’s rivals in the looming civil 
war. 
It is against these rival Emperors, and not the original Tetrarchic college responsible for the 
Persecution of Diocletian, that Eusebius’ narrative is ultimately directed. The senior Emperor Diocletian, 
far from being portrayed as a wicked arch-persecutor, is ultimately blamed more for his abdication than 
for his acts in office. Even his junior partner Galerius, branded by Eusebius’ contemporary Lactantius as 
 
20 καί τι περὶ τὴν ὅλην ἀρχὴν νεώτερον γεγονὸς τὰ πάντα πράγματα ἀνατρέπει 
21 πρᾶγμα μηδ’ ἄλλοτέ πω πάλαι γεγονὸς μνήμῃ παραδεδομένον 
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the odiously wicked architect for the Persecution as a whole,22 is attacked by name only after the death 
of his senior partner, and then only in his painful mortal illness, which, while treated as a manifest divine 
punishment “for the murderous perpetrator of these evils” (8.16.2),23 is accompanied by a transcript24 of 
a remarkable deathbed decree halting the persecutions and asking for the prayers of the Christians 
(8.17). Eusebius shows no such restraint, however, in dealing with the new Caesars Maxentius and 
Maximinus Daia, the direct enemies of Constantine and his ally Licinius. He portrays them, rather, in the 
most hyperbolic terms as “the two tyrants dividing East and West” (8.14.18),25 guilty not only of this 
unnatural division of the Empire but also of other, more symbolic crimes of division, such as “separating 
lawful wives from their husbands” (8.14.2)26 to sexually abuse them and “tearing apart pregnant 
women” (8.14.5)27 to read their unborn infants’ entrails. Along with such personal wickedness, visible in 
sexual abuses, reliance on pagan magic, and persecution of Christians, these men are distinguished by 
basic breaches in political order, waging a quasi-civil war against the long-time (Christian) Roman allies 
the Armenians (9.8.2), granting such a degree of license to subordinates as to “all but invite them to be 
co-tyrants” (8.14.11)28, and finally, and most absurdly, “rush[ing] to be so shameless as to dare to be 
publicly proclaimed the first in honor” (9.10.1).29 Because of the failure of these junior Emperors to 
 
22 See Lactantius, De mortibus persecutorum. 
23 τῷ δ’ αὐθέντῃ τῶν κακῶν 
24 As Johnson 2014, 86, points out, the sheer quantity of quoted and excerpted material in Historia Ecclesiastica (as well as in 
Eusebius’ other works, cf. e.g. Perrone 1996, 527-528) makes it “one of the first truly documentary histories.” Heyne 2010 has 
recently issued a strong defense of Eusebius against the charge of having deliberately falsified these sources, even while 
acknowledging the bias shown in their selection and quotation, against the arguments of Grant 1980.  
25 τῶν δύο τυράννων ἀνατολὴν καὶ δύσιν διειληφότων 
26 διαζευγνύς γέ τοι τῶν ἀνδρῶν τὰς κατὰ νόμον γαμετάς 
27 γυναῖκας ἐγκύμονας ἀνασχίζοντος 
28 μόνον οὐχὶ συντυραννοῦντας αὐτῷ προκαλούμενος. 
29 τολμᾶν ὥρμητο θρασύνεσθαι καὶ πρῶτον ἑαυτὸν ταῖς τιμαῖς ἀναγορεύειν. 
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maintain clear precedence over their subordinates and clear subordination to their own Imperial 
superior, the entire Roman Empire falls, inevitably, into civil war. 
In Eusebius’ portrayal, this civil conflict can be resolved in only one way: through the restoration 
of a clear, singular primate to the Imperial college and the annihilation of the insubordinate Emperors 
Maxentius and Maximinus Daia. Maxentius’ fall comes first, at the hands of the pious Constantine, son 
of the pious Tetrarch Constantius, the only Emperor of his day, according to Eusebius, to refrain from 
persecution of Christians (8.13.12-14).30 In this conflict, Constantine, “superior and the first in the honor 
and status (τάξις) of the Imperial office (βασιλεία)”31 (9.9.2),32 is characterized by a direct analogy with 
the Biblical prophet Moses. Like Moses, Constantine, “relying on the fact that God was fighting with 
him”(9.9.3),33 in the end has to do nothing more than watch as his enemies, like the Biblical Pharaoh and 
his soldiers, are destroyed by God through water in the collapse of the Milvian Bridge (9.9.5-7). Eusebius 
even goes so far as to symbolically ascribe the song of victory sung by the Hebrews after Pharaoh’s 
death (Exodus 15:1-19) to Constantine: “Having sung by his deeds themselves these very things, and 
things akin and similar to them, to God the All-Ruler and Cause of his victory, Constantine marched into 
Rome to triumphal songs” (9.9.9).34 Maximinus Dia, meanwhile, is defeated by Constantine’s 
 
30 It should be noted that, unlike his ally Maximinus, there is significant evidence both for Maxentius’ suspension of persecutory 
edicts against Christians and for his generally favorable patronage of the Church in his domains (cf. Drake 2000, 170-175). 
31 By the established rules of the Tetrarchic office, Constantine would not have been the maximus augustus during his war with 
Maxentius, since Maximinus Dia had been appointed Caesar under Galerius in the domains formerly ruled by Diocletian and 
thus would have normatively been the successor to his title, while Licinius had been appointed Western Augustus by Galerius 
over a Constantine only grudgingly granted the status of subordinate Caesar under him (cf. e.g. Bruun 1976). If Constantine’s 
rejected attempt to assume the office of Augustus in 307 were accepted as divinely legitimated, however, Constantine would 
have technically preceded his allies Licinius and Maximinus Dia in office. While the Roman Senate was later to formally (if semi-
legally) grant Constantine the title of maximus augustus (cf. Bruun 1976, 18-19, Barnes 1981, 46), this took place only after his 
victory against Maxentius and accompanying conquest of Rome. 
32 πρότερός γε μὴν ὁ καὶ τιμῇ καὶ τάξει τῆς βασιλείας πρῶτος. 
33 ὁ τῆς ἐκ θεοῦ συμμαχίας ἀνημμένος. 
34 ταῦτα καὶ ὅσα τούτοις ἀδελφά τε καὶ ἐμφερῆ Κωνσταντῖνος τῷ πανηγεμόνι καὶ τῆς νίκης αἰτίῳ θεῷ αὐτοῖς ἔργοις 
ἀνυμνήσας, ἐπὶ Ῥώμης μετ’ ἐπινικίων εἰσήλαυνεν. 
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subordinate colleague Licinius and then dies horribly through disease (9.10), after which he is subject to 
a decree of damnatio memoriae applied with special violence to his images and those of his family 
throughout the Empire (9.11.11). Book Nine of the Historia Ecclesiastica, perhaps one original ending of 
the work as a whole,35 concludes not with a vision of peace but rather with a virtual orgy of revenge 
against Maximinus’ remaining associates, in which subordinate officials, the priests of a pagan cult newly 
erected by him at Antioch, and even his relatives and children are executed “with as much torment as 
possible” (9.11.6).36 This outcome Eusebius seems to endorse, as he explains that these men, women, 
and children suffered their grisly fate “because they had not accepted education, nor had they 
acknowledged and understood the exhortation given in the Sacred Scriptures: ‘Put not your faith in 
rulers, in the sons of man, in whom there is no salvation’ [Psalm 146:3]” (9.11.7-8).37 By these victories 
over divisive tyranny, and the accompanying Edict of Toleration issued by Constantine and Licinius to 
put a permanent end to the persecution of Christians, peace and harmony have been restored to both 
Church and Empire—at least for the moment.  
In the final version of the Historia Ecclesiastica, however, one further wrinkle remains. The 
present text of the tenth and final book of the work begins with an acknowledgement that this book has 
been added at some later point, in response to a request from the bishop of Tyre Paulinus. In Eusebius’ 
telling, what this new book primarily adds to the original teleological narrative is the reassuring certainty 
that the victory won by Constantine was not merely a temporary peace: 
And indeed, following the Scripture which commands us to ‘sing a new song’ [Psalm 96:1], let us 
now proclaim that after those terrible and dark visions and narratives now we are considered 
worthy to see and to panegyrize such things as many prophets and truly just men and martyrs of 
 
35 See the discussion in Appendix D below. 
36 μετὰ πλείστας ὅσας αἰκίας. 
37 ἐπεὶ μὴ ἐδέξαντο παιδείαν μηδὲ ἔγνωσαν μηδὲ συνῆκαν τὴν φάσκουσαν ἐν ἱεροῖς λόγοις παρακέλευσιν μὴ πεποίθετε ἐπ’ 
ἄρχοντας, ἐπὶ υἱοὺς ἀνθρώπων, οἷς οὐκ οἷς οὐκ ἔστιν σωτηρία 
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God before us desired to see upon the earth, and did not see, and desired to hear, and did not 
hear [Matthew 13:17/Luke 10:24] (10.1.4).38 
The prosperity enjoyed by the Church in the years following the Persecution is, then, not a 
temporary respite, but a secure eschatological fulfillment. At several points in the tenth book of his 
church history, Eusebius asserts that the present reality of the Church in the age of Constantine is, in 
fact, a “fulfillment” (τέλος) of a Scriptural prophecy (10.1.5, cf. Psalm 46:9; 10.1.7, cf. Psalm 37: 35-36; 
10.3.2, cf. Ezekiel 37:7). This eschatological happiness is manifest not merely in the absence of 
persecution, but also in the numerous grants of money, support, and legal exemptions made by the 
Emperor Constantine to the Christians (10.5-7), expressions of a joined divine and Imperial beneficence 
made most physically visible and tangible in the massive new church buildings erected throughout the 
Empire. Not only has Constantine granted money for the building of churches, but he has also taken an 
active interest in the unity of the Church itself, summoning episcopal synods on his own authority to 
settle dissensions (10.5.18-24) such as those that, in the view of Eusebius, had once been responsible for 
the Persecution of Diocletian. Thanks to the efforts of the Roman Empire Constantine, the Christian 
Church now enjoys a unity that is truly divine, visible in all its splendor at the public festival during which 
a new, Constantinian basilica was consecrated for the city of Tyre: “There was one power of the Divine 
Spirit moving through all the members, and one soul for all, and the same enthusiasm of faith, and one 
hymn of divine knowledge arising from all” (10.3.3).39 As opposed to the violent, unnatural civil conflict 
of the Persecution of Diocletian, the normative state of life for Christians in the age of Constantine can 
 
38 καὶ δὴ τῷ λογίῳ προστάττοντι τὸ καινὸν ᾆσμα διὰ τοῦδε νῦν ἀκολούθως ἐπιφωνῶμεν ὅτι δὴ μετὰ τὰς δεινὰς καὶ σκοτεινὰς 
ἐκείνας ὄψεις τε καὶ διηγήσεις τοιαῦτα νῦν ὁρᾶν καὶ τοιαῦτα πανηγυρίζειν ἠξιώθημεν, οἷα τῶν πρὸ ἡμῶν πολλοὶ τῷ ὄντι 
δίκαιοι καὶ θεοῦ μάρτυρες ἐπεθύμησαν ἐπὶ γῆς ἰδεῖν, καὶ οὐκ εἶδον, καὶ ἀκοῦσαι, καὶ οὐκ ἤκουσαν. 
39 μία τε ἦν θείου πνεύματος διὰ πάντων τῶν μελῶν χωροῦσα δύναμις καὶ ψυχὴ τῶν πάντων μία καὶ προθυμία πίστεως ἡ αὐτὴ 
καὶ εἷς ἐξ ἁπάντων θεολογίας ὕμνος. 
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be summed up in one short, dense phrase: “The unification of the parts of the body of Christ coming 
together into one harmony” (10.3.1).40  
This glorious unification has come, however, at a real cost. The other primary wrinkle added to 
Eusebius’ narrative by this latest book is the fact that Constantine’s co-Emperor Licinius, previously 
praised by Eusebius for his part in ending persecution of Christians, had in the meantime been killed in a 
civil war with his senior partner. Two Emperors had now become one, and the division of the Empire 
into East and West had been unmade in blood. Eusebius’ response to this event is to deploy all his 
rhetorical powers to demonize Licinius in terms nearly identical to those once deployed against his and 
Constantine’s previous opponents. Like Maxentius and Maximinus Dia, Licinius is accused both of 
symbolic physical crimes of division—once again “separating wedded wives”41 from their husbands 
(10.8.13) for sexual abuse and “butchering into many pieces the bodies” of Christian bishops 
(10.8.17)42—and of the primary political crime of rebelling against his superior (κατὰ τοῦ κρείττονος, 
10.8.5), Constantine, in relation to whom he properly possesses, not an equal share in a single Imperial 
office, but rather “the honor of the second rank” (δευτερείων τιμῆς, 10.8.2). 
Thankfully, however, the bond between Constantine and God, absolute superior and privileged 
inferior, is not so easily broken. This bond is manifested first and foremost in an intimate form of divine 
enlightenment by which “God made every deception and snare visible to the God-beloved Emperor” 
(10.8.7),43 thus delivering him from the secret plots of his erstwhile subordinate. On the breaking out of 
open war, the connection between God and Constantine only grows more apparent, as Constantine 
 
40 τῶν Χριστοῦ σώματος μελῶν εἰς μίαν συνιόντων ἁρμονίαν ἕνωσις. 
41 τὰς κουριδίας ἀποζευγνὺς γαμετὰς. 
42 ξίφει τὸ σῶμα εἰς πολλὰ τμήματα κατακρεουργούμενοι. 
43 τοῦ θεοῦ πάντα δόλον τε καὶ ῥᾳδιουργίαν τῷ θεοφιλεῖ βασιλεῖ κατάφωρα ποιοῦντος. 
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assumes several titles with not only Mosaic, but also specifically Christological import:44 “God made 
shine forth suddenly as a great Light in deep darkness [cf. Isaiah 9:3] and a black night and as a Savior of 
All [cf. 1 Tim 4:10] his Servant [cf. e.g. Exodus 14:31]45 Constantine, and he led him by the hand, with an 
uplifted arm [cf. Acts 13:17], into these regions” (10.8.19).46 In this directly salvific conflict, Constantine 
is assisted by a privileged subordinate of his own, his firstborn son Crispus, thus presenting, as Eusebius 
explicitly points out, a virtual icon of God accompanied by his only-begotten Son in heaven: “Then, as 
though employing God, the Emperor of All, and the Son of God, the Savior of All, as their guides and 
fellow combatants, both of them, the father together with his son, drew up their ranks against the 
enemies of God” (10.9.4).47 This new subordinate, we learn, is not only the son of Constantine, but also 
“similar (ὅμοιος) in all things to his father”(10.9.6)48—and thus, we are meant to infer, united to his 
superior and father so closely that further political division is simply unthinkable. Indeed, although 
Licinius in the East and Constantine in the West had for many years been close allies, connected through 
ties of marriage and part of a single common Imperial system, it is only now, Eusebius asserts, after 
Licinius is dead and the Empire belongs to one Augustus with one clearly subordinate son and Caesar, 
that “they caused the Roman Empire to be united in one, as it was in ancient times, and they brought 
this whole Empire from the rising of the sun in a circle across the rest of the inhabited world (οἰκουμένη) 
 
44 Though as Rapp 1998 points out, this transition is made more natural by the fact that the figure of Moses also possessed 
strong Christological resonances for 4th century Christians, including for Eusebius himself, who in his Demonstratio Evangelica 
2.6-30 had presented Moses as a clear prefiguration of Christ.  
45 See note 85 in section 1.3 above. 
46 θεὸς ὡς ἐν βαθεῖ σκότῳ καὶ νυκτὶ ζοφωδεστάτῃ φωστῆρα μέγαν ἀθρόως καὶ σωτῆρα τοῖς πᾶσιν ἐξέλαμψεν, τὸν αὐτοῦ 
θεράποντα Κωνσταντῖνον ὑψηλῷ βραχίονι ἐπὶ τὰ τῇδε χειραγωγήσας. 
47 εἶθ’ οἷα παμβασιλεῖ θεῷ θεοῦ τε παιδὶ σωτῆρι ἁπάντων ποδηγῷ καὶ συμμάχῳ χρώμενοι, πατὴρ ἅμα καὶ υἱὸς ἄμφω κύκλῳ 
διελόντες τὴν κατὰ τῶν θεομισῶν παράταξιν. 
48 τὰ πάντα τοῦ πατρὸς ὁμοίῳ. 
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and the North and the South together to the furthest reaches of the setting sun under their peace” 
(10.9.6).49  
The lessons of the bloody persecutions and civil wars of Eusebius’ early life have now become 
clear: not only is the unity of the Empire and the inhabited world absolutely necessary for the peace of 
the Church, but any quasi-Tetrarchic system of Imperial colleagues sharing a single office is, in the end, 
totally ineffective at achieving that unity. The Emperor must have subordinate assistants and governors, 
but he cannot have equals.  
Constantine’s son Crispus, however, holds a unique position in this political system inasmuch as, 
thanks to his ties of blood and origination to his father and the resulting similarity which he bears to 
him, there is no threat of him rebelling against his father’s power, nor does his presence divide the 
Empire, administratively or even nominally, into separate parts as Licinius had. Son and father act, 
rather, in perfect concert, with Constantine taking the lead and his son following and assisting. In acting 
in such a way, Imperial father and son have the model of divine Father and Son in heaven to look to, as 
well as the clear, direct guidance and assistance of this divine pair.50 As for the rest of the inhabitants of 
the human world, they have only to exult in the unity and peace of this new, definitive political and 
cosmic order, and together “honor God the Emperor of All as the first of all, as they had been taught, 
and then the Pious Emperor together with his God-loving children” (10.9.7).51 
 
49 μίαν ἡνωμένην τὴν Ῥωμαίων κατὰ τὸ παλαιὸν παρεῖχον ἀρχήν, τὴν ἀπ’ ἀνίσχοντος ἡλίου πᾶσαν ἐν κύκλῳ κατὰ θάτερα τῆς 
οἰκουμένης ἄρκτον τε ὁμοῦ καὶ μεσημβρίαν εἰς ἔσχατα δυομένης ἡμέρας ὑπὸ τὴν αὐτῶν ἄγοντες εἰρήνην. 
50 This allegedly divine unity was not, however, to last long, as Crispus was murdered in unclear circumstances by his father in 
326 (see note 13 in section 3.2 below). Syriac manuscripts of Historia Ecclesiastica exist in which all references to Crispus have 
been systematically expunged, leading to the plausible scholarly hypothesis that Eusebius himself was brought, only a few years 
after his declaration of the perfect and unbreakable bond between son and father, to systematically edit that relationship out 
of his text (see e.g. Barnes 1980, 197-198, recently challenged, however, by Johnson 2014, 106-108, who argues that such 
alterations should be seen rather as the work of later copyists). Crispus will not be mentioned at all in the later Vita Constantini. 




Thanks to God and Constantine, the history of the persecuted Church has come to an end, and a 
new age has dawned.52 
2.3:  
Eusebius and Arius 
It is unclear exactly when Eusebius of Caesarea first saw in person the Emperor so praised by 
him in Historia Ecclesiastica. At the very latest, this event must have occurred at the Council of Nicaea, 
which both men attended, though whether the two actually met on this occasion—as indeed, to what 
degree they were personally acquainted at any point in their overlapping lives—remains a vexed 
question in scholarship.53 Certainly by the last phases of the composition of Historia Ecclesiastica 
Eusebius was presenting himself self-consciously as an advocate for the first Christian Emperor and his 
role in both Empire and Church. 
Equally important for the purposes of this study, however, is Eusebius’ long association with 
another important and controversial figure in the history of the 4th century: the Alexandrian priest Arius, 
who, when like Origen before him he had been driven out of his diocese due to a conflict with his 
bishop, like Origen found a powerful friend and ally in the bishop of Caesarea. From documents 
 
52 Here it should be clear that, while the positive claim of Johnson 2014, 92-93, 104, 111-12, that the end of Historia 
Ecclesiastica reflects a return to Eusebius’ pervasive theme of Christ’s vindication of his Christian people and the “political 
confirmation of true piety and wisdom embodied in the lives of Christians” (112) is of course correct, I find his sketchy attempts 
to suggest that the end of Historia Ecclesiastica “may be less pro-Imperial and more ambivalent than is frequently claimed” 
(93), like most of his attempts to downplay the Imperial valences of Eusebius’ works, unconvincing. 
53 See e.g. Cameron 1983, 73, Barnes 1981, 266, for the common belief that Nicaea marked the first personal meeting between 
the two men. For the now uncommon scholarly stance that Eusebius was actually a close personal associate of Constantine, see 
e.g. Storch 1971. For the more common position that Eusebius had only relatively infrequent public contacts with the Emperor, 
see e.g. Barnes 1981, 265-267 (who argues that only four public contacts between the two men can be proven, including 
Nicaea), as well as Rapp 1998. More recently, again, Drake 2000, 368-372, has presented a somewhat more nuanced 
presentation of Eusebius of Caesarea as a key personal associate and ally, albeit one with an agenda differing in key points from 
his patron’s. In my judgment, this balanced position seems wisest, and is largely borne out by my argumentation both here and 
in chapter one. 
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preserved in this period,54 it is clear that Eusebius formed a key part of the alliance of bishops55 
assembled in support of Arius throughout Libya, Palestine, and parts of Syria and Asia Minor—including 
most importantly the powerful bishop of the city of Licinius’ Imperial court, Eusebius of Nicomedia56—to 
counter the condemnation of the bishop of Alexandria Alexander and the networks of bishops allied 
with him both within Egypt itself and throughout Syria and Asia Minor.57 The theological issues central 
to this so-called “Arian controversy” had emerged from the basic, long-standing tension in Christian 
belief and practice created by the presence of polemical assertions of monotheism side-by-side with the 
invocation and worship of three apparently divine entities—referred to by virtually all participants in 4th 
century debates via the traditional designation of the “Holy Trinity” (ἡ ἅγια τριάς/sancta trinitas)—
 
54 Besides the documents discussed below, see in particular the letter of Arius to Eusebius of Nicomedia (preserved in 
Theodoret, Historia Ecclesiastica 1.5) appealing for support, where Eusebius of Caesarea is mentioned as already an ally against 
Alexander, as well as the report of Sozomen, Historia Ecclesiastica 1.15 that Eusebius of Caesarea went so far as to hold a synod 
in Palestine where Arius was vindicated against Alexander.  
55 Here it should be clearly stated that in my presentation of Eusebius and the events before Nicaea I differ from the position, 
relatively common in English scholarship and argued for most cogently by Gwynn 2006, that downplays the existence of two 
clear factions of bishops, defined both by personal and ecclesiastical contacts and by theological affinities, before and after 
Nicaea, and that I share the fundamental stance, argued for most forcefully by S. Parvis 2006a, esp. 39-68, that “there is no 
denying that that the period immediately prior to Nicaea was characterized by the drawing up of two alliances: an alliance of 
those who were prepared to speak, or write, in favour of Arius [...] and an alliance of those who actively backed Alexander 
against Arius and his supporters” (39). I also strongly maintain, against the position of e.g. Johnson 2014, that in this incipient 
alliance Eusebius was, as Kopecek 1979, 7, correctly asserts, “the most powerful and seemingly energetic” of Arius’ advocates in 
Syria and Palestine, and therefore key to the alliance as a whole. As Logan 1992, 436-437, notes, there is even evidence that 
Eusebius may have participated in a general canvassing of support for Arius by “touring” (437) surrounding regions preaching 
sermons on the theological topics under debate. 
56 See e.g. Athanasius, De synodis 17, Sozomen, Historia Ecclesiastica 1.15. For an excellent general summation of the evidence 
for the pro-Arius faction before and after Nicaea, including both the names of episcopal members and their regions, see S. 
Parvis 2006a, 39-50. As Parvis notes, support for Arius seems to have been overwhelmingly concentrated in Libya, Bithynia 
(home of Eusebius of Nicomedia), and Cilicia, with important supporters also present in the more divided regions of Syria, 
Phoenicia, and Palestine (home of Eusebius of Caesarea). 
57 See S. Parvis 2006a, 50-68, for a similar summation of the evidence for and membership of Alexander’s faction, which 
included the prominent bishops of Alexandria, Antioch, Jerusalem, and Ancyra along with the extensive episcopal networks 
associated with these sees throughout Egypt, Syria, and Asia Minor. It was precisely based on these existing episcopal networks 
that, as Parvis convincingly argues (66-68, 74-75) on the evidence of surviving conciliar lists, “Alexander’s numerical advantage 
over the pro-Arius alliance [...] was overwhelming, both before and during Nicaea” (67). While Eusebius and his allies seem to 
have had to piece together support based on personal contacts and extensive theological “canvassing,” Alexander, Eustathius, 
and Marcellus could relatively easily assemble large numbers of bishops—such as the almost two hundred, mostly from Egypt 
and Libya, who signed Alexander’s circular letter against Eusebus of Nicomedia or the fifty-six signatories of the decrees of the 
Council of Antioch in 324—in support of their common efforts. 
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consisting of God the Father, a Son also known as the Word (ὁ λόγος) or Wisdom (ἡ σοφία) and 
identified with the human Messiah Jesus, and the Holy Spirit. While the question of how to reconcile this 
tension had long occupied Christian theologians, the conflict between Arius and his bishop Alexander 
seems to have been sharpened further by a novel focus on one, central question under debate: did the 
Father precede the Son in existence? If so, then, as both Arius and Alexander in different respects 
acknowledged, the Son could not possess in full the essential divine quality of eternal existence and so 
could not be simply identified with the metaphysically ultimate God asserted against pagan polytheists. 
If the Son had come into existence (in any sense) after the Father, then the Son must be assigned some 
other, less absolute but potentially more cosmic or salvific, position in the relationship between God and 
man.58  
Neither Eusebius of Caesarea’s strong agreement with one side of this initial debate against the 
other, nor his participation in common efforts aimed at asserting this position against his fellow bishops, 
are historically in question. In particular, two letters are extant in fragmentary form59 from this period in 
which Eusebius of Caesarea issues strong defenses of both Arius’ person and his doctrine. 
In the former, written in the late 310s or early 320s60 to the bishop Euphration of Balanea in 
Syria, Eusebius attacks as a total absurdity any system, like that allegedly held by Alexander against 
Arius, that would make of Father and Son in any sense equals:  
 
58 For the central theological points maintained by Arius himself and his closest allies against Alexander in the early Arian 
controversy prior to Nicaea, see in particular Kopecek 1979, 3-48, Anatolios 2011, 42-52, as well as the somewhat more 
speculative account of Arius’ context and beliefs in Williams 2001 and the flawed but valuable account of Arius’ soteriology 
given by Gregg and Groh 1981 (cf. Gregg and Groh 1977).  
59 Both letters are preserved in part in the acts of the Second Council of Nicaea in AD 787, at which Eusebius of Caesarea’s 
theology was discussed and the text of his letters quoted at length. Athanasius also references the letter to Euphration in De 
synodis 17, and quotations from it are found in Eusebius’ own Contra Marcellum.  
60 The dating of the commencement of the “Arian Controversy,” and therefore of the documents emanating from it, has long 
been a matter of debate. While some scholars (e.g. Opitz 1934) place it as early as 318 and others (e.g. Telfer 1946, Schwartz 
165 
 
For if two existed who were on an equal footing (ἐξ ἴσου) with one another and similarly equal 
in honor (ἰσότιμος), they would be considered, as I said, either both unbegotten or both 
begotten. But this is not at all true of these two. For neither are both of them unbegotten nor 
are both begotten, but the first and greater precedes the one who is second both in status 
(τάξις) and in honor, since the first has become the cause (αἴτιον) of both the existence and the 
attributes of the one who is second. Besides, the one who understands everything precisely, the 
Son of God, knowing that he was different from the Father and lesser and subordinate, very well 
and piously taught us this, saying: ‘The Father who sent me is greater than I’ [John 14:28]. 
(Epistula ad Euphrationem 1-2).61 
Already in this early document appear characteristics that would remain fundamental to 
Eusebius’ thought, on both human and divine matters, through the entirety of his career: a focus on the 
idea of order or status (τάξις), a metaphysical understanding by which the causation (αἴτιον) of one 
thing by another grants both metaphysical pre-existence and unreserved primacy in status to the 
former, and hence a basic and straightforward opposition to the possibility of true equality in nature or 
honor among persons. For Eusebius, the claim that the Father begets and therefore causes the Son is 
sufficient in itself to establish the precedence in existence and primacy in status of the Father, such that 
the Father is the only one who can be called both “true God” and “the one God” confessed by Christians 
(Epistula ad Euphrationem 3, 5). 
Similarly, in writing to Arius’ opponent Alexander, Eusebius is not so much polemical as 
(rhetorically) flabbergasted by Alexander’s insistence that teaching the inferiority of the Son is somehow 
heretical: “Surely this is held also by you!” (Epistula ad Alexandrum Alexandrinum 2).62 A basic concept 
of status grounded in precedence is again crucial to the argument: the fact that Arius and his allies teach 
 
1959) as late as 323, more recent scholarship has generally settled for a compromise position somewhere in between (321 
according to Williams 2001, 56, early 322 according to S. Parvis 2006a, 68-75). 
61 δύο γὰρ ἐξ ἴσου ὁμοίως ἀλλήλοις συνυπάρχοντα ἰσότιμα ἂν νοοῖντο καὶ ἤτοι ἄμφω, ὡς ἔφην, ἀγέννητα ἢ ἑκάτερα γεννητά. 
ἀλλ’ οὐδέτερον τούτων ἀληθές· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ἀγέννητον οὔτε τὸ γεννητὸν <ἀμφότερον> ἂν εἴη. ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν καὶ πρῶτον καὶ 
κρεῖττον καὶ τάξει καὶ τιμῇ τοῦ δευτέρου ἡγεῖται, ὡς ἂν καὶ τοῦ εἶναι καὶ τοῦ τοιῶσδε εἶναι τῷ δευτέρῳ αἴτιον γεγενημένον. 
Πλὴν αὐτὸς ὁ πάντων μᾶλλον ἀκριβῶς ἐπιστάμενος υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ ἕτερον ἑαυτὸν εἰδὼς τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ μείω καὶ 
ὑποβεβηκότα, εὖ μάλα εὐσεβῶς τοῦτο καὶ ἡμᾶς διδάσκει λέγων· «ὁ πατὴρ ὁ πέμψας με μείζων μού ἐστι». 
62 πάντως δὲ καὶ παρὰ σοὶ φέρεται 
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that the Son is both after and inferior to the Father, Eusebius insists, in no way necessitates that the Son 
is simply like all the other created things, as Alexander charges, rather than superior to them in turn (2-
3). Alexander’s insistence that the only alternative to making the Son a mere created thing like all others 
is ascribing to him divinity in the fullest sense and eternal co-existence with the Father is, in Eusebius’ 
judgment, both incoherent and unbelievable:  
Again you charge them with saying, ‘The one who is begot one who is not.’ I am amazed that 
someone would be able to say otherwise. For if ‘the one who is’ is one, it is clear that everything 
has come into existence from him and is therefore after him. But if the one who is is not one 
alone, but the Son also is the one who is, then how would the one who is beget one who is? For 
then there would be ‘two who are.’ (4)63 
The existence of two persons sharing in the essential divine attribute of absolute, uncaused, 
eternal being (εἶναι), rather than the becoming (γίγνεσθαι) and derivative status proper to all things but 
God, is, for Eusebius, simply unthinkable. For the assertion of monotheism to have any meaning, there 
must be one, and only one, entirely solitary entity prior to and unconditioned by all others. Alexander’s 
insistence to the contrary, that despite being two distinct persons, Father and Son must be said to 
mutually and inextricably exist together from eternity, is either willful dishonesty or total absurdity. This 
position Eusebius seems to have held adamantly over the near-decade of ecclesiastical conflict 
occasioned by Arius and Alexander. 
As already discussed in Chapter One, the Emperor Constantine, as part of the clear interest in 
ecclesiastical and episcopal unity noted and praised by Eusebius in the final book of his Historia 
Ecclesiastica, soon took notice of the burgeoning conflict in his new eastern domains, and in 325 
summoned hundreds of bishops to Nicaea to meet and settle the matter, once and for all.64  
 
63 πάλιν αὐτοὺς ᾐτιῶ λέγοντας ὅτι «ὁ ὢν τὸν μὴ ὄντα ἐγέννησε». θαυμάζω δέ, εἰ δύναταί τις ἄλλως εἰπεῖν. εἰ γὰρ εἷς ἐστιν ὁ 
ὤν, δῆλον ὅτι ἐξ αὐτοῦ γέγονε πᾶν ὅ, τι καὶ ἔστι μετ’ αὐτόν· εἰ δὲ μὴ μόνος αὐτός ἐστιν ὁ ὤν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ υἱὸς ἦν ὁ ὤν, καὶ πῶς 
τὸν ὄντα ὁ ὢν ἐγέννησεν; οὕτως γὰρ ἂν δύο εἴη τὰ ὄντα. 
64 While the initiative for the summoning of the Council of Nicaea has usually been ascribed to Constantine himself, S. Parvis 
2006a, 75-77, argues for the plausible hypothesis that Alexander and his allies had already initiated plans for a large council at 
Ancyra, based on their own extensive episcopal networks and with the primary goal of deposing Eusebius of Nicomedia, prior to 
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Unfortunately for Eusebius, the Council of Nicaea turned out to be a disaster for the bishops 
who had supported Arius. After a lengthy series of debates, the Alexandrians and their allies, led by 
Alexander and his young secretary Athanasius, emerged victorious, dealing a crushing defeat to the 
rebel priest Arius, most of whose allies deserted him rather than be on the losing side.65 Arius himself, 
along with a tiny handful of obstinate allies, including his principal episcopal supporter Eusebius of 
Nicomedia, were exiled by Constantine after failing to comply with the council’s decisions.66 Taken 
 
Constantine’s defeat of Licinius in 324—a council which Constantine then effectively hijacked for his own more conciliatory 
purposes and moved to Nicaea. Similarly, Drake 2000, 251-252, suggests that the initial setting of Constantine’s proposed 
council at Ancyra might have been decided upon without the Emperor’s involvement by his envoy Hosius of Cordoba, clearly 
partial to the Alexandrian party, while pointing out that the site of Nicaea, perhaps in an attempt to mollify the fears of the pro-
Arius bishops, was heavily tilted in their favor, falling as it did within Eusebius of Nicomedia’s province and in the diocese of a 
bishop, Theognis, who was a prominent member of the pro-Arius party. 
65 Though see the argument of S. Parvis 2006a, 68-95, who argues strongly that Nicaea should be seen as a “dismal failure” (83) 
for the Alexandrian party inasmuch as Constantine’s intervention in a process where the Alexandrians had previously held an 
overwhelming numerical advantage ended up blunting the force of the condemnations and allowing key opponents, including 
Eusebius of Caesarea, to retain their sees. In my judgment, however, Parvis’ argument, while valid on its own terms, fails to 
take into account the countervailing advantages granted to the anti-Arius alliance both by the unprecedented size of the 
assembly and by Constantine’s involvement, which while it may have made the assembly’s judgments less one-sided also 
granted those decisions far more force and allowed for the deposition of prominent opponents with far greater certainty than 
would have been possible in a merely episcopal assembly. See section 1.3 above for more discussion of this complex dynamic. 
66 The precise number and names of the episcopal allies of Arius who were exiled, as well as the precise reason for their exile, 
differ somewhat in our sources. According to Socrates Scholasticus (Historia Ecclesiastica 1.8), who offers a straightforward and 
precise narrative of the council, five bishops in all refused to accept the council’s final documents because of their use of the 
term ὁμοούσιος and their condemnation of Arius and were consequently exiled: Eusebius of Nicomedia himself, Theognis of 
Nicaea, Maris of Chalcedon, Theonas of Marmarica, and Secundus of Ptolemais. Athanasius, however, in his earlier De decretis 
Concilii Nicaeae 3 asserts that “the faction of Eusebius” (οἱ περὶ Εὐσέβιον) did in fact subscribe to (ὑπογράφω) the council’s 
creed, since in fact “all the bishops” had done so—though the context is highly polemical, and it may be that Athanasius is 
deliberately conflating either Eusebius’ of Nicomedia’s later retraction in exile with his behavior at the council or Eusebius of 
Caesarea (whose letter he quotes immediately thereafter) with the rest of his faction; in De synodis 13, by contrast, only 
“Eusebius” is said to have signed the council’s creed, with the accompanying context and quotations making it clear that the 
reference is to Eusebius of Caesarea alone. Theodoret (Historia Ecclesiastica 1.7) does not mention Eusebius of Nicomedia at 
all, has only two episcopal allies of Arius remaining loyal to him by the end of the council (Theonas of Marmarica and Secundus 
of Ptolemais), asserts that everyone present signed the document, and makes no mention of any decrees of exile. This is clearly 
based in part on the account of the council by Eustathius of Antioch quoted by him (1.8.1-5), in which it is asserted that the 
“Ariomaniacs” had as a class deceptively subscribed to the council’s anathemas in order to retain their sees, although no 
specific bishops are named among this group. Similarly, the 5th century Eunomian historian Philostorgius (Historia Ecclesiastica 
1.9) has only Theonas and Secundus refusing to sign the council’s creed and being exiled as a result, but asserts that Eusebius of 
Nicomedia, Theognis, and Maris signed “deceptively” with subscriptions in which the offending term ὁμοούσιος was secretly 
replaced by ὁμοιούσιος, but then were deposed and exiled anyway three months following the council after recanting their 
subscription before Constantine. This basic hypothesis, that Eusebius, Theognis, and Maris were in fact exiled only three 
months after the council, and perhaps on entirely different charges, would seem to find some confirmation in Constantine’s 
Epistola ad Nicomedienses (discussed and quoted above in section 1.4), and has been increasingly supported by modern 
scholars (see e.g. S. Parvis 2006a, 94-95). Sozomen (Historia Ecclesiastica 2.21), finally, who here as elsewhere is heavily 
dependent on Socrates, cites the same list of five allies of Arius, including Eusebius of Nicomedia, but asserts that all five signed 
the council’s main creed, while only two of them, Eusebius of Nicomedia and Theognis of Nicaea, refused to sign the 
accompanying condemnation of Arius and so were exiled. This is clearly based on the document quoted by both Socrates 
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together, these events seemingly put a sudden and definitive end to Eusebius’ emerging theological 
faction. 
In response to this state of affairs, Eusebius of Caesarea chose a very different tactic from his 
erstwhile allies. Unlike the few die-hards, he not only signed the Creed of Nicaea and the accompanying 
condemnations of his allies’ theology and persons, but also clearly did his best to avoid appearing 
stubborn or disrespectful in the eyes of the Emperor and the rest of the council, thus escaping the 
condemnation of his peers and exile at the hands of the Imperial administration.  
Eusebius seems to have been well aware, however, of the negative optics produced by both this 
seeming defeat and his seeming change of sides and positions, and consequently composed a letter, 
addressed to the people of his diocese but almost certainly intended to circulate more widely among 
the bishops who had been sympathetic to Arius in years preceding Nicaea.67 The letter doubles as an 
apologia for Eusebius’ conduct at the council, in particular his decision to abandon Arius and sign the 
final creed of the council, and a theological explanation of this creed in terms compatible with Eusebius’ 
own largely unchanged beliefs. This was, to say the least, a delicate rhetorical task: to explain a defeat 
 
(1.14.2-6) and Sozomen (2.16) where Eusebius and Theognis, in appealing for their recall from exile, assert that they had in fact 
signed or at least verbally indicated their agreement with (ὑποσημαίνω) the “faith” (πίστις) of the council, including the 
ὁμοούσιος, but had merely been unwilling to subscribe to (ὑπογράφω) the council’s “anathematization” (ἀναθεματισμῷ), an 
ambiguous term that may refer either to the anathemas against Arius’ doctrines or merely to the individual excommunication 
directed against him. The safest conclusion is probably that Eusebius of Nicomedia and his closest allies, despite their 
compliance with many aspects of the council’s operations, were unwilling to subscribe in written form to at least some of the 
council’s documents, although it may be that their partial compliance helped them escape immediate deposition and exile at 
the hands of the Emperor until a later period. Given the likelihood that many of the council’s acts and decrees may have passed 
through multiple versions and/or would have been subscribed together it is likely that the exact reasoning behind their 
compliance and refusal at different points would have remained open to interpretation. That it would have been possible for 
bishops at the council to avoid subscribing to at least some of the council’s documents and decisions while avoiding exile is 
suggested by the account of Philostorgius 1.9, and has been supported by e.g. Kopecek 1979, 52. 
67 This letter is quoted in full in Athanasius, De decretis Concilii Nicaeae 33, Theodoret, Historia Ecclesiastica 1.12, and Socrates 
Scholasticus, Historia Ecclesiastica 1.8 (with the omission of one paragraph), and referenced in De synodis 13—all likely signs of 
general interest in and wide circulation of the document.  
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for his preferred theology as an (at least partial) victory. It would not be the last time Eusebius would be 
called upon to thread a theological and political needle. 
According to Eusebius himself, his intent in writing is precisely to dispel the rumors he fears may 
have reached the ears of his diocese since the closing of the council (Epistula ad Caesarienses)—rumors 
which would naturally have described it as a humiliating defeat for their bishop and his faction. To 
counter this narrative, Eusebius offers one of his own, in which neither Arius nor Alexander put in an 
appearance and the only named figures are himself and the Emperor Constantine. As Eusebius presents 
it, the council can be summarized almost as a brief dialog between bishop and Emperor, one in which 
Eusebius presented a creed of his own composition (33.2-6) that Constantine immediately accepted 
with praise, ordering the bishops to accept and promulgate it (33.1, 7)—with, however, a few small, 
trifling additions:  
When I had put forward this creed, there was no place for anyone to contradict me, but first of 
all our most God-loving Emperor himself testified that it was most orthodox. He confessed that 
he also agreed with this, and he was exhorting everyone to assent to this creed and to subscribe 
to these dogmas and to agree with these very things—after only one word had been added, 
ὁμοούσιος (Athanasius, De decretis 33.7).68 
This presentation has been contradicted both by ancient eyewitnesses to the council such as 
Athanasius (who gives his own, heavily rhetorical but rather more plausible version of its events in De 
decretiis Concilii Nicaeae 3.19-20)69 and by modern scholars, many of whom have challenged Eusebius’ 
 
68 Ταύτης ὑφ’ ἡμῶν ἐκτεθείσης τῆς πίστεως οὐδενὶ παρῆν ἀντιλογίας τόπος, ἀλλ’ αὐτός τε πρῶτος ὁ θεοφιλέστατος ἡμῶν 
βασιλεὺς ὀρθότατα περιέχειν αὐτὴν ἐμαρτύρησεν. οὕτω τε καὶ ἑαυτὸν φρονεῖν συνωμολόγησε καὶ ταύτῃ τοὺς πάντας 
συγκαταθέσθαι ὑπογράφειν τε τοῖς δόγμασι καὶ συμφωνεῖν τούτοις αὐτοῖς παρεκελεύετο, ἑνὸς μόνου προσεγγραφέντος 
ῥήματος τοῦ ὁμοουσίου. 
69 Athanasius’ description of the actual events of the council (as opposed to his own theological interpretation) is as a series of 
escalating clashes between a small, increasingly unpopular minority of bishops led by Eusebius of Nicomedia and a majority of 
bishops increasingly inclined to exclude the former group by any means necessary—culminating in the inclusion of the term 
ὁμοούσιος on the belief that it was the one thing that Eusebius of Nicomedia and his allies would not accept (in corroboration 
of which see the hostile mention of the term in the fragment of Eusebius of Nicomedia preserved in Ambrose, De fide 3.15, 
which Ambrose treats as the origin of the council’s use of the term, cf. S. Parvis 2006a, 88). Despite Athanasius’ penchant for 
polemics, this is in itself a perfectly plausible reconstruction of the turbulent and heavily politicized operations of a council that 
resulted in the forced deposition and exile of multiple clerics.  
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claim that the final creed of the council was in any way based on the one he presented at the council (to 
which, as he quotes both documents in his letter, it bears little resemblance)70 and the apparent 
implication that Constantine himself was responsible for the insertion of the term ὁμοούσιος into the 
final document. The latter claim, however, it should be noted, is not explicitly made by Eusebius in this 
letter, even if it has sometimes been deduced by scholars.71 All that Eusebius explicitly says is that 
Constantine received his initial presentation with praise and indicated his own agreement with it—and 
then, following the addition of the term ὁμοούσιος, exhorted all of the assembled bishops to subscribe 
to the beliefs, creed, and dogmas under discussion. Both of these claims are perfectly plausible and 
likely true. Given the numerous differences (far beyond a single word) between Eusebius’ creed and the 
council’s final documents, however, a considerable duration of time must have occurred between his 
initial presentation and the close of the council, during which the assembled bishops debated and finally 
adopted a different set of formulas possibly based on an entirely different original model. Eusebius, 
however, deliberately elides all these events to provide a simplified, arguably misleading, but not 
actually false account of Constantine’s actions at Nicaea.  
In any event, after highlighting Constantine’s praise of his initial formula, Eusebius goes on to 
give the Emperor’s personal qualification of the word ὁμοούσιος (“the same in οὐσία,” “of one 
substance”), a term that would in the decades ahead become the focus of increasingly fierce debate and 
 
70 The view that Eusebius’ creed was the basis of the final document (after numerous rounds of revisions) has, however, been 
recently defended by e.g. Vinzent 1999, S. Parvis 2006a, 85-91. For the more common view that the final creed was in no way 
based on Eusebius’ rejected proposal, see e.g. Lietzmann 1925, 193-202, Kelly 1972, 217-220, Logan 1992, 438.  
71 The addition of the term is given in a genitive absolute using a passive aorist participle (προσεγγραφέντος) with no stated 
agent. Given Eusebius’ consistent and rather tendentious treatment both of the ὁμοούσιος and Constantine’s theology 
throughout the rest of the letter, it is difficult to see why Eusebius would go out of his way to ascribe the use of his least 
favored term to the (in his treatment) most authoritative voice present. If taken, however, as a way to briefly acknowledge the 
addition of other less favored terminology to his creed in conciliar debate prior to its promulgation, the phrase makes far more 
sense. It is frankly difficult for me to see why the idea of Constantine’s responsibility for the ὁμοούσιος—an ambiguous, 
metaphysically complex, and ideologically polemical term with no presence in or affinity with his existing writings on theological 
topics (see Chapter One)—has been so widely accepted by scholars (see e.g. Barnes 1981, 216, S. Parvis 2006a, 89, Drake 2000, 
254-257, though the latter two acknowledge the obvious issues with ascribing the term to Constantine). 
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increasingly involved theological interpretation. While as discussed in the previous chapter (section 1.4), 
Eusebius’ quotations of Constantine in this letter, and the accompanying implication that Constantine, 
as he had initially praised Eusebius’ creed, had also initially joined Eusebius and his allies in opposing the 
term ὁμοούσιος, are plausible, the highly rhetorical quality of Eusebius’ portrayal of Constantine and his 
theology cannot be denied. In this narrative, Eusebius and the Emperor are in constant and near-perfect 
agreement, not only on general policy, but even on specific theological issues. Whatever basis in reality 
this may have had, such intimate characterization of the relationship between God-loving Emperor and 
favored bishop would come to loom even larger in Eusebius’ later works. Here, however, it is merely one 
facet in a larger discussion in which Eusebius is finally brought by the council at large to accept terms 
and anathemas that could plausibly be read as clear condemnations of his own position, as well as clear 
affirmations of a position that he himself regarded as utterly absurd.  
In opposition to such readings of recent events, Eusebius offers his defense. The council’s 
insistence that the Son was “from the οὐσία of the Father,” Eusebius says, was explained to him by 
(anonymous) fellow bishops at the council as meaning merely that “it is clear that he is from the Father, 
but does not exist as a part of the Father” (33.9).72 The anathemas of the council, directed clearly against 
the position of Arius defended formerly by Eusebius,73 are explained by him in various connected ways. 
In the first place, regarding the anathemas in toto, “we considered this painless because they forbade 
the use of terms that are not Scriptural, because of which nearly all this division and anarchy in the 
 
72 δηλωτικὸν εἶναι τοῦ ἐκ μὲν τοῦ πατρὸς εἶναι, οὐ μὴν ὡς μέρος ὑπάρχειν τοῦ πατρός. 
73 The council anathematized the propositions that the Son at one time did not exist, that he did not exist before he was 
begotten, that he came into existence from nothing, that he was from another οὐσία or ὑπόστασις, and that he could be 
described as created (κτιστός), capable of being affected (τρεπτός), or capable of change (ἀλλοιωτός). These anathemas and 
the position allegedly described by them would have a long after-history in Nicene polemic (particularly in Lucifer of Cagliari), 
where the anathematized propositions would at times be ascribed carte blanche to all non-Nicene thinkers. 
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Church has arisen” (33.15).74 Indeed, not only had the Sacred Scriptures not made any use of these non-
Scriptural terms, but neither, at least prior to the recent controversies, had Eusebius himself (33.15). His 
essential theological perspective, Eusebius argues, is not dependent on these particular formulations, 
and indeed taken individually each could be rightly seen as problematic. Describing the Son as “created” 
(κτιστός) risks obscuring the profound gulf between the Son and “the rest of the creatures, the ones 
who came into being through the Son, to which the Son bears no similarity” (33.11).75 As Eusebius would 
later argue at great length in his works of theological polemic, the fact that the Son is not God in the 
fullest sense does not mean that he can simply be equated with the ordered cosmos that he himself 
independently preceded and caused. Likewise, as to the anathemas’ seeming ascription of eternal, 
uncaused existence to the Son, Eusebius on the one hand suggests that these statements can be read as 
asserting no more than that the Son existed prior to his “begetting” in human flesh (not his begetting 
from the Father) and on the other hand cites a possible clarification from Constantine himself, namely 
that “even before he was begotten in operation, he existed in an unbegotten fashion within the Father, 
since the Father exists eternally as Father, just as he exists as an eternal Emperor and an eternal Savior, 
being all things in potentiality, and eternally existing in the same way” (33.16).76 In other words, the Son 
can be said to have eternally existed in an uncaused way in just the same way that the same statement 
can be made about all other created things: namely, inasmuch as the Father, to whom uncaused, eternal 
existence alone belongs, has nonetheless caused all things and therefore contains them in potentiality.  
 
74 ἄλυπον ἡγησάμεθα διὰ τὸ ἀπείργειν ἀγράφοις χρῆσθαι φωναῖς, διὸ σχεδὸν ἡ πᾶσα γέγονε σύγχυσις καὶ ἀκαταστασία τῆς 
ἐκκλησίας. 
75 τῶν λοιπῶν κτισμάτων τῶν διὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ γενομένων, ὧν οὐδὲν ὅμοιον ἔχειν τὸν υἱόν 
76 καὶ πρὶν ἐνεργείᾳ γεννηθῆναι δυνάμει ἦν ἐν τῷ πατρὶ ἀγεννήτως, ὄντος τοῦ πατρὸς ἀεὶ πατρὸς ὡς καὶ βασιλέως ἀεὶ καὶ 
σωτῆρος ἀεί, δυνάμει πάντα ὄντος, ἀεί τε κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντος. 
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Finally, as for the dreaded ὁμοούσιος, Eusebius admits that he was brought to agree to it only 
grudgingly, and for reasons more social than theological: “We also agreed here, not even declining the 
word ὁμοούσιος, since the aim of peace was set before our eyes, and so as to not fall from the correct 
understanding” (33.10).77 Thinking it over on his own, however, Eusebius eventually concluded that the 
term could be employed in a useful sense to make clear that “the Son of God has no similarity with the 
created things that have come into being, but he is considered similar in every way only to the Father 
who has begotten him” (33.13).78 That the Son is begotten rather than created by the Father does not, 
however, necessitate that the Son is the same as the Father rather than clearly inferior to and derivative 
from him. It merely grants to him, by means of “a method of genesis that is inexpressible and 
incomprehensible to every nature that has come into existence” (33.11),79 a “similarity” with the Father 
that makes him in turn the unmistakable superior of the rest of creation. All, then, that the Nicene 
Council has done, according to Eusebius, is to assert that the Son, however clearly derivative and inferior 
to the Father, is also clearly superior to and the cause of the material cosmos and ordered creation as a 
whole. The Son is not merely one creature among others; he is unique and superior to them all, with a 
separate, intermediate οὐσία and an intermediate status between the one God and all other beings 
(33.11). These are themes that would continue to be developed both by Eusebius himself and by later 
non-Nicene thinkers over the course of the fourth century.  
All this, of course, is Eusebius’ interpretation—not necessarily the interpretation of all or likely 
even the majority of those present at the council. According to Eusebius himself, however, his 
 
77 καὶ ἡμεῖς συνετιθέμεθα οὐδὲ τὴν φωνὴν τοῦ ὁμοουσίου παραιτούμενοι τοῦ τῆς εἰρήνης σκοποῦ πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν ἡμῖν 
κειμένου καὶ τοῦ μὴ τῆς ὀρθῆς ἐκπεσεῖν διανοίας. 
78 μηδεμίαν ἐμφέρειαν πρὸς τὰ γενητὰ κτίσματα τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ θεοῦ φέρειν, μόνῳ δὲ τῷ πατρὶ τῷ γεγεννηκότι κατὰ πάντα 
τρόπον ἀφωμοιῶσθαι 
79 τοῦ τρόπου τῆς γεννήσεως ἀνεκφράστου καὶ ἀνεπιλογίστου πάσῃ γενητῇ φύσει τυγχάνοντος 
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submission to Nicaea is backed up by one, very important authority: “We all agreed to this creed, not 
without careful examination, but according to the interpretations put forward in the presence of the 
God-beloved Emperor himself, after having examined these interpretations and after having agreed to 
them because of the reasons we have mentioned” (33.14-15).80 It is the presence of the Emperor, first 
and foremost, that is determinative for Eusebius’ submission to the council—and then only according to 
a narrow rubric of interpretation that is, at least according to Eusebius, in keeping with that of 
Constantine himself. An embarrassing moment for Eusebius and his theology has become, instead, a 




In the immediate aftermath of the Council of Nicaea, Eusebius’ hopeful interpretation both of 
that council’s outcome and of Constantine’s viewpoint might have seemed wishful thinking at best. 
Eusebius of Nicomedia, one of the most influential bishops in the Eastern Church and the acknowledged 
leader of the faction that had opposed the bishop of Alexandria, had been deposed and exiled along 
with Arius and the only other bishops, perhaps five out of the over three hundred to attend the 
council,81 so foolish as to continue to support him.  
 
80 ᾗ συνεφωνήσαμεν οἱ πάντες οὐκ ἀνεξετάστως, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὰς ἀποδοθείσας διανοίας ἐπ’ αὐτοῦ τοῦ θεοφιλεστάτου 
βασιλέως ἐξετασθείσας καὶ τοῖς εἰρημένοις λογισμοῖς συνομολογηθείσας. 
81 See note 66 in section 2.3 above for a discussion of the number and names of Arius’ allies exiled along with him. In regards to 
the overall number of bishops at the council, Socrates Scholasticus, Historia Ecclesiastica 1.8, whose sources for the council 
seem generally precise, gives the number of bishops who signed the final document as three hundred and eighteen (which 
would presumably not include the five who in his account refused to sign). Theodoret, Historia Ecclesiastica 1.7.3, on the other 
hand, gives three hundred and eighteen as the total number of bishops initially assembled by Constantine. Sozomen, Historia 
Ecclesiastica 2.17, perhaps in an attempt to acknowledge the difference between the total body of bishops and the signers of 
the final document, gives the total number of bishops initially assembled as “about three hundred and twenty.” Athanasius of 
Alexandria, a participant in the council himself, had earlier in De decretis Concilii Nicaeae 3.1 given the number as “three 
hundred, more or less,” and similarly in De synodis 43 as a (clearly rounded) three hundred. Earliest of all, Eusebius of Caesarea 
himself, in his own Vita Constantini 3.8, gave the number as “exceeding two hundred and fifty.” 
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As discussed in the previous chapter, however, the ten years following the council would soon 
prove otherwise, as individual bishops defeated at Nicaea began to take on ever greater influence in 
both Church and Empire and some of the most vocal bishops of the anti-Arius episcopal alliance met, 
one by one, with deposition and exile. To what degree these latter events reflect, as Athanasius of 
Alexandria was eventually to claim, a concerted conspiracy against the Council of Nicaea and its 
defenders by a coherent faction of “Eusebians” is still debated in scholarship. The numerous public 
successes in both ecclesiastical politics and theological controversy of individual bishops with ties to 
Arius, however, including Eusebius of Caesarea himself, can hardly be denied. 
The continuing prominence of bishops of the defeated party at Nicaea seems to have naturally 
drawn the ire of members of the Alexandrian-allied faction who had thought themselves triumphant 
only a little while before.82 Not long after Eusebius of Caesarea’s return to his diocese, the bishop of 
Antioch Eustathius—Eusebius’ immediate episcopal superior and a prominent supporter of Alexander’s 
faction who seems to have gone so far as to hold a council in 324, prior to Nicaea, where his junior 
metropolitan was nominally excommunicated and deposed83—resumed public controversy once again, 
clearly stymied by Eusebius’ ability, despite defeat at Nicaea, to retain both his office84 and his 
 
82 This is explicitly acknowledged by Julius of Rome in his letter of 341 to (among others) Eusebius of Nicomedia, in which, after 
criticizing the Eastern bishops for having received “the Ariomaniacs” back into communion, he asserts that “of those who 
served as judges [at Nicaea] [...] we have come to know well that those who are still even now in this life are violently angry 
(ἀγανακτεῖν) that some people have annulled their judgment” (Apologia contra Arianos 23.4, Letter 2.4 In Thompson 2015). 
83 The letter from this council was first discovered in a Syriac translation by Schwartz 1905 (reprinted in Schwartz 1959). In it, 
Eustathius of Antioch and Hosius of Cordoba (see Chadwick 1958) claim to have assembled fifty-nine bishops from Palestine, 
Arabia, Phoenicia, Coele-Syria, Cilicia, and Cappadocia at Antioch to deal with the urgent threats to doctrine and Church order 
caused by the reception into communion by some bishops within these provinces of priests expelled by Alexander of Alexandria 
for their support of Arius. Three of these bishops, the document claims, Theodotus of Laodicea, Narcissus of Neronias, and 
Eusebius of Caesarea, have been interrogated, found guilty of heresy, and formally excommunicated—with, however, the 
possibility of appeal to the approaching, larger council at Ancyra (later moved to Nicaea: see e.g. Logan 1992, esp. 439-440). 
While the authenticity of the document was questioned upon its discovery (most notably by Harnack 1908, a claim repeated 
more recently by Holland 1970), it has been overwhelmingly accepted both then and since as an authentic document from the 
lead-up to the Council of Nicaea (see e.g. Chadwick 1958, 293-294, who even in presenting additional manuscript evidence was 
able to refer to the consensus in favor of the document as “almost unanimous,” Hanson 1988, 147, Logan 1992, 427-429).  
84 See in particular the fragment of Eustathius of Antioch quoted by the Antiochene historian Theodoret (Historia Ecclesiastica 
1.8.1-5), in which Eustathius, in the course of an account of the Council of Nicaea, bitterly asserts that “the Ariomaniacs [...] 
having retained their sees through the greatest trickery imaginable, although it was right for them to receive a sentence of 
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theological opinions intact.85 Eusebius himself responded shortly with theological accusations of his 
own, and, while no text survives of what seems to have been a bitter exchange of pamphlets between 
the two bishops,86 the outcome is known: a council was finally held at Antioch, most likely in the fall of 
327,87 at which Eusebius managed to secure the deposition and exile of his rival on charges that remain 
unclear to this day.88 
Regardless of the public reasons (or lack thereof) given for Eustathius’ sudden fall from one of 
the most influential positions in the Eastern episcopate, this could hardly be seen as anything but a 
major victory for Eusebius of Caesarea, who shortly thereafter seems to have come close to succeeding 
 
deposition, now maintain, at one time secretly, at another time openly, those opinions which were condemned [at Nicaea]” (οἱ 
δ’ Ἀρειομανῖται [...] τῶν δὲ προεδριῶν ‹διὰ πλείστης ὅσης περιδρομῆς κρατήσαντες, δέον αὐτοὺς ὑπόπτωσιν ‹λαμβάνειν, τοτὲ 
μὲν λεληθότως, τοτὲ δὲ προφανῶς τὰς ἀποψηφι‹σθείσας πρεσβεύουσι δόξας, διαφόροις ἐπιβουλεύοντες τοῖς ἐλέγχοις, 
1.8.3,4). 
85 Despite frequently exaggerated claims, there is little or no evidence that Eusebius substantially modified either his 
theological thought or his terminology as the result of Nicaea. Any such impression is in my view rooted far more in an 
“argument from silence” created by the fact that many of Eusebius’ theological polemics do not survive and those that do are 
neglected than in any positive evidence. While two of Eusebius’ extant works, Commentaria in Psalmos and Commentarius in 
Isaiam, have often been dated to before and after Nicaea, respectively, on the basis of how direct or “cautious” their 
subordinationist language is (see e.g. Johnson 2014, 22-23), their status as copious verse-by-verse Scriptural commentaries 
makes such evaluations tenuous at best. Certainly any retractions or cautions must have lasted a very short time indeed, given 
both Eusebius’ forthright exchange of theological polemic with one of the leaders of the anti-Arius faction only a few years after 
Nicaea and the fact that, in the later Contra Marcellum, he shows no reticence whatsoever either in polemically asserting a 
strongly subordinationist position substantially identical to that held by him prior to Nicaea or in defending such close allies of 
Arius as Eusebius of Nicomedia and Asterius. As my discussion here will indicate, I strongly dispute the claim of Johnson 2014 
that in Contra Marcellum Eusebius presents “a coherent and thoughtful middle ground between the poles of Marcellus and 
Arius in a way that was consistent with Nicaea” (114). Thoughtful and coherent it may be, but while there was certainly no 
simple and univocal consensus on the meaning of the documents of Nicaea during the 330s for Eusebius to conform his 
theology to, the stark difference in the treatment of Nicaea present in the works of Eusebius and his rivals is clear and notable. 
Marcellus of Ancyra and Athanasius could and did appeal to Nicaea in defense of their personal and doctrinal claims (e.g. in the 
letter of Marcellus to Julius of Rome c. 340 from Epiphanius, Panarion 72.2f, recently edited as Letter I in Thompson 2015, or in 
Athanasius, Apologia contra Arianos) while Eusebius makes no direct reference to the council or its documents in any of his 
works of theology while frequently issuing strong defenses of persons condemned there. 
86 See Socrates Scholasticus, Historia Ecclesiastica 1.32, who claims to have read at least some of the works in question by both 
men, but expresses his confusion at their actual theological differences and his dislike for what he sees as the excessive 
invective on both sides. Enough fragmentary texts do survive, however, to allow for a rough evaluation of Eustathius’ theology, 
which seems to have been particularly focused around the distinction between the full divinity and the complete human soul in 
Christ, in contradistinction to theories that challenged the Son’s possession of the divine trait of total immutability (cf. e.g. S. 
Parvis 2006a, 57-60).  
87 See note 158 in section 1.4 above. 
88 See note 68 in section 1.3 above. 
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his fallen primate as bishop of Antioch.89 The restoration by Constantine of both Eusebius of Nicomedia 
and Arius from exile at around the same time further undid the impression of an irrecoverable defeat at 
Nicaea.90 With Eusebius of Caesarea triumphant and Arius and Eusebius of Nicomedia back in the 
Emperor’s good graces, the pre-Nicaea alliance was able to rapidly reconstitute itself at the center of 
ecclesiastical events in the East.  
Helping to cement the visibility of this newly reconstituted faction was the arrival on the scene 
of a popular travelling theologian, Asterius, a long-time contact of Arius who from surviving fragments 
seems to have centered his discourses on a full-throated defense of the theology and character of the 
newly-prominent Eusebius of Nicomedia.91 Asterius’ presence in the cities of the Eastern Empire 
delivering public lectures on theology, in a vein remarkably similar to the condemned priest Arius, seems 
to have been the immediate spur for the entrance into the controversy of Marcellus, bishop since at 
least 314 of Ancyra in Asia Minor.92 Like Eustathius, Marcellus had been in attendance at the Council of 
Nicaea, and was angered by the restoration to prominence of men whose defeat and deposition he 
 
89 See the account given by Eusebius himself in Vita Constantini 3.59-62, where three letters from Constantine are quoted. 
Though Eusebius implies that he voluntarily declined the offer when made to him by an Antiochene synod, after which his 
refusal was highly praised by Constantine, it is almost irresistible to read the letters as instead indicating a narrative where 
Eusebius had indeed hoped to take over the see following a synodal process with which he himself was intimately involved—
only to be stymied by the Emperor’s last-minute rejection of his candidacy on the alleged basis of Nicaea’s ban on episcopal 
translation. As we shall see in Contra Marcellum, Eusebius himself clearly viewed the transfer of a worthy bishop from one see 
to another, more prestigious one as a positive practice. 
90 See the discussion in section 1.4 above. 
91 The surviving fragments, largely drawn from Asterius’ rivals, are assembled in Vinzent 1993 and translated and discussed at 
length in Hanson 1988, 32-41. For a general discussion of Asterius as a theologian, see Anatolios 2011, 53-59. Athanasius in De 
decretis 8.1 goes so far as to suggest that Arius himself was a mere pupil of Asterius, and in De synodis 18.3 describes his 
travelling lectures from his work Syntagmion. Kopecek 1979, 55-57, suggests that Asterius’ defense of Eusebius of Nicomedia 
was intended to aid his return from exile, while S. Parvis 2006a, 118-123, more plausibly suggests that Asterius’ travels and 
writings were part of a concerted effort in support of the Council of Nicomedia presided over by the already-reinstated 
Eusebius of Nicomedia not long before. 
92 Marcellus presided over the Council of Ancyra in 314 (see in particular S. Parvis 2006a, 11-30), a large and wide-ranging 
gathering that issued numerous disciplinary canons and, as Logan 1992, 432-433, notes, seems to have featured unusually 
comprehensive episcopal representation. By 325 he certainly would been a well-known and respected bishop in his region. As 
Logan 1992, 433-436, notes, it is even likely that Marcellus of Ancyra played a key role in the preparations for the Council of 
Nicaea, which was initially intended to meet in his own diocese of Ancyra. 
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himself had helped to bring about. 93 Like Eustathius, too, he took to writing to attack both Asterius and 
the bishops supported by him, including Eusebius of Nicomedia and Eusebius of Caesarea;94 and as he 
had done with Eustathius, Eusebius of Caesarea responded in writing, accusing his rival in turn of 
heretical “Sabellian” beliefs. The major difference between the two incidents is that, in the case of 
Eusebius’ conflict with Marcellus, both of his written responses have survived in full: Contra Marcellum, 
discussed here, and De ecclesiastica theologia, discussed later in section 2.6.95 
The likely reason for the survival of these works, as opposed to Eusebius’ other theological 
polemics, is the fact that, though initially defended along with Athanasius by the bishop of Rome and 
the majority of the bishops of the Western Empire (most prominently at the Western Council of Serdica 
in 343), Marcellus and his theology soon fell drastically out of favor with the dominant Nicene faction of 
the later 4th century, leading to his being largely abandoned by the bishops of Rome and his erstwhile 
ally Athanasius, severely attacked by the Cappadocian Fathers, and so remembered as a heretic by later 
 
93 See in particular the apologetic letter addressed by Marcellus to the bishop of Rome Julius at some point prior to the Council 
of Rome in 341 (Epiphanius 72.2.f, recently given as Letter 1 in Thompson 2015), which opens by asserting that “some of those 
who were condemned before because of their incorrect belief, people whom I myself argued against at the Council of Nicaea, 
have dared to write against me to your Piety” (1). S. Parvis 2006a, 91-92, has argued, based on the differences between the 
council’s documents and Marcellus’ theology and the absence of Marcellus’ name from some (but not all) extant lists of 
signatories that Marcellus did not in fact sign the main Creed of Nicaea, but only the accompanying canons. While I find this 
argument unconvincing, it would not seriously alter Marcellus’ palpable frustration at Eusebius of Caesarea and Eusebius of 
Nicomedia’s continuing prominence. 
94 The history of direct conflict between Eusebius and Marcellus seems to date at least to the period before Nicaea; while direct 
evidence for Marcellus’ participation in the Council of Antioch in 324 (at which Eusebius of Caesarea was deposed for heresy) is 
lacking, Marcellus (as quoted in Contra Marcellum 1.4) was later to accuse Eusebius of having visited his diocese in the period 
prior to Nicaea and having preached a sermon in which he criticized as heretics all those who refused to confess multiple οὐσίαι 
of the Father and Son. It is little wonder if such a direct attack on a local bishop by a visiting theologian ended up provoking a 
long-standing grudge. S. Parvis 2006a, 116-118, also notes the seemingly disproportionate viciousness with which Marcellus 
attacks Eusebius of Caesarea in particular, and suggests it may be related to anger over Eusebius’ prominent role in the 
downfall of Eustathius of Antioch not long before. 
95 The straightforward, attested fact that Eusebius wrote other works of theological polemic that have not survived should 
temper the assessment of scholars like Perrone 1996, that “in Eusebius the apologist generally takes precedence over the 
polemicist” (524). In fact, not only in his surviving polemics does Eusebius show no hesitation at all about forthrightly setting 
out his own views and seeking the total exclusion of his opponents, but in De ecclesiastica theologia Eusebius admits to 
habitually being compelled in his apologetic works for pagan audiences to “put off until the proper time” (εἰς εὔκαιρον 
ταμιεύεσθαι) the more complex and less clearly monotheistic aspects of Christianity and the doctrine of Christ (2.22.3-4), thus 
granting a certain priority to his polemics as the place for the fullest exposition of his mature theological viewpoint. 
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generations of ecclesiastical writers.96 While Eusebius’ polemic against a revered Nicene “martyr” like 
Eustathius would hardly commend itself to later scribes, his polemic against a remembered heretic like 
Marcellus would no doubt have been seen as useful, at the very least, for refuting similar views.97 
While Eusebius’ first attack on his opponent, Contra Marcellum, is polemical enough, it is also 
notable for the general sense of superiority it attempts to maintain in opposition to his fellow bishop. As 
Eusebius points out or implies at several points in his polemics (e.g. Contra Marcellum 1.1.1, De 
ecclesiastica theologia praefatio), Marcellus’ controversial work seems to have been his first written 
publication—whereas, of course, Eusebius himself had already become known throughout the Empire 
for his written works and speeches alike. Eusebius frequently has recourse to this obvious inferiority in 
skill and status to characterize Marcellus’ writings as a mere jealous outburst against superiors: “The 
purpose of his writing was hatred of his brothers, but its cause was jealousy and envy[:] For from the 
beginning jealousy and envy caused fratricide” (Contra Marcellum 1.1.1).98 Like those ecclesiastics 
ultimately responsible in Eusebius’ earlier judgment for the Persecution of Diocletian, Marcellus, 
inspired by envy, is attempting to divide the episcopate and the Church, and so must be countered by all 
means necessary. 
In Eusebius’ telling, the gravity of Marcellus’ crimes is very much increased by the particular 
bishops he has chosen to attack, whose status far outweighs his own. Eusebius is not at all shy about 
 
96 For Marcellus’ fall from grace, see note 104 in section 3.4 below, as well as the apropos comment of Logan 1992, 439, that in 
later Nicene sources “Marcellus almost became a kind of non-person, as if one were to write the history of the Russian 
revolution without any mention of the part played in it by Trotsky.” The fullest and most convincing defense of Marcellus’ 
prominence as a bishop before and after Nicaea and his importance within the anti-Arian faction of the 320s-340s is given by S. 
Parvis 2006a.  
97 Recent theological scholarship has emphasized the importance of anti-Marcellan animus and theological formulations, 
including those originally developed by Eusebius of Caesarea in Contra Marcellum and elsewhere, in the overall narrative of 4th 
century theology and the development of the final Nicene consensus in the latter part of the century. See in particular Barnes 
1998, as well as Spoerl and Vinzent 2017, esp. 3-6, 60-70.  




listing and defending these by name—including most notably himself—nor is he shy in his forthright 
assertion of their (and his) superior prestige in comparison to the contemptable “foreign [...] theologian” 
(τοῦ ξένου [...] θεολόγου) (1.1.6) Marcellus. Among this august company, Eusebius of Nicomedia is 
repeatedly singled out for praise as “Eusebius the Great” (Εὐσέβιος ὁ μέγας) (1.4.1., 1.4.9), whose 
preeminence is grounded straightforwardly in the fact that “most of the dioceses and cities of the world, 
and the most conspicuous of them, have claimed (μεταποιεῖσθαι) his episcopal authority for their own” 
(1.4.9).99 Likewise, in censuring Marcellus’ attacks on Paulinus of Tyre, Eusebius singles out the fact that 
Paulinus had “by fittingly serving as bishop of Tyre shone so preeminently in his episcopal authority that 
the Church of Antioch100 claimed (μεταποιεῖσθαι) him as its own good (1.4.1-2).”101 Eusebius’ transfer of 
his episcopate from Berytus to the Imperial court at Nicomedia had been widely criticized by his 
opponents prior to Nicaea as a sign of unseemly ambition, and the Council of Nicaea itself had issued an 
ecclesiastical regulation, almost certainly directed in large measure against Eusebius of Nicomedia 
himself, totally forbidding the practice (Canon 15). For Eusebius of Caesarea, however, such transfers, 
particular those from a less to a more prestigious diocese or those in which multiple dioceses compete 
for a single bishop’s residence, are not shameful signs of ambition or envy, but rather positive and 
honorable indications of a bishop’s standing within the episcopate.  
Marcellus has not confined his attacks to bishops, however; he has also slandered both the 
priest and theologian Asterius (ally and defender of “Eusebius the Great”), and Eusebius of Caesarea’s 
 
99 οὗ τῆς ἐπισκοπῆς πλεῖσται καὶ διαφανεῖς ἐπαρχίαι τε καὶ πόλεις μετεποιήθησαν 
100 The question of when or if Paulinus of Tyre actually served as bishop of Antioch is complex. The most common position is 
that argued for by Burgess and Witakowski 1999, 184-91, who hypothesize that Paulinus briefly served as bishop of Antioch 
from the death of Philogonius in 323 to his own death in early 324, after which he was replaced by Eustathius. P. Parvis 2006 
has argued, on the other hand, that Paulinus was actually a rival bishop to Eustathius, accepted only by a partial faction within 
Antioch but with the support of Eusebius of Caesarea, whose claim briefly achieved wider acceptance after the deposition of 
Eustathius himself in 327. 
101 διαπρεπῶς δ’ ἐπισκοπεύσαντα τῆς Τυρίων οὕτω τε ἐν τῇ ἐπισκοπῇ διαλάμψαντα, ὡς τὴν Ἀντιοχέων ἐκκλησίαν ὡς οἰκείου 
ἀγαθοῦ μεταποιηθῆναι αὐτοῦ. 
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own predecessor as writer and theologian, Origen of Alexandria. As for our author himself, also a target 
of Marcellus’ invective, Eusebius of Caesarea generally refrains from specifically praising himself, beyond 
the simple expedient of closely and repeatedly associating himself with his prestigious fellow targets 
Eusebius, Paulinus, Origen, and Asterius. Origen and Paulinus were both long dead by the time of 
Marcellus’ attack, making it, in Eusebius’ view, doubly impious (1.4.3). Yet it is this attack on writers of 
past generations that makes it clear both that Marcellus in reality “is rejecting all of the Ecclesiastical 
Fathers together, since he is pleased with no one except himself” (1.4.3-4),102 and that his opponent’s 
claim that Eusebius’ theological beliefs are a recently invented heresy is a total fabrication: “But I myself 
have come across very many holy ecclesiastical writings of men more ancient than Origen, distinguished 
letters of bishops and synods written long ago, in which one and the same character of the Faith is 
revealed” (1.4.8-9).103 The force of this claim is, however, undercut by the fact that Eusebius studiously 
avoids quoting these documents or indeed giving any indication whatsoever of either their date or the 
identity of the bishops and synods in question. On this point, at least, Eusebius’ own authority will have 
to suffice. 
As for the “character of the Faith” which the prestige of Eusebius and his fellows supports, he is 
not at all reticent about either its content or implications.104 As Eusebius acknowledges, Marcellus has 
 
102 ὁμοῦ τε πάντας τοὺς ἐκκλησιαστικοὺς πατέρας ἀθετεῖ, οὐδενὶ τὸ παράπαν ἀρεσκόμενος ἢ μόνῳ ἑαυτῷ. 
103 ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ Ὠριγένους παλαιοτέρων ἀνδρῶν πλείστοις ὅσοις ἐκκλησιαστικοῖς συγγράμμασιν ἐντετύχηκα, ἐπισκόπων τε καὶ 
συνόδων ἐπιστολαῖς διαφόροις πρόπαλαι γραφείσαις, δι’ ὧν εἷς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ὁ τῆς πίστεως χαρακτὴρ ἀποδείκνυται. 
104 This is as good a place as any to address the elephant in the room, namely whether or not Eusebius should be categorized, 
theologically or otherwise, as an “Arian.” Here very careful distinctions are necessary. On the one side, the repeated (but largely 
unclarified) assertions of Johnson 2014 that “Eusebius was neither an ‘Arian’ nor a ‘modified Arian” (114) but rather a kind of 
theological moderate bears little relationship to the copious evidence of Eusebius’ open and far from moderate factional and 
theological activities. On the other hand, the assertion of Barnes 1981, 265, that “[e]ven a casual reader [...] cannot fail to see 
that it is an Arian orthodoxy which Eusebius represents as the accepted teaching of the Church,” should be clearly qualified. 
What can and should be said is that ecclesiastically and politically Eusebius was straightforwardly a member of a clear 
ecclesiastical faction that engaged in mutual defense of Arius and other members, including its main leader the powerful bishop 
Eusebius of Nicomedia, and sought to theologically and ecclesiastically de-legitimize and depose its primary opponents both 
before and after Nicaea. Within that alliance, Eusebius of Caesarea is the main theological author whose works have survived in 
significant volume. His theological thought, the product of his own theological and political interests stretching back well before 
any contact with Arius, bore fundamental continuities but also differences both with contemporary members of the same 
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attacked him by name for “saying that there are two Gods” (δύο μὲν θεοὺς λέγειν) (1.4.46), the Father 
and Son, and therefore “introducing belief in gods” (θεῶν δόξας εἰσάγοντας) (1.4.51). Though Eusebius 
clearly finds this claim slanderous, he does not deny, but rather strongly affirms, Marcellus’ central 
charge that he has granted the title of “God” (θεός) and divine worship to the Son as a separate, inferior 
entity who, as he strongly argues, can by no means be referred to as either “the God” (ὁ θεός) (e.g. 
1.14.40) or “the only true God” (μόνος ἀληθινὸς θεός) (1.14.51-52, cf. John 17:3)—all titles applicable in 
Eusebius’ view to the Father alone.  
As for what the Son actually is, if he is God but not ‘the God,’ Eusebius bases his theological case 
in Contra Marcellum almost entirely around a single concept, defined in a clear and distinctive sense and 
applied as the primary distinguishing feature of the Son of God within the overall cosmic order: 
mediation (μεσιτεία). Every mediator, Eusebius argues, is “of necessity in the middle (μέσος) between 
not one, but two, being neither of those in the middle of whom he is (1.1.33).”105 As for what primarily 
defines this quality of “being in the middle,” Eusebius is equally explicit: “Being in the middle between 
two statuses (τάγματα), he is neither rank of those for whom he is the mediator” (1.33).106 This is 
straightforwardly spatial language, and the “space” to which it applies is the cosmos as a whole, 
 
faction and with the later non-Nicene thinkers discussed in subsequent chapters. As DelCogliano 2006, 481-484, has 
persuasively argued, in the context of the 4th century membership in such a faction, like membership in an ancient philosophical 
school, was grounded not only in having “sufficient basic doctrinal principles” (481) in common, but also by more complex 
bonds such as “reverence for particular terminologies” (481) shared by members even when interpreted in varying ways, and 
“the existence of common enemies” (481) against which members were committed to defending one another, and was 
perfectly compatible with theological differences and disagreements, such that “a central feature of any defense of another 
member of the alliance was the correction of the insufficient views of those being defended” (481). All of these features are 
clearly visible in the treatment by Eusebius himself of Arius, Asterius, and Eusebius of Nicomedia, as well as in the relation of 
later thinkers to Eusebius himself. Overall, my stance on Eusebius’ place in the theology of the 4th century is essentially that of 
Khaled Anatolios, who in his excellent introduction to 4th century theology divides theologians broadly by the central question 
of whether the unity of the divine realm was seen as based on being or essence on the one hand or will on the other. Within 
the latter category, Anatolios, quite correctly in my judgment, sees Eusebius as one of the most important and influential 
thinkers (Anatolios 2011, 59-69), in fundamental continuity with Arius, Asterius, and Eunomius, and with a key place as the 
primary early-4th-century figure behind the later “homoian” theology of the 350s and 360s (70-71). 
105 διὸ οὗτος μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν ἑνός, δυεῖν δὲ μέσος ἐξ ἀνάγκης, οὐδέτερος ὢν ἐκείνων ὧν μέσος τυγχάνει· 
106 μέσος ὢν ἑκατέρου τάγματος, οὐδέτερόν ἐστιν, <ὧν> μεσίτης ὑπάρχει· 
183 
 
conceived of as a quasi-political hierarchy of statuses (τάγμα or τάξις) extending from ‘the God’ on high 
through the Son to the angels and finally to human beings. Eusebius argues that, prior to his Incarnation, 
the Son bore the title and rank not of “mediator between God and man” (ὁ μεσίτης θεοῦ καὶ 
ἀνθρώπων) (1.1.29, cf. 1 Tim 2:5), but of “mediator between God and angels” (ὁ μεσίτης θεοῦ καὶ 
ἀγγέλων) (1.1.29). It was in this capacity that the Son acted as the means by which the Law of Moses 
was handed down in turn from ‘the God’ to the Son to the angels and finally to the human Israelites on 
earth (1.1.28-36, cf. Galatians 3:19-20). Conceived of in these terms, the Incarnation of the Son is 
primarily a change in position, whereby the preexisting “mediator between God and angels” and 
“mediator between God and all created things” (ὁ μεσίτης θεοῦ τε καὶ τῶν γενητῶν πάντων) (1.1.35) 
took on the additional, special status of “mediator between God and man”—allowing Christians, as it 
were, to skip a number of steps on the cosmic ladder and gain direct contact with, not just the next 
highest rung, but the one closest to the top. 
Unlike his eventual Nicene rivals, then, Eusebius’ picture of cosmic order is defined primarily not 
by metaphysical ideas of shared nature or essence, but by the deceptively simple concept of rank or 
status, a pervasive spatial and social reality that unifies the cosmos as a whole, operating not only across 
such large categories as “angels” or “human beings,” but even within them. As we have seen, Eusebius 
asserts that a mediator, by definition, cannot be the same as, or share the same status as, the two 
beings and ranks between whom he mediates. Since the Incarnate Son is seemingly a man, sharing 
presumably in some kind of common human nature and status with other human persons, and since he 
is also, in some sense, God, an obvious problem is posed for Eusebius’ system. This issue Eusebius claims 
to resolve as follows: “He is neither the one and solitary God, nor is he a man in the same way (ὁμοίως) 
as other men” (1.1.33-34).107 The Son is a human being, but not in the same way as other human beings, 
 
107 οὔτ’ αὐτὸς ὢν ὁ εἷς καὶ μόνος θεὸς οὔθ’ ὁμοίως τοῖς λοιποῖς ἀνθρώποις ἄνθρωπος. 
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precisely because he does not, and indeed cannot, share the same status and nature as the rest of 
humanity for whom he is a mediator. Likewise, the Son is God, but not in any way that would make him 
the same as ‘the God’ rather than, as Eusebius asserts, “the most similar (ὅμοιος) to the Father” (1.4.35) 
of all other beings.108  
Here, the concept of similarity is invoked to define a characteristic relationship, based on status, 
among multiple entities arranged hierarchically by means of essentially asymmetric relationships. It is 
primarily this concept of similarity that provides the link by which the spatial metaphor of mediation is 
connected to ideas of nature, quality, power, honor, glory, and other divine, human, and Imperial 
attributes mentioned by Eusebius (e.g. 2.4.48). After all, the Scriptures, Eusebius points out, assert that 
Adam begot his son Seth “according to his own appearance (ἰδέα) and according to his own image 
(εἰκών)” (1.4.35, cf. Gen 5:3]).109 In the same way, the Son’s preeminent mediatorial status between God 
and created things is grounded in the fact that he is properly “the living image (εἰκών) of his own Father” 
(1.4.35)110 bearing, not the same οὐσία as God (1.4.41), but that closest to him, not just in status, but 
also in similarity of qualities, similarity of power, and similarity of activity. It is this, more than anything, 
that makes it right for the Son to be called God and worshiped as such. 
 In context, however, this theologizing is intertwined with the challenge brought by Eusebius 
against Marcellus’ basic theology of the Godhead, in which (as presented by Eusebius) the Son is 
conceived of solely as “the Word,” in the sense of an innate or internal reason of the Father, and treated 
as “the Son” only after his “begetting” from the Father in the Incarnation. In opposition to this position, 
Eusebius strongly asserts the necessarily interpersonal quality of the Father and Son’s relationship, a 
 
108 τῷ πατρὶ ὁμοιότατος. 
109 ἐγέννησεν κατὰ τὴν ἰδέαν αὐτοῦ καὶ κατὰ τὴν εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ. 
110 ἔμψυχός [...] εἰκὼν τοῦ ἰδίου πατρὸς. 
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relationship incapable of being understood through the analogy of a human person and their internal 
and external reasoning processes:  
For if God and the Word within him were one and the same—and no one ever can become his 
own Father, as neither can someone who is one and alone become himself his own Son, but God 
would be one and alone and the same as his own Word—it is clear that God would not be the 
Father of a Son who did not exist, nor would he be the Son of a Father who did not subsist 
(ὑποστῆναι) (2.2.42).111  
As already mentioned, Alexander and his allies prior to the Council of Nicaea had charged Arius 
and Eusebius with denying the fatherhood of God, since God could not be eternally the Father of a Son 
who did not also exist eternally. Though in Contra Marcellum as elsewhere Eusebius continues to deny 
the eternity of the Son—seeing it as logically contradictory to allow a begotten Son to share in God’s 
eternal, necessarily uncaused and so unbegotten existence (2.2.2)112—he here broadly accepts the 
premises of that argument and turns it back against his enemy. A view of Father and Son that, like that 
of Marcellus here or that laid out by Constantine in his early theological writings, made of their 
relationship a mere means of internal constitution of one and the same entity would make of God’s 
fatherhood a mere (nonsensical) metaphor, equivalent to calling a human person’s own internal 
 
111 εἰ γὰρ ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν ἦν ὁ θεὸς καὶ ὁ ἐν αὐτῷ λόγος, οὐδεὶς δὲ πώποτε αὐτὸς ἑαυτοῦ γένοιτ’ ἂν πατὴρ ὡς οὐδ’ αὐτὸς 
ἑαυτοῦ υἱὸς <εἷς> ὢν καὶ μόνος, εἷς δὲ μόνος ἦν καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς τῷ ἑαυτοῦ λόγῳ ὁ θεός, δῆλον ὡς οὐ πατὴρ ἦν μὴ ὑπάρχοντος 
αὐτῷ υἱοῦ, οὐδὲ υἱὸς μὴ ὑφεστῶτος αὐτῷ πατρός. 
112 Though as Spoerl and Vinzent 2017, 47-8, have recently argued, there is a degree of tension between Eusebius’ strident 
denials of the Son’s “eternal” (ἀίδιος) existence and his affirmations that the Son existed “before all ages” or “always” that has 
been used to argue for Eusebius’ acceptance of Origen’s doctrine of the Son’s eternal generation (cf. Beeley 2012, 88). The 
solution of Anatolios 2011, 60-63, however, is in my judgment far more convincing: namely that Eusebius in his occasional 
assertions of the Son’s perpetual existence is, like Asterius, speaking solely of his precedence to the rest of creation and 
consequent constant existence within the totality of the history of the temporal cosmos (cf. Williams 2001, 172), so that when 
these statements are taken together with his clear assertions of the Son’s non-eternity Eusebius can be seen to be concerned 
above all to make clear “that the Son’s generation is not posterior to any temporal ‘once,’ neither is it inseparably and mutually 
related to the Father’s being but rather is a product of his ‘will and power’” (63). I would argue, in fact, that given the 
hierarchical conception, presented most cogently in De laudibus Constantini, of rule as grounded in a one-sided dependence of 
inferior to superior, Eusebius in asserting the superiority of Father to Son and Son to cosmos is required by his own logic to 
deny both any sort of true coexistence and mutuality in the relationship between Son and Father (such as eternity in the full 
sense would grant) and any kind of true coexistence and mutuality in the relationship between the Son, as cosmic Emperor, and 
the cosmos ruled by him such as temporality in the common sense would grant. Although the Son as Son cannot be absolutely 
eternal like the Father, his status as cosmic ruler requires his own independence from, and therefore pre-existence to, the 
totality of the cosmos bounded by time. 
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reasoning processes or spoken words his “children” (2.4.22). A really existing God the Father, Eusebius 
insists, demands a really existing, and so necessarily distinct, Son.  
This basic argument would be accepted equally by the Nicene thinkers of the mid-4th century, 
such as Athanasius, Hilary of Poitiers, and even Lucifer of Cagliari, all of whom agreed on the essentially 
interpersonal and not merely internal nature of the relationship between Father and Son. Where 
Eusebius differs from them, however, is in his insistence, in fundamental continuity with Arius, that such 
interpersonal distinction strictly requires the existence of a separate ὑπόστασις and οὐσία for each of 
the two, Father and Son (e.g. 2.4.21), and his equal insistence that such separation requires that the Son 
be fundamentally inferior both in status and power to the Father. The idea of two persons sharing a 
single τάγμα within the cosmic hierarchy is, for Eusebius, as unthinkable as the idea of two persons 
occupying the same physical space. Likewise, as we will see in more detail in De ecclesiastica theologia, 
the idea that two persons might share equally in a single substance, with all its attributes and qualities, 
is as unthinkable as the idea of an image not only similar, but actually identical to, its archetype. 
As we have seen, this basic picture of interpersonal status both across and within cosmic and 
social categories is applied by Eusebius not just to Father and Son or humanity and angels, but also to 
the interactions and interrelationships of Christian bishops. Marcellus may be a bishop, a brother, but he 
is also undoubtedly inferior in both skill and status to the bishops and theologians he has chosen to 
attack—an inferiority made manifest both by his lack of former publications and specialized theological 
knowledge and by the fact that, unlike such luminaries as Eusebius of Nicomedia, Paulinus of Tyre, and 
Eusebius of Caesarea, he has not received the public approbation of the world manifest in the 
occurrence or attempt of episcopal translation. The best thing for Marcellus to have done, Eusebius 
insists, would have been to confine himself to tending his obscure flock, currently overrun with heretics 
(1.1.1-2)—leaving to Eusebius of Nicomedia and himself, bishops “whose fame, because of the 
excellence (ἀρετή) of their piety towards God and their training (ἄσκησις) in the divine words, is sung of, 
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so to speak, throughout the whole113 inhabited world (οἰκουμένη)” (1.1.2),114 the affairs of public 
theology and the Church as a whole.115 At the very least, if Marcellus had not given in to jealousy and 
made a written attack on his superiors, he would have avoided the inevitable sequel. Now, however, 
Eusebius of Caesarea, one of the most prestigious authors of his age, has written a refutation in print of 
his ideas, and he has found himself deposed and exiled, cast from the episcopate and the Church.  
Yet this infraction against bishops of higher status is not, in Eusebius’ telling, the immediate 
cause for Marcellus’ condemnation. This came in his direct attack on a much higher superior, Christ 
himself, whose separate existence and divinity he has denied (e.g. 2.1.8-9) and whose everlasting 
Imperial power he has openly attacked (e.g. 2.1.2-8, quoting Luke 1:31-33, Dan 7: 13-14, and Isaiah 9:6-
7). This latter charge is the most clearly highlighted and fully explored theological point made against 
Marcellus both in Contra Marcellum and De ecclesiastica theologia. As quoted and interpreted by 
Eusebius (e.g. 1.1.23), Marcellus asserts that, since the Word was within God in eternity, after which he 
was “begotten” from God to become the Son of God and Emperor of creation through the Incarnation, 
at the end of the time the Son will once again abandon his human body and separate kingship and 
 
113 There is likely an intentional pun here in the use of the phrase καθ’ ὅλης (source of the term καθολικός) in tandem with 
οἰκουμένη: the implication being that Eusebius of Caesarea and Eusebius of Nicomedia, due to their status, are properly 
“Catholic” and “Ecumenical” bishops, while Marcellus of Ancyra is not. 
114 ὧν μάλιστα δι’ ἀρετὴν θεοσεβείας λόγων τε θείων ἀσκήσεως ἡ φήμη καθ’ ὅλης ὡς εἰπεῖν ᾄδεται τῆς οἰκουμένης 
115 As the previous discussion indicates, I do not agree with the account of S. Parvis 2006a, 47, who although acknowledging 
Eusebius of Caesarea’s straightforward membership in the ecclesiastical alliance led by Eusebius of Nicomedia, suggests that “it 
is not unlikely that he concealed [his factional membership] from himself as much as he concealed it from the readers of his Life 
of Constantine,” since such activities and membership would be “against all of his principles of church unity and respect for the 
major sees,” principles which seem to have led him to feel “nervous and ambiguous towards Eusebius of Nicomedia from early 
on.” Eusebius in Contra Marcellum is certainly neither nervous nor ambiguous in his praise for “Eusebius the Great” and the 
other members of his ecclesiastical faction. Nor, in my judgment, do this membership and these activities in any way contradict 
his actual expressed principles, which, as I have argued, based the unity of the Church precisely on the exalted status of himself 
and his allies, a status established, not just by the fact of possessing prominent sees (like his bitter enemies Eustathius and 
Alexander), but also on theological and intellectual ability, prestige among colleagues and in relation to the Emperor, and 
consequent meriting of higher stations in the episcopate. Eusebius’ characterization of himself and his opponents throughout 
his works is thus designed to emphasize the intellectual and social credentials and consequent high status of himself and his 
allies while consistently denigrating those of his opponents.  
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return to total unity with God.116 Eusebius considers this the ultimate insult against both Christ and his 
Imperial power:  
But Marcellus does not even give the Christ of God equal honors with the prophets. For the 
prophets will obtain eternal, deathless, and unending life, and will live for all ages in the 
promised Kingdom of Heaven[.] [...] But the Christ of God himself, the common Savior of All, the 
‘firstborn of the dead’ [Colossians 1:18], the hope of the resurrection of the Saints, he alone at 
that time will be destroyed after his Imperial power (βασιλεία) has ceased to exist (2.4.28).117 
It is immediately after recounting this charge that Eusebius goes on to relate the eventual fate 
of this miscreant: “Fittingly, therefore, these things incited the very truly God-loving and Thrice-blessed 
Emperor against the man” (2.4.29).118 It is in Eusebius’ judgment eminently reasonable that Marcellus, 
guilty in his theology of a sort of cosmic lèse-majesté, should find himself the enemy of the Emperor, 
“even though he had added myriads of flatteries and gone through many encomia of the Emperor in his 
treatise” (2.4.29).119 Indeed, Marcellus had gone so far as to personally present120 his treatise to the 
Emperor, “hoping perhaps that he would obtain immunity before the Emperor himself because of his 
encomia of him, and that the bishops slandered by him would be subjected to punishment” (2.4.31).121 
 
116 Though as S. Parvis 2006a, 30-37, has emphasized in her sympathetic account of Marcellus’ theology, scholars should be 
wary of taking Eusebius’ word on Marcellus’ beliefs, particularly in regard to these more extreme positions, which Marcellus 
seems to have treated more as speculative responses or concessions in the context of theological polemic than established 
beliefs, and some of which he appears to downplay or even finally deny in the fragments given by Eusebius (36-37). For a fuller 
and more balanced summary of Marcellus’ theology, see Anatolios 2011, 86-92. 
117 ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ τὰ ἴσα τοῖς προφήταις φέρειν δίδωσιν Μάρκελλος τῷ Χριστῷ τοῦ θεοῦ. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ζωῆς αἰωνίου ἀθανάτου τε καὶ 
ἀτελευτήτου τεύξονται, εἰς τοὺς ἅπαντας αἰῶνας ἐν τῇ κατηγγελμένῃ τῶν οὐρανῶν βασιλείᾳ βιωσόμενοι[.] [...] ὁ δὲ Χριστὸς 
τοῦ θεοῦ αὐτὸς ὁ κοινὸς ἁπάντων σωτήρ, «ὁ πρωτότοκος τῶν νεκρῶν», ἡ ἐλπὶς τῆς τῶν ἁγίων ἀναστάσεως, μόνος ἄρα τότε 
ἀπολειφθήσεται, παυθησομένης αὐτοῦ τῆς βασιλείας[.] 
118 εἰκότως ἄρα ταῦτα βασιλέα τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς θεοφιλῆ καὶ τρισμακάριον κατὰ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἐκίνει 
119 καίτοι μυρία κολακεύσαντος καὶ πολλὰ βασιλέως ἐγκώμια αὐτοῦ ἐν συγγράμματι διελθόντος. 
120 There is some debate in scholarship over whether or not these remarks of Eusebius should be taken as an indication that 
Marcellus’ treatise was composed for and addressed to the Emperor on the occasion of the Council of Tyre c. 335. For this 
position, see e.g. Seibt 1994, 241-243, Barnes 1981, 241. For the negative position (that the work was composed for an 
episcopal audience c. 328 and only later presented to Constantine, perhaps with a new “covering letter” containing the alleged 
flatteries), see e.g. S. Parvis 2006a, 119-123, Simonetti 1975, 131, Hanson 1988, 217, Vinzent 1996, xvii.   
121 τάχα που ἐλπίσας τῶν εἰς αὐτὸν ἐγκωμίων χάριν αὐτὸς μὲν τυχεῖν προνομίας τῆς παρ’ αὐτῷ τῷ βασιλεῖ, τοὺς δ’ ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ 
κακηγορηθέντας ἐπισκόπους ὑποβληθῆναι τιμωρίᾳ 
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Marcellus, in other words, had thought that any theology could be acceptable to Constantine so long as 
it was accompanied by proper respect and sufficiently copious praise for the Emperor—and he had been 
wrong. Constantine had recognized, rightly, the threat to his own Imperial authority in the wrong done 
to Christ’s kingship, and so the Council of Constantinople in 336 had deposed Marcellus from office 
(2.4.29) and Eusebius, in the aftermath of the deposition, had written the present treatise to put the last 
nail in his fallen adversary’s coffin.122  
As Eusebius acknowledges, however, the primary reason for his writing of the treatise was not 
to gloat over his victory, but rather to “heal the suspicion of our brothers” (2.4.30),123 unnamed bishops 
who believed that Marcellus had been wrongfully deposed. This remarkable admission, coming only at 
the end of Contra Marcellum, serves to drastically recontextualize the work as a whole. To attack a 
prominent bishop still in possession of his office, like Eustathius, might appear only reasonable; to attack 
such an allegedly obscure and contemptible adversary after his deposition and exile from the public 
stage might appear, rather, either like unseemly gloating—or like an indication of real, substantial fears. 
At the time of the publication of Contra Marcellum, Eusebius was clearly worried enough about 
continuing support for Marcellus and continuing opposition to his own theology to publish, after his 
enemy’s downfall, a detailed and rhetorical pamphlet defending both the rightness of Marcellus’ 
deposition and the theological beliefs that he and Eusebius of Nicomedia had championed and 
Marcellus had attacked. Even with the downfall of Athanasius, Eustathius, and Marcellus, Eusebius still 
had reason to fear the existence of bishops willing to champion their cause. 
 
122 Although the present text clearly dates to after Marcellus’ deposition, several scholars (e.g. Vinzent 1996, xix, S. Parvis 
2006a, 129-132) have argued that it in fact represents the accusation drawn up by Eusebius for the trial of Marcellus itself, with 
additional sections added for more general publication in its aftermath. The claim of S. Parvis 2006a, 130-132, that the primary 
intended audience for the treatise was the Emperor Constantine (based on its alleged exploitation of his theological ignorance 
and lack of knowledge of Greek) is, however, insufficiently supported by the text itself.  
123 ἀποθεραπεῦσαι τὴν τῶν ἡμετέρων ἀδελφῶν ὑπόνοιαν 
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That fear would be more than justified over the next decades.  
2.5:  
De laudibus Constantini 
“In Praise of Constantine” 
If Eusebius was eager to forestall any further support for Marcellus of Ancyra following the 
Council of Constantinople in 336, it was perhaps in part because he had just reached the very peak of his 
prestige in Church and Empire. Eusebius and his allies had recently achieved a double victory: in 335, at 
the Council of Tyre, Athanasius, the former secretary of Alexander of Alexandria at Nicaea and therefore 
the presumed head of the faction of bishops once responsible for the exile of Arius and Eusebius of 
Nicomedia, had himself been deposed and exiled on charges of conspiracy and violence against his 
enemies in Egypt.124 Like Marcellus of Ancyra, Athanasius had attempted to personally appeal from the 
synod to Constantine—and had been definitively rejected. That same year, a large council at Jerusalem 
had received Arius himself into communion, after which, at the end of 335 or the beginning of 336, the 
Council of Constantinople deposed Marcellus of Ancyra. These three councils and accompanying events, 
occurring in short succession,125 may or may not be seen (as Athanasius later would) as marking a 
triumph of “Arianism” within the Church and Empire, but they certainly must be seen as successes for 
Eusebius of Nicomedia and Eusebius of Caesarea, the two leading members of an episcopal faction 
 
124 Eusebius of Caesarea seems to have been an especially active mover in these events, as he not only was actively involved in 
the proceedings of the Council of Tyre but also had presided at the earlier Council of Caesarea c. 334, which condemned and 
deposed Athanasius but whose sentence seems to have been left unexecuted by Constantine (See Spoerl and Vinzent 2017, 16-
17, Barnes 1981, 234-235, cf. Sozomen, Historia Ecclesiastica 2.25, Athanasius, Apologia Secunda 65.4). 
125 However, as e.g. Drake 1975, 346-350, notes, the precise dating of these events, apart from their basic sequence within 
335/336, is relatively difficult, though a secure placement in 335/336 already allows De laudibus Constantini to be dated more 
precisely than most of Eusebius’ corpus. Though the widely accepted (see e.g. Pietri 2013, 27) suggestion of Drake 1975 that 
the speech was delivered on July 25, 336, at the closing celebrations for Constantine’s Tricennalian year, and therefore after the 
three councils of Tyre, Jerusalem, and Constantinople, is convincing, the effect on my thesis of different proposals is slight. 
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which, defeated only ten years before, had now definitively turned the tables on key bishops 
responsible for their earlier downfall.126 
These three councils took place, however, in the background of events that most Christians of 
the Roman Empire would have seen as far more momentous: the dedication in Jerusalem of a massive 
new complex of Constantinian buildings, including most notably the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, that 
would for centuries to come constitute the clearest and most enduring sign of the Roman Empire’s 
embrace of the formerly proscribed Christian religion.127 These festivities also coincided with an event of 
great import for all citizens of the Empire, Christian and pagan alike: the remarkable thirtieth 
anniversary of Constantine’s reign. While not all of those years had been spent as sole ruler of the 
Roman Empire, the lasting mark made by Constantine, who had unified the Empire around himself and 
so brought about an extended period of peace and stability after nearly a century of civil war, could 
hardly be denied. 
It was in the context of these events that Eusebius of Caesarea received two of the most signal 
honors of his career, being appointed to deliver both a speech at the dedication of the Church of the 
 
126 As S. Parvis 2006a, 100, notes, this is in essence “the period’s biggest question: was there a conspiracy by a group of ‘those 
around’ Eusebius of Nicomedia (‘the Eusebians’), many of whom were former allies of Arius, to depose as many as possible of 
their opponents from the period before Nicaea?” Given the clear evidence in Eusebius and other authors for just such factional 
and theological concerns, I find the general contention of S. Parvis 2006a, esp. 96-133 (strongly supported by Barnes 2011, 140-
142), that these events do in fact reflect a concerted effort by members of the alliance assembled prior to Nicaea to depose 
members of the former Alexandrian faction far more convincing than the judgment of e.g. Gwynn 2006 that such narratives 
reflect no more than the conspiratorial self-defense of Athanasius. Most scholarly attempts to find a middle ground between 
these two positions, such as e.g. Ayres 2004, 106, who suggests that “there is a great difference between an attempt to shape 
ecclesiastical affairs in the light of a theological trajectory and an attempt to do so as part of an overt conspiracy to perpetuate 
the theology of Arius,” add little to the picture, since this for the most part little more than the difference in perspective to be 
expected in any conflict between two parties. I do believe, however, that a fuller understanding both of the theological-
ecclesiastical system of Eusebius of Caesarea and of the dynamics between Emperor and bishops leads to a somewhat more 
complex picture of the motivations and actions of all parties during this period. As I have argued in these chapters, Constantine 
and Eusebius certainly did not see themselves as participating in a furtive “conspiracy,” but publicly and repeatedly justified 
their efforts to secure the readmittance of Arius and the deposition of key opponents as eminently legitimate both 
ecclesiastically and theologically—a position, however, hardly likely to be shared by Athanasius, Eustathius, Marcellus, or their 
allies. 
127 For a discussion of the origins, background, and nature of this Constantinian building project and accompanying festivities, 
see e.g. Hunt 1997. 
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Holy Sepulchre and, not long after, a public panegyric to Constantine himself on the thirtieth anniversary 
of his reign (cf. Vita Constantini 33, 45-46).128  
The resulting document,129 attached by Eusebius himself to the text of Vita Constantini and 
known commonly as the Tricennalian Oration, is one of the most remarkable texts to survive from the 
4th century. Its interest arises in the first place from its genre and speaker: an Imperial panegyric 
delivered on one of the most important ceremonial occasions of Constantine’s reign by a Christian 
bishop and theologian. No other event in the 4th century so perfectly encapsulates the intimate 
association between Christian Church and Roman Empire held up as the ideal by Eusebius in his Historia 
Ecclesiastica. The role of Imperial panegyrist, for centuries a central interpretive figure amid the vast set 
of practices, beliefs, and court ceremonial known conventionally as Imperial cult,130 is now given to a 
 
128 As Cameron 1983, 76, points out, however, Eusebius himself indicates that he was not the only panegyrist, and not even the 
only clerical panegyrist, to speak on these occasions, though thanks to his efforts in Vita Constantini he is the only one whose 
speech survives. As always, it is difficult to determine, on the basis of Eusebius’ own self-representation, just how prestigious 
his standing with Constantine actually was.   
129 Here should be mentioned the scholarly hypothesis that the present text of De laudibus Constantini in fact combines two 
distinct orations: one delivered before Constantine on the occasion of his thirtieth anniversary (1-10), and another delivered by 
Eusebius, again before Constantine and either in Jerusalem itself or Constantinople, in honor of the dedication of the Church of 
the Holy Sepulchre (11-18) (see e.g. Drake 1976, Cameron 1983, 75, Pietri 2013, 26-29). While this corresponds at least roughly 
to the promises made by Eusebius in the text of Vita Constantini 4.46 (to whose manuscripts De laudibus Constantini was 
attached) to append two additional works to his text, one an oration given on Constantine’s thirtieth anniversary and another 
involving a detailed description of the Constantinian building project, as scholars have long recognized the alleged “second 
speech” of De laudibus Constantini is unlikely to be the text mentioned by Eusebius in Vita Constantini, since it contains no 
physical description whatsoever of the buildings in Jerusalem (and indeed only a few glancing mentions of the project in 
general). The position of Pietri 2013, who argues that the “second speech” consists of a “catéchèse élémentaire” (Pietri 2013, 
27) connecting the sojourn of Christ on earth with the overall system of cosmic monarchy foregrounded in the first part of De 
laudibus Constantini, and thus identified with the oration described as given in the palace of Constantinople in Vita Constantini 
4.33, is, I believe, more accurate to the text as transmitted. Although in the present text these two alleged speeches function as 
one continuous panegyric with a substantial continuity of argument across the two halves and a pervasive focus on praising 
Constantine by analogy to the cosmic monarchy of God and the Word, when thus divided the two sections do show at least 
arguably distinct emphases (most tangibly in the turn to a more detailed discussion of basic Christian beliefs about Christ’s life 
on earth and the professed intention of defending Constantine’s Jerusalem building project against pagan critics in 11.1-7). 
However, given the fundamental continuity of viewpoint and belief across the two halves and the likelihood that, even if this 
hypothesis is correct, Eusebius himself was responsible for joining the two addresses in attaching them to Vita Constantini, I 
have made no effort to separate out the two halves or treat them as distinct works here. Read together, the two give, I would 
strongly assert, a clear and coherent picture of Eusebius’ views on cosmic monarchy and its connections with Constantine on 
earth. 
130 See Drake 2000, 62-70, for a discussion of the political importance of Imperial panegyrists within the late Empire, who, 
rather than mere passive sycophants, in fact were “the wild cards of the game of empire,” who “in the course of praising the 
emperor and celebrating his virtues [...] wrote the rules of the game” (69) which the Emperor would be expected to follow to 
retain his legitimacy in the eyes of subordinate elites and the population at large; also Omissi 2018, 42-67, who gives a 
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Christian bishop, holder of an office and adherent of a religious system that, only a few decades before, 
would have made him a persona non grata in the Empire. That Eusebius had personally lived through 
the persecution of Diocletian and witnessed its grisly consequences would no doubt have made this 
reality even more striking for our author himself—and he would later highlight both the speech and 
Constantine’s glowing reaction to it in his Vita Constantini (4.46), a sign of his own appreciation of the 
importance of the occasion and honor involved. 
Eusebius of Caesarea, after a lifetime spent studying Greek literature, philosophy, and rhetoric 
to become one of the foremost scholars of his period, after a lifetime of Scriptural study, clerical 
training, and ecclesiastical activity that had made him one of the most respected bishops and 
theologians in the world, was ready for the role of a lifetime.  
As might be expected, our author—at least judging by the text that has come down to us from 
Eusebius himself—plays his part with grace and aplomb, but does so, as he acknowledges, in a way 
designed to highlight precisely his own distinctive qualities as a Christian episcopal panegyrist. As he 
declares at the very start of his oration, Eusebius intends to present not an ordinary Imperial 
panegyric,131 but rather “a rather new strain of Imperial praises” (praefatio 2),132 one that grants him 
 
somewhat more negative assessment of the genre’s truthfulness while emphasizing that the fact that “the most powerful men 
in the Roman world were forced, on a daily basis, to attend” Imperial court rituals made of such ceremonies and their 
accompanying panegyric speeches “a recurrent and ritualized act of submission on the part of orator and audience” (61) aimed 
at “creat[ing] a community, a community bound together by a vision of its leader that was intentionally constructed by both 
author and audience, who in their repetitive consumption of the propaganda messages found within the speeches thereby 
identified themselves with those messages, an in-group of order and harmony beneath the god-like emperor formed against an 
out-group, real or imagined, of tyranny, of barbarism, of chaos” (62). 
131 As Cameron 1983 correctly points out, De laudibus Constantini is “not an ordinary panegyric, having none of the formal 
components of the basilikos logos” (81) as laid out in manuals of rhetoric. Rather, “[i]t is self-consciously new,” aimed at 
“evolving a new theoretical basis for Constantine’s rule” inasmuch as it “takes as its starting point his unique position in 
Christian history, and demonstrates it in a new way” (82). Similarly, Warmington 1998, 269-270, points out that De laudibus 
Constantini is “like no other surviving panegyric” (269) in its presentation of a complex and novel Christian theology of rulership 
and its abuse of polytheism, in both of which Eusebius was “committing a serious crime in a panegyrist—saying something 
original” (270). 
132 βασιλικῶν ὕμνων καινοτέρας ᾠδῆς 
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membership in a higher class than the vulgar, non-Christian encomiasts his listeners are used to and 
allows him to safely “leave it to panegyrists of the second rank to hymn the second rank of the 
Emperor’s good qualities” (praefatio 2).133  The superiority of his Christian praises to those of his pagan 
colleagues is highlighted by Eusebius, somewhat paradoxically, through use of the language of pagan 
initiatory cults:  
But those who have passed within the inaccessible (ἄδυτον) and untrodden (ἄβατον) inmost 
parts of the holy royal temple (ἀνάκτορον), who have shut the doors on all profane hearers, let 
them explain the unspeakable initiations (μύησις) of the Emperor to those alone who have been 
initiated (μύστης) into these things; and, after purifying their ears in the flowing springs of piety 
and after laying hold of intellectual reality (τὸ νοερὸν) with the uplifted wing of their soul, let 
them dance in chorus around the Emperor of All, in silence fulfilling (τελεῖν) those initiations 
that are divine (praefatio 4).134  
It is, to say the least, paradoxical to begin a public address with a declaration of the privileged 
and secretive nature of the things one is about to discuss—yet in the paradigmatically pagan 
environment of an Imperial panegyric such ascriptions serve primarily to buttress the authority of the 
speaker, who wishes to remind his audience, pagan and Christian alike,135 that he is in fact a Christian 
priest and therefore an authority in specialized knowledge and a presider in sacred rites analogous to 
 
133 δευτέροις ἀνυμνεῖν τὰ δεύτερα τῶν καλῶν παραχωρήσαντες 
134 οἱ δ’ ἀνακτόρων ἁγίων εἴσω ἀδύτων τε καὶ ἀβάτων μυχῶν ἐντὸς διαβεβηκότες, θύρας βεβήλοις ἀκοαῖς ἀποκλείσαντες, τὰς 
ἀπορρήτους βασιλέως μυήσεις τοῖς τούτων μύσταις διηγείσθων μόνοις, οἱ δὲ τὰ ὦτα νάμασιν εὐσεβείας καθηράμενοι ψυχῆς 
τε αὐτῆς μεταρσίῳ πτερῷ τὸ νοερὸν ἐπερείσαντες ἀμφὶ τὸν πάντων βασιλέα χορευόντων, σιγῇ τὰ θεῖα τελούμενοι. 
135 See e.g. Cameron 1983, 77-81, for a strong argument for the apologetic tone, style, and intentions of both halves of De 
laudibus Constantini, because of which it can be conclusively argued that Eusebius’ expected audience for his panegyrics 
included not only Christians but also pagans (cf. Warmington 1998, 278). This apologetic intent, it should be clearly stated, 
strongly undercuts the argument of Drake 2000, 379-383, who sees in the “universal and inclusive” language of the first part of 
De laudibus Constantini a sign of Constantine’s influence rather than Eusebius’ own thought. Here as elsewhere, Drake’s 
Eusebius is based to too great a degree on inferences of Eusebius’ intolerance drawn from his historical works, and takes 
insufficient account of the bishop’s own apologetic projects and the consistent strategy shown in them of beginning with 




those in pagan contexts.136 For what Eusebius is setting out to do in his speech is to attempt to apply his 
own highly technical knowledge of Christian theology to the task of praising the Emperor.137   
To do this, Eusebius will deliver not just an address on Constantine or the Roman Empire, but 
one “about Imperial power (βασιλεία) itself, about the Most High Emperor and the Divine Bodyguard 
around the Emperor of All and about the Imperial Exemplar in our midst and about that marked with a 
counterfeit image and about those who follow and attend in every rank (τάγμα)” (praefatio 5).138 The 
task Eusebius sets himself, then, is to theologize, in a specifically Christian vein, on the essential nature 
of political authority, the connection between God’s Imperial power in heaven and that of Constantine 
on earth, and the overall arrangement of the cosmos that makes this possible. Around the same time as 
he delivered this speech, Eusebius was writing Contra Marcellum and laying out his view of the Christian 
cosmos in very similar terms. Yet it is here, in his entire corpus of writings, that he most explicitly lays 
out his view on the relationship between God and the real, flesh-and-blood Emperor in front of him. It is 
 
136 See e.g. Johnson 2014, 147-148, Drake 2000, 381-382, for the close connections between Eusebius’ presentation of Imperial 
imitation of divine monarchy in De laudibus Constantini and pre-existing Neopythagorean concepts expressed frequently in 
pagan panegyrics.  
137 The specifically Christian and indeed specifically theological and Eusebian viewpoint of De laudibus Constantini has not 
always been recognized in scholarship (see e.g. Baynes 1934, Cameron 1983, Drake 1976, Drake 2000). Drake 1976, 60, goes so 
far as to argue that the relative absence of specifically Christian terminology in what he regards as the first speech (1-10) of two 
separate addresses (see note 129 in the present section) is a sign that Constantine at this time was still reticent to embrace 
Christianity in such a public setting (though this argument is essentially abandoned in Drake 2000, 372-384). Since Drake’s 
division of the speech at this point is in large part based on precisely the presence of more directly Christian and apologetic 
material in the second part, the argument is somewhat circular. It also ignores not only Eusebius’ presentation of his own 
exclusive Christian credentials in the first part of the speech, but also the straightforward fact that the description of the 
absolute Monarch God the Father, the subordinate “Only-Begotten” Monarch the Logos, and the Emperor Constantine as 
having definitively overthrown both divided government and polytheism by means of the saving Sign and the building of 
churches, if expanded on in more detail in the second half of the speech, is fundamentally identical in both halves (see e.g. 
Cameron 1983, 80-81 for a marshalling of the evidence on these points), and is likewise inextricable from the thoroughly 
Christian and Scripturally-grounded portrait of the cosmos given in Contra Marcellum and De ecclesiastica theologia. While the 
links between Eusebius’ political theology and previous pagan ruler-cult models cannot be denied (see e.g. Baynes 1934), this 
should not be allowed to obscure Eusebius’ own forthright assertion of Christianity both here and elsewhere, as well as the 
novelty of his efforts to Christianize long-standing Greek and Roman ideas and genres.  
138 ἀμφὶ βασιλείας αὐτῆς ἀμφί τε βασιλέως τοῦ ἀνωτάτω δορυφορίας τε θείας ἀμφὶ τὸν πάντων βασιλέα τοῦ τε καθ’ ἡμᾶς 
βασιλικοῦ παραδείγματος καὶ τοῦ τὸ χάραγμα κεκιβδηλευμένου τῶν θ’ ἑκατέρῳ συνομαρτούντων τάγματι. 
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here, in other words, that Eusebius of Caesarea lays out his political theology, in the proper sense of that 
term, most cogently and completely.139 
To carry out his task, Eusebius has to talk, not just about God or the cosmos, but also and 
explicitly about the Son of God, the “mediator between God and created things” described in Contra 
Marcellum. For, as Eusebius argues strongly, the connection he imagines between divine and human 
βασιλεία absolutely requires a picture of divine Logos very far from that found in Marcellus of Ancyra or 
later Nicene authors—one grounded, rather, in the key theological theses which Arius, Eusebius of 
Nicomedia, and his other allies had for decades engaged in public controversy and even suffered exile in 
order to affirm. Even in the middle of a public address before the Emperor, then, Eusebius takes it upon 
himself to attack his erstwhile theological opponents,140 “those who have declared that the Word 
himself is ‘the God,’ the one beyond all, mixing up (I do not know how) things that in reality stand very 
far apart (τὰ πορρωτάτω διεστῶτα)” (11.17).141 As in Contra Marcellum, the necessary gap between 
Father and Son is conceived, first and foremost, in spatial terms, as a matter of both literal and social 
standing. What his theological opponents have done, Eusebius asserts, is to insult the status of God by 
imputing to him a drastic change in physical location and social status alike, “throwing the All-Ruler 
himself, the Unbegotten and Most High Power, down onto the earth, entangling him in a material and 
corruptible body, and saying that he is shut up in the middle (μέσος) between irrational animals and 
 
139 As Anatolios 2011, 68, notes, while “we should not leap to the conclusion that a trinitarian theology based on ontological 
subordinationism [...] will necessarily lead to a monarchical political theology [...] in Eusebius this is exactly what happens.” 
Eusebius of Caesarea is therefore naturally the primary model employed by Erik Peterson to elaborate the concept of “political 
theology” (in the strict sense of a direct analogy between monotheistic deity and political sovereign) in his seminal Der 
Monotheismus als politischers Problem (Peterson 1935). 
140 Indeed, as Johnson 2014, 152, argues, it is likely that one of Eusebius’ main goals in the oration, coming so soon after the 
Council of Tyre and in the midst of the controversy with Marcellus, was the theological-political one of gaining the Emperor’s 
favor against his theological opponents.  
141 οἱ δ’ αὐτὸν εἶναι τὸν ἐπέκεινα τῶν ὅλων θεὸν οὐκ οἶδ’ ὅπως τὰ πορρωτάτω διεστῶτα μιγνύντες ἀπεφήναντο 
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rational, mortal and immortal” (11.17).142 The Son, because he fundamentally is a mediate entity, can in 
principle lower himself to assume other mediatory roles in the cosmos, but to ascribe to the 
monarchical Father any mediation whatsoever is the gravest of insults.  
In De laudibus Constantini, then, Eusebius provides us with a more detailed contextualization of 
the concept of mediation found in Contra Marcellum. Cosmic mediation, Eusebius asserts, does not exist 
for its own sake, as a good in its own right, but entirely in relation to and at the service of absolute, 
monarchical power. The fundamental role of the Son in the cosmic order, Eusebius asserts, is to be “that 
Light which, above all things, dances around the Father and mediates (μεσιτεύειν) and separates the 
one uncaused and unbegotten Form (ἰδέα) from the οὐσίαι of things that have come into being” (1.6).143 
The Son’s mediatorial status between God and creatures, like the array of Imperial officials physically 
surrounding Constantine at this celebration, has as its primary purpose the separation of the Emperor 
from all others and so the manifestation of his superiority in status. Mediation is at the service of 
monarchy.  
In the case of divine Father, this monarchy is in the strongest sense absolute, “totally separate 
from all the administration (οἰκονομία) of his subordinates” (12.1).144 While the goal of this cosmic and 
political system is unity, this unity requires a clear and definitive separation of ruler from ruled—a 
separation made visible and actual by means of the Son and other privileged subordinates. Their 
mediation at once manifests this absolute separation and also serves, to a degree, to bridge it, by 
 
142 αὐτὸν τὸν πανηγεμόνα καὶ τὴν ἀγέννητον καὶ ἀνωτάτω δύναμιν κάτω βάλλοντες ἐπὶ γῆν, καὶ σώματι ὕλῃ τε φθαρτῇ 
συμπλέξαντες, ζώων τε ἀλόγων καὶ λογικῶν θνητῶν τε καὶ ἀθανάτων μέσον εἰλεῖσθαι φήσαντες. ἀλλ’ οἱ μὲν ταῦτα. 
143 τὸ φῶς [...] τὸ ἐπέκεινα τῶν ὅλων ἀμφὶ τὸν πατέρα χορεῦον μεσιτεῦόν τε καὶ διεῖργον τῆς τῶν γενητῶν οὐσίας τὴν ἄναρχον 
καὶ ἀγένητον ἰδέαν 
144 πάσης ἀλλότριον ὑπηρετικῆς οἰκονομίας· 
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allowing subordinates a degree of access to the monarch, by means of higher and more privileged 
subordinates, otherwise impossible to them:  
For since it was not possible for the unstable οὐσίαι of bodies and of rational beings recently 
come into existence to draw near to God the All-Ruler because of the excessive distance by 
which they fall short of their Superior [...] and because their οὐσίαι have come into existence 
from nothing and so stand very far apart and are separated very far from the Unbegotten 
Nature, the All-Good Good fittingly put forward a certain οὐσία in the middle (μέσος) of all 
things, the Divinity of the Only-Begotten Word himself and his all-powerful Power (11.12).145  
Paradoxically, then, the Son serves at the same time to separate the monarchical God from the 
rest of creation and as the means by which this creation comes into (mediated) contact with its ruler. 
This comes in the first place through the fact that the Son, in common with the rest of creation, is not 
‘the God’ and so like them can stand only at a distance from him. Eusebius uses precisely the same 
terminology for the Son’s “standing very far apart” (πορρωτάτω διεστῶτα, 11.17) from God the Father 
as when describing creation as a whole (πορρωτάτω τε διεστῶσα, 11.12). Both the Son and creatures 
share, as constitutive to their being, a fundamental and inescapable separation from God, the sole 
monarch—but as Eusebius asserted in Contra Marcellum and at the Council of Nicaea alike, this does not 
necessitate but rather contradicts the assumption that the Son, as a mediator logically sharing neither 
status of those he mediates, is simply the same as the rest of creation. If two entities stand at a great 
distance from a third, one can still stand closer than the other. 
For Eusebius in De laudibus Constantini, however, as for Constantine in Oratio ad coetum 
Sanctorum, the primary reality underlying all meditation, and therefore all political power, is not 
metaphysical being or even spatial location, but will. This is because, as Eusebius strongly asserts, the 
only thing that truly connects the absolutely separate singularity and monarchy of God to all other 
 
145 ἐπεὶ γὰρ μὴ οἷόν τε ἦν τὴν ῥευστὴν τῶν σωμάτων οὐσίαν τήν τε τῶν ἄρτι γενομένων λογικῶν φύσιν τῷ πανηγεμόνι  θεῷ 
πελάζειν δι’ ὑπερβολὴν τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ἐλλείψεως· [...] ἡ δ’ ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων προβεβλημένη πορρωτάτω τε διεστῶσα καὶ 
μακρὰν τῆς ἀγεννήτου φύσεως ἀπεσχοινισμένη· εἰκότως ὁ πανάγαθος καὶ θεὸς τῶν ὅλων μέσην τινὰ προεμβάλλει τὴν τοῦ 
μονογενοῦς αὐτοῦ λόγου θείαν καὶ παναλκῆ δύναμιν. 
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things is his supreme and Imperial will:146 “But he himself, as the Emperor dwelling in unapproachable 
Light, in unspeakable and inaccessible and untrodden places, makes laws and arranges everything solely 
by means of the power of his will. For everything is when he wills it, and is not when he does not will it” 
(12.2).147 The principal way, then, in which the Son brings creation into contact with God rather than 
further separating it from him may at first glance appear somewhat surprising: “He is the Ruler of the 
whole Cosmos, the one pervading over all and through all and in all things visible and invisible, the Word 
of God” (1.6).148 The Son mediates between God and creation fundamentally by being, under and 
according to the will of God, the ruler of that creation, directing it freely according to his own monarchic 
will: “Therefore the Divine Word, having gone under all things together and having taken hold of the 
reins of all things with his bodiless and divine Power, leads them and directs them as the all-wise 
Charioteer in whatever way seems good to him” (11.12).149  
The Son’s monarchy, however, is fundamentally a mediatorial one, based on a far greater 
degree of closeness and contact with the rest of creation than that of the Father. This difference is 
described, characteristically, in spatial terms. While the Father is declared to be “not involved in place, 
nor present in bodies, not present in Heaven nor in the Aether nor in any portion of all things, but 
 
146 As Anatolios 2011, 59-60, notes, while Eusebius’ description of the absolute separation of God from creation (so extreme 
that in De laudibus Constantini the Father is not treated as creator or ruler of the cosmos in any direct sense) is highly 
reminiscent of Middle Platonist authors such as Numenius (see e.g. Ricken 1967, Strutwolf 1999), his treatment of will as the 
sole means of contact between God and creation and the basis of cosmic hierarchy in general, creating a “chain of willing” (60) 
as much as or more than a chain of being, has no parallels in that tradition. This emphasis on hierarchy of will and command 
over and above being or nature, I would suggest, fits especially well with Eusebius’ more overtly political focus, and bears 
strong resemblances to the thought of Constantine examined in Chapter One. 
147 ἀλλ’ αὐτὸς μὲν οἷα βασιλεὺς εἴσω που ἐν ἀρρήτοις καὶ ἀδύτοις καὶ ἀβάτοις φῶς οἰκῶν ἀπρόσιτον διὰ παντὸς μόνῃ τῇ 
θελητικῇ δυνάμει νομοθετεῖ καὶ διατάττεται· θέλοντος γὰρ ἔστιν ὅ τι καὶ ἔστιν, καὶ μὴ θέλοντος οὐκ ἔστιν. 
148 αὐτὸς δ’ ἂν εἴη ὁ τοῦδε τοῦ σύμπαντος καθηγεμὼν κόσμου, ὁ ἐπὶ πάντων καὶ διὰ πάντων καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν ὁρωμένοις τε καὶ 
ἀφανέσιν ἐπιπορευόμενος τοῦ θεοῦ λόγος. 
149 διὸ δὴ λόγος θεῖος ἀναμὶξ τόδε τὸ πᾶν ὑπελθὼν καὶ τὰς ἡνίας τοῦ παντὸς ἐνδησάμενος ἀσωμάτῳ καὶ θεϊκῇ δυνάμει ἄγει 
καὶ φέρει, πανσόφως ἡνιοχῶν ᾗ καλῶς ἔχειν αὐτῷ καταφαίνεται. 
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entirely outside of everything, secreted away in the unspeakable depths of knowledge” (12.1),150 the 
Son can be described not only as physically undergirding and taking the reins of the world, but also as 
“spreading himself through all things, bodilessly extending himself through up and down and height and 
depth, taking hold, as though with broad hands, of the breadth and length of everything” (11.14).151 The 
Father stands totally apart from creation, and relates to it only through his will. It is the Son, not the 
Father, that is actually present within creation and actively directs it—first and foremost by “lowering 
himself down to the earth” (11.15)152 and actively creating all things, including the earth itself, animals, 
plants, and fish, and then, later, by once again “making a descent among men” (13.1)153 in the 
Incarnation.  
The primary service the Son performs for God, then, is to actually carry out all those parts of his 
monarchical activity that would involve him in any contact with creation, thereby preserving his 
absolute supremacy and isolation. The service he performs for the world at large is to directly create, 
control, and rule everything, and thereby make the will of God the Emperor present in the world. It is 
this lesser and inferior monarchy that actually connects God with creation and so binds the cosmos 
together.154 
 
150 οὐκ ἐν τόπῳ περιληπτόν, οὐκ ἐν σώμασιν ὄν, οὐκ ἐν οὐρανῷ οὐκ ἐν αἰθέρι οὐδ’ ἔν τινι μέρει τοῦ παντός, ἀλλὰ πάντη καὶ 
πάντων ἐκτὸς ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ βυθῷ γνώσεως τεταμιευμένον. 
151 διὰ πάντων ἑαυτὸν ἁπλώσας, καὶ ἄνω τε πρὸς ὕψος καὶ κάτω πρὸς βάθος ἑαυτὸν ἀσωμάτως ἐκτείνας, πλάτη τε καὶ μήκη 
τοῦ παντὸς πλατείαις ὥσπερ ταῖς χερσὶ περιλαβών. 
152 κατὰ γῆν ἑαυτὸν βαθύνας. 
153 τὴν εἰς ἀνθρώπους κάθοδον ἐποιεῖτο. 
154 This picture of the Son’s inferior monarchy is, as Anatolios 2011, 65, correctly argues, not only “cosmological,” but also 
“radically soteriological.” Unlike the Father, the embodiment of absolute transcendence, the Son’s very being is bound up with 
the “mitigation of the Unbegotten’s transcendence,” and therefore constitutes “an expression of the Father’s goodness and the 
benevolence of his intentions toward creation.” In a similar way, as Eusebius will make clear, Constantine’s status as 
subordinate ruler is expressive of the Son’s benevolence towards his subjects—thus exploiting to the fullest extent the double 
political-theological meaning of the title σωτήρ in the ancient world. 
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Likewise, though himself separated from God, the Word enjoys a degree of closeness with the 
will of God entirely inconceivable for any other being: “He converses with the Father as exactly and as 
closely as is possible, and rejoices in him within himself” (11.12).155 It is this fact of an interior 
enlightenment of Son by Father that is primarily responsible for the Son’s status as monarch. Like all 
other things, the Son is connected to the Father only through his will, but his closeness to that will and 
consequent ability to carry it out within the world is vastly greater than any other. It is principally for this 
reason, according to Eusebius, that the Son can be described as the Word of God, analogous to the 
external, spoken word or command by which the hidden inner intention (νοῦς) of the monarch’s mind is 
actually carried out (12.3-12.4). Because of his closeness and direct origination from the will of God, 
denied to all other creatures, even the act of governing the world involves, for the Son, a substantial, 
active condescension and lowering to his subjects, “gently descending and to some extent conforming 
himself to those who are far from his height” (11.12).156 It is this combination of exalted separation and 
absolute rule on the one hand and degrading condescension and concern for creation on the other that 
makes the Son what he is: an intermediate monarch, not as totally separate and supreme as God, whose 
will he carries out, but still supreme above all other things. “Looking upwards to his Father and following 
his commands, he governs all those things below and after him as a common Savior of all, standing in 
the middle and connecting the begotten οὐσίαι to the one Unbegotten” (12.6).157 It is only because of 
the Son’s active, inferior monarchy that the distant, inactive God of Eusebius is Emperor of the cosmos. 
All of this rather abstruse theological discussion, much of it openly polemical in its assertion of 
Eusebius’ position against his fallen rivals, may well justify Eusebius’ claim to be presenting a panegyric 
 
155 ἀκριβέστατα μὲν ὡς ὅτι μάλιστα καὶ ἐγγύτατα τῷ πατρὶ προσομιλοῦσαν εἴσω τε αὐτοῦ τῶν ἀπορρήτων ἀπολαύουσαν. 
156 πραότατα δὲ συγκατιοῦσαν καὶ ἁμωσγέπως συσχηματιζομένην τοῖς τῆς ἄκρας ἀπολιμπανομένοις 
157 ἄνω τε πρὸς τὸν αὐτοῦ πατέρα βλέπων τοῖς ἐκείνου νεύμασι τὰ κάτω καὶ μετ’ αὐτὸν ἀκολούθως οἷα κοινὸς ἁπάντων σωτὴρ 
διακυβερνᾷ, μεσεύων ἁμηγέπη καὶ συνάγων πρὸς τὸν ἀγέννητον τὴν γεννητὴν οὐσίαν. 
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intended for a few initiates only.158 Yet in the context of the overall discourse, it stands very clearly at 
the service of our panegyricist’s overarching goal: to glorify Constantine by connecting his earthly 
Imperial status and activities to their true, divine exemplar. This Eusebius proceeds to do at great length, 
and to a degree that makes him without a doubt the most properly political of all the political 
theologians of the 4th century. Through his distinctively Christian (and distinctively Eusebian) theological 
picture, Eusebius has constructed a cosmic order founded on the spatial, social, and metaphysical 
independence and precedence of rulers in relation to subjects and therefore, as he promised, created a 
universal definition of Imperial power applicable to God, the Son, and Constantine. God is Emperor in 
the absolute sense, because he stands entirely apart from all other things and governs them solely 
through his will and a single, privileged, but inferior and unconditioning subordinate. The Son is Emperor 
in an intermediate sense because he stands in a unique closeness to the will of God and therefore has 
the authority to carry out that will prior to and separate from and all other things. Then, finally, 
Constantine himself, as Eusebius soon makes clear, is Emperor because of his special closeness to the 
Son’s will and the authority he bears to directly put that will into effect in the human realm, subject to 
the larger cosmic order governed by the Son. 
Constantine’s Imperial authority as Eusebius describes it is in a striking way not merely cosmic 
but eschatological—for it comes about solely thanks to the dramatic fact of the Son’s Incarnation within 
human history. The Incarnation itself was caused, in Eusebius’ telling, by the unprecedented wickedness 
and misery of the human race amid all the creatures of the cosmos, and the result was therefore 
perfectly logical. In response to a crisis caused by human ignorance and rebelliousness, the Son made 
 
158 This statement, however, should be taken as rhetorical flattery for his audience rather than literally; in fact, as Perrone 1996, 
522-524, notes, although Eusebius seems to have started out writing for a more restricted scholarly audience, De laudibus 
Constantini forms part of a larger body of texts, including most notably his works of apologetics, connected to “Eusebius’ search 
for a wider public” (524).  
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use of a visible, corporeal human body159 as a means to communicate with his visible, corporeal subjects 
and enforce the will of God more directly on earth (e.g. 14.2).160 Apart from overcoming death and 
serving as an offering to ransom the human race and end the power of demons (15.1-15.13), it is the 
presence and victory of the Imperial Word via a human body on earth that is also responsible, in 
Eusebius’ narration, for the existence of the Roman Empire:  
Just as the saving instrument, the all-holy Body of Christ itself, was revealed as superior to all 
demonic deception and activity and foreign to all evil works and words and was exalted as a 
victorious trophy against the demons and a charm averting ancient evils, all the works of 
demons immediately were undone and there existed no more governments by place 
(τοπαρχίαι) and governments by many (πολυαρχίαι), tyrannies and democracies, and the things 
that arise because of these, devastations and sieges in cities and provinces, but one God was 
proclaimed to all. At this time also one Roman Empire appeared to all, and that implacable and 
irreconcilable enmity of the nations which is from eternity was completely abolished (16.3-4).161 
 
159 It is worth noting that in Eusebius the Incarnation is presented in what would be seen later as thoroughly “Apollinarian” 
terms—that is, denying the assumption by Christ along with a physical body of a human soul and a human nature (e.g. 14.3; a 
position asserted even more directly in De ecclesiastica theologia 1.18-20). As Eusebius argues, the Son’s making use through 
“bodyless contact” (ἀσωμάτως ἐπαφωμένη) of a human body to carry out his will is no different and no more “defiling” than 
his equally spiritual direction of the physical cosmos—both described by Eusebius via identical metaphors of sunlight imparting 
energy to things while not itself being defiled by what it touches (e.g. 12.8, 14.4) and of a person playing a lyre (e.g. 12.11, 
14.5). Eusebius even goes so far as to deny that the Word himself suffered on the Cross (15.6), arguing by analogy that the 
sunlight would not be harmed by contact with mud (14.10), nor would the player of a lyre himself suffer anything if the lyre 
were to break (14.9). For a fuller recent discussion of Eusebius’ Christology (without, however, making any use of De laudibus 
Constantini), see Spoerl and Vinzent 2017, 50-60. Spoerl 1994 plausibly argues that, though the later Christology of Apollinaris 
of Laodicea is notably anti-Arian, it was likely also developed in part as a refutation of the overtly two-personal Christology of 
Marcellus of Ancyra, and so may have been directly influenced by Eusebius’ anti-Marcellan writings. In taking this stance, 
Eusebius was directly contradicting his teacher Origen, who had clearly argued for the existence of a truly human soul in Christ 
(see De principiis 2.6), and incidentally agreeing with the expressed position of Constantine himself, who nearly a decade 
earlier, in documents aimed at attacking Eusebius of Nicomedia and Arius and asserting a rather Sabellian theology (see the 
relevant passages in Constantine’s Epistola ad Nicomedienses and Epistola ad Arium et Arianos, both discussed in section 1.4 
above), had asserted a functionally identical Christology designed to preserve God from any true contact with human 
degradation and suffering. It seems to me likely that the stance taken by Eusebius in his later works is in fact adopted from 
Constantine, and not the other way around. If all these suppositions are accurate, this would ironically make the true originator 
of the “Apollinarian heresy” not a bishop, but the Emperor Constantine. 
160 As Anatolios 2011, 65-66, notes, Eusebius’ soteriology throughout his corpus is focused entirely around the concepts of 
“benevolent rule and enlightened obedience” (66) that are “framed within the interactivity of divine and human willing” (66). In 
this, Christ is both teacher of divine knowledge and mediatory ruler who therefore “manifests and enacts the benevolent will of 
the Father as an appeal to the human will” (66). This system, it should be emphasized, functions equally as a “soteriology” of 
Imperial rule on earth, and pervasively shapes Eusebius’ portrayal of Constantine in De laudibus Constantini and Vita 
Constantini. 
161 ὡς δὲ τὸ σωτήριον ὄργανον, αὐτὸ δὴ τὸ πανάγιον τοῦ Χριστοῦ σῶμα, τὸ κρεῖττον ἁπάσης δαιμονικῆς πλάνης καὶ ἐνεργείας 
ὀφθὲν κακίας τε τῆς δι’ ἔργων καὶ λόγων ἀλλότριον, νικητήριον τρόπαιον κατὰ δαιμόνων παλαιῶν τε κακῶν ἀποτρόπαιον 
ἀνυψοῦτο, ἐλύετό τε αὐτίκα πάντα δαιμόνων ἔργα καὶ οὐκέτ’ ἦσαν τοπαρχίαι καὶ πολυαρχίαι, τυραννίδες τε καὶ δημοκρατίαι, 
αἵ τε διὰ ταῦτα συνιστάμεναι κατὰ πόλεις καὶ κατὰ χώρας δῃώσεις καὶ πολιορκίαι, ἀλλὰ θεὸς μὲν <εἷς> εἰς πάντας ἐκηρύττετο· 
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 Just as the division of political power prior to the coming of Christ, Eusebius asserts, was due to 
the work of many demons and the fundamental cosmic error of polytheism (16.2-3), so too the 
existence of one, universal Roman Empire is due to the monarchical triumph of Christ, which “destroyed 
at the same time the many governments (πολυαρχία) and the many gods (πολυθεΐα) of the demons” 
(16.6).162 Christianity and the Roman Empire, then, far from being rivals, are intrinsically inseparable 
children of the same father: “Together and at one and the same time, as from a single act of divine will, 
there grew up for men two growths of good things: the Roman Empire and the teaching of Christian 
piety” (16.4).163 These two things, Christian theology and Roman rule, not only arise from the same God 
but exist for the same purpose: the full unification of the human race under and according to the 
singular, monarchical order of the cosmos.164 That this goal, prophesied long ago as an eschatological 
fulfillment by the Hebrew prophets [cf. Psalm 72:8, Psalm 72:7, Isaiah 2:4], has now been achieved 
under the aegis of the Constantinian Empire should be completely clear to all people, who have only to 
look around them and believe the testimony of their own eyes (16-7-16.9).165 
 While the monarchical order in heaven is governed by the Emperor Word according to the will 
of the absolute eternal Emperor God, this rule is itself implemented on earth and in the human realm 
 
ἐν ταὐτῷ δὲ καὶ βασιλεία μία τοῖς πᾶσιν ἡ Ῥωμαίων ἐπήνθει, ἀνῄρητό τε ἀθρόως ἡ ἐξ αἰῶνος ἄσπειστος καὶ ἀκατάλλακτος τῶν 
ἐθνῶν ἔχθρα. 
162 τὰς τῶν δαιμόνων πολυαρχίας τε καὶ πολυθεΐας καθεῖλε 
163 ὁμοῦ τε καὶ ὑφ’ ἑνὶ καιρῷ ὥσπερ ἐξ ἑνὸς θείου νεύματος ἀνεφύοντο εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἀγαθῶν δύο βλαστοί, ἥ τε Ῥωμαίων 
ἀρχὴ καὶ ἡ εὐσεβὴς διδασκαλία. 
164 Cf. Drake 2000, 363-364. 
165 As Shepherd 1967, 69-70, rather dryly points out in regards to this passage and others like it, none of the contemporary 
realities pointed out by Eusebius as signs of the eschatological status of the Constantinian age (the erection of church buildings 
throughout the world; the presence of Christian asceticism through the Empire; the widespread teaching of Christian doctrine; 
and the harmony of people throughout the Empire in participating in Christian worship) in fact reflect innovations of the period 
of Constantine other than in degree. Yet as I will argue, for Eusebius the proof of Constantine’s eschatological importance is not 
just the novel extent of his benefactions towards the Church, but also his mere existence as universal monarch exercising 
authority under the Christian God over both Christians and non-Christians.  
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through the intermediate monarchical authority of the human Emperor Constantine: “Adorned 
(κοσμεῖν) with the image of the Imperial power (βασιλεία) of heaven, looking upward he governs and 
directs the things below according to this archetypal form, ruling by imitation of the power of 
monarchy” (3.5).166 What makes Constantine’s reign truly an imitation (μίμημα) of the cosmic monarchy 
shared in by divine Word and divine Father is precisely that it is a monarchy, a rule of one. To imitate the 
absolute monarchy of the one God among humans, Eusebius makes clear, is not just a matter of wise 
governance (since all alternatives are better defined as sheer anarchy (3.6))—it is itself a divine gift, 
something that could only have emerged among men thanks to the beneficent reign of the Word: “From 
where has the understanding of lawful Empire and Imperial authority entered into men? From where 
has autocratic power entered into one composed of flesh and blood? [...] The one pervading all things, 
the Word of God, was the one interpreter of these things. [...] From him the strength of the Imperial 
office and this unconquerable rule over all things on earth has come to man” (4.1, 4.2).167 Thanks to the 
similarity (ὁμοίωσις) to God granted to human beings by the Word, man may be defined as “the 
Imperial animal”  (βασιλικόν τὸ ζῶον), since he is “the only living thing on earth able to rule and to be 
ruled” (4.2).168 It is this capacity for monarchy, to be ruled by a single person of manifestly higher status 
in imitation of the monarchy of the Word and God in heaven, that makes man truly a creature “made in 
the image of God” (4.2, cf. Gen 1:27). 
 Eusebius acknowledges, however, that the Roman Imperial monarchy was not always as blessed 
as it is now, precisely due to the fact that, as his narrative in Historia Ecclesiastica had made clear, many 
 
166 κἄπειτα τῆς οὐρανίου βασιλείας εἰκόνι κεκοσμημένος, ἄνω βλέπων κατὰ τὴν ἀρχέτυπον ἰδέαν τοὺς κάτω διακυβερνῶν 
ἰθύνει, μονάρχου δυναστείας μιμήματι κραταιούμενος·  
167 ἐννόμου δ’ ἀρχῆς καὶ βασιλικῆς ἐξουσίας πόθεν ἀνθρώποις ὑπεισῆλθον ἔννοιαι; πόθεν αὐτοκρατορικὴ δύναμις τῷ σαρκὶ 
καὶ αἵματι πεπιλημένῳ; [...] ἀλλ’ ἦν ἄρα τούτων εἷς ἑρμηνεὺς ὁ διὰ πάντων ἥκων τοῦ θεοῦ λόγος [...] ἔνθεν ἀνθρώπῳ 
βασιλείας ἰσχὺς καὶ κράτος ἄμαχον τῶν ἐπὶ γῆς ἁπάντων 
168 μόνον τῶν ἐπὶ γῆς βασιλεύειν καὶ βασιλεύεσθαι 
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of the holders of this archetypal power, including most recently the architects of the Persecution of 
Diocletian, had themselves been rebels, by their pagan sacrifices and persecution of Christians, against 
their own cosmic superiors (5.2, 7, 9). Now, however, with the accession of Constantine, something truly 
new has taken place:  
‘The eye’ of mortals ‘has not seen, nor has ear heard’ nor has the mind clothed with flesh been 
able to comprehend ‘the things that have been prepared’ [1 Cor 2:9] for those adorned with 
piety—just as now, to you alone, Most Pious Emperor, of all those who have existed from 
eternity, has the God of all and Emperor of all granted to purify human life, and to you also he 
has revealed his saving sign (6.21).169 
To Constantine, then, in a manner far beyond any past ruler of the Roman Empire, belongs a 
special divine intimacy created, as with the Word, not only by means of monarchical power but also by 
the special revelation of the will of superior to inferior, expressed in “myriads of theophanies of the 
Savior, myriads of appearances in dreams, [and] inspirations of his which to us are unspeakable” (18.1-
2).170 It is this special relationship with the divine will that allows Constantine to direct the Roman 
Empire rightly and even to act as the teacher of sacred doctrine and piety to all of his subjects (e.g. 
9.10). While a part of this piety, Eusebius acknowledges, consists of Constantine’s rightful recognition of 
the trifling nature of his own earthly Empire in comparison to the eternal divine Empire offered by Christ 
(5.5), as well as of the “common nature” (κοινὴν [...] φύσιν) present in both him and his subjects (5.6), 
as always with Eusebius, status looms far larger than essence or nature. Constantine’s Imperial status 
means that he can rightfully take his place as a true monarch within the overall cosmic order, one who, 
like the Word (e.g. 1.6), is also a High Priest who “offers to God as a great gift himself, the first fruits of 
the cosmos which has been entrusted to him: this, the greatest sacrifice, the Emperor offers before all 
 
169 θνητῶν δ’ ὀφθαλμὸς οὐκ εἶδεν, οὐδὲ ἀκοή τις διέγνω, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ νοῦς σάρκα ἠμφιεσμένος οἷός τε ἂν εἴη διαθρῆσαι ἃ τοῖς 
εὐσεβείᾳ διακοσμησαμένοις προητοίμασται, ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ σοί, βασιλεῦ θεοσεβέστατε, ᾧ μόνῳ τῶν ἐξ αἰῶνος ἐντεῦθεν ἤδη 
τὸν ἀνθρώπειον ἀποκαθᾶραι βίον αὐτὸς ὁ τῶν ὅλων παμβασιλεὺς θεὸς ἐδωρήσατο, ᾧ καὶ τὸ αὐτοῦ σωτήριον ἀνέδειξε 
σημεῖον 
170 μυρίας τοῦ σοῦ σωτῆρος θεοφανείας, μυρίας καθ’ ὕπνους  παρουσίας [...] τὰς ἀπορρήτους ἡμῖν ὑποβολὰς αὐτοῦ 
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others” (2.5).171 Constantine’s Imperial status is in fact nothing other than an “image of the Imperial 
power above” (τῆς ἀνωτάτω βασιλείας τὴν εἰκόνα) by which Constantine “in imitation of his superior” 
(κατὰ μίμησιν τοῦ κρείττονος), the intermediate cosmic monarch Christ, “guides and directs the rudder 
of all things on the earth” (1.6).172  
Consequently, a large portion of Eusebius’ panegyric is dedicated to direct comparisons 
between the Word’s divine and Imperial status in the cosmos and the exactly similar status possessed by 
Constantine on earth.173 As the Word implements God’s rule in the cosmos, so Constantine implement’s 
the Word’s rule on earth (2.2); as the Word teaches his subjects about his Father’s Empire (2.4) and so 
saves them and allows them to enter into it (2.6), so Constantine teaches his subjects about the Word’s 
Empire (2.4) and acts as the Word’s agent in saving their souls (2.6); as the Word overcomes the 
demonic “barbarians,” so Constantine overthrows these barbarians’ worshipers (2.3, 7.13) and brings 
the human barbarians themselves into peace under the sway of the Roman Empire (7.13); and so on.  
Most relevant for the later history of the Constantinian Empire, however, is the direct analogy 
drawn by Eusebius between God and his subordinates and Constantine and his. In Historia Ecclesiastica, 
Eusebius had glorified the unique relationship between Constantine and his eldest son and sole Caesar 
Crispus; by 336, however, Crispus was long dead, having been killed in 326 by his own father under 
circumstances that remain unclear.174 The attempt to construct a clear line of succession for the Empire 
 
171 αὐτῷ καὶ μέγα δῶρον ἀνατιθεὶς αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν οὗ πεπίστευται κόσμου τὸ ἀκροθίνιον· τοῦτο δὴ μέγιστον ἱερεῖον πρὸ τῶν 
ἁπάντων καλλιερεῖ βασιλεύς. 
172 τῶν ἐπὶ γῆς ἁπάντων τοὺς οἴακας διακυβερνῶν ἰθύνει. 
173 Johnson 2014, 148-151, rightly points out the novelty and significance within the tradition of ancient panegyric of Eusebius’ 
focus on the virtues and powers of the Emperor solely with reference to their (Christian) divine exemplar, though his 
confidence that such a focus results in “a minimization of the emperor’s role in the events of Eusebius’ time” (150) or even “a 
hint of democratization” (151) strikes me as unwarranted. While the question of the practical political import of this theological 
presentation is necessarily complex, Eusebius’ presentation of the importance of the Emperor and the absoluteness of 
monarchy within the cosmos is more, not less, stark than pagan equivalents. 
174 See note 13 in section 3.2 below. 
208 
 
as a whole, based on a unique familial relationship allowing for no possibility of discord, had clearly 
failed; so in his place Constantine had appointed his three surviving sons Constantine II, Constantius II, 
and Constans, along with his nephew Dalmatius, as clearly subordinate Caesars, with greater numbers 
but greatly reduced powers. This arrangement Eusebius now undertakes to praise in rather different 
terms from the direct Father-Son analogy of the Historia Ecclesiastica. The four Caesars, directed by 
their clearly superior monarch Constantine, are like four rays, lampstands, or openings directing the light 
of the sun of Constantine himself to every region of the Empire, as well as like the four horses in a 
chariot of state driven by Constantine alone (3.3). Through these privileged subordinates, as well as 
through all his other subordinates throughout the Empire, Constantine is able, like his model the Word, 
to extend his presence and Imperial power throughout his realm (3.2), making him, like the Word, at the 
same time above all others and omnipresent: “Holding the reigns from above he drives the chariot on 
high, traversing at one and the same time every place where the sun shines; so he himself is present to 
all and sees all” (3.4).175 This picture of sole monarch surrounded by and acting through numerous 
subordinates is no longer presented by Eusebius as an analogue to the Father’s privileged relationship 
with his only Son, but rather as an image of the Word’s sharing of his power with the whole body of his 
Christian subjects: “‘And the saints of the Most High will receive the Kingdom’” [Daniel 7:18] (3.2).176 
Apart from this, there is only the general relationship of Constantine with his numerous Imperial officials 
and subordinates, analogous merely to the angels that surround the throne of God (e.g,. 3.7, 5.6). The 
cosmic chain of monarchs, it seems, ends with Constantine.177 
 
175 ἄνωθεν ὑψηλῶς ἡνιοχῶν ἐλαύνει, ὁμοῦ τὴν σύμπασαν ὅσην ἥλιος ἐφορᾷ διϊππεύων, αὐτός τε τοῖς πᾶσιν ἐπιπαρὼν καὶ τὰ 
πάντα διασκοπούμενος. 
176καὶ διαλήψονται τὴν βασιλείαν ἅγιοι ὑψίστου. 
177 As Lenski 2016, 65, notes in reference to this passage, “Eusebius blurs many boundaries here: that between emperor and 
god, between temporal rule and cosmic order, and between Christian and pagan solar theism.” Like the Father acting through 
the Son or the Son acting through his created cosmic inferiors, it is precisely “[t]hrough his dynasty”—that is, through the 
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This, however, presents at least a potential issue for Eusebius’ idealized picture of the 
Constantinian age. If Constantine no longer has a single heir and successor capable of taking his place 
and continuing to unify the human realm under a single ruler, then the peace and harmony currently 
enjoyed by the world would seem to have an expiration date, logically to be followed by more of the 
discord and civil war presented in Historia Ecclesiastica. As we will see, Eusebius would continue to 
wrestle with this problem in the years ahead; for now, the present celebrations of Constantine’s reign 
on earth are themselves only a shadow of those transpiring among the citizens of heaven, while his 
Imperial authority on earth is only a foretaste of that power which he will bear for all eternity:  
While those on earth rejoice in the flowers of divine knowledge, it would not be far from the 
mark to think that the choruses in heaven, drawn by the laws of nature, rejoice together with 
those on earth, and that he himself, the Emperor over all, like a good father celebrates together 
with his good, pious sons, and rewards the Ruler and Cause of these good things with the 
honors of many years: so that he will not confine his Imperial reign to the period of thirty years, 
but distribute and extend it past the longest and farthest age (6.2).178 
Unlike all rulers before him, Constantine will reign forever. 
2.6:  
De ecclesiastica theologia  
“On Ecclesiastical Theology” 
Eusebius’s own status remained far more open to challenge than that of his Imperial patron, and 
as a bishop of the 4th century Christian Church necessarily depended on his ability to actively counter 
and refute his opponents through theological argumentation. Contra Marcellum had been a brief volley 
against an enemy who had just been (seemingly) defeated for good, in which Eusebius had specifically (if 
 
existence of similar, but clearly inferior and dependent, agents caused by and therefore consequent to Constantine himself— 
that “Constantine has become a god unto himself, guiding his empire even as he enlightens the world.” 
178 τῶν δ’ ἐπὶ γῆς θεογνωσίας ἄνθεσι φαιδρυνομένων, οὐκ ἀπὸ σκοποῦ ἂν εἴη καὶ τὰς ἐν οὐρανῷ χορείας φύσεως νόμοις 
ἑλκομένας τοῖς ἐπὶ γῆς συγχαίρειν, αὐτόν τε τὸν ἐπὶ πάντων βασιλέα πατρὸς ἀγαθοῦ δίκην ἐφ’ υἱοῖς ἀγαθοῖς θεοσεβοῦσιν 
εὐφραίνεσθαι, καὶ ταύτῃ μάλιστα τὸν καθηγεμόνα καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν αἴτιον πολυχρονίοις γεραίρειν τιμαῖς, ὡς μὴ ἀπαρκεῖν τρεῖς 
ἐν δεκάσι περιόδους τῇ βασιλείᾳ, νέμειν δὲ αὐτὴν ἐπὶ μήκιστον καὶ εἰς μακρὸν παραπέμπειν αἰῶνα. 
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somewhat disingenuously) asserted that he had no intention of actually refuting his inferior opponent’s 
babblings other than by quoting them and letting their obvious absurdity stand (Contra Marcellum 
2.2.43). Only a few years later, however,179 Eusebius was brought to take up his pen once again to offer 
precisely that refutation, and at far greater length. Clearly, despite the dramatic fall from power of most 
of Eusebius’ opponents, Marcellus’ theology and others like it were far from eradicated among the body 
of bishops. 
In both outline and substance, the theological case made by Eusebius in De ecclesiastica 
theologia is the same as that laid out in Contra Marcellum: based on a strong separation of the 
ὑποστάσεις of Father and Son, a cosmic system of statuses, and the Son’s possession of an intermediate 
position between the one God and the cosmos at large. In De ecclesiastica theologia, however, Eusebius 
takes far greater care not just to argue the absurdity of Marcellus’ picture, but also to make his own 
theological case as nuanced, comprehensive, and logically inescapable as possible. The bulk of these 
efforts come through a wide-ranging treatment and explanation of the Scriptures, particularly those 
passages most crucial to Marcellus’ (and later Nicene authors’) case for the full divinity of the Son and 
his unity with the Father. By bringing together many different strands of Scriptural evidence and 
argumentation, Eusebius intends to show that only his theology, not that of Marcellus or his allies, can 
account for the totality of Scriptural evidence. 
In attempting to make his case foolproof and comprehensive, however, Eusebius is brought to 
break somewhat from the theology of his ally Asterius, and arguably even from that of Arius, who had 
 
179 While the date of De theologia ecclesiastica’s composition and publication is difficult to establish precisely, it must have 
been written after Contra Marcellum (which it explicitly references in its opening) and therefore after the Council of 
Constantinople in 336. Some scholars (e.g. Seibt 1993) likewise place its publication before the death of Constantine in May 337 
and therefore prior to the writing and publication of Vita Constantini. Barnes 1981, 263-264, however, (supported more 
recently by S. Parvis 2006a, 156, Spoerl and Vinzent 2017, 18) has argued for a publication date after the death of Constantine 
but before the death of Eusebius himself in 339 in response to the general amnesty for exiled bishops upon the death of 
Constantine, and therefore likely with some degree of chronological overlap with Vita Constantini. 
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died in relative disgrace in 336.180 This break comes most cogently through Eusebius’ clear rejection of 
any language of fashioning or creation, especially creation out of nothing, applied to the begetting of the 
Son from the Father (e.g. 1.9). As Eusebius acknowledges, in fundamental harmony with both earlier and 
later Nicene theologians, “one who had come into existence from nothing would not truly be Son of 
God, because he would be no different from the things that have been generated” (1.9.6).181 Marcellus 
and his allies, Eusebius acknowledges, were in fact right to find such language inappropriate and 
blasphemous when applied to the Son, and to reject interpretations of the Scripture that seemed to lead 
to such conclusions (e.g. 3.2).182 The mere fact of being called “only-begotten Son” necessitates a far 
closer relationship with God than that of creation, such that the Son is rightly referred to as God in his 
 
180 Though see the caution offered by S. Parvis 2006a, 115-116, of the evidence for a gradual effort by Arius, Eusebius of 
Nicomedia, and Asterius themselves to modify their terminology of the Son’s inferiority using the terminology and concepts of 
Eusebius of Caesarea’s noticeably more polished theology. For the differences between Eusebius’ theology and that of his allies 
Arius and Asterius, see in particular DelCogliano 2006, who highlights what he sees as the essential differences in the 
understanding of the Son as “Image of God.” While all these thinkers fundamentally agreed that the Son was not ‘the God’ but 
could be called God inasmuch as he was God’s Image, they differed in their understanding of precisely what this status as 
“Image” consisted in. For Arius and Asterius, the Son is fundamentally a created entity foreign to the οὐσία of God, who 
nonetheless participates (μετέχειν) in a preeminent and unique way in God’s essence and attributes, thus making him “the 
indistinguishable Image of God” (cf. DelCogliano 2006, 462-465); Eusebius, on the other hand, both in De ecclesiastica theologia 
and elsewhere, emphasizes the Son’s status as Image of God as actually constitutive of the Son’s being, making his entire οὐσία 
nothing other than the “appearance” (εἶδος) of the Father (see in particular Demonstratio Evangelica 5.1) and thereby granting 
him a true similarity with God that allows God to be known through him (cf. DelCogliano 2006, 471-476). However, 
DelCogliano’s summation of the differences between these two views is in my judgment somewhat stronger than the evidence 
allows. Not only does Eusebius, like Arius, make use of the concept of participation to describe the Son’s relationship with the 
essence of God (De ecclesiastica theologia 3.21.1), but by DelCogliano’s own argument (465-471), the treatment by Arius and 
Asterius of the Son as the “indistinguishable Image of God” (ἀπαράλλακτος εἰκών, cf. Asterius, frag. 10), granting him a true 
“epistemic identity” (DelCogliano 2006, 470) with the Father, is in many ways actually stronger than Eusebius’ largely 
unembellished idea of “similarity” expressed through analogies of material images. Hence, the two theologies are 
fundamentally in continuity in their basic approach to explaining the Son’s ability to be called God despite his separation and 
inferiority to the Father. 
181 ὁ γὰρ ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων γεγονὼς οὐκ [ἂν] ἀληθῶς γένοιτ’ ἂν υἱὸς θεοῦ, ὅτι μηδὲ ἄλλο τι τῶν γεννητῶν. 
182 Though as Anatolios 2011, 60-63, notes, this difference between Eusebius and his allies (as well as between Eusebius’ earlier 
and later theology) features “an underlying consistency beneath what is perhaps only a development of emphasis” (61), since 
for Eusebius, “the proper terms for construing the relation between God and everything else are not ‘divine substance’ and 
‘nothing’ but rather ‘divine power’ and ‘will’” (63). Even ordinary created things are not, in the strict sense, “from nothing” (see 
e.g. Demonstratio Evangelica 4.1) but from the divine will and power, the sole means by which God relates to and causes other 
entities, including the Son (see the discussion of this principle in section 2.4 above). While the Son’s generation is unique 
inasmuch as he shares a special closeness and immediacy with the divine will denied to other creatures fashioned through his 
own will and inasmuch as his own origination takes place prior to the creation of the totality of the cosmic and temporal order 
in an ineffable way that must be distinguished from his own active part, as mediatory craftsman, in the creation of all other 
things, the Son nonetheless shares with creatures a fundamental status as derivative, non-eternal entities caused by the 
singular divine will and power. 
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own right, just as the son of a human being is rightly called a human being (1.10.1).183 As to what it 
actually means to call the Son begotten rather than made, however, Eusebius, unlike his Nicene rivals, 
appeals simply to mystery, arguing by analogy that since God’s method of creating everything else in the 
world is ineffable and beyond human comprehension, even more so is his origination of the Son, which 
took place before the rest of the world had come into being (1.12.1-3). 
Along with these terminological concessions comes a much fuller attempt on Eusebius’ part to 
explain what it is about the Son that actually makes it right to apply the term ‘God’ to him, despite the 
fact that, in his system, he is clearly separate from and inferior to ‘the God.’ Marcellus and Eusebius’ 
other opponents had charged that this assertion logically entailed polytheism, since not only did it lead 
to two separate entities called God but also in principle allowed for other (created) beings to be 
described in just the same way. In De ecclesiastica theologia, Eusebius attempts to answer his accusers 
by explaining that the divinity of the Son is not a separate divinity of his own (which would in Eusebius’ 
judgment, as in those of his enemies, necessitate polytheism), but rather the one divinity of the Father 
overflowing into or imaged by the Son begotten (in an ineffable way clearly different from the rest of 
creation) from him (1.2). It is this fundamental fact of only one divinity, possessed by only one absolute 
and eternal God but shared in in a unique way by a single Son, that in Eusebius’ judgment preserves the 
essence of Christianity as opposed to pagan polytheism (1.12.10). As we will see, although intended by 
Eusebius himself primarily to reinforce his own (thoroughly subordinationist) theology, many of these 
 
183 As Spoerl and Vinzent 2017, 41-42, argue, Eusebius’ emphasis on this human analogy is in contradistinction to Marcellus’ 
belief that the proper title of the pre-existent Christ is the metaphysical-philosophical term “Word,” not the interpersonal-social 
term “Son,” with the Word only becoming “Son” (and king/Emperor, cf. Spoerl and Vinzent 2017, 38-40) upon his Incarnation. 
This analogy allows Eusebius to place greater emphasis on the Son’s derivative, inferior, but nonetheless properly divine nature 
in comparison to Arius and Asterius, while also emphasizing “that Father and Son [...] were distinct personal entities, just as 
human sons are distinct from their fathers” (42). Both sides of this will be clearly taken up by later Nicene authors, albeit with a 
metaphysical doctrine of nature and an ideal of interpersonal equality foreign to Eusebius’ thought. 
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basic arguments would be taken up and expanded on (in a rather different spirit) by later Nicene 
theologians.184  
For Eusebius, however, unlike later Nicene authors, monotheism is ultimately preserved not just 
by the existence of one divinity shared in by Son as well as Father, but also and more fundamentally by 
the fact that even in this participation the Son remains fundamentally separate from and inferior to the 
Father, who is thus the only one who possesses divinity in its totality and as his own: “If this makes them 
afraid lest it seems to proclaim two Gods, let them know that (as even the Son of God himself confesses 
to us) that that one alone is God, the only one without ἀρχή and unbegotten, who possesses divinity as 
his own, who has become the cause (αἴτιος) of the existence and qualities of the Son himself” 
(1.11.1).185 As in Eusebius’ thought extending back to Epistula ad Euphration, there is in the end one and 
only “one who is,” only one whose existence and will are fundamentally prior to, unconditioned by, and 
the cause of all other things. 
 
184 Though as S. Parvis 2006a, 52-55,  importantly notes, these quasi-“Nicene” aspects of Eusebius’ thought relate not only to 
later theological developments, but also to existing differences within the anti-Arius alliance during Eusebius’ own lifetime. In 
particular the theology of Alexander of Alexandria, the main leader of the alliance, whose “agreements in terminology” with 
Eusebius of Caesarea “against Marcellus are legion” (52), was not only, like Eusebius’, fundamentally Origenist in basic 
orientation, but also, despite its strident assertion of the Son’s eternity and full divinity, perfectly comfortable making use of 
language of multiple ὑποστάσεις of Son and Father, of the Son as Image of the Father, and even of the Son as mediator (in a 
drastically different sense) between God and creation. Eusebius’ choice of Marcellus as his primary polemical target is no doubt 
in part on the basis of his more extreme theology, which would be easier to attack than the more similar positions of Alexander 
and his successor Athanasius. On the other hand, as Parvis argues, “in some ways Marcellus’ theology was actually closer to 
that of Arius and Asterius,” and hence to Eusebius’, “than it was to Alexander and Athanasius’” (66), particularly in the shared 
assumption of ultimate cosmic monism such that the assertion of a first cause is held to be incompatible with any true 
begetting or causation within the Godhead—for which see also the fuller discussion of the Marcellus-Asterius conflict in Spoerl 
and Vinzent 2017, 18-33, which concludes that “Marcellus [...] builds in many ways on Asterius’ ideas” (32), as well as the 
account of Anatolios 2011, 86-92, who likewise argues that “the deeper structures of his thought shows significant affinities” 
with theologies of unity of will like those of Arius, Asterius, and Eusebius. This combination of shared metaphysical ground but 
extreme differences in final conclusions makes Marcellus in a sense the ideal interlocutor for Eusebius: “no one exposes better 
the heart of the Eusebian system than Marcellus” (S. Parvis 2006a, 66).  
185 εἰ δὲ φόβον αὐτοῖς ἐμποιεῖ, μή πη ἄρα δύο θεοὺς ἀναγορεύειν δόξαιεν, ἴστωσαν ὡς καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ πρὸς ἡμῶν 
ὁμολογουμένου θεοῦ εἷς ἂν γένοιτο θεὸς μόνος ἐκεῖνος, ὁ μόνος ἄναρχος καὶ ἀγέννητος, ὁ τὴν θεότητα οἰκείαν κεκτημένος, 
αὐτῷ τε τῷ υἱῷ τοῦ εἶναι καὶ τοῦ τοιῷδε εἶναι γεγονὼς αἴτιος· 
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In De ecclesiastica theologia, as in Contra Marcellum, the appellation of the term God to both 
Son and Father is explained through the analogy of the Son as image of the Father—which here, 
however, noticeably takes over the central position from the concept of mediation in Eusebius’ 
theological exposition.186 It is this analogy of a physical image of a human person that explains, more 
than anything else, just how the Son is able to possess the Father’s divinity within himself while 
remaining separate and inferior:  
The divine Apostle establishes this definition about Christ, saying that he is the Image of God [2 
Cor 4:3-4], so that no one may suppose that there are two Gods, but that there is one over all. 
For since ‘God is one, and there is no other beside him’ [Deuteronomy 4:35], this God himself is 
the one recognized by means of the Son as through an image. Therefore also the Son is God, 
since the appearance of the Father is in him as in an image (1.20.73).187  
It is this unique status as the living image of God, “made similar to his Father in all things” 
(2.14.21-22),188 that allows the Son, as opposed to all other beings created after him,189 to be rightly 
described and honored as God. 
This expanded idea of divine appearance and similarity in the Son as image provides at least the 
rudiments of a properly metaphysical grounding for the status-based cosmos expressed in Contra 
Marcellum. The idea of status, however, still looms large in Eusebius’ presentation, and now is 
 
186 One reason for this change in emphasis, I would suggest, apart from continuing refinements of Eusebius’ metaphysics in 
response to more sophisticated opponents, is the possibility that De ecclesiastica theologia was written after Constantine’s 
death and hence under the authority of his son Constantius, who as argued in sections 3.2-3.4 below, placed great emphasis on 
the direct blood connection between the sons of Constantine and their absent, but still supreme father as the basis for a new 
Imperial system of legitimacy. In a very real sense, and as Eusebius himself would come to assert in Vita Constantini, after 
Constantine’s death the Roman Empire was now ruled, not by one person preeminent in status over all others, but by multiple 
more or less imperfect images of the absent supreme ruler. 
187 ὁ θεῖος ἀπόστολος ὁρικὸν ἐξηνέγκατο λόγον περὶ τοῦ Χριστοῦ εἰπὼν αὐτὸν εἰκόνα τοῦ θεοῦ, ἵνα μή τις δύο θεοὺς ὑπολάβοι 
εἶναι, ἀλλ’ ἕνα τὸν ἐπὶ πάντων. εἰ γὰρ «εἷς θεός, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἕτερος πλὴν αὐτοῦ», αὐτὸς ἂν εἴη ὁ καὶ διὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ ὡς δι’ 
εἰκόνος γνωριζόμενος. διὸ καὶ ὁ υἱὸς θεός, διὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ τοῦ πατρὸς ὡς ἐν εἰκόνι μόρφωσιν. 
188 τῷ αὐτοῦ πατρὶ κατὰ πάντα ἀφωμοιωμένος. 
189 In Eusebius’ presentation this includes, notably, the Holy Spirit, who is merely the first and greatest of the class of 
ministering spirits around the throne of the Word, analogous to a privileged royal counselor and therefore included within the 
“Holy Trinity,” but certainly subordinate to the monarchical Word and not to be described as God himself (3.4-6). Cf. Johnson 
2014, 138-142, Anatolios 2011, 66-67. 
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expressed in the even more directly political and monarchical terms of De laudibus Constantini. The Son 
is now clearly a subordinate monarch and ruler who, holding an intermediate position between God and 
the world, actively carries out in the midst of the world the will of the distant, absolute monarch the 
Father (1.13.1-3, 2.17.6-7), creating and ruling and judging all things and therefore, thanks to his cosmic 
“rank” (ἀξίωμα) (2.14.15) as much as to his status as image, rightly addressed as God. Here, though, the 
picture of the relationship between absolute and intermediate monarchs is filled out in more detail 
according to the system of images found elsewhere in De ecclesiastica theologia (3.3). According to 
Eusebius the Father has spent eternity “making laws and establishing types” (3.3.50)190 within himself 
for his creation and then, finally, “after the Father has revealed his own secrets” (3.3.56)191 to the Son, 
the Son “then, like a good inscriber (γραφεύς), receiving the archetypal forms from the Father’s 
calculations, transfers them to the οὐσίαι of his works, forming and establishing them to be like the 
things which he saw beforehand stored up in the Father’s intellect” (3.3.53).192 For this reason, all 
created things can be described as “likenesses (ὁμοιώματα) produced through the Son of the archetypal 
works subsisting beforehand in the unspeakable calculations of the Father” (3.3.56),193 imperfect copies 
of divine forms crafted by a Son who is himself an imperfect image of God. The whole cosmos, then, can 
be reconstructed, not just as a series of quasi-physical statuses with God alone at the highest point, but 
also as a series of more or less similar images of the one God, the one absolute entity in himself, 
beginning with his privileged and least imperfect image the Son and extending through the imperfect 
 
190 νομοθετῶν καὶ διατυπούμενος 
191 δεικνύντος ἄρα τοῦ πατρὸς τὰ ἑαυτοῦ κρύφια 
192 εἶθ’ ὡς ἀγαθὸς γραφεὺς τὰς ἀρχετύπους ἰδέας ἐκ τῶν πατρικῶν λογισμῶν ἀπολαμβάνων ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν ἔργων μετέφερεν 
οὐσίας, τοιαῦτα ζωοπλαστῶν καὶ ὑφιστάμενος, ὁποῖα τῇ τοῦ πατρὸς διανοίᾳ προϋποκείμενα ἑώρα. 
193 ὁμοιώματα τυγχάνει τὰ πρὸς τοῦ υἱοῦ γιγνόμενα ἔργων ἀρχετύπων ἐν ἀπορρήτοις τοῦ πατρὸς λογισμοῖς προϋφισταμένων 
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copies of divine archetypes found in the rest of creation.194 In the one Empire of the cosmos, differences 
in status are grounded ultimately in greater or lesser similarity to the one Emperor. 
As quickly becomes clear, this picture of the Son as image of God has for Eusebius not only 
metaphysical but also specifically political valences. In multiple places (2.23.3, 3.21.1, 2.7.16-17), 
Eusebius compares the Father’s use of an image to make himself present in his creation with the 
(contemporary) use by the Roman Emperor of material images to make himself present to his subjects 
and allow them to honor him in absentia. This political analogy is particularly useful for Eusebius 
because it allows him to make as clear as possible, in the face of those accusing him of polytheism, that 
the Son’s status as separate, inferior world-ruler and creator in no way either threatens or divides the 
Father’s absolute monarchy and the unity of the cosmos under him:  
Just as when the image of the one ruling Emperor is carried everywhere throughout the earth 
no one prudent would say that there are two rulers, but rather one Emperor who is also 
honored through this image, in just the same way (as we have often said) also the Church of 
God, having received the tradition of piously honoring one God, continues to worship 
(προσκυνεῖν) him through the Son as through an image (2.23.3).195 
In this striking simile, the operations of the one God in the cosmos are made directly analogous 
to a central, longstanding feature of Roman Imperial rule and cult: the public and private worship of the 
Emperor by means of statues throughout the Empire. As scholars have argued, the distribution and 
ritual worship of images of the Emperor constituted by far the clearest and most pervasive sign of 
Imperial power, communicating to elites and ordinary citizens alike an essentially asymmetric 
 
194 See Johnson 2014, 124-132, for a clear discussion of the strong Neoplatonic overtones of this system, based on the 
communication of divine archetypes from a monadic first principle through hierarchically-arranged ὑποστάσεις and a Demiurgic 
creator, as well as the key differences between Eusebius’ Biblically-inflected treatment of the second and third ὑποστάσεις and 
those of Plotinus and Porphyry. 
195 ὥσπερ βασιλέως κρατοῦντος ἑνὸς εἰκόνος δὲ αὐτοῦ πανταχοῦ γῆς προφερομένης οὐκ ἄν τις σωφρονῶν δύο εἴποι τοὺς 
κρατοῦντας, ἀλλ’ ἕνα τὸν καὶ διὰ τῆς εἰκόνος τιμώμενον, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον (ὡς καὶ πολλάκις ἡμῖν εἴρηται) καὶ ἡ ἐκκλησία 
τοῦ θεοῦ ἕνα παραλαβοῦσα θεὸν σέβειν τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ διὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ, ὡς διὰ εἰκόνος, μένει προσκυνοῦσα. 
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relationship between ruler and ruled.196 During earlier persecutions of Christians, willingness to offer 
incense to such a statue had even been used as a test of (criminal) Christian status.197 Now, however, 
this quintessentially Imperial relationship is applied to the one God and his Son, making the Son’s 
inferior monarchy in a very tangible and Imperial sense an image of the Father’s: a means by which the 
distance of the one Imperial office can be maintained while at the same time allowing the ruler to be 
(indirectly) present to his subjects and so seen and honored by them. As Eusebius argues, just as 
Imperial statues allowed Roman subjects to get at least some sense of the nature, qualities, and 
appearance of their physically distant ruler, so too the presence of the similar Son in their midst allows 
Christians to get at least some sense of the qualities of their infinitely distant God:  
For as someone beholding the Imperial image, one made accurately similar to the Emperor 
himself, by receiving through this representation an impression of the outlines of his form would 
imagine the Emperor himself, in just the same way, but even more, beyond all accounting and 
beyond every example, someone with a clear mind and a purified soul and eyes enlightened by 
the Holy Spirit who had gazed steadily at and contemplated the greatness of the power of the 
Only-Begotten Son and Lord, [...] and who had considered that the Father begot him alone as 
Only-Begotten Son, the one made similar to him in all things, by this power will see the Father 
himself through the Son (3.21.1).198  
 The Son, and the intermediate monarchical power over the universe possessed by him, is thus 
absolutely essential for knowledge of God, the indispensable means by which the existence of the 
Father’s own absolute and so distant and invisible (2.17.6) monarchical power is made visible to his 
 
196 See e.g. Weisweiler 2012 (cf. Weisweiler 2015), who argues that the presence and ritual use of Imperial images in Rome 
constituted “an epiphany of Imperial power” (349) designed to underscore a fundamental “status asymmetry” (321) between 
Roman aristocrats and their Emperor, and the means by which the Emperor “presented himself no longer as a peer of senators, 
but as their divine master” (349). 
197 See in particular Pliny, Epistulae 10.96-97, c. AD 111-113, where the governor of Bithynia requires those accused of the 
crime of Christianity to offer wine and incense and perform proskynesis to a statue of the reigning Emperor, and which seems 
to have played an important role in establishing Imperial and legal precedent for the practice.  
198 ὡς γὰρ καὶ ὁ τὴν βασιλικὴν εἰκόνα τὴν ἐπ’ ἀκριβὲς ἀφωμοιωμένην αὐτῷ τεθεαμένος τοὺς τῆς μορφῆς τύπους διὰ τῆς 
γραφῆς ἀποματτόμενος φαντασιοῦται τὸν βασιλέα, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον μᾶλλον δ’ ὑπὲρ πάντα λόγον παντός τε ἐπέκεινα 
παραδείγματος ὁ νῷ διαυγεῖ καὶ ψυχῆς κεκαθαρμένοις ἁγίῳ τε πνεύματι πεφωτισμένοις ὄμμασιν τῷ τε μεγέθει τῆς τοῦ 
μονογενοῦς υἱοῦ καὶ κυρίου δυνάμεως ἐνατενίσας καὶ ἐννοήσας, [...] λογισάμενός τε ὡς μόνον αὐτὸν υἱὸν μονογενῆ ἐγέννα ὁ 
πατὴρ κατὰ πάντα ἀφωμοιωμένον αὐτῷ, δυνάμει καὶ αὐτὸν ὄψεται τὸν πατέρα διὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ[.] 
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subjects. It is through this medium that the Father’s subjects are able, not only to know that he exists 
and is their ruler, but also to offer him the honor that is his due, all without threatening his own 
supreme and isolated status. Marcellus (like later Nicene thinkers) had charged Eusebius and his allies 
with idolatry precisely because in their system there would be two separate beings called God, both of 
whom were honored by Christians with public divine worship. For Eusebius, however, the fact that 
Father and Son are paid similar honors in no way threatens, but rather reinforces, monotheism and the 
absolute supremacy of the Father: “For just as by honoring the image of an Emperor that has been sent 
out by him we honor the prototype, the Emperor himself, in just the same way the Father is honored 
through the Son, since he is seen through him” (2.7.16-17).199 This divine honor, paid to an entity who is 
not ‘the God,’ is not idolatry—precisely because the Son, despite his separate divine and monarchical 
status, is nothing more than a clearly inferior copy of the real thing, with no purpose other than to point 
to and signify his own archetype. Every honor paid to the Son is ultimately referred, not to the Son 
himself as inferior image, but simply and solely to God. Because of this, Eusebius argues, the absolute 
supremacy and isolation of the eternal Father is in no way threatened by the existence of the Son, his 
“greatest and most valuable possession” (3.2.21).200 The Son is, rather, the indispensable means by 
which that monarchical isolation is at once reinforced and gratified. In a striking simile, Eusebius 
imagines the Father, after the non-eternal (e.g. 2.12.2) Son has come into being but before the Son has 
crafted all other things, as taking pleasure in the Son, his “Beloved”  (e.g. 1.20.85), in a way that is in the 
most literal sense entirely self-centered: “Before the cosmos came into existence, the Father rejoiced, 
looking from afar on him, his Only-Begotten Son, and seeing as in a mirror his own self in him, as in his 
 
199 ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ βασιλέως καταπεμφθεῖσαν εἰκόνα τιμῶντες τὸ πρωτότυπον τῆς εἰκόνος αὐτὸν ἂν τιμήσαιμεν τὸν βασιλέα, 
τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὁ πατὴρ ἂν εἴη διὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ τιμώμενος, ὡς καὶ δι’ αὐτοῦ ὁρώμενος. 
200 τὸ μέγιστον καὶ τιμιώτατον κτῆμα. 
219 
 
Image” (3.3.57).201 The one God gazes from a great distance on his Son, and sees only himself, and so 
remains alone. 
This analogy of the Imperial image is also used by Eusebius in De ecclesiastica theologia, in a 
rather startling way, to describe not the presence of God in the Word, but rather the presence of the 
Word himself, through the Incarnation, in his human body on earth. Even before the Incarnation, 
Eusebius asserts, the Son had been responsible for all the appearances of God in the Old Testament—
not in this way being deceptive by claiming to be the one and only God rather than his inferior agent, 
but rather acting and speaking as the Image of God and therefore in the person of his own superior 
(2.20-22).202 As the culmination of this process of divine action, the Incarnation is treated by Eusebius as 
a theophany and (implicitly) as an Imperial adventus, announced beforehand through the prophets like 
heralds (1.13.4-5). Even this event, however, is carried out not in person, so to speak, but rather in such 
a way that “he himself, the Only-Begotten Son of God, was present as in a divine statue, the instrument 
of his body” (1.13.5-6).203 As the Father made himself present in his lower domain, the created cosmos, 
by means of the Son as a separate and inferior image of himself, the Son makes himself present in his 
lower domain, the human realm, in and through a lowly human body. As though to underscore the 
analogy, Eusebius goes so far in De ecclesiastica theologia as to present, in addition to the by-then-
traditional Trinity of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, also a rather more novel “Trinity” consisting of 
separate and superior Father, separate and inferior Son, and, finally, the separate and inferior human 
body of Christ which had acted and suffered on earth (1.6.1). The analogy between the three terms of 
 
201 ἔχαιρέν τε ὁ πατὴρ πρὶν ἢ καὶ τὸν κόσμον γενέσθαι, εἰς αὐτὸν ἀφορῶν τὸν ἑαυτοῦ μονογενῆ υἱὸν καὶ ὥσπερ ἐν εἰκόνι 
ἑαυτὸν ἐνοπτριζόμενος ἐν αὐτῷ· 
202 As Johnson 2014, 60, notes, this interpretation has for Eusebius not only theological but also social valence, as it “provided 
carefully nuanced interpretative distinctions that were useful for maintaining a critical stance towards the Jews while 
nonetheless claiming their Scriptures as authoritative.” 
203 αὐτός τε ἦν ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ μονογενὴς υἱὸς ὡς ἐν ἀγάλματι θείῳ, τῷ τοῦ σώματος ὀργάνῳ, τῷ τῶν ἀνθρώπων καθομιλῶν γένει 
διδασκαλίαις, θεραπείαις, ἐνθέου σοφίας ἀπορρήτοις παιδεύμασιν. 
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this Trinity and their interrelationships is intended by Eusebius to be very close indeed: “Neither was the 
body which he assumed the same thing as the Son of God who assumed it, nor should the Son of God be 
considered one and the same with the one who begot him” (1.6.2).204 As for those who for any reason 
refuse to confess the separation of all three of these terms, and therefore the inferiorities and distances 
out of which the cosmos itself is constructed, Eusebius’ recommendation is blunt: “Let them be made 
outcasts thrown completely out of the Church” (1.6.2).205 Such people are as foolish as those who would 
take a statue of the Emperor for the Emperor himself, or charge a subject with disloyalty for paying 
homage to an image rather than to the distant and inaccessible ruler himself. 
The central claim of De ecclesiastica theologia, then, is that all206 of the evidence from the 
Scriptures, however strident in its declaration of God’s sole divinity or the Son’s divine status and glory, 
can be accounted for by means of this system—a system in which, in all parts of the cosmos, an inferior, 
through its status as a similar image with special access to its superior’s will, can be described as, speak, 
 
204 ἀλλ’ οὔτε ὃ ἀνείληφεν σῶμα ταὐτὸν ἦν τῷ ἀνειληφότι υἱῷ τοῦ θεοῦ, οὔτε αὐτὸς ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ εἷς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἂν 
νομισθείη τῷ γεγεννηκότι. 
205 ἐκποδών ποιούμενοι τῆς ἐκκλησίας εἶεν ἂν ἀπόβλητοι 
206 The only (partial) exception to this rule that Eusebius himself acknowledges are the direct assertions of the absolute 
singularity of God and prohibitions on worship of any other contained in the Old Testament and especially the Torah 
(Deuteronomy 4:35, 4:39, 6:4-5, 32:39, Exodus 3:15, 20:5, Baruch 3:36-38, Isaiah 41:4, 43:10-11, 44:6, 45:14-15, 45:21, 46:8-9, 
Hosea 13:4, Malachi 2:10, Psalm 80:8-10); to the citation of these by Marcellus, Eusebius responds not just with the claim that 
in these passages the Father was himself speaking in and through his mediator-interpreter-Image the Son (e.g. 2.21.10, 2.22.1), 
but also with furious anti-Jewish polemic that declares the Torah to be an imperfect and incomplete revelation for a morally 
perverse people tempted by pagan polytheism (2.20). Similarly, Eusebius accuses Marcellus and all like him of being Jews in 
their exaggerated fear of polytheism and denial of the separate existence of the Son (1.4, 1.7.2, 2.2.1, 2.2.5, 2.18.7, 2.22.5, 
2.25.2) and in fact worse than Jews since they at least acknowledge the unity of the one God and his separation from the 
human Messiah while Marcellus attempts to divide the one God into Father and Son (1.5.2). As Kofsky 1996, 70-83 (cf. Johnson 
2014, 65-66), notes, this is related to a larger effort in Eusebius’ works to distinguish the pure ancient Hebrew traditions 
inherited by Christianity from the perverse “Jewish” legacy marked by corruption by Egyptian polytheism and the extreme 
(failed) corrective of the Law of Moses. Kofsky 1996, esp. 63-70, also argues that this feature of Eusebius’ thought is largely 
absent from his Biblical commentaries, where positive firsthand contacts with Jewish scholars in the relatively tolerant 
atmosphere of Caesarea are mentioned, and seems to have emerged in the context of his larger apologetic projects 
(particularly the Demonstratio Evangelica) aimed at defending Christianity from pagan and Jewish charges. In my judgment, 
however, the connection between Eusebius’ theological and factional conflicts and the clear emergence of anti-Jewish polemic 
(stronger here and in Contra Marcellum than at almost any other point within Eusebius’ corpus) as a distinct strand of his 
thought is notable and likely decisive. As we will see, some later Nicene authors, particularly Lucifer of Cagliari (see in particular 
note 72 in section 5.3 below), would paint a very different picture of the relations between the Hebrew Scriptures, the Law, and 
present-day Christianity on the basis of their more univocal treatment of Christian and Jewish monotheism. 
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and act in the place of that superior. The only conceivable alternative, as Eusebius lays it out, to this 
comprehensive explanation of the Scriptural evidence, political authority, and the cosmos as a whole 
would be the one thing that Eusebius absolutely denies is either logically possible or politically desirable: 
the existence of two persons who are not only similar, but actually equal, in status, essence, honor, and 
glory. 
Therefore it is necessary to understand that the Church of God does not proclaim two Gods: for 
it does not introduce two unbegottens or two without ἀρχή, as I have often said, nor two 
οὐσίαι207 that, because they are equal in honor (ἐξ ἰσοτιμίας), are set in rivalry with one 
another, but it teaches that the one ἀρχή and God is also himself Father of the Only-Begotten 
and Beloved Son, and that likewise this one is the one Image “of ‘the God’ who is invisible” 
[Colossians 1:15] (2.23.1).208 
This denial is as much political as metaphysical.209 As Eusebius had asserted in Historia 
Ecclesiastica, any system in which multiple persons share in one and the same equal (Imperial) rank will 
inevitably end in dissension and civil war. That the cosmos could be ultimately governed in such a way, 
with multiple equal persons rivaling one another rather than a clear superiority of one over all others, is 
simply inconceivable. The Father alone is without cause and without ruler; he has begotten (not in 
eternity, but before all things) the Son, and has therefore become his ἀρχή—a word, as discussed above 
in section 1.5, with multiple inextricable valences, both metaphysically an “origin” or “principle” but also 
 
207 This is the clearest indication in the text of De ecclesiastica theologia itself (and is cited as such) that the admittedly 
speculative thesis of Spoerl and Vinzent 2017, 43-44, that Eusebius in this late work (in clear contrast to his pre-Nicene 
theology) “promotes a semantic shift in the connotation of the term” οὐσία in distinction to ὑπόστασις, thus laying the 
groundwork for later Nicene uses, is incorrect. While ὑπόστασις is clearly Eusebius’ preferred term in De ecclesiastica theologia 
itself, Spoerl and Vinzent fail to note that Eusebius had in De laudibus Constantini as little as a year before clearly asserted the 
existence of separate (and cosmically distanced) οὐσίαι for Son and Father (see e.g. 11.12, 12.6, as well as the general 
discussion in section 2.4 above), so that it is extremely unlikely that any such semantic shift has actually taken place. 
208 δέον ἐντεῦθεν συνεῖναι ὡς οὐ δύο θεοὺς ἡ ἐκκλησία τοῦ θεοῦ κηρύττει· οὐ γὰρ δύο ἀγέννητα οὐδὲ δύο ἄναρχα, ὡς 
πολλάκις ἡμῖν εἴρηται, οὐδὲ δύο οὐσίας ἐξ ἰσοτιμίας ἀντιπαρεξαγομένας ἀλλήλαις εἰσάγει, διὸ οὐδὲ δύο θεούς, ἀλλὰ μίαν 
ἀρχὴν καὶ θεὸν καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν πατέρα διδάσκουσα εἶναι τοῦ μονογενοῦς καὶ ἀγαπητοῦ υἱοῦ, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ μίαν εἰκόνα «τοῦ 
θεοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου». 
209 It should be clear, then, that I dissent from the view of Johnson 2014, 145, that Eusebius, in his theological works from later 
in Constantine’s reign, evinces “a remarkable minimization of Imperial matters.” While the general absence of explicit 
references to the Roman Empire is unremarkable in abstract theological discussions that rarely stray below the divine and 
noetic realms, Eusebius’ theological thought remains pervasively inextricable from social and political considerations. 
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politically a “sovereignty” or even an “empire”;210 and accordingly the Son can be, in the final balance, 
nothing but the clear inferior, in honor, status, power, divinity and every other quality, of his Father. On 
this set of connected assertions Eusebius’ theology and politics alike stand or fall. 
2.7:  
Vita Constantini 
“Life of Constantine” 
This theology had by the end of Eusebius’ life become increasingly inextricable from not only the 
general Roman Imperial system, but also the specific person of the Roman Emperor Constantine.211 With 
the death of the first Christian Emperor in May 337,212 Eusebius once again set himself the task of 
composing, in the form of a biography rather than a panegyric this time,213 a political and theological 
interpretation of Constantine’s life and times. 
 
210 Cf. Brill Dictionary of Ancient Greek 310.  
211 Here the general challenge offered by Johnson 2014 against the scholarly trend that would see in Eusebius’ Imperial works 
nothing but the “fawning flattery and uncritical acceptance” (151) of a “court theologian” (146) is very helpful. As I have argued, 
Eusebius’ treatment of politics in general and Constantine in particular can and should be read as a consistent, developed 
outgrowth of his fundamental theological and social principles, not a slavish echo of Constantinian propaganda. In the complex 
relationship between bishop and Emperor, Eusebius is far more an active and at times dominating interpreter than a passive 
tool.  
212 The surviving text of Vita Constantini must date after not only the death of Constantine in May 337, but also the 
appointment of his three sons as Augusti in September of that same year. Other than that, however, there are few 
chronological indications available other than the death of Eusebius himself in 339. While it is possible that the gathering of 
documentary evidence for the work and possibly even earlier stages of composition took place prior to the death of 
Constantine (see e.g. Drake 1988, Barnes 1989, 113, Pietri 2013, 20), the very nature of the work, in its final form aimed 
explicitly at asserting the total continuity of religious and political power following Constantine’s death, makes this hypothesis 
in my judgment a particularly fraught one to prove or draw conclusions from.  
213 Though as Perrone 1996, 520, notes (cf. Pietri 2013, 59-65), Eusebius himself chose to publish Vita Constantini together with 
his own panegyrics while deliberately hearkening back to (and at times outright repeating passages from) the ending of his 
earlier Historia Ecclesiastica, thus deliberately blurring the generic lines between biography, panegyric, and history and so 
“unit[ing] different genres into a new creation of Christian literature” (526). As Johnson 2014, 156-157, notes, however, the 
origins of the ancient genre of biography seem to have been in funeral eulogies, making Vita Constantini in some ways a return 
to form for a genre that had since grown more realistic and critical in its search for positive and negative moral exemplars, 
while, as Cameron 1997, 151-152, 164-165, 169-172, notes (cf. Pietri 2013, 65), also looking ahead to the combination of 
rhetorical encomia with more historical and biographical elements in the Christian genre of hagiography. The generic 
strangeness of Vita Constantini has also been used as the basis for a thesis (originated by Pasquali 1910, and argued for more 
recently by e.g. Barnes 1989, 1994) that the current text of Vita Constantini represents an incomplete melding, still capable of 
being cleanly separated passage-by-passage, of two different original texts, one a straightforward Imperial panegyric on 
Constantine’s death and the other “something daringly original, which hovers between ecclesiastical history and hagiography” 
(Barnes 1989, 116) and perhaps intended originally as a continuation of Historia Ecclesiastica (113). The assumptions underlying 
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The resulting document has long puzzled scholars, particularly those of a more directly historical 
bent. What is one to make of a biography that openly declares, in its first sections, that its dead subject 
is still alive? To attempt to discern, in the context of a work situated entirely within Eusebius’ political 
and theological project—grown to its full dimensions over decades of scholarly and ecclesiastical activity 
and now applied pervasively to the exposition of all the events and persons of Constantine’s lifetime—
the actual historical “facts” of Constantine’s reign is, to say the least, no easy task.214 For those 
interested in that project in itself, though, Vita Constantini forms an essential conclusion to Eusebius of 
Caesarea’s political-theological corpus. 
Eusebius’ portrayal of the person and activities of Constantine, I would clearly assert, is drawn as 
much from the portrait of the ideal Father-Son, absolute monarch-subordinate monarch model of De 
laudibus Constantini and De ecclesiastica theologia as from any historical source.215 Born of a pious 
Imperial father (e.g. 1.13, 1.16-18) and a mother, in Eusebius’ telling, directly analogous to the Virgin 
Mary (3.41-3.47),216 from the very beginning of his life, far before his conversion to Christianity, 
 
this thesis are in my judgment more than ably refuted by Cameron 1997, while Pietri 2013, 15-20, has recently demonstrated 
the weakness of the textual arguments and argued rather for “l’unité de composition” (20) of the work, the generic features of 
which vary logically according to the subject being covered (58-65). Cameron 1983, 82-87, presents in my judgment the best 
summation of the novel generic qualities of Vita Constantini in its panegyric focus on Constantine’s religious character, its 
biographical form of a life laid out chronologically, and its strongly religious and indeed Christian emphasis on exclusive divine 
“signs” of Constantine’s piety and divine favor paired with historical verifications through documentary and eyewitness 
evidence. In particular I fundamentally agree with her assertion that the origins of the work’s generic strangeness must be 
sought less in any purported process of composition than in Eusebius’ fully developed political-theological system, such that 
“the form of the presentation [...] is necessitated by Eusebius’ conception of Constantine” (85) and “Eusebius was literally 
forced to ‘rethink history,’ simply because in his scheme of things history had changed with the coming to power of 
Constantine” (87). 
214 Cf. Cameron 1983, 72: “For most have been interested first in Constantine, and only second in Eusebius, whom they treat 
mainly as a ‘source.’ Signs of rewriting or evident selectivity condemn him to charges of dishonesty; individual passages become 
battlegrounds. For if Eusebius can be upheld or discredited, Constantine can be reinterpreted.”  
215 Cameron 1997, 152-153, is in my view correct to assert the specifically apologetic nature and purpose of Vita Constantini, in 
continuity with Eusebius’ past apologia for the Christian religion but now aiming in a more explicitly political way “to defend 
Constantine, present all his actions and motives in the best possible light[,] and to claim and commend the continuation of his 
policies” (152). As Cameron clarifies, however, Eusebius’ text “is a work of persuasion and apologetic through and through, but 
it is not necessarily for that reason deliberately fraudulent” (154). 
216 Eusebius’ praise of Helena (3.41-3.47) comes in the context of a description of Constantine’s endowment of the holy sites of 
the Ascension and the Nativity, the place where Christ “undertook the things of birth in flesh” (3.41). Constantine undertook 
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Constantine possessed a special relationship with his divine superior. Although like his ancient exemplar 
Moses217 largely brought up at the court of tyrants responsible for the persecution of the people of God, 
from a young age, Eusebius asserts, “his good nature (φύσις), along with the divine Spirit, drew him 
from that time toward piety and a life favored by God” (1.12.3).218 As an illustration of Constantine’s 
extraordinary nature, Eusebius offers a personal reminiscence of a journey of Constantine’s through 
Palestine together with his father, where the young prince “offered even at that time signs of his 
Imperial character” (1.19.1-2),219 including both the fact that “in the beauty of the appearance of his 
body and the greatness of his stature there was none other to compare with him, and in the power of 
his physical strength he surpassed those of the same age so much that he was the cause of fear to 
them” (1.19.2)220 and the deeper reality of his “excelling others to an extraordinary degree in the culture 
 
this monumental effort, we are told, “in order to immortalize his mother” (3.42)—a mother that at first seems to be to the 
mother of Jesus but is immediately revealed to be instead the mother of Constantine and a remarkable figure in her own right, 
who both seemed to ascend into heaven upon her mortal death (3.46) and is ultimately worthy to be honored and 
immortalized precisely “because of the extraordinary and incredible offspring born from her” (εἵνεκα [...] τοῦ τ’ ἐξ αὐτῆς 
φύντος ὑπερφυοῦς καὶ παραδόξου φυτοῦ) (3.47). Though the analogy is implicit, it is clear in my judgment that it is intended 
by Eusebius. This prominent role for Helena, drawn from Constantine’s own public glorification of his lower-status mother, 
whom his father had divorced to make room for a more appropriate dynastic wife, is at least somewhat in tension with 
Eusebius’ general political theology, which stressed a completely sovereign and singular origination of inferior Son from Father 
in heaven and granted to Mary only the origination of a soul-less human body, not Christ or the Son himself (see note 159 in 
section 2.5 above).  
217 See Johnson 2014, 160-162, for a discussion of the numerous analogies between Constantine and Moses, both explicit and 
more speculative, in Vita Constantini, likewise Cameron 1997, 158-161, who also notes the apologetic appropriateness of 
Eusebius’ choice of Moses as sole Old Testament exemplar for Constantine, since he was a figure widely known and even 
praised among pagan philosophical authors. Rapp 1998 also points out Moses’ use throughout Late Antiquity as a primary 
exemplar for bishops and its connection with Eusebius’ portrayal of Constantine in quasi-priestly and episcopal terms, while 
Pietri 2013, 103-111, adds to this by asserting a number of deliberate connections between Constantine and not only Moses, 
but also the Apostle Paul, perhaps the principal Late Antique Christian model for a bishop. 
218 εἷλκε γὰρ αὐτὸν ἐξ ἐκείνου θείῳ σὺν πνεύματι φύσις ἀγαθὴ πρὸς τὸν εὐσεβῆ καὶ θεῷ κεχαρισμένον βίον. 
219 βασιλικοῦ φρονήματος ἐξ ἐκείνου τεκμήρια παρέχων. 
220 σώματος μὲν γὰρ εἰς κάλλους ὥραν μέγεθός τε ἡλικίας οὐδ’ ἦν αὐτῷ παραβαλεῖν ἕτερον, ῥώμῃ δ’ ἰσχύος τοσοῦτον 
ἐπλεονέκτει τοὺς ὁμήλικας ὡς καὶ φοβερὸν αὐτοῖς εἶναι. 
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and learning of his discourses and in God-given wisdom” (1.19.2).221 Even prior to his accession, 
Constantine had no true equals. 
All of this, however, is only prelude and preparation for the central event, in Eusebius’ telling, of 
both Constantine’s life and the history of the Roman Empire: the direct appointment of Constantine by 
God to sole Imperial power. 
In this way the God of all, the Presider (πρύτανις) over the whole cosmos, through his own self 
chose Constantine, who had been born of such a father, as Leader (ἄρχων) and Ruler 
(καθηγεμών),222 in such a way that, while all others were considered worthy of this honor by the 
judgment of other persons, of this man alone could no one among human persons boast of 
having taken part in his promotion (1.24).223 
Even among Emperors, then, Constantine is unique, and unique precisely in his possession of a 
more direct and intimate connection with the will of his superior, who has not only personally appointed 
him to his position but also favored him with visions, dreams, and divine power. Here, it should be 
emphasized, Eusebius’ account of Constantine’s conversion to Christianity comes only in the context of a 
larger recounting of divine favors to an Emperor already, well prior to his change in affiliation, possessed 
 
221 παιδεύσει λόγων φρονήσει τ’ ἐμφύτῳ καὶ τῇ θεοσδότῳ σοφίᾳ διαφερόντως ἐκπρέπων. 
222 Eusebius here seems to deliberately create a certain slippage between the titles and statuses of Father, Son, and 
Constantine. In De laudibus Constantini, the Son is given the unique title of “Ruler (καθηγεμών) of the whole cosmos,” a title 
that here is divided between Constantine and God. Even who “God” refers to here is somewhat ambiguous, since Eusebius 
omits the definite article that elsewhere serves as the unique designation of the Father in comparison to the Son and assigns 
him a title more reminiscent of that used of the Son elsewhere (e.g. De ecclesiastica theologia 3.2.25), emphasizing his 
connection to the cosmos rather than his separation from it. Making the designation even more ambiguous, the term πρύτανις 
is not used by Eusebius as a proper title of God or Imperial power other than in Vita Constantini. Finally, while the title ὁ τῶν 
ὅλων θεὸς is most commonly in Eusebius a title reserved for God the Father alone (e.g. De ecclesiastica theologia 1.20.15), he 
also refers to the Son by the same title, absent only the definite article, in his later theology (e.g. De ecclesiastica theologia 
1.9.3). Furthermore, the placement of τῶν ὅλων between καθηγεμόνα and θεὸς renders it at least initially ambiguous whether 
this supremacy is being assigned to God or Constantine—while rulership and sovereignty over τῶν ὅλων is overwhelmingly 
assigned to Father and Son in Eusebius’ corpus, De laudibus Constantini does at one point seem to treat ἄρχων καὶ τῶν ὅλων 
κύριος (5.3) as a reasonable title for the Emperor in imitation of his divine models. All this, I would argue, is reflective of the 
mature Eusebian emphasis on the intimate connection between different levels of the singular divine monarchy. According to 
the system established by Eusebius in De ecclesiastica theologia the appointment of Constantine by God could only have been 
carried out by means of the similar divine monarch the Son, and as argued in De laudibus Constantini the universal rule 
assumed by Constantine is comprehensible only as a reflection and means of the cosmic kingship of Son and Father.  
223 Οὕτω δὴ Κωνσταντῖνον, τοιούτου φύντα πατρός, ἄρχοντα καὶ καθηγεμόνα τῶν ὅλων θεὸς ὁ τοῦ σύμπαντος κόσμου 
πρύτανις δι’ ἑαυτοῦ προεχειρίζετο, ὡς μηδένα ἀνθρώπων μόνου τοῦδε τὴν προαγωγὴν αὐχῆσαι, τῶν ἄλλων ἐξ ἐπικρίσεως 
ἑτέρων τῆς τιμῆς ἠξιωμένων. 
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of an innate piety and a special relationship with God. It is, in fact, precisely on the basis of that existing 
relationship that Constantine, prior to his joining in battle with his pagan rivals, engages in a lengthy 
religious and philosophical deliberation (1.27) and finally decides to actively implore help and revelation 
from, not the God of the Christians or divinity in general, but rather “the God inherited from his father” 
(1.27.3),224 a God usually identified with the monotheizing Imperial cult of Sol Invictus.225 Constantine’s 
reasoning, made possible, we have already been told, thanks to the preeminent God-given wisdom 
already imparted to him as a young Imperial protegee (1.19.2) leads to a direct appeal, on the basis of 
the inborn piety also imparted by the divine spirit (1.12.3), from Emperor to patron deity—which, 
naturally, is immediately heard and answered.  
Constantine, according to Eusebius, would later recount precisely what took place to his favored 
bishop, a set of events that in this retelling is totally consistent with Eusebius’ mature theological and 
political viewpoint. 226 First, Constantine, along with his whole army, was granted a public vision of a 
cross superimposed on the sun together with the words “in this sign you will conquer” (1.28); following 
this public revelation comes a dream, a far more exclusive and intimate form of divine communication, 
in which Constantine’s cosmic superior Christ appears to the Emperor and directly gives to him alone the 
command to fashion an image of his divine sign and employ it in battle (1.29); then Constantine, having 
like the cosmic Son in De ecclesiastica theologia received within himself the divine archetype of his 
superior’s will, reveals that will to his own servants and sees to the physical imprinting of the archetype 
 
224 τὸν δὲ πατρῷον [...] θεόν. 
225 Surviving sources make it clear both that each of the four original Tetrarchs were publicly associated with a tutelary deity 
and that Constantius I’s was Sol Invictus/Apollo (see note 17 in section 1.1 above). This dynastic association was continued by 
Constantine in his own public propaganda during the early part of his reign (see note 22 in section 1.1 above). 
226 For recent scholarly discussions of this famous “vision of Constantine” and associated historical issues, see e.g. Drake 2000, 
178-191, Pietri 2013, 67-77, Barnes 2011, 74-80. As Barnes in particular notes, it is possible (and given Constantine’s proclivities 
even likely) that Constantine’s recounting of this narrative to Eusebius took place, not in private (as has sometimes been 
assumed), but in a public address such as Oratio ad Coetum Sanctorum. 
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onto matter (1.30).227 The resulting object, a material image in imitation of a divine symbol, will go on to 
be the source of miracles and the unfailing cause of Constantine’s victory, not only in this battle (1.38), 
but in many campaigns to come throughout the entirety of his reign (e.g. 2.6-2.9, 4.5).228  
It is only at this point, after Constantine himself has received and effected the divine will 
according to his own lights, that Christianity enters the account at all—as Constantine’s consultation 
with Christian clerics, carried out on his own initiative thanks to the information provided by his vision, 
allows him to identify the cosmic superior in question as Christ and the divine sign as the “symbol of 
immortality and trophy of his victory over death” (1.32.2).229 Even here, though, Constantine remains 
fully in control of the process, thanks to the same God-given wisdom present in his earlier deliberations: 
“Having compared the heavenly vision with the interpretation of what had been said he confirmed this 
understanding, having been persuaded that the knowledge of these things had been taught to him by 
God (1.32.3).”230 Having been supplied by them with new information about his cosmic superior’s 
sojourn on earth in the form of Christ, Constantine attaches Christian clerics to him as advisers and 
devotes himself to the personal study of the Christian Scriptures (1.32.3), but otherwise remains as he 
was before: the privileged recipient of exclusive revelations of the divine will.  
 
227 Eusebius’s description of Constantine’s overseeing the fashioning of his standard is intended to evoke the Biblical 
descriptions of Moses’ presiding over the fashioning of the Ark of the Covenant and associated implements of divine worship 
based on archetypes and detailed descriptions revealed to him directly by God on Mount Sinai (Exodus 25-31, 35-40, cf. 
Cameron and Hall 1999, 209). Constantine himself will later be described as offering intimate divine worship to God in a tent on 
the battlefield in a manner reminiscent of Moses’ tabernacle, the site of exclusive revelations of God (2.14, cf. e.g. Johnson 
2014, 160). 
228 As Drake 2000, 201-204, notes, this object, the so-called labarum, a military standard with additional Constantinian images 
and symbols, would go on to play a significant role in Constantine’s visual program, though there is some debate in modern 
scholarship over precisely what the symbols on the standard were intended and/or popularly interpreted to mean. For an 
excellent summary of the multiple valences of the labarum and its associated symbols, see Lenski 2016, 9-12. 
229 σύμβολον μὲν ἀθανασίας εἶναι, τρόπαιον δ’ ὑπάρχειν τῆς κατὰ τοῦ θανάτου νίκης. 
230 συμβάλλων τε τὴν οὐράνιον ὄψιν τῇ τῶν λεγομένων ἑρμηνείᾳ τὴν διάνοιαν ἐστηρίζετο, θεοδίδακτον αὐτῷ τὴν τούτων 
γνῶσιν παρεῖναι πειθόμενος. 
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This is a picture of the conversion of a ruler that, as we will see, could not be more different 
from that found in later Nicene authors such as Hilary of Poitiers and Lucifer of Cagliari, who focus 
instead on the ignorant and incompetent Emperor’s need to be passively taught the truth by Christian 
clerics and then baptized at their hands. In Eusebius’ model, in contrast, the Emperor Constantine not 
only takes the initiative at every step in his own conversion, but continues to take the leading role in all 
interactions with the Church and bishops throughout his reign, despite having failed to submit to 
baptism until the end of his life.  
In this regard, Eusebius’ account of the Council of Nicaea and its aftermath is extremely 
instructive. The initial conflicts of the Arian controversy are described, like the ecclesiastical conflicts 
prior to the Persecution of Diocletian and like that Persecution itself, as a civil war inspired by the envy 
of the Devil towards the prosperity of the Church (2.61). Originating in Egypt and Alexandria, this conflict 
quickly spread throughout the Empire, leading to a state of anarchy in which not only did bishops 
oppose bishops, but “peoples rose up against peoples” (3.4),231 and, most shocking of all, “because they 
were out of their minds and in despair they even undertook unholy deeds and dared to abuse the 
images (εἰκόνες) of the Emperor” (3.4).232 The ecclesiastical conflicts leading up to the council—conflicts 
in which Eusebius himself had taken enthusiastic part—become in this retelling a dissension analogous 
to, and every bit as bad as, the persecutions and civil wars prior to the rise of Constantine. Indeed, 
Eusebius’ description of the essential cause of the conflict and its solution is intentionally reminiscent of 
his description of these earlier civic conflicts:  
No one among human persons was able to find a remedy for this evil because of the equal 
standing (ἰσοστασίος) of the parties to the strife—but for the one and only all-powerful God it 
 
231 δήμων τε δήμοις ἐπανισταμένων. 
232 ἤδη φρενῶν ἐκστάσει τοὺς ἀπεγνωσμένους ἀνοσίοις ἐγχειρεῖν καὶ ταῖς βασιλέως τολμᾶν ἐνυβρίζειν εἰκόσιν. 
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was still easy to heal these things, and so there was revealed his one and only helper in good 
deeds for what is on earth, Constantine (3.5.2).233  
Once again, the cause of dissension is equality. As the Imperial civil wars could never be resolved 
so long as multiple Emperors possessed of equal honor and the same office continued to exist, with 
their own sources of Imperial power and authority, so too the ecclesiastical conflicts of Eusebius’ day are 
in principle unsolvable so long as the only parties to the dispute are bishops, each with their own 
diocese and their own power base and their own theology. In Eusebius’ pessimistic picture, the bishops 
of Alexandria and Antioch might well have opposed those of Nicomedia and Caesarea forever, with no 
hope of resolution. Admittedly, the existence of differences in order or priority among bishops sharing 
the same office, of majorities and minorities and alliances and consensuses, might go some way towards 
resolving this issue, as it had for the Tetrarchic college in the time of Diocletian. By this time in his 
career, however, following the death of Licinius and the end of the Tetrarchy, Eusebius has long since 
abandoned any hope that such a system could be finally workable and stable, at least for the whole 
Empire and the whole Church. God himself has revealed a better way, whose name is Constantine. In De 
laudibus Constantini, Eusebius had made of Constantine the singular monarchical ruler of the totality of 
the human realm and things on earth, without, however, explicitly applying that monarchical power to 
the realm of the Church and its internal governance. In Vita Constantini, however, the one servant of 
God for all things on earth has clearly brought his beneficent monarchy to the bishops as well.  
In Eusebius’ retelling, Constantine’s intervention in the Church is an event of cosmic moment, 
one directly analogous to the saving military campaigns by which he had earlier liberated and unified the 
Roman Empire: “He said that it was necessary for him to greatly struggle in this other war, the one 
 
233 οὐδεὶς οἷός τ’ ἦν ἀνθρώπων θεραπείαν εὕρασθαι τοῦ κακοῦ, ἰσοστασίου τῆς ἔριδος τοῖς διεστῶσιν ὑπαρχούσης, μόνῳ δ’ 




against the invisible enemy who was disturbing the Church” (3.5.3).234 In this campaign, Constantine is 
once again in command, while the bishops summoned by him to Nicaea are the “phalanx of God” 
(φάλαγγα θεοῦ) (3.6.1) rushing to Nicaea in obedience to their general’s “mobilization order” 
(παράγγελμα), inspired not only by a desire for peace but by the desire to witness “the sight of the 
strange wonder of the vision of so great an Emperor” (3.6.2).235 A new image of the divine power has 
appeared on earth, and it is great enough to draw even the bishops of the Church as enthralled 
onlookers.  
Once assembled, Eusebius dwells on both the number and eminence of the bishops present at 
Nicaea, analogous to but clearly greater than the body of disciples assembled at Pentecost (3.7-9, cf. 
Acts 2). His recounting of the honors of various bishops, however, is for Eusebius only a prelude to the 
entrance of the one who, like the Holy Spirit at Pentecost,236 has actually brought them together as an 
offering to Christ (3.7.2). The resulting scene, one of the most vivid in all of Eusebius’ writings, demands 
to be quoted at length:  
In the central chamber of the Imperial Palace, which seemed to surpass all buildings in size, with 
the majority of the seats arranged according to status (τάξις) on either side of the chamber, 
everyone was called inside and received the seat appropriate to him. But when the whole 
Council had been arranged in fitting order (κόσμος), silence held everyone in anticipation of the 
entrance of the Emperor, and there entered the one who was first, then the second, then the 
third of those who were around the Emperor.237 Then also others preceded him, not of his 
 
234 ἄλλον τουτονὶ καταγωνιεῖσθαι δεῖν ἔφη τὸν κατὰ τοῦ ταράττοντος τὴν ἐκκλησίαν ἀφανοῦς ἐχθροῦ πόλεμον. 
235 τοῦ τε ξένου θαύματος τῆς τοῦ τοσούτου βασιλέως ὄψεως ἡ θέα. 
236 This (implicit but in my judgment clear) analogy might seem extreme if it is not remembered that (as mentioned above in 
section 2.6, esp. note 189) for Eusebius the Holy Spirit is merely the first among the numerous spirits attendant on the cosmic 
monarch Christ. Unlike the Son, for Eusebius the Holy Spirit cannot in any sense be referred to as God, but might like 
Constantine at the Council of Nicaea be reasonably described as a “heavenly messenger.” 
237 While the expression here is vague enough to encompass members of Constantine’s Imperial administration more generally, 
given the emphasis here on their preeminent status and the deliberate Trinitarian echo, it is likely Eusebius intends them to be 
the three sons and Caesars whom he elsewhere in Vita Constantini likens to the Trinity. If so, Eusebius’ failure to name the 
three figures may be a deliberate obfuscation, given that in 325 the “Trinity” of Constantine’s sons and Caesars would have 
included, in the place of the later-elevated Constans, Constantine’s eldest son Crispus, who would shortly be murdered by his 
father (see note 13 in section 3.2 below) and whose existence Eusebius scrupulously avoids acknowledging throughout Vita 
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accompanying soldiers and bodyguards, but only of those who were his trustworthy238 friends. 
And when everyone had stood up in unison (the sign that indicated the entrance of the 
Emperor), he himself at last walked through the middle (μέσος) like some heavenly messenger 
of God, emitting like lightning a surrounding garment luminous as though with flashes of light, 
shining down on them with the fiery rays of his Imperial robe, and adorned (κοσμούμενος) with 
the radiant lights of gold and many-colored stones. All this pertained to his body. In soul he was 
manifestly made most beautiful by fear of God and reverence. His eyes looking downward 
revealed this, and the blush on his face, and the motion of his walk, and all the rest of his 
appearance, and his size surpassed all those around him <...> and in the beauty of his 
gracefulness and the magnificence of his elegant appearance and the power of his irresistible 
strength. These things, mingled with the goodness of his moral character and the meekness of 
his Imperial clemency, made it clear that the surpassing character of his understanding was 
greater than all accounting. And when he had entered into the supreme position (ἀρχή) of the 
statuses (τάγμα), he stood in the middle (μέσος) while a cross made of gilded wood was set 
before him, and did not sit down before the bishops had nodded their consent. Everyone was 
doing one and the same thing along with the Emperor (3.10.1-5).239 
In this one scene, the entirety of Eusebius’ political, theological, and ecclesiastical viewpoint is 
summed up. The discordant, equal rivals among the bishops have been brought together in the Imperial 
palace, arranged not equally but in a literal microcosm whose organizational principle is hierarchical 
gradations in status mapped onto physical location, with each person assigned his own fitting place. Into 
the midst of this ordered assembly, preceded by his privileged inferiors in proper sequence, comes 
Constantine, at once a mediator set physically in the middle of the cosmos and an image of the one 
 
Constantini. If, as seems likely to me, this is in fact a concealed reference to Crispus, it would partially answer the questions 
posed by e.g. Austin 1980, 134-135, as to Crispus’ location and activities in 325 prior to his death in the summer of 326. 
238 Probably a deliberate pun for those officials who were trustworthy (πιστός) precisely because they shared with Constantine 
his Christian Faith (πίστις). 
239 ἐν αὐτῷ δὴ τῷ μεσαιτάτῳ οἴκῳ τῶν βασιλείων, ὃς δὴ καὶ ὑπερφέρειν ἐδόκει μεγέθει τοὺς πάντας, βάθρων τ’ ἐν τάξει 
πλειόνων ἐφ’ ἑκατέραις τοῦ οἴκου πλευραῖς διατεθέντων, εἴσω παρῄεσαν οἱ κεκλημένοι καὶ τὴν προσήκουσαν ἕδραν οἱ πάντες 
ἀπελάμβανον. ἀλλ’ ὅτε δὴ σὺν κόσμῳ τῷ πρέποντι ἡ πᾶσα καθῆστο σύνοδος, σιγὴ μὲν τοὺς πάντας εἶχε προσδοκίᾳ τῆς 
βασιλέως παρόδου, εἰσῄει δέ τις πρῶτος κἄπειτα δεύτερος καὶ τρίτος τῶν ἀμφὶ βασιλέα. ἡγοῦντο δὲ καὶ ἄλλοι οὐ τῶν 
συνήθων ὁπλιτῶν τε καὶ δορυφόρων, μόνων δὲ τῶν πιστῶν φίλων. πάντων δ’ ἐξαναστάντων ἐπὶ συνθήματι, ὃ τὴν βασιλέως 
εἴσοδον ἐδήλου, αὐτὸς δὴ λοιπὸν διέβαινε μέσος οἷα θεοῦ τις οὐράνιος ἄγγελος, λαμπρὰν μὲν ὥσπερ φωτὸς μαρμαρυγαῖς 
ἐξαστράπτων περιβολήν, ἁλουργίδος δὲ πυρωποῖς καταλαμπόμενος ἀκτῖσι, χρυσοῦ τε καὶ λίθων πολυτελῶν διαυγέσι φέγγεσι 
κοσμούμενος. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἀμφὶ τὸ σῶμα. τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν θεοῦ φόβῳ καὶ εὐλαβείᾳ δῆλος ἦν κεκαλλωπισμένος· ὑπέφαινον δὲ 
καὶ ταῦτ’ ὀφθαλμοὶ κάτω νεύοντες, ἐρύθημα προσώπου, περιπάτου κίνησις, τό τ’ ἄλλο εἶδος, τὸ μέγεθός τε ὑπερβάλλον μὲν 
τοὺς ἀμφ’ αὐτὸν ἅπαντας <***> τῷ τε κάλλει τῆς ὥρας καὶ τῷ μεγαλοπρεπεῖ τῆς τοῦ σώματος εὐπρεπείας ἀλκῇ τε ῥώμης 
ἀμάχου, ἃ δὴ τρόπων ἐπιεικείᾳ πραότητί τε βασιλικῆς ἡμερότητος ἐγκεκραμένα τὸ τῆς διανοίας ὑπερφυὲς παντὸς κρεῖττον 
ἀπέφαινον λόγου. ἐπεὶ δὲ παρελθὼν ἐπὶ τὴν πρώτην τῶν ταγμάτων ἀρχὴν μέσος ἔστη, σμικροῦ τινος αὐτῷ καθίσματος ὕλης 




monarchical God, radiant with divine light.240 This divine monarch is distinguished, not merely by spatial 
position, but by his absolute preeminence in every positive quality, physical beauty, stature, and 
intelligence alike—a similarity to God expressed precisely through supremacy over inferiors.241 Once 
Constantine has taken his proper position as ἀρχή above all the gradated statuses of his cosmos, the 
formerly factitious, divided body of bishops, like the people of the Roman Empire before them, 
recognize the Image of God in Constantine and act totally in concert, in obedience to the commands of 
the Emperor as heavenly messenger of the divine will.242 Through the absolute supremacy of one person 
and the hierarchical arrangement of statuses under him, Church, Empire, and cosmos have become one.  
Compared to its role as perfect spectacle of cosmic order, the actual proceedings of the council 
become in Eusebius’ retelling rather secondary. The theological points under debate are not even 
 
240 In making use of solar imagery for Constantine here and elsewhere, Eusebius is following a consistent theme of 
Constantine’s public works and acts, which from his early association with Sol Invictus through the totality of his reign as 
Emperor emphasized the sun and sunlight as a potent image for both divinity and Imperial rule (see Lenski 2016, 48-52) 
241 While I believe that Drake 2000, 389-392, is correct that in this account Eusebius is interested in communicating not only 
that “dealing with the bishops was one of the most important items, perhaps the most important, on Constantine’s agenda” 
(389) but also “that the bishops have now replaced the Senate in the role of imperial college” (391), his characterization of 
Eusebius’ account as showing “the emperor interacting with the bishops in a collegial fashion” (390-391) such that the bishops 
are empowered “to act with an independence that the imperial Senate never had” (391) and so “judge, and if necessary, 
condemn imperial conduct” (391) is, in my judgment, precisely the wrong emphasis to draw from this passage. Here and 
elsewhere in Vita Constantini, while bishops in a sense “become mediators of the emperor’s charismatic authority” (391), this is 
only inasmuch as the Emperor is positioned as the new cosmic mediator of divine presence, truth, and unity for the episcopate 
as a whole. 
242 Here I differ from Johnson 2014, 165-166, who asserts that “a theology of consensus pervades the entirety of the Life” (165). 
While Eusebius is greatly concerned with the theological and political unity of the Church and Empire, at no point is this unity 
effected, as with Hilary of Poitiers and the later writings of Athanasius, through an uncoerced consensus of equals, but always 
through the imposition (frequently via processes of either literal or metaphorical warfare) of the will of a single, clear superior. 
Even Eusebius’ willful obscuring of the actual theological issues under debate at Nicaea and Tyre should not be seen as an olive 
branch or a gesture in favor of ecclesiastical peace, but rather as consistent with the strategy, begun in his Epistula ad 
Caesarienses after Nicaea and continued through Contra Marcellum and De ecclesiastica theologia, of rhetorically de-
legitimizing his opponents by systematically erasing them and their beliefs from his record and interpretation of events. Already 
mere anonymous interlocutors in Epistula ad Caesarienses, in Eusebius’ treatment of the aftermath of Nicaea in Vita 
Constantini these opponents (including implicitly the prestigious and powerful bishop of Alexandria himself) are finally reduced 
to mere scattered, nameless rebels against political and ecclesiastical order, without any status or viewpoint whatsoever (e.g., 
3.23, 3.59, 4.41). As in Eusebius’ theological polemics, such characterization is both a potent rhetorical tool and a theological 
claim in itself.  
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mentioned,243 besides the organizational question of the date for the celebration of Easter—but in the 
complex of theological debates, Eusebius grants the Emperor once again the preeminent place, as the 
main actor responsible for eliciting opinions and reconciling the various parties, “until he made them of 
one and the same judgment (ὁμογνώμων) and of one and the same opinion (ὁμόδοξος) on all the 
disputed questions, so that they possessed one and the same (ὁμόφωνος)244 Faith” (3.13.2-3.14.1).245 
Left to themselves, without the Imperial presence and guidance, the bishops had fallen into anarchy—
but with Constantine, all is soon restored to total uniformity.  
Following this Imperial victory of unity and reconciliation, Eusebius recounts the celebrations 
given by Constantine to celebrate the 20th anniversary of his reign, including an extravagant Imperial 
banquet at which bishops, entering “the inmost places of the royal dwelling (ἀνάκτορον),246 either 
reclined along with the Emperor himself, or rested on couches set around those of the others” 
(3.15.2).247 Even decades after the fact, this picture of bishops permitted to enter into the overwhelming 
presence of the Emperor and dining in his company is for Eusebius nothing less than a vision of heaven 
 
243 The description of Cameron 1997, 166-167 (cf. Barnes 1981, 269-270) of Eusebius’ account of Nicaea as “a masterpiece of 
disingenuousness” is perhaps overly harsh, particularly in her treatment of the lengthy ekphrasis of Constantine as a mere 
distraction from the council’s theological concerns. While Eusebius’ suppression of the doctrinal questions involved is clearly 
intended at least in part, like the earlier account in Epistula ad Caesarienses, to conceal his own defeat at Nicaea and the not at 
all harmonious reality of his own enthusiastic participation in ecclesiastical controversy in the decade since, Eusebius’ narrative 
of the council as predominantly about Constantine’s decisive bringing of the Church into harmony with the rest of the cosmic 
order through his monarchical presence and authority is both coherent in itself and fully consistent with his viewpoints in Vita 
Constantini and elsewhere (cf. Pietri 2013, 88-95). 
244 It is practically irresistible to take Eusebius’ use of these rare derivatives of ὁμός (“the same”) here as a deliberate, and 
perhaps deliberately ironic, reference to the Council’s use of the controversial term ὁμοούσιος—even more ironic given that, as 
already mentioned, Eusebius refrains from either quoting the Council’s decrees that include the term ὁμοούσιος or indeed 
giving any indication at all what the theological dispute was about.  
245 εἰσόθ’ ὁμογνώμονας καὶ ὁμοδόξους αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀμφισβητουμένοις ἅπασι κατεστήσατο, ὡς ὁμόφωνον μὲν κρατῆσαι 
τὴν πίστιν. 
246 The term used here, ἀνάκτορον, while at root meaning a king’s dwelling, is more commonly a term for a god’s dwelling place 
or temple (cf. Brill Dictionary of Ancient Greek 140); it was used as such by Eusebius in De laudibus Constantini praefatio 4 in 
reference to initiatory entrance into the hidden inmost chambers of the “temple” of divine knowledge. 
247 εἶθ’ οἱ μὲν αὐτῷ συνανεκλίνοντο, οἱ δ’ ἀμφὶ τὰς ἑκατέρων προσανεπαύοντο  κλινάδας. 
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itself: “One would have thought that an image (εἰκών) was being presented of the Kingdom of Christ, 
that what was happening was a dream, not a reality” (3.15.2).248 Not just a vision of the future, the 
banquet is in Eusebius’ recounting also a quasi-Eucharistic sacrifice in which Constantine himself is the 
officiating priest:249 “The Emperor himself presided over (ἐξάρχειν) a feast for the servants of God, 
drinking with those he had reconciled and as though offering this fitting sacrifice (θυσία) to God through 
them” (3.15.1).250 Just as Constantine himself is an image of the divine priest-monarch Christ, so too his 
beneficences granted to the Church and to bishops are an image of Christ’s grace to his people and his 
sacrifices offered through them—graces and sacrifices destined to culminate in a final, eschatological 
kingdom which Constantine is now in some mysterious way making present on earth.  
Until, of course, in the present of the publication of Vita Constantini, Constantine himself has 
died, his Empire has been immediately split, following a massacre of the former Emperor’s relatives, 
between his three sons, and the work of cosmic salvation is once again in grave peril. By the terms 
 
248 Χριστοῦ βασιλείας ἔδοξεν ἄν τις φαντασιοῦσθαι εἰκόνα, ὄναρ τ’ εἶναι ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὕπαρ τὸ γιγνόμενον. 
249 This is far from the only place in Eusebius’ writings where Constantine is treated as a priest and seen as offering sacrifice to 
God. Most notably, in De laudibus Constantini, Constantine is directly compared to Christ as the cosmic High Priest whose task 
it is to offer first himself and then his subjects to God as the most pleasing of sacrifices (see e.g. 2.5-3.1 as well as the discussion 
above in section 2.5). Elsewhere in Vita Constantini itself, Eusebius, in two striking and famous passages, refers to Constantine 
as operating like “a universal bishop appointed by God” (κοινὸς ἐπίσκοπος ἐκ θεοῦ καθεσταμένος, 1.44.1-2) in his convening of 
synods, and has Constantine assert to a gathering of bishops his own status as the sole “God-appointed bishop of what is 
outside” the Church (τῶν ἐκτὸς ὑπὸ θεοῦ καθεσταμένος ἐπίσκοπος, 4.24). As McLynn 2004, 235-242, has noted, Eusebius in 
Vita Constantini (1.42, 44; 3.15; 4.22, 4.29–33) and elsewhere (Commentarius in Isaiam 49:23) indicates that Constantine never 
in fact attended regular services of the Christian church prior to his deathbed baptism, but rather set up his own parallel 
religious observances and liturgies in the palace, with the (unbaptized and so normatively excluded from participation in 
Christian mysteries) Emperor as ritual presider and preacher. In keeping with this historical reality, Constantine in Vita 
Constantini appears repeatedly as a supreme priestly figure offering sacrifice to God while the numerous subordinate bishops, 
the primary regular officiants of Christian liturgy, function as mere instruments (δι’ αὐτῶν, 3.15.1) or even (in his account of 
Constantine’s assembling of bishops at Nicaea) as the offering (χαριστήριον, 3.7.2) itself. In my judgment, what is seen clearly in 
all these passages, and preeminently in the account of the Council of Nicaea, is less an assimilation of Constantine to Christian 
priestly or episcopal status (a la “caesaropapism”) than a picture of monarchy in a cosmic context as inherently priestly and 
sacrificial in nature (see e.g. De laudibus Constantini 2.5-3.1), combined with a (for Eusebius) logical belief in the functional 
supremacy of Constantine over all his subordinates, including the priests of the Christian religion (cf. e.g. Seston 1947, Straub 
1957). All this is strikingly different from the views on episcopal and priestly status expressed by later Nicene authors. 
250 τοῖς δέ γε τοῦ θεοῦ λειτουργοῖς εὐωχίας αὐτὸς ἐξῆρχε βασιλεύς, συμποσιάζων εἰρηνεύσασι καὶ οἱονεὶ θυσίαν ταύτην 
ἀποδιδοὺς ἐμπρέπουσαν τῷ θεῷ δι’ αὐτῶν· 
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established throughout Eusebius’ corpus, any such state of affairs would be inherently unstable, prone 
to crises that have, as of Vita Constantini, only one solution: Constantine himself, the one naturally 
preeminent and pious ruler of the totality of the human realm directly appointed by God in all of history. 
It is thus in itself perfectly logical that, in response to this latest crisis, Eusebius offers precisely the same 
solution as before, only slightly altered for the circumstances: “It is possible to see even now [...] that he 
is in possession of his Imperial power (βασιλεία) even after death. Since, then, he, because of his return 
to life, is administering the whole Empire, he, possessing the same form of address as before, Victorious 
Greatest Augustus, rules the Roman Empire” (4.71.2-4.72.1).251 If the only way to unite the human realm 
with God is for there to be one pious human ruler over all, and if Constantine is the one divinely-chosen 
eschatological agent of that unity, then, in an Empire now apparently divided between multiple equals, 
Constantine must somehow be continuing to play the same role even after dying.  
Constantine plays this role first and foremost by being, as Eusebius asserts, still fully credited 
and honored by his subjects and sons alike as the singular monarch of the whole Roman Empire. The 
iconography, present on images and coins and in public ceremonial, of the Imperial (pagan) apotheosis 
decreed for Constantine by the Roman Senate,252 along with the ordinary funereal honors granted to the 
Emperor’s remains, are joined by Eusebius to complimentary Christian imagery of the believer’s reign 
with Christ in heaven and interpreted in a starkly literal way (4.66-4.74, 1.2): 253  
 
251 ὁρᾶν <ἔστι> εἰσέτι καὶ νῦν [...] αὐτὸν δὲ τῆς βασιλείας καὶ μετὰ θάνατον ἐπειλημμένον. ὥσπερ οὖν ἐξ ἀναβιώσεως τὴν 
σύμπασαν ἀρχὴν διοικῶν, Νικητὴς Μέγιστος Σεβαστὸς αὐτῷ προσρήματι τῆς Ῥωμαίων ἡγεμονίας κρατεῖ· 
252 For the consecratio of Constantine, which took place in the ordinary pagan manner but which was expressed publicly 
through imagery capable of being interpreted in both pagan and Christian ways, see e.g. Bruun 1954, Hunt 1998, 1-2. 
253 As noted by Burgess 2008, 29-30 (cf. Lenski 2016, 116), although Eusebius does not directly cite it in support of his thesis, 
there is evidence of a brief period after Constantine’s death, when, most likely due to the unexpected nature of Constantine’s 
death in May 337 and the immediate conflicts over succession (including the “massacre of the princes”) following over the next 
three months, Imperial decrees continued to be issued in the name of Constantine as sole Augustus along with his subordinate 
Caesars. By the time of the extant edition of Vita Constantini, however, Constantine’s three sons had (in September 337) 
definitively assumed the title of Augustus and rule of the Empire from their father, and this practice had ceased. 
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This blessed one alone among mortals reigned as Emperor after his death, and continued to do 
the things he was accustomed to do as if he were alive, since to him alone of all from eternity 
God had granted this gift. [...] The God over all thought it worthy that even his mortal remains 
reign among human beings, in this way showing to all those not entirely stubborn in their minds 
the unfading and unending Imperial power possessed by his soul (4.67.3).254  
While this might seem at first either panegyric extravagance or sheer insanity, Eusebius’ claim is 
greatly aided by the system of images and inferiors established by him in previous works as the 
fundamental principle of cosmic order. Constantine can continue to reign as sole Emperor of the Roman 
Emperor even while absent from the earth precisely because, as with God and the Word, his images and 
inferiors are able to be where he is not, and so continue to make him and his rule present throughout 
his domains.255 As Eusebius points out, even after his death, Constantine’s Imperial image (εἰκών) 
continued to be set up and honored throughout the Roman Empire as before along with those of his 
sons (4.72). What difference did it make if the already distant referent of those images was no longer 
present on earth, but rather in heaven with Christ? In this, Eusebius argues, Constantine is merely like 
Christ himself, who had left the earth but continued to reign through his images and associates on earth 
(4.72)—including for a time Constantine himself. 
Still, if the honors and physical images of Constantine go some way towards allowing him to 
continue his eschatological reign as Emperor, they are not, in themselves, sufficient. The linchpin for the 
continuity and unity of the Roman state rests far more on the fact that, as Constantine before had acted 
in absentia through his subordinate but similar sons the Caesars, so now he continues to be represented 
 
254 ἐβασίλευε δὲ καὶ μετὰ θάνατον μόνος θνητῶν ὁ μακάριος, ἐπράττετό τε τὰ συνήθη ὡσανεὶ καὶ ζῶντος αὐτοῦ, τοῦτο 
μονωτάτῳ αὐτῷ ἀπ’ αἰῶνος τοῦ θεοῦ δεδωρημένου. καὶ τὸ θνητὸν αὐτοῦ βασιλεύειν ἐν ἀνθρώποις ὁ ἐπὶ πάντων ἠξίου θεός, 
ὧδ’ ἐπιδεικνὺς τὴν ἀγήρω καὶ ἀτελεύτητον τῆς ψυχῆς βασιλείαν τοῖς μὴ τὸν νοῦν λελιθωμένοις 
255 Johnson 2014, 157-158, notes Vita Constantini’s striking and outsized emphasis within the genre of ancient biography of 
detailed ekphrases of the physical appearance of the Emperor and physical images associated with him, by which “Eusebius 
thus perpetuated and even legitimized the frequently remarked visual agenda of Constantine’s representational propaganda” 
(158). As we have seen, besides coinciding with the general Imperial and Constantinian emphasis on visual propaganda, a focus 
on images as the fundamental metaphysical means for the extension of political and divine power is a pervasive feature of 
Eusebius’ thought more generally. 
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on earth through those same sons, who, “now having put him on whole by the excellence of their piety, 
are displayed as Autocrats, Augustuses, Pious Emperors, conspicuous in the beauties of their father” 
(1.1.3).256 If the Son can be called God and reign as monarch while remaining fundamentally an inferior 
image of his superior monarchical Father, there is no difficulty at all with Constantine’s sons being 
named Augustus while he maintains from heaven his Imperial rule and superiority over them all. As in 
De laudibus Constantini, these subordinate children are described, even after the death of their father, 
as “lampstands filling everything with his radiance, while he himself, still living in power, governs the 
whole of life more powerfully than before, multiplied in the succession of his children” (1.1.3).257 If 
Father and Son alike possess numerous inferior agents through whom they act, if Constantine himself 
while alive had been able to govern through his sons, inferior agents caused by their father and similar 
to him, there is no reason at all why the new legal division of the Empire need lead to any real division. 
So long as the dynasty of Constantine continues to reign, Constantine himself will continue to govern 
the world through his children—and through him, Christ, and through Christ, God.  
Even in Eusebius’ rhetorically capable hands, this extravagantly positive picture cannot help 
seeming somewhat desperate in its hopefulness for the future, its certainty that the long history of the 
human realm and the Church have now reached their definitive settlement.258 Eusebius’ career as both 
theologian and political theorist had depended on, worked for, nothing less than the final, monarchical 
unity of the cosmos, in heaven with belief in the inferior monarchy of the Son and on earth with 
 
256 νυνὶ δ’ ὅλον αὐτὸν ἐνδυσάμενοι θεοσεβείας ἀρετῇ, αὐτοκράτορες αὔγουστοι σεβαστοὶ βασιλεῖς τοῖς τοῦ πατρὸς 
ἐμπρέποντες καλλωπίσμασιν ἀνεδείχθησαν. 
257 λαμπτῆρας τῶν αὐτοῦ μαρμαρυγῶν συνορᾷ πληροῦντας τὸ πᾶν, αὐτόν τε ζῶντα δυνάμει καὶ τὸν σύμπαντα διακυβερνῶντα 
βίον κρειττόνως ἢ πρόσθεν τῇ τῶν παίδων πολυπλασιασθέντα διαδοχῇ· 
258 Cf. the apropos remark of Johnson 2014, 10: “Eusebius depiction of the reign of Constantine’s sons as a joyous time of peace 
under a ‘trinity’ of divinely graced rulers was, therefore, a rich and brilliant but deceptively thin veneer lying lightly over the 
more jagged realities.” 
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adherence to the Empire of Constantine.259 With the death of Constantine, both those unities were 
manifestly in peril. However purportedly united by their shared adherence to the legacy of their father, 
the sons of Constantine were now in possession of divided power quite capable of being directed 
against one another.260 Even more troublingly, with the death of Constantine, the bishops exiled by him, 
including bitter enemies of Eusebius and his theology, had been permitted to return to their sees, their 
sentences of exile cancelled—and they would shortly more than justify Eusebius’ fears about the 
seditious nature of their theology, ecclesiology, and politics, stirring up trouble beyond Eusebius’ 
imagining in Church and Roman Empire alike.  
By the time of Eusebius’ death in 339, the cracks in the Constantinian settlement were visible 
and widening. It would not be until after his death, though, that that settlement would fail. 
2.8:  
Summary and Conclusion 
 Eusebius of Caesarea established himself early in his career as perhaps the most original and 
brilliant Christian scholar of his day, the self-conscious heir to the great Origen of Alexandria. In Historia 
 
259 As Johnson 2014, 162-165, notes, as treated in Vita Constantini Constantine has not only theological and cosmic and political 
but also directly personal significance for Eusebius, with his literary portrait of Constantine also doubling as a self-portrait and 
“a potent affirmation of Eusebius’ importance in ecclesiastical affairs and theological matters” (164). Cameron 1983, 85-87, 
likewise emphasizes the intensely personal and religious nature of Eusebius’ portrait of Constantine, and uses this to push back 
against scholarly claims of Eusebius’ willful distortions of history: ”Eusebius was not composing a scientific history; he was 
writing as a committed believer, with the avowed aim of revealing to the world the relation of Constantine’s actions to the 
march of Christian providence” (86). 
260 A consistent trend in scholarship (see e.g. Johnson 2014, 166-169, Cameron 1997, 154) has argued, plausibly, that Vita 
Constantini should be seen as a “mirror of princes,” in line with “Eusebius’ lifelong struggle to define a good Christian king” 
(Drake 2000, 389), with Constantine’s sons and in particular Constantius II, the Augustus ruling in Eusebius’ own Eastern portion 
of the Empire, as the primary intended audience. If correct, this would allow Vita Constantini to be profitably read in tandem 
with later Nicene attempts, such as those of Lucifer of Cagliari and Hilary of Poitiers, to not only construct a theology of proper 
Imperial conduct but also actively persuade the Emperor to put it into effect under less than favorable conditions. Similarly, 
Cameron 1997, 166-169, has suggested that the work should be seen in part as a theological apologetic, in the ongoing conflict 
between the ecclesiastical faction headed by Eusebius of Nicomedia and its rivals, aimed at asserting and cementing continuity 
of religious policy between the latter reign of Constantine and his sons and therefore the continuing dominance of Eusebius’ 
ecclesiastical faction against its rivals. As Cameron notes, this allows Vita Constantini to be read together with the later texts of 
Athanasius of Alexandria, works of narrative historiography characterized by extensive quotation of documentary sources and 
aimed at making a persuasive theological case. Athanasius himself clearly had some familiarity with Eusebius of Caesarea’s 
writings and so could even have conceivably been directly influenced by Vita Constantini (cf. Cameron 1997, 171-172). 
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ecclesiastica he created an entirely new genre of documentary Church history based around the 
combination of Christian and Roman Imperial narratives and chronological data, culminating in the 
work’s final form in the Persecution of Diocletian and the dramatic, divinely-favored victory of 
Constantine. At the onset of the “Arian controversy,” Eusebius showed himself an unequivocal partisan 
of Arius and his theology against that of Alexander of Alexandria, writing letters in which he declared 
entirely absurd the idea of two divine persons equal in status and eternity. Following his faction’s defeat 
at Nicaea, however, Eusebius presented in Epistula ad Nicomedienses an apologia for his own 
capitulation to the council’s decrees, buttressed not only by numerous questionable interpretive leaps 
but also and more cogently by the astounding presence and theological skill of the Emperor 
Constantine. In the years following Nicaea, Eusebius resumed public theological controversy against the 
faction triumphant at Nicaea, managing in short order to effect the deposition of his own ecclesiastical 
superior, Eustathius of Antioch. With the restoration of his allies Arius and Eusebius of Nicomedia by 
Constantine, Eusebius participated enthusiastically in the processes that would ultimately lead to the 
deposition of other opponents, including Athanasius of Alexandria and Marcellus of Ancyra.  
The process against Marcellus of Ancyra, in particular, would lead to the remarkable Contra 
Marcellum, in which Eusebius argues for a cosmic order centered around a spatial conception of status. 
In this order, the Son’s existence is defined by mediation between the one God and all other things, a 
mediation that, in truly spatial fashion, places him necessarily in between the two statuses for whom he 
mediates. While originally the mediator placed between God and angels, by his Incarnation the Son has 
taken on the additional role of mediator between God and man, making him neither the same as God 
nor a man in the same way as humanity. The bulk of Eusebius’ presentation in Contra Marcellum, 
however, is devoted to polemical attacks against Marcellus himself, presented as a contemptible, lower-
status bishop aiming envious attacks against the higher-status clerics Eusebius of Caesarea and Eusebius 
of Nicomedia, and to critiques of Marcellus’ monadic theology, presented as the ultimate insult to the 
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separate, mediatorial kingship of Christ. It is based on this attack on Christ’s Imperial power, Eusebius 
asserts, that Constantine himself had rejected Marcellus’ theology and arranged his condemnation. 
Around the same time as Marcellus’ deposition, and shortly after Arius had shared communion 
with the bishops of the Council of Jerusalem, Eusebius was granted the flattering task of delivering a 
panegyric celebrating the thirtieth anniversary of Constantine’s reign. In the resulting document, De 
laudibus Constantini, Eusebius presents a remarkable political theology in which the cosmos is governed 
by a monarchical hierarchy of three Emperors, Father, Son, and Constantine. While the one Emperor 
God is outside of all things and so entirely separated from any contact with any other entity, the inferior 
οὐσία of the Word has been granted, thanks to his unique closeness to the Father’s will manifested in 
interior inspiration, the position of subordinate Emperor over the cosmos. This Imperial status is itself 
manifested in the Word’s priority to the cosmos as a whole, which he himself directly created and 
throughout which he, and not the Father, is actually present. In the Incarnation, this ruling Word made 
use of a soul-less human body as an instrument to make himself visible to his subjects while himself 
suffering no diminishment or death whatsoever. It was this Incarnation and the dramatic overthrow of 
the power of demons brought about by it that is in Eusebius’ telling directly responsible for the 
existence of the Roman Empire, given by God, in tandem with its “twin” of Christian teaching, the 
purpose of annihilating all multiple governments everywhere in favor of a single, universal monarchy. 
After an unfortunate interlude in which the rebellious Emperors of Rome tried to oppose their superior 
through the persecution of Christians, the Word has directly appointed Constantine as the first divinely-
authorized monarch of the human realm in history. Constantine’s Imperial power is thus nothing more 
or less than a reflection of and participation in that single Imperial power also possessed in differing 
degrees by Father and Word. This Imperial power, Eusebius assures us, is destined, like that of God’s 
and the Word’s, to last forever. 
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 In the years following, Eusebius returned to the offensive against Marcellus with the voluminous 
De ecclesiastica theologia, in which Eusebius attempts to prove that only his own theology, and not any 
other, can account for the totality of Scriptural evidence on Father and Son. While continuing to assert 
an essentially status-based cosmos, in De ecclesiastica theologia Eusebius also presents a sophisticated 
image theology in which the Son can be called God and worshipped without idolatry precisely because 
of his status as inferior-derivative image, directly analogous to the Imperial statues by which the Roman 
Emperor was perceived and honored by his subjects. Just as such statues were clearly separate from and 
inferior to their archetype, so too the Son is separate from and inferior to the Father. Just as such 
statues served to make the distant Emperor indirectly present, allow his subjects some idea of his nature 
and properties, and allow them to honor him in absentia, so too the Son allows the infinitely distant, 
monadic God to be perceived and worshiped by human beings. This analogy is extended by Eusebius to 
the Incarnation also, in which the Son, as cosmic monarch and direct creator of the world, utilizes a 
soulless human body as a “statue” to make his presence and will known to his subjects on earth. In this 
way, Eusebius innovates, besides the traditional “Holy Trinity” of Father, Son, and Spirit, an additional 
“Trinity” of Father, Son, and the human body of Christ, with each relationship defined by the clear 
separation of inferior image from superior archetype. 
 In Vita Constantini, this mature theology is applied pervasively to the life, death, and succession 
of Constantine. As in De laudibus Constantini, Constantine is the one and only Emperor directly 
appointed by God to rule the human world in its totality, blessed from his youth with divine favor and 
inspiration. Granted through visions and dreams both knowledge of God’s will and certain victory, 
Constantine has in short order brought into total, monarchical unity both the Roman Empire and then 
the Church. At the heart of this historical picture is an account of the Council of Nicaea, in which a 
divided, squabbling cosmos of episcopal equals is brought into hierarchical order and unity by 
Constantine’s divinely radiant presence and divinely superior will. 
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 With Constantine’s death and the division of the Empire among his sons, Eusebius’ picture of 
divine monarchical unity was threatened by a return to chaotic multiplicity. In Eusebius’ presentation in 
Vita Constantini, however, Constantine remains even after his death the single, eschatological ruler of 
the human realm, whose presence and will continues to unify the world through his three sons as 
inferior-derivative images. As long as the dynasty of Constantine continues to reign, then, Constantine 







Τῆς βασιλείας ἡ συμφωνία 
Constantius II and the Εnd of the Constantinian Settlement 
3.1:  
Constantius and His Critics 
Writing about Constantius II is a very fraught endeavor, which is perhaps why relatively few 
have done so. This is by no means due to the brevity or insignificance of his reign. Constantius served as 
Augustus for roughly 25 years, almost eight of which were spent as the sole ruler of the Roman Empire; 
Julian the Apostate, in contrast, a figure that looms large in both scholarship and the post-
Enlightenment Western cultural imagination, served as Augustus for barely two. In practically every 
realm about which both ancient and modern authors have been concerned, Constantius’ reign 
represents one of the most important periods of development and conflict in the 4th century, profoundly 
influencing trends that would continue for centuries thereafter and into the present day. Then, too, 
throughout this period, as I will argue, Constantius was consistently among the most important and 
decisive actors in both political and ecclesiastical spheres. 
At least some of Constantius’ obscurity doubtless comes from being overshadowed by his much 
more famous father, Constantine the Great. Yet this comparison between two rulers, father and son, is 
by no means so unequivocally in favor of Constantine as has sometimes been imagined. Constantine 
converted to Christianity and set in place a massive set of legal and institutional changes in both Church 
and Empire: yet in nearly every instance the consequences of these changes and their underlying logic 
became fully visible only during the reign of his son and successor. Constantine forcibly united the 
Roman Empire and established a new, dynastic principle in place of the Tetrarchy; Constantius actually 
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tried to govern the Empire on this basis, and found himself beset on all sides by family conflicts and 
attempted usurpations. Constantine led armies in multiple civil wars to establish his sole power, unify 
the Empire around himself, and extend its borders, dying while preparing a massive invasion of the 
Persian Empire; Constantius was similarly forced to fight multiple civil wars to gain and preserve the title 
of sole ruler of the Empire, as well as numerous campaigns on all the Empire’s fronts. Constantine 
attempted to unify the Roman Empire around his allegedly sacred person, cosmic status, and 
preeminent ability; Constantius furthered his father’s reforms and was faced with widespread 
resistance. Constantine called the Council of Nicaea, deposed Athanasius of Alexandria, and helped 
Eusebius of Nicomedia gain unprecedented influence within the Church; but only under Constantius did 
these conflicts erupt into open ecclesiastical warfare, a schism that for a time divided practically the 
entirety of the Western and Eastern Empires, and a series of councils that in both the total number of 
bishops involved and the clarity and sophistication of theological debates far outstripped Nicaea. In 
every area, Constantius’ reign was marked by both profound and deliberate continuity with, and 
dramatic development from, the decisions, policies, beliefs, and legacy of his father.  
Although he came to power more than forty years after Constantine’s death, Theodosius I is 
frequently pitched, in historical sketches ancient and modern, as the natural heir and continuer of the 
Constantinian Empire and the Constantinian settlement, with the short-lived Julian granted the 
glamorous role of the last, doomed opponent of that settlement and its consequences for human 
history. The Emperor who, for nearly 25 years, attempted to actually maintain and further the actual 
Constantinian settlement, as established by Constantine himself, is barely worthy of a footnote. This is in 
part, I would argue, the result of a natural bias in favor of success over failure; but also the result of the 
fact that, once granted his proper place in the 4th century, Constantius’ administration calls into radical 
question a number of common beliefs about the reign of his more famous predecessor. For both those 
who revere it and those who hate it, the Council of Nicaea and its condemnation of Arius is a glamorous, 
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triumphant occasion—but not the forty years of Empire-dividing theological conflict following it which 
reached its climax under Constantius. Constantine’s dramatic victories to become sole ruler of the 
Empire, end the persecution of Christians, and establish Christianity as the favored religious system of 
the Empire have become practically mythical; Constantius’ struggles to hold that Empire together in the 
face of numerous usurpations and further the position of Christianity in the face of overwhelming 
religious conflict are apparently trivial by comparison. Yet as I have emphasized, on nearly every one of 
these points Constantius was in profound continuity with his father, followed the principles laid down by 
him, and attempted to govern in the manner he had established. The reign of Constantine cannot be 
understood without reference to the reign of Constantius, and vice versa. If this has not been clearly 
understood in scholarship and popular imagination, it is because the main result of the principles 
established by Constantine was in almost every instance not success and glory, but failure and infamy 
for his son and successor. It is for this reason, above all, that Constantius has been and remains the 
embarrassing secret of Constantinian studies. 
This treatment began well within the reign of Constantius himself. If there is any other reason 
for the general neglect of Constantius within modern scholarship, it is certainly not any paucity of 
contemporary and near-contemporary authors writing about Constantius. About few Roman Emperors, 
in fact, do we possess so much involved discussion of their reigns and character by contemporaries. 
What is remarkable about these sources from the broader perspective of Roman historiography, 
however, is the fact that they are, with only a few exceptions, uniformly and extravagantly hostile to the 
Emperor, his policies, and his person. The most copious of these sources, forming the bulk of all 
surviving writings from Constantius’ actual reign, are letters and treatises of Christian bishops, 
theologians, and controversialists, some of which will be discussed in depth in the following chapters. 
With the notable exception of Lucifer of Cagliari, Christian bishops opposing Constantius’ religious 
policies rhetorically posed him against his own father, even or especially in areas where Constantius’ 
246 
 
actions were straightforwardly in line with those of Constantine. This is never so true, as I will argue, as 
in the issue that was to form the spark for the broadest and most violent episcopal opposition to a 
reigning Emperor in the fourth century: the decision to depose and exile the popular bishop Athanasius 
of Alexandria. The purpose of this exaggerated contrast between father and son, as I will argue, was not 
primarily factual but rhetorical, based on the degree to which, in both specific policies and general 
propaganda programme, Constantius himself grounded his legitimacy on descent from and imitation of 
his own father. The accusation of being radically out of step with Constantine was an effective one for 
exiled bishops to employ precisely because it struck at the very heart of Constantius’ projected image as 
Constantine’s natural heir and successor, similar in all things. For men attempting to resist and even 
dethrone the sitting Emperor, this strategy possessed obvious advantages.  
Beginning early in the 5th century, the Nicene ecclesiastical historians largely followed the 
prevailing narratives given them by Athanasius and his fellow Nicenes, but employed them in texts 
animated by a very different spirit viz-à-vis the Christian Empire that Constantine had founded. As we 
will see, Athanasius, Hilary, and Lucifer of Cagliari had all been brought to straightforwardly accuse 
Constantius of being an unrepentant heretic, a violent murderer and persecutor of the Church, a 
corrupter of bishops with gifts and largesse, and a precursor of Antichrist, and to participate actively in 
efforts aimed at delegitimizing his authority over both Church and Empire. For later Nicene historians, 
writing after the Theodosian settlement, this method of relating to a sitting Emperor, particularly one so 
closely related to Constantine the Great, was both incomprehensible and rather impolitic. The 
Constantius that appears in the 5th century historians, then, is, if not more sympathetic, certainly far less 
threatening than the 4th century Nicene version. Both Socrates Scholasticus (Historia Ecclesiastica 2.2) 
and Theodoret (Historia Ecclesiastica 2.3) acknowledge some kind of association with “Arianism” on 
Constantius’ part, but blame it entirely on the influence of an unnamed priest also responsible, in this 
telling, for Constantine’s earlier recall of Arius from exile—who apparently owed his vast (and otherwise 
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invisible) influence with Constantius to his ability to influence the women and eunuchs of the Imperial 
court and to his being entrusted by Constantine on his deathbed with the (certainly fictitious) secret will 
assigning control of the Eastern Empire and Constantinople to Constantius.  
Even this generic appeal to blaming courtiers for the sins of the Emperor was not, however, 
sufficient for dealing with a figure so closely connected to the revered Constantine. The hallmark of 
Constantius in all 5th century Nicene accounts is mental and moral ignorance and weakness, which, 
however clearly employed to exculpate him of responsibility for the Imperial-sponsored ecclesiastical 
acts of his regime, leaves little room for any positive account of his character and accomplishments. 
Sozomen (Historia Ecclesiastica 3.18) simply finds it impossible to credit that any son of Constantine 
could actually have denied the ὁμοούσιος, and baldly asserts that “from the first [the sons of 
Constantine] maintained their father’s opinion about doctrine” and “were both supporters of the Faith 
of Nicaea” (3.18.1).1 While Constans maintained this faith in a completely unequivocal way, however, 
thanks to the deceptive terminological quibbling of the “Arians” and their allies, “Constantius the 
Emperor was persuaded by such arguments, and although in understanding, as I believe, he thought the 
same things about the Father and the Son, he exchanged one term for another and said ὁμοιούσιος 
instead of ὁμοούσιος” (3.18.4).2 Theodoret, meanwhile, the only one of the 5th century ecclesiastical 
historians to serve as a bishop, and no stranger to theological controversy himself, is perhaps the most 
unequivocal in his declaration of Constantius’ complete lack of agency, the result of a fundamentally 
idiotic and vacillating intellect. The Antiochene historian accuses the episcopal party of Eusebius not 
only of heresy and crimes against their fellow bishops, but also of “beguiling the empty mind of the 
 
1 Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ αὐτὸ τὸ δόγμα τὰ πρῶτα τὴν πατρῴαν ἐφύλαττον δόξαν· ἄμφω γὰρ ἐπαινέται τῆς ἐν Νικαίᾳ πίστεως 
ἤστην. 
2 ὑπὸ δὴ τῶν τοιούτων καὶ Κωνστάντιος ὁ βασιλεὺς μετεπείσθη. καὶ κατὰ μὲν διάνοιαν, ὡς εἰκάζω, ὅμοια τῷ πατρὶ καὶ τῷ 
ἀδελφῷ ἐφρόνει, ῥητὸν δὲ ῥητοῦ ἀμείψας ἀντὶ ὁμοουσίου ὁμοιούσιον ἔλεγε. 
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Emperor” (2.5.2)3 and “besieging his empty mind with arguments” (2.4.1),4 in the process taking care to 
inform his readers that “the mind of Constantius was unstable, and resembled reeds driven this way and 
that by contrary winds” (2.3.6).5 Such a man may be a bad Emperor according to the 5th century rubric, 
but he is in no meaningful sense capable of such high crimes as heresy or persecution. These evils are to 
be assigned, not to the weak-minded Emperor himself, but to his episcopal advisors. 
The pagan historian Ammianus, meanwhile, even in largely ignoring the ecclesiastical events of 
Constantius’ reign, characterizes him, if anything, even more negatively than his Christian counterparts. 
As the 5th century Nicene historians are grounded in both the traditions passed down from Athanasius 
and his allies and the more uncomplicatedly Imperial Christianity of their own century, so Ammianus’ 
account of Constantius is grounded in his self-conscious self-presentation as pagan Roman historian in 
the mold of Tacitus, expected, therefore, to focus his narratives on the presentation of positive and 
negative moral exemplars, a political vision of Imperial rule based around adherence to traditional 
Roman models of power, and a deeply self-interested defense of particular Roman elites—not here 
Tacitus’ father-in-law Agricola, but rather Ammianus’ beloved commander Ursicinus and personal hero 
Julian, both men who had frequently come into conflict with Constantius during his reign. From such a 
viewpoint, it is essentially impossible for Constantius to succeed. Though Ammianus, like his Christian 
counterparts, blames much of Constantius’ wrongdoing on the excessive influence of his courtiers and 
eunuchs,6 his final summation of the Emperor’s character (Res Gestae 21.16) is heavily weighted 
towards the negative. While Ammianus praises Constantius’ sense of the dignity of the Imperial office 
 
3 τὴν κουφοτάτην τοῦ βασιλέως παραπείσαντες γνώμην. 
4 λόγοις τὴν κουφοτάτην αὐτοῦ πολιορκήσαντες γνώμην. 
5 εὔριπον τοῦ Κωνσταντίου τὴν γνώμην καὶ καλάμοις ὑπ’ ἀνέμων ἐναντίων τῇδε κἀκεῖσε κλινομένοις προσεοικυῖαν. 
6 For a discussion of Ammianus’ fixation on the presence and power of eunuchs at the Imperial court, see Tougher 1999; for 
more general discussions of the actual role of eunuchs at the Imperial court, see Hopkins 1963, Smith 2007, 203-208. 
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(21.16.1, 7) and his total lack of personal and sexual misbehavior (21.16.6-7), he attacks him at length 
for his alleged cruelty and fear of usurpation, which led him to torture and execute, or at least suspect 
and oppress, many innocent men, including his own family members, and, allegedly, Ammianus’ allies 
Ursicinus and Julian (21.16.8-11).7 Most damning of all, perhaps, in Ammianus’ judgment are the public 
plaudits Constantius claimed in triumphing over internal enemies through civil war—an eminently 
Constantinian trait if ever there was one, but one that in Ammianus’ judgment indicates, not divine 
favor, but a total lack of concern for the loss of life and internal stability brought to the Roman Empire 
by such conflicts (21.16.15). That Constantius did in fact have good reason to fear usurpation and 
rebellion is something Ammianus only grudgingly acknowledges (21.16.10). Yet in Ammianus’ hardly 
sympathetic opinion, the right response for an Emperor so constantly threatened by civil conflict and 
rebellion would have been very different indeed: “And as certain wise men correctly judged, it would 
have been more an indication of great virtue for this Constantius to have given up his imperium without 
bloodshed than to have vindicated it so unmercifully (inclementer)” (21.16.12).8 In such straitened 
circumstances, hamstrung by a basic lack of legitimacy, the quintessential Roman and Imperial virtue of 
clementia can be shown, seemingly, only by abdication. However true this conclusion may be to the 
ancient philosophical tradition or Classical Roman political thought, it is hardly reflective of the actual 
political system of the 4th century.  
Finally, and most notably for our purposes, the pagan Ammianus finds Constantius’ constant 
participation in Christian theological disputes both bizarre and counterproductive:  
 
7 See in particular Hunt 1999 for an analysis of “Ammianus’ sweeping denunciation of the methods of Constantius’ 
government” (47), which relies on stereotyped features and personal blame of Constantius over acknowledgement of the 
general means and methods of 4th century Imperial governance and largely elides Ammianus’ own role and those of his heroes 
Ursicinus and Julian as enforcers of Imperial will. For a more balanced and thorough analysis of the role of the Imperial court in 
the Late Roman Empire, see Smith 2007. 
8 Utque recte sentientes quidam arbitrabantur, virtutis erat potius indicium magnae, imperio eundem Constantium sine cruore 
cessisse quam vindicasse tam inclementer. 
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By mixing up the Christian religion, which is complete and simple, with the superstition of an old 
woman—superstition which contains things that are more difficult to enquire into than in 
serious need of being set in order—he roused up very many schisms which once in progress he 
abundantly nourished by his love of disputation about words, with the result that because of the 
masses of bishops riding public transports here and there to what they call synods, attempting 
to conform every ritual to their own judgment, he cut the sinews of the public cursus 
(21.16.18).9 
An Empire in which every ritual (and every belief about the cosmic order) is to be determined by 
Christian bishops and the Emperor through complex theological negotiation is not one that in any way 
corresponds to Ammianus’ ideas of good order or piety. Ammianus is far from uniformly hostile to 
Christianity—but he is hostile to Constantius’ attempts to settle Christian doctrine through Imperial 
conciliar projects, a trait shared with many members of the Nicene episcopate in Constantius’ lifetime. 
That Constantius might have had good reason to be worried about, and therefore attempt to control, 
the theological opinions and concerted political action of bishops is something that these Nicene 
bishops were, as we will see, well aware of, but which Ammianus does not consider at all. For the 
Roman res publica of Cicero, Tacitus, and Ammianus, Constantius is simply a bad ruler. 
The sole exception to this withering hail of criticism in Late Antiquity is the 5th century Eunomian 
historian Philostorgius, who practically alone among ancient and modern historians finds Constantius in 
some measure a heroic and virtuous figure. More to the point of this study, it is Philostorgius alone 
among authors writing in Late Antiquity who highlights the continuities and similarities between 
Constantius and Constantine in policy, character, and theological belief. In strong contradistinction to 
Ammianus, not only does Philostorgius exculpate Constantius’ murder of his relatives as punishment for 
their alleged poisoning of Constantine ordered by the dying Emperor himself through a secret will 
(Historia Ecclesiastica 2.16), but he also takes care to justify Constantius’ civil wars to retain and further 
 
9 Christianam religionem absolutam et simplicem anili superstitione confundens, in qua scrutanda perplexius quam conponenda 
gravius, excitavit discidia plurima, quae progressa fusius aluit concertatione verborum, ut catervis antistitum iumentis publicis 
ultro citroque discurrentibus per synodos, quas appellant, dum ritum omnem ad suum trahere conantur arbitrium, rei 
vehiculariae succideret nervos. 
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his supreme power and highlight the relative mercy and forbearance shown to attempted usurpers such 
as Vetrano (3.22) and even his murdered relative Gallus (whose death Constantius repented of and 
would have prevented if not for a conspiracy of his courtiers) (4.1). Like his father, too, Constantius is 
favored in his civil conflict with Magnentius—the final step before the assumption of sole authority over 
the Roman Empire—by a sign of victory from heaven, one even more dramatic and spectacular than his 
father’s solar halo: a giant cross of light hovering over the site of Calvary in Jerusalem, surrounded by a 
rainbow shaped like a crown, and so brilliant that “with its astonishing rays it outshone the light of day” 
(3.16).10 Finally, Constantius is portrayed positively in his general religious piety, his building program of 
churches,11 his authoritative interest in theological matters (e.g. 3.2, 4.7, 4.10), his sending of bishops to 
convert the Indians, the Ethiopians, and the Goths to a resolutely anti-Nicene Christianity (3.4-3.6), and 
especially his alliance with (Philostorgius’ “Neo-Arian” heroes) Aetius and Eunomius against the violent 
heretic Athanasius of Alexandria, the profane homoousian Basil of Ancyra, and all their allies. 
Even this positive presentation, however, is not unqualified. Philostorgius, writing nearly fifty 
years after Nicene Christianity had become the religion of the Emperor (if not always his court or the 
Roman military), retains strong traces of positive traditions towards both Constantius and Constantine 
as heroes of the anti-Nicene cause. His is, nonetheless, a decidedly non-Imperial brand of Christianity, 
the heir not of Eusebius of Caesarea or his successor Acacius (both of whom Philostorgius derides as 
deceptive compromisers), but of Aetius, an anti-Nicene priest so radical that even his closest theological 
allies finally turned on him and managed to effect his banishment by Constantius as part of the final 
 
10 καταπληκτικωτάταις αἴγλαις ὑπεραστράψαντος τὸ τῆς ἡμέρας φῶς. 
11 For a review of Constantius’ extensive involvement with building projects throughout the Empire, especially in Rome, 
Constantinople, Antioch, and other cities in which he personally resided throughout his reign see Henck 2002. As Henck 
summarizes, “an emperor who paid so much attention to detail when it came to court ceremony in general and an imperial 
adventus in particular, who took care not to spit or wipe his face in public and to bow as he passed under arches, also took 
great pains with the stage upon which he acted or the backdrop against which the scene was set” (304). Similarly, Kleinbauer 
2006 highlights Constantius’ significant architectural interest and inventiveness, arguing that he should be credited for the 
invention of both the cross-shaped church type and the double-shelled building type.  
252 
 
triumph of homoianism (4.12). His Constantius, then, is a figure of piety and promise, but not, finally, of 
the heroic faith espoused by those anti-Nicenes willing to risk Imperial censure to proclaim clearly the 
Gospel of the Son’s total foreignness in οὐσία to the Father. While Aetius remains consistently faithful 
through every trial, Constantius is brought by his own harsh temper and by deceptive bishops—at first 
Basil of Ancyra (4.8), then Eusebius’ heir Acacius (4.12, 5.1)—to authorize the exile of the truly orthodox. 
When Constantius finally dies, it is in the midst of defeats that, as Philostorgius makes clear, constitute a 
divine punishment both for his murder of his kin and for his unjust exile of anti-Nicene theologians and 
bishops (5.4). In his last days, Philostorgius says, Constantius had begun to doubt the wicked 
compromiser Acacius’ good faith and make plans to examine the issues more thoroughly, which would 
surely have resulted in Aetius’ triumph (6.4)—but the revolt of Julian and his own death deprived him of 
this opportunity of repentance and reconciliation. Even to his most sympathetic biographer, Constantius 
is finally a failure. 
As already mentioned, Constantius’ propaganda and writings throughout his lifetime show a 
pervasive focus on continuity with and imitation of Constantine. Imperial Father and Son are, if not 
always precisely equivalent, still fundamentally similar in their relationship with the Empire at large, civil 
and foreign conflicts, and the Christian religion and its bishops. If many modern and ancient thinkers are 
to be believed, however, Constantius would seem rather to be entirely dissimilar to his father. Where 
Constantine is an overwhelming presence even for those who hate him, Constantius is obscure. Where 
Constantine is a skilled manager of the Empire, Constantius is incompetent. Where Constantine is 
resolutely above conflict and suspicion, marching from foreordained victory to victory, Constantius is 
blamed for his suspiciousness and the violent means by which held on to power. Even in areas where 
similarity is acknowledged, it is only for the purposes of underscoring the even more fundamental 
differences between good and evil, competence and incompetence, success and failure. Constantine is 
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the glorious representative of a successful political and religious revolution—Constantius is, at best, his 
shadow.  
Yet a proper understanding of Constantius both as a ruler and a key figure in the history of the 
4th century depends, I believe, on a forthright understanding of the profound continuity in policies, 
beliefs, and character between Emperor and successor, father and son, Constantine and Constantius. 
For it is only in the light of these similarities that the meaningful differences can be properly and 
proportionally understood: most of all the difference between the purported successes of Constantine 
and the purported failures of Constantius. One of the primary purposes of this study is to attempt to 
understand the events of Constantius’ reign not primarily through the lens of his alleged flaws of 
character or belief, but rather through the lens of the Constantinian settlement, its underlying logic, and 
its unfolding in the reign of his son and successor. The successes and failures of Constantius were not his 
alone, but those of a political system, a theological belief, and a dynasty. The failure of Constantius was 
the failure of the Constantinian settlement.   
3.2:  
Succeeding the Cosmic Emperor 
The second son of Constantine by his second wife was not yet ten years old12 when his elder 
half-brother and designated Imperial heir Crispus was executed by their father, throwing Constantine’s 
dynastic ambitions into immediate and near-total disarray.13 In a sense, it is this sudden and inexplicable 
 
12 Constantius was most likely born in 317, and was appointed Caesar in 324 while still a young child (Jones, Martindale, and 
Morris 1971, 226). 
13 In mid-326, Constantine’s eldest son Crispus, Caesar since 317, an important military commander in Constantine’s campaigns 
in Gaul and in his civil war against Licinius, and previously prominent on Constantine’s imagery and coinage and clearly the 
designated heir among Constantine’s four sons, was suddenly executed by his father. Shortly thereafter, Constantine’s second 
wife Fausta, Crispus’ step-mother and the mother of all three of Constantine’s other sons, also met a sudden and untimely end 
under even more unclear circumstances. Afterwards, a damnatio memoriae seems to have been decreed against both, and few 
references to them appear in the imagery or literature of the remainder of Constantine’s reign or those of his successors. These 
mysterious deaths in the family of the Emperor have naturally provoked feverish speculation in writers ancient and modern, 
who have produced hypotheses as varied and melodramatic as any contemporary novelist: including most prominently an 
unsuccessful-stepmother-son seduction-leading-to-rape-accusation-leading-to-murder plot taken directly from the Greek 
tragedy Hippolytus, actual stepmother-son adultery possibly leading to pregnancy and the death of Fausta in a desperate 
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murder of a royal heir, more than any decision of Constantius himself, that was most responsible for the 
overall shape of his reign. The newly united Roman Empire, presided over by a single experienced ruler, 
no longer had a single militarily and administratively competent successor. Over the remaining ten years 
of his reign, Constantine made up for this loss by promoting a dizzying array of relatives to high positions 
in the Empire, including a quartet of immature Caesars who may or may not have been intended to 
constitute a quasi-Tetrarchy upon his death. When Constantine finally died, however, it was a 
thoroughly unexpected event, overshadowed in our sources by his last-minute decision to receive 
baptism at Nicomedia. If at this point Constantine made any plan or provisions for what would happen 
next, little trace survives. 
Much scholarly speculation has focused on what Constantine’s actual plan for the succession of 
the Empire might have been.14 Yet whatever his actual intentions, the most determinative thing for the 
 
attempt at instigating an abortion, some sort of actual treasonous plot by Crispus acting in conjunction with a step-mother with 
whom he may or may not have been sexually involved, and/or an effort by a somewhat more chaste Fausta to clear the way for 
her sons’ ascendancy through accusations of treason (or, alternately, magic) against her step-son leading to her own murder (or 
perhaps suicide, to avoid trial and execution) once Constantine had come to regret (possibly thanks to the intervention of his 
own mother Helena) the hasty execution of his beloved son. While the final hypothesis seems to me the most likely, the issue is 
by nature unresolvable—though for the purposes of this study it should be at least mentioned that, while to the best of my 
knowledge no modern scholar has ever supported it, the early 5th century historian/theologian Orosius argues that 
Constantine’s murder of his wife and son was in fact due to religious conflicts brought on by the Arian Controversy (Historiae 
Adversus Paganos 7.28.26). Given the close associations explored in later chapters between the political conflicts between 
Constantius, Constans, Constantine II, and Julian and Christian theological disputes, this possibility is not nearly as absurd as it 
has sometimes been treated. For various reviews of the basic evidence and hypotheses, see e.g. Guthrie 1966, Austin 1980, 
Barnes 1981, 220-221, Woods 1998, Blockley 1972, 457-458, Barnes 2011, 144-158, and especially Pohlsander 1984, in my 
judgment the most comprehensive and balanced discussion. 
14 Burgess 2008, 7-9, 19-21, 26-27, argues (cf. Blockley 1972, 458-460, Barnes 2011, 163-168), in direct contradiction to 
Eusebius’ repeated assertions in Vita Constantini that Constantine had himself arranged to have his three sons succeed him 
(e.g. 51.1, 63.3), that Constantine’s original intention prior to his unexpected death was to promote his two eldest sons 
Constantine II and Constantius to the position of Augustus, leading to another Tetrarchy of two Augusti and two Caesars 
supported by the other male relatives recently appointed to power. If accurate, this would give Eusebius’ attempt to impose a 
straightforwardly monarchical pattern on both Constantine’s original intentions and the thoroughly unplanned final result even 
more striking, and would lend support to the idea that Eusebius’ intention in Vita Constantini may have been in part to 
influence Constantius, the apparent engineer of the new state of affairs. Woods 2011, 190-191, has more recently argued 
against the numismatic evidence on which this hypothesis is based, while Lenski 2016, 63-65, has instead asserted that 
Constantine’s appointment of relatives to numerous subordinate posts “reflected more about his concerns with the promotion 
of dynasty than an orchestrated effort to recreate the tetrarchy” (64), constituting a “bloated extension of the family tree into 
the imperial apparatus” (64) in the service of increasing Constantine’s own importance as Emperor-cum-father of a new 
Imperial dynastic system whose failure “was all but guaranteed by its excess” (65).  
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actual succession of power was not any such abortive plan, but the actual system of legitimacy he had 
created—one that, in the form presented in Chapter One, was practically impossible to extend to any 
successor, let alone four. As I have argued, Constantine’s primary argument for his own legitimacy, as 
expressed in his writings and speeches during his lifetime, was grounded in the alleged necessity of a 
strictly monarchical cosmos with a single will proactively commanding all others, as well as in his own 
charismatic status as the unique “Servant of God” favored with divine guidance and favor visible in 
victory in battle and especially in his revolutionarily pious deed of punishing the tyrants responsible for 
the Persecution of Diocletian. Whatever Constantine’s intentions for his successors, it is, to say the least, 
difficult to see how any of these things could be reasonably claimed by the four young and 
inexperienced Caesars of a divided Empire.  
In his efforts to establish his own legitimacy and centralize power around himself, Constantine 
had, whether deliberately or accidentally, left only one means of legitimacy to the men tasked with 
ruling the Roman Empire after him: connection with Constantine himself. Servants of God they might 
not be, nor monarchical cosmic rulers, but they were all related to one. This shift has often been 
understood as a return to a simple dynastic principle of rule after Diocletian’s more complicated efforts 
to construct a system of legitimacy. Yet by murdering the only son competent to replace him and then 
appointing more than a dozen family members to various positions of authority, with no clear division or 
hierarchy of power, Constantine had in fact forestalled any typical form of dynastic succession. 
The simple dynastic logic of family inheritance had served the noble families of Rome well for 
many centuries, keeping family wealth together through elaborate structures of intermarriage and 
adoption, and such structures had in the past constituted a relatively stable basis for Imperial succession 
as well. In the legal fiction of the Roman Empire at its height, the Imperial office could be passed down 
to a single designated heir just like family property. Constantine, however, had entirely failed to 
designate any such heir. Unwilling to accept a nominal equal in Crispus, he had instead sought, like the 
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sun so extolled by him as the model of monarchical rule, to spread his power as broadly as possible, 
granting a share in Imperial power to practically every male member of his family, but granting to none 
whatsoever the hope of one day possessing the totality of that power. In parallel with this political 
transformation, in the writings of Eusebius of Caesarea, the holding up of Crispus as an analogue for the 
Son of God united to his Father in Historia Ecclesiastica had given away to a starker system in which 
Constantine was explicitly the final link in the chain of cosmic monarchs, himself subordinate to the 
subordinate Son but with nothing below him but multiple yoked inferiors directed by his will, reflecting 
his light, and rendering him, in a divided, multiple human world, an analogue of the omnipresent and 
omnipotent Word in heaven. Constantine’s family members, even those bearing the title of Caesar, 
possessed their authority not as heirs to a dynasty but as a class of Imperial representatives and 
subordinate administrators serving at his command. Privileged they might be due to their familial 
relationship, but they still governed at Constantine’s pleasure and in his name. They could wield power 
because of him, but they could not easily take his place. As in the cosmos presided over by superior 
Father and inferior Son, origination and familial connection was everything—but equality was 
impossible. Constantine could not be replaced any more than the Father could. 
One attempt to deal with this odd situation we have already seen: Eusebius of Caesarea’s 
bizarre claim that Constantine remained sole ruler of the human realm after his death, represented but 
not replaced by his children as subordinate functionaries. Whether or not this was true in the cosmic or 
legal sense, it remained in a real way the truth of the post-Constantinian Empire. Constantine had not, in 
fact, been succeeded. His heirs had little choice but to attempt to claim his legacy and authority as the 
basis of their own, for all the world as if they were still Caesars appealing to a ruling Augustus. 
Constantine, in order to shore up the shaky power acquired largely through civil war, had created a 
political system centered squarely on himself and dependent as much as possible on his own will. Now, 
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in the unavoidable absence of that dominating presence and will, unity had inevitably given way to 
multiplicity.  
This posed one rather immediate issue for the governance of the Empire after Constantine’s 
death. Put simply, if blood relation to Constantine was to be the new primary basis of claims to Imperial 
power, there were far, far too many people who could make such a claim. As in the polemically 
polytheistic cosmos criticized by Constantine in Oratio ad coetum sanctorum, with no supreme God to 
maintain order among numerous competing authorities, each with their own sphere of power and 
influence, civil conflict was all but unavoidable. Constantine had once been the supreme God keeping his 
cosmos in order with his will, authority, and presence; but now God was quite unexpectedly dead in the 
middle of preparing for a campaign with the Persians, and a truly cosmic crisis had arisen. 
The first political act the barely twenty-year-old Constantius II seems to have undertaken 
following his father’s death, then, was to craft an immediate and practical solution to this pressing crisis. 
That solution was to establish a clear basis of Imperial legitimacy and hierarchy where none existed by 
systematically eliminating nearly every male15 member of Constantine’s extended family except for 
 
15 A notable exception to this massacre, of course, was the female relatives of Constantine, who as such would ultimately 
guarantee the continuance of Constantinian blood into the next century (see note 291 in section 3.6 below). Although in reality 
women were absolutely necessary for a system dependent on blood relations, this role seems to have been relatively obscured 
in the Imperial propaganda and art of the Constantinian dynasty. While Tetrarchic women had been erased altogether, 
Constantinian women at least merited artistic representations that emphasized their status as mothers of members of the 
Constantinian dynasty—without, however, granting them the unique, quasi-divine iconography of power reserved for Imperial 
men (cf. Harries 2014, 200-202, Clauss 2002, Schade 2000). Imperial women appear relatively rarely in narratives of 4th century 
ecclesiastical and secular politics, and mostly in a few highly stereotyped positions derived from traditional court narratives (i.e. 
as means of access to the Emperor and alleged schemers onto whom responsibility for disfavored decisions can be fobbed off), 
few of which possess much historical plausibility (see e.g. Harries 2014, 197-198 for the anachronistic nature of Philostorgius’ 
claims about Constantina’s primary role in the usurpation of Vetranio, as well as my own discussion of the 5th century narratives 
surrounding Constantine’s reception of Arius in sections 1.4 and 3.1). Other than that, the most tangible effect of the 
Constantinian return to dynastic politics was a new prominence of women as minor supporters for claimants to Imperial power, 
means of discrediting the origins and legitimacy of such claimants, and consequently victims of Imperial in-fighting and violence 
to an extent not seen in Roman politics since the time of the Julio-Claudians (cf. Harries 2014, 199-201, Hillner 2017, 78-88). 
The most unfortunate female victim of this period was without a doubt Fausta, second wife of Constantine, who saw both her 
father Maximian and brother Maxentius killed by her husband and then likely fell victim to him herself in the incidents 
surrounding the death of Crispus (cf. Harries 2014, 202-206, as well as the additional sources on the deaths of Crispus and 
Fausta given at note 13 in section 3.2 above). On the more positive side, the need of Emperors to demonstrate their continuing 
connection to the city of Rome and its aristocracy led to residence in Rome for a number of Imperial women, including most 
prominently Helena and Constantina, who were thus able to gain a certain remove from Imperial politics and a new prominent 
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himself and his two brothers.16 With all of these claimants to Constantine’s blood out of the picture,17 an 
actual system of succession could be established where none had existed before: as with Father and Son 
in heaven, what mattered was not mere familial relationship, the sharing in a single blood or a single 
nature, but direct origination of inferiors by a superior. The three brothers could thus assume the title of 
Augustus as the three sons of an absent father, similar to him thanks to their origination by him and 
therefore sharing, in a limited way, in his supreme power. This was a Trinity in a very different sense 
than anyone in the 4th century had imagined. Yet if it brought stability to the Empire, clearly even 
Eusebius of Caesarea was willing to accept it.  
As it happened, the twenty-five years of Constantius’ reign proved even bloodier than those that 
had brought Constantine to sole rulership of the Empire. The civil conflicts that marked these decades, 
like those that had brought an end to the Tetrarchic college, were occasioned in large part by the 
question of precedence. Unlike in the Tetrarchic system, Constantine had left no clear indications of 
how seniority was to be assigned and a chain of command established among multiple Emperors, a 
situation naturally of far less concern in a political system where one monarch claimed all precedence 
and command for himself but extremely pressing in one now divided between three supreme rulers. 
 
public role as patrons of Christian building, piety, and beneficence, looking forward to the more ascetic models of female power 
in later centuries (cf. Hillner 2017, Harries 2014, 206-212).  
16 The fundamental study on the so-called “massacre of the princes,” in which ten of Constantine’s close male relatives, 
including the Caesar Dalmatius, along with other unrelated members of Constantine’s administration, were murdered or 
executed by the Roman army, remains Burgess 2008, who argues for Constantius’ status as the sole, direct instigator of the 
massacre. More recently, Moser 2018, 148-153, also highlights Constantius’ responsibility for the massacre, carried out by his 
own troops in the absence of his two brothers, and then justified through propagandic coinage, produced first in the East and 
then later sporadically spread Westward, which emphasized unbroken continuity with Constantine and constituted both a 
“rewriting of history” to eliminate these acts of familial bloodshed and “a justification for why they had been necessary” (153). 
Even in an Imperial panegyric delivered before Constantius by Julian (Orationes 1.17a), the least damning thing that can be said 
about Constantius’ involvement in the massacres is that he had failed to prevent them—events that clearly served his interests 
and whose results he then cemented by deliberate concerted efforts (cf. Hunt 1998, 3-5). 
17 Tougher 2012, 186-191, has recently highlighted those male relatives that did survive the massacre, which included not only 
his half-cousins Julian and Gallus but also a number of their maternal relatives favored with high office under Constantius. As he 
summarizes from this evidence, Constantius seemingly “could tolerate and deploy maternal relations of his paternal relatives” 
(191). While this may have reflected an estimation of their potential danger as usurpers, there were also almost certainly 
ideological reasons behind this overt focus on male descent.  
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Each of Constantine’s sons could make a plausible claim to the position. Constantine II was the eldest of 
the three brothers and the first to be appointed Caesar by his father, and thus might well claim to 
represent the primate of the new Imperial college—but in fact, in both the assignment of rough spheres 
of influence by Constantine and the division of territory that followed Constantius’ massacre of their 
male relatives, he had received the least populated and prestigious portions of the Empire in the 
extreme West. On their father’s part, this was likely a reflection of no more than an immediate concern 
for assigning the most competent general to the most difficult task of managing campaigns against 
Germanic incursions farthest from the supreme Augustus. When it came to the division of territories 
made by Constantius and Constans after the downfall of the fourth Caesar Dalmatius, however, it could 
hardly be seen as anything but a deliberate slight. Constans was the youngest brother, perhaps 
seventeen years old at the time of his father’s death, and allegedly serving under the guardianship of his 
elder brother Constantine II; yet he controlled both North Africa and Italy, including Rome, the city that 
had once played a key role in granting Constantine an alleged primacy within the Tetrarchic college and 
hence aiding his rise to sole power. In numerous practical and ideological ways, finally, the new division 
of the Empire favored Constantius, the seeming architect of the massacre of the princes, the resulting 
division of territories, and the new Imperial system as a whole, and the Emperor who when the dust 
settled was left in unchallenged control both of the most densely-populated Eastern portions of the 
Empire and of the new, indelibly Constantinian Imperial capital at Constantinople.18 
The members of the Tetrarchic college had been united by shared membership in alleged Jovian 
and Herculean dynasties, as well as by ties of intermarriage. The new Trinity of Constantinian rulers 
 
18 That Constantius did in fact use his possession of Constantinople to assert his seniority within the Imperial college has been 
recently and persuasively argued by Moser 2018, 119-168, who asserts that despite spending the bulk of the years between 
337 and 350 resident at the Imperial court at Antioch (121-131), Constantius nonetheless “us[ed] his father’s city as a basis to 
claim legitimacy and the senior position among the brother emperors” (120).  
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were united by even closer ties of blood and by shared origination from the cosmic Emperor 
Constantine. Neither system, however, proved capable of preventing civil war. 
3.3: 
Constantius and the Bishops 
 As I have argued, Constantine had tied his legitimacy as a ruler to a preeminent cosmic status 
grounded both in an abstract theology of subordination and in concrete relationships with the bishops 
of the Christian Church. He thus left to rulers interested in following in his footsteps a delicate and 
difficult task, one that had not previously formed any part of the Roman Emperor’s duties: governing the 
Church by managing bishops, episcopal processes (particularly the new Imperial-episcopal judicial 
system discussed in section 1.3 above), and theological doctrine. Constantine had tied his legitimacy to 
the Church, and to be a legitimate ruler in his image, Constantius would have to do likewise. 
 Here, however, another immediate problem presented itself, one closely connected with the 
threats Constantius had already faced and surmounted in the political and dynastic sphere. It was, once 
again, highly unclear how and under what terms Constantius could make use of the authority 
consistently employed by his father in his dealings with bishops. 
In any political system, the relationship between personal charisma and institutional authority is 
a complex one. This disjunct necessarily played a larger role for Constantine, as a usurper trying to 
establish a new dynasty, than for Emperors in more stable times; and in no area did it loom larger than 
in his relationship with the Christian Church. In the complex interactions between Emperor and bishops 
during the reign of Constantine, totally novel norms and procedures had been worked out almost totally 
on the basis of ad hoc decisions and interactions between Emperor and bishops. In dealing with these 
events, as I have argued, Constantine had forthrightly appealed to his own divinely-appointed and 
providentially-guided status to cement his very tangible claims to authority in matters of episcopal 
conduct and theology. The question of whether this status and accompanying authority adhered to the 
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Imperial office as such or merely to Constantine as a unique figure had not only not been resolved, 
however, it had actually grown less and less clear as Constantine’s reign had progressed and his 
interventions into episcopal processes and theological conflicts had grown more extreme. 
As expressed in his own extant writings, Constantine’s claim to authority rested on a further 
claim to continuing providential guidance, itself justified by the assertion that he had risen to power and 
assumed sole rulership of the Empire thanks to the divine inspiration, aid, and favor manifest in his 
dramatic military victories over the tyrants responsible for the Persecution of Diocletian. When 
Constantine declared to episcopal councils that none of them could deny that he was in fact the Servant 
of God, he did so by appealing precisely to these facts and associated claims, claims which most bishops 
did in fact seem to find difficult to deny. Whatever their precise beliefs on the nature of the cosmos or 
the Imperial office in general, bishops who had lived through the Persecution of Diocletian could hardly 
dispute the fact of the highly unlikely and unexpected (and therefore, according to the logic accepted in 
the 4th century by both Christians and pagans, providential) events that had brought the Church in only a 
few years from a proscribed and devastated institution to one freed from persecution and honored with 
legal privileges and imposing edifices throughout the Empire. When Constantine came to address and 
intervene in Christian disputes, then, he did so from a position of strength.  
Constantius was in a far weaker position. While like Constantine he seems to have possessed 
significant intellectual ability, thanks to his thorough education at his father’s direction and his interest 
in philosophy, theology, and liberal arts,19 there was little reason for bishops to take his opinions as 
reflective of divine inspiration. While like Constantine he had risen to power thanks to civil conflict, in his 
case that civil conflict had involved a furtive massacre of family members, none of whom could plausibly 
be accused of persecution. Even after he had successfully fended off numerous foreign incursions on the 
 
19 For a discussion of Constantius’ education and his status as a φιλόλογος and patron of intellectual pursuits, see Henck 2001. 
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borders of the Empire and fought multiple civil wars against would-be usurpers, these victories had little 
hope of equaling Constantine’s in their status as divinely favored miracles benefiting Church and Empire 
alike.  
In his dealings with bishops, Constantius found himself in a rather unenviable position: reliant 
on the Church and bishops for legitimacy, expected to intervene in their theological disputes and preside 
over their episcopal judicial system, but lacking the personal, charismatic authority on which his father 
had relied. More fundamentally still, Constantius lacked Constantine’s basic position as sole ruler of the 
Empire. However charismatic Constantius might have been or aspired to be, there were two equally 
Constantinian brothers who could appeal to and make use of bishops for their own causes and 
purposes. It should not be a surprise, then, that Constantius was frequently accused throughout of his 
reign of using far more violent and heavy-handed tactics in controlling synods, punishing bishops, and 
mandating theological agreement than his father. The directly coercive power of the Imperial office was 
the one thing that Constantius possessed in total commonality with Constantine. As he was to find out, 
however, his own acts of violence could not be legitimized nearly as easily as those of his father. 
The main thing I wish to emphasize at the outset, then, before turning to a detailed narrative of 
the ecclesiastical events of Constantius’ reign, is that at almost every point, in dealing with the Christian 
Church and bishops, Constantius attempted to act in continuity with his father in self-portrayal, 
theological orientation, and methods of ecclesiastical management. What differed was not so much 
what was done, but by whom and to whom it was done. In the new, divided environment of the 
Christian Roman Empire after Constantine, the fundamental pillars on which the Constantinian 






Conflicts in the Constantinian Trinity 
Constantius inherited from his father not only Constantinople and the Christian East, but also 
those bishops who had, in the final years of Constantine’s reign, found in the Emperor a key ally for their 
theological and ecclesiastical projects. For all their connections with Constantine, however, Eusebius of 
Caesarea and Eusebius of Nicomedia hardly possessed the dynastic or administrative qualifications to 
wield Imperial power on their own behalf, nor was a continuing alliance with the new Eastern wielder of 
that power by any means assured. It is likely that this fact provides at least some of the context for 
Eusebius of Caesarea’s Vita Constantini, which was likely intended in part to advertise his own bona 
fides as an ally and interpreter of Constantine and his preferred theological and political beliefs to a 
Constantius now in firm possession of the Eastern Empire and interested in emulating and appealing to 
his father’s legacy.  
On a basic level, such an alliance made clear sense for both parties. Eusebius of Caesarea, 
Eusebius of Nicomedia, and their allies were naturally interested in maintaining both the stability of the 
overall episcopal system and their own newly dominant position in ecclesiastical affairs in the East. In 
both areas, the natural means to achieve these goals was to ally with Constantius as they had with his 
father. From Constantius’ side as well, an alliance with the most powerful and influential bishops in the 
East, possessing close connections to his father and in command of networks of bishops extending 
throughout his domains, had both ideological and practical advantages. As argued above, Constantine’s 
management of the Church had relied on charismatic authority and accomplishments that his younger 
son simply did not possess, but would have to forge painstakingly on his own account. Then, too, even 
Constantine had found the utility of outsourcing at least some of the tasks of ecclesiastical management 
to influential and well-connected bishops, and this method would have even more appeal for a young 
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ruler with little experience of direct governance in either Church or Empire. For an inexperienced 
Emperor, the natural thing to do, in both Church and Empire, was to delegate.  
It is not at all a surprise, then, that among Constantius’ first attested ecclesiastical acts was the 
transfer of Eusebius of Nicomedia from his position as bishop of Nicomedia, the old Eastern Imperial 
court where he had baptized the ailing Constantine on his deathbed, to the modern Imperial capitol of 
Constantinople, in the process deposing and exiling the hapless incumbent Paul.20 Constantine had 
clearly regarded Eusebius as a valuable ally, but had shown himself unwilling to directly defy the Council 
of Nicaea’s canon absolutely forbidding the transfer of bishops from see to see. This was exactly the kind 
of Constantinian precedent, however, which Constantius could safely defy, especially in the service of 
practically and symbolically binding himself closer to his father.21 In the short term, there was little 
reason for anyone to object, least of all Eusebius himself.  
All of this was, in a real sense, in continuity with Constantine. Yet the balance of power had 
subtly, almost imperceptibly, shifted. Eusebius of Caesarea and Eusebius of Nicomedia had related to 
 
20 The career of Paul of Constantinople constitutes one of the more unfortunate examples of the interrelationship of politics 
and the episcopate in the 4th century. Paul, although only briefly bishop of the Constantinople prior to his deposition to make 
way for Eusebius (cf. Barnes 1993, 212-213) and although possessing little attraction to the bishops of the Western Empire, 
seems to have been crucial in gaining Constans’ active support of the exiles. As S. Parvis 2006a, 202-206, suggests, this is likely 
due to Paul’s deep connections among the populace of Constantinople, a city in the border regions between the two halves of 
the Empire and one crucial to Constantius’ bid for legitimacy through connection with Constantine. The most extreme 
documented incident of popular unrest during Constantius’ reign was to take place c. 342 when, upon Eusebius’ death, Paul, 
seemingly at the instigation of Constans, attempted to regain his see, leading to rioting violent and sustained enough to drive 
the Imperial proconsul from the city altogether, cause the death of Constantius’ envoy and comes Hermogenes, and ultimately 
bring Constantius himself onto the scene to depose Paul and punish the population of the city by cutting their grain dole in half 
(cf. Barnes 1993, 213-214, Moser 2018, 133-134; S. Parvis 2006a, 202-206; Skinner 2015). Undeterred, Paul seems to have 
made another abortive attempt to return to Constantinople either just before or after the Council of Serdica (Socrates 
Scholasticus 2.16, cf. Barnes 1993, 86, 214), but was almost immediately taken prisoner and deported back to Constans’ realm 
in the West. Constantius’ relative leniency in dealing with him in both of these incidents, I would suggest, in contrast to other 
bishops who were subject to far more punitive action, should be ascribed to a desire to avoid conflict with Constans, with 
whom Paul seems to have possessed a good deal of favor. While Paul was eventually reinstated thanks to Constans’ 
intervention c. 346, he was not to survive his patron’s death by very many months: in 350, after being deposed and exiled, he 
was starved and finally strangled, the typical methods for disposing of prisoners whose direct execution was legally forbidden 
or impolitic (cf. S. Parvis 2006a, 204, Barnes 1993, 214-217).  
21 This connection to his father may have been strengthened by the possibility that, as Ammianus asserts (22.9.4), Eusebius was 
himself distantly related to Constantine (cf. Tougher 2012, 188-189). 
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Constantine as ambitious bishops reliant on Constantine’s Imperial authority to cement their own 
influence and prestige within the episcopate. Now, however, that influence and prestige was well and 
truly cemented, and it was the Emperor who found himself in a shaky position, needing to forge his own 
networks of support within the episcopate but lacking the prestige and charisma to do so on his own 
account. While Constantius decamped to Antioch to manage the defensive campaigns against the 
Persians that would occupy much of his attention for the decade to come, Eusebius held court at the 
heart of the Constantinian Empire. From this position of symbolic power, he was well-positioned to 
continue the work of the unification of the Eastern Church around the twin poles of Eusebian theology 
and political support for Constantius’ regime. Constantius, meanwhile, had not just bishops and Persians 
but also fellow Roman Emperors to deal with.  
As if to make this point clear, the ecclesiastical and political balance of power was almost 
immediately threatened by the decision, allegedly made in consultation by all three of the new 
Emperors but instigated, at the very least, by Constantine II, to return to their sees all the bishops exiled 
by Constantine during the latter years of his reign.  
The Imperial-episcopal judicial system established by Constantine had only begun to use exile as 
a punishment once Constantine had gained sole control of the entirety of the Empire, and this for 
straightforward reasons: because in many cases the extent of the Roman Empire as a whole was 
necessary to cleanly separate bishops from the dense networks of alliance and support found not only in 
their local churches but in their broader provinces and regions. Now, however, the Eastern bishops 
exiled by Constantine to the West found themselves under the authority of Constantine II,22 with their 
 
22 For the location of the various exiles, see S. Parvis 2006a, 134-136. While Parvis suggests that not all of the exiles may have 
been in the far West, any not in Constantine II’s territory would have been at least in the middle realm of his younger brother 
Constans (over whom Constantine II claimed a nominal guardianship), and so in Constantine II’s eyes under his authority. This, 
together with his claim to primogeniture and the general confusion of the months after Constantine’s death, would have 
provided ample opportunity and justification for a unilateral move. 
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cities under the direct control of Constantius. This produced, to say the least, a drastically different state 
of affairs. Religious motivations aside, there was little reason for one Emperor to keep notorious 
ecclesiastical troublemakers in his domain, whose absence from their sees could in no way benefit him 
while their presence in another Emperor’s realm might well have a pleasingly destabilizing effect as they 
vied with their replacements for control of cities and churches. Notably, the letter announcing the 
return of Athanasius from exile to Alexandria (quoted in e.g. Apologia contra Arianos 87) contains only 
the name of Constantine II and the title of Caesar, signs both of the rapidity with which Constantine II 
attempted the move, and the likely motivation behind his decision.23 Constantius’ acceptance of this act 
by his brother would have been practically a given during a period when the massacre of the princes was 
still ongoing and he was actively attempting to forge a new united Empire, and a new basis for Imperial 
legitimacy, around himself and his two brothers. What is perhaps even more notable, though, is the 
basis on which Constantine II sought to have Athanasius’ return (and presumably that of the other 
exiles) accepted by his two brothers. In a letter sent to the Church of Alexandria, Constantine II makes a 
startling series of claims: 
Constantine Caesar to the people of the Catholic Church of the city of Alexandria: I think that it 
has not escaped the knowledge of your holy understanding that Athanasius, the interpreter of 
the worshipful Law, was sent to Gaul for a time for this reason: so that, so long as the cruelty of 
his bloodthirsty and warlike enemies was continuing to endanger his holy head, he might not 
suffer fatal injuries from the perversity of worthless men. In order that he might escape from 
this danger, he was taken from the jaws of the men attacking him and was ordered to spend his 
life under my authority [...] Furthermore, although our Master (δεσπότης) Constantine 
Augustus, my father, had decided to restore this same bishop to his own place, nevertheless 
since he was taken by the fate of human beings and died before he had fulfilled this petition, 
after succeeding him I decided to fulfill the will (προαίρεσις) of the Emperor of divine memory. 
[...] The Divine Providence will guard you, beloved brothers (Athanasius, Apologia contra 
Arianos 87).24 
 
23 As e.g. Hunt 1998, 5, notes, the continuing use of the title Caesar indicates a date between Constantine’s death in May 337 
and the meeting of the three sons of Constantine and resumption of the title of the Augustus in September.  
24 Κωνσταντῖνος Καῖσαρ τῷ λαῷ τῆς καθολικῆς ἐκκλησίας πόλεως Ἀλεξανδρείας. Οὐδὲ τὴν τῆς ὑμετέρας ἱερᾶς ἐννοίας 
ἀποπεφευγέναι γνῶσιν οἶμαι, διὰ τοῦτο Ἀθανάσιον τὸν τοῦ προσκυνητοῦ νόμου ὑποφήτην πρὸς καιρὸν εἰς τὰς Γαλλίας 
ἀπεστάλθαι, ἵν’, ἐπειδὴ ἡ ἀγριότης τῶν αἱμοβόρων αὐτοῦ καὶ πολεμίων ἐχθρῶν εἰς κίνδυνον τῆς ἱερᾶς αὐτοῦ κεφαλῆς 
ἐπέμεινε, μὴ ἄρα διὰ τῆς τῶν φαύλων διαστροφῆς ἀνήκεστα ὑποστῇ. πρὸς τὸ διαπαῖξαι τοίνυν ταύτην ἀφαιρεθεὶς τῶν 
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 There is a great deal more in this brief communication than meets the eye. Despite the assertion 
in later sources that the exiles had been recalled by the three Emperors acting together, there is here no 
trace of the other two brothers at all, other than the brief acknowledgement that Constantine remains 
the “Master” of an “us” that presumably includes Constantine II’s brothers as well as himself. 
Constantine is described, however, not as the father of three Caesars, but solely as the father of 
Constantine II, a nod to his claim to primogeniture.25 Even more strikingly, Constantine II grants himself 
only the title of Caesar, while Constantine retains both his title of Augustus and his mastery of the 
Caesars as a group. It is on the basis of Constantine’s authority, not his own, that Constantine II actually 
recalls Athanasius from exile.26  
This refusal to explicitly claim the office of Augustus and appeal to his dead father as reigning 
Augustus was, I would suggest, less a matter of legal precision than practical necessity. In the incipient 
conflict among the three brothers, the only real higher authority capable of commanding and uniting 
 
φαρύγγων τῶν ἐπικειμένων αὐτῷ ἀνδρῶν ὑπ’ ἐμοὶ διάγειν κεκέλευσται [...] τοιγαροῦν εἰ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα πρὸς τὴν 
προσφιλεστάτην ὑμῶν θεοσέβειαν ὁ δεσπότης ἡμῶν Κωνσταντῖνος ὁ Σεβαστός, ὁ ἐμὸς πατήρ, τὸν αὐτὸν ἐπίσκοπον τῷ ἰδίῳ 
τόπῳ παρασχεῖν προῄρητο, ὅμως ἐπειδὴ ἀνθρωπίνῳ κλήρῳ προληφθεὶς πρὸ τοῦ τὴν εὐχὴν πληρῶσαι ἀνεπαύσατο, 
ἀκόλουθον ἡγησάμην τὴν προαίρεσιν τοῦ τῆς θείας μνήμης βασιλέως διαδεξάμενος πληρῶσαι.[...]. ἡ θεία πρόνοια ὑμᾶς 
διαφυλάξει, ἀγαπητοὶ ἀδελφοί. 
25 This echoes a motif found in Constantine II’s coinage whereby, as Moser 2018, 153-156, notes, his own status as son of 
Constantine and Augustus is emphasized to the downplaying or even exclusion of his brothers, as in a coin series in which 
Constantine is referred to, not (as on Constantius’ coinage) as “Father of the Augusti,” but simply as “Father of the Augustus.” 
As Moser summarizes, “Constantius’ legend thus always implied that there was more than one Augustus in the new political 
order, but Constantine II issued coins in the memory of his deceased father which implied that there was only one imperial 
successor – himself” (154). 
26 As Barnes 1993, 34, notes, while Athanasius indicates that all three Emperors had allowed the exiles to return (Historia 
Arianorum 8.1), he “nowhere quotes the formal act which had legal force.” As S. Parvis 2006a, 137, notes, because of this, “it is 
not clear exactly what legislation and what level of administrative back-up is implied by this statement,” and indeed in my 
judgment it is possible that no formal decree was ever actually issued, particularly given the difficulty of effecting such a decree 
in the tumultuous months immediately after Constantine’s death, in favor of more ad hoc directives for the return of the 
various exiles. Even if we accept that a formal decree was issued, it need not (as Barnes suggests) have been in the name of all 
the living Emperors (including perhaps even the fourth Caesar Dalmatius, who would shortly be murdered), but, given 
Constantine II’s conspicuous lack of mention of these co-Caesars in this letter and his even more conspicuous claims to 
Constantine’s authority, under the authority of Constantine alone, perhaps in conjunction with that of his eldest son, and 
therefore without even the most nominal form of participation by the other Caesars. This would have been a forceful political 
move during a period where both Constantine II and Constantius were actively trying to craft their preferred versions of the 
Imperial succession (cf. Hunt 1998, 5). 
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was, as Eusebius of Caesarea had intuited, their dead father and master Constantine. Even as eldest son, 
Constantine II does not dare ask his brothers to accept his decision on any other basis.  
At the same time, Constantine II’s deliberate underscoring of Constantine’s recent death and 
assertion that he had in fact succeeded his father in office, combined with the total lack of mention of 
any of his brothers, constitute a masked claim to preeminent authority in the Empire on the basis of his 
inheritance as eldest son. In these partially contradictory features, the letter straightforwardly matches 
up with the set of contradictory pressures and concerns roused in Constantine’s sons by his sudden 
death. Constantine II can implicitly claim right of succession to his father’s office of Augustus and 
supreme ruler of the Empire—but not, in the present confused state of an Empire divided between 
multiple subordinate Caesars, actually grant himself that title or that power. Indeed, he cannot even 
grant himself the authority to recall a bishop from exile without appealing to a spurious intention of his 
dead father. All he can really do, in the short term, is oppose and undermine his brothers.  
The idea that Constantine had actually deposed and exiled Athanasius as a protective measure 
against the malice of “the Eusebians” is flatly contradicted by every other available piece of evidence. 
The Alexandrians to whom Constantine II was writing had not long before been the recipient of multiple 
letters from his father denouncing Athanasius in the harshest of terms and denying their requests for his 
reinstatement (see e.g. Sozomen, 2.31), and would presumably have been more surprised than anyone 
to learn of Constantine’s secret affection for him. As a claim of fact, this is an obvious, and not 
particularly disguised, fiction. As a bald-faced appeal to Constantine’s authority in making a 
controversial decision likely to be opposed by his brothers, it fits perfectly within the negotiation of 
power and legitimacy among his family members following Constantine’s death.  
At the same time, Constantine II’s highlighting of the malice of the Eusebian bishops represents 
a straightforward attack on a powerful and well-connected episcopal group within Constantius’ 
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domains—a group that most likely had already decisively thrown their support behind Constantius. In 
the next century, Philostorgius would ascribe responsibility for the “massacre of the princes” in part to 
his hero Eusebius of Nicomedia,27 a tradition that likely reflects the very real role played by Eusebius in 
Constantius’ cementing of power in the East. Indeed, given the rhetorical highlighting of the bloodthirsty 
nature of Athanasius’ enemies and the imminent danger of murder under which Athanasius had 
apparently lived in the East, it is possible that Constantine II may in fact be referencing just this 
massacre, an event in which, if surviving evidence is to be trusted, he had played no part and to which 
he responded with hostility.28 Even their father Constantine, it seems, had been aware that life in 
Constantius’ Eastern domains was one where public figures were constantly threatened with fatal 
violence, for which the only real safety was escape to life under Constantine II’s authority in the West. 
Now, however, the one truly pious son of Constantine is sending back on his own authority this powerful 
bishop, hated and persecuted in the Eastern Empire, to resume his position of power at the heart of 
Constantius’ domains.  
In this scenario, Athanasius himself fades almost into insignificance. Generic episcopal holiness 
aside, he is little more than a weapon wielded by one Emperor against another, with that Emperor’s 
own favored bishops as the immediate target, and Constantine the Great as the sole shared source of 
authority bridging the divides within the allegedly united Roman Empire. The Divine Providence may still 
 
27 See Philostorgius 11.16, cf. Hunt 1998, 11. 
28 As Burgess 2008, 22-24, notes, from surviving indications (most notably a series of coins struck at his mints in honor of 
Theodora, the mother of Dalmatius and several other murdered relatives) it is likely that Constantine II opposed or reacted 
negatively to the massacre (perhaps because, as Woods 2011, 193-195, suggests, he was himself married to a relative of 
Theodora and Dalmatius). Likewise, as Moser 2018, 153-156, points out, while some of Constantius’ iconic elements 
emphasizing unbroken succession and papering over the massacre eventually found their way into Constantine II’s coinage, this 
took place after the meeting between the brothers that led to their joint accession as Augusti, and in such a way that “the motif 
was produced first by Constantius and then used also in the West in a more uncoordinated manner” (154). 
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govern the Empire in the form of Constantine II, but this alleged providence has never been more 
unclear or more seemingly divided against itself.  
In the short term, the result of Constantine II’s action was effective enough, as an Athanasius 
now deeply indebted to the Western Emperor resumed without challenge29 his commanding position of 
power over Constantius’ largest and most important province of Egypt, while the attempt of other exiles 
to regain control of their patrimony from Eusebian successors would lead over the next years to rioting 
and disorder in other cities throughout Constantius’ domains.30  
 Even on the authority of Constantine the Great, Constantine II’s action was not to remain 
unchallenged long. As the three brothers attempted to resume more directly the supreme authority 
vacated by their father, and conflicts over precedence and territory loomed ever larger, Constantius lost 
little time in cementing his alliance with Eusebius of Nicomedia—an alliance that required as its sine qua 
non the exclusion of prominent bishops unwilling to participate in the pro-Constantian, pro-Eusebian 
networks now associated with the see of Constantinople. Almost immediately upon their return, then, 
 
29 The unusual ease with which Athanasius assumed his office can be ascribed not only to his local dominance in Alexandria, but 
also to the shrewd move of delaying his return to Alexandria to hold a personal interview with Constantius, presumably to gain 
at least his nominal consent to the event (Apologia ad Constantium 5.2, cf. Barnes 1993, 34, S. Parvis 2006a, 140). S. Parvis 
2006a, 137-138, has also argued for the influence of Constantius’ Praetorian Prefect Flavius Ablabius, who is cited by 
Athanasius in several documents as a friend and supporter and may have played a role in helping not only Athanasius but also 
the other returning exiles regain their churches and sees. As Parvis notes (138), Flavius Ablabius was dismissed from office and 
executed for treason only a year into Constantius’ reign, conceivably at least in part due to his involvement with this disfavored 
faction of bishops. 
30 According to Theodoret (2.3.8), Eusebius of Nicomedia would later allege that the return of the exiles had led to civil unrest in 
Syria, Phoenicia, and Palestine, presumably connected to the return of Asclepas of Gaza and Hellanicus of Tripolia and 
continuing unrest over the deposition of Eustathius of Antioch, who seems to have either died prior to the other exiles’ return, 
been unsuccessful in regaining his see at this time, or simply not have been given the opportunity to return at all—with the 
latter two options in my judgment as possible as the former given that Antioch was the primary residence of Constantius for 
most of the early years of his reign. Similarly, the letter of Eastern Serdica (Hilary, Adversus Valentem et Ursacium Series A 4) 
would accuse Marcellus of Ancyra, Asclepas of Gaza, and Lucius of Adrianopole of being involved in mob violence on their 
return from exile (cf. S. Parvis 2006a, 141-146). While, as S. Parvis 2006a, 142-146, argues, the actual acts involved are almost 
certainly exaggerated for polemical purposes, it is logical to assume that the attempt of these bishops to regain their 
patrimonies in opposition to living successors would have resulted in some degree of conflict and civil unrest emanating from 
the local networks of both returning exile and living successor. Yet her claim (S. Parvis 2006a, 143-146) that such violence would 
have been mostly carried out by civil authorities tasked with restoring the bishops in opposition to local mobs supporting their 
successors is uncertain given the lack of evidence for the presence of such civil support. 
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Athanasius and the other returned exiles found themselves threatened once again with deposition. 
Now, however, their ecclesiastical opponents had to take stock of a fundamentally divided Empire, with 
no Constantine to unilaterally and finally decide the terms of episcopal deposition and exile. By 
forthright appeal to the authorities of this newly divided Empire, including the three Emperors and the 
bishop of Rome Julius, the exiles managed to delay their re-deposition, in the end, for nearly two 
years.31 Even then, forced out of Constantius’ realms by the Emperor’s officials, they simply travelled to 
the domains of Constantius’ brothers in the West, where they were treated, not as deposed and exiled 
criminals, but as honored (and legally spotless) guests—and helpful means by which to further 
undermine Constantius’ authority and legitimacy. 
 This method of appealing to one Emperor against another, however, would soon prove quite 
dangerous. Though logically enough Athanasius seems to have initially sought the aid of his former 
benefactor Constantine II, within a year of his arrival in Rome this benefactor had died in a failed 
invasion of the territory of his brother Constans—an invasion that, if successful, would have constituted 
an effective repetition of the most important event of Constantine’s rise to sole power, control of Britain 
and Gaul leading to armed invasion of Italy and the wresting of Rome from an Imperial rival.32 The 
 
31 See in particular the narrative, including a clear and well-argued timeline of events, given by S. Parvis 2006a, 146-157, as well 
as the broader narrative offered by Barnes 1993, 36-46. These two narratives differ on a number of specific points which do not 
impinge on the content of this study, though as elsewhere Parvis’ reconstruction of a process dominated by a few favored allies 
of Eusebius in coordination with Constantius, and mostly taking place apart from formal synodical procedure (cf. Schwartz 
1959, 279) is more convincing than Barnes’ assumption of a broad base of moderate support expressed in large synods for the 
deposition of the exiles.  
32 As Moser 2018, 154-156, points out, from the death of his father, Constantine II’s coinage, in strong contrast to Constantius’ 
in the East, portrayed Constantine in almost exclusively in military guise, such that “the soldier motif was produced only by 
mints under Constantine II’s authority and so can easily be identified as a motif unique to that emperor” (154). Although 
Constantine II and Constans had quarreled over territorial claims in North Africa (cf. Frakes 2012, 99-100), given this emphasis 
on Constantine as the victor of military campaigns, the indications discussed above that Constantine II had designs on claiming 
a sole succession, and the fact that war with Constans, when it came, took the form not of conquest of marginal territory but of 
a sudden attempt to invade and claim Rome, the conclusion that Constantine II was pursuing a premeditated policy of gaining 
legitimacy by reenacting his father’s rise to power through military victory over his two brothers is almost irresistible. Given 
this, too, it is likely that Constantius and Constans’ exclusion of him from their division of territory after Dalmatius’ death 
reflects at least in part a deliberate (and ultimately successful) policy of self-defense. 
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failure of this attempt to claim Constantinian status through direct reenactment of his bloody rise to 
power effectively brought to an end any hope of primogeniture being accepted as the basis of 
precedence within the Constantinian dynasty, but incidentally made life much easier for scholars tasked 
with writing about the similarly-named members of that dynasty. With the trinity of sons of Constantine 
reduced to an uneasy duo, a new stage was set for conflict on both theological and political matters. 
 Evidence of the political status quo between Constantius II and Constans over the decade from 
Constantine II’s death in 340 to Constans’ in 350 is sparse and relatively difficult to interpret. While the 
two Emperors were for the most part publicly presented through Imperial images, laws, and dedications 
as co-rulers of a united Empire, this belied a vastly more complex reality marked by both collaboration 
and conflict.33 Muriel Moser has recently emphasized the way in which this unsteady balance of a 
formally united Empire ruled by two Emperors allowed the two Emperors to use appointments and 
honors as a way to extend their power into the realm of the other brother—most notably in 
Constantius’ outsized patronage of senators in Rome, which forced the younger brother to compete 
with the elder for support even at the ostensible heart of his realm.34 Constans, in contrast, seems to 
have had far more difficulty effectively extending his power into his brother’s more united Eastern 
realm,35 a weakness that, as I will argue, would be partially made up for through ecclesiastical means. As 
 
33 See e.g. Moser 2018, 87-91, who presents a complex picture of an Empire united in public propaganda but partially divided in 
practice is helpful, as well as Omissi 2018, 157-163, who gives a somewhat harsher picture and underscores the overt 
fictionalism of contemporary panegyrics, which declared an absolute dynastic unity while totally obscuring the existence of 
both the “massacre of princes” and the dead Constantine II. For a more general historical review of Constans’ reign in the West, 
see Hunt 1998, 5-14. 
34 Moser 2018, 91-114. As an instance of this competition, Moser (85-86) highlights the case of a Senator and influential 
officeholder in Rome, who first set up two statues of Constantius and Constantine II in Rome and then, upon the death of 
Constantine II, rededicated one as an additional statue of Constantius II, leaving Constans out altogether. While Moser takes 
this as a sign of Constantius’ ability to directly access Rome and its environs and therefore of the effective unity of the Empire, it 
would also, and perhaps more immediately, have served as a powerful sign of partisan influence. 
35 Moser 2018, 114-117, points out Constans’ unprecedented patronage and investment in Greece, a part of the Empire with 
close ties both to the Roman senatorial aristocracy and the Greek-speaking provinces of Constantius. As Moser suggests, “this 
Greek policy of Constans may have been consciously directed against Constantius II, who was deprived of such acts of 
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this study has emphasized again and again, the relegation of ecclesiastical and episcopal affairs to a 
separate “religious” or “Christian” sphere distorts the actual political and social realities of the 4th 
century. The conflicts among bishops and Emperors during the joint reign of the sons of Constantine 
represented significant concentrations not merely of religious authority, but also of practical, material 
power and influence. Even in terms of the raw wealth and political influence involved, Constantius’ 
patronage of a senator in Constans’ Rome was not nearly as threatening as a partisan of Constans on the 
episcopal throne of Constantius’ Alexandria. In the same way, a claim to authority by a bishop of Rome 
over the Eastern Empire was far more alarming than the presence of a Roman Senator at the court of 
Constantius. 
By the time of the Dedication Council of Antioch in 341, the two halves of the Empire faced each 
other in an uncannily mirror-like fashion. The Emperor Constans in the West, supported by a network of 
bishops clearly headed by the bishop of Rome Julius I, faced the Emperor Constantius II in the East, 
supported by a network of bishops forged in the ecclesiastical conflicts of former decades and headed 
by the bishop of the new Imperial city of Constantinople, Eusebius of Nicomedia. The issues over which 
they competed were (1) the juridical cases of the bishops deposed by Constantine and more recently 
driven from his domains by Constantius, (2) the theological issue of the Father’s relationship to the Son, 
and (3) the ecclesiastical question of precedence and authority within the episcopate. Negotiations 
between the two factions had barely begun before they dissolved into bitter recriminations.  
For the bulk of this conflict, the main Western protagonist was not the young Emperor 
Constans, but the bishop of Rome Julius I,36 who had received the celebrated exiles Athanasius of 
 
patronage in this region” (117). While this campaign was perhaps effective at denying Constantius support and personnel, 
Greece was not directly part of Constantius’ realm—very much unlike his key province of Egypt. 
36 While it is unclear what knowledge the previous bishop of Rome had of the depositions of Eustathius and Athanasius under 
Constantine, Julius was elected bishop only once Athanasius and his allies were safely in exile in the West. His first intervention 
into the case seems to have taken place shortly thereafter when Eusebius of Nicomedia and his allies wrote to him asking him 
to receive into communion their appointed Alexandrian bishop Pistus, who was, however, immediately and forcefully rejected 
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Alexandria, Marcellus of Ancyra, and their allies37 at Rome and resolutely championed their cause while 
asserting the authority of the Council of Nicaea against the condemned “Arians”38 Eusebius of 
Nicomedia and his allies, whose uncanonical councils he possessed, as bishop of Rome, both the right 
and the duty to overrule.39 On the other side, the Dedication Council of Antioch represented the largest 
 
by Julius thanks to his ordination by Secundus of Ptolemais, one of the few close allies of Arius to share his condemnation and 
deposition at Nicaea (cf. Barnes 1993, 40-41, S. Parvis 2006a, 150-160). Julius’ counteroffer of a synod in Rome at which he 
would preside and which would look into the cases of all of the exiles was duly and predictably rejected by Eusebius of 
Nicomedia, who responded by calling the Dedication Council of Antioch. In all this, it should be said, Julius’ intervention was 
made much easier by the protection of Constans, which allowed him to argue and assert his authority on ecclesiastical and 
canonical terms without either directly challenging or having to negotiate with Constantius. Constans’ support was clear 
throughout, however, in particular in the fact that Julius’ letter to the synod of Antioch was delivered by Constans’ Imperial 
comes Gabianus (Apologia contra Arianos 20.3). 
37 In his letter to the Dedication Council of Antioch in 341, Julius of Rome speaks by name of Athanasius of Alexandria and 
Marcellus of Ancyra as currently resident in Rome, along with other exiled bishops from Thrace, Syria Coele, Phoenicia, and 
Palestine—identified by Barnes 1993, 61, based on the exiles mentioned by Athanasius in Historia Arianorum (see note 50 in 
section 7.3 below), as including Lucius of Adrianopole, Cyrus of Beroea, Euphration of Balanae, Hellanicus of Tripolis, and 
Asclepas of Gaza, most of whom were originally exiled and deposed during the latter years of the reign of Constantine. 
38 Timothy Barnes (Barnes 1993, 53-55), Lewis Ayres (Ayres 2004, 105-117), and Sara Parvis (S. Parvis 2006a, 180-192) give 
prominent place to the period of the exiles’ sojourn in Rome for the creation of “the full-blown myth of Arianism” (S. Parvis 
2006a, 180)—that is, the fitting of Athanasius’, Marcellus’, and Julius’ ways of speaking about their theological and ecclesiastical 
opponents into the pre-existing schema, developed by earlier authors such as Irenaeus of Lyons and Hippolytus of Rome, of 
“heresy,” with its characteristic origin from a single heresiarch, its spread like a contagion, its unity through diabolical direction, 
and its set of clearly delineated forbidden propositions expressly countered by formulations of universal “Catholic” truth. While 
Barnes 1993, 53, 55, sees this as an essentially cynical and self-interested move on Athanasius’ part, and S. Parvis 2006a gives a 
much more sympathetic view of Marcellus and Athanasius’ development of a heresiological schema as a “temptation they 
found themselves unable to resist” (191) based on the fact that Eusebius of Nicomedia’s allies had “acted continually in political 
concert” (192) in attacking and deposing their own enemies, none, in my view, gives a proper place to Julius of Rome and the 
larger ecclesiastical context of this choice and portrayal. The purpose of the heresiological schema, particularly as made use of 
and applied by 2nd and 3rd century episcopal authors such as Irenaeus or Cyprian of Carthage, was that it allowed for the 
conceptualization of heresy not as theological error or sociological description, but as a crime for which priests and bishops 
could be punished. Athanasius and Marcellus were now subordinate allies of the bishop of Rome, who presided over episcopal 
networks that functioned most effectively in areas where Arius and Eusebius of Nicomedia were at best distant names. For 
Julius to dedicate himself and the institutional authority of the Church of Rome to the defense of Athanasius and Marcellus and 
opposition to their enemies, something more than just inchoate appeals to the Council of Nicaea was necessary: a clear schema 
of an ecclesiastical crime according to which “heretical” priests and bishops in both East and West could be identified and 
punished. 
39 See in particular the reply of Julius to the Dedication Council of Antioch, offered in his own name but with the subscription of 
the approximately fifty Italian bishops summoned to the Council of Rome in 341, given in Athanasius, Apologia contra Arianos 
21-35 and as Letter 2 in the recent edition of Thompson 2015. So many contradictory viewpoints have been taken on this letter 
by scholars interested in the history of the papacy that a further attempt to characterize it seems almost futile. For S. Parvis 
2006a, 192-199, the letter “is enormously restrained, indeed, defensive” (192-199), and does little more than reiterate Julius’ 
local decision to receive the exiled bishops’ into communion since they had not (yet) been validly judged, while for e.g. Frend 
1984, 529, it reflects Julius staking his claim on the authority of Peter to overrule Eusebius and his allies. For Barnes 1993, 59-
61, it is practically a dictation by Marcellus and Athanasius of their own polemical position, while for Hanson 1988, 272-273, it is 
an opportunistic attempt at increasing the power of the Church of Rome. Julius’ perspective as an independent operator and 
participant in the ecclesiastical affairs of the period has, however, recently been given a somewhat more convincing and 
balanced appraisal by Thompson 2015, 27-37. In my judgment, all of these evaluations reflect accurate aspects of Julius’ 
delicate position. Julius does in fact write in a defensive and conciliatory fashion, declining to explicitly break off communion 
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and most representative gathering of bishops in the East since Nicaea, and was clearly dominated by the 
networks presided over by Eusebius of Nicomedia.40 It was also without question the most directly 
Imperial council since the councils of Jerusalem and Constantinople in 335/6, since, like those councils, it 
celebrated the dedication of a new Imperial church project (the grand Domus Aurea in Antioch) begun 
by Constantine but now finished by his legitimate successor,41 and took place in Constantius’ primary 
Imperial court city in the presence of the Emperor himself. Backed by this authority, the council seems 
to have seen little point in conciliating the bishop of Rome.42 In answer to Julius’ claims, the synod 
declared the equality of all bishops regardless of the honor of their sees while denying any right by 
bishops in the “West” to interfere in Eastern affairs, declared all synodal decrees sacrosanct and 
unrevisable by other gatherings, and maintained that, although they were not “Arians” because they, as 
bishops, had no need to follow a mere priest, they had examined Arius’ faith and found it fully orthodox, 
a judgment in no way subject to question by the bishop of Rome or any other members of the 
 
with either the bishops of the East as a whole, the bishops assembled at Antioch, or even the few bishops addressed by him by 
name. He does, on the other hand, clearly indicate that at least some of the bishops directing ecclesiastical affairs in the East 
(including most obviously Eusebius of Nicomedia) are condemned heretics incapable of holding ecclesiastical office. The basic 
decision he upholds is merely the one to accept Athanasius and Marcellus into communion for the time being inasmuch as their 
depositions were invalid for a variety of mostly procedural reasons. He also however, maintains that this evaluation, made, not 
by the Council of Rome, but prior to it by Julius himself, is ecclesiastically and canonically valid; it makes of Athanasius and 
Marcellus the legal holders of their sees and their replacements usurpers, and gives Julius the right to summon the Eastern 
bishops to Rome for a council that will come to a final judgment not only on the exiles’ cases, but also on the charges brought 
by them against Eusebius of Nicomedia and other Eastern bishops. Likewise, Julius asserts that the procedural invalidity of the 
deposition of Athanasius is in part due to the fact that Alexandria is a Petrine see and, thanks to “the tradition of the Apostles 
received from Peter,” no deposition of its bishop can be valid without his participation and consent. Taken together, then, the 
letter of Julius constitutes a fairly complete and comprehensive account, not merely of Athanasius or Marcellus’ exculpatory 
narratives, but of the institutional position of the Church of Rome and the ecclesiastical networks associated with it that would 
be consistently adhered to down to the end of Constantius’ reign. 
40 For a detailed and conclusive argument on this front, see S. Parvis 2006a, 162-165.  
41 For the construction and building of this church and its importance within Constantian propaganda during this period, 
including its being assigned the significant titles μετάνοια (repentance) and ὁμόνοια (unanimity), see Henck 2002, 295-297, 
Kleinbauer 2006, 126-128. 
42 Cf. McLynn 2004, 245: The ‘elegantly composed and lawyerly letter’ that the council of the Encaenia at Antioch sent to the 
bishop of Rome, deploring his ill-informed support for Athanasius and other exiled bishops, carried greater force for bearing the 
imprimatur of an emperor.” 
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episcopate.43 Marcellus of Ancyra was, once again, the brunt of all specific theological criticism, 
essentially ignoring the beliefs of Athanasius and Julius alike.44 
In response to Julius’ vague appeal to the authority of Nicaea against the “Ariomaniacs,” the 
council at Antioch put forward a creed that would for the next several decades serve as an authoritative 
touchstone of Eastern belief. More precisely, this is one of three creeds associated with the council, 
along with a short statement of belief included in the synod’s letter to Julius of Rome (Athanasius, De 
synodis 22.5-7)45 and another presented by the bishop Theophronius of Tyana to clear himself of the 
suspicion of sharing Marcellus of Ancyra’s theology (De synodis 24.2-5).46 The famous “Dedication 
Creed” seems to have been the only one formally endorsed by the council as a whole, however.47 At the 
time of its promulgation, this creed stood clearly at the center of the theological alliance formed prior to 
Nicaea by Eusebius of Nicomedia and successfully held together for decades through similar formulas. 
Indeed, both ancient and modern scholars have suggested that the Dedication Creed was not composed 
 
43 The contents of the synod’s reply to Julius—which, as Barnes 1993, 58, notes, seems to have been written personally by 
Eusebius of Nicomedia (cf. S. Parvis 2006a, 167, who suggests Asterius, Basil of Ancyra, and Acacius of Caesarea as additional 
possible candidates), while the eloquence of its style is commented on both by Julius (Apologia contra Arianos 21.5) and 
Sozomen (3.8.4)—have to be inferred from Sozomen’s summary of the letter (3.8.4-8), Julius’ reply to it (Apologia contra 
Arianos 21-35, Thompson 2015 Letter 2), and the few quotations from the council’s documents given by Athanasius in De 
synodis 22. For modern scholarly reconstructions, see S. Parvis 2006a, 165-166, Barnes 1993, 58-59. 
44 See e.g. S. Parvis 2006a, 167-170. 
45 As Hanson 1988, 291, puts it, this creed, while bare, represents the position of “Arians of sang pur,” and indeed S. Parvis 
2006a, 171-172, argues plausibly that it was the creed produced by Arius himself for acceptance by the Council of Jerusalem 
that had officially rehabilitated him in 335—now flourished in Julius’ face in a somewhat less than diplomatic fashion to justify 
their continuing refusal to disavow the now-dead Arius and his beliefs. 
46 As S. Parvis 2006a, 173-177, points out, this creed, elicited under severe pressure from a follower of Marcellus of Ancyra 
accused of heresy, shows numerous signs of continuing adherence to Marcellus’ theology and opposition to the prevailing 
theology of the council. 
47 Cf. S. Parvis 2006a, 172, Barnes 1993, 58, who suggests, however, that the creed, with its (to Julius and his allies) offensive 
doctrinal content, may have been circulated only in the East. 
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there, but had been a principal creedal document of the Eusebian party for as long as several decades 
prior, reiterated once again as part of the final triumph of this party in the East.48  
In asserting the Son’s relationship to the Father, the creed makes use of precisely the language 
employed by both Arius and Asterius,49 referring to him as “unvarying (ἀπαράλλακτος) Image of the 
divinity, οὐσία and intention (βουλή), power (δύναμις) and glory of the Father” (Athanasius, De synodis 
23.3),50 and taking care to underline both the distinctness and inferiority of the Son and his similarity to 
the Father: “God from God, whole from whole, alone from alone, complete from complete, Emperor 
from Emperor, Lord from Lord, living Word, living Wisdom, true Light, Way, Truth, Resurrection, 
Shepherd, Door, unchangeable and unalterable” (23.3).51 In the larger context of the creed, the 
similarity between Father and Son consists most immediately in the fact that both are, in their 
respective orders, entities fundamentally alone and complete in themselves, incapable of being affected 
or altered by any other and defined by rule over others. In summing up this position, the creed provides 
 
48 According to Sozomen (Historia Ecclesiastica 3.5.9), the creed was originally composed by Lucian of Antioch, the teacher of 
both Arius and Eusebius of Nicomedia who was martyred during the persecution of Diocletian in 312. Multiple scholars have 
likewise noted that Asterius, in the quotations given by Marcellus of Ancyra, seems to be quoting and defending a creedal 
statement with numerous identical formulations to the Dedication Creed (cf. Vinzent 1993, 164-166, S. Parvis 2006a, 113-115). 
Based on this, a number of distinct theories have been put forward: Löhr 1993, 89-91 regards the alleged Lucianic origin of the 
dedication creed as an invention of the later homoiousian party of the 350s; Hanson 1988, 289, proposes that Asterius was 
present at the Dedication Council and composed the creed there based on his previous theological works; Vinzent 1993, 166, 
argues that Asterius was the sole author of the creed but composed it prior to Nicaea, making it a longstanding touchstone of 
the pro-Arius alliance; Bardy 1936, 119-132, argues for Lucian as the true author and for the importance of the creed to the 
theology of both Asterius and Eusebius of Caesarea; and S. Parvis 2006a, 111-116, has proposed that it may have been the 
creed officially promulgated by the Council of Nicomedia, called by Eusebius of Nicomedia following his return from exile in 
328, and originally intended to take the place of the Creed of Nicaea. Whoever the author, there can be little doubt that, as S. 
Parvis 2006a, 172-173, points out, the council’s adoption without modification of a creed so closely associated with the 
theological alliance of Eusebius of Nicomedia, Asterius, and Arius, and previously attacked as heretical by the same Marcellus of 
Ancyra whom, along with his close allies, the council had bitterly refused to retry, represented a “fitting act of revenge” (173) 
for the humiliation of Arius and his allies at Nicaea and afterwards.  
49 See DelCogliano 2006 for the importance of the term ἀπαράλλακτος εἰκών to the theology of both Arius and Asterius in 
distinction to Eusebius of Caesarea, who while making central use of image theology avoids the term ἀπαράλλακτος. Asterius 
seems to have personally attended the Dedication Council of Antioch.  
50 τῆς θεότητος οὐσίας τε καὶ βουλῆς καὶ δυνάμεως καὶ δόξης τοῦ πατρὸς ἀπαράλλακτον εἰκόνα 
51 θεὸν ἐκ θεοῦ, ὅλον ἐξ ὅλου, μόνον ἐκ μόνου, τέλειον ἐκ τελείου, βασιλέα ἐκ βασιλέως, κύριον ἀπὸ κυρίου, λόγον ζῶντα, 
σοφίαν ζῶσαν, φῶς ἀληθινόν, ὁδόν, ἀλήθειαν, ἀνάστασιν, ποιμένα, θύραν, ἄτρεπτόν τε καὶ ἀναλλοίωτον. 
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a fundamental hermeneutic by which the three persons of the Trinity, and indeed in principle all other 
persons denoted by separate names and ὑποστάσεις, are to be understood: “These names were not laid 
down without distinction or without effect, but they signify accurately the particular ὑπόστασίς and 
status (τάξις) and glory of each one, so that they are three in ὑπόστασίς, but in agreement (συμφωνία) 
one” (23.6-7).52 Equality may define the relationships among bishops, but in the cosmos at large, as 
Eusebius of Caesarea had argued, hierarchy of status and agreement of will is the primary method of 
unification.  
Still, this creed, as decisively as it stands within the tradition of Eusebius of Caesarea, Arius, 
Asterius, and Eusebius of Nicomedia, possessed one obvious advantage that would grow more decisive 
over the next few decades: vagueness. Interpreted in the light of the fundamental cosmic hierarchy 
affirmed by its originators, it could hardly be more contrary to the developing position of Athanasius of 
Alexandria and his allies. Yet read in a somewhat different light, its ringing declarations of similarity in all 
divine qualities, combined with a rote “anti-Arian” anathema (fully compatible with the developed 
beliefs of Arius himself) of those who held the existence of a temporal period prior to the Son’s 
generation, could also be read, as we will see, as affirmations of something rather different than its 
framers intended.  
For the moment, however, both the creed and its associated council possessed one very obvious 
meaning: in the last public act of his long career, Eusebius of Nicomedia, bishop of the Imperial city of 
Constantinople, had shown himself the dominating master of ecclesiastical policy and theology in the 
East, capable of going toe to toe with no less an ecclesiastical authority than the bishop of Rome and of 
assembling a sizeable council willing to join him in challenging the entire Western Empire and endorsing 
 
52 τῶν ὀνομάτων οὐχ ἁπλῶς οὐδὲ ἀργῶς κειμένων, ἀλλὰ σημαινόντων ἀκριβῶς τὴν οἰκείαν ἑκάστου τῶν ὀνομαζομένων 
ὑπόστασίν τε καὶ τάξιν καὶ δόξαν, ὡς εἶναι τῇ μὲν ὑποστάσει τρία, τῇ δὲ συμφωνίᾳ ἕν. 
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his preferred theology and creed. While Constantius summoned and personally attended the Dedication 
Council, almost certainly as a deliberate response to Constans’ reception of the exiled bishops and 
support of Julius’ proposal for an Empire-wide council,53 there is no trace in surviving sources of any 
meaningful interventions of the Emperor in its theological and ecclesiastical proceedings. Only a few 
decades before, the Western Emperor Constantine had straightforwardly bypassed the judgment of the 
bishop of Rome Miltiades in the case of the Donatists in North Africa, while later in his career as sole 
Emperor he had engaged in complex negotiations with Arius and Eusebius based on his own theological 
thought and his own ability to judge and discern. Now, however, the two young, inexperienced 
Emperors of the divided Roman Empire had visibly given place to bishops as the protagonists of 
theological and ecclesiastical conflict and resolution. As Neil McLynn has pointed out, this yielding of 
power and position to bishops was made ritually tangible in the decision of the young Emperor to 
refrain from summoning the council to the Imperial palace, as his father had done at Nicaea and 
Constantinople, but instead to join the assembly of bishops in the episcopal-dominated space of the 
new cathedral church of Antioch.54  
The principle issue with this method of resolution, however, was that it did not resolve. Julius 
and Eusebius might exchange furious barbs, but no amount of appeals to ecclesiastical law, the 
traditions of the apostles, or the authority of councils could bring about meaningful unification in the 
absence of either theological or ecclesiastical consensus or a single figure capable of authoritatively 
declaring the victory of one party over another. The authority of the bishop of Rome had at times in the 
3rd century served as a means to cement the outcome of ecclesiastical conflicts involving bishops of 
 
53 Cf. S. Parvis 2006a, 202. 
54 McLynn 2004, 244-250. As McLynn points out, this is one of only three occasions in which Constantius is attested to have 
visited a church building, with one being his private prayer at a martyr shrine during the battle of Mursa Major (Sulpicius 
Severus 2.36-38) and the other his attendance of the consecration of Hagia Sophia after the Council of Constantinople in 360, 
where he naturally assumed a far more dominant profile.   
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Antioch, Alexandria, North Africa, and Gaul—and earlier in the 4th century, the Christian Emperor 
Constantine had brought about ecclesiastical unity and the resolution of cases by somewhat more 
forceful means. Now, however, a synod of Eastern bishops had straightforwardly rejected the authority 
of the bishop of Rome in favor of the networks presided over by Eusebius of Nicomedia, and no Emperor 
stood ready to do any more than further the conflict by backing the bishops of their own domain against 
their rival’s. Only three years after the death of Constantine, divided Emperors had produced a divided 
Church.  
Still, if unity as Constantine had once brought it about was now impossible, cooperation among 
the two brothers, on the basis of their shared origination and nature, was certainly possible. Two 
Emperors acting in unison could in theory equal one Constantine, using their shared resources to 
summon large councils and enforce their decisions.55 Following years of further negotiations, then, an 
agreement was reached between the principal parties to assemble a single Empire-wide Council at 
Serdica, on the border between Constans and Constantius’ domains.  
By the time the bishops assembled in Serdica in AD 342 or 343,56 Eusebius of Nicomedia, 
perhaps the most consequential ecclesiastical figure of his lifetime, had died. Eusebius of Caesarea had 
preceded his ally in death by several years, leaving fewer and fewer members of the original party that 
 
55 According to Theodoret (2.4.4-6), the instigator for this move was Constans, a logical deduction given that the proposal to 
summon a larger council to avoid schism seems to have originated with Julius of Rome. In Constans’ hands, however, the move 
to summon a large-scale council at which Hosius of Cordoba would be present and which would once again address the date of 
Easter possessed the additional resonance of yet another reenactment of Constantine’s career in order to gain legitimacy in the 
struggle with his brother (cf. S. Parvis 2006a 201). 
56 There is a substantial, longstanding, but for the most part irrelevant for our purposes debate in scholarship over the dating of 
the Council of Serdica. As S. Parvis 2006a, 210-217, points out in a recent review of the evidence, this debate has taken place 
almost entirely along national and linguistic lines, with German scholars (e.g. Schwartz 1959, Brennecke 1984b, Ulrich 1994) 
supporting a date of 342 while French (e.g. Zeiller 1918, Tetz 1985), Italian (e.g. Simonetti 1975), and Anglophone scholars (e.g. 
Hess 1958, Barnes 1993, S. Parvis 2006a) have been virtually unanimous in dating the council to 343. The essential issue is that 
the 5th century ecclesiastical historians (Socrates 2.20.4, Sozomen 3.12.7) date the council to 347, a dating that has been largely 
abandoned in favor of that given in the Alexandrian Festal Index—with modern scholarly debate being over how to interpret 
the data from this source in conjunction with other information. 
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had defended Arius prior to Nicaea still alive and prominent in Eastern affairs. The ecclesiastical and 
political networks forged by this alliance within Antioch, Syria, Libya, and Asia Minor, however, were still 
alive and well, and at least for the moment carried on the basic policies of their former leaders with few 
immediate disconnects. Eusebius of Caesarea was perhaps luckiest of all in the choice of his successor. 
At both Antioch57 and Serdica, and for decades to come, his essential theological viewpoint was well 
represented by the brilliant Acacius of Caesarea, his student and successor, who spent the bulk of his 
career appealing to and attempting to further the theology and goals of his predecessor. Eusebius of 
Nicomedia, on the other hand, had been succeeded at Constantinople by Macedonius, who was to 
prove a far more unstable and controversial figure, and far less adept at managing ecclesiastical affairs. 
Meanwhile, at Ancyra, Basil, the selected replacement for Marcellus, would soon distinguish himself as a 
shrewd ecclesiastical and theological operator, clearly interested in asserting his own independence 
from the larger Eusebian network.58 Even more radical figures were, as we will see, already waiting in 
the wings. For all the immediate appearance of continuity, generational change in the episcopate would 
prove to have very long-lasting and unpredictable effects indeed on both theology and policy. 
Still, the primary issue impeding the unity of the Church of the Roman Empire was not the 
absence of Eusebius of Caesarea or Eusebius of Nicomedia, but the presence of the still very alive and 
well Athanasius of Alexandria. Finding themselves significantly outnumbered, and provoked by the 
decision to admit Athanasius and Marcellus to the proceedings of the council as fellow bishops, the 
Eastern bishops flatly refused to meet with their Western counterparts, who had arrived at Serdica first 
and already begun holding assemblies and liturgies in private lodgings and churches throughout the 
 
57 Cf. S. Parvis 2006a, 167-170, who suggests that surviving fragments written by Acacius (Epiphanius, Panarion 72.6-10) may be 
derived from a series of addresses made at the Dedication Council against Marcellus and his theology, continuing without a 
hitch the anti-Marcellan campaign of his predecessor Eusebius of Caesarea expressed in Contra Marcellum and De ecclesiastica 
theologia. 
58 Cf. S. Parvis 2006a, 164. 
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city.59 The Eastern delegation, meanwhile, spent their sojourn in Serdica virtually barricaded in the 
Imperial palace with an increasingly hostile mob of local Christians gathered outside.60 The decision to 
secede from the larger council seems, indeed, to have been to some degree a pre-arranged decision by 
a body of bishops that had been more carefully selected than ever before from among ecclesiastical 
networks with long-standing ties to the two Eusebiuses and their successors, excluding almost totally 
bishops that had attended Nicaea decades earlier.61 Rather than attempt the difficult task of building a 
broad consensus in the East, in other words, Acacius of Caesarea and his allies had employed precisely 
the methods innovated by Constantine and the two Eusebiuses in earlier decades, selecting for their 
conciliar proceedings those bishops, and only those bishops, who could be expected to cooperate in 
arriving at a pre-arranged outcome. These same Constantinian methods are also seen in the actual 
operations of the delegation, who not only met separately several times before arriving at Serdica to 
establish internal cohesion and a united policy, but were also overseen by three high Imperial officials, 
including two Imperial comites, who kept the bishops confined within the Imperial palace in Serdica 
rather than allowing them to mingle with their Western counterparts.62 Clearly, the very last thing 
 
59 Cf. S. Parvis 2006a, 234. 
60 See Hilary, Adversus Valentem et Ursacium Series A 4.1.19. 
61 See the full and convincing analysis of the numbers, provinces, and names of the Eastern delegation at Serdica in S. Parvis 
2006a, 218-224. To summarize her findings: while the delegation of seventy-six bishops present at Serdica from Constantius’ 
realms represented twenty-eight provinces, most of these provinces had only one or two bishops present, which in the majority 
of cases did not include the metropolitan of the province; of the 185 Eastern dioceses with bishops present at Nicaea, only forty 
saw representation at Eastern Serdica, while only six of those forty possessed the bishop they had had twenty years earlier, and 
of those six four represented key members of the pro-Arius alliance at Nicaea, namely Narcissus of Neronias, Macedonius of 
Mopsuestia, Menophantus of Ephesus, and Maris of Chalcedon. When compared with the general rate of survival of men in the 
ancient world in general and of bishops in the rest of the Empire in particular, as Parvis puts it, “those who would argue that 
there was no systematic weeding-out of their opponents by the Eusebians between Nicaea and Serdica have some work to do 
to explain these figures” (220). As she also notes, this information is particularly devastating to historical accounts based 
around the existence of an alleged center of moderate bishops imagined to have changed their minds or at least adjusted their 
alliances between Nicaea and Serdica (221).  
62 For the presence of these Imperial officials, Strategius Musonianus, Hesychius, and Philagrius, see Athanasius, Apologia 
contra Arianos 36.2, Historia Arianorum 18, Festal Index 15 (cf. Barnes 1993, 72, who suggests that Philagrius in particular, 
previously Prefect of Egypt and a longstanding opponent of Athanasius, would have been the primary actor responsible for 
managing the Eastern bishops and preventing them from joining the larger council). The letter of the Western Council offers the 
evidence of Asterius of Arabia and Arius of Palestine, two Eastern bishops who had slipped out of the Imperial palace to join 
them, and who arrived full of complaints against the conduct of the leaders of their group, who, they claimed, had used a mix of 
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Constantius wished to do was to enable the Eastern bishops at large to either operate freely in the 
territory of Constans or interact with their Western counterparts there—where they might easily be, as 
Athanasius and other Eastern bishops had been, coopted into aiding Constans’ efforts against himself 
and his legitimacy.63 Even the bare presence of Eastern bishops at Serdica seems to have been in part 
due to inclement circumstances, as imminent threats on the Empire’s Eastern front kept Constantius 
from either being present himself or pressing the conflict against Constans more directly. As soon as 
news arrived that the Persian threat had abated thanks to a dramatic victory of Constantius, the Eastern 
delegation and their Imperial advisors left the city, never to return.64 
Thus divided, each council produced extensive polemical documents, including anathemas and a 
creedal statement that sought to articulate the theological concerns of the dominant party within their 
portion of the Empire. The creed of the Eastern delegation is both the more developed and the more 
immediately interesting of the two. At the Dedication Council of Antioch, Eusebius of Nicomedia and his 
allies, in the midst of a pamphlet war with Julius of Rome and attempting for the first and only time to 
assemble a larger synod with broader representation throughout the East, had produced a creed that 
stood squarely in the center of the theological traditions of pro-Arius alliance of the previous decades, 
without the modifications given it by Eusebius of Caesarea’s mature theology. At Serdica, in what seems 
to have been a far smaller and more controlled Eastern delegation dominated by a new generation of 
 
promises, threats, and coercion to get the Eastern delegation to agree to a common plan of action that included an absolute 
rejection of attendance at the larger council, and now were holding them as virtual prisoners in the Imperial palace (as quoted 
in Athanasius, Apologia contra Arianos 48). Even so, S. Parvis 2006a, 232-234, argues for the existence of a more conciliatory or 
pro-Western group in the Eastern delegation, including Maris of Chalcedon, Macedonius of Mopsuestia, Dianius of Caesarea (in 
Asia Minor), and Basil of Ancyra, who were in this instance overruled by the leaders of the delegation, and even suggests that 
the letter of the Eastern synod, although issued in the name of the whole delegation, may not have received the signatures of 
all the bishops present. While this is highly speculative, Parvis’ statement that “it is difficult to imagine bishops from nearly 
every province in the East agreeing deliberately to split the whole church along imperial political lines in this way” (234) is 
understandable. 
63 Cf. S. Parvis 2006a, 223-224: “This was undoubtedly Constantius’ policy; forced into an ecumenical synod he did not want by 
the politicking of a power-hungry younger brother, he had given his officials the task of making sure it never took place.” 
64 See Historia Arianorum 16.2-3, cf. Barnes 1993, 73, S. Parvis 2006a, 233. 
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prelates, there was a chance to set forward a developed theological position with far more directness, 
without the need for negotiation with the bishop of Rome and his allies or broader theological opinion 
in the East. Surviving sources indicate that the primary architect of this policy was Eusebius’ successor 
Acacius of Caesarea, who seems to have been the primary author of the council’s documents.65 
The creed of Eastern Serdica, then, is straightforwardly a document of the mature Eusebian 
theology of De ecclesiastica theologia, developed and brought into starker relief by Acacius in conflict 
with Marcellus of Ancyra and other theological interlocutors. Acacius’ starting point was the purported 
“Fourth Creed of Antioch,” a relatively bare (and therefore implicitly conciliatory) creed presented by an 
embassy of Eastern bishops to Constans following the death of Eusebius of Nicomedia66—but added to it 
now were six new anathemas that were anything but pacific, aimed as they were at not just permitting 
or implicitly endorsing the beliefs of an Arius or a Eusebius, but actively ruling out the beliefs of their 
enemies, including for the first time not just the more radical beliefs of Marcellus of Ancyra (or 
caricatures thereof) but those of Athanasius of Alexandria and his close allies.67 This creed seems to 
have been freely innovated on by Acacius and his allies not only at Serdica, but during the journey back 
to the East and into the next year, resulting in a final document, presented to the bishops of the West in 
an embassy the following year, that combined the original Fourth Creed of Antioch, additional 
anathemas, and lengthy theological explanations from a decidedly Eusebian standpoint.68 In its final 
 
65 See in particular S. Parvis 2006a, 222-223, who notes the autobiographical information given by the author of the Eastern 
synodal letter, which mark him as a younger bishop not yet in office at the time of the deposition of Marcellus and Athanasius 
c. 335, as well as the similarities between the letter’s characterization of Marcellus’ theology and Acacius’ other extant writings 
on the topic. 
66 See Athanasius, De synodis 25. 
67 Cf. S. Parvis 2006a, 231-232: “These are particularly interesting for being addressed directly against the theology of 
Athanasius, the only apparent case of Athanasius’ theology rather than his conduct being targeted by the leaders of the East” 
(231). 
68 The creed of Serdica with anathemas is given at Hilary, De Synodis 34. Athanasius, meanwhile, in his own De Synodis ascribes 
a longer version of the same creed, including lengthy explanations for the anathemas, to an embassy by a number of Eastern 
bishops to Italy c. 344. S. Parvis 2006a, 231-232, suggests that some of the anathemas may have been added on the return 
journey, perhaps at Philopollis. Barnes 1993, 87-88, suggests that the lengthy explanations may have been added at a Council of 
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form, as the so-called “Creed of Long Lines,” this document would represent the official Eastern and 
Constantian position until the Council of Sirmium in 351.69 
The original position of Arius and his allies that “there was when the Son did not exist” is now 
replaced, as it had already been in Constantine’s and Eusebius’ mature theology, by the more subtle 
assertion that “it must by no means be laid down that the Son is without ἀρχή and unoriginated 
together with the Father” (Athanasius De synodis 26.3.3).70 Rather, “we know that the Father alone is 
without ἀρχή and unoriginated, and that he gave birth in a manner ungraspable and incomprehensible 
to all, but the Son was begotten before the ages and in no way is unbegotten similarly (ὁμοίως) to the 
Father, but he has the Father who begot him as his ἀρχή” (26.3.3).71 The key term ἀρχή, as used in this 
creed and in Eusebian theology generally, bears at the same time the metaphysical sense of “principle,” 
the quasi-temporal sense of “beginning” (implying priority in existence), and the political and social 
 
Antioch c. 344 that also deposed the bishop of Antioch Stephanus. While both Kelly 1972, 279, and Barnes 1993, 88, see the 
additions as expressing an intent to conciliate the Western bishops, I believe the series of revisions would be better seen in the 
context of a larger attempt by Acacius and his allies to produce a standard creedal version of their own Eusebian theology 
capable of excluding and replacing both the Marcellan and Athanasian strands of “Nicene” belief while attracting broader 
support in both East and West. Indeed, in my judgment the possibility cannot be excluded that the Creed of Long Lines 
represented the original form of the creed of Serdica, with the more detailed (and therefore harder to explain away) 
explanations omitted by Hilary for his own conciliatory purposes. 
69 The clearly Eusebian and anti-Athanasian standpoint of the Creed of Long Lines has rarely been addressed in scholarship—
with the standard account being that of Kelly 1972, 279-280, who argues that despite the fact that “the language has a slightly 
subordinationist flavor” (280) overall the creed “breathed the spirit of appeasement” (279). The account of Ayres 2004, 127-
129, however, while still emphasizing the allegedly conciliatory nature of the creed, at the same time notes its continuity with 
past Eusebian doctrine. As Ayres puts it, this creed is defined by its deliberate avoidance of “the οὐσία language deployed in the 
Dedication creed” and “presentations of the Son as intrinsic to the Father’s being” on the one hand and by its attempt “to 
demonstrate that there is some sort of continuity of being between Father and Son” (127) on the other. This tension between 
the clear rejection of any suggestion of an intrinsic, mutual, and non-will-based relationship between Father and Son combined 
with an interest in asserting a true metaphysical similarity and continuity in attributes is also reflective of the mature theology 
of Eusebius of Caesarea expressed in his anti-Marcellan writings (see sections 2.4 and 2.6 above). 
70 οὔτε μὴν συνάναρχον καὶ συναγέννητον τῷ πατρὶ τὸν υἱὸν εἶναι νομιστέον· συνανάρχου γὰρ καὶ συναγεννήτου οὐδεὶς 
κυρίως πατὴρ ἢ υἱὸς λεχθήσεται. 
71 ἀλλὰ τὸν μὲν πατέρα μόνον ἄναρχον ὄντα καὶ ἀγέννητον γεγεννηκέναι ἀνεφίκτως καὶ πᾶσιν ἀκαταλήπτως οἴδαμεν, τὸν δὲ 




sense of “authority,” “power,” and “precedence.”72 The centrality of this term goes back in fact to Arius, 
and had been a key point of the attack by Athanasius and Alexander against him;73 and as discussed in 
Chapters One and Two, it had also found prominent place in theological documents produced by 
Eusebius of Caesarea and the Emperor Constantine alike. The causation of the Son by the Father, while 
different from the means by which God generated ordered creation as a whole, brings him immediately 
into a hierarchical and one-sided relationship with the Father, effected and maintained solely by means 
of God’s totally free and sovereign will: “For we, knowing that God is an absolute ruler (αὐτοκράτωρ) 
and that he is Lord of himself, have piously concluded that he begot the Son voluntarily and at will” 
(26.8.2).74 The principle concern, as in Eusebius of Caesarea’s theology, is to assert the priority of the 
Father in relation to the Son, and therefore the one truly cause-less and superior-less God’s absolute 
freedom and power in relation to all things not himself. 
It is for this reason, principally, that, although the Son can be called “God from ‘the God,’ 
complete according to nature and true” (26.4.3),75 inasmuch as he “is similar in all things to the Father” 
(26.6.3)76 and “acted as his servant for the craftsmanship (δημιουργία) of all things, whether visible or 
invisible” (26.6.2-3),77 the Son is in no way equal to the Father in his monarchical authority over the 
cosmos: “The Father alone is the universal all-ruler (παντάρχων) of all things, even the Son himself, and 
the Son has been put beneath the father in status (ὑποτάσσειν), but except for him serves as Emperor 
 
72 See Brill Dictionary of Ancient Greek 310. 
73 See Athanasius, Orationes Contra Arianos 1.5.3, where this belief is ascribed to Arius and attacked; cf. S. Parvis 2006a, 184. 
74 αὐτοκράτορα γὰρ ἡμεῖς τὸν θεὸν καὶ κύριον αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ εἰδότες ἑκουσίως αὐτὸν καὶ ἐθελοντὴν τὸν υἱὸν γεγεννηκέναι 
εὐσεβῶς ὑπειλήφαμεν. 
75 ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ θεὸν κατὰ φύσιν τέλειον εἶναι καὶ ἀληθῆ. 
76 τῷ πατρὶ κατὰ πάντα ὅμοιον εἶναι 
77 πρὸς πᾶσαν διακονησάμενον αὐτῷ τὴν δημιουργίαν εἴτε τῶν ὁρατῶν εἴτε τῶν ἀοράτων. 
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(βασιλεύειν) of all things after himself” (26.9.3).78 It is this essential ordering of monarchical, divine 
rulers, each prior to and unconditioned by everything after him, that is the crux both of Eusebius of 
Caesarea’s theology and of the Acacian theology of the Creed of Long Lines.  
In this hierarchical cosmos, it is the Son, thanks to his generation through the will of another, 
whose intermediate being and status is capable of the direct involvement with the material world 
implied by the Incarnation, of which the Father’s higher nature is intrinsically incapable: “And those who 
say that the same one is Father and Son and Holy Spirit, impiously understanding the three names of 
one and the same thing (πρᾶγμα) and person (πρόσωπον), we fittingly excommunicate from the Church, 
because they have laid down that the uncontainable and without-passivity (ἀπαθής) Father is at the 
same time containable and subject to passivity through the Incarnation. [...] For we know that the 
Father who sent has remained in his own particular characteristic of unchangeable divinity, but the one 
who was sent, Christ, fulfilled the administration (οἰκονομίαν) of the Incarnation” (26.7.1,2).79 As in De 
laudibus Constantini, while the Father is absolutely independent of all others, the Son is unchangeable 
only in a mixed, intermediate sense—and for this reason is capable of the actual contact with and 
administration of the physical cosmos required by creation and Incarnation. 
Fundamentally in continuity with Eusebius of Caesarea’s thought at every stage of its 
development, the accusation of teaching polytheism is answered principally by the assertion that “we 
know that the self-sufficient and unbegotten and uncaused and invisible God is one alone, the God and 
Father of the Only-Begotten, the only one having existence from himself, and alone bestowing without 
 
78 πανταρχοῦντος μὲν καθόλου πάντων καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ υἱοῦ μόνου τοῦ πατρός, τοῦ δὲ υἱοῦ ὑποτεταγμένου τῷ πατρί, ἐκτὸς δὲ 
αὐτοῦ πάντων μετ’ αὐτὸν βασιλεύοντος 
79 Καὶ τοὺς λέγοντας δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι πατέρα καὶ υἱὸν καὶ ἅγιον πνεῦμα, καθ’ ἑνὸς καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράγματός τε καὶ 
προσώπου τὰ τρία ὀνόματα ἀσεβῶς ἐκλαμβάνοντας εἰκότως ἀποκηρύσσομεν τῆς ἐκκλησίας, ὅτι τὸν ἀχώρητον καὶ ἀπαθῆ 
πατέρα χωρητὸν ἅμα καὶ παθητὸν διὰ τῆς ἐνανθρωπήσεως ὑποτίθενται. [...] οἴδαμεν γὰρ ἡμεῖς τὸν μὲν ἀποστείλαντα πατέρα 




envy this existence as a favor to all others” (26.4.1-2).80 There is, in the end, only one God—precisely 
because there is only one who, in the final balance, is actually totally independent and self-sufficient and 
free, owing nothing to anyone else, in no inextricable or mutual relationship with anyone else, and in no 
way bound by any duty or obligation to anyone else. God is absolutely and characteristically self-
sufficient, the Son relatively so—and so they rule the world together in a perfect hierarchy of will and 
command. Taken together, this is a cosmic and political doctrine that can be well summed up by a 
phrase used to sum up the relationship between Father and Son: “the harmony of Imperial power” (τῆς 
βασιλείας τὴν συμφωνίαν, 26.9.3). God, the one absolutely free and autocratic monarch, has chosen to 
relate to the world by means of one, or perhaps two, subordinates, the cosmic monarch the Son, 
possessed of a special means of origination prior to and superior to all others, and the ambiguously 
divine Holy Spirit81—just as Constantine, although absent, continues to rule the world through the 
privileged subordinate monarch Constantius, the eldest living son, and his ambiguously Imperial younger 
brother Constans.  
In opposition to this highly developed and sophisticated account of divine relations, the 
theological document produced by the Western bishops is notable for its lack of either rhetorical polish 
or philosophical elaboration. The chief claim of the Westerners against the Eusebian doctrine 
proclaimed by Eastern Serdica is that the Father and Son, despite one begetting the other and despite 
being at least notionally distinct, exist inextricably and mutually in relation to each other, a relationship 
 
80 τὸν αὐτοτελῆ καὶ ἀγέννητον ἄναρχόν τε καὶ ἀόρατον θεὸν ἕνα μόνον οἴδαμεν, τὸν θεὸν καὶ πατέρα τοῦ μονογενοῦς, τὸν 
μόνον μὲν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ τὸ εἶναι ἔχοντα, μόνον δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν ἀφθόνως τοῦτο χαριζόμενον. 
81 As in Eusebius of Caesarea’s writings, the creed, while granting the Holy Spirit his traditional place in the “Holy Trinity,” rather 
pointedly avoids referring to him by the name God (“believing then in the all-complete Most Holy Trinity, that is, in the Father, 
and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, and saying that the Father is God, and the Son is God, but not that these are two Gods,” 
πιστεύοντες οὖν εἰς τὴν παντέλειον τριάδα τὴν ἁγιωτάτην, τουτέστιν εἰς τὸν πατέρα καὶ εἰς τὸν υἱὸν καὶ εἰς τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ 
ἅγιον, καὶ θεὸν μὲν τὸν πατέρα λέγοντες, θεὸν δὲ καὶ τὸν υἱόν, οὐ δύο τούτους θεούς, 26.9.3). The creed makes no attempt to 
indicate either the Spirit’s essential nature or why he is included in this Trinity if he is neither God nor even a cosmic 
monarchical ruler in the manner of Father and Son. 
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in which it is truly and totally impossible for either party to exist independent of the other: “It is not 
possible for the Father ever to have existed or exist without the Son, nor the Son without the Father [...] 
the Father is able neither to be named nor to exist without the Son” (Theodoret 2.8.40, 41).82 The 
Father, then, is from all eternity dependent on the Son for his naming and existence as Father, just as 
the Son is dependent on the Father for his naming and existence as Son. Despite the asymmetry implied 
in the begetting of one from the other, then, the relationship of Father and Son is in a real and 
fundamental sense both mutual and symmetrical. In opposition to the Eastern council’s insistence that 
the Son’s begetting requires the Father to be his ἀρχή and therefore truly precede him in existence and 
will, the Western Council is brusquely contradictory: “For he is not able to always exist if he had an 
ἀρχή, because the Word who always exists does not have an ἀρχή, and God never undergoes an end” 
(2.8.42).83 In the relationship between divine Father and divine Son, the starkness of one-sided 
causation, precedence, and authority implied by the political/metaphysical term ἀρχή is entirely 
inappropriate.  
The metaphysical grounding for this eternal, uncaused co-existence between Father and Son is 
the fact that “there is one ὑπόστασις, which the heretics call οὐσία, of the Father and the Son and the 
Holy Spirit” (2.8.39).84 This assertion in particular has been taken as one of many signs that the creed 
was authored principally by Marcellus of Ancyra, who, unlike Alexander and Athanasius, had always 
taught the existence of only one divine ὑπόστασις85—though in the context of the council’s dealings 
 
82 καὶ μηδέ ποτε πατέρα χωρὶς υἱοῦ μηδὲ υἱὸν χωρὶς πατρὸς γεγενῆσθαι μηδὲ εἶναι δύνασθαι [...] πατέρα χωρὶς υἱοῦ μήτε 
ὀνομάζεσθαι μήτε εἶναι δύνασθαι. 
83 οὐ πάντοτε γὰρ εἶναι ἠδύνατο εἰ ἀρχὴν ἔλαβεν, ὅτι ὁ πάντοτε ὢν ἀρχὴν οὐκ ἔχει λόγος, θεὸς δὲ οὐδέποτε ὑπομένει τέλος. 
84 μίαν εἶναι ὑπόστασιν, ἣν αὐτοὶ οἱ αἱρετικοὶ οὐσίαν προσαγορεύουσι, τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος. 
85 For arguments for Marcellan authorship of this document, based not only on its theological viewpoint but also on its use of 
identical language and arguments to those in Marcellus’ corpus, see in particular Seibt 1994, 143-144, S. Parvis 2006a, 239-245. 
Other scholars, however, while recognizing its Marcellan theological perspective, have ascribed its actual composition to Hosius 
and Protogenes (e.g. Hanson 1988, 303-304).  
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with Julius it may also reflect deference to traditional Latin theological terminology, which had long 
asserted the existence of a single divine substantia.86 While care is taken to assert that “we do not say 
that the Father is the Son nor again that the Son is the Father, but the Father is the Father and the Son is 
the Son of the Father” (2.8.42),87 no attempt is made to explain how Father, Son, and Spirit can be truly 
distinct if they all share a single ὑπόστασις and οὐσία—that totally singular divine ὑπόστασις, in fact, 
“which is acknowledged to be the only one of the Father” (2.8.40)88— and the attempt to explain how 
the Father can be called “greater” than the Son in the Scriptures if they differ in no essential way is, to 
say the least, difficult to understand: “No one denies that the Father is greater than the Son, not 
because of another ὑπόστασις, nor because of difference, but because the very term ‘the Father’ is 
greater than ‘the Son’” (2.8.45).89  
Perhaps most notable for our purposes, however, is the fact that, in contrast to the gradated 
sequence of monarchical rulers presented by the Eastern bishops, the Western bishops chose to take 
their stand on the total unity and indeed identity of divine power, even when shared among multiple 
persons: “And this we believe: that always, without ἀρχή and without end, this one reigns along with 
the Father, and this Imperial power (βασιλεία) of his has neither time nor cessation” (2.8.48).90 It is this 
 
86 The formulation una substantia, tres personae is first attested in Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 1, and appears in many places 
in 4th century Latin authors (see e.g. Faustinus, Confessio Fidei 22-28, Jerome, Epistula 15.3-4, Hilary, De synodis 32, De Trinitate 
4.3, 6.6, as well as the discussion in section 5.1 below for the centrality of this formula to Lucifer’s theology). While it is by no 
means certain that every Latin-speaking bishop involved with the Western cause at Serdica would have known this terminology, 
one would assume that many did, certainly including Julius himself. It is at least potentially notable, then, that the document 
makes no reference to the countervailing Latin term persona or its Greek equivalents, instead (in Marcellan fashion) failing to 
provide any terminology for the distinct divine persons at all.  
87 οὐ λέγομεν τὸν πατέρα υἱὸν εἶναι οὐδὲ πάλιν τὸν υἱὸν πατέρα εἶναι· ἀλλ’ ὁ πατὴρ πατήρ ἐστι καὶ ὁ υἱὸς πατρὸς υἱός. 
88 αὕτη ἦν ἡ μόνη τοῦ πατρὸς ὁμολογουμένη. 
89 οὐδέ τις ἀρνεῖταί ποτε τὸν πατέρα τοῦ υἱοῦ μείζονα, οὐ δι’ ἄλλην ὑπόστασιν, οὐ διὰ τὴν διαφοράν, ἀλλ’ ὅτι αὐτὸ τὸ ὄνομα 
τοῦ πατρὸς μεῖζόν ἐστι τοῦ υἱοῦ. 
90 καὶ τοῦτο δὲ πιστεύομεν πάντοτε, ἀνάρχως καὶ ἀτελευτήτως τοῦτον μετὰ τοῦ πατρὸς βασιλεύειν καὶ μὴ ἔχειν μήτε χρόνον 
μήτε ἔκλειψιν αὐτοῦ τὴν βασιλείαν. 
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total and mutual sharing in a single divine power by multiple persons, not the absolute independence 
and priority of one over all others, that actually unites both the divine realm, and, implicitly, the human 
realm as well: “We confess that there is one God, we confess one divinity of Father and Son” (2.8.45).91 
However clear its basic assertion of divine unity and mutuality may be in theory, the council’s 
theological statement is undeniably clumsy and rambling,92 composed not as a creed but as a series of 
ad hoc denunciations of the teachings contained in the Eastern Creed of Serdica and taught in previous 
decades by Eusebius of Caesarea, with little attempt at synthesizing a broader position across 
theological divides. Indeed, the official status of this document is very much in doubt since, as 
Athanasius explicitly asserts and some modern scholars have argued, it may have either never been 
officially promulgated by the council as a whole or else quashed by the absent Julius of Rome, whose 
approval the council had sought for its acts, in deference to the continuing authority of the Creed of 
Nicaea.93 Where the Western bishops clearly felt more confident was in their assertion of the juridical 
 
91 ὁμολογοῦμεν ἕνα εἶναι θεόν, ὁμολογοῦμεν μίαν πατρὸς καὶ υἱοῦ θεότητα. 
92 Cf. Barnes 1993, 76: “a rambling, outspoken, and incautious statement.” See, however, S. Parvis 2006a, 239-245, who gives a 
more positive elaboration of the creed as a document of Marcellus of Ancyra’s mature thought, in response to the developing 
Eusebian position, though she also accepts that the creed’s theology shows “Marcellus’ political limitations” in that he “was not 
prepared to compromise, to propose a formula which a broad spectrum of Eastern as well as Western bishops might be 
prepared to sign up to” (244). 
93 The creed is found in Greek as an addition to the Western encyclical letter in Theodoret, Historia Ecclesiastica 2.8.37-52, as 
well as in a Latin version in the Verona Codex 2.2.4; it is not included, however, in Athanasius’ version of the letter in Apologia 
contra Arianos 42.1-47.6, nor in Hilary of Poitier’s Latin version in Adversus Valentem et Ursacium Series B 1.1-8, with both of 
these versions featuring clear (if differing) endings where the creed stands in the other versions. Athanasius directly asserts in 
Tomus ad Antiochenos 5 that the council had promulgated no theological documents in favor of continuing adherence to the 
Creed of Nicaea, and orders the Antiochenes to suppress any reading of a theological document that alleges to have been put 
together at Serdica, presumably our current text of the “Creed of Western Serdica.” While a few scholars (e.g. Hanson 1988, 
304) have seen this as a straightforward lie on Athanasius’ part, most have taken it as an indication that the document did in 
fact fall short of full endorsement by the synod. The thesis that the creed was drafted as part of the encyclical letter but never 
promulgated by the council is argued at length by Tetz 1985, and endorsed by Barnes 1993, 76-78. S. Parvis 2006a, 236-239, 
argues based on the evidence of existing lists of signatories for the existence of three smaller “working groups” of bishops at 
Serdica, including two smaller groups led by Hosius and Protogenes and a larger main group led by Julius’ legates, who were 
likely under strict instructions not to permit the council to do any more than reaffirm the creed of Nicaea. It was Hosius and 
Protogenes, in particular, who were brought to write to Julius (Verona Codex 1.2.4) apologetically explaining why they had felt 
it necessary to modify what seems to have been his clearly-expressed intention that they not go beyond the Creed of Nicaea, 
and (as Parvis argues based on the text of the letter to Julius contained in Hilary, Adversus Valentem et Ursacium Series B 2.2) 
by going on to assert the doctrinal authority of the Church of Rome in the strongest terms (hoc enim optimum et valde 
congruentissimum esse videbitur, si ad caput, id est ad Petri apostoli sedem, de singulis quibusque provinciis domini referant 
sacerdotes) thereby implicitly extending to him the right to reject the creed if he wished. As Parvis concludes (238), it seems 
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authority to clear Athanasius, Marcellus, Asclepas of Gaza, and the other exiles of all suspicion, and 
likewise in their denunciation by name and deposition in theory of their main opponents in the East, 
including most notably Acacius of Caesarea,94 on the charges of heretical doctrine (e.g. 2.8.33-35), unjust 
judicial processes against personal enemies (2.8.11-16, 32),95 and the manipulation of ecclesiastical 
networks through episcopal translations and promotions and the use of coercion to control the results 
of synods (2.8.29-32). Perhaps the most important, and certainly the most long-lasting, accomplishment 
of the council came in the numerous disciplinary canons aimed at creating an Empire-spanning episcopal 
judicial system in principle totally free from Imperial involvement and presided over by the bishop of 
Rome, not the Roman Emperor, as the ultimate court of appeals.96 However well-intentioned or even 
theoretically sound this system may have been, in an Empire and Church now clearly divided between 
Constantius and Constans, Constantinople and Rome, it had little chance of being put into effect. 
The contrast between the synod’s juridical unanimity and its theological confusion is, as Sara 
Parvis has argued, likely indicative of the fact that, unlike their Eastern counterparts, the “Western” 
 
likely that, while Julius did in fact exercise this right to quash the council’s theological statement, others present at the council, 
including most likely its probable author Marcellus of Ancyra and his contacts among the followers of Eustathius in Antioch (cf. 
Ulrich 1994, 106), continued to circulate the document and regard it as authoritative. She also suggests, plausibly enough, that 
the insistence on adopting a creed may have ultimately derived from Constans, who, although he refrained from attending the 
council himself, may have hoped to use Serdica to portray himself as a new Constantine presiding over a new Nicaea (231). 
94 The full list of men excommunicated and (theoretically) deposed by the Council includes the (recently deceased) Eusebius of 
Nicomedia, Theodorus of Heraclea, Narcissus of Neronias, Stephanus of Antioch, George of Laodicea, Acacius of Caesarea, 
Menophantus of Ephesus, Ursacius of Singidinum, Valens of Mursa (2.8.28), and the recently-appointed replacements George 
of Alexandria, Basil of Ancyra, and Quintianus of Gaza. Narcissus of Neronias, notably, had been excommunicated, along with 
Eusebius of Caesarea, by the Council of Antioch in 324 prior to Nicaea, making him perhaps the eldest and most long-standing 
member of the pro-Arius alliance still active. 
95 Notably, however, while the Western Council of Serdica brings forward the testimony of bishops and flocks exiled and 
physically abused by Imperial soldiers, no attempt is made to assign any responsibility for these (Imperial) punishments to any 
actual Emperor, but only to rival bishops. 
96 See in particular Canons 4-5, providing mechanisms and norms for a universal right of appeal to Rome and preventing the 
appointment of a replacement bishop without the bishop of Rome’s consent, as well as Canons 7-9, which forbid bishops to 
travel on their own initiative to the Imperial court and require petitions for redress presented to the Emperor to first pass 
through metropolitan bishops and (in some cases) the bishop of Rome. For the later importance of the canons of Serdica, see in 
particular Hess 1958, Hess 2002. 
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delegation (which included a majority of bishops from Greek-speaking areas of Constans’ Empire) was 
far less carefully controlled and far more internally divided on both political and theological policy than 
their “Eastern” counterparts.97 Still, in its assertion of ecclesiastical independence in judgment and 
declaration of the Father, Son, and Spirit’s mutual existence, shared singular essence, and identity of 
power, there can be little doubt that the immediate foundations of a consensus Nicene theology were 
laid, not at Nicaea, but at Western Serdica. 
As at Antioch, however, the more immediate and practical result of the Council of Serdica was 
further and deeper division. In particular, while the Western council had, in deference to Julius’ more 
conciliatory approach, excommunicated and deposed only a small list of named bishops, the Eastern 
council had issued a sweeping anathematization of not only their chief opponents (including the 
episcopal exiles, the bishop of Rome, and the most important metropolitan bishops of the Western 
Empire) but also all those who held communion with them98—in other words, the entire Western 
Empire and beyond. Even if taken as limited to the seventy-six Eastern bishops actually present at 
Serdica, this was a schism of a size not seen since the time of Novatian a century before, if then. If taken 
as the official position of Constantius II and the entire East ruled by him, it represented without question 
the largest and most consequential ecclesiastical schism in the history of the Christian Church. This 
unprecedented breach led almost immediately to unprecedented action against those now officially 
apostate and excommunicate in the eyes of Eastern Church and Emperor alike, including the immediate 
execution of ten lay Christians who refused to share communion with the Eastern delegation on their 
return journey, the deposition and exile of the few Eastern bishops who had broken ranks and joined 
 
97 For the makeup of the Western delegation, see S. Parvis 2006a, 225-229. As both she and Ayres 2004, 122-123, note, the 
division of the bishops of Serdica into “East” and “West” was a political, not a linguistic or cultural division. 
98 See the Eastern encyclical letter given in Hilary Adversus Valentem et Ursacium Series A 4. 
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the larger council, and, most dramatically, the public proscription on pain of capital punishment of any 
one of the exiled bishops found returning to their sees.99  
In the face of a divided Empire, Constantine’s Imperial-episcopal judicial system was visibly 
breaking down. His general refusal to employ capital punishment against bishops had been based, as I 
have argued, not only on apparent personal respect for the sanctity of the episcopal office, but also on 
his practical ability to achieve at least passive unanimity through the direction of synodal proceedings 
and final recourse to himself, as well as his equally practical ability to send bishops into exile far from 
their local networks of power. Now, however, exiled bishops, operating with impunity throughout 
Constans’ realm and insinuating themselves into the ecclesiastical networks there, had become deadly 
means of political delegitimization, while even the most forceful Constantinian means of synodal 
direction had barely sufficed for the temporary holding together of a small and unusually uniform 
Eastern delegation forced to operate for a brief period outside of Constantius’ territory. The only 
practical recourse remaining was force, barely legitimized through conciliar means. For Constantius, 
violence against his brother and rival Emperor, son of the one Emperor Constantine, seems to have 
remained taboo; but that did not apply to the clerics who had allied themselves with him. The exiled 
bishops and their Western allies, officially declared anathema by the Eastern synod of Serdica, would 
enter the territory of Constantius at their own peril. 
Using Imperial resources to get a large number of bishops to one place, it turned out, was the 
easy part—getting them to actually meet together and agree in the absence of a single Imperial 
 
99 See Athanasius, Historia Arianorum 18.2-19.4, cf. Barnes 1993, 82-86. Arius of Petra and Asterius of Arabia, the two Eastern 
dissenters mentioned in the documents of Western Serdica, were sent into exile to Upper Libya, where, according to 
Athanasius, the Imperial officials involved “made them suffer acts of wanton violence” (ὕβρεων μετασχεῖν αὐτοὺς πεποιήκασι, 
Historia Arianorum 18.3). Similarly, in his Apologia de Fuga 3.4-5, Athanasius mentions the proscription under pain of death 
(along with himself) of the bishops Theodulus and Olympius of Thrace, which may also belong to this period. The only 
documented instance of a bishop actually dying due to these laws, however, is that of Lucius of Adrianopole, who seems to 
have attempted to regain his see shortly after the council and who was, according to Athanasius, put in chains, sent into exile, 
and died shortly thereafter in Imperial custody (Historia Arianorum 19.1-2). 
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jurisdiction or ecclesiastical authority structure was much harder. In the final balance, the Western 
bishops knew that Constans would support their rulings, whatever they might be, while the Eastern 
bishops of the networks once presided over by Eusebius of Nicomedia could count on the active 
cooperation and involvement of a Constantius not only closely allied with them, but also naturally 
jealous of Constans’ intervention in his realms and bitterly opposed to the return of men he had 
personally exiled for crimes as much political as theological. The result was an obvious and predictable 
stalemate.  
 Still, as Constantine had known well, in the game of divided Empire, there was one completely 
reliable method of breaking any stalemate: civil war. In the end, the Western ecclesiastical faction 
achieved a partial victory by the simple expedient of Constans threatening invasion. In a letter written to 
his eldest brother a few years after Serdica, the youngest son of Constantine could hardly be more 
direct:  
Athanasius and Paul are here with me: but by questioning them I have come to know that they 
are being persecuted for the sake of piety. If, therefore, you give orders that their episcopal 
thrones be given back to them, at the same time taking revenge on those who are senselessly 
attacking them, I will send these men to you: but if you refuse to do these things as I say, know 
well that I myself will come there, even if you are unwilling, and give them back their thrones. 
(Socrates Scholasticus 2.22.5).100 
 While the authenticity of Constans’ threat of invasion, reported in all the 5th century 
ecclesiastical historians (Rufinus 10.20, Philostorgius 3.12, Theodoret 2.8.54-56, Sozomen 3.20.1), and 
the accompanying fragment of a letter (preserved in Socrates Scholasticus 2.22.5) has been doubted at 
 
100 Ὧδε μέν εἰσι παῤ ἐμοὶ Ἀθανάσιος καὶ Παῦλος: ἀλλὰ πυνθανόμενος διέγνων εὐσεβείας αὐτοὺς χάριν διώκεσθαι. Εἰ μὲν οὖν 
ἐπαγγέλλῃ ἀποδιδόναι τούτοις τοὺς θρόνους, ἐπαμυνόμενος τοὺς μάτην αὐτοῖς προσφυομένους, ἀποστελῶ πρός σε τοὺς 




times by scholars,101 it is perfectly consistent with the uneasy game of political and ecclesiastical 
brinkmanship played by the sons of Constantine during these decades.102 Only a few years earlier, 
Constans had come out very much the winner in the civil war with his brother Constantine II, and it is 
not at all unreasonable that, like his father before him, he would have taken this victory as a sign of 
divine favor and so be more ready on a later occasion to appeal to the will of heaven, as expressed in 
the outcome of doubtful military campaigns. As even Constantine had known and constantly asserted, 
however, certain victory required a divinely blessed cause—of which the best and most potent example, 
constantly held up by Constantine as the badge of legitimacy and cause of victory, was the freeing of 
Christians from persecution. Constans’ assertion that Athanasius and Paul had been unjustly persecuted 
for piety, then, should be seen not so much as a sign of his personal religiosity as the convenient 
assertion of a cause that, in the best Constantinian fashion, would both justify war and guarantee 
victory. Bishops deposed in conciliar proceedings on theological and moral charges have become, for the 
first time, figures comparable to the martyrs and confessors of old—at least for the eminently Imperial 
and Constantinian purpose of justifying a civil conflict. Here, notably, Marcellus of Ancyra, Asclepias of 
Gaza, and the rest of the exiles who, like Athanasius but unlike Paul,103 had been vindicated personally 
 
101 Its authenticity is rejected by Schwartz 1935, while Girardet 1975, 145, regards the incident as authentic but not the 
quotation. Barnes 1993, 89-90, provides significant evidence for the authenticity of both the letter and incident from the other 
ecclesiastical historians and Athanasius.  
102 See in particular Hanson 1988, 307: “It is difficult to believe that Constans would have been ready to plunge the Empire into 
civil war [...] for the sake of the restoration of a few bishops.” The most cogent counter-statement is that of S. Parvis 2006a, 
200: “Hanson is right [...] Constans was ready to demand the restoration of a few bishops for the sake of plunging the empire 
into civil war; or rather, for the opportunity to lay claim to some of his brother’s territory.” 
103 Paul is mentioned neither in the writings of Julius nor in the documents of the Western Council of Serdica, though he is 
prominently attacked in the encyclical letter of Eastern Serdica. As S. Parvis 2006a, 226-227, suggests, this may be reflective of 
disagreement between Paul on the one hand and Julius and Athanasius on the other over the right way to proceed, with the 
latter favoring a more ecclesiastical (and at least for Julius, relatively conciliatory) solution while Paul was more focused on 
gaining Constans’ direct patronage and support. Though the Western bishops at Serdica do not explicitly discuss his case or 
clear him, S. Parvis 2006a, 228-229, argues that he would have been implicitly covered by the synod’s formulaic clearing of the 
other exiled bishops in communion with Athanasius, Marcellus, and Asclepas, while Barnes 1993, 77, argues on the evidence of 
Socrates Scholasticus (Historia Ecclesiastica 2.20.12) and the 9th century Patriarch Photius (Bibliotheca 257, 476 a 20/1) that 
Paul was in fact present at the council, and explains the omission of his name from the synod’s official documents as a tactical 
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and theologically at the Council of Serdica, entirely disappear from the narrative. The allegedly 
problematic theology of Marcellus104 aside, Ancyra was at best a provincially important city—it was not 
the capitol of Egypt or the city of Constantine. Thanks to Constantine’s reasonings on civil war, 
legitimacy, and victory, the exiled bishops of the two most important cities of Constantius’ domains 
have become tickets to the legitimate conquest of those cities and the Empire as a whole. 
In the contentious atmosphere of conflict among the sons of Constantine, the greater surprise is 
not that Constans threatened civil war, nor that he made use of alleged persecution of Christians to 
justify such a conflict, but that Constantius did not, in fact, accept the challenge offered him. 
Constantius, after all, possessed just as much as his brother a properly ecclesiastical and Christian 
backing for his rule, as well as a much more notable history of fighting and winning difficult military 
campaigns. The 5th century Nicene historians ascribe Constantius’ decision here, as they do most 
substantive decisions during his reign, not to his own judgment but to that of his (unnamed) 
ecclesiastical advisors.105 Whether Acacius of Caesarea or his absent predecessor Eusebius would have 
favored civil war among the sons of Constantine for the purpose of keeping their ecclesiastical 
 
move based on the fact that “even his supporters could not produce a plausible defense of his actions,” especially his bloody 
return to Constantinople in 342. 
104 That theology had become even more problematic since Serdica, as Marcellus’ disciple Photinus of Sirmium had in the 
intervening years been subject to theological condemnation by Julius of Rome and then by a council held at Milan in 345 with 
the active participation of Athanasius. After this council, at which Marcellus was not formally condemned or excommunicated, 
but which he seems to have deliberately not attended to avoid being forced to condemn his pupil (see e.g. Lienhard 1993, 
Brennecke 1984b, 57-62, S. Parvis 2006a, 248-250), the ousted bishop of Ancyra essentially disappears from the historical 
record until 371, when he was apparently still living at Ancyra with a small circle of disciples and followers and was subjected to 
vicious theological attack by Basil of Caesarea but defended by Athanasius, who negotiated with both Basil and Marcellus’ 
followers but ultimately refused to break communion with him (see e.g. Lienhard 1989). Marcellus’ reasons for generally 
withdrawing from ecclesiastical life are unclear. Barnes 1993, 93, and Hanson 1988, 222, both ascribe the sudden move from 
theological and ecclesiastical prominence to obscurity in part to senility brought on by old age, while S. Parvis 2006a, 245-252, 
more positively suggests that it was due to an unwillingness to condemn his student Photinus combined with recognition that, 
given the increasingly negative reputation engendered both by that connection and by Eusebian polemic in the East, it would 
be effectively impossible for him to actually govern the Church of Ancyra, while even the increasingly consensus-based Nicene 
cause of Athanasius and Julius would be better served by his withdrawal from public life. As Parvis points out (251), such 
withdrawal had in fact been the canonical norm laid down by the Council of Ancyra of 314, over which Marcellus had presided 
(see note 92 in section 2.4 above), for a bishop unable to effectively occupy the diocese assigned to him. 
105 See e.g. Socrates Scholasticus 2.23.1-2, Sozomen 3.20.1-2. 
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opponents out of power is unclear. Either way, Constantius had reasons of his own to be wary of such a 
conflict.  
In the first place, Constantius was, as I have argued, the principal architect of the new Imperial 
system of legitimacy, established by his decision to slaughter all male relatives except his two brothers. 
The system of legitimacy that had emerged from this massacre depended almost entirely on the sanctity 
and unity ascribed to the status of being born of Constantine. Constantine II seems to have had the least 
to do with creating this new system and so predictably had been the first to openly defy it by going to 
war with his brother Constans. Constantius, in contrast, had the most invested of any of his brothers in 
maintaining it and its underlying logic of familial unity.106 Whatever else may be said of Constantius’ 
proclivities towards civil war or the murder of relatives, he seems to have taken great pains to avoid 
conflict with his brothers. If, as Constantius consistently maintained, the right to rule flowed simply and 
solely from direct descent from Constantine, a civil conflict among his sons was perhaps the one sort of 
conflict intrinsically impossible to legitimize. Whatever the wickedness of Athanasius or Paul, or 
whatever the inexpediency of not allowing men indebted to his brother to hold positions of power 
within his Empire, Constantius did not finally regard this as grounds for violating the basis of his own 
authority and the post-Constantinian Imperial system as a whole. Nor was it grounds for violating the 
larger order of the cosmos, grounded in the divine realm not, as for Constans, on an unclear but singular 
divine unity, but on hierarchical and unequal relations among clearly distinct entities emanating from 
one God. Finally, and most mundanely, Constantius was currently engaged in military operations on the 
 
106 As Moser 2018, 164, points out, Constans seems to have made no use of Constantine on his coinage, such that “Constantius 
was the only emperor to produce coin series that expressively commemorated Constantine in their legends and motifs after 
340.” In Constantius’ coinage during this period, in contrast, he pervasively portrayed Constantine in tandem with his sons and 
frequently included his younger brother as well as himself. All this again suggests Constantius’ greater commitment to the 




Empire’s Eastern front, and so would find a military challenge from the West far more logistically 
demanding.  
Whatever the precise reasoning behind it, Constantius’ decision is not in doubt, and was 
accompanied by multiple written documents explaining and justifying his choice.107 As these documents 
show, Constantius responded to Constans’ move by parlaying it as much as possible in his own favor, in 
a rather more theologically sophisticated fashion than Constans had shown himself capable of. In the 
first letter written to Athanasius following Constans’ threat, Constantius sought to explain a complex 
decision in the terms of the somewhat simplistic concept of authority and legitimacy contained in 
Eusebian theology:  
Constantius the Victorious Augustus to Athanasius. 
 The Philanthropy of our Gentleness does not permit you any longer to be wave-tossed 
and storm-tossed by the savage swells of the sea. Our untiring Piety has not abandoned you, 
although stripped of your ancestral hearth and deprived of your own possessions and wandering 
in pathless wastelands. And although I have for a long time delayed putting in writing the 
purpose (πρόθεσις) of my understanding (διανοία), expecting that you were going to come to us 
of your own free will and ask for the care of our labors, nevertheless since fear still impeded the 
choice (προαίρεσις) of your purpose (πρόθεσις), for this reason we sent letters very full of grace 
to Your Steadfastness, so that you might hurry to quickly offer your presence to our sight, for 
the sake of which, after enjoying what you had desired and experiencing our Philanthropy, you 
might be restored to what is your own. For it is because of this that I called beside myself my 
master and brother Constans the Victorious Augustus, for your sake, so that he might give you 
authorization to come, so that you might be restored to your inheritance thanks to us both 
granting it, possessing this as a pledge of our favor (Athanasius, Apologia contra Arianos 51.1-
4).108 
 
107 For Constantius’ numismatic issues c. 346, almost certainly in response to Constans’ actions, which emphasized his status as 
triumphator in campaigns against the Persians as well as an idealized unity with his brother, see Wienand 2015. See also Moser 
2018, 162, who highlights a new coin series issued in 346, likely in response to Constans’ forced return of Athanasius, which 
returns to the motif of the dynasty’s origins in Constantine and directly styles Constantius Maximus Augustus. 
108 Κωνστάντιος Νικητὴς Αὔγουστος Ἀθανασίῳ. Ἐπὶ πολύ σε κλυδωνίζεσθαι καὶ χειμάζεσθαι τοῖς τῆς θαλάττης ἀγρίοις κύμασιν 
οὐκ ἀφῆκεν ἡ τῆς ἡμετέρας ἡμερότητος φιλανθρωπία. γυμνωθέντα σε τῆς πατρῴας ἑστίας καὶ στερηθέντα τῶν ἰδίων καὶ 
πλανώμενον ἐν θηριώδεσιν ἀνοδίαις οὐ παρῆκεν ἡ ἀκάματος ἡμῶν εὐσέβεια. καὶ εἰ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα ἐπιπολὺ ὑπερεθέμην 
γράψαι τὴν πρόθεσιν τῆς ἐμῆς διανοίας προσδοκῶν αὐθαίρετόν σε παραγενέσθαι πρὸς ἡμᾶς καὶ τῶν καμάτων αἰτεῖν 
θεραπείαν, ὅμως, ἐπειδὴ ἴσως ὁ φόβος τὴν προαίρεσιν τῆς προθέσεως ἐνεπόδισε, διὰ τοῦτο δωρεᾶς πληρέστατα γράμματα 
πρὸς τὴν σὴν στερρότητα διεπεμψάμεθα, ἵνα ἀφόβως ταῖς ἡμετέραις προσόψεσι ταχεῖαν τὴν σαυτοῦ παρουσίαν παρασχεῖν 
σπουδάσῃς, ὑπὲρ τοῦ τῆς σαυτοῦ ἐπιθυμίας ἀπολαύσας καὶ πειραθεὶς ἡμῶν τῆς φιλανθρωπίας τοῖς ἰδίοις ἀποκατασταθῇς. 
τούτου γὰρ ἕνεκα καὶ τὸν δεσπότην μου καὶ ἀδελφόν μου Κώνσταντα τὸν Νικητὴν Αὔγουστον ὑπὲρ σοῦ παρεκάλεσα, ἵνα τοῦ 
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Contained in this document are a number of issues key to the Constantinian system as I have 
constructed it. First and most importantly, the main note of the document is an overwhelming 
preoccupation with establishing the absolute priority of the Emperor’s will in relation to subordinates. 
Although to an outside observer it might seem that Constantius had intended to depose Athanasius and 
keep him in exile, in fact he had fully intended, throughout the entire process, to eventually restore him. 
Although it might seem that Athanasius had in fact been the active instigator of his restoration by 
forging ecclesiastical networks, having synods summoned to vindicate himself, and finally bringing the 
Emperor Constans to threaten civil war, in fact the pious and philanthropic Constantius had been in 
complete control all along, having already made his choice freely, without any influence from anyone 
else, and then having merely waited for Athanasius to freely offer him a petition to grant. This is a model 
of authority in its principal aspects identical to the concept of political authority in Eusebius of Caesarea 
and Constantine, by which monarchical power and metaphysical divinity alike are defined above all by 
priority and independence in willing. Like God in relation to Christ or Christ in relation to his servant 
Constantine, Constantius had watched from afar as Athanasius suffered, appearing to abandon him but 
in fact fully aware of his own intention to restore him upon receipt of a properly free and humble 
prayer. Even then, when, thanks to the impeding influence of Athanasius’ passions on his ability to make 
truly free decisions, he had unaccountably failed to ask for what he desired, Constantius had mercifully 
revealed his long-concealed intention and proactively summoned the prodigal into his presence. Like 
God, the Emperor Constantius works in mysterious ways—even, at times, in ways that directly 
contradict his own previous actions and expressed intentions. 
Constantius likewise shows a strong interest in maintaining priority in relation to his brother 
Constans, though here, the nature of that priority is somewhat more complex. Constans is clearly, in 
 




every legal sense, the same as his brother: both Augusti, both victorious, and both possessed of the 
authority, alone or jointly, to order about the inferior Athanasius and bestow unmerited favors upon 
him. Constans is even here, in a generous gesture, referred to as Constantius’ “Master,” as Constantine 
II had referred to Constantine in heaven. For all these signs of similarity, however, Constantius maintains 
a clear priority in relation to his brother in willing and commanding. Far from yielding to a threat of civil 
war from a brother who had already summoned councils to declare Athanasius innocent, here 
Constantius is without a doubt the one who, from the very beginning, had retained within himself the 
hidden intention of restoring Athanasius. It was Constantius, too, who had made the free decision to 
reveal this intention to Constans and summon him to his side so that the two might, together, bring 
Athanasius from his turbulent and deprived exile in the pathless wastelands of Constans’ dominions 
back to his true home in Constantius’ city of Alexandria. In fundamental agreement with his father and 
the Eusebian bishops, Constantius recognizes that primacy and supremacy are, first and foremost, a 
matter of who gives the commands, and who receives them. Constantius is, de facto if not de jure, the 
one and only imperator. 
Regardless of the forthrightness with which this letter asserts Constantius’ consistent good-will 
towards Athanasius, it does not seem to have been particularly effective at reassuring its recipient. In 
the end, it would take two further letters to Athanasius himself (Apologia contra Arianos 51.5, 51.6), a 
letter to the Church of Alexandria (55), a general encyclical letter to the bishops of Constantius’ domains 
(54), and a letter to the governors of Egypt and Libya (56) by which all legal restrictions against both 
Athanasius and his followers were cancelled—all carefully preserved by Athanasius himself and later 
used in his defense once Constantius had predictably turned on him—before Athanasius considered 
himself secure enough to actually return to his flock in Alexandria, a full year after Constantius’ first 
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letter.109 Even in presenting elaborate declarations of good-will, these letters are careful to assign all 
credit for Athanasius’ return and the cancelling of legal disabilities against his followers not to 
Athanasius or Constans, but solely to “the will (βουλήσις) of our Superior and our own judgment” 
(54.2),110 or similarly “the decree of our Superior and our decision” (55.5).111 Here, divine and Imperial 
willing and decreeing are so closely connected as to be nearly synonymous. This connection between 
divine commands and Imperial commands possesses, however, a clear ordering schema. As Constantius 
sums up: “We have ordered, in imitation (ὁμοιότης) of that Providence which has already gone before, 
that all such people should even now benefit from the favor which is offered to them from us by the will 
(βουλήσις) of our Superior” (54.5).112 In the order of cosmos and Empire alike, favor is handed down 
from the will of God through the will of Constantius.  
Where in this order the fellow Augustus Constans might be found is unclear. As the son of 
Constantine, possessing the same father and the same titles, he is in some genuine sense an equal of 
Constantius himself: in the order of command, however, he is at best an inferior, and at worst simply 
superfluous. Eusebius had appealed to the legal fiction of a continuing rule by Constantine to justify the 
problematic existence of multiple, quasi-equal rulers on earth. Now, however, Constantine has gradually 
disappeared from the picture, replaced by the same monarchical God from whom Constantine himself 
had claimed the right to rule, and rule alone. As subordinate sons of Constantine, co-existence and 
 
109 Cf. Barnes 1993, 91, who points out that during the intervening year, Athanasius seems to have first visited Constans at court 
(cf. Apologia ad Constantium 4.5), then visited Julius in Rome, where he received a panegyrical letter to take back to his people 
in Alexandria (preserved in Apologia contra Arianos 52-53, given as Letter 5 in Thompson 2015), and only then met with 
Constantius, from whom, according to Historia Arianorum 22.2, he extorted a promise never again to listen to any accusations 
against himself. All of this shows a very strong (and understandable) interest in assuring his own safety in the face of an 
Emperor who had shown himself willing in the past to use extreme force against bishops. 
110 βουλήσει τοῦ κρείττονος καὶ κρίσει ἡμετέρᾳ. 
111 ψήφῳ τοῦ κρείττονος καὶ ἡμετέρᾳ γνώμῃ. 
112 τούτους πάντας ἐκελεύσαμεν καθ’ ὁμοιότητα τῆς φθανούσης προνοίας καὶ νῦν τῆς ὑφ’ ἡμῶν βουλήσει τοῦ κρείττονος 
παρασχεθείσης χάριτος ἀπολαύειν. 
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equality were, at least in theory, possible—in a monarchical cosmos grounded on strict precedence, 
however, there is ultimately only need for one Emperor handing down divine decrees. Read in the light 
of these theological concepts, the ecclesiastical conflicts between Constans and Constantius take on a 
very different valence. If one Emperor was acting and believing rightly, in tandem with truly holy 
bishops, while his counterpart was ensnared by heresy and persecution, then his claim to a status 
analogous to Constantine’s solitary, monarchical “Servant of God” could be legitimatized—and his rival 
delegitimized. In the end, there could be only one. 
3.5: 
Return of the Cosmic Emperor 
As it turned out, this incipient conflict113 was resolved without Constantius’ direct intervention. 
Constans had come into possession of Gaul through civil war with his brother Constantine II, shattering 
the illusion of perfect harmony among the sons of Constantine. Rule by force of arms and victory in 
battle had once brought their father Constantine to power—but it had also summoned a host of rivals to 
challenge him. It is perhaps not a surprise, then, that ten years after their Emperor’s death, the armies 
of Constantine II’s former realm of Gaul showed their dissatisfaction with Constans’ rule by declaring the 
Gallic general Magnentius Emperor.114 Magnentius in turn lost little time in murdering the allegedly 
sacrosanct son of Constantine and declaring a new Imperial regime grounded for the first time in 
decades on neither blood ties with Constantine nor even the pretense of political cooperation across the 
 
113 Barnes 1993, 98-100, argues for a Council of Antioch c. 349, before Constans’ death, where Athanasius was accused of 
having returned to power illegally and deposed (cf. Sozomen 4.8.3-4). Paul, too, may have been initially brought to trial and 
deposed c. 349 (Barnes 1993, 214-217, cf. Historia Arianorum 7.1, 3), but was not actually executed until after Constans’ death. 
If accurate, this may suggest that Constantius, sensing his brother’s growing weakness in the West, was already preparing a 
new offensive, ecclesiastical and/or political, against Constans before his death.  
114 For an account of the usurpation of Magnentius, which was supported by high members of Constans’ administration and 
seems to have been carefully planned and executed at a time when Constantius’ troops were engaged with the Persians and so 




borders of East and West.115 In a move that showed the wisdom of Constantius in avoiding such civil 
conflict, however, Magnentius was brought shortly thereafter to appeal to the now clearly senior 
Augustus, only surviving son of Constantine, and only remaining ruler who owed neither his position nor 
territories to civil war after two other usurpers, Vetranio and Nepotianus, seized the opportunity 
presented by the breakdown of Imperial legitimacy to make their own bids for power. Notably, while 
Magnentius seems to have rested his claim (in imitation of Constantine) on control of Rome, victory in 
battle, and the slaying of the “tyrant” Constans,116 both of these challengers appealed, in somewhat 
convoluted forms, to the Constantinian dynastic principle to justify their own power.117  
Yet if Magnentius had hoped to restore his tarnished legitimacy by being accepted, in Tetrarchic 
fashion, as a worthy member of the new Constantinian Imperial college, he had clearly misjudged 
Constantius.118 Magnentius not only had no blood relationship at all, however tenuous, to Constantine, 
 
115 As Moser 2018, 171-172, points out, one of Magnentius’ first moves seems to have been to replace the Prefect of Rome with 
the former Prefect of Gaul, at once a political act aimed at denying Constantius access to Rome and its senators and an attempt 
“to claim legitimacy through the support of the senate of Rome” (171). At the same time, however, as Barnes 1993, 101-105, 
points out, Magnentius also seems to have made a deliberate attempt to associate himself with Constantine by presenting 
himself in his coinage as the liberator of Rome from tyranny and a victor favored by the Christian God and wielding the 
Constantinian labarum. Indeed, as Drinkwater 2000, 137, suggests, Magnentius way well have hoped that, given the history of 
conflict between Constantius and Constans, Constantius would be happy to accept him as a less threatening, more cooperative 
junior Emperor also ruling in imitation of Constantine. 
116 See e.g. Omissi 2018, 165: “Constans’ deposition was clearly portrayed by Magnentius as a tyrannicide, for inscriptions 
dedicated to Magnentius advertised him as liberator orbis Romani, restitutor libertatis et rei publicae, conservator militum et 
provincialium.” 
117 Nepotianus was Constantine’s nephew by a half-sister and one of the very few remaining male relatives of Constantine left 
after Constantius’ purge (cf. Burgess 2008, 10 n. 34, Vanderspoel 1999, 53, Tougher 2012, 188). The more successful of the two, 
he was able, according to more recent scholarly constructions, to rule Rome with the active cooperation of the Senatorial class 
for as long as four or five months despite his almost total lack of military resources (cf. Bleckmann 2003 46 n.7, Moser 2018, 
173-174). The powerful and experienced general Vetranio, on the other hand, although totally unrelated to Constantine, seems 
to have tried to claim legitimacy as an agent of Constantius and the Constantinian dynasty against Magnentius, a claim backed 
up by the active support of Constantius’ sister Constantina and his aunt’s brother and Imperial comes Vulcacius Rufinus (see e.g. 
Drinkwater 2000, 146-159, Dearn 2003, Moser 2018, 174-175, Omissi 2018, 164, 167-168, 182-190). While Nepotianus was 
overcome and killed by Magnentius, Vetranio (who may well have been to some degree a genuine Constantian loyalist) was 
able to peacefully negotiate an end to his reign, surrendering to Constantius’ troops when they finally reached Sirmium and 
thereafter sent into peaceful retirement—an event later trumpeted by Themistius as a sign of Constantius’ status as the true 
philosopher king spoken of by Plato, capable of conquering by eloquence and reason without recourse to bloodshed (Orationes 
2.36d-37d). 
118 Cf. Drinkwater 2000, 137-138: “I would indeed suggest that hopes of reviving and exploiting tetrarchic principles were 
central to the thinking of those involved in what may be termed the ‘Magnentian experiment.’ [...] Constantius could have 
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but had come to power through the murder of Constantine’s son. If Constantius wished to continue to 
rule stably on the basis of origination from Constantine, he could not possibly accept the rule of anyone 
else on entirely different grounds. If Magnentius’ rule were accepted, even provisionally, on the sole 
basis of usurpation and victory in battle, there was a very real danger of a return to the bloody conflicts 
of the 3rd century and the breakdown of the Tetrarchic system in the early 4th. As I have argued, 
Constantine had systematically worked throughout his reign to annihilate the Tetrarchic system of 
collegial Imperial legitimacy in favor of a starkly monarchical and dynastic system designed to forestall 
any possibility of usurpation—and now Constantius, his last remaining son, was tasked with finishing the 
job. After Constantine, no Emperor unrelated to him could ever rule again.119 Forced to be, so to speak, 
two places at once by the civil war with Magnentius and the ever-dangerous Persian front, Constantius 
once again appealed to bloodlines, granted the title of Caesar to his cousin Gallus,120 and set out to bring 
an end to Magnentius’ new Empire by whatever means. In December of 350, he arrived outside the 
walls of Sirmium, the capital of the prefecture of Illyricum and the city from which in the coming years 
 
justified acceptance of Magnentius if he chose to announce that it was but a reversion to the tetrarchic notion of collegiality.” 
That the political-theological stances of Constantine and Constantius were primarily directed against any such system of non-
dynastic collegiality is one of the main arguments of the present study. 
119 This dynastic principle was dramatized in a surviving fragment of the 6th century Byzantine historian Petros Patrikios, where 
a vacillating Constantius is visited in his sleep by Constantine, who forbids him to make peace with the murderer of his son (fr. 
16, from Zonaras 13.7.20-22). Given the long-standing and particularly Constantinian and Eusebian ideology of dreams as a 
means of divine communication to the reigning Emperor (see the discussion in sections 2.5 and 2.7 above as well as section 5.5 
below), it is possible that this story dates in some form to Constantius’ actual reign. 
120 As Moser 2018, 175-176, points out, Constantius’ appointment of his younger cousin to the lower rank of Caesar in itself 
constituted a clear rejection of Magnentius’ proposed system of two quasi-equal Augusti ruling without familial relation. 
Magnentius seems to have responded to this move by marrying a woman who may have been a distant relative of Constantine 
(cf. Barnes 1993, 102, Frakes 2012, 96-97), while at the same time clearly rejecting Constantinian blood as the basis of rule by 
appointing a relative of his own to the office of Caesar. While the elevation of Gallus helped to underscore the dynastic power 
of Constantinian blood, Constantius does not seem to have actually sent his Caesar to the East until more than six months had 
elapsed and he had married him to his own sister Constantina, both signs of the senior Augustus’ discomfort with the new 
arrangement (Ammianus 21.13.11, cf. Moser 2018, 175-176, 178-179). For the position of Caesar in Constantius’ understanding 
as a glorified military standard and quasi-imagistic extension of Imperial presence, see both the discussion of Julian’s 
appointment in section 3.6 below and the excellent analysis of Blockley 1972, though I do not necessarily concur with Blockley’s 
assertion that Constantius “was not concerned with the succession when he appointed Gallus and Julian” (461). Given the very 
real risk that he would lose the civil war with Magnentius, it is likely in my judgment that one of Constantius’ goals in making 
Gallus Caesar was to secure a nominal Constantinian successor in the East in the event of his defeat.  
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he would plan and effect both the reconquest of the West and the reunification of the Church of the 
Roman Empire. 
According to Ammianus (21.16.12), Constantius’ decision to forcefully reject Magnentius’ offer 
of a legitimizing settlement had been made only over the strident opposition of his closest advisors, who 
foresaw a bloody campaign to retake the West.121 It may be doubted, however, whether they foresaw 
the full extent of the bloodiest civil conflict of the 4th century, and indeed one of the bloodiest in all of 
Roman history, a campaign that consumed, according to one later source, the lives of more than 50,000 
Roman soldiers in the single battle of Mursa Major.122 In the end, the war would drag on for over two 
years—yet in the eyes of both Constantius himself and numerous contemporaries, the conflict to restore 
the unity of the Roman Empire under the heir of Constantine was truly a “holy war” (πόλεμος ἱερός), to 
be pursued to its end no matter the cost.123 
In late 351, Constantius summoned a council to the Imperial court city of Sirmium and gave the 
assembled bishops three closely related tasks. This council, populated with reliable Eastern episcopal 
 
121 Two much later Byzantine sources (Zonas 13.8.7; Zosimus 2.46.3) suggest that Constantius did end up extending a diplomatic 
offer that would have allowed Magnentius to peacefully retain rule of Gaul in exchange for the surrender of exclusive control of 
Italy to Constantius. While this proposal, if genuine, was likely extended on the assumption of it being totally unacceptable to a 
Magnentius already in firm control of the entire West, if accepted it would have established Constantius as the clear superior 
ruler and made of Magnentius little more than one Imperial official among others, ruling over one of the least populated and 
most rebellious provinces of the Empire. Such a status quo would also have deprived Magnentius of his only real bid at 
legitimacy through control of Rome, and so made him much easier to remove later by less bloody means. All in all it is hardly a 
surprise that Magnentius rejected the offer. 
122 Figures of soldiers and losses involved in the battle are drawn from Zonaras, Epitome Historiarum 13.2.16-17 (cf. 3.8.17). 
These figures, like all those for ancient conflicts, have been criticized as exaggerated. For general accounts of the course of the 
war with Magnentius, see Hunt 1998, 17-22, Rubin 1998, 124-128, Bleckmann 1999. 
123 This terminology is from Julian’s first panegyric before Constantius (Orationes 1.33d), employed in explicit reference to the 
so-called “sacred war” of 356-346 BC, which was justified by the Phocians’ seizure of the Temple of Apollo at Delphi. In a 
somewhat more Christian vein, Philostorgius recounts a miraculous sign in Jerusalem during Constantius’ campaign, and a letter 
is extant from Cyril of Jerusalem to the Emperor in 351 (Epistula ad Constantium) recounting a similar prodigy and connecting it 
with Constantine’s vision as a sign of inevitable victory. According to Sulpicius Severus 11.38.5-7, Valens of Mursa later insisted 
that he had heard the outcome of the Battle of Mursa Major from an angel. The argument that Magnentius was supported by 
pagans in the Roman army who hoped for a pagan restoration through him has been put by Rubin 1998, although challenged by 
other scholars (see esp. Omissi 2018, 176-177, who points out that Magnentius seems to have been the first ruler to employ 




allies, should be seen in the larger political context of this period, where, as Muriel Moser has recently 
argued, a Constantius threatened with civil conflict had begun to increasingly bypass traditional pan-
Imperial networks of status and prestige in favor of reliance on a new (and for the first time almost 
entirely Eastern rather than Roman or senatorial) political class where administrative experience and 
personal loyalty to the Emperor took precedence over other considerations.124 In Moser’s convincing 
reconstruction, this included the inauguration for the first time of a true Imperial senate in 
Constantinople, in explicit rivalry to that in Rome under Magnentius, in order to aid the legitimacy of 
Constantius’ rule through the exaltation of a city founded by Constantine and now indelibly tied to the 
supremacy of the Constantinian dynasty.125  
In my judgment, the council in Sirmium should be seen as a further attempt to legitimize 
Constantius’ civil conflict against the Western Empire by appeal to another constituency that had come 
to play a crucial role in legitimizing Imperial power: Christian bishops. The assembly of entirely Eastern 
bishops brought to the Imperial court at Sirmium seem to have been selected, like their counterparts in 
the new Imperial senate, on the basis of previous prestige in the East and connections to Constantius 
himself, including service in councils like the Dedication Council at Antioch and Serdica East. Like the 
Imperial advisors present in Sirmium at the same time, and with whom they seem to have cooperated 
freely in the interrogation and deposition of the friendless Photinus of Sirmium,126 they were assigned 
 
124 See Moser 2018, 180-189. 
125 Moser 2018, 189-196, 214-276. 
126 According to Epiphanus (Panarion 71.1.5-8), who seems to have had access to the transcript, Photinus was interrogated by 
Basil of Ancyra in the presence of eight high officials of Constantius’ administration. While Ephiphanius indicates that these 
were in fact constituted as judges over Photinus, Barnes 1993, 109, insists that this must have been merely a preliminary 
interrogation prior to the actual formal trial at the Council of Sirmium later that year. This distinction, however, is somewhat 
overly formulaic for a Constantian administration on overt war-time footing. It is likely that this interrogation was the closest 
thing to a formal trial Photinus ever received, with the later episcopal council doing little more than rubberstamping an already-
accomplished deposition of a bishop toward whom Constantius had long been hostile and whom he would hardly have allowed 
to continue to function as bishop of the city of his war headquarters for the months it would take to summon a large-scale 
episcopal council. As Hunt 1998, 17-20, notes concerning the high status of the Imperial officials involved in Photinus’ 
interrogation, “it is a striking indication of the mix of demands at the court of Constantius that in the midst of civil war against a 
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tasks that together helped to lay the groundwork for the coming civil war with the Western Empire: first, 
the removal of the bishop of Constantius’ new capital of Sirmium, Photinus, deeply unpopular with the 
majority of Eastern and Western bishops but seemingly a past favorite of the Emperor Constans;127 
secondly, the condemnation of Athanasius of Alexandria, who had twice managed to return to power, 
for treason;128 and lastly the promulgation of a new norm of theological orthodoxy directly aimed at that 
put forward at Serdica by the bishop of Rome and his allies.  
The creed produced by the council is best understood as an attempt to take the essentially 
Eusebian and Acacian theological perspective of Serdica East and shape it into a form not only 
supportive of Constantius’ efforts to unify the Roman Empire and cosmos under his sole authority, but 
also capable of being extended to, or at least imposed upon, the bishops within those domains now 
under the control of Magnentius. The fundamental theological perspective and emphases have not 
changed from the basic arguments made by Eusebius of Caesarea, but are now put in a form highly 
 
usurper the emperor should assemble men of the rank of counts and patricians to deliberate, not on prosecuting the war, but 
on the doctrinal views of the local bishop” (20). 
127 Photinus, as mentioned above (note 104 in section 3.4 and note 126 in section 3.5), was a pupil of Marcellus of Ancyra’s. He 
was condemned by Julius and Athanasius in the West in 345 at a synod held in Milan, after which he became something of a 
bête noire for the Nicene party—even Lucifer of Cagliari regards him with utter disgust and attacks his theology as just as bad 
as, if not functionally identical to, that of the “Arians” (see e.g. De non Parcendo 18). Given his episcopate in Sirmium, an 
important city in Constans’ domains, it is logical to conclude that he possessed some degree of influence with the Emperor, 
especially since despite his condemnation by the bishop of Rome and many fellow bishops he was not removed from office so 
long as Constans was alive. After Constantius had gained control of Sirmium, however, he was quickly deposed and replaced 
with a more trustworthy Eastern bishop, Germinius of Cyzicus (Socrates 2.29.4).  
128 Cf. Barnes 1993, 109-110. This action of Constantius was in strong contradiction to a move made by him barely a year 
before, when, in response to overtures by Magnentius to Athanasius, he sent the bishop a letter (Apologia ad Constantium 23) 
promising that Constans’ death would cause no change in his possession of his see and offering the remarkable declaration that 
“We will this: that according to our will (βούλησις) you be bishop in your own place at every time” (τὸ σὲ κατὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν 
βούλησιν ἐν παντὶ καιρῷ ἐν τῷ σῷ τόπῳ ἐπίσκοπον εἶναι βουλόμεθα, 23.3). While the overt cynicism of this missive likely did 
not escape the notice of Athanasius, it was sufficient to gain his loyalty to the dynasty of Constantine during a critical period of 
the conflict between Constantius and Magnentius (cf. Barnes 1993, 102-105). By the time of the Council of Sirmium, however, 
the campaign against Magnentius was well underway, and Constantius clearly no longer felt obliged to pander to his enemies in 
East or West.  
309 
 
suitable for a Constantius who had just directly rejected the possibility of any equal colleague in Imperial 
power:  
If anyone will say that the Son is unoriginated and without ἀρχὴ, saying that there are two 
without ἀρχὴ and two unoriginated and making two Gods, let him be anathema. For the Head, 
that is the ἀρχὴ, of all things, is the Son. But ‘God is the Head’—that is, the ἀρχὴ—'of Christ’ [1 
Cor. 11:3], for in this way we piously refer everything back to one ἀρχὴ without ἀρχὴ through 
the Son (Athanasius, De synodis 27.3.26). 129 
In Empire and cosmos alike, the anarchy of more than one supreme ruler must be firmly and 
totally rejected. The ambiguous political-theological term ἀρχὴ is once again key to the assertion of the 
essential Eusebian hierarchical causative chain of Father-Son-cosmos, a chain in which Constantine had 
once taken on the role of final monarchical ruler of the human realm, with only divided, multiple 
subordinates below him. This is one of two essential Eusebian dicta declared by the council. The other is 
the consequences of this for the Son’s τάξις (27) and therefore for the all-important issue of willing and 
commanding:  
If anyone, hearing that the Father is Lord and the Son is Lord and the Father and Son are Lord, 
since there is a Lord from a Lord, will say that there are two Gods, let him be anathema. For we 
do not make the Son equal in status (συντάσσειν) to the Father, but lower in status 
(ὑποτάσσειν) to the Father. For he did not descend on Sodom [Genesis 18:21] apart from the 
will (βουλή) of the Father nor did he rain on it [Genesis 19:24] at his own will, but because of a 
Lord that possesses full power over him— that is, clearly the Father—nor does he sit at the right 
hand on his own will, but he hears the Father saying, ‘Sit at my right hand’ [Psalm 110:1] 
(27.3.18).130 
 The cosmos, then, possesses an absolutely clear chain of command, one where even the 
monarchical Son can never act or wield authority except on the explicit authorization of his superior. In 
such a cosmos, there cannot exist two equal colleagues in either divinity or Imperial power. Reiterating 
 
129 Εἴ τις ἀγέννητον καὶ ἄναρχον λέγοι τὸν υἱόν, ὡς δύο ἄναρχα καὶ δύο ἀγέννητα λέγων καὶ δύο ποιῶν θεούς, ἀνάθεμα ἔστω. 
κεφαλὴ γάρ, ὅ ἐστιν ἀρχὴ πάντων, ὁ υἱός. «κεφαλὴ δέ», ὅ ἐστιν ἀρχή, «τοῦ Χριστοῦ ὁ θεός», οὕτω γὰρ εἰς μίαν ἄναρχον τῶν 
ὅλων ἀρχὴν δι’ υἱοῦ εὐσεβῶς τὰ πάντα ἀνάγομεν. 
130 Εἴ τις ἀκούων κύριον τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὸν υἱὸν κύριον καὶ κύριον τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὸν υἱόν, ἐπεὶ κύριος ἐκ κυρίου, δύο λέγοι 
θεούς, ἀνάθεμα ἔστω. οὐ γὰρ συντάσσομεν υἱὸν τῷ πατρί, ἀλλ’ ὑποτεταγμένον τῷ πατρί. οὔτε γὰρ κατῆλθεν ἐπὶ Σόδομα ἄνευ 
βουλῆς τοῦ πατρὸς οὔτε ἔβρεξεν ἀφ’ ἑαυτοῦ, ἀλλὰ παρὰ κυρίου αὐθεντοῦντος δηλαδὴ τοῦ πατρός, οὔτε κάθηται ἐκ δεξιῶν 
ἀφ’ ἑαυτοῦ, ἀλλ’ ἀκούει λέγοντος τοῦ πατρός· «κάθου ἐκ δεξιῶν μου.» 
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other themes from past theological statements, the creed makes clear that the singular supreme οὐσία 
of God is defined not only by its complete priority in willing and causation but also by its total freedom 
from any passivity (27.3.25), including any extension or contraction that might allow it to simultaneously 
be both Father and Son (27.3.6-7). It is manifestly the distinct and subordinate οὐσία of the Son, then, 
not that of the Father, that takes on all roles of direct interaction with the created realm, including the 
actual creation of the cosmos (27.3.3), being seen and interacting with human beings like Abraham or 
Israel in the Old Testament (27.3.15-17), or being born of Mary and being crucified in the New (27.3.4, 
10). Once again, the absolutely supreme and independent God acts through a relatively supreme and 
independent subordinate, thus maintaining supremacy, precedence, and independence as the 
fundamental basis of power on heaven and earth alike. In the end there is only one ἀρχὴ, one Empire 
ruled by one solitary Emperor, on earth as in heaven. 
 Still, for all its fundamentally Eusebian character, this creed also shows signs of reaching for 
consensus in its push for more clearly but broadly defined borders of theological thought. Maintaining 
the absolute priority in willing, causation, and order of Father over Son and Son over cosmos is required. 
All else, however, is much more open to interpretation. Most important, perhaps, is the creed’s 
insistence on making as much use of Scriptural examples and terminology, supplemented with and 
interpreted through philosophical and political language, but to a much lesser degree than any of the 
previous Eusebian creeds of the previous decade. This Scriptural language, too, is pervasive enough that 
differing interpretations of Scriptural data would yield rather different interpretations of the creed’s 
main conclusions. The result of this is a certain degree of vagueness, as when the creed explicitly 
anathematizes not those who (like the bishops at Western Serdica) say that Father, Son, and Holy Spirit 
are one ὑπόστασις or one οὐσία, but only those asserting that that they are one πρόσωπον (3.27.19)—
the immediate Greek equivalent of the traditional Latin persona, a term that few even of the most 
radical advocates of the unity of Father and Son would ever employ in such a manner. Likewise, the 
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attacks made on the concept of one οὐσία (focusing on the imputation of quasi-physical extension or 
contraction to the divine essence) and on the Father’s necessary begetting of the Son (focusing more 
heavily on the imputation of actual compulsion or physical necessity) are phrased in such a way that a 
sufficiently subtle homoousian might well find ways around their conclusions by way of their premises. 
As we will see, this is precisely what the most subtle of all homoousians, Hilary of Poitiers, would soon 
do. On the most immediate reading, however, these attributes connect most naturally not with any 
attempt at rapprochement with Western Nicenes, but with the concerns of the later Imperial homoian 
creeds of Ariminum/Seleucia and Constantinople in their overt suspicion of οὐσία language and of any 
doctrine that might imply mutuality or co-existence in the hierarchical relationship of Father and Son.131  
In 351, when the Council of Sirmium met, the civil war was well underway, with its outcome still 
in doubt. By the time the war ended in 353 with total victory for Constantius, the situation had on every 
level drastically altered. First, and most importantly, Constantius II had for the first time in his decades-
long reign achieved a full succession from his father, whom he had now replaced as sole Augustus and 
ruler of the entire Roman Empire. By this point in his reign, the similarities between Constantius and his 
father had never been more pervasive. Like Constantine, Constantius had initially gained power as part 
of a college of quasi-equal Emperors ruling over different domains; and like his father, he now found 
himself, after a bloody series of civil wars brought about by questions of precedence and by the 
breakdown of the former system of legitimacy, the last Emperor standing. It is perhaps not a surprise, 
then, that the pro-Constantian traditions contained in the historian Philostorgius cement these parallels 
by granting Constantius the public sign of a cross in the sun prior to his victory (3.16), one similar to, but 
even greater than, that granted to Constantine prior to his victory over Maxentius. The competition 
among Constantius and his brothers over closeness and similarity to Constantine and primacy in willing 
 
131 Cf. e.g. Ayres 2004, 134-135. 
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was now over. No longer one of many subordinates sharing a common origination from a superior 
father, Constantius could now claim similarity to his father in a far stronger and more consequential 
sense: the holding of precisely the same position in Empire and cosmos. Constantius, like Constantine 
before him, was now ruler of the world—and thus in a position to exercise to the full his father’s 
prerogatives in the governance of the Church. 
In both its condemnation of Athanasius and its proclamation of a new acceptable orthodoxy, the 
Council of Sirmium was a thoroughly Eastern and thoroughly Imperial council. To secure the acceptance 
of both of these faits accomplis in the West, conquered by bloodshed after decades of general hostility, 
was a very different question, one requiring more skillful and authoritative management than 
Constantius had yet shown himself capable of.  
In the political sphere, the incorporation of the Western Empire into his sphere of influence 
seems to have been relatively heavy-handed, including numerous prosecutions for treason that may 
have extended up to even the rank of praetorian prefect.132 Constantius’ delicate political position in the 
West, however, where he had been able to maintain and further political networks through the bulk of 
Constans’ reign, was not nearly as challenged as his ecclesiastical standing. In dealing with the East, 
Constantius had been able to rely on his alliance with Eusebius of Nicomedia, Eusebius of Caesarea, and 
their successors—but after decades of ecclesiastical feuding, these men were all considered notorious 
heretics in the West. If Constantius wished to relate to the bishops of his new domains, he would have 
to do so directly, not on the basis of any existing ecclesiastical networks. In the conciliar proceedings of 
the next decade, the list of Constantius’ consistent Western advocates is, to say the least, extremely 
 
132 See Ammianus 14.5, cf. Moser 2018, 278-279, Hunt 1998, 22-23. For the possible prosecution of the former praetorian 
prefect Philippus, see Bleckmann 1999, 82 n. 42, Moser 2018, 199-205. 
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short.133 His closest attested episcopal allies during this period were two men from the border region of 
Illyricum who had already assumed something of a legendary status in the polemic of Athanasius’ allies: 
Ursacius of Singidinum and Valens of Mursa, whose association with Arius and Eusebius of Nicomedia 
and participation in Eastern councils going back to the Dedication Council of Antioch and Eastern Serdica 
had roused so much hatred they had been denounced by name in the documents of Western Serdica 
and then forced, while Constans was still in power, to submit a cringing petition to Julius of Rome 
begging for forgiveness.134 However well-positioned they might be to provide helpful information or act 
as delegates for Imperial authority, these were hardly men at the center of Western ecclesiastical life. If 
Constantius wished to bring unity to the Western Empire according to the model laid out at Serdica and 
Sirmium, he had only one real option: impose it from above. 
For Athanasius, present at the heart of Constantius original Eastern domains and now lacking 
any Imperial sponsor, only one ally of importance remained: the bishop of Rome, his authority undercut 
by the loss of a Western Emperor but still potent enough that the even the new sole Emperor might 
hesitate to antagonize him. Constantius’ initial attempt at securing the compliance of Western bishops 
took the form of a Council at Arles, where he had repaired after his victory in 353. At this thoroughly 
Imperial assembly, their new Emperor asked the assembled bishops to subscribe to the decrees of the 
Council of Sirmium without further alteration, while deposing the bishop of the former Magnentian 
 
133 See Barnes 1993, 114-115, who for the entirety of this period can find only Saturninus of Arles, Paternus of Perigeux, 
Epictetus of Centumcellae, Auxentius of Milan, Zosimus of Naples, and Potamius of Lisbon, three of whom seem to have been 
of Eastern origin and appointed by Constantius to take the place of bishops exiled at the Council of Milan in 355. As Barnes 
points out, this is a clear indicator of “an almost complete lack of enthusiasm” for Sirmium and Constantius’ theological and 
ecclesiastical projects, because of which “Constantius was compelled to obtain acceptance of these decisions by coercion and 
threats” (115). 
134 The text of this letter is from Hilary, Adversus Valentem et Ursacium Series B 2.6, included as as Letter VI in Thompson 2015. 
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capital, Paulinus of Trier, for what was surely a mix of ecclesiastical and political reasons.135 This effort, 
however, was almost immediately undone by the intervention of the new Roman bishop Liberius, who 
openly denounced the council’s results, including the subscription of one of his own legates, and was 
able to negotiate the holding of a new, larger council in the city of Milan, practically in his backyard.136 
Given the bishop of Rome’s influence in Italy, Liberius may well have hoped that events here would 
proceed more according to his liking. If this was his expectation, however, he had failed to take into 
account the personal presence of Constantius himself, in the city of his principal Western Imperial court, 
to which he had recently moved to oversee the reincorporation of the West into the Constantinian 
Empire. 
In the political world of the Empire, the Constantius who summoned the representatives of the 
Roman bishop to the Council of Milan was one who had recently demonstrated in a drastic way his own 
monarchical power. The struggle to find a trustworthy subordinate, one who, thanks to ties of blood or 
perfect obedience, would not turn rebel or usurper, had bedeviled Constantius from the beginning, as it 
had his father. The attempt at a quasi-Tetrarchic Imperial college of equals based on Constantinian 
descent had failed; but, like Constantine before him, Constantius had still found himself in need of 
privileged subordinates to represent him, carry out his will, manage campaigns in his absence, and 
potentially even succeed him should the constant conflicts of a divided Empire claim his life. Like 
Constantine with his son and Caesar Crispus, from the death of Constans to 354, the quasi-filial position 
of sole Caesar of the Empire had been held by Gallus, one of a very few surviving male members of 
 
135 See Sulpicius Severus Chronicon 2.39.1-3. That the bishops at the councils of the 350s were compelled to sign onto a 
theological statement in addition to juridical condemnations has been persuasively argued by e.g. Girardet 1974, Hanson 1988, 
329-331, Hunt 1998, 23-24, while Barnes 1993, 109-115 argues logically that this was simply the decrees of Sirmium 351. 
136 See the letter of Liberius preserved in Hilary, Adversus Valentem et Ursacium Series A 7. In this letter, the recently-elected 
Liberius laments the seeming hostility of Constantius towards him (1) but declares his intention to follow the institutional policy 
of his predecessors (3) by seeing to the calling of a proper conciliar trial for Athanasius (4, 6) in keeping with “divine law” 
(divinam legem, 2) and “Apostolic decrees” (statuta [...] Apostolica, 3), without any participation by those “Arians” condemned 
at the Council of Nicaea and before it by Alexander of Alexandria and Sylvester of Rome (4). 
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Constantine’s extended family, who had been hastily appointed when Constantius found himself facing 
a major civil war of uncertain outcome. The Gallus who had allegedly ruled the East and supervised the 
Persian war in Constantius’ absence had been one, like the Son in Constantius’ favored Eusebian 
theology, totally subordinate to his superior in all things, deprived as much as possible of actual 
administrative authority and surrounded by officials, including not only all important political and 
military positions but even the head of his own personal bodyguard, appointed by and answering to 
Constantius alone.137  
Once the civil war was over, however, and Constantius was established as sole ruler of the 
entire Roman Empire, even this subordinate Caesar began to seem less like a necessary stopgap and 
more like an unacceptable threat. In 354, Gallus was suddenly summoned to Milan, deposed from office, 
and immediately executed, seemingly in fear of usurpation but also, I would suggest, in part due to a 
basic (and eminently Constantinian) discomfort with any figure who might seem to constitute an 
analogous power or successor in an Empire now grounded once again on a singular, cosmic monarchy. It 
is, at the least, a notable coincidence138 that both Constantine and Constantius made use of a single 
privileged subordinate and implied successor in their civil conflicts, and that both had this person 
suddenly executed a few years into their sole rulership of the Empire, precisely during a time when both 
were increasingly preoccupied with the theological unity of cosmos and episcopate. In the aftermath of 
 
137 See Moser 2018, 180-188. Blockley 1969, 410-413 (cf. Blockley 1972, 161-168) further suggests that an eventual 
confrontation with Gallus was to an extent made inevitable by the “somewhat anomalous” (410) nature of the positions 
assigned by Constantius’ Caesars, such that “although theoretically the heads of the civil and military administration of the 
parts of the Empire assigned to them [...] in fact they seem to have had no civil competence at all” and only limited military 
competence (410). It was this basic conflict between Gallus’ theoretically exalted position and his strictly limited powers that 
seems to have earned him both the nearly universal opprobrium of his civil and military officials, who resented his interference 
in their domains and were instrumental in bringing about his downfall, and the anger of Constantius himself, who saw him as 
treasonably exceeding his powers—in strong contrast to the common soldiers, who seem to have shown more loyalty to Gallus’ 
office and Constantinian blood and were carefully excluded from participation in his downfall. 
138 The parallel between Constantine’s murder of Crispus and Constantius’ contentious relationship with his own Caesars is 
drawn also by Blockley 1972, 457-458, focusing on the dynamic by which a legally dependent Caesar gradually takes on more 
independent authority due to military victory and so comes to be seen as a threat by the senior Augustus. 
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Crispus’ death, Constantine had acted with increasing directness in personally intervening in 
ecclesiastical disputes—and now, Constantius would do the same.  
The actual events of the Council of Milan, one of the most important ecclesiastical events of the 
4th century, are notoriously difficult to reconstruct with accuracy.139 While the names of the some thirty 
bishops, headed by Constantius’ envoys Ursacius and Valens, who attended the council have survived,140 
almost all that remains of the council’s actual events141 are a fragmentary description from Hilary of 
Poitiers, one of the bishops to be exiled following the council.142 Hilary’s account presents a picture of an 
assembly dominated by irreconcilable inter-episcopal conflict and finally brought to heel by the Emperor 
himself. This account is presented from the point of view of the prominent Italian bishop Eusebius of 
Vercelli and may be based on his recollections, since Hilary himself was not present. Hilary also mentions 
by name, and grants prominent place to, Dionysius of Milan and the legates sent by Liberius in Rome: 
the Roman deacon Hilary, the Roman priest Pancratius, and the bishop of Cagliari in Sardinia, Lucifer. 
The villain of the account, in contrast, is very much Constantius’ ally Valens. Arriving late to the council, 
Eusebius of Vercelli is asked to subscribe to the decrees of Sirmium presented by Valens, and 
immediately turns the tables on the assembly: “He said that it was right first to be clear about priestly 
faith; that certain of those present were known by him to be polluted with the stain of heresy. Then he 
put the Faith set forth at Nicaea, which we have mentioned above, in the middle of the assembly, 
 
139 For various reconstructions, see Hanson 1988, 332-334, McLynn 1992, 18-19, Brennecke 1984b, 178-184, Hunt 1998, 26-27, 
Barnes 1993, 117-118. 
140 The names are derived from a now-lost manuscript published in Baronius 1895, 537 (cf. Barnes 1993, 117, 275-6 n. 47). 
141 Other accounts include those given in Socrates 2.36 and Sulpicius Severus 2.39.3-6, both of whom present a simple narrative 
in which the Emperor’s envoys demand subscription to the documents of Sirmium and those who refuse are then exiled. 
142 For the preservation of these fragments of what is most likely Hilary’s Adversus Valentem et Ursacium in the alleged first 
book of Ad Constantium, see note 55 in section 6.4 below. Section numberings here are from the edition of Feder 1916, where 




promising that he would do everything they asked if they subscribed to the profession of Faith” 
(2.3/8).143 However, when Dionysius of Milan began to sign the paper, all hell broke loose: “Valens 
violently tore the pen and paper from his hands, shouting that it was not possible for anything to be 
admitted from that creed. After a great clamor, the matter was brought to the knowledge of the people, 
grave distress arose in everyone: the Faith has been attacked by priests. Fearing, therefore, the 
judgment of the people, those men passed over from the Lord’s House to the Palace” (2.3/8).144 At this 
point, the fragment breaks off with a brief reference to the sentence eventually passed by the council 
against Eusebius.145 
What both this account and others make clear, however, is the decisiveness to the council’s 
outcome of an eventual personal intervention by the Emperor Constantius acting in his own name, 
without any episcopal middlemen, to settle the affair. The result was, from the standpoint of over a 
decade of Western episcopal policy, shocking to the extreme: Lucifer of Cagliari and his companions, the 
personal representatives of the bishop of Rome, were exiled to the East along with the bishop of the 
new Imperial court Dionysius of Milan and the influential Eusebius of Vercelli, for refusing to sign onto 
the doctrinal and juridical documents offered by the Emperor. Neither the Council of Milan nor the 
previous Council of Arles had produced anything new—rather, at both assemblies the Emperor insisted 
that all present affirm results arrived at years earlier by Eastern bishops. In neither judicial nor doctrinal 
spheres did Constantius allow the questionably loyal Western bishops to make their own contributions. 
 
143 Ait: de sacerdotali fide prius oportere constare; compertos sibi quosdam ex his, qui adessent, haeretica labe pollutos. 
Expositam fidem apud Nicaeam, cuius superius meminimus, posuit in medio spondens omnia se, quae postularent esse 
facturum, si fidei professionem scripsissent. 
144 Res post clamorem multum deducta in conscientiam plebis est: gravis omnium dolor ortus est, impugnata est a sacerdotibus 
fides. Verentes igitur illi populi iudicium, e Dominico ad palatium transeunt. 
145 While Brennecke 1984b, 178-184 denies the historicity of this narrative on a priori grounds (namely the prominence to the 
account of the Creed of Nicaea), Barnes 1993, 117-118, points out its perfect consistency with the general Western and 
Athanasian strategy of opposing Constantius during this period.  
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In the aftermath of these events, Constantius seems to have taken the step, formerly unprecedented in 
dealing with a council this small and unrepresentative, of circulating the council’s decrees throughout 
suspect areas of the Empire. Any bishop refusing to sign was exiled.146  
As Constantine had known, while Imperial presence was a powerful thing, the ability to exile 
bishops at will from one end of the Empire to the other, far from their episcopal and theological and 
linguistic networks, was the ultimate guarantee of the Emperor’s ability to manage the Church. In the 
divided Empire under Constantius and his brothers, exile had ceased to have much meaning in the face 
of appeals from one domain to another—but under Constantine, there are no attested cases of any 
bishop successfully resisting such a decree or being restored other than by the Emperor himself. The 
limits of this power were as yet unclear, and it is natural that a Constantius seeking self-consciously to 
establish himself in Constantine’s formerly dominating position over the Church, backed up by a 
theology of hierarchical command and faced with broad opposition from the bishops of the newly-
conquered West, would make use of it more broadly than ever before.  
With his deposition now nominally ratified by representatives of both East and West, Athanasius 
was driven from Alexandria by main Imperial force, in a series of conflicts between Christian laity and 
clerics and Imperial troops that would shortly take on legendary status among those sympathetic to 
Athanasius’ cause. After Athanasius’ flight into the desert, Constantius addressed a letter to the people 
of Alexandria praising them for their compliance with the fait accompli of their bishop’s deposition and 
urging them to accept his chosen replacement, the learned Cappadocian bishop George,147 a close ally of 
 
146 For this event see Athanasius, Epistula ad episcopos Aegypti et Libyae 5-6, which warns the bishops in his former sphere of 
influence to expect Imperial representatives bearing a creed to be signed under pain of exile, and Historia Arianorum 31.2-6 for 
a description of the actual operations of this procedure, which allegedly included threats to local decurions that they would 
face financial losses if they were not successful in gaining the compliance of their local bishop, as well as Liberius in his first 
letter to Eusebius of Vercelli, sometimes known from its incipit as Me, frater carissime, who describes a similar process in Italy 
(cf. Barnes 1993, 115-116). 
147 Athanasius’ replacement was clearly both a learned man and one with Imperial connections, as a letter of the Emperor Julian 
(Epistula ad Ecdicium) mentions his own personal acquaintance with George during his supervised early education near 
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the “Neo-Arian” radicals Aetius and Eunomius,148 who had arrived in Alexandria, as his opponents would 
later declare, under armed Imperial guard and amidst significant rioting.149 A large portion of the letter, 
including its opening, is dedicated to expositing the proper relationship between Imperial ruler and loyal 
subjects, a model exemplified both by their legendary founder Alexander the Great150 and by the 
present relationship between Constantius and Alexandria: 
Your city, guarding its ancestral rank and remembering the excellence of its inhabitants, has 
both habitually and on this occasion submitted itself obediently—while we ourselves will know 
that we are falling short of what is proper unless we eclipse Alexander in our good will towards 
your city. For as it is belongs to prudence to provide an orderly (κόσμιος) mode of life for itself 
in all things, it belongs to Imperial power, because of your excellence <...> to embrace you 
before all others as the first to become interpreters of wisdom, and the first to understand that 
God exists, you who have chosen the best of guides, and have willingly acquiesced to our decree 
and justly cast away that cheat and imposter (Athanasius, Apologia ad Constantium 30.1-2).151 
 Rank, excellence, submission, and command—it is these considerations, above all, which justify 
the condemnation of Athanasius at the hands of the Emperor. In this letter, Constantius does not 
 
Cappadocia and describes his extensive library, full of both secular and Christian authors. For a full account of his background, 
which seems to have included not only contacts with Gallus and Julian but also the holding of Imperial posts in Constantinople, 
see Kopecek 1979, 138-144. 
148 For the close association between George and Aetius, which included hosting him personally in Alexandria after his 
expulsion from Antioch and reinstating him to the diaconate there, see in particular Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium 1.38-
39, Theodoret 2.23, Epiphanius, Panarion 76.1 (cf. Kopecek 1979, 137-138). 
149 See Barnes 1993, 119-120 for a description of the various riots and attempted lynchings that marked George’s reign as 
bishop of Alexandria, which prevented George from exercising anything but the most tenuous control over the diocese for most 
of his tenure. 
150 See Moser 2018, 160-164, for Constantius’ use of Alexander as a model for his own position, as expressed both through 
coinage that portrayed him in terms drawn from Hellenistic kingship and through contemporary works on Alexander dedicated 
to Constantius, in one of which (Polemius, Itinerarium 4 [10]) Constantius is explicitly said to surpass Alexander due to his 
successful campaigns against the Persians and descent from the even greater ruler Constantine. This comparison, I would 
argue, was based not only on Constantius’ status as a determined military opponent of the Persians (Moser 2018, 162-164), but 
also on his claims, through Christian theology, to a cosmic position and divine associations similar to that claimed by Alexander 
and other Hellenistic kings.  
151 Ἡ μὲν πόλις τὸ πάτριον σχῆμα φυλάττουσα καὶ τῆς τῶν οἰκιστῶν ἀρετῆς μεμνημένη πειθηνίαν ἑαυτὴν συνήθως καὶ νῦν 
παρέσχηκεν, ἡμεῖς δέ, εἰ μὴ καὶ τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον ἀποκρύψαιμεν εὐνοίᾳ τῇ περὶ τὴν πόλιν τὴν ὑμετέραν, οὐ τὰ τυχόντα 
πλημμελεῖν συνεισόμεθα. ὡς μὲν γὰρ σωφροσύνης ἴδιον <τὴν δίαιταν> κοσμίαν ἑαυτῷ διὰ πάντων ἄγειν, βασιλείας δὲ τῆς 
ἀρετῆς—δότε δὲ εἰπεῖν—τῆς ὑμετέρας <...> πρὸ ἁπάντων ἀσπάζεσθαι πρώτους μὲν σοφίας ἐξηγητὰς καταστάντας, πρώτους 
δὲ θεὸν τὸν ὄντα συνέντας, οἳ καὶ τῶν ἐξηγητῶν τοὺς ἄκρους εἵλεσθε καὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν ψῆφον ἑκόντες ἐστέρξατε τὸν μὲν 
ἀπατεῶνα καὶ φένακα δικαίως ἀποστραφέντες, τοῖς δὲ σεμνοῖς καὶ παντὸς ἐπέκεινα θαύματος δεόντως προσθέμενοι. 
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actually mention any specific crimes of Athanasius responsible for his deposition, let alone those of 
criminal violence and treason of which he had been accused at Milan and earlier. It is rather on the one 
hand his fundamental nature, in contrast to the excellence of the Alexandrian people, and on the other 
the profane nature of his theology, in contrast to the Alexandrian excellence in philosophy, that has 
made his removal urgent: “A man who had risen up from the deepest pits was ruling over you, leading 
as though in darkness those who were aiming at the truth into a lie, never offering a fruitful argument, 
but corrupting souls with sophistries” (30.3).152 Because of his profane theology and character alike, 
Athanasius’ leadership is fundamentally out of accord with the basic system of status, obedience, and 
excellence on which the Empire depends: “A man of the vulgar mob was leading—how could I say this 
any more truly?” (30.4).153  
Whereas Athanasius is a blasphemous demagogue, the bishop now appointed by the Emperor 
to replace him could hardly be praised more highly, offering salvation, peace, and, most importantly, 
safety from Imperial punishment to those loyal subjects willing to listen to his teachings: “Because of 
this man you will pass your time with good hope for the life to come, and will live in this present life with 
ease. Would that all those in the city might hang upon the voice of this man, as on a holy anchor, so that 
we might desist from our cutting and burning against those who are sick in soul!” (30.6-7).154 To listen to 
George is to be safe, in body and soul; to listen to Athanasius is to be liable to immediate and painful 
surgery. This letter ends, then, not with any further elaboration of Constantius’ love or Alexandria’s 
 
152 ἐπεκράτει δὲ ἀνὴρ βαράθρων ἀπὸ ἐσχάτων ὁρμώμενος ὥσπερ ἐν σκότῳ τοὺς τῆς ἀληθείας ἐφιεμένους πρὸς τὸ ψεῦδος 
ἀπάγων, λόγον μὲν ἔγκαρπον οὐδέποτε παρασχόμενος, τερθρείαις δὲ καὶ τηνάλλως τὰς ψυχὰς λυμαινόμενος. 
153 ἡγεῖτο δὲ ἀνὴρ τοῦ πλήθους—πῶς ἂν ἀληθέστερον αὐτὸ εἴποιμι; 
154 δι’ ὃν καὶ κατὰ τὸν ὕστερον βίον μετὰ καλῆς ἐλπίδος διάξετε καὶ τὸν ἐν τῷ παρόντι μετὰ ῥᾳστώνης βιώσεσθε. (7) εἴη δὲ 
κοινῇ πάντας τοὺς κατὰ τὴν πόλιν ὥσπερ ἱερᾶς ἀγκύρας τῆς τούτου φωνῆς ἐξηρτῆσθαι, ἵνα μὴ τομῶν ἢ καύσεων δεηθῶμεν 
κατὰ τῶν τὰς ψυχὰς λελωβημένων. 
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submission, but with a forthright declaration of the means by which this submission will be maintained 
for the present:155 
For it would be strange if on the one hand Athanasius is driven from land to land convicted of 
the most shameful crimes, so that he would never suffer retribution worthy of him even if he 
was deprived of life ten times, but on the other hand we allowed his flatterers and servants, 
vagabonds and men of the sort it is shameful to name, to move about—these men are already 
liable to the judges for the death sentence. And perhaps they will still not die, if they repent at 
last by departing from their previous sins. The most accursed Athanasius was their leader and 
corrupted the whole commonwealth and laid his accursed and abominable hands on the most 
holy things (30.8-9).156 
This overt interest in ensuring the eradication, not only of Athanasius and his followers, but also 
of the theology taught by him, extended very far indeed. A letter is extant from Constantius to the rulers 
of the Ethiopian kingdom of Aksum, aimed at ensuring that these foreign allies are not led astray by the 
bishop Frumentius, the venerable head of the Church in Ethiopia and a former disciple and ordinand of 
Athanasius.157 In writing to this foreign Christian kingdom, not formally a part of the Roman Empire, 
Constantius nevertheless asserts in the strongest possible terms his own authority over Christians, and 
Christian theology, everywhere in the world:  
The knowledge of our Superior is for us altogether a matter for concern and for the greatest 
effort. For it is right, I think, that the common race of human beings be considered worthy of 
equal care in such matters, so that while still in a state of expectation they may pass their lives 
knowing such things about God and in no way differing about the correct ordering (ἐξέτασις) of 
justice and truth. Therefore, because we consider you worthy of and grant you an equal share 
 
155 As Henck 2007 has emphasized, however, this overtly coercive method of managing a civic populace seems to have been 
unusual for Constantius, who was generally known for his good relations with the urban population of the cities in which he 
lived. In general, however, it seems to be the case that “emperors found it extremely difficult to control the citizenry in those 
cities where they were not or could not be present” (156). Henck reasonably takes the alternately pleading and threatening 
tone of this letter as a sign of Constantius’ unusual powerlessness in the face of the religious conflicts in Alexandria during this 
period. 
156 καὶ γὰρ ἄτοπον τὸν μὲν ὄλεθρον Ἀθανάσιον γῆν πρὸ γῆς ἀπεληλᾶσθαι καὶ τοῖς αἰσχίστοις ἁλόντα, ὥς <οὐ> ποτε ἂν ἐκεῖνος 
τὴν ἀξίαν ἐκτίσειε, καὶ εἰ δέκα<κις αὐ>τόν τις τοῦ ζῆν προσαφέληται, τοὺς δὲ ἐκείνου κόλακας καὶ θεραπευτὰς ἀγύρτας τινὰς 
καὶ τοιούτους ἀνθρώπους οἵους ὀνομάζειν αἰσχύνη περιορᾶν σφαδάζοντας, οὓς πάλαι τεθνάναι διηγόρευται τοῖς δικασταῖς. 
καὶ ἴσως οὐδέπω τεθνήξονται, ἢν μὴ τῶν φθασάντων ἀποστάντες πλημμελημάτων ὀψέ ποτε μεταθῶνται· ὧν ὁ μοχθηρότατος 
Ἀθανάσιος ἡγεῖτο καὶ τῇ κοινῇ πολιτείᾳ λυμαινόμενος καὶ τοῖς ἁγιωτάτοις δυσσεβεῖς καὶ ἐναγεῖς προσάγων τὰς χεῖρας. 




along with the Romans in this providence (προνοία), we order you to possess one and the same 
dogma as us in ecclesiastical matters (31.3).158 
If Constantius had assumed at times a relative position of precedence in relation to his brothers, 
in relation to this foreign kingdom, he is in every way the monarch of the human realm spoken of by 
Eusebius, confidently extending his providential care and guidance to his inferior administrators and 
commanding them to believe and confess accurately concerning his own cosmic superior. For the 
present, however, this task of guiding and uniting the Church on earth leads in a somewhat more 
adversarial direction, as Constantius orders this allied ruler of a Christian kingdom to hand over the most 
prominent bishop of that kingdom for examination and potential punishment at the hands of Roman 
authorities and the new Alexandrian bishop George. It is tempting to imagine the likely response of the 
Aksumite ruler to this overtly threatening overture by a powerful foreign ruler concerning a bishop who, 
according to later sources, had acted as his childhood tutor159—yet, in the terms of the Imperial 
theology laid out in the letter, Constantius’ command to agree with his theology and hand over 
Frumentius is not a threat, but a manifestation of goodwill. As Constantius argues, it is not only his own 
monarchical authority, but all authority and order in the human realm that is dependent on proper 
theological belief and succession in the Church. In committing crimes against the Empire and preaching 
a blasphemous theology of divine unity, Athanasius and his followers have become rebels against 
Empire and cosmos alike, spreading religious disorder and political unrest everywhere they go:  
And we are afraid that, entering into Aksum, he will corrupt those among you, offering 
abominable and accursed arguments, not only disturbing and confusing the Churches and 
 
158 πάνυ διὰ φροντίδος καὶ διὰ σπουδῆς τῆς μεγίστης ἡμῖν ἐστιν ἡ τοῦ κρείττονος γνῶσις. δεῖ γάρ, οἶμαι, τὸ κοινὸν τῶν 
ἀνθρώπων γένος τῆς ἴσης ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀξιοῦσθαι κηδεμονίας, ὡς ἂν μέχρι τῆς ἐλπίδος τὸν βίον διάγοιεν τὰ τοιαῦτα περὶ 
τοῦ θεοῦ γινώσκοντες καὶ μηδὲν διαφωνοῦντες περὶ τὴν τοῦ δικαίου καὶ ἀληθοῦς ἐξέτασιν. τῆς αὐτῆς τοίνυν προνοίας 
ἀξιοῦντες ὑμᾶς καὶ τῶν ἴσων Ῥωμαίοις μεταδιδόντες ἕν τι μετ’ αὐτῶν κρατεῖν δόγμα ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις κελεύομεν. 
159 See the account of Rufinus 10.9. 
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blaspheming against our Superior, but also because of these things introducing every kind of 
disturbance and civil unrest to the people in your nation (31.5).160 
This concern is not as hyperbolic as it might first appear. By this point in his reign, Athanasius’ 
theology had been used as the basis for overt defiance of Constantius’ authority by almost the entirety 
of the Western Empire, including his brother Constans, the bishop of Rome Julius, and the numerous 
bishops that had made up the Council of Western Serdica. If any ruler in Roman history had good reason 
to regard theological dissent as the cause of civil conflict, it was certainly Constantius. 
Both the letter to the Alexandrians and the letter to the Ethiopians were in essence mopping-up 
efforts in a region now thoroughly purged of dissent, one where many bishops connected with 
Athanasius had already been deposed and sent to join their fallen leader in exile.161 Supporters and 
ordinands in other nations aside, Constantius’ last prominent episcopal opponent in the Eastern Empire 
now found himself in a state ably summarized by Constantius in his letter to Aksum: “he has now lost his 
episcopal throne and, entirely deprived of his livelihood, wanders as an exile from one land to another” 
(31.4).162 The West, however, remained far less pacified both ecclesiastically and politically—and so, 
shortly after Athanasius’ flight, Constantius directed his attentions to securing the removal of his 
principal Western adversary. 
Following the Council of Milan, the bishop of Rome Liberius had reacted to the Imperial 
domination of his conciliar project with open defiance, refusing to endorse the council’s decisions and 
sending his exiled allies on their way with an extraordinary letter that declared them, not condemned 
 
160 καὶ δέος μὴ διαβὰς εἰς Αὔξουμιν διαφθείρῃ τοὺς παρ’ ὑμῖν, λόγους ἐναγεῖς καὶ δυσσεβεῖς παρεχόμενος, μὴ μόνον τὰς 
ἐκκλησίας συγχέων καὶ θορυβῶν καὶ βλασφημῶν εἰς τὸν κρείττονα, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς κατὰ τὸ ἔθνος ἐκ τούτων ἀνατροπὴν καὶ 
ἀνάστασιν παντελῆ προξενῶν. 
161 Athanasius, Historia Arianorum 72 gives the names of 28 Egyptian bishops exiled by Constantius during his reign. 




men, but spotless martyrs of the Faith equivalent to those Christians murdered under Diocletian, secure 
in their possession of eternal salvation.163 The bishop of Rome, moreover, had for decades been the 
institutional leader of networks of bishops and churches supported by the Western Emperor but openly 
defiant towards the Emperor in the East; and Liberius was clearly dedicated to continuing this policy as 
literally as possible even in a politically united Empire. As Constantine had learned with Alexander and 
Athanasius, dominating a council was often a far easier task than bringing to heel a single bishop, 
particularly one entrenched in deep networks of local and episcopal support and buttressed by 
longstanding institutional policy. However effective Constantius’ efforts at establishing ecclesiastical 
control in the West, they could never be complete until the bishop of Rome was brought to heel. 
In 356, not long after the council at which he had had Liberius’ appointed legates deposed and 
exiled, Constantius summoned the bishop of Rome to the Western Imperial court at Milan and deposed 
and exiled him in turn. If surviving sources are to be believed, this deposition of the most influential 
bishop in the Western Empire took place without any episcopal council at all, solely on the authority of 
the Emperor. If accurate, this would have represented without question the most serious breach of 
Constantine’s general policy of having bishops judged by their own ever put into effect. In another 
sense, however, this was no more than an enforcement of the results of the Council of Milan, and there 
was ample precedent in Constantine’s reign, as we have seen, for the direct judgment, deposition, and 
exiling of bishops by the Emperor as the final court of appeals in the Imperial-episcopal judicial system. 
This event mirrors in many ways the “secular” deposition a few years before of Constantius’ junior 
Caesar and relative Gallus. As he had summoned Gallus to his court at Milan, where he could be dealt 
with out of view of his troops and supporters in the East, so now he summoned Liberius, divested of his 
flock in Rome, to the same city for a similar purpose. 
 
163 The text of this letter is given in Hilary, Adversus Valentem et Ursacium Series B 7.2. 
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The meeting between these two men, Roman Emperor and Roman bishop, seems to have fired 
the imagination not only of Christian authors but of the pagan Ammianus as well. The deposition of 
Liberius gave rise to some of Ammianus’ very rare commentary on ecclesiastical events within 
Constantius’ reign (15.7.6-10). According to Ammianus, the Alexandrian bishop Athanasius had been 
condemned both by the Emperor and his fellow bishops for meddling in affairs outside of his own 
province, for using his religious expertise to predict the future, and for other unspecified offenses 
against Christian law (15.7.7-8), but Constantius, “although he knew the judgment had already been 
executed, nevertheless was striving with burning desire for it to be confirmed also by the more powerful 
authority of the bishop of the Eternal City” (15.7.10).164 While Ammianus naturally shows little interest 
in or understanding of the theological or ecclesiastical issues involved, his account is relatively 
sympathetic to Liberius, both in his portrayal of the Roman bishop taking his stand on the longstanding 
point of Roman law that forbade a man to be tried in absentia, insisting on this even to the point of 
“openly resisting the judgment of the Emperor” (15.7.9),165 and in his note that Liberius had to be 
transported out of Rome by night “for fear of the people, who were burning with love for him” 
(15.7.10).166 In his appeal to the Roman populus, his insistence on what is fas and nefas, and his 
willingness to challenge the Emperor’s power in the name of his own authority as the Roman bishop, 
Liberius is a respectable figure according to Ammianus’ self-consciously archaic code. 
If this incident made an impression even on the generally indifferent Ammianus, it naturally 
made an even greater one on the Christian historians of the period. Athanasius in Historia Arianorum 
(35-41) is the first to present a (clearly imagined) account of a dialogue between Emperor and bishop, in 
 
164 licet sciret impletum, tamen auctoritate quoque potiore aeternae urbis episcopi firmari desiderio nitebatur ardenti. 
165 aperte scilicet recalcitrans imperatoris arbitrio. 
166 populi metu, qui eius amore flagrabat. 
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which, in keeping with the overall purpose of the work, Liberius is presented as a resolute advocate both 
of Nicene doctrine and of episcopal resistance to Imperial authority, thanks not to Roman traditions of 
Republican independence, but “because it is an Apostolic Throne [...] and because Rome is the 
metropolitan see of the Roman Empire” (35.2).167 It is as one universal authority of the Roman Empire to 
another that Liberius faces Constantius, and demands that the case of Athanasius and doctrine be 
decided solely by bishops, with no Imperial involvement or interference whatsoever. 
This picture, however, reflects the polemical state of affairs at the very end of Constantius’ reign 
in the early 360s, not the actual status quo in 355. The 5th century ecclesiastical historian Theodoret 
preserves a document (2.16) that purports to be an official transcript of the actual interrogation 
between Constantius and Liberius, and which has generally been accepted as an accurate, if perhaps 
embellished, transcription by modern historians.168 Most notably, the Constantius that appears in this 
document is recognizably the preternaturally self-controlled Emperor of Ammianus and other secular 4th 
century authors,169 not the weak-willed and easily-influenced figure of the rest of Theodoret’s text.  
In this document, Liberius makes his stand, respectfully enough, on three points: (1) the need to 
confirm the orthodoxy of all parties to the case by a general subscription, as his ally Eusebius of Vercelli 
had attempted at Milan, to the Creed of Nicaea; (2) the recall from exile of those bishops deposed due 
to recent conciliar processes; and finally (3) the summoning of a larger and more representative 
episcopal council to see to impartial justice and examine Athanasius’ case in person (2.16.16). The 
closest Liberius comes to any assertion of episcopal independence is the claim, in response to a remark 
by another bishop present that such a large council would overburden the Imperial cursus, that local 
 
167 ὅτι ἀποστολικός ἐστι θρόνος ᾐδέσθησαν [...] ὅτι μητρόπολις ἡ Ῥώμη τῆς Ῥωμανίας ἐστὶν. 
168 See e.g. Barnes 1993, 118. 
169 For Constantius’ contemporary reputation for self-control and forbearance in the face of opposition, see Ammianus 16.1-7, 
Libanius Orationes 19, 20; Themistius Orationes 1, 3; cf. Henck 2007, Whitby 1999. 
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dioceses could fund their own bishops’ travel (2.16.17-18). Central to the position of the bishop of Rome 
both here and elsewhere, however, is the ambiguity present in the very first Imperial intervention into 
ecclesiastical judgments, Constantine’s summoning of the Donatists to Rome to be judged by Miltiades. 
Constantius, like his father, had long since come to a position in which the Emperor was 
straightforwardly the final court of appeals for ecclesiastical cases, not only involved in summoning and 
managing episcopal councils but also capable of overruling them if necessary. Liberius’ unstated 
assumption, in contrast, is that the Emperor is ultimately little more than a facilitator of judgment by 
bishops, bound to respect their decisions, but not a judge in his own right. By rescinding the Imperial 
punishment of exile and allowing the bishops to assemble at their own expense, Constantius would be 
not only saving himself a great deal of time and trouble, but also implicitly acknowledging this reality as 
well. 
In response to this provocative noncompliance, it is the bishops and advisors around him, not 
Constantius himself, who are stung to anger or annoyance. Epictetus of Centumcellae, in particular, 
highlights the larger political context by asserting that “Oh Emperor, it is not for the sake of faith nor 
ecclesiastical judgments that Liberius is making this proposal, but in order that he might boast to the 
Senators in Rome that he defeated the Emperor in argument” (2.16.12).170 The Emperor himself, 
perhaps in part to forestall any such undermining of his authority, refuses to argue at all. At the 
beginning of the interrogation, he lays out his ultimatum clearly and concisely, offers no response to 
Liberius’ arguments, and entirely ignores his concrete proposals. In this document, then, we possess yet 
another vivid instantiation of a Constantinian model of Imperial authority focused on the assertion of 
priority and command over inferiors—even one so important as the bishop of Rome. 
 
170 «Βασιλεῦ, οὐ πίστεως ἕνεκεν σήμερον οὐδὲ κριμάτων ἐκκλησιαστικῶν ἀντιποιούμενος Λιβέριος τὸν λόγον ποιεῖται, ἀλλ’ 
ἵνα τοῖς ἐν Ῥώμῃ συγκλητικοῖς καυχήσηται, ὡς συλλογισάμενος τὸν βασιλέα.» 
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Constantius’ stated case is straightforward enough: “We ourselves, both because you are a 
Christian and because you are the bishop of our city, have judged this worthy and have summoned you 
and recommend this to you: to reject the communion of the unholy Athanasius. For the inhabited world 
(οἰκουμένη) has determined that this is good, and by the vote of a synod has judged him a foreigner to 
ecclesiastical communion” (2.16.1).171 It is the whole inhabited world, as manifested in the united 
judgment of Constantius, the Council of Sirmium, and the Council of Milan, that has condemned 
Athanasius and now requires the subscription of the bishop of the Emperor’s own city. This emphasis on 
the properly universal nature of Constantius’ judgment recurs again and again in his quoted remarks, 
perhaps most cogently in the most direct challenge offered by Roman Emperor to the authority of 
Roman bishop: “What part are you of the inhabited world (οἰκουμένη), that you alone should side with 
an unholy man and destroy the peace of the inhabited world and the whole cosmos?” (2.16.13).172 The 
interrogative used here, πόστος, literally refers, not to size or number, but rather to the precise place 
occupied by an entity in an ordinal sequence.173 The fundamental question, then, is not whether either 
Liberius or Constantius is one man or many, but rather what rank each holds in the ordered sequence of 
οἰκουμένη and cosmos. In the basic system upheld by Eusebius and Constantine, and now maintained 
by Constantius, the judgment of the Emperor, thanks to his preeminent status, can indeed speak on 
behalf of the whole world—but that of the bishop of Rome cannot. By rejecting the due order of Empire 
and cosmos, Liberius has become a rebel, and must be punished accordingly. 
 
171 Ἡμεῖς, καὶ διὰ τὸ Χριστιανόν σε εἶναι καὶ ἐπίσκοπον τῆς ἡμετέρας πόλεως, ἄξιον ἐκρίναμεν καὶ τοῦτο μεταστειλάμενοι 
παραινοῦμέν σοι τῆς ἀπορρήτου ἀπονοίας τοῦ ἀνοσίου Ἀθανασίου τὴν κοινωνίαν ἀρνήσασθαι. τοῦτο γὰρ ἡ οἰκουμένη εὖ 
ἔχειν ἐδοκίμασε συνόδου τε ψηφίσματι ἀλλότριον τῆς ἐκκλησιαστικῆς κοινωνίας ἔκρινε. 
172 «Πόστον εἶ μέρος τῆς οἰκουμένης, ὅτι σὺ μόνος συναίρῃ ἀνθρώπῳ ἀνοσίῳ καὶ τῆς οἰκουμένης τὴν εἰρήνην καὶ ὅλου τοῦ 
κόσμου λύεις;» 
173 See e.g. Brill Dictionary of Ancient Greek 1727.  
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 The danger of bishops rebelling against cosmic order, however, is not limited to Liberius. When 
Liberius criticizes as a breach of judicial impartiality Constantius’ alleged personal hostility towards 
Athanasius, the Emperor replies with a remarkable account of the reasons for his deposition: 
He has committed injustice against all people in common, but against no one in the same way as 
me. This man, not satisfied with the destruction of my elder brother, never stopped provoking 
Constans of blessed memory to hatred of me, even though we ourselves with very great 
moderation put up with the hostile authority of both the man provoking and the man provoked. 
I have won no victory for myself, not even those against Magnentius and Silvanus, as great as 
stripping that accursed man of his ecclesiastical office (2.16.21).174 
The strength of this statement, particularly in its direct comparison of Athanasius with the 
usurpers Magnentius and Silvanus, is remarkable—but in the larger context of the Constantinian Empire 
as reconstructed in this study, it is perfectly plausible. If the fundamental problem of the post-
Constantinian Empire was legitimacy in relation to Church and cosmos, then Athanasius the bishop was 
in a straightforward sense a greater threat than any usurper. Magnentius and Silvanus had killed one 
son of Constantine, and then been defeated by another son of Constantine, thus vindicating the sole 
rule of Constantius and displaying in dramatic fashion the divine favor and justice that undergirded his 
power. Athanasius, however, had turned one son of Constantine against another, made powerful priests 
of God into enemies of the divinely favored Emperor, and so challenged the fundamental principles 
underpinning the Constantinian dynasty.  
Most strikingly, in this summation Constantius blames Athanasius not only for turning Constans 
against him, but also for the death of Constantine II in civil war with Constans. Given Athanasius’ initial 
close alliance with Constantine II, some form of direct involvement in this conflict is not as far-fetched as 
 
174 Πάντας μὲν κοινῶς ἠδίκησεν, οὐδένα δὲ οὕτως ὡς ἐμέ. ὅστις μὴ ἀρκεσθεὶς ἐπὶ τῇ ἀπωλείᾳ τοῦ μειζοτέρου μου ἀδελφοῦ, 
οὐδὲ τὸν μακαρίτην Κώνσταντα ἐπαύσατο παροξύνων εἰς ἡμετέραν ἔχθραν, εἰ μὴ ἡμεῖς πλείονι ἡμερότητι ὑπηνέγκαμεν τὴν 
τοῦ παροξύνοντος καὶ τοῦ παροξυνομένου ῥοπήν. οὐδὲν δέ μοι τοιοῦτον κατόρθωμα, οὐδὲ τὸ κατὰ Μαγνέντιον καὶ Σιλβανόν, 
ὡς τοῦ μιαροῦ ἐκείνου περιαιρουμένου τῶν ἐκκλησιαστικῶν πραγμάτων.» 
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it might sound.175 On a more fundamental level, however, Constantius, far from a weak-willed being at 
the mercy of the grudges of bishops, here targets perhaps the fundamental dynamic of the last two 
decades of Imperial rule. In the tumultuous post-Constantinian Empire, Constantius, as I have argued, 
was the main figure actually attempting to craft an orderly system of succession, one based on an 
alliance with the Eusebian episcopal faction in the East with their theology of unity through precedence 
and hierarchy; the unity of the three remaining sons of Constantine based on their descent from him; 
and, implicitly, Constantius’ own precedence within this new Imperial college. Conceived in these terms, 
Athanasius was without a doubt the most long-standing and influential opponent of every part of this 
attempted settlement. From Constantine II’s sending of him back to Alexandria and Constantius’ 
domains, to Constans’ returning him again through threats of civil war, through Liberius’ most recent 
defiance of the ecclesiastical and political reincorporation of the West in his name, Athanasius had again 
and again struck at the most vulnerable aspect of the Constantian Empire: its pervasive lack of unity. 
Now, however, the Empire was once again united in the person of a single man and a single son 
of Constantine, and no opponent of this unity could be allowed to remain. Not only Athanasius, but 
every ally of his unwilling to sign on to his condemnation and the Imperial Creed of Sirmium would be 
brought to submit to the monarchical will that was to be, in the system now replacing the quasi-Trinity 
of related brothers, the new basis for the Empire’s unity. Ignoring both the bishop of Rome’s attempts at 
argument and his concrete proposals, Constantius closes the interview by issuing a laconic ultimatum 
based entirely his own prior decision, unmodified by the opposition either of Liberius or the other exiled 
bishops of the Empire: “There is only one thing to think about. I want you to embrace the communion of 
 
175 Constantius’ suggestion here is given due weight by Barnes 1993, 50-52, who deduces from the text of Apologia ad 
Constantium an initial letter sent by Athanasius in Rome to the court of Constantine II upon his arrival there in the early 
summer of 359. As this purported letter was followed by Constantine II’s invasion of Rome the next spring, Barnes concludes 
that Constantius’ implied accusation that “Athanasius had encouraged [Constantine II] to attack his brother [...] may have been 
completely untrue, yet it was plausible” (52). At the very least, the presence of Athanasius and his exiled allies in Rome may 
have been seen by Constantine II as a helpful coincidence, as it provided his invasion with a persecuted Christian to rescue, as 
Constans was later to claim under similar circumstances (see above in section 3.4). 
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the Church and be sent back again to Rome. [...] Therefore you have an interval of three days to 
consider: if you want, subscribe and return to Rome, or else think about what place you want to be 
exiled to” (2.16.23, 25).176 After refusing this generous offer, the bishop of Rome was deposed, replaced, 
and sent into exile, not to return for nearly three years.177  
Another document preserved from this period allows us an even closer look at the new status 
quo of cosmic imperium in the Constantian Empire. The remarkable “Codex-Calendar” of 354 contains a 
full listing of the public and religious festivals practiced in the city of Rome at this time period, along 
with numerous illustrations, including a justly famous one of Constantius II himself as reigning Emperor 
seated on a throne with a solar halo and lunar symbols, holding a scepter in one hand and pouring gold 
coins from the other. Even more important for our purposes is the calendar of festivals itself, which has 
generally been studied by scholars for its mingling of traditional pagan festivals, divested of sacrifice or 
 
176 Ἕν ἐστι τὸ ζητούμενον. βούλομαι γάρ σε ἀσπασάμενον τὴν πρὸς τὰς ἐκκλησίας κοινωνίαν πάλιν εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην ἀποστεῖλαι. 
[...] Οὐκοῦν τριῶν ἡμερῶν ἔχεις σκέψεως διάστημα· εἰ βούλει, ὑπογράψας ὑπόστρεψον εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην, ἢ ἐννόησον ἐν ποίῳ 
τόπῳ μετατεθῆναι βούλει. 
177 Liberius seems to have returned to Rome and taken up his position as bishop there in the summer of 357 (cf. Barnes 1993, 
138). The circumstances of his return are, to say the least, disputed. The barest accounts are that of Socrates Scholasticus 
(2.37.91-94) and Theodoret (2.17), who indicate that Constantius restored Liberius to his position after personal petitions from 
aristocratic women (Theodoret) and/or rioting by the people of Rome (Socrates), both presumably coinciding with the 
Emperor’s visit to the city in 357. On the other hand, Hilary’s fragmentary Adversus Valentem et Ursacium preserves three 
letters (Series B 3, 8, 9), whose authenticity has been disputed, in which Liberius first declares that he no longer holds 
communion with Athanasius (5), and then adds that he now holds to the faith put forward in the decrees of Sirmium 351 (8) 
and finally all but begs the favored Illyrian bishops Ursacius and Valens to appeal to Constantius on his behalf (9). Sozomen 
(4.15), meanwhile, indicates that before returning him to Rome Constantius summoned Liberius to Sirmium and compelled him 
to sign a document consisting of some combination of the decrees against Paul of Samosata in the 3rd century, the decrees 
against Photinus of Sirmium (presumably at least some of the documents of Sirmium 351), and one of the creeds of the 
Dedication Council of Antioch. It is, to say the least, difficult to know how to interpret and reconcile these reports, and scholarly 
debate over what precisely Liberius did or did not do to ensure his return has been vigorous over the centuries. For our 
purposes, however, the response of Athanasius in Historia Arianorum to reports of Liberius’ “subscription” after two years of 
exile are most apropos: “But even this shows [...] Liberius’ hatred of this heresy and his decision in favor of Athanasius, so long 
as he had his own free will. For things done contrary to someone’s original judgment after torture do not represent the will of 
the ones who have been terrified, but the will of their torturers” (ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο δείκνυσιν [...] Λιβερίου δὲ τὸ κατὰ τῆς 
αἱρέσεως μῖσος καὶ τὴν ὑπὲρ Ἀθανασίου ψῆφον, ὅτε τὴν προαίρεσιν εἶχεν ἐλευθέραν. τὰ γὰρ ἐκ βασάνων παρὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς 
γνώμην γιγνόμενα, ταῦτα οὐ τῶν φοβηθέντων, ἀλλὰ τῶν βασανιζόντων ἐστὶ βουλήματα. 41.3-4). Whatever the circumstances 
of his return, they clearly were not sufficient to earn Constantius’ trust, as Liberius was deliberately excluded from the 
proceedings of the Council of Ariminum (see note 275 in section 3.6 below), and likewise do not seem to have prevented him 
from continuing to function as the institutional leader of Western Nicenes, most notably in decisions regarding treatment of 
lapsed bishops following Ariminum and negotiations with Eastern homoiousians (see sections 5.1 and 6.5 and Epilogue below), 
until his death in 366. 
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other offensive elements, with an incipient calendar of Christian holidays, including Christmas, Easter, 
and feasts for the martyrs and past bishops of Rome.178 Central to this cycle of festivals, and most 
notable for any examination of Imperial policy and ideology during this period, is the extensive cycle of 
Imperial cult celebrations, a cycle mandated and funded by the new sole Emperor of the Roman world, 
Constantius.179 All these Imperial cult festivals, it should be said, were fundamentally religious in nature, 
including their overseeing by a pontifex Flavianalis, or priest of the Constantinian dynasty, who retained 
possession of the templum gentis Flaviae, a temple dedicated to Constantine and his successors. The 
only clear break from past pagan Imperial practice was the absence from such festivities of the rite of 
sacrifice,180 which indeed Constantius may have been the first ruler to attempt to ban in its entirety.181 
The emphasis of the public festivals of the city of Rome is overwhelmingly weighted towards 
celebrations of the Imperial cult in general and Constantius and his father Constantine in particular. By 
the estimation of Michele Salzmann, the calendar contains, out of a total of “177 holiday or festival days 
[...] devoted to ludi and circenses,”182 a remarkable “ninety-eight days of ludi and circenses in honor of 
 
178 See Salzman 1990 for a full discussion and bibliography for these elements. 
179 See Salzman, 1990, 136: “We see his [i.e. Constantius’] personal handiwork in the imperial festivals,” as well as 137: “it 
therefore appears likely that the imperial cult festivals at Rome were subsidized from the imperial treasury.” 
180 Salzman 1990, 143. 
181 The first law in the Codex Theodosianus banning sacrifice was issued jointly by Constantius and Constans in 341 (16.10.2). 
Following Constans’ death, in 353 Constantius issued another law against nocturnal sacrifice (16.10.5) followed in the coming 
years by comprehensive laws ordering the closure of temples and mandating punishment for those who carried out sacrifices 
(16.10.4) and, most dramatically of all, making both sacrifice and worship of pagan images crimes liable to capital punishment 
(16.10.6). As with the reign of Constantine (see note 88 in section 1.4 above), much scholarly attention has been given to the 
interpretation of these laws. Moser 2018, 292-298, argues for a relatively religiously tolerant Constantius whose laws were for 
the most part not intended to apply to the traditional state cults of Rome, as indicated by his performance of the traditional 
duties of the pontifex maximus, his continuing appointment of priests to the principal cults in Rome, and most notably the 
public sacrifice to the Dioscuri performed by his urban prefect Tertullus in 359 (cf. Ammianus 19.10.4). Similarly, Ferri 2015 
emphasizes the gradual process of “osmosis and assimilation” (145) that marked the decline of Roman cults and conversion of 
the Roman aristocracy, in which the reign of Constantius does not constitute a major break. In my judgment, while the 
harshness of Constantius’ anti-sacrificial laws is notable, there is sufficient evidence to indicate that these laws were enforced 
only intermittently, especially when dealing with traditionally privileged groups within the Empire. As with Constantine, none of 
this need be taken as a sign of insincerity on the part of Constantius himself.  
182 Salzman 1990, 120. 
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the imperial cult,”183 with “the majority, some sixty-nine days, [...] devoted to the House of 
Constantine.”184 Out of the public festival days of the city of Rome, then, almost forty percent were 
dedicated to celebrating Constantius or his father. These included, most notably, fifty days dedicated to 
celebrating Imperial victories against foreign enemies, all but one of which were won by Constantius or 
Constantine, and the most celebrated of which, extending into a full seven-day festival, was the ludi 
Sarmatici, which celebrated a victory won by Constantine together with his Caesar Constantius in 334.185 
Both the birthdays and accession dates of Constantine and Constantius were celebrated with 
appropriate festivities, along with other important dates in the reign of the founder of the dynasty, 
including Constantine’s entrance into and departure from Rome, the tenth and twentieth anniversaries 
of his reign, and, most strikingly, dedicated festivals for the defeat of his two principal civil enemies, 
Maxentius and Licinius, celebrated as Evictio Tyranni and Fugato Licinio, respectively.186 As Salzman 
notes, the holding of festivals celebrating such events in the lifetime of any Emperor other than the 
current ruling one was unprecedented in previous Imperial cultic practice187—a sign of the continuing 
importance of Constantine as model and legitimizing figure for Constantius’ authority as sole Emperor, 
as well as of “a special emphasis on imperial victory,”188 and, it should be added, on Imperial victory in 
civil war in particular, fundamentally consonant with Constantine’s presentation of his own legitimacy as 
I have reconstructed it. Not only is the outsized presence of Constantine remarkable, but also the 
 
183 Salzman 1990, 131. 
184 Salzman 1990, 132. 
185 Salzman 1990, 137-139. 
186 Salzman 1990, 140-141. 
187 Salzman 1990, 145. 
188 Salzman 1990, 145. 
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“omission from the Calendar of offending members of the Constantinian household.”189 Apart from a 
single day of festivities dedicated to the accession of Constantine’s father, all festivals of the 
Constantinian dynasty are focused on either Constantine or Constantius. For all practical purposes, the 
calendar presents an Empire where the former co-Augusti Constantine II and Constans—not to mention 
the dead Caesars and other male relatives of Constantine—had never existed.190 
This calendar of festivals, together with numerous images set up by both the Emperor and the 
Senatorial elite,191 helped to make Constantius and his father a constant, overwhelming presence in the 
city of Rome. It would not be until 357, however, on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of his reign as 
Augustus, that Constantius graced the city with his presence in imitation of his father, who had not only 
celebrated his own vicennelia with just such a Roman adventus, but also had used both of his visits to 
the city to commemorate recent victories in civil war.192 This visit, I would suggest, was a crucial one for 
Constantius for a number of reasons. Not only was this the first visit of a sole Roman Emperor to Rome 
in more than thirty years, not only was it the celebration of the twentieth year of a reign that had faced 
almost continuous challenges, but it was also an event freighted with significance for the Constantinian 
 
189 Salzman 1990, 145. 
190 This presentation followed an earlier one, exemplified by the panegyricist Libanius in Orationes 49, in which Constantius and 
Constans had been the only two sons of Constantine and had assumed power peacefully following their father’s death and 
based on his succession plan, retrospectively eliminating all other relatives and the dead Constantine II (cf. Omissi 2018, 159-
163). Likewise, in the more recent panegyrics following the death of Constans (Themistius, Orationes 2, Julian, Orationes 1, 2, 
cf. Omissi 2018, 177-179), the divided rule of Constantius’ brothers had been treated as a calamity for the Empire fortunately 
brought to an end by providence in support of Constantius’ sole monarchy. 
191 See Weisweiler 2012 for the prevalence and meaning of images of the Emperor at Rome during this period. As Omissi 2018, 
179, points out, statues were set up in Rome following Magnentius’ defeat with such dedications as “to the restorer of the city 
of Rome and of the world and to the destroyer of foul tyranny, our lord Flavius Iulius Constantius, victor and triumphator, 
forever Augustus” (CIL VI.1158)—designed to emphasize Constantius’ similarity and superiority to his father as liberator of 
Rome and defeater of tyranny.  
192 For the overt connection between Imperial adventus to Rome and legitimation of power after victory in civil war throughout 
the 4th century, including the reigns of Constantine and Constantius, see Humphries 2015. For Constantine’s famous triumphal 
procession into Rome in 318, which notably included the parading of the severed head of the defeated Maxentius, and its 
significance in contemporary and later sources, see Omissi 2018, 135-142 (cf. Barnes 2011, 83, who argues that, though 
Constantine “entered Rome in triumph,” he did not “celebrate[] a formal triumph” on this occasion as a nod to the impropriety 
of doing so in celebration of a victory in civil war). 
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dynasty in particular. During the divided years of Constantius’ earlier reign, more than one would-be 
ruler of the world had sought to emulate Constantine’s divinely-favored liberation of Rome from the 
tyrant Maxentius, an event that had been among the most important in Constantine’s bloody rise to 
supreme power, had been repeatedly recounted and embellished by Constantine himself in his public 
works and speeches, and had now been inscribed in a central place into the festal calendar of Rome 
itself. Now, the only remaining son of Constantine had the chance to reenact this legendary event, 
displaying himself for the first time to Rome and the world as the divinely-favored victor of multiple civil 
wars, the liberator of Rome from the tyrant Magnentius, and, in short, as the true, singular successor of 
Constantine. Notably, in the propaganda produced for this visit, Constantius is finally declared to have 
not just imitated Constantine, but finally and definitively surpassed him.193 
As I have discussed, one of the principal issues in dealing with Constantius’ reign is the relative 
lack of texts emanating from Constantius himself. On his first visit to Rome as sole ruler of the Roman 
world, however, we have something that is in its own way just as important: an eyewitness description 
of his Imperial, ritual self-presentation.194 Ammianus’ description of Constantius at the height of his 
unchallenged rule of the Empire has long been among the most famous passages from this work, and for 
good reason: it presents in striking, visual form an image of Imperial rule very different from anything in 
the more familiar sources of the Principate. For the purposes of this study, it is likewise remarkable to 
 
193 See Moser 2018, 303-311 (cf. Humphries 2015, 158-160, Omissi 2018, 169-191), for a review of the historical evidence of the 
centrality of the defeat of Magnentius and the surpassing of Constantine to Constantius’ visit to Rome, as expressed in 
dedications, benefactions, panegyrics, and even in what seems to have been a public reenactment of Constantius’ victories in 
the Circus Maximus. As Moser correctly notes, “Constantius’ defeat of Magnentius was trumpeted in Rome not because it was 
his only major victory, but because it allowed him to compare himself favourably to Constantine” (305). This is most clearly 
asserted Julian’s panegyric for the occasion (Orationes 1.37b), in which Constantius’ conquest of Magnentius is directly stated 
to be superior to Constantine’s conquest of Maxentius. For a more general account of the context and goals of the visit to 
Rome, see Thompson 2005. 
194 It is unclear whether or not Ammianus was actually present at the adventus (cf. e.g. Thompson 2005, 93). While Ammianus 
was in the west from 354 until his return with Ursicinus to take part in a new Persian campaign in 359, much of this time seems 
to have spent in Gaul (Matthews 1989, 18-19). It is not impossible, however, that he was present at the adventus, as the 
extraordinary vividness and details of the account would suggest, though Matthews 1989, 11-13, suggests that certain aspects 
of the passage may reflect Ammianus’ experience of the adventus of Theodosius in 389. 
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find, in a pagan historian such as an Ammianus, an image that conforms in almost every detail to 
Eusebius of Caesarea’s model of the nature of Imperial and cosmic rule, similarly expressed in visual and 
ritual terms in his description of Constantine at the Council of Nicaea (discussed in section 1.4 above). In 
the ritual context of Imperial cult, not undermined but if anything heightened by the Christianity of 
Constantine and Eusebius, Constantius is anything but a mere man: 
When, therefore, many such things had been spent on the royal preparations, and gifts had 
been given in return to each one according to his merits, at the second prefecture of Orfitus, 
after passing through Ocriculum, puffed up by these great honors and surrounded by terrifying 
columns of soldiers drawn up as though for battle, he was led along with the eyes of all focused 
on him with fixed stares. And when he drew near to the city, contemplating with a serene face 
the ceremonial honors of the Senate and the venerable effigies of the patrician race, he thought 
not, like that legate of Pyrrhus Cineas, that a multitude of kings had been gathered into one, 195 
but that the sanctuary of the whole world was present. When he had turned himself from there 
to look toward the people, he was amazed at the speed with which every kind of person who 
exists everywhere had flowed together to Rome. And intending to terrify Rome as though it 
were the Euphrates or the Rhine, with a display of arms, he himself was sitting apart, with 
military standards going before him, alone, in a golden chariot shining with the brilliance of 
multi-colored stones, from the shimmering of which a certain mingled, flickering light seemed to 
emerge. And after the other decorations of many sorts that went before him, there surrounded 
him serpents woven with purple threads, tied onto the golden and jewel-covered tops of spears, 
with air able to pass through them thanks to great openings, and for this reason hissing as 
though roused to anger, and letting the winding folds of their tails trail behind them into the 
wind. And there was marching here and there a double row of armed men, wearing helmets 
with crests, and radiant with flashing light, wearing white leather cuirasses, and cavalrymen in 
mail were spread throughout them, of the kind they call clibinarii, [masked,] armored with 
coverings on their chests, and wearing iron headbands, so that you would believe that they 
were statues polished by the hand of Praxiteles, not men; thin circles of plate attached to the 
curves of their bodies were covering them in every part, distributed in such a way that, in 
whatever direction necessity moved their joints, the fitted joinings of their armor followed 
continuously. And in the same way he, although acclaimed Augustus by auspicious voices, did 
not at all tremble at the thunderous roaring of voices and trumpets, showing himself the same 
and similarly immobile as he appeared in his provinces. For he was even bending his rather short 
body when entering high gates, and, as though his neck were held in place by armor, holding the 
gaze of his eyes taut and directed, he was turning his face neither to the right nor to the left, as 
though he were the statue of a man: at no time was he seen nodding when the wheel shook 
 
195 A reference to Plutarch’s Life of Pyrrhus, where after a diplomatic visit to Rome, the proverbial philosopher-advisor Cineas 
was so impressed by the unanimity of the Romans in the absence of monarchical authority that he “said that the Senate 
appeared to him to be a gathering of many kings” (εἰπεῖν ὡς ἡ σύγκλητος αὐτῷ βασιλέων πολλῶν συνέδριον φανείη, 19). In 
Ammianus’ estimation, then, Constantius is like the Greek Cineas in being a foreign visitor to Rome and its Senate—but unlike 
that wise philosopher, he shows no amazement at the dignity and unanimity of the Roman aristocracy since he sees nothing in 
them but a representation of the whole world governed by himself as cosmic monarch. 
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violently, nor spitting or wiping or rubbing his face or nose or moving his hand. These things, 
although he was exerting himself to do them, were nonetheless, both these things and certain 
others in his more private life, signs of a not small self-control, one, as was intended to be 
understood, granted to him alone (16.10.4-11).196 
While in part a reflection of the rituals of Imperial rule built up over the preceding centuries and 
under the Tetrarchy, both the scene and its description reflect elements of particularly Constantinian 
and Constantian focus. As Ammianus intuits to his own disgust, in the new Constantinian Empire, the 
city of Rome and its aristocracy have decisively given way to a ritual of the Imperial office that is 
explicitly universal and cosmic in scope. A part of this transition was tied to the recent founding and 
promotion of the city of Constantinople, recently exposited by Muriel Moser in her discussion of 
Constantius’ complex presentation of the relationship between the two Imperial capitols and senates.197 
While Moser notes the explicit declaration in the propaganda of Constantius of Rome’s higher status as 
“mother” to “daughter” and “first” to “second” capitol in relationship with Constantinople,198 as well as 
the implicit compliment contained in the fact that “only [Rome] could be the model for a new capital in 
 
196 Ut igitur multa quaeque consumpta sunt in apparatu regio, pro meritis cuilibet munera reddita, secunda Orfiti praefectura, 
transcurso Ocriculo, elatus honoribus magnis stipatusque agminibus formidandis tamquam acie ducebatur instructa, omnium 
oculis in eo contuitu pertinaci intentis. Cumque urbi propinquaret, senatus officia reverendasque patriciae stirpis effigies ore 
sereno contemplans non ut Cineas ille Pyrri legatus in unum coactam multitudinem regum sed asylum mundi totius adesse 
existimabat. Unde cum se vertisset ad plebem, stupebat, qua celeritate omne quod ubique est hominum genus confluxerit 
Romam. Et tamquam Euphratem armorum specie territurus aut Rhenum altrinsecus praeeuntibus signis insidebat aureo solus 
ipse carpento fulgenti claritudine lapidum variorum, quo micante lux quaedam misceri videbatur alterna. Eumque post 
antegressos multiplices alios purpureis subtegminibus texti circumdedere dracones hastarum aureis gemmatisque 
summitatibus inligati, hiatu vasto perflabiles et ideo velut ira perciti sibilantes caudarumque volumina relinquentes in ventum. 
8 Et incedebat hinc inde ordo geminus armatorum clipeatus atque cristatus corusco lumine radians, nitidis loricis indutus, 
sparsique cataphracti equites, quos clibanarios dictitant, [personati] thoracum muniti tegminibus et limbis ferreis cincti, ut 
Praxitelis manu polita crederes simulacra, non viros: quos lamminarum circuli tenues apti corporis flexibus ambiebant per 
omnia membra diducti ut, quocumque artus necessitas commovisset, vestitus congrueret iunctura cohaerenter aptata. 
Augustus itaque faustis vocibus appellatus minime vocum lituorumque intonante fragore cohorruit, talem se tamque 
immobilem, qualis in provinciis suis visebatur, ostendens. Nam et corpus perhumile curvabat portas ingrediens celsas, et velut 
collo munito rectam aciem luminum tendens nec dextra vultum nec laeva flectebat tamquam figmentum hominis: non cum 
rota concuteret nutans, nec spuens aut os aut nasum tergens vel fricans, manumve agitans visus est umquam. Quae licet 
adfectabat, erant tamen haec et alia quaedam in citeriore vita patientiae non mediocris indicia, ut existimari dabatur, uni illi 
concessae.  
197 Moser 2018, 277-312. 
198 Moser 2018, 298-303. 
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the East,”199 this could hardly take the sting from the fact that, for the first time in Roman history, Rome 
did not stand alone as the one unique ruling city of the world (having merely, in Ammianus’ famous 
formulation, handed over the Empire to her children the Emperors to manage on her behalf),200 but was 
now merely one capitol among many. In the cosmic system of Eusebius and Constantius, such 
multiplicity was a clear sign of inferiority. What this scheme exalted, in fact, was neither Rome nor 
Constantinople, but the monarchical Emperor himself. It was the one Emperor who now stood clearly 
above both Rome and Constantinople, imbued with the unprecedented power, based on the new 
cosmic position granted by Constantinian blood, to father a new Rome of his own and to apportion out 
privileges, favors, and status among the multiple, inferior capitals of his one Empire.201 For the senators 
at Rome and Constantinople, this move does not seem to have dramatically disrupted the basic system 
in which they operated, already a hierarchical competition among wealthy, socially-advantaged 
individuals for Imperial privilege and favors; its essential meaning is to be sought rather in what it said, 
at the fundamental level of legitimacy and authority, about the Emperor himself.202 
However important Rome or Constantinople, bishops or senators, might be in helping with the 
practical task of governance, the governmental innovations put forward by Constantine and Constantius 
relied in the most immediate and practical sense on the armies of the Empire, both in their ability to win 
civil wars and their ability to overawe the populace with displays of power. In particular, in the new 
 
199 Moser 2018, 303. 
200 Ammianus, 14.6.5: Ideo urbs venerabilis post superbas efferatarum gentium cervices oppressas latasque leges fundamenta 
libertatis et retinacula sempiterna velut frugi parens et prudens et dives Caesaribus tamquam liberis suis regenda patrimonii 
iura permisit. 
201 As Moser 2018, 272-275, notes, a dramatic shift is visible in the presentation of Constantinople over time, whereby a city 
originally presented as the “son” of Constantine and therefore as a quasi-sibling to Constantius becomes, in the propaganda of 
Constantius, his own city, named after him rather than his father, and founded and endowed with its honors by himself. 
202 This conclusion should be read in tandem with those of Moser 2018 (esp. as summarized 313-332, contra Edbrooke 1976), 
who emphasizes the continuity present in the governmental innovations brought about by Constantius. The present study aims 
to complete this picture with reference to the other major constituency passed over by Moser, the Christian bishops, and in 
terms of the systems of legitimacy in cosmic and theological terms asserted by Constantius in relating to them. 
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system of legitimacy based on imitation of Constantine, victory in civil war had overtly taken the place of 
victory over foreign barbarians as the focus of Imperial ritual and celebration, and therefore the means 
by which Imperial power was legitimated—a troubling development, to say the least, for the overall 
stability of the Roman Empire.203  
Likewise, in a more religious and social sense, the new Constantinian system of legitimacy relied 
on the Emperor successfully presenting himself, both in person and through images, propaganda, and 
theology, as something more than human. The Emperor cannot rule as one man among others, not even 
one Roman among others, but only as a mediator, as Eusebius of Caesarea would have it, occupying 
neither status of those for whom he mediates. Something more than a mere man, he is something less 
than God. To rule, the Emperor must display, in a visible and immediate form, that absolute priority, 
self-sufficiency, and self-control displayed to a greater degree in the heavens by Christ and God. This is 
to some extent an acknowledged fiction, but nevertheless a powerful one, powerful enough that even 
the disdainful advocate of Republican values Ammianus praises it in his eventual summation of 
Constantius’ character. The ritual performance of absolute power and proactive command makes of the 
Emperor an entity that can only act—he cannot, or is not supposed to, react to, let alone interact with, 
the physical world around him, his assembled subjects, and even his own body.204 In the most precise 
 
203 Cf. Humphries 2015, esp. 166-168, McCormick 1986, 80-83, Omissi 2018, 179. 
204 In the context of Ammianus, however, this presentation of absolute ritual self-sufficiency is to a degree set up to be knocked 
down, as the incredible wonders of Rome succeed in amazing Constantius and causing him to surrender some of his autocratic 
pretenses while in the city (16.10.13-17). Similarly, the ecclesiastical historians record interventions of both populace and local 
notables on behalf of the deposed bishop Liberius reflective of a certain atmosphere of popular liberty (Sozomen 4.11.12, 
Theodoret, 11.17, cf. Hunt 1998, 31-32). Ammianus’ presentation of Constantius’ behavior in Rome, along with the similar 
descriptions of the Roman senatorial grandee Symmachus (3.7), has been taken (e.g. Moser 2018, 287-292, Hunt 1998, 29-30) 
as a sign of a self-conscious shift in Constantius’ bearing from a performance of cosmic monarchy to a more collegial 
performance as civilis princeps in relation to the Roman senators and people themselves. While there is no doubt truth in this, 
Ammianus’ account shows a Constantius brought to wonder at the monuments of Rome and so to compete with previous 
Emperors in extending favors and benefactions to the Senate and people of Rome (including the dramatic gesture of setting up 
a new obelisk in Rome a la Augustus), but not precisely performing collegiality in the manner expected of Emperors during the 
principate. As Hunt 1998, 30, suggests, however, even such minimal adjustments would have represented “unfamiliar 
concessions” to an Emperor who had never before visited Rome or been expected to perform anything resembling collegiality 
with his subjects. In relation to his privileged inferiors the senators of Rome, the Emperor becomes noticeably more human, but 
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sense, in both Eusebian theology and Ammianus’ description, the Emperor is not God, but the image of 
God. As in the descriptions of De laudibus Constantini and Vita Constantini, in the ritual of Imperial 
power Constantius and his soldiers are not men, but statues, images, mirrors, picturing a divine power 
and reflecting a divine light. Like Constantine at Nicaea in the imagination of Eusebius, it is the Emperor, 
and the Emperor alone, who sits above his soldiers and his provinces, clad in gold, surrounded by 
spiritual powers, and radiant with many-colored light. 
By the time Constantius performed this ritual for the people of Rome, the unification of the 
Empire had been well and truly achieved. While for the senators of Rome, this unification meant little 
more than innovation on an existing status quo, for the bishops of the Christian Church it had rather 
more revolutionary implications. An Emperor who for decades had patronized a theology of cosmic 
unity through command and submission had now made himself, in theory if not in fact, sole ruler of the 
world, and had brought unity to the Church. In both his patronage of an essentially Eusebian theology 
and his methods of bringing unity, Constantius had self-consciously followed in the footsteps of his 
father. The personal presence of the Emperor, his personal ability to discern theological matters and 
interfere in theological quarrels, his presence at the top of the judicial pyramid of episcopal judgment, 
his ability to enforce his will with the effective punishment of exile, even the basic theology used to 
justify such decisions—all were as unimpeachably Constantinian as possible. 
Still, in the forcefulness of his assertion of Imperial privilege, as expressed in the deposition and 
replacement not only of Athanasius, but also of numerous organized allies and advocates of a contrary 
“Nicene” theology up to and including the bishop of Rome, Constantius had not merely imitated 
Constantine, but in a real sense surpassed him. This surpassing of Constantine in theology and 
 
remains the superior bestowing favors, receiving honors, and hearing petitions from his subjects. He retains, too, his properly 
Imperial and predominantly Eastern court and retinue (cf. Edbrooke 1975).  
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ecclesiastical management would lead, in the years ahead, to even more dramatic efforts at achieving 
and cementing unity. 
Constantine, however, had not spent the first two decades of a divided reign building up 
resistance and antagonism to himself among the bishops and provinces of the Empire. He had operated 
from a position of strength, as a benefactor who had brought an end to persecution, and from that 
position of strength had pursued a limited policy of integration and management. To his subjects of the 
Western Empire, newly conquered and subjugated in a bloody civil war, Constantius was, if anything, in 
precisely the opposite position. His will might be theoretically preeminent in Church as well as Empire—
but it was by no means free from opposition.  
3.6: 
Neo-Arians, Neo-Nicenes, and the Eternal Emperor 
The following chapters consist of detailed examinations of the theology and actions of bishops 
exiled after Milan, bishops who would prove far more adept than their predecessors at successfully 
resisting the will of the sole Emperor of the Roman world. It would be, however, very easy to 
overemphasize the immediate impact of the actions taken by these bishops during the tumultuous years 
between 355 and Constantius’ death in 361. The 5th century Nicene historians inherited traditions that 
made of these bishops heroic martyrs and protagonists in a historical narrative divided between 
episcopal heretics and episcopal Orthodox, with the Emperor at best a tool and patsy alternately used 
and blamed by both sides. In examining the actual events of the 350s, however, it is difficult to deny 
that in each and every conflict within the episcopate, over precedence, unity, or theology, the most 
consequential figure was not a bishop, but the Emperor. In practically every instance, it was Constantius’ 
decisions and actions, and not those of any particular episcopal faction or actor, that brought events to 
crisis and helped shape their resolution. Whether allies or enemies, all the bishops of the latter half of 
the 350s are visibly struggling with the same dominating figure. 
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Unlike in the Eusebian and Constantinian model, however, to understand the Emperor’s actions 
during this period it is necessary to understand the ecclesiastical and theological context to which he 
was reacting. On the occasion of the Dedication Council of Antioch in 341, the Eastern Empire, under 
Constantius and in opposition to Julius and Constans in the West, had constituted to the most 
substantial degree yet a coherent set of episcopal networks under the ultimate influence of Eusebius of 
Nicomedia, Eusebius of Caesarea’s successor Acacius, and their broadly shared theological project. In 
the early part of the 350s, Constantius had attempted to transform this originally episcopal and partisan 
theological project into the theological and creedal basis for a single united Church of the Roman Empire 
under his authority. As we have seen, this attempt naturally met with significant opposition among the 
allies of Athanasius and the bishop of Rome in the West. In the latter part of the 350s, however, it also 
began to be threatened by a new, perhaps more unexpected event: in the united Empire of Constantius, 
the Eusebian ecclesiastical networks of the East began to fracture and fall to pieces.  
On the one hand, as I will argue in subsequent chapters, was a new “neo-Nicene” belief, for the 
first time worked out in metaphysical detail and brought into close contact with the prevailing Greek 
theological trends of recent decades, and for the first time tied to a radical political theology focused 
around episcopal unity over and against Imperial claims to cosmic position and religious authority. On 
the other side, and perhaps more important for Constantius, was the formation of new theological 
parties in the East made possible both by increasing contact between Eastern and Western theology and 
by the absence of a single effective leader to take the place of Eusebius of Nicomedia. Macedonius of 
Constantinople, Eusebius’ successor, had proven a heavy-handed embarrassment prone to alienating his 
allies as much as his enemies.205 Acacius of Caesarea was a dominant theological authority, but in beliefs 
 
205 The 5th century ecclesiastical historians (see in particular Socrates Scholasticus 2.16, 2.27, 2.38, Sozomen 4.2-3. 4.20-21) 
provide numerous anecdotes accusing Macedonius of ostentation, heavy-handedness, and brutal violence against ecclesiastical 
opponents. Macedonius was eventually deposed by Constantius himself and replaced with Eudoxius, a move allegedly made in 
response to Macedonius’ audacious decision to transfer the remains of Constantine without consulting the Emperor. 
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and abilities he was the successor of Eusebius of Caesarea, not Eusebius of Nicomedia. Then, as we will 
see, in the late 350s there emerged on the scene theological figures of a much more logically and 
socially unambiguous bent, with far less interest in attaching their metaphysical beliefs to political 
theology and ecclesiastical alliances:206 the so-called “Neo-Arian” or “heterousian” party, led by the 
brilliant (and unpopular) priest-theologian Aetius and his disciple and sponsor Eunomius of Cyzicus.207 
Stung by the success of these new radicals, the successor and opponent of Marcellus Basil of Ancyra had 
already begun to form networks dedicated to promoting an alleged consensus position pitched between 
the two poles of “Arian” radicalism and “Nicene” Sabellianism. Finally, and somewhat ironically, the 
clearest winner of the intra-Eastern ecclesiastical conflict of these years ended up being the rather 
unlikely candidate Eudoxius of Germanica, a man possessed seemingly of neither great theological 
acumen nor skill at controlling ecclesiastical networks, but a bishop with close ties to Constantius. 
Still, while all these bishops and their episcopal networks constituted the context for Imperial 
ecclesiastical action, according to the political-theological model they themselves had promoted, and in 
the context of the bitter theological conflicts they themselves had furthered, they were hardly in a 
 
206 For discussions of Aetius and the “Neo-Arian” thinkers associated with him, including Eunomius, see esp. Vaggione 2000, 
Kopecek 1979, Anatolios 2011, 69-79. As Kopecek emphasizes, (see esp. 123-128), the theology of this faction was in essence an 
effort to harmonize and clarify, in syllogistic form, the doctrines of anti-Nicene thinkers of previous generations, including Arius, 
Eusebius of Nicomedia, and Eusebius of Caesarea. Despite his reputation for uncompromising radicalness, Aetius’ doctrine was 
in some ways actually less strong than Arius’ initial teachings, particularly in its confident ascription of immutability by nature to 
the Son as well as the Father (cf. esp. 123-128, 190). The caution of Barnes 1993, 136-138, against the implications of the 
moniker “Neo-Arian” in demarcating too strong a line between Aetius and Eunomius and other thinkers in the same tradition in 
the 350s and before is thus in my judgment entirely justified, though I have employed the term as a useful shorthand here and 
elsewhere. On the other side, Ayres 2004, 144-149, with little justification in my view, emphasizes the novelty of Aetius’ and 
Eunomius’ views on the basis of an alleged lack of directly proven connections to the theology of Arius. 
207 Unpopular Aetius may have been during his lifetime, but he earned the approbation of later generations of anti-Nicenes 
such as the 5th century Eunomian Philostorgius, who in his hagiographical account in Historia Ecclesiastica 3.15-20 presents 
Aetius as a travelling theologian and debater of unmatched abilities, trained successively by Paulinus of Tyre, Athanasius of 
Anazarbus (prominent episcopal allies of Arius and Eusebius of Caesarea going back to before Nicaea), Antony of Tarsus, and 
finally Leontius of Antioch, and later himself the teacher of Eunomius. Philostorgius’ sketch of Aetius’ activities and training is 
almost certainly accurate and has been generally accepted by scholars (see in particular the excellent exposition of Aetius’ 
background and education in Kopecek 1979, 61-75), and is noteworthy for the direct connection it provides between earlier 
allies of Arius and Eusebius of Caesarea and the heterousian theology of the latter 4th century. For the background and activities 
of Aetius’ disciple Eunomius, who like his allies Aetius and George of Cappadocia seems to have been of relatively low birth and 
to have held Imperial office, see Vaggione 2000, Kopecek 138-150. 
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position to unify the Roman Empire as a whole. If Eusebian ecclesiastical networks and theology, 
favored and promoted by Constantius since his accession in the 330s, were to constitute the basis for a 
truly Empire-wide ecclesiastical establishment, unification was desperately needed—and according to 
the Constantinian and Eusebian models of cosmic unity, the Church of the Roman Empire could be made 
one only by the one Roman Emperor.  
It is in this context, I would argue, that we should understand the complex series of documents 
emanating from the Imperial court of Sirmium during Constantius’ residence there from 357 to 359, as 
he grappled with the military threat of the Sarmatians and Quadi:208 not, as scholars have at times taken 
them, as results of a dizzying sequence of ecclesiastical councils, whose occasions and other acts are 
entirely missing from the historical record (a hypothesis ably refuted by Timothy Barnes),209 but rather 
as results of an Imperial-driven attempt to craft a new creed and a new consensus theology for the 
Empire as a whole. Constantius throughout his tenure as joint Emperor had acted both reactively and 
proactively to keep in place and extend an already-dominant Eastern network of bishops tied to a 
distinctive Eusebian form of belief, on both of which his legitimacy as a ruler was seen to depend. So 
long as he was merely one Emperor among many, however, he was naturally not in a position to act for 
the Empire as a whole, nor, given the constant conflict with his brothers and powerful bishops, was 
Constantius eager to allow any episcopal council, however loyal, to restrict his ability to maneuver. The 
task after 351 accordingly, as expressed in the Council of Sirmium and at Arles and Milan, had been to 
extend his already-established methodology from East to West, imposing a modified Eusebian form of 
belief on the Western Empire while removing individual bishops opposed to the Emperor and his 
theology. 
 
208 Hunt 1998, 32. 
209 Cf. Barnes 1993, 231-232. 
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The statements emanating from Sirmium beginning in 357 were continuations of this campaign, 
indelibly tied to it by Constantius’ use of the figure and authority of Hosius of Cordoba, for many years a 
flashpoint of opposition to his rule and theology in the West. More radically, however, these statements 
for the first time showed an intention by Constantius and his advisors to use the full force of Imperial 
power to overrule, not merely the disloyal theology of the conquered bishops of the West, but also the 
theological positions promulgated Eastern bishops over the proceeding decades, in a favor of a new, 
fixed, and universal norm of orthodox belief. Imposing the Sirmium creed on the West by force was one 
thing; crafting a genuinely united theology for the entire Christian Church of the Roman Empire was 
another. With new theological issues on the table and an episcopate marked by both new alliances and 
old conflicts, the time was ripe for the Emperor to intervene in the most decisive and proactive fashion 
yet. 210 
This intervention was one that, in best Eusebian fashion, would proceed logically and in a 
coherent fashion downward from the Imperial will. By summoning a few favored bishops to his court at 
Sirmium and setting them the task of theological discussion, debate, and negotiation, Constantius 
granted himself unprecedented ability to examine the theological issues under debate, iterate on a 
statement suitable to his needs, test the reaction produced by such statements within the broader 
episcopate, and, most importantly of all, retain for himself the ultimate right of modifying, accepting, 
rejecting, or promulgating the results of this process.  
The initial results of this experiment were far from favorable. In 357, a statement was produced 
at the Imperial court of Sirmium211 and then circulated in both Greek and Latin by officials of Constantius 
 
210 For a recent discussion of the limits of the scholarly model of Imperial reactivity in Constantius’ religious policies during this 
period, see Diefenbach 2015.  
211 Discussion of these events is made difficult by confusion over just how many councils were held at Sirmium in the 340s and 
the 350s; based on the extant sources, it is possible to argue for as many as three, one in 347 or 348, one in 351, and the one 
from which the “blasphemous” document Hilary opposes originated in 357. As Barnes 1993, 231-232, argues forcefully, 
however, the first such council may in fact be merely the result of a textual error, and the one in 357, given the very few 
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to bishops throughout the East and the West,212 which provoked an immediate and hostile response in 
both quarters. 
This document begins with a forthright declaration of the occasion and the purpose of its 
composition: “Since it seemed that some discussion about the Faith had arisen, everything has been 
unfailingly investigated and examined at Sirmium in the presence of Valens and Ursacius and Germinius 
and the rest” (Athanasius, De synodis 28.2).213 The authority asserted in this statement is breathtaking, 
particularly in the theologically divided context of the latter 350s—and there can be little question that 
it derives ultimately from Constantius. Besides Constantius’ allies Valens and Ursacius, and the recently-
appointed bishop of the Imperial court at Sirmium Germinius, the names of only two other signatories 
are attested by Hilary of Poitiers, including most notably the prominent and respected Spanish bishop 
Hosius of Cordoba, a key architect of both Nicaea and Western Serdica, who appears to have been 
forcibly summoned by Constantius to the court at Sirmium and detained there for just this purpose.214 
 
bishops associated with it in extant sources (five) and the reaction to it by the bulk of the Eastern episcopate, would better be 
characterized as a small, informal conference by episcopal allies of Constantius. In this study, then, the titles “Council of 
Sirmium” and “Creed of Sirmium” are used exclusively with reference to the large council of 351, while the document produced 
by a small group of bishops at the Imperial court in 357 is referred to not as a creed, but as the “Statement of Sirmium.” 
212 According to Athanasius, De synodis 28.1, the text was composed originally in Latin, and then translated into Greek. As with 
Constantine’s theological statements, the initial composition in Latin should be taken less as a literal statement of a purely 
Latinate original as a reflection of a will to include Latin bishops (and even the Emperor, who like his father may have been 
more comfortable conversing in Latin than in Greek) in a bilingual process of composition centered around Greek theological 
concepts and terminology. In keeping with most creedal statements of the period, the Greek version seems to have been the 
more definitive and influential one for ecclesiastical and episcopal purposes. I have therefore in making my translations relied 
primarily on the Greek version given in Athanasius De synodis, with secondary reference to the Latin version given in Hilary’s De 
synodis 11, particularly in the interpretation of ambiguous passages. 
213 Ἐπειδὴ περὶ πίστεως ἔδοξέ τινα διάσκεψιν γενέσθαι, πάντα ἀσφαλῶς ἐζητήθη καὶ διηρευνήθη ἐν τῷ Σιρμίῳ ἐπὶ παρουσίᾳ 
Οὐάλεντος καὶ Οὐρσακίου καὶ Γερμινίου καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν. 
214 According to Hilary, the bishops present at Sirmium had “yielded [...] to the judgment of Potamius and Hosius” (in 
sententiam Potamii atque Osii [...] concesserant, De synodis 3), referring to the Spanish bishops Potamius of Lisbon and Hosius 
of Cordoba. From this reference alone, however, it is unclear whether or not Potamius and Hosius actually participated in the 
composition of the text, or, more likely given Hosius’ long-standing association with the Western Nicene party, whether they 
were merely some of the very few Latin-speaking bishops to sign the formula. According to Athanasius in Historia Arianorum 
45, Hosius was brought to sign the formula only after being summoned to Sirmium by Constantius and detained there for a 
year, with, Athanasius strongly implies, the application of physical coercion and even torture. The most likely conclusion from 
all this is that, while Hosius was not among the composers of the document, he was among the first to sign it in Sirmium itself; 
then, given his long-standing prestige, this endorsement was given a prominent place in the Latin text circulated in the West. 
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The use of the formula “the rest”215 to cover the other bishops present at the disputation may indicate 
that the authors expected the existence and names of the small “working group” of bishops at the 
Imperial court to be well-known. The only real justification for the assertion that these issues had in fact 
been “unfailingly” investigated and settled by this small, favored group would have been the words “at 
Sirmium”—that is, at the Imperial court and under the Emperor’s authorization.216 Strikingly, then, the 
“creedal” portion of the document is prefaced, not with a statement of belief, but with the laconic “it 
has been concluded” (συνέστηκεν, 28.3), a fundamental break from typical synodal form, but one 
befitting a formula produced and promulgated according to a thoroughly new, and thoroughly Imperial, 
process. This is not so much a confession of faith, then, as a unilateral declaration of the acceptable faith 
of the Empire.217 
The second most provocative portion of this statement, which would in short order rouse the 
wrath of a great many bishops in both East and West, is presented in an equally direct fashion:  
There is no doubt for anyone that the Father is greater.218 For no one would disagree that the 
Father is greater in honor (τιμή) and value (ἀξία) and divinity and the very name itself of 
 
Phoebadius of Agen (Contra Arianos 3) directly asserts that Ursacius and Valens were the document’s actual authors, a 
supposition supported by e.g. Barnes 1993, 138. 
215 This addition is not present in the Latin text, however, leading to the supposition by e.g. Barnes 1993, 232, that it did not 
stand in the original text, meaning that there were no other bishops in the working group at all.  
216 While it is unclear precisely when in 357 the statement was issued and therefore whether Constantius would have been 
resident at Sirmium or still on his way back from Rome (see the timeline of Barnes 1993, Appendix 9, 218-228; cf. Portmann 
2006, 244, n. 295, Diefenbach 2015, 358 n. 22), most scholars have logically assumed that it took place after his arrival in the 
city (cf. Klein 1977, 63, Brennecke 1984b, 315-316, Hunt 1998, 32-33). In any event, contra Diefenbach 2015, 358, Constantius’ 
presence or absence is less important for the statement’s manifestly “Imperial” nature than its location in Sirmium and the 
identity of the bishops associated with it (Ursacius and Valens, two longstanding episcopal allies of Constantius; Germinius, the 
bishop of an Imperial court city only recently appointed at Constantius instigation, and Hosius, one of the most prominent 
Western episcopal opponents of Constantius, recently brought to Illyricum by force), and its location in Sirmium.  
217 Cf. Barnes 1993, 139: “The nature of this manifesto must not be misunderstood. It was not a creed [...] the manifesto was, to 
use modern parlance, a ‘trial balloon’” (139).  
218 Almost certainly intended as a reference to the creed of Western Serdica (see above, section 3.4), which Hosius may have 
been involved in composing (see note 93 in section 3.4 above) but which he certainly agreed to and defended. This expedient of 
quoting a past authoritative statement associated with Hosius himself and then using it to justify a radically contrary theological 
position may have been intended as conciliatory, but seems to have more naturally infuriated Hosius’ allies. 
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‘Father,’ since the Son himself witnesses: ‘The one who sent me is greater than I’ [John 14:28]. 
And no one is ignorant that this is Catholic: that there are two persons (πρόσωπα) of Father and 
Son, and that the Father is greater, and that the Son is lower in status (ὑποτάσσειν) than the 
Father, along with all those things that the Father has put under him in status (ὑποτάσσειν), and 
that the Father does not have an ἀρχὴ and that he is invisible and immortal and without passion 
(ἀπαθής), but that the Son was begotten from the Father” (28.7-9).219 
Here, the medium and the message make almost precisely the same point. In proclaiming the 
true inferiority of the Son in honor and value, social status and metaphysical divinity, this small group of 
bishops empowered by Constantius make clear their own superiority in understanding to the rest of the 
episcopate, a status derived, like that of the Son’s, from their own subjection to the superior Emperor 
and his will. For a small coterie of less than ten bishops at the Imperial court to confidently declare that 
no one could possibly have any doubt about the most controversial theological issue of the past three 
decades, and declare their own formulation Catholic or universal, only the unifying power of a single, 
clearly higher will is sufficient. Valens and Ursacius may have been the principal authors, but the 
authority is all Constantius’. 
This alleged authority of Constantius in matters of theology is, it would seem, very great indeed, 
and never more visible than in the most provocative section of the document, which served as the 
proverbial first shot in an ecclesiastical and theological conflict that would, over the next several years, 
engulf the Empire as a whole:  
But since many people have been disturbed about what is called in Latin substantia, but in 
Greek οὐσία—that is, that it may be known more precisely, the ὁμοούσιος or the so-called 
ὁμοιοούσιος—it is not permitted that there be any mention at all of these terms nor is it 
permitted that they be expounded in the Church, for this cause and this reason, that nothing has 
been written in the Divine Scriptures about them, and that these things are above the 
knowledge of human beings and the mind of human beings (28.6).220 
 
219 οὐδενὶ δὲ ἀμφίβολόν ἐστι μείζονα εἶναι τὸν πατέρα. οὐδὲ γὰρ διστάσειεν ἄν τις τὸν πατέρα τιμῇ καὶ ἀξίᾳ καὶ θειότητι καὶ 
αὐτῷ τῷ ὀνόματι τῷ πατρικῷ μείζονα εἶναι, διαμαρτυρουμένου αὐτοῦ τοῦ υἱοῦ· «ὁ ἐμὲ πέμψας πατὴρ μείζων μού ἐστι». καὶ 
τοῦτο δὲ καθολικὸν εἶναι οὐδεὶς ἀγνοεῖ δύο πρόσωπα εἶναι πατρὸς καὶ υἱοῦ, καὶ τὸν μὲν πατέρα μείζονα, τὸν δὲ υἱὸν 
ὑποτεταγμένον τῷ πατρὶ μετὰ πάντων, ὧν αὐτῷ ὁ πατὴρ ὑπέταξε, τὸν δὲ πατέρα ἀρχὴν μὴ ἔχειν καὶ ἀόρατον εἶναι καὶ 
ἀθάνατον εἶναι καὶ ἀπαθῆ εἶναι, τὸν δὲ υἱὸν γεγεννῆσθαι ἐκ τοῦ πατρός. 
220 ἐπειδὴ δὲ πολλούς τινας κινεῖ περὶ τῆς λεγομένης Ῥωμαιστὶ μὲν ‘σουβσταντίας’, Ἑλληνιστὶ δὲ λεγομένης ‘οὐσίας’, τουτέστιν 
ἵνα ἀκριβέστερον γνωσθῇ τὸ ὁμοούσιον ἢ τὸ λεγόμενον ὁμοιοούσιον, οὐ χρή τινα τούτων παντελῶς μνήμην γίνεσθαι οὐδὲ 
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Once again, the justification for this new position, forbidding all mention of the metaphysical 
terminology that had been key to the discussion of the divinity and divine relations for decades, is 
inextricably bound up with the form of its promulgation. These metaphysical debates have disturbed the 
minds of the many, both lay and episcopal, but they are in reality above the things that human beings 
are able to discuss or understand.221 That the Father is superior to and prior to the Son can be confessed 
easily by all through submission to the higher authority of these bishops and their Imperial sponsor—
any further discussion of the underlying metaphysical or theological justification for these statements is 
not permitted. This is not so much a statement of epistemic modesty as of autocratic command. 
The Statement of Sirmium, composed by a small group of episcopal allies at the Imperial court 
and then circulated by Imperial officials throughout the Empire,222 was met with a reaction the extent 
and intensity of which it is doubtful even Constantius could have anticipated. In what was almost 
certainly a prearranged event, a council at Antioch in 357, which included the new bishop of Antioch 
Eudoxius and Acacius of Caesarea, immediately endorsed the statement and praised its authors for their 
service to the truth.223 More surprisingly, however, the statement was met not only by the predictable 
 
περὶ τούτων ἐξηγεῖσθαι ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ διὰ τοῦτον τὸν λογισμόν, ὅτι ἐν ταῖς θείαις γραφαῖς οὐ 
γέγραπται περὶ τούτων, καὶ ὅτι ταῦτα ὑπὲρ τὴν ἀνθρώπων γνῶσιν καὶ τὸν ἀνθρώπων νοῦν ἐστι. 
221 See De Ecclesiastica theologia 1.12.1-3 for a similar argument made by Eusebius of Caesarea, who asserts both that the 
Father’s generation of the Son is unknowable, and that, strictly speaking, so is the means by which he created the world.  
222 The statement was sufficiently well-known in the West for Phoebadius of Agen in Aquitania, by no means the holder of an 
important or well-connected see, to compose his lengthy Liber contra Arianos against it in the autumn of 357 (cf. Barnes 1993, 
141), in which he asserts to his fellow bishops at least in Gaul, if not the larger West that the Statement of Sirmium had 
“recently been written to us” (nuper ad nos scripta, 1.1), while Hilary of Poitiers, writing in 358 or early 359 to all the bishops of 
Gaul and Britain can likewise assume that his audience is familiar with the statement and assert that it had been “recently sent 
to you” (missam proxime vobis, De Synodis 1.2). Similarly, in the East the Council of Antioch in 357 and the Council of Ancyra in 
early 358 could both assume general knowledge of the statement throughout at least Syria and Asia Minor. Given all this, it is 
difficult to avoid the conclusion that the statement had been almost immediately copied and distributed throughout the Empire 
using Imperial resources. Indeed, Hilary in De synodis, speaking of the statement of Sirmium, directly states that the Emperor 
had “expounded the faith of such faithlessness, and although not yet regenerated by baptism imposed a form of belief on the 
churches” (78). 
223 Sozomen 4.12.5-7. 
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rejection of many Western bishops, who were not at all mollified by the authority of Hosius,224 but also 
by a concerted attack on Constantius’ Eastern flank. Basil of Ancyra responded by summoning a council 
to his see that, on the pretext of condemning the beliefs of the radical priest Aetius, anathematized 
anyone who denied that the Son was similar to the Father according to οὐσία. In addition, Basil and his 
allies promulgated for the benefit of their fellow bishops a historical narrative centered on the authority 
of the Dedication Creed of Antioch and the need to oppose the twin errors of Marcellus of Ancyra and 
the “Neo-Arians” associated with Aetius. The accompanying creedal statement, although 
anathematizing the term ὁμοούσιος as Sabellian, likewise expressed a theological position clearly 
influenced by Athanasius of Alexandria.225  
This was a bold move in multiple ways, not only in its straightforward rejection of the Sirmium 
group’s forbidding of οὐσία language, but also in its open attack on Aetius, who, although only a priest 
himself, was preaching under the sponsorship of the new bishop of Antioch, Eudoxius. Eudoxius, 
originally bishop of Germanica in Syria, was likely among those Eusebian bishops appointed during the 
general purge that followed the deposition of Eustathius of Antioch in 327/328.226 After attending the 
Dedication Council of Antioch and Eastern Serdica along with Acacius, he seems to have been among the 
few Eastern bishops to accompany Constantius and the Imperial court to the West following the defeat 
of Magnentius. When the bishop of Antioch Leontius died, Eudoxius returned to the East and 
immediately took over this key episcopal see, seemingly without opposition, on the basis of an asserted 
 
224 See in particular Phoebadius of Agen, Contra Arianos 28, who asserts that “the name of Hosius is being wielded as a 
battering ram against us” (Hosii nomen quasi quemdam in nos arietem temperari), but angrily concludes “I say again: I will not 
be dictated to on his authority” (Rursum dico, non mihi eius auctoritate praescribitur). According to Hilary in De synodis 1-5, this 
had resulted in a synod in Gaul that had condemned the statement at length (cf. Barnes 1993, 141-142). 
225 See in particular the exposition of Kopecek 1979, 155-172, based largely on the synodal letter of the council given in 
Epiphanius, Panarion 73.2-11. 
226 Eudoxius is first attested as an Antiochene presbyter opposing the succession of Eusthatius of Antioch (S. Parvis 2006a 78 n. 




authorization by the Emperor.227 Given the importance of the see, the role Emperors had played since 
the deposition of Eustathius in seeing to its occupancy, and above all Constantius’ close connections 
with the city of Antioch, which had served as his primary Imperial court in the years from 337 to 350,228 
there is, in itself, little reason to doubt that Constantius had deliberately sent him there for just this 
purpose.  
At a stroke, then, the Sirmium statement had managed to rouse direct opposition against the 
Emperor’s favored bishops and theology in both East and West. Even more troublingly for Constantius, 
for practically the first time since the civil war of Magnentius, there is evidence of direct cooperation 
between Eastern and Western bishops, including the Gallic exile Hilary of Poitiers and the powerful Basil 
of Ancyra, in the interests of opposing the Statement of Sirmium, its theology, and its sponsors.229 For 
Hilary, as we will see, this was a heaven-sent opportunity for a new alliance between moderate 
elements in both theological and geographical camps—for Constantius, interested in unifying the 
 
227 For later accounts of Eudoxius’ appointment to Antioch, see Socrates Scholasticus 2.37.6-11, who treats his charge from the 
Emperor as fraudulent, while Sozomen 4.12.3-5 reports the tradition that Eudoxius had in fact possessed the authorization of 
the Emperor and his courtiers to take possession of the Church of Antioch, and Theodoret 2.25-26 merely reports that Eudoxius 
had publicly announced that he had been appointed by the Emperor but that Constantius later denied this. 
228 See in particular Moser 2018, 121-131, for a summation of Constantius’ close links to the city, which included not only long 
residency and close association with local elites but also lavish acts of patronage culminating in the ecclesiastical project of the 
dedication of the grand “Golden Church,” an occasion celebrated by panegyricists throughout the Empire and accompanied by 
the proceedings of the Dedication Council of Antioch. 
229 According to the fifth charge drawn up against Basil at the Council of Constantinople in 360, “he raised up opposition to 
Germanius in Sirmium, and, although he was in communion with him and with Valens and Ursacius, he slandered them in 
letters written to the bishops of Africa, and when accused of this he denied it and swore an oath and when his lie was detected 
he then attempted to make sophistical distinctions about his oath, and he was the cause of division and rebellion in Illyricum 
and Italy and Africa and of the things that happened in the Church of Rome” (Γερμανίῳ τὸν ἐν Σιρμίῳ κλῆρον ἐπανέστησε καί, 
κοινωνῶν αὐτῷ καὶ Οὐάλεντι καὶ Οὐρσακίῳ, γράφων διέβαλλεν αὐτοὺς πρὸς τοὺς τῆς Ἀφρικῆς ἐπισκόπους, ἐγκαλούμενός τε 
ἠρνεῖτο καὶ ἐπιώρκει καὶ φωραθεὶς ἐπεχείρει σοφίζεσθαι τὴν ἐπιορκίαν, καὶ διχονοίας καὶ στάσεως αἴτιος ἐγένετο Ἰλλυριοῖς 
καὶ Ἰταλοῖς καὶ Ἄφροις καὶ τῶν περὶ τὴν Ῥωμαίων ἐκκλησίαν συμβάντων, Sozomen 4.24.6). The context for these alleged 
slanderous communications to bishops in the West about the paired activities of Germinius, Valens, and Ursacius, can only be 
the Statement of Sirmium (cf. Barnes 1996b, 552). For Hilary of Poitier’s active (and ultimately successful) attempt to forge an 
alliance between Basil and the homoousians, see Chapter Six below. 
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Empire around his own unchallenged position, it was a clear threat to his theological-ecclesiastical 
project and so to his legitimacy as sole ruler. 
Given its authorship and the names associated with it, and in particular the efforts to which 
Constantius went to secure Hosius of Cordoba’s compliance, the Statement of Sirmium was likely aimed 
initially primarily at the Western Empire. It is probable that neither Constantius nor his small working 
group of Illyrian bishops had clearly anticipated widespread opposition in an Eastern Empire that for 
decades had been relatively united in its approbation of his ecclesiastical projects. When the stance 
adopted at Sirmium was proved unacceptable to a large and powerful network of Eastern bishops, 
however, the Emperor was forced to adopt an alternative strategy for managing the episcopate, one 
somewhat more subtle than the strict policy of command employed at Milan and elsewhere in the West. 
This meant at least a temporary alliance with Basil of Ancyra, who had shown himself adept at 
ecclesiastical management in the East, and a re-affirmation of Basil’s preferred terminology, based in 
large part on the Dedication Creed of 341, promulgated years ago under Constantius’ authority and in 
his presence.  
A letter is extant from Constantius to the Church of Antioch in which, while not disavowing the 
Statement of Sirmium, he does disclaim responsibility for the appointment of Eudoxius and endorse the 
basic theological vocabulary asserted by Basil at Ancyra. As with the recall of Athanasius from exile, the 
primary purpose of the letter is to assert his proactive origination of the current policy, which had been 
foisted on him by others, while passing over or denying outright his own past actions in contradiction of 
that policy. The letter’s hyperbolic and repeated denials of responsibility, however, give it a somewhat 
panicked feeling, particularly in its abrupt, punctuated opening sentences: “Eudoxius did not come from 
us. Let no one think this. We are far from agreeing with people like this” (Sozomen 4.14.1).230 
 
230 Εὐδόξιος οὐ παρ’ ἡμῶν ἧκε· μηδεὶς οὕτως οἰέσθω. πόρρω τοῦ προστίθεσθαι τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐσμέν. 
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Constantius is well aware that, just as in that previous instance some had supposed that he had wanted 
Athanasius exiled and kept from his see, so now some suppose he may have had something to do with 
the appointment of Eudoxius to the most important court city of his regime. Nothing, however, could be 
farther from the truth: “But these crafty men, audacious in everything, have bragged to some people 
something of this sort, that we approve of their ordination, the ordination with which they ordained 
themselves. These things are said by those people accustomed to babble things like this, but it is not 
that way at all or anywhere near to it” (4.14.3-4).231 The strength of these denials rather increases than 
decreases the probability, in my judgment, that Constantius had in fact approved of Eudoxius’ 
ordination, as he would only a few years later approve of the ordination of the same bishop to an even 
more important see, Constantinople itself.  
For the moment, however, Constantius is deeply invested in denying any connection not just 
with Eudoxius, but even more with Aetius, the controversial priest-theologian that Eudoxius had chosen 
unwisely to foster and who had aroused so much controversy that not even Constantius wishes to name 
him: “There is a report about certain vagabonds and sophists, whom it is not right to name, since they 
are a workshop of evil and impiety” (4.14.2).232 It is these people, apparently, who are responsible for 
the heretical beliefs recently condemned at Ancyra, beliefs with which Constantius could never have 
been in any way associated: “Recall my first arguments, when we were considering about the Faith, in 
which our Savior was shown to be the Son of God and similar in οὐσία to the Father” (4.14.4).233 This is a 
reference to the Dedication Creed of Antioch, which had spoken of Christ as the image of the Father in 
 
231 ἀλλ’ οἱ κομψοὶ καὶ πρὸς πάντα εὔτολμοι ἤδη τι τοιοῦτον πρός τινας ἐνεανιεύσαντο, ὅτι χαίροιμεν αὐτῶν τῇ χειροτονίᾳ, ἣν 
ἑαυτοὺς ἐχειροτόνησαν. ταῦτα παρ’ ἐκείνων μὲν ᾄδεται τῶν τὰ τοιαῦτα θρυλεῖν εἰωθότων, ἔστι δ’ οὐδ’ ὅλως ποθὲν οὐδ’ 
ἐγγύς. 
232 εἶναι δὲ λόγος περὶ αὐτοὺς ἀγύρτας τινὰς καὶ σοφιστάς, οὓς οὐδὲ ὀνομάζειν θέμις, ἐργαστήριον πονηρόν τε καὶ 
δυσσεβέστατον. 
233 καί μοι τῶν πρώτων ἀναμνήσθητε λόγων, ὅτε περὶ τῆς πίστεως ἐσκοποῦμεν, ἐν οἷς ὁ σωτὴρ ἡμῶν ἀπεδείκνυτο υἱὸς τοῦ 
θεοῦ καὶ κατ’ οὐσίαν ὅμοιος τῷ πατρί. 
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οὐσία, and which had been produced and promulgated in the presence of Constantius, in the city to 
which he was now writing, nearly twenty years before. Far from being responsible for the new theology 
of the Statement of Sirmium, then, Constantius is in fact the true, proactive originator of the creed and 
theology currently upheld by Basil and his allies. The overall goal of the emerging party centered on Basil 
of Ancyra had been to uphold the Dedication Creed as the standard of Orthodoxy over both Nicaea and 
all other councils, while interpreting that creed in a very different fashion than Eusebius of Nicomedia 
and its initial adopters had intended. This creedal norm Constantius, for the moment at least, has been 
brought to endorse. 
If the 5th century Eunomian historian Philostorgius is to be believed, Constantius’ abrupt reversal 
kicked off a purge within the Eastern episcopate, as Basil of Ancyra and his allies, who had just 
effectively stared down the Emperor and won, were able to secure the deposition and exile of some of 
their rivals on Constantius’ authority.234 It is likely, however, that more was involved in this incident for 
Constantius than mere capitulation to a powerful faction of bishops. In 354, as discussed above, 
Constantius had executed his Caesar Gallus as a threat to his authority—and according to Philostorgius 
(Historia Ecclesiastica 3.27), Aetius had been a close associate of Gallus, who had appointed him to a 
teaching post at his Imperial court and even employed him as a tutor for his younger brother Julian. 
Under such circumstances, for Eudoxius to publicly endorse Aetius’ views and employ him as a preacher 
within his diocese was exceptionally poor political judgment. Also according to Philostorgius (4.8), when 
 
234 See Philostorgius, Historia Ecclesiastica 4.8. While Philostorgius mentions by name only the bishop Theophilus of 
Eleutheropolis and Eunomius, then a mere deacon, he asserts that Basil exiled seventy people in all. While this number may be 
exaggerated for polemical purposes, it is possible that Basil in fact was able to secure the deposition of at least some other 
bishops with close ties to Aetius and/or Gallus, as well as (as Kopecek 1979, 176, suggests) a much larger number of lay or 
clerical associates of Aetius in Antioch. Both the small number of actual attested episcopal depositions at this period and the 
fact that Basil would later be accused at the Council of Constantinople of extensive acts of personal violence, intimidation, and 
personal cooption of Imperial officials (Sozomen 4.24.4-8), are reflective, I believe, of relatively limited access to Imperial power 
even at his height of influence. As Barnes 1996b suggests, many of Basil’s alleged actions during this period seem to reflect a 
concerted effort to use the legal force of episcopal and conciliar decisions to coopt Imperial officials into punishing his rivals in 
the absence of commands by the Emperor—or even in opposition to them, such as Basil’s apparent efforts to obstruct 
Constantius’ decision to recall Aetius and his followers from exile in 359. 
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Basil had arrived at the Imperial court following the Council of Ancyra, it was with further accusations 
against Eudoxius, Aetius, Eunomius, and other theological opponents of having aided Gallus in 
treasonable activities, and it was based on these charges that he was able to secure, for the moment, 
Constantius’ cooperation.  
As secular sources make clear, one of the greatest recurring problems of Constantius’ 
administration, like that of his father but to an even greater extent, was access to information and 
control of subordinate officials, many of whom seem to have been subject during Constantius’ reign to 
legal examination and punishment on the word of informers from among their own administration.235 
Basil’s successful intervention into Constantius’ affairs seems to have closely followed such models,236 as 
a subordinate of the bishop of Antioch first denounced in print his superior to Basil of Ancyra and other 
influential allies, who then were able to gain coveted access to the Imperial person at court and there 
present evidence of alleged treasonous activities previously hidden from the Emperor.237 While for Basil 
this seems to have been primarily a theological crusade, for Constantius, allowing Eastern clerics with 
close connections to Aetius to be removed would have been primarily a means of finishing the job of 
rooting out his former Caesar’s networks in the ecclesiastical as well as the political realm. As 
Constantine had been brought to reject the formerly favored Eusebius of Nicomedia due to his close 
connections with his former co-Emperor Licinius, so now Constantius had been brought to reject a 
 
235 Cf. Drinkwater 1983, 363-367. 
236 See in particular Blockley 1969, who describes in detail the challenges and methods of Imperial information and control 
during this period, which focused on exploiting divides between senior and subordinate officials so as to make each responsible 
for the other and incentivize sounding the alarm to the Emperor about infractions. 
237 See in particular Sozomen 4.13 (cf. Barnes 1993, 139-140), who quotes from a letter of George of Laodicea in Syria, a 
subordinate bishop to Eudoxius, denouncing his metropolitan to allies in Asia Minor, and then describes the embassy formed by 
Basil’s allies to Constantius’ court, which consisted of Basil of Ancyra, Eustathius of Sebaste, Eleusius of Cyzicus, and one 
Leontius, apparently a priest of the Imperial court, who seems to have been instrumental at gaining them access to the 
Emperor’s person. As Sozomen narrates it, so successful were they that they were able to prevent Constantius from sending a 




bishop whom he had formerly favored due to his own potentially treasonous connections with a 
defeated Imperial rival.  
Still, these events did not represent as much of a setback for Constantius’ episcopal allies as 
they might seem. Indeed, the emphasis in both Ammianus Marcellinus and the 5th century ecclesiastical 
historians on the ability of Constantius’ courtiers to manipulate him through accusations against 
subordinates seems to have been greatly exaggerated.238 While the deeply unpopular Eudoxius and his 
even more unpopular ally Aetius had been singled out as scapegoats and a few bishops in the East with 
ties to him exiled, no bishop reliably associated with the Statement of Sirmium seems to have been 
punished or even disfavored in any way. Indeed, given that the Statement of Sirmium had been in form 
not a creed, but a set of theological statements, Constantius’ reaffirmation of the Dedication Creed need 
not derail the further workings of the theological group of Sirmium. That the Dedication Creed had been 
allowed to stand for the moment as the most authoritative Imperial-endorsed form of belief did not 
mean it could not at some future point be replaced once this group had come to its final conclusions. 
The Statement of Sirmium had asserted that in the future, all language of οὐσία should be rendered null 
and void; and within a few years Constantius and the bishops associated with the statement would be 
once again found making a concerted effort to do just that. Evidence of a real breach between 
Constantius and the bishops and theology of Sirmium, then, is essentially nonexistent. Even the 
scapegoat Eudoxius, while he was apparently forced to withdraw from the city of Antioch itself, does not 
seem to have been formally deposed from his position or exiled. Faced with the publicly-expressed 
disfavor of Constantius and opposition within and around Antioch, he withdrew temporarily from the 
 
238 Cf. e.g. Drinkwater 1983, 360-363: “In fact, they seem to have been only really successful in their denunciations  when they 
were riding the wave of Constantius’ own voiced or otherwise manifest prejudices [...] otherwise, attempts by court sycophants 
[...] to topple powerful personal enemies not yet hopelessly out of imperial favour were all remarkably half-baked in their 
planning and execution, and all were unsuccessful.” In this case, Basil’s attempt to gain the Emperor’s aid for his own 
theological cause eventually led to the complete undoing of his episcopal network and his own deposition and banishment.   
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city and returned to his native Armenia, but suffered no further harm.239 When he reappeared in the 
public eye at the Council of Seleucia several years later, it was once again as bishop of Antioch and a 
favored episcopal ally of Constantius.  
Whether the choice to call an Empire-wide ecumenical council, imitating and surpassing that of 
Constantine, was the original plan of Constantius and the Sirmium working group, or a response to the 
resistance occasioned by their initial statement, is unclear.240 The events of the Council of Seleucia, 
along with its twin in the West at Ariminum and its successor at Constantinople, will be covered in more 
detail in the following chapters. What should be emphasized here, however, is both the continuity with 
Constantine shown in the attempt to summon an empire-wide Council to take the place of Nicaea, and 
the significant changes made by Constantius to this existing model. 
Although the decision to call an Empire-wide council to deal with a large-scale ecclesiastical 
conflict was in itself fully in keeping with Constantinian precedent, the councils that met in 359 and 360 
proved very different from Nicaea in format, methodology, and goals. Some of these innovations had 
already been present in the later model of conciliar management Constantine had employed in the 
rehabilitation of Arius and deposition of his rivals at Jerusalem, Constantinople, and Tyre. Others may 
well have been brought about by circumstances rather than planning. Given the number of bishops 
involved and the tumultuous events of the late 350s, with ongoing military conflicts on many of the 
Empire’s fronts,241 two simultaneous councils, one at Seleucia in the East and one at Ariminum in the 
 
239 See Philostorgius 4.8, who does not directly state (as e.g. Kopecek 1979, 176, asserts) that Eudoxius was formally either 
deposed or banished as he does with the other episcopal “Neo-Arian” Theophilus of Eleutheropolis. 
240 Socrates Scholasticus (2.37.1), Sozomen (4.16), Theodoret (2.18), and Philostorgius (4.10) all ascribe the decision to hold an 
ecumenical council to Constantius, though Sozomen and Philostorgius (4.11) both describe a series of negotiations between 
Basil of Ancyra and the Emperor over its form and location, while Theodoret as usual ascribes the ultimate decision to call a 
council to Constantius’ wicked “Arian” episcopal advisers; Barnes 1993, 140, however, sees the move as made at the instigation 
of Basil.  
241 For Constantius’ conflicts with the Persians c. 359-360, see Hunt 1998, 39-43. Constantius did not, however, actually begin 
his campaign against the Persians until the spring of 360, after the Council of Constantinople at which he had established formal 
unity in belief for the Roman Empire. This commencement of a major campaign against the Persians after a religious campaign 
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West, certainly helped to simplify the logistical challenge and strain on the Imperial cursus considerably. 
These events also made it more difficult for Constantius to participate directly in one or both of these 
councils, particularly if, as he himself would later plead in excuse for forcibly detaining the four-hundred 
bishops of the Council of Ariminum for nearly seven months, it was necessary for him to be pure of 
ongoing military concerns before undertaking the study of Christian doctrine.242 In addition, Nicomedia, 
the apparent site of an initial proposed Empire-wide council, was struck by a dramatic earthquake that 
devastated the city and claimed its bishop’s life, causing many bishops to be understandably hesitant 
about gathering in a similarly vulnerable place.243 None of these factors in themselves, however, actually 
prevented either the summoning of a council or the Emperor’s presence. 
 I would accordingly argue that the principal features of these councils are best explained in 
more intentional terms.244 In particular, the decision to hold two councils instead of one can be seen as a 
logical response to the events of Serdica and recent developments in the episcopate. At Serdica, a large 
council composed of Eastern and Western bishops had ended up bitterly divided among different 
factions, and it seemed likely that a shared council during even more tumultuous times might end up 
similarly gridlocked. At Serdica, too, Constantius had clearly been concerned about the possibility that a 
council composed of Eastern and Western bishops in the absence of the Emperor might find ways to 
make common cause against him, and had done everything in his power to prevent the council from 
 
for unity within the Empire was likely at least in part designed in imitation of Constantine, whose (abortive) campaign against 
the Persians took place following the unifying councils of Tyre, Jerusalem, and Constantinople.  
242 This short letter is quoted in Athanasius, De synodis 55.2-4. Given the close juxtaposition between Imperial interventions 
into doctrine and concurrent military campaigns throughout Constantius’ reign, it is all but impossible to take this claim at face 
value. 
243 See Sozomen 4.16.1-13, Philostorgius 4.11. 
244 Cf. e.g Barnes 1993, 140-141 (“Constantius decided to hold two parallel councils in East and West, presumably because 
either he or the bishops who had his ear [...] thought that separate councils were more likely to produce a correct decision than 
a single empire-wide council—or at least could be more easily induced to do so”), Hunt 1998, 34 (“it must have seemed to the 
emperor an attractive mechanism for imperial management of the conciliar process”). 
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ever actually meeting in one session where they might come to a single, definitive ecclesiastical and 
episcopal conclusion binding even on him. In its final divided form, very much unlike Nicaea, Serdica had 
proven quite easy to modify or set aside, as Constantius had first endorsed the Eastern delegation’s 
decisions and then a few years later effectively jettisoned them and instead accepted (some of) the 
results of the Western council, in neither case by explicit appeal to any authority other than his own 
commanding will and providence.  
Even the Emperor’s absence had a certain logical role to play in creating a clearer hierarchy of 
command between bishops and Emperor, council and Constantius. Constantine’s personal participation 
at Nicaea, as I have argued, was likely intended to create a public perception of a united front and 
united authority for the Church and Empire as a whole, but it had also plunged the Emperor deep into 
theological debates and decisions over which he was able to exercise little effective control, many of 
which he would later be brought to reverse on his own authority. For all Constantine’s emphasis on the 
divinely-graced power of his personal presence, his experience at Nicaea had shown that it was difficult, 
if not impossible, for even an Emperor with such great splendor and charisma as described by Eusebius 
to unilaterally impose his will on a massive assembly of angry, argumentative bishops, deeply 
entrenched in their own factions and alliances. This issue Constantius avoided through the simple 
solution of not being present at either council, but requiring that each assembly send him, after their 
own deliberations, a small delegation of ten bishops to present their decisions for review, after which he 
would then decide, on his own authority, what to do about them.  
In my judgment, this procedure was a straightforward way of highlighting and implementing the 
higher, independent authority of the Emperor over episcopal councils—an impression made even 
stronger by the double nature of the councils involved. Like the Father in heaven, or Constantine on 
earth, Constantius could delegate multiple subordinates to do his bidding in different spheres of 
influence, while retaining for himself the power of reconciling and promulgating their decisions for the 
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Empire as a whole. This methodology of pitting multiple inferiors against one another was one with both 
highly practical utility and clear theoretical and theological valences, and had been employed by 
Constantius in other portions of his administration as well.245 As events turned out, it was almost 
entirely the division of the council into two that allowed the Emperor’s will to actually triumph against 
majority opposition in both separate assemblies. The final court of appeals, and the final, commanding 
will on earth, was not the many bishops, but the one Emperor. 
The primary difference between Ariminum and Seleucia on the one hand and Nicaea on the 
other hand, however, was directly tied to the proactive Imperial theological efforts already highlighted 
by the Statement of Sirmium. From all accounts the debates at Nicaea were wide-ranging and bitter, and 
although the precise origins of the Creed of Nicaea and its key language remain relatively unclear to this 
day, it was almost certainly composed and settled on during the sessions of the council itself. At 
Ariminum and Seleucia, in contrast, the creed eventually accepted in slightly different forms by 
representatives of the two councils had already been composed at the Imperial court of Sirmium, by the 
same working group that had produced the statement of 357, and officially promulgated prior to either 
council, as the text itself declared proudly, in the presence of the Emperor himself. In effect, the 
procedure followed by Constantius with the suspect, recently-conquered bishops of the West over the 
proceeding decade—in which they had been asked, both through carefully-controlled conciliar 
 
245 See both the discussion of Constantius’ decision to create a second, rival Imperial capitol and senate in Constantinople at 
section 3.5 above, and the discussion of Blockley 1980 on Constantius’ methods of managing his generals, which relied on his 
ability to pit one against another so as to check and limit the power and influence of potential Imperial claimants. As Blockley 
argues in regard to the popular and powerful general Ursicinus, “Constantius’ policy towards Ursicinus appears to have been 
one of use and control, the control taking the form of playing him off against other senior generals” (477). He concludes that 
this strategy should be seen not as accidental or in terms of the alleged personality flaws of Constantius, but as a matter of 
systemic policy: “[W]hen this material is viewed cumulatively and in the light of the overall objectives of the Emperor as part of 
a political system, then it takes on a coherence which indicates that more was involved than merely the ‘timidity’ or ‘suspicion’ 
of an Emperor, the ambitions of his officials, or infighting over policy differences” (484). 
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proceedings and through more direct Imperial coercion, to sign onto already-written conciliar 
statements—was now being applied to the episcopate as a whole.  
As discussed above, the Statement of Sirmium had been met with widespread, if not 
overwhelming, opposition in both East and West—and now, a creed composed by the same bishops was 
being presented to both councils by those bishops themselves, including Ursacius and Valens at 
Ariminum, and at Seleucia, a small faction that included not only Acacius of Caesarea, but also the 
allegedly disfavored Eudoxius of Antioch. While according to Constantinian precedent both councils 
were directed by high Imperial officials,246 the ability of the favored Imperial parties to gather networks 
of like-minded bishops seems to have significantly atrophied: at Seleucia, in the Eastern Empire where 
Eusebius of Nicomedia had once dominated affairs, Acacius and Eudoxius could get barely forty bishops 
out of one hundred and sixty to sign onto their creed on the Emperor’s authority,247 while in a Western 
Empire more recently accustomed to Imperial coercion Ursacius and Valens succeeded in getting eighty 
bishops to join them out of a council composed of more than four hundred.248 Accounts of both councils 
record the astonishment of the majority of bishops present at the minority’s presentation of a new 
definitive creed and the insistence that it be accepted and promulgated on the Emperor’s authority.249 
 
246 For Ariminum, this was Flavius Taurus, praetorian prefect of Italy and Africa—Sulpicius Severus 2.41.1 mentions the rumor 
that he had been promised a consulate as reward for his successful management of the council (cf. Barnes 1993, 145)—while at 
Seleucia, the Imperial comes Leonas and dux Bassidius Lauricius were tasked with directing events. According to Socrates 
Scholasticus’ account of Seleucia (2.39-40), which appears to be based on recorded acts of the council delivered to Constantius 
(cf. Barnes 1993, 284 n. 8), Leonas forced the council to start before Basil of Ancyra had arrived, and it was he who read the 
modified version of the homoian creed to the council at Acacius’ instigation and then dissolved the assembly entirely after it 
became clear that the creed would not be accepted by the majority. 
247 The total number of 160 is given by Socrates Scholasticus 2.39.5 and Athanasius, De synodis 12.1, while Theodoret 
2.26.9/27.6 has a (probably rounded) 150. Forty-three subscriptions to the “dated creed” from Seleucia are given by 
Ephiphanius Panarion 73.26, while Socrates Scholasticus (2.39.16) gives the number of supporters of Acacius at the council as 
thirty-two and Hilary notes the presence of only nineteen “anomoiousians” (In Constantium 12). Given the basic strategy 
employed by the minority faction, these numbers are not necessarily inconsistent, but likely reflect a core group of followers 
brought to the council gradually added to by defectors from the majority. Cf. Barnes 1993, 146. 
248 These numbers come from the account of the council in Sulpicius Severus, Chronicon 41-44, which Barnes 1993, 284 n.8, 
argues is based either directly or indirectly on recorded acta.  
249 See in particular Athanasius De synodis 8-9, Socrates Scholasticus 2.40. While Basil of Ancyra had already been specially 
summoned to Sirmium to subscribe to the creed prior to the council, he had done so only with the addition of his own creedal 
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The bishops of the Empire had arrived at the twin councils expecting to debate theology and compete 
factionally as they had always done, but were instead being asked to accept or reject the will of the 
Emperor. A clearer or more hierarchical chain of command was hardly possible. 
The “homoian” belief represented in these creeds—centered on the dual planks of the bare 
assertion that the Son is “similar” (ὅμοιος, hence “homoian”) to the Father and the banning of all 
metaphysical language (including οὐσία, ὁμοούσιος, ὁμοιούσιος, and eventually ὑπόστασις) formerly 
used to explicate their relationship—has at times been taken as an attempt at compromise or consensus 
on the part of Constantius and his advisors.250 This viewpoint is, in my judgment as in the judgment of 
practically every contemporary voice, extremely difficult to sustain. As often in this study, the question 
in examining 4th century theology or politics is emphatically not whether unity or agreement is the goal 
of specific Imperial and ecclesiastical figures or theologies. Indeed in one way or another unity 
represents the primary overriding concern and goal of every theologian and every theology profiled in 
this study. The question, rather, is what model of unity is employed, how it is understood, and how it is 
implemented. The model of unity ultimately chosen by Constantius for the councils of Ariminum and 
Seleucia was one focused neither on compromise nor consensus, but on one authoritative will governing 
many.  
 
statement that straightforwardly contradicted the main text by asserting that the Son was like the Father not just in will, but in 
ὑπόστασις and (in a rather bald-faced substitution for the banned οὐσία) τὸ εἰναι (see Epiphanius, Panarion 73:22). Basil’s 
presence at Sirmium and his extorted (partial) subscription to the dated creed should be seen more, I believe, in the light of 
Ossius’ summoning to Sirmium and extorted subscription to the earlier statement of Sirmium 357 than as a substantial effort at 
seeking compromise between the Danubean bishops and the homoiousians (contra e.g. Kopecek 1979, 177-180, Ayres 2004, 
157-159). At the very least, this subscription does not seem to have prevented Basil and/or his allies from forthrightly attacking 
the ban on the term οὐσία in the “position paper” written shortly thereafter (see Epiphanius, Panarion 73.12-22), though this 
successful compromising of the leading opposition figure does seem to have served its intended purpose of hampering Basil’s 
efforts at the Council of Seleucia, to which he arrived late and at which he was forced to yield leadership to his allies George of 
Laodicaea, Sophronius of Pompeiopolis, and Eleusis of Cyzicus (see Socrates 2.29, Sozomen 4.22, cf. Kopecek 1979, 196-197).  
250 See e.g. Hunt 1998, 32-37 (“Constantius might well hope to have found the lowest common denominator politically capable 
of producing a consensus of doctrine, west and east”), Kopecek 1979, 179 (“this document was a compromise”), and Löhr 1993, 
98 (“for the emperor, credal documents were essentially a compromise”).  
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As Steffen Diefenbach has recently emphasized, the conciliar creedal format was both in origins 
and development a polemical one, aimed less at asserting a universal normative belief than at 
describing the limits of acceptable orthodoxy and polemicizing against opponents.251 There is little 
evidence that either the bishops present at Nicaea or Constantine himself had intended the Creed of 
Nicaea to be a final and universal statement of belief for the whole Church for all time rather than an 
immediate defeat for Arius, Eusebius of Nicomedia, and their theological faction. Indeed, for 
Constantine, as I have argued in Chapter One, even the council’s judgment against Eusebius and Arius 
could be seen as merely provisional, as his acceptance of the authority of Nicaea did not prevent him 
from continuing to revise his own theological beliefs while rehabilitating the key figures whose theology 
had been the direct target of the Nicene creed and its anathemas. Julius of Rome’s upholding of the 
authority of Nicaea against the Eastern bishops, on the other hand, had focused on the necessity of 
continuing to condemn and exclude these figures and their theology, not on the positive assertion of a 
detailed theological content supposedly upheld by the council. In his conflicts with the Western Empire 
and its bishops, Constantius had similarly employed the Creed of Sirmium (and its associated 
condemnations of Athanasius and Photinus) primarily as a means of enforcing unity and identifying and 
punishing opponents to his authority and the Eastern Eusebian theology long associated with it. This was 
a model of unity that was not accidentally but essentially polemical and punitive.252 Now, as suggested 
 
251 Diefenbach 2015, 364-376. 
252 This discussion should be read in tandem with the similar argument of Diefenbach 2015, 357-364, who argues that it was 
only at Ariminum and Seleucia that Constantius explicitly sought to use creedal statements to impose theological unity on the 
Empire as a whole. While Diefenbach’s theoretical argument is sound, the accompanying narrative of Constantius’ ecclesiastical 
projects is in my judgment seriously flawed. It suffers from a binary attempt to foist responsibility for a number of actions onto 
the bishops associated with Constantius to the complete exclusion of Constantius himself, including the attempt to impose the 
Creed of Sirmium on the West at Arles and Milan, councils Constantius personally attended, the development and 
promulgation of the Statement of Sirmium, and (most absurdly) the universal imposition of the final homoian creed by Imperial 
diktat. In my judgment all these claims rest on the mistaken belief that Constantius could act only by means of the Imperial 
administration, not episcopal allies, and more fundamentally reflect a misunderstanding of the position of Constantius viz-à-vis 




earlier, new signs of discord and dissension among the Eastern bishops at large had led to the attempt 
to impose a single creed on the bishops of the Empire as a whole—a creed that specifically targeted and 
banned the theological terminology central to the theological factions, homoousian and homoiousian, 
that had thwarted Constantius’ will in the past. 
Still, for all of its fundamental continuity with past uses of theological-creedal formulas, no 
creed of the 4th century is more explicitly concerned with drawing strict lines of acceptable theology 
than those of Ariminum, Seleucia, and Constantinople. In its final form, the new Imperial ecumenical 
creed deliberately confines its affirmative statements to vague generalizations—but directly and 
precisely targets the theological formulation used by disfavored groups over previous decades.253 The 
primary innovation of the homoian creed was to render, at one stroke, practically all the creedal 
statements and theological positions adopted and argued for over the previous decades forbidden, by 
banning the terminology that for decades had been central to all theological discussion on Father and 
Son:  
But inasmuch as the term ‘οὐσία’ was set down by the Fathers because of their very great 
simple-mindedness, and it brought scandal because of the ignorance of the people, because the 
Scriptures do not include this term it has seemed good that this term be entirely nullified, and 
that there be no mention at all of ‘οὐσία’ in reference to God ever again, because the Divine 
Scriptures never mention ‘οὐσία’ about the Father and Son. But we say that the Son is similar 
(ὅμοιος) to the Father in all things as the Holy Scriptures both say and teach” (Athanasius, De 
synodis 8.7).254 
At a single blow, the Dedication Creed of Antioch, the Creed of Sirmium 351, and the Creed of 
Nicaea, all of which had made use of this now forbidden term in explicating the relationship of Father 
 
253 Cf. Ayres 2004, 165: “The creed of 360 is a deliberate attempt to render unorthodox any other way of construing that 
tradition than their own.”  
254 τὸ δὲ ὄνομα τῆς οὐσίας διὰ τὸ ἁπλούστερον παρὰ τῶν πατέρων τεθεῖσθαι, ἀγνοούμενον δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν λαῶν σκάνδαλον 
φέρειν, διὰ τὸ μήτε τὰς γραφὰς τοῦτο περιέχειν ἤρεσε τοῦτο περιαιρεθῆναι καὶ παντελῶς μηδεμίαν μνήμην οὐσίας ἐπὶ θεοῦ 
εἶναι τοῦ λοιποῦ διὰ τὸ τὰς θείας γραφὰς μηδαμοῦ περὶ πατρὸς καὶ υἱοῦ οὐσίας μεμνῆσθαι. ὅμοιον δὲ λέγομεν τὸν υἱὸν τῷ 
πατρὶ κατὰ πάντα ὡς καὶ αἱ ἅγιαι γραφαὶ λέγουσί τε καὶ διδάσκουσι. 
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and Son, were officially annulled. It beggars belief to see this as evidence of well-intentioned attempt to 
find a formula acceptable to all parties, rather than as a deliberate move to veto the positions of all 
parties save one. Since at least the time of Western Serdica, the bishops of Rome and their allies had 
made the Council of Nicaea central to their theological and ecclesiastical position, increasingly 
sharpened over the course of the 350s into an insistence on the term ὁμοούσιος and on the total 
singularity of one divine οὐσία against all weaker formulations of the divine relations. To expect the 
increasingly polemical followers of this formula to happily surrender it was the height of absurdity—
something which Constantius, after years of feuding with Western bishops insistent on universal 
subscription to Nicaea, would have been more aware of than anyone else. Similarly, in the East Basil of 
Ancyra and his allies had shown themselves, at the latest after the Statement of Sirmium, inflexibly 
committed to their interpretation of the Dedication Creed and its formulation that the Son was similar in 
οὐσία to the Father. Constantius, who had been brought to endorse this stance publicly and depose 
Basil’s theological opponents only a few years before, could hardly have forgotten this fact. In every 
aspect in which it innovated on previous creedal statements and theological viewpoints, then, 
“homoianism” did so in a way that ensured that it would be unacceptable to large majorities in both the 
Eastern and Western Empire. The most straightforward conclusion is not that the Emperor was naive or 
misled, as later Nicene commentators would insist, but that, finding himself faced with intransigent 
opposition in both East and West, opposition arising from different theological quarters but all insistent 
on different uses of the term οὐσία, Constantius, in the hierarchical, proactive fashion of command 
modeled by Father, Son, and Constantine, chose to end to this opposition by a straightforward 
overruling from above. 255 
 
255 That an intrinsic conflict in goals between the homoiousians and Constantius, and not merely accidental changes in 
personalities or fortunes, was ultimately responsible for Basil’s downfall, is noted by e.g. Löhr 1993: “On the one hand, their 
leaders wanted to be the agents and protagonists of imperial church policy. On the other hand [...] those sensibilities favored a 
366 
 
Still, these creeds, while essentially negative and polemical in nature, did at the same time 
attempt to mandate certain positive theological viewpoints as Orthodoxy for all time. This development, 
I believe, should be seen in light of the changes in context since the Creed of Sirmium in 351. As I will 
argue in subsequent chapters, over the course of the 350s the emphasis on Nicaea as the primary 
polemical weapon against Arius, Eusebius, and their associates had gradually morphed into a more 
positive affirmation of the Creed of Nicaea, and especially its key term ὁμοούσιος, as the key to a new, 
sophisticated, and consensus-driven theological position on the nature of cosmos and divinity. 
Constantius’ attempt to foist a single creedal theology upon all bishops for all time, then, should be seen 
as neither a simple imitation of Constantine and Nicaea, nor even a forceful attempt to create unity in a 
Church riven by internal conflict, but as a response to the rise of a new “Nicene” theology increasingly 
grounded in adherence to the Creed of Nicaea as the perpetual touchstone of orthodoxy. By means of 
the creedal statements of Ariminum, Seleucia, and Constantinople, Constantius was attempting to 
replace not so much the Creed of Nicaea itself as the unprecedented position that creed had recently 
come to occupy in the minds of Eastern and Western bishops alike, and the unprecedented way its 
wording had become linked to particular, highly sophisticated theological viewpoints—viewpoints 
increasingly favored even by the allies of Basil of Ancyra. If the alleged authority of a sacrosanct creed 
adopted by an “ecumenical council” was now the primary support of theological viewpoints 
unacceptable to Constantius, the logical response was to produce another sacrosanct creed, tied to a 
very different positive theology, and supported by even greater and more ecumenical authority. 
The positive theological stance presented and eventually adopted at Constantinople, it should 
be emphasized, was in no sense a compromise, but a clear endorsement of an essentially Eusebian and 
Constantinian norm. The theologies developed in the 350s by both Nicenes in the West and 
 




homoiousians in the East relied on their ability to clearly identify a metaphysical divine essence shared 
in by the persons and wills of Father and Son. Among the more radical Nicenes, this had led, as I will 
argue in subsequent chapters, to a forthright belief in a total interpersonal mutuality and equality made 
possible by the existence of a single metaphysical divine substantia or οὐσία shared in its totality by 
multiple coexistent and interrelated persons. In the East, wary of the consequences of confessing a total 
identity of οὐσία, Basil of Ancyra and his allies nonetheless had made the use of the term οὐσία 
increasingly central to opposition to the more radical doctrine of the statement of 357. According to this 
theology, while to simply assert the Father’s superiority to the Son in status or power threatened divine 
unity, if Father and Son were confessed not only as cause and caused, but as properly Father and Son, 
possessed of similar metaphysical οὐσίαι just like human fathers and sons, the necessity, mutuality, and 
eternity of the relationship between Father and Son could be made absolutely clear.256 What united all 
these parties, in the context of the late 350s, was their total reliance on metaphysical terminology to 
explicate the divine relations in a way that made of Father and Son truly divine beings existing on the 
same fundamental cosmic plane, possessed of an ordered relationship of Father originating Son but also 
and more fundamentally of a shared eternity that made of that potentially one-sided relationship a true, 
inextricable coexistence and co-divinity. In the emerging consensus theology that would dominate the 
 
256 For the theology of the leaders of the homoiousian faction Basil of Ancyra and George of Laodicaea, see in particular the 
documents of the Council of Ancyra found in Hilary, De synodis 12-25 and Epiphanius, Panarion 73.2-11, as well as the 
polemical “position paper” composed prior to the councils of Ariminum and Seleucia found in Epiphanius, Panarion 73.12-22. 
See also the analysis of Kopecek 1979, 155-172 and 183-198, who argues convincingly that the key tenets of the homoiousian 
position were based around bitter opposition to the “Neo-Arian” stance of Aetius and Eunomius combined with limited 
rapprochement with the Origenist theology of Athanasius of Alexandria. For the homoiousian party in general, see also Ayres 
2004, 149-153. As Ayres himself points out, much of the understanding of this faction has been from a controversial Nicene 
perspective—with the term ὁμοιούσιος seen as a tenuous compromise falling short of the full clarity of the ὁμοούσιος—and 
has not reflected the self-understanding of Basil himself and his allies, who saw themselves rather as continuing and clarifying 
the dominant Eusebian synodical theology of the previous decades. See also the characterization of Löhr 1993 of the 
homoiousians as “one wing of the former Eusebian [...] party [...] now claiming exclusively for themselves the common 
synodical tradition” (88) of the previous few decades also claimed (with, I would argue, somewhat stronger justification) by 
their rivals Ursacius, Valens, and Acacius, as well as his narrative of a gradual transformation of homoiousian arguments from a 




remainder of the 4th century, divine and human unity in being and nature was set clearly and decisively 
prior to any considerations of will and status. Without the term οὐσία or something like it, however, no 
such metaphysical unity of Father and Son could be maintained, let alone defended against concerted 
opposition. To confess this stance, or anything remotely like it, some terminology of divine being as 
distinct from willing, commanding, or causing was, in the absolutely strict sense, necessary. Without 
some term to connote the positive metaphysical thing by which Father and Son were united, only the 
relationships of begetting and begotten, commanding and commanded, first and second, would 
remain.257 In a divine realm and cosmos defined in such a way, only one person could be in the fullest 
sense God.  
The theological position put forward in preference to this, and its slightly modified successors 
eventually accepted by representatives of Ariminum and Seleucia and then officially promulgated at 
Constantinople, is notable for its bareness—but this bareness is by no means neutrality. In my judgment, 
the theological position known as “homoianism” should be seen primarily as an attempt to put what I 
have identified as the political-theological core of the Eusebian-Constantinian theology in as pure a form 
as possible, dispensing almost entirely with the controversial metaphysical arguments and terminology 
that had once underlain it but which now threatened to give aid and comfort to theologies of divine 
unity such as those of Basil and the Nicenes. It is hardly a coincidence, I would argue, that one of the 
only significant creeds of the past decades to make no use of the term οὐσία in its arguments—and 
therefore to not fall under the nullification of the new creed—was that of Eastern Serdica and its 
 
257 This principle seems to have been key to the “Neo-Arian” position of Aetius, as in a fragment preserved by Basil of Caesarea 
(De spiritu sancto 4, cf. Kopecek 1979, 202-205) in which Aetius argues that “things expressed in unlike terms are unlike in 
nature,” and uses this principle to argue from 1 Corinthians 8:6 that “whatever [...] is the relation of these terms to one 
another, such will be the relation of the natures signified by them; but ‘through whom’ is unlike ‘from whom’; therefore, the 
Son is unlike the Father” (Ὡς οὖν ἔχουσιν αἱ φωναὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλας, οὕτως ἕξουσι, φησί, καὶ αἱ δι’ αὐτῶν σημαινόμεναι φύσεις· 
ἀνόμοιον δὲ τῷ ἐξ οὗ τὸ δι’ οὗ· ἀνόμοιος ἄρα καὶ τῷ Πατρὶ ὁ Υἱός, 4). In other words, in the absence of a shared nature capable 
of being expressed through different terms and relations, all that can remain to Father and Son is the essential non-identity 
expressed in the different names, activities, and relations ascribed to them. Father and Son cannot be both God in the absence 
of a divinity capable of subsisting in multiple relations. 
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successor the Creed of Long Lines, developed by Acacius, Ursacius, and Valens in relative freedom. 
Likewise, it was the modified version of the Creed of Serdica known as the Creed of Long Lines that had 
officially promulgated what would now become the central formula of the new Imperial theology: “the 
Son is similar in all things to the Father” (Athanasius, De synodis 26.6.3).258 At Serdica, Ursacius, Valens, 
and Acacius had been able to secure the compliance of only a carefully-controlled minority of bishops, 
while the assembled bishops of the West openly defied their theology and judgments alike. It was these 
same men who now, nearly two decades later, presented the new Imperial creed to the assembled 
bishops of the world.  
Given this Acacian background to the final homoian position, I do not believe that it is a 
coincidence that Eusebius of Caesarea, although making use of the term οὐσία in his polemical and 
theological writings, had given it relatively little importance, preferring instead to focus on his preferred 
concepts of status imagined in quasi-spatial terms, the similarity, inferiority, and dependence of an 
image on its referent, and absolute and relative priority in willing, command, and causation. It is this, 
more than anything else, that had allowed Eusebius, and later his allies Eusebius of Nicomedia and Arius, 
to accept the ὁμοούσιος as defined at Nicaea—because their fundamental theological belief was not 
reliant, in the same way as their rivals, on any essential metaphysical terminology to define a divine 
being distinct from person and status. Indeed, in a very real sense, the central claim of Eusebius going 
back to before Nicaea was that there was properly no distinction between the absolutely prior and 
commanding will of the Father and his metaphysical divinity. To be divine was not fundamentally to 
share in an οὐσία, but to be prior to, independent of, and in command and in control in relation to all 
other persons and all other things. The Father was divine in the fullest sense, and the Son in a lesser and 
relative sense, precisely because there was no such thing as a divine οὐσία capable of being shared in by 
 
258 τῷ πατρὶ κατὰ πάντα ὅμοιον εἶναι. 
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multiple interrelated persons, but only the one-sided relationships of causation and command summed 
up in the Father’s begetting of the Son and the Son’s dependent creation of the cosmos. For Eusebius 
and his successor Acacius, there was thus no fundamental need for a specific term either to denote the 
divine substance or to create a strict dividing line between created and divine persons—only a chain of 
willing, similarity, and mediation extending from heaven to earth. So long as this basic reality was 
maintained in the political as well as theological realms, this chain, and its singular monarchical 
culmination, could be asserted even with the bare minimum of metaphysics.  
In keeping with this background, Eusebian terminology is clearly present in the first creed 
presented at Ariminum and Seleucia—the so-called “Dated Creed”—much of which remained in the 
final creed promulgated at Constantinople. The Dated Creed, for instance, refers to God the Father, in 
precisely the preferred language of Eusebius, as “the only true God” (Athanasius De Synodis 8.4)259 and 
“’the God’” (ὁ θεός, 8.4,5 passim). It likewise lays emphasis on the fact that the Son “was begotten 
without passivity from God” (8.4)260 in a manner that, as Eusebius of Caesarea and Serdica East had alike 
emphasized, “no one understands except the Father alone who begot him” (8.4-5),261 and in such a way 
that both Father and Son remain “alone from alone” (8.4),262 after which the Son, “making himself 
present at the Father’s command” (8.5)263 suffered and died and in so doing “fulfilled his whole 
administration (οἰκονομία) according to the Father’s will (βούλησις)” (8.5).264 The final Creed of 
Constantinople, while removing the distinctively Eusebian language of the Father as the “the only true 
 
259 τὸν μόνον καὶ ἀληθινὸν θεὸν. 
260 γεγεννημένον ἀπαθῶς ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ. 
261 οὐδεὶς ἐπίσταται εἰ μὴ μόνος ὁ γεννήσας αὐτὸν πατήρ. 
262 μόνον ἐκ μόνου. 
263 νεύματι πατρικῷ παραγενόμενον. 
264 πᾶσαν τὴν οἰκονομίαν πληρώσαντα κατὰ τὴν πατρικὴν βούλησιν. 
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God” and the insistence on passionless begetting, preserved the assertions that only the Father, and not 
the Son, knew how he had begotten him (30.4), the language of “alone from alone” (30.3),265 and the 
insistence that in his descent to earth, suffering, and death, the Son “fulfilled his whole administration 
(οἰκονομία) according to the Father’s will (βούλησις)” (30.5).266 The greatest innovation of the Creed of 
Constantinople relative to the Dated Creed, however, was the decision to simplify even further the 
metaphysical connection between Father and Son, closing the last remaining loophole left to those 
interested in ascribing any form of union in being to Father and Son by proscribing also the term 
ὑπόστασις, favored by Arius, Eusebius of Nicomedia, and Eusebius of Caesarea but employed in 
different senses also by Alexander, Athanasius, Marcellus of Ancyra, and the homoiousians, and 
reducing the entirety of the Son’s metaphysical relationship to the Father to the bare assertion that “the 
Son is similar to the Father” (30.9-10, cf. 9.3).267 How Father and Son might be similar now that all terms 
once used to describe such similarity had been proscribed forever might be at first glance unclear. Yet 
even the bare language of the creed includes an essentially Eusebian and Constantinian answer: the 
solitary rule and causation of Father over Son and Son over cosmos.  
In this assertion of a cosmic hierarchy of monarchical willing and commanding, as well as in the 
specific emphasis on the impassivity of the Father’s begetting and the use of the term βούλησις to 
express the divine will presiding over the Son’s actions,268 these creeds also reflect, not just the theology 
 
265 As Ayres 2004, 165 notes, the final creed’s removal of all “X from X” statements other than “God from God” (immediately 
qualified by “alone from alone”) seems to be a reflection of the way such relational statements had come to be interpreted by 
the homoiousians (and by Hilary of Poitiers, as discussed in section 6.2 below): namely, as indications of equivalency or even 
identity in status and nature rather than of hierarchical similarity.  
266 πάσης τῆς οἰκονομίας πληρωθείσης κατὰ τὴν πατρικὴν 
267 ὅμοιον [...] τῷ πατρὶ τὸν υἱόν. 
268 In its assertion that the Son was begotten “prior to every comprehended οὐσία” (πρὸ πάσης καταληπτῆς οὐσίας, 8.4), the 
Dated Creed also reflected a phrase employed in Constantine’s letter to Arius (τοῦτ’ ἔστι τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς βούλησιν, ἥτις [...] 
οὔτε [...] διά τινος ἐξεζητημένης οὐσίας κατελήφθη, Apologia contra Arianos 41.1), though in a direction somewhat different 
from the theology contained in that letter. Perhaps in a nod to the reasonable conclusion that a creed condemning the term 
οὐσία should not itself make use of the term οὐσία, however, this article was dropped from the final Creed of Constantinople. 
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of Eusebius or Acacius, but also the theological viewpoint of Constantine himself, as I have established it 
in Chapter One. Indeed, in the negotiations in Constantinople between small delegations of Eastern and 
Western bishops from both councils and the Emperor, negotiations in which by every account 
Constantius’ will represented the final word, the theologically Constantinian was preserved and 
highlighted even more than the distinctively Eusebian. Constantine, as we have seen, seems to have had 
relatively little interest in the metaphysical nature of divinity in comparison to the necessary assertion of 
a clear, monarchical hierarchy of willing and commanding in heaven and on earth. The creed of 
Constantinople, in negating all metaphysical language that could be used to express a shared divinity 
and insisting merely on the fact of the precedence of the Father over the Son as superior to similar 
inferior, alone to alone, generating to generated, commanding to commanded, had boiled down this 
Imperial theology to its barest possible essence. Both the Dedication Creed of Antioch and Eusebius of 
Caesarea had put forward a complex image theology designed to account for the metaphysical similarity 
of Son to Father and the presence of the latter in the former; in the final homoian creed, this entire 
theology has been reduced to nothing more than the assertion of order and similarity. In a real sense, in 
the final doctrine of the Council of Constantinople, the Imperial theology of Constantine has overcome 
and supplanted the episcopal theology of Eusebius. 
The Imperial-theological nature of homoianism is never so overt as in the prologue to the 
original “Dated Creed” presented at the twin councils, which straightforwardly set out the basis of its 
own authority, an authority so great that the assembled bishops of the world were intended to submit 
to it in preference to the theological formulas and viewpoints for which they had for decades contended 
among themselves:  
The Catholic Faith was decreed in the presence of our Master the Most Pious and Gloriously 
Victorious Emperor Constantius Augustus, the Eternal Augustus (ὁ αἰωνίος Σεβαστός), in the 
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consulship of the Flavians Eusebius and Hypatius, viri illustrissimi, in Sirmium on the eleventh 
day before the Kalends of June (Athanasius, De synodis 8.3).269 
 The bishops of the Roman Empire, assembled to debate doctrine, had found themselves instead 
confronted with a Catholic Faith already pre-determined and promulgated on the sole authority of the 
Emperor. In earth as in heaven, one will had chosen independently of all others—and now would 
impose itself upon all. In keeping with this new level of exalted Imperial authority, the last draft of the 
creed promulgated at the Council of Constantinople included a clause that for the first time 
anathematized as heresy not just particular disfavored propositions, but all beliefs whatsoever contrary 
to the written text of the creed: “But all heresies, both those that have been condemned before, and 
whichever ones, although they may be even more new, happen to be contrary to this written decree, let 
them be anathema” (Athanasius, De synodis 30.10).270 The theology of the eternal Emperor, it seems, 
will be equally long-lasting. 
Only relatively sketchy traces remain in our sources of the closed-door debates and negotiations 
in which Constantius separately imposed his will upon the various delegations of bishops, favored and 
unfavored, present at Constantinople and along Constantius’ campaign path in the winter of 359 and 
spring of 360.271 The result, however, is clear: on the last day of the year 359, after, according to 
Sozomen (Historia Ecclesiastica 4.23.8), a closed-door session extending through the entire day and into 
the night, the Emperor, resident in Constantinople after a successful campaign against the Persians, 
succeeded in bringing the ten bishops sent from the dominant homoiousian party at Seleucia to 
 
269 Ἐξετέθη ἡ πίστις ἡ καθολικὴ ἐπὶ παρουσίᾳ τοῦ δεσπότου ἡμῶν τοῦ εὐσεβεστάτου καὶ καλλινίκου βασιλέως Κωνσταντίου 
Αὐγούστου τοῦ αἰωνίου Σεβαστοῦ ὑπατείᾳ Φλαυίων καλλινίκου βασιλέως Κωνσταντίου Αὐγούστου τοῦ αἰωνίου Σεβαστοῦ 
ὑπατείᾳ Φλαυίων Εὐσεβίου καὶ Ὑπατίου τῶν λαμπροτάτων ἐν Σιρμίῳ τῇ πρὸ ιαʹ καλανδῶν Ἰουνίων. 
270 πᾶσαι δὲ αἱ αἱρέσεις, αἵ τε ἤδη πρότερον κατεκρίθησαν, καὶ αἵτινες ἐὰν καινότεραι γένωνται, ἐναντίαι τυγχάνουσαι τῆς 
ἐκτεθείσης ταύτης γραφῆς, ἀνάθεμα ἔστωσαν. 
271 See for instance Philostorgius 4.12-5.1, Socrates Scholasticus 2.41, Sozomen 4.19, 4.23. For plausible reconstructions of 
events, see Barnes 1993, 146, 148-149, Hunt 1998, 34-37. 
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subscribe to his chosen formula, joined once again by the homoousian deputies from Ariminum, who 
had been forced to follow Constantius on campaign to Nike in Thrace and had there subscribed as well. 
Shortly thereafter, in January of 360, this submission was ratified by a small gathering of favored bishops 
assembled at the central Imperial capitol of Constantinople,272 who promulgated what was intended to 
be the final and definitive creed of the Church of the Roman Empire. Sometime that spring, the 
remaining bishops at Ariminum, who had been detained by the Emperor for nearly seven months and 
prevented from returning to their sees, capitulated as well.  
This result, in terms of the ecclesiastical and Imperial politics of the previous decades, could not 
have been clearer. Decades ago, Athanasius, Constans, and the bishop of Rome had together succeeded 
in dividing the Church of the Empire in two, each confessing a different creed and a different theology of 
divine unity—now, Constans was dead, Athanasius was permanently exiled, and the bishops of both 
East and West had submitted to the single creed that would from now on dictate the sole acceptable 
theology of the Empire. In what was likely a deliberate move, Constantius also chose the event of the 
council to celebrate the dedication of the new “Great Church” of Constantinople, the Hagia Sophia.273 As 
the upholders of the “ecumenical” authority of Nicaea had been answered by the summoning of two 
even greater “ecumenical councils” at Ariminum and Seleucia, so the upholders of the Dedication Creed 
of Antioch 341 would meet their downfall at another “Dedication Council” assembled to celebrate the 
dedication of another, even more important Imperial church building project at Constantinople. This 
 
272 See Chronicon Paschale for 360, which claims that seventy-two bishops were present and gives the name of approximately 
fifty of them, as well as Socrates Historia Ecclesiastica 2.41.5-6, Philostorgius 4.12, Sozomen 4.24.1 (cf. Barnes 1993, 148-149). 
273 According to Chronicon Paschale for 360, Eudoxius was enthroned on January 27, 360 in the presence of the seventy-two 
bishops at the council, while Hagia Sophia was dedicated on 15 February. For scholarly discussion of the building and dedication 
of this church, which seems to have been self-consciously designed to supersede the nearby church of Holy Peace established 
by Constantine, see in particular Henck 2002, 291-293, Hunt 1998, 38-39, McLynn 2004, 248-250. Brief accounts of the 
dedication ceremony, focusing on the controversial Christological sermon delivered by Constantius’ new appointee Eudoxius, 
are given in Socrates 2.43.7-11, Sozomen 4.26.1. These events also seem to have been paralleled by the arrival and installation 
of new relics of the Apostles brought to Constantinople by Constantius (Woods 1991), another dramatic example of Imperial 
beneficence towards the church of the Constantinian capitol.  
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was ecclesiastical politics at its finest. Several years before, Basil had succeeded in driving Eudoxius from 
Antioch and bringing Constantius to repudiate all connection with him; now, after the deposition of his 
unpopular predecessor Macedonius, Eudoxius was solemnly enthroned as bishop of Constantinople and 
successor to Eusebius of Nicomedia, while Basil and at least eight of his close allies were deposed from 
office and replaced by bishops friendlier to the new Imperial theology.274 Unlike the Dedication Creed, or 
the Creed of Eastern Serdica, or even the Creed of Sirmium, the creed upheld at Constantinople was 
now the creed of the entire Roman Empire; and while no depositions of Western bishops opposed to 
the new formula, including the reinstated bishop of Rome Liberius,275 had as yet been carried out, there 
can be little question that Constantius would ultimately employ whatever tactics necessary to ensure his 
creed’s supremacy. Bishops who still hoped to cling to their older theologies were living on borrowed 
time.  
 
274 According to the pro-Constantian historian Philostorgius (Historia Ecclesiastica 5.1), following the Council of Constantinople 
Basil of Ancyra, Eustathius of Sebaste, Onesimus of Nicomedia, Silvanus of Tarsus, and Macedonius of Constantinople were all 
deposed and banished. To this already impressive list of prominent Eastern prelates Socrates Scholasticus (Historia Ecclesiastica 
2.42) adds Eleusius of Cyzicus, Dracontius of Pergamon, Neonas of Seleucia, Sophronius of Pompeiopolis, Elpidius of Satala, Cyril 
of Jerusalem, “and others.” Sozomen largely reproduces this list (4.24-4.25) with the addition of Heortasius of Sardis, and 
indicates that ten other bishops were put on probation, suspended from office and required to sign the council’s decrees within 
six months or face deposition. Taken together, this represented a clean sweep of some of the most important Eastern bishops 
of the time, replaced by prelates more favorable to Constantius’ new position. Notably for the shape of later Eastern 
theological thought, the Cappadocian Father Basil of Caesarea seems to have been present among the retinue of Basil of Ancyra 
at either the disputations of 359 or the Council of Constantinople, but to have fled Constantinople rather than face forced 
subscription or exile (cf. Philostorgius 4.12, Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium 4.12).  
275 It is clear that Liberius, although restored to the position of bishop of Rome by Constantius c. 357, took no part in the 
proceedings of either Ariminum and Seleucia—not only from all surviving accounts that make no mention of him, but also and 
most directly from the condemnation of the Council of Ariminum given by the Council of Rome of 371, whose encyclical letter 
to the bishops of Illyricum (given, in what is presumably a Greek translation of a Latin original, in Sozomen 6.23.7-15), argued 
that “no weight in judgment is able to be derived from the number of those assembled at Ariminum, since they did not have 
the agreement of the bishop of Rome, whose judgment it is necessary to accept before all others” (οὐδὲ γὰρ πρόκριμά τι 
ἠδυνήθη γενέσθαι ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ τῶν ἐν Ἀριμήνῳ συναχθέντων, ὁπότε συνέστηκε μήτε τοῦ Ῥωμαίων ἐπισκόπου, οὗ πρὸ 
πάντων ἔδει τὴν γνώμην ἐκδέξασθαι, 6.23.12). Liberius’ lack of participation, while likely reflective of his own ongoing 
opposition to Constantian ecclesiastical projects, would probably not have been allowed to stand without some decision by 
Constantius himself, who still clearly did not trust Liberius and who likely wished to exclude the influence of the institutional 
Nicene leader from the carefully-controlled environment of his council.  
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These events represented a shared triumph for the alliance of Acacius, Ursacius and Valens, 
George of Alexandria, Eunomius, and Eudoxius,276 one upheld by a formula acceptable, in principle, to 
theologians every bit as radical in their beliefs as Arius himself.277 Still, in the general round of 
depositions, one more radical figure shared the fate of Basil: the priest Aetius, who found himself once 
again deposed and exiled by Constantius himself in the middle of the closed-door debates that resulted 
in the final creed. The reason for this singling-out, particularly given that Aetius’ student and ally 
Eunomius was not only not punished at this time, but elevated from the diaconate to the episcopate and 
appointed to the see of Cyzicus, is somewhat unclear,278 though it is likely that, along with whatever 
 
276 For the formation of this “grand alliance” between the more radical followers of Aetius, the favored Imperial bishops 
Ursacius and Valens, and Acacius of Caesarea, who are found acting in planned concert in all accounts of the councils of 
Ariminum and Seleucia and its aftermath, with even the radicals Aetius and Eunomius willing to sign on to not only the dated 
creed’s banning of οὐσία language, but also its anathematization of all who spoke of the Son as ἀνόμοιος (“unlike”) to the 
Father, see the somewhat speculative account of Kopecek 1979, 180-183, 209-213. Kopecek, however, makes the formation of 
this alliance somewhat more mysterious than it need be by almost entirely eliminating any role or agency for Constantius, who 
as I have argued in the present narrative seems to have been in fact the most immediate cause of their unification through his 
active instigation of the conciliar process, his endorsement of the homoian Dated Creed, and his participation as final arbiter in 
the negotiations following the twin councils. Likewise, I believe that Kopecek’s lack of sympathy and understanding of the 
Eusebian position of Acacius and his allies, as well as the Imperial theology of Constantius, leads him to make the theological 
divide between Acacius and Aetius larger than is actually justified by the sources. 
277 One the one side, Ayres 2004, esp. 138-140, emphasizes the gradual formation of a theological position suspicious of all 
οὐσία language as well as the “presence of likeness language throughout the first half of the fourth century, and its presence in 
such credal documents as the [Creed of Long Lines]” (138 n. 15), while Weedman 2007 sees the “homoians” as forming a 
distinct faction and theological position only as late as 357, focused on safeguarding the distinction of the Father and Son 
against Photinus of Sirmium by excluding any suggestion of physical substance and emphasizing the subordination of Son to 
Father. On the other side Simonetti 1996 argues that “homoianism” should not be seen as a distinct theological position or 
faction of its own, but rather as a politically-dictated formulation designed to exclude both homoousians and homoiousians 
while remaining perfectly compatible with anti-Nicene views as extreme as that of Arius himself. In my judgment, all these 
accounts have something to recommend them, as in my own narrative I have sought to emphasize both the roots of homoian 
theological formulas in the theology of Eusebius of Caesarea (who had made similarity a key principle of his system while de-
emphasizing language of οὐσία as early as the 330s) and the fact that the actual position of Sirmium 357 and Constantinople 
361, and particularly its authoritative banning of all οὐσία language, was fundamentally the result of Imperial theological and 
political concerns, not the gradual development of an episcopal theological faction. 
278 The narratives given by Philostorgius 4.12, Sozomen 4.23, and Theodoret 2.27 (28) are by no means easy to reconcile either 
with each other or with the actual condemnation of Aetius given in a special letter by the Council of Constantinople to the 
people of Antioch (given in Theodoret 2.28 (29)). For one effort to harmonize them, see Kopecek 1979, 346-359, who is, 
however, hampered by his assumption of a theologically novice but polemically anti-“Arian” Constantius and his somewhat 
inconsistent assumptions both that Aetius was deposed and exiled for “more [his] style than his thought” (354) and that the 
exile of Aetius constituted a drastic defeat and point of no return for the “Neo-Arian” faction he represented. While Kopecek 
1979 (351-352) is most likely right that the report of Philostorgius that Aetius had been thrown out of the palace by Constantius 
after stating that the Son was “indistinguishably” (ἀπαραλλάκτως) similar to the Father suggests that Constantius saw Aetius as 
endorsing the Dedication Creed of Antioch and thereby threatening the homoian settlement, the implication (in keeping with 
Philostorgius’ general portrayal of Constantius as a committed, albeit easily misled, heterousian) that Constantius effectively 
mistook Aetius for a homoiousian is highly unlikely to be historical. In my judgment, these narratives and underlying theological 
positions can be reconciled only by supposing either that Constantius was so stupid as to be incapable of grasping the actual 
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theological issues were under debate, Aetius’ association with Constantius’ proscribed former Caesar 
Gallus was once again a contributing factor. Even in an Empire allegedly united in theology, political 
enmities retained their influence. 
As if to emphasize this point, the Council of Constantinople was shortly followed by a political 
event that would drastically shift the terms of theological debate once again. When Constantius had 
massacred the members of his extended family, he had left only two close male relatives alive: his 
cousins Gallus and Julian, who may have been saved in part thanks to the intervention of Eusebius of 
Nicomedia, who seems to have assumed some form of guardianship over them both.279 After Gallus had 
been appointed Caesar and murdered within a four-year span, only one close male relative of 
Constantine remained: the young, scholarly Julian, sequestered far from power as a student at Athens. 
After coming in person to Milan to pacify the newly-conquered Western Empire, Constantius clearly 
wished to resume ruling from Sirmium—but the threat of revolt, in Gaul and throughout the West, 
remained as real as ever, a fact demonstrated by the short-lived usurpation of Silvanus in Cologne.280  
However, it was for theological as much as political reasons, I would argue, that in 355 
Constantius was brought to turn to the young Julian and appoint him, with highly limited and carefully-
controlled powers and a retinue consisting almost entirely of loyal officials from the East, to the rank of 
Caesar and command over Gaul.281 Given the young Caesar’s total lack of military or administrative 
 
theological issues under debate (a position that, as argued throughout this chapter, I do not regard as plausible), or that there 
were other issues influencing Constantius’ treatment of Aetius, such as the political charges previously leveled Basil and his 
allies. 
279 For Eusebius of Nicomedia’s relationship with Julian, see in particular Ammianus 22.9.4. Sozomen 5.2.8-9, however, reports 
that Gallus was spared because he was already sick with an illness that Constantius and his allies believed would end in his 
imminent death, while Julian was left alive due to his young age (eight at the time of the massacre). 
280 See Ammianus 15.5.15–6.4, cf. Den Boer 1960, who argues that Silvanus was brought to assume the purple unwillingly at the 
instigation of his soldiers and Hunt 1998, 27-29, who highlights the importance of local Gallic conditions in the revolt. For an 
analysis of the complexity of Ammianus’ narrative of the revolt and the historian’s own part in the events, see also Hunt 1999. 
281 Cf. Moser 2018, 285-286. Moser’s insistence that the choice of only Eastern officials for Julian’s command in Gaul, like the 
choice of Flavius Leontius to the urban prefecture of Rome, “should not [...] be seen as a move against the senatorial 
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experience and the almost complete denial to him of meaningful authority, the choice made little sense 
from any standpoint other than the purely symbolic, with the blood of Constantine rendering Julian a 
serviceable proxy for Constantius’ Imperial splendor in an area prone to revolt and therefore, as 
Constantine would have it, clearly in need of some form of real or mediated Imperial presence.282 This 
reality is underscored by a remark of Constantius later recorded by Julian: “For indeed he both said and 
wrote this, that he was not giving an Emperor to the Gauls, but one who would convey his own image 
(εἰκών) to them” (Epistula ad Athenaeos 7).283 In other official communications, moreover, the 
relationship of Constantius to Julian was explicitly described as that of a father and son.284 For the very 
last time, the Constantinian dream of a single, privileged subordinate, in some mysterious way 
extending the presence and power of the sovereign but totally submissive to his will, was being 
attempted on earth as it was in heaven. It ended, predictably, no better than before. 
In the following years, Julian’s nominal presiding over military campaigns brought him 
unexpected success, and this success in turn brought him greater popularity with the troops under his 
command and increasingly more independent authority in relation to the Constantian generals and civil 
administrators around him.285 Finally, in November 360, Julian’s troops in Gaul declared him Augustus, 
and the Roman Empire was once more in a state of de facto civil war. In theory, Julian was willing, as 
 
aristocracy of Rome” (286) may be correct, but it is nonetheless difficult to avoid the conclusion that it reflects distrust by 
Constantius of the Roman senatorial class, who, however reliable they might be for general administrative posts in the West, 
had betrayed him before during the revolt of Magnentius and might well do so again in support of Julian. 
282 See Blockley 1972, 445-447, 452-453, “Julian’s initial function, although nominally military, was really that of a figure-head, 
chosen to parade around the dress and image of the Emperor whom he represented” (446), as well as Omissi 2018, 195: 
“Constantius’ willingness to acclaim a man who had every reason to wish him dead shows the emperor’s personal commitment 
to the ideology of his dynasty.” 
283 καὶ γάρ τοι καὶ τοῦτο εἴρητο καὶ ἐγέγραπτο, ὅτι τοῖς Γάλλοις οὐ βασιλέα δίδωσιν, ἀλλὰ τὸν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ πρὸς ἐκείνους 
εἰκόνα κομιοῦντα 
284 See Straub 1964, 46-47. 
285 For three plausible reconstructions of the development of Julian’s powers and rebellious intentions during this period, see in 
particular Blockley 1972, esp. 447-451 (cf. Blockley 1980, 477-480), Drinkwater 1983, 370-383, and Omissi 2018, 195-208. 
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Constantius had once been, to accept the position of junior Augustus in an Empire once more divided 
between multiple relatives of Constantine. Constantius, however, was no longer willing to tolerate 
anything close to an Imperial equal. As the two Emperors came closer to open warfare, ecclesiastical 
opposition to Constantius began to spring up everywhere. Numerous exiled Western bishops returned 
to what was once again for them a place of refuge from Constantius’ will, and, with the aid of the 
reinstated Liberius, began a campaign of synods aimed at purging all supporters of homoianism and 
Constantius from the Western Empire, while in the East opposition to Constantius as the Antichrist was 
roused to a fever pitch by Athanasius of Alexandria and his allies, now including numerous former 
homoiousians. Julian, meanwhile, in a missive sent to the people of Athens and clearly intended as a 
propaganda piece for the benefit of Constantius’ Eastern subjects,286 forthrightly appealed not only to 
his own Constantinian blood but to Constantius’ status as an unrepentant parricide: 
It is public knowledge that the blood I received from my father originates from the same place 
as the blood Constantius received from his own father: for our two fathers were begotten as 
brothers from one father. Although we were such close relatives, this Most Philanthropic 
Emperor did for us such things as this: six cousins of mine and his, and my father, who was his 
own uncle, and, yet more, the other common uncle on my father’s side, and my eldest brother 
he killed without trial, and me and my other brother he intended to kill, but finally driving us 
into exile, from which he later released me, while on my brother he bestowed for a short time 
before his slaughter the name of Caesar—why is it necessary now to recite unspeakable things 
from a tragedy? They say: ‘He has repented of that, and has been stung terribly by conscience, 
and believes that childlessness287 has fallen upon him because of it, and supposes that because 
of these things he does not meet with success in the war with the Persians.’ These things were 
whispered by those at the court of my brother of blessed memory Gallus, who now hears his 
name uttered for the first time, since Constantius murdered him contrary to the laws, and did 
 
286 See in particular the analysis of Omissi 2018, 194, 197-208, who notes that this letter “is the only surviving example of the 
host of letters that Julian sent out during the closing months of the year 361” aimed at making the case for his usurpation, and 
“was thus a carefully crafted political statement intended for a neutral audience in a conflict as yet undecided” (194). The letter 
therefore “allows us a glimpse at how the processes of image formation that went on in the wake of an emperor’s fall were set 
in motion” (194), crafting an official party line that would later be echoed and developed in the panegyrics of Julian’s reign (e.g. 
Panegyrici Latini 3, Libanius, Orationes 13).  
287 Constantius seems to have married three times, but only his last marriage to Faustina produced any offspring, a daughter 




not allow him to share in the tombs of his father’s family, nor did he command that he be left an 
undefiled memory (Julian, Epistula Ad Athenaeos 3).288 
Even in a missive of the (then clandestinely) pagan Julian, legitimacy is based on the blood of 
Constantine. Here, however, it is no longer the sole blood of Constantine, as the favored agent of God, 
that is determinative, but the single, shared stock of two brothers, Constantine and Julian’s father, 
begotten in turn from one and the same father. As Julian implies, Constantius had been a murderer of 
kin because he believed, in the final balance, that only one of these brothers, the one who had 
triumphed in battle as the Servant of God, could unite the Empire and pass it on to the children 
begotten by him; but Julian has now set himself to prove otherwise. The name of his own brother 
Gallus, murdered and then subjected to a damnatio memoriae, would now be spoken aloud, as Crispus’ 
had not been, and the blood they had shared would give Julian the right to rule as a sharer in the Empire 
and the Imperial office. Spoken by a pagan, but one allied by circumstances with anti-Constantian 
Nicene bishops in both East and West, this would prove one of the last statements of political theology 
issued by a member of the dynasty of Constantine. 
With this final civil war between relatives of Constantine, each appealing to blood, there could 
be little doubt that the succession from Constantine had definitively failed—as had, at least for the 
moment, Constantius’ attempt to unite the Church of the whole Empire around his sole will. The final 
result of Constantine’s political theology of legitimacy through a singular Imperial will was an Empire 
where his only two surviving male relatives prepared for war while bishops openly defied the Emperor 
as the precursor of Antichrist. Whatever the outcome of Constantius’ war with Julian, whether or not 
Constantius was able, once again, to patch together Church and Empire through another civil war and 
 
288 σφαγῆς ἐρύσατο τὸ τοῦ Καίσαρος ὄνομα, τί με δεῖ νῦν ὥσπερ ἐκ τραγῳδίας τὰ ἄρρητα ἀναμετρεῖσθαι; «Μετεμέλησε γὰρ 
αὐτῷ», φασί, «καὶ ἐδήχθη δεινῶς, ἀπαιδίαν τε ἐντεῦθεν νομίζει δυστυχεῖν, τά τε ἐς τοὺς πολεμίους τοὺς Πέρσας οὐκ εὐτυχῶς 
πράττειν ἐκ τούτων ὑπολαμβάνει». Ταῦτα ἐθρύλλουν οἱ περὶ τὴν αὐλὴν τότε καὶ τὸν μακαρίτην ἀδελφὸν ἐμὸν Γάλλον, τοῦτο 
νῦν πρῶτον ἀκούοντα τὸ ὄνομα· κτείνας γὰρ αὐτὸν παρὰ τοὺς νόμους, οὐδὲ τῶν πατρῴων μεταλαχεῖν εἴασε τάφων οὐδὲ τῆς 
εὐαγοῦς ἠξίωσε μνήμης. 
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another fratricidal conflict and another imposition of Imperial will on bishops, there could be little doubt 
that the Constantinian settlement, as implemented by Constantine himself, was at an end. Legitimacy 
through cosmic order had once again become legitimacy through force.  
Still, the end of Constantius’ reign, when it came, was more peaceful than expected. Marching 
against his cousin, preparing for yet another brutal reconquest of the Western Empire, Constantius was 
struck with disease and died unexpectedly—but not without, according to Ammianus, bringing a final 
end to the conflict by officially designating Julian as his sole successor.289 In his death as in his life, 
Constantius had imitated his father, dying in the midst of war preparations and shortly after a baptism 
administered by a controversial bishop, the recently-appointed Euzoius of Antioch. Decades earlier, in 
the aftermath of the Council of Nicaea, Constantine had sent Euzoius into exile along with Arius—and 
now he had the honor of baptizing the only surviving son of Constantine.290 Even Constantius’ alleged 
granting of the Empire to Julian reflected an underlying logic expressed many times during his reign. In 
his last act, Constantius once again made of a forced concession a proactive Imperial judgment, to bring 
unity to the world. 
Granted by his cousin the legitimate title of sole ruler of the Roman Empire, Julian almost 
immediately rejected the Christian basis of the Constantinian Empire and declared himself a pagan 
 
289 See e.g. Ammianus 21.15.1-3. 
290 See Athanasius, who writing shortly after the event in De Synodis 31.3, tells us explicitly that Constantius, “having remained 
until the end in impiety, finally in the act of dying thought it good to be baptized, not at the hands of pious men, but under 
Euzoius, who because of his Arian heresy had not once, but many times been deposed” (μέχρι τέλους διαμείνας ἐν ἀσεβείᾳ καὶ 
λοιπὸν ἀποθνήσκων ἔδοξε βαπτίζεσθαι, οὐ παρὰ εὐσεβῶν ἀνδρῶν, ἀλλ’ ὑπὸ Εὐζωίου τοῦ διὰ τὴν ἀρειανὴν αἵρεσιν οὐχ ἅπαξ, 
ἀλλὰ καὶ πολλάκις καθαιρεθέντος). Indeed by 361 it would have been difficult to find a closer or more long-standing associate 
of Arius than Euzoius, who as a deacon in Alexandria had been included in Alexander’s initial excommunication of Arius and 
denounced by name in his encyclical letter (Athanasius, De decretis 35.6) and then had faithfully shared his leader’s exile 
following the Council of Nicaea (see e.g. Socrates Scholasticus 1.24.9). Constantius had personally appointed Euzoius to the 
favored position of bishop of Antioch after deposing the short-lived incumbent Meletius a matter of months before (Socrates 
Scholasticus 2.44, Sozomen 4.28, Theodoret 2.32(31)). 
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ruling once again on the authority of the pagan gods—and within three years, he himself had died. The 
Constantinian dynasty was extinct,291 and the cosmic Empire ended. 
3.7:   
Summary and Conclusion 
 Despite the length and importance of his reign, Constantius II has received relatively little 
attention from scholars of the Constantinian age. This is in part because of the hatred shown him by 
contemporaries, and in part because his purported failures and sins have served for scholars both 
ancient and modern as an embarrassing counterpoint to the purported successes and glories of his 
father In fact, as I argue, Constantius’ failures were largely dictated by the failure of the Constantinian 
settlement as Constantine himself had created it. 
 The early part of Constantius’ reign was almost entirely defined by a succession crisis created by 
Constantine himself, who had executed his son and heir Crispus and thereafter failed to create any clear 
system of succession, instead appointed numerous male relatives to positions of power while reserving 
for himself the sole monarchical power so important to his and Eusebius of Caesarea’s theology. With 
his unexpected death, Constantius attempted to resolve the incipient succession crisis by systematically 
slaughtering his male relatives, creating a new system whereby direct origination from Constantine 
would allow his three sons, and only his sons, to rule the Empire in his name. At the same time, 
Constantius attempted to assert his own primacy within this new Imperial college through his control of 
Constantinople and alliance with the faction of Eastern bishops most associated with Constantine, that 
led by Eusebius of Nicomedia and Eusebius of Caesarea. Based on this theology, Constantius showed 
 
291 At least as a ruling dynasty. While Jovian, Valentinian, and Valens were all unrelated to Constantius, Valentian I forged a 
dynastic connection with Constantine by himself marrying a distant female relative, Justina, and marrying his son Gratian to 
Constantius’ daughter. This infusion of Constantinian blood into the Valentinianic dynasty ensured that it would continue to be 
distantly and intermittently associated with the office of Western Emperor until the death of Valentinian III and the end of that 
dynasty in AD 455 (cf. Frakes 2012). 
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throughout his negotiations with his brothers a preoccupation with maintaining a primacy in willing and 
commanding over all others, with his own beneficent will preceding all others and totally unconditioned 
by opposition. This principle was, however, hampered by the efforts of his brothers, who employed the 
bishops exiled from the East under Constantine and Constantius as potent weapons of political and 
religious delegitimization. With the death of one of Constantius’ two brothers in civil war with his 
brother Constans, Empire and Church alike were rapidly divided into two. At the Dedication Council of 
Antioch a large number of Eastern bishops, led by Eusebius of Nicomedia with the personal participation 
of Constantius, defied the authority of the bishop of Rome Julius while asserting a hierarchical theology 
of command, while Julius himself, backed by Constans, sought to have those condemned at Nicaea 
excluded from the Church and the exiled bishops’ cases retried. This conflict culminated in the divided 
Council of Serdica, which split into two councils and resulted in a remarkable anathematization of the 
entire Western Church by the Eastern delegation, who also produced a creed which, while avoiding the 
language of οὐσία, directly targeted for the first time the theology of Athanasius of Alexandria. Thanks 
to a threat of civil war from Constans, Constantius was brought to accept the reinstatement of 
Athanasius to his position of power, a decision presented in communications to Athanasius as the totally 
free, unconditioned choice of his own will, long hidden from Athanasius but now revealed as the 
originating cause behind Constans’ actions.  
 With the death of Constans in the usurpation of Magnentius, Constantius began a “holy war” 
aimed at the reconquest of the West. This campaign was quickly buttressed by the Council of Sirmium, 
in which Athanasius was condemned and deposed and a new creed was produced that affirmed in 
stronger terms than ever before the absolute priority in willing and commanding of Father over Son. 
Following Constantius’ victory in perhaps the bloodiest civil war in Roman history, Constantius was for 
the first time empowered to present himself, like his father, as the divinely-favored sole ruler of the 
Empire and the human realm. As part of his campaign to unify West and East under his authority, 
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Constantius required the Western bishops to sign the decrees of Sirmium or face deposition and exile, a 
campaign that culminated in the personal interrogation and deposition of the new bishop of Rome 
Liberius and Constantius’ triumphal entry into Rome itself in 357.  
 In 357, however, Constantius’ efforts to unify the doctrine of the Empire took a new, and far 
more controversial form with the “Statement of Sirmium,” a laconic decree by a small coterie of bishops 
at the Imperial court that purported to resolve all doctrinal controversy through a bare assertion of the 
Father’s superiority to the Son coupled with the proscription of all οὐσία-language whatsoever. This 
statement, however, provoked an immediate, violent opposition not only in the West but also in the 
East, where Basil of Ancyra emerged as the leader of a new faction of self-conscious “homoiousians” 
aimed at asserting the Son’s true divinity and similarity in οὐσία to the Father in opposition to both 
radical “Neo-Arians” and Western homoousians. Stymied by this opposition, Constantius once again 
produced a document in which he reaffirmed his support for the homoiousian formula of the Dedication 
Council while denying any association with the disfavored bishop of Antioch Eudoxius or his ally the 
“Neo-Arian” priest Aetius. Within only a few years, however, Constantius summoned two Empire-wide 
councils, Ariminum in the West and Seleucia in the East. The bishops at these councils found themselves 
presented by Eudoxius, Aetius, and the architects of the Statement of Sirmium with a new creedal 
formula produced at Sirmium and already sanctioned by the Emperor himself. Although majorities from 
both councils rejected this formulation, Constantius was able to impose his will directly on legates from 
both councils, ultimately resulting in an ecumenical creed promulgated at the Council of Constantinople 
in early 360. In this formula, all language of οὐσία and ὑπόστασις was banned in favor of the simple 
declaration that the Son was like the Father. While often presented in scholarship as an attempt at 
compromise, I argue strongly that this creed and its method of production alike should be seen as an 
expression of the Imperial model of unification presented by Constantine in Chapter One. By forcibly 
imposing his single will on multiple bodies of bishops, Constantius demonstrated his superiority to the 
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episcopate as a whole beyond doubt. Likewise, in proscribing all language of οὐσία and ὑπόστασις while 
asserting Father and Son’s status as similar Emperors associated by various forms of asymmetrical 
relationship, Constantius deliberately rendered any theology that prized divine unity and equality over 
hierarchy impossible. With no way to speak of a divine essence distinct from but shared in by the 
persons and wills of Father and Son, the bishops of the Emperor would have no choice but to accept a 
similarly hierarchical unity under the will of Constantius. 
 Constantius’ efforts were soon stymied, however, both by the continuing rabid opposition of 
self-consciously Nicene bishops, and also by the political rebellion of his cousin Julian. Appointed by 
Constantius as one of the few surviving relatives of Constantine to act as his “image” in the rebellion-
prone West, Julian had predictably turned on his sponsor and now openly accused Constantius of the 
murder of his relatives while sheltering Western Nicene bishops from his wrath. With this open division 
of Church, Empire, and the family of Constantine into warring factions, the Constantinian Settlement 
had failed. While preparing for war with Julian, Constantius died unexpectedly, to be followed only two 






























Athanasius of Alexandria, the Son of God, and the Sons of Constantine 
4.1: 
Cracks in the Constantinian Settlement 
 As argued in the chapters above, one of the principal causes of the failure of the Constantian 
ecclesiastical project and the Constantinian Settlement as a whole was bishops—not only the bishops who 
had been deposed in the new system established by Constantine to deal with episcopal misconduct, but 
also the bishop of Rome and his networks in the West, the numerous Egyptian bishops supportive of 
Athanasius through his many exiles, and even former members of Eusebian episcopal networks such as 
Basil of Ancyra and his allies.  
In the most immediate sense, the Constantinian settlement was first placed in peril by 
breakdowns of the Imperial-episcopal judicial system described in section 1.3 above. The Constantinian 
and Constantian system of collaboration between bishops and Emperor depended crucially on the 
ability of episcopal councils to depose bishops and have those sentences enforced by Imperial power 
and then accepted by bishops and the people at large. Under Constantine, this system was challenged, 
as we have seen, both by Constantine’s decision to rehabilitate unpopular figures condemned at Nicaea 
and by the refusal of significant numbers in Christian communities such as those of Antioch and 
Alexandria to accept the deposition of their locally popular religious leaders. However, under 
Constantine, while significant schisms and unrest seem to have taken place on the local level and on the 
level of individual bishops, this unrest and opposition remained localized and small-scale.  
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Put simply, no political or religious authority existed in the Roman Empire that would have 
allowed opposition to the broad and deep concentrations of power represented by diverse episcopal 
councils supported by Imperial power. Any meaningful opposition to the united front of universal 
Emperor and allied bishops would have to, like Constantine himself, bring together bishops from across 
the Empire, bridging its major linguistic and cultural divides, and at the same time have the forcefulness 
and resiliency to directly oppose Imperial power. Also like the Constantinian Settlement, to gain broad 
popular and episcopal support such a system would need to be justified ultimately in theological terms, 
with divine backing strong enough to outweigh the inherited religious sanction both of large numbers of 
bishops and of the Roman Emperor himself. This was, to say the least, a tall order. 
 Over the course of the long reign of Constantius and his brothers, the religious and political 
system crafted by Constantine would be almost totally shattered. Part of that story, told in previous 
chapters, has to do with the actions of Constantius himself and the failures brought about by the 
tumultuous political events of his reign and the theological and dynastic ideology of legitimacy inherited 
from his father. The part of this narrative addressed here and in the following chapters will be the 
formation of a truly Empire-wide episcopal counter-system by increasingly powerful and independent 
networks of bishops, many of whom had themselves fallen victim to the Constantinian Imperial-
episcopal judicial system, and all of whom came to espouse, in the end, a distinctively “Nicene” theology 
of the cosmos and political order.  
While this story will be told largely through the actions, interactions, and theological 
argumentation of Christian bishops, it also possessed more directly Roman and political valences. As 
Adrastos Omissi has recently argued, the absence of “institutional means by which to control or regulate 
the behaviour of emperors” was one of the characteristic features of Late Roman Imperial power and a 
driver behind the cycle of civil war and usurpation exemplified in the narrative of previous chapters. 
Since “the emperor’s enmity was essentially a death sentence” and “[r]ebellion [...] was the only way to 
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challenge an emperor,”1 persons or populations subject to the Emperor’s wrath or resolutely opposed to 
his policies had little recourse besides creating or supporting a rival Emperor. To effectively check an 
Emperor, in other words, only another Emperor would do. Because of this dynamic, the main means of 
resolving irreconcilable conflicts between significant numbers of citizens and Emperors was civil war—
an area where bishops were hardly adept or experienced actors. Whatever their beliefs about the 
nature of Church and Empire, then, bishops threatened with deposition had every reason to take 
extraordinary measures to placate the sitting Emperor, treating him for all intents and purposes as the 
final court of appeals for their cases and fates. In this they did little more than accede to a broader 
feature of late Roman rule, where panegyricists might wax poetic in “defin[ing] just rule in contrast to 
tyranny,” but nevertheless “did not define usurpation in any constitutionally meaningful way,” such that 
“political necessity ensured that the emperor under whom they lived and wrote was always legitimate, 
just, and a model of virtue.”2 Whatever their issues with Constantine or Constantius, in the basic logic of 
Late Roman power, bishops had neither the ability nor the incentive to directly challenge the actions or 
character of the sitting Emperor. 
The trajectory sketched in the following chapters can be understood, then, not only in intra-
ecclesiastical terms, but also as the gradual evolution of precisely those “institutional means by which to 
control or regulate the behaviour of emperors” conspicuously lacking in the Roman political system in 
general through interaction with the existing systems and beliefs of the Christian Church. It was left to 
the bishops of theological factions conspicuously out of favor with Constantius to craft a theology, a 
rhetoric, and various highly practical methods by which the reigning Emperor, sole ruler of the human 
world, could in fact be opposed, checked, and even defeated without recourse to civil war. 
 
1 Omissi 2018, 16. 
2 Omissi 2018, 21. 
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To set the stage for this broader narrative, we will begin by returning to the influential but 
controversial Egyptian bishop Athanasius, already treated in the chapters above. 
4.2: 
Athanasius 
Born perhaps as late as AD 299,3 Athanasius was only a young man when conflict broke out in 
Alexandria between the popular priest Arius and the bishop Alexander, who had given Athanasius, 
although of relatively humble origins,4 a clerical training and education5 and employed him as his 
personal secretary. From all surviving accounts, Athanasius seems to have been extraordinarily 
precocious in his intellectual abilities, as some of his principal works—including most notably the 
treatise De incarnatione Verbi, considered to this day a classic of Christian theology—seem to have been 
written relatively early in his career.6 Almost as impressively, scholars have argued that some of the key 
 
3 Most of our evidence for Athanasius’ birthdate is derived from the controversy over his election as bishop of Alexandria in 
328, which was challenged on the grounds that he had not yet attained the canonical age of thirty (cf. Epistulae Festales index 
3, Epistula Ammonis 13). Whether or not this charge was strictly accurate, Athanasius must have been close enough to thirty 
that doubt was possible (cf. Barnes 1993, 10). 
4 For Athanasius’ origins from “the vulgar mob,” see the comment of Constantius in Apologia Contra Arianos 30.3-4 (quoted in 
section 3.5 above), a basic reality confirmed earlier by Athanasius himself in Apologia contra Arianos 9.4. Cf. Barnes 1993, 10-
11, 13-14, who summarizes “The educated classes of the Roman Empire would never have recognised in him a fellow member 
of the cultured élite. He was not [...] born into a leisured and cultured milieu” (13). 
5 Cf. Barnes 1993, 11-12: As Barnes’ notes, while Athanasius had clearly received excellent training in Greek and in the Christian 
Scriptures, there is relatively little indication in his writings of a standard elite rhetorical and philosophical education. This was 
noted by the highly-educated Gregory of Nazianzus in his panegyric following Athanasius’ death (Orationes 21.6).  
6 The precise dating of De incarnatione Verbi has long been a matter of debate, based on both the clear similarities to Eusebius 
of Caesarea’s Theophania and the complete absence of any explicit mention of the Arian controversy and associated issues. The 
former factor has led to the hypothesis that it should be dated c. 336 (Bienert 1989) and/or between 328 and 335 (Barnes 1993, 
12-13, Anatolios 1998, 26-30), while the latter has led some scholars to argue that it was written prior to the outbreak of the 
Arian controversy or at least during an early period of it (Van Winden 1975), and hence at a very young age indeed, or else 
around the time of the Council of Nicaea (Barnes 1981, 206-207, Meijering 1989, 11-20, S. Parvis 2006a 60-61). 
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documents of Alexander in his theological campaign against Arius and his allies were in fact ghost-
written by his young secretary,7 who also accompanied his bishop to the Council of Nicaea.8 
 Still, Athanasius’ intellectual and theological abilities would ultimately be less determinative for 
his career than his close association with Alexander and proximity to the leadership of the Church of 
Alexandria, already before the legalization of Christianity a venerable and imposing institution with 
extensive networks of material relief and influence extending throughout one of the largest and most 
important provinces of the Empire. By the time of the Arian controversy, there were perhaps as many as 
one hundred bishops under the bishop of Alexandria’s command,9 a raw concentration of episcopal 
numbers that few if any bishops in the Empire could hope to match.10 Similarly, in the theological and 
philosophical traditions of early Christianity, practically every influential voice writing in Greek had come 
from or made his mark at Alexandria,11 in close proximity to the acknowledged center of Platonic and 
Neo-Platonic philosophy in the Empire.12 In contrast to many of his allies in the anti-Arius cause, the 
 
7 See Stead 1988, cf. S. Parvis 2006a, 61-65. This applies in particular to the encyclical letter known as ἑνὸς σώματος and 
preserved in De decretis 35. 
8 For Athanasius’ presence at Nicaea, see e.g. Athanasius, De decretis (discussed below in section 4.3). 
9 At least fifty-seven Egyptian bishops are clearly attested as directly subject to Alexandria in the period of the early 4th century 
(Wipszycka 2007, 332). At the outset of the Arian controversy c. 320, when by Alexander’s own admission there remained 
significant support for Arius in Egypt and Libya, Alexander was able to gather nearly a hundred bishops from these regions to 
join in his condemnation (cf. S. Parvis 2006a, 66). A part of the bishop of Alexandria’s unusual power came from the fact that, in 
sharp distinction to the rest of the Christian Church, the Egyptian Church possessed no metropolitan bishops, meaning that all 
bishops of Egypt and Libya were directly subject to Alexandria without any intervening structures of primacy. For a discussion of 
the unprecedented direct power this granted the bishop of the Alexandria, see Wipszycka 2007, esp. 331-342. 
10 While both Athanasius and his predecessor Dionysius showed significant deference towards the bishop of Rome, the actual 
numbers regularly available to support the bishop of Rome’s actions seems to have been rather smaller. The letter of Julius of 
Rome in 341 to the Dedication Council of Antioch was co-signed by only around fifty Italian bishops (Apologia contra Arianos 
20.3, cf. S. Parvis 2006a, 192), while the letter itself is written by Julius himself in his own person and not as a typical synodal 
letter. As the letter of the dedication council had complained (as referenced in Julius, Letter 2.8 in Thompson 2015, Apologia 
contra Arianos 26.1-2), Julius’ previous letter summoning them to a council had been written without any concurring episcopal 
signatures at all. 
11 See in particular the writings of Clement of Alexandria, Origen of Alexandria, and Dionysius of Alexandria.  




theological figure that loomed largest for Athanasius, defining the terms of his own thought, was 
precisely the same as for his rival Eusebius of Caesarea: Origen of Alexandria.13 While both Athanasius 
and Eusebius would innovate significantly on what they received in episcopal management and theology 
alike, the contrast between them cannot be properly understood until each is seen, not only as an 
innovative thinker in his own right, but also as a disciple: two rival heirs of Origen’s thought, emerging 
from the two dioceses in which Origen had resided, and hence the latest members in two distinct but 
inextricable episcopal and theological lineages. Like Eusebius, Athanasius found himself throughout his 
career deeply embedded both in an institutional tradition of theology and in institutional networks of 
power—traditions and networks, however, far older, more prestigious, and vastly more extensive than 
those possessed by Eusebius and his predecessor Pamphilius as metropolitans of Palestine under the 
ultimate authority of the bishop of Antioch. If surviving indications are to be trusted, Athanasius seems 
to have been trained by Alexander from a fairly young age with the expectation that he would one day 
play a central role in preserving, managing, and furthering precisely that tradition and those networks.  
 These institutional connections also burdened Athanasius, as it had his successors, with the 
difficult task of managing a Church extended throughout Egypt and riven by numerous internal conflicts. 
In the early 4th century, those conflicts largely centered around the Meletian schism, a conflict over the 
leadership of the diocese of Alexandria that had spread throughout Egypt. It was this conflict, in 
particular, that would provide Athanasius’ enemies with the bulk of their tangible criminal charges 
against the bishop, accused in his dealings with recalcitrant Meletians of acts of both violence and 
sacrilege.14 The question of Athanasius’ guilt or innocence in these precise charges, which Athanasius 
 
13 For the many similarities between the early theology of Athanasius and that of Eusebius of Caesarea, derived from their 
shared Origenist roots, but employed in strikingly different ways, see in particular Anatolios 2011, 100-106. 
14 For these charges and Athanasius’ defense against them, see in particular Athanasius, Apologia contra Arianos, cf. Barnes 
1993, 32-33, Lenski 2016, 273-275, both of whom, however, show a strong, pervasive bias against Athanasius. As both of these 
scholars note, nearly all of the assumption of Athanasius’ guilt in modern scholarship is derived from the corroborating 
discovery of a papyrus (London Papyrus 14) containing a letter from a Melitian cleric to two Melitian priests and providing a 
vivid narrative of violence by local adherents of Athanasius against a Melitian bishop and several monks along with somewhat 
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himself stridently denied and on the falsehood of which numerous prominent bishops staked their 
offices and reputations, need not detain us here—yet it should be said that even these charges are often 
wrongly contextualized by modern scholars, indebted to a German and Anglophone scholarly tradition 
prone to viewing the African archbishop as a “thug”15 or “gangster”16 interested in personal 
aggrandizement first and foremost. Even if every charge ever made against him by an ecclesiastical 
opponent is taken as entirely true, the proper light in which to view such acts of local repression is not 
that of private violence or criminal conspiracy, but rather of public, institutional power wielded by the 
holder of an office with responsibilities that might well give any Roman governor pause. As argued in 
previous chapters, however, Athanasius’ relationship with marginal groups in Egypt itself ultimately 
proved less determinative for his fortunes than his overtly adversarial relationship with well-connected 
bishops outside of Egypt—Eusebius of Nicomedia and Eusebius of Caesarea in particular—and his 
successive relationships with four Emperors of the dynasty of Constantine. In the absence of such 
conflicts, it is extraordinarily unlikely that the bishop of Alexandria would ever have faced deposition on 
such charges. 
 Athanasius’ place in the conflicts of the reign of Constantine and the shared reigns of 
Constantine II, Constans, and Constantius has already been covered in previous chapters. I will now 
resume our account of the formation of Nicene networks with the years following Constantius’ 
 
vaguer charges that Athanasius and/or his supporters had forcibly detained other clerics in Alexandria. While this is certainly 
indicative of a general atmosphere of violence among supporters of different ecclesiastical factions within Alexandria and 
Egypt, it is hardly as unbiased or unequivocal a piece of evidence for Athanasius’ responsibility as scholars have assumed. For 
this, see in particular Arnold 1991, 71-89, who notes that, despite being typically the only cited evidence in scholarly accounts 
for Athanasius’ proven aptitude for violence, LP 1914 contains numerous basic ambiguities in its treatment of different parties 
(written as it was by a non-native Greek speaker in a highly labored style and in reference to groups known to the writer and his 
recipient but needing to be inferred by modern readers) as well as significant hiatuses (the most important of which comes in 
eliminating any expressed subject for many of the acts of alleged violence, a hiatus filled in by modern scholars with 
Athanasius) in the document. She also points out the highly simplistic nature of most scholarly interpretations relative to the 
attested complexity of ecclesiastical events and loyalties in Egypt during this period. 
15 Lenski 2016, 273.  
16 Barnes 1981, 230. For a strong defense of Athanasius against such characterizations, see in particular Arnold 1991.  
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assumption of sole Imperial power after conquering the Western usurper Magnentius. After decades of 
unrest, the Empire, and perhaps the human realm as a whole, possessed once again a single ruler—one 
who could begin piecing back together the religious system undone by politically troublesome bishops 
and their Imperial backers. For Athanasius this was very bad news indeed, for he found himself now 
under the absolute power of a sole Emperor who had numerous reasons, from the theological to the 
political to the personal, to regard him as an enemy. 
4.3: 
De Decretis Concilii Nicaeae 
“On the Decrees of the Council of Nicaea” 
Having lost any hope of political influence, Athanasius’ cultivation of episcopal allies rapidly 
became his principal defense. There was now a new bishop of Rome, Liberius, who had inherited from 
his predecessor, during the tumultuous years of conflict between Constans and Constantius, an 
institutional mandate to defend both the Council of Nicaea and Athanasius against their purported 
enemies in the East. As part of his defense against the new charges brought against him at councils like 
that of Sirmium in 351, Athanasius wrote a work, De decretis Concilii Nicaeae, perhaps to Liberius 
himself but at least to his episcopal allies,17 that helped to grant the Council of Nicaea and in particular 
its use of the term ὁμοούσιος a new centrality both to his own defense and to the opposition to 
“Arianism.”18  
 
17 That this work was written to Liberius of Rome, in direct response to Athanasius’ condemnation at the Council of Sirmium in 
351, is the hypothesis of Barnes 1993, 110-12. Kopocek 1979, 119-20, in contrast, dates it earlier to c. 350 and posits a wider 
and more general audience, on the basis of the text’s purported influence on the theology of the “neo-Arian” theologian Aetius. 
Both hypotheses, however, have been challenged more recently by Gwynn 2006, 29-33, who dates the text more 
conservatively to the period between 350 and Athanasius’ exile in 356, and denies that an address to Liberius can be clearly 
established from the text. While an address to Liberius strikes me as logical given the circumstances (especially the importance 
of the bishop of Rome’s support during the period prior to the Council of Milan), I would agree that it can remain at best a 
hypothesis.  
18 Though if the proposal of S. Parvis 2006a, 87-89, that Athanasius himself was responsible for the initial use of the unscriptural 
term οὐσία (already a characteristic feature of his own theology but not those of his most prominent allies) in the Creed of 
Nicaea, is correct, this prominence would presumably already have existed for Athanasius himself. 
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What Eusebius of Nicomedia and his fellows had been trying for the past decades to do, 
Athanasius argues, is to overthrow the authoritative theology of an “Ecumenical Council”19 in favor of 
their own system grounded in the assertion of a true intermediate space between God and creation 
occupied by the Son as ruler of the created realm.20 As argued in Chapter Two above, in Eusebius of 
Caesarea’s theology the concept of mediation, expressed in quasi-spatial terms, had played a key role 
not only in his interpretation of the Son’s place in the cosmic order—standing between God and cosmos 
and sharing fully in neither status—but also for his interpretation of the human Emperor. Athanasius, in 
contrast, stakes his entire theology on the denial of any such space: 
But if all other created things are unable to bear the working of the unmixed hand of the 
Uncreated, and the Son alone was created by only God, but other things came into existence 
through the Son as through a servant and helper [...] how would he himself be able to come into 
existence from God alone? And if there were need for an intermediary, so that created things 
might come into existence, and the Son is created according to you, it is necessary also that 
there be some intermediary before him, so that he might be created. And since that mediator 
himself would be a created thing, again it would happen that that one would need another 
intermediary for his own formation. And whenever anyone thinks of another one, he would 
think beforehand of the intermediary of that one, so that it would proceed to infinity (8.1-2).21  
The flaw in Eusebius’ concept of quasi-spatial mediation, according to Athanasius, is that it 
posits between God and creatures an essentially undifferentiated space. For Eusebius, the most 
important figures in this space had been monarchical Son and monarchical Emperor, thus creating a 
 
19 At 4, Athanasius refers to the Council of Nicaea as τῇ τοσαύτῃ καὶ οἰκουμενικῇ συνόδῳ (“so great and ecumenical a synod”) 
and at 27 simply as τὴν οἰκουμενικὴν σύνοδον. Though Chadwick 1972 argues that this terminology dates in some form back to 
Nicaea itself, it first appears in extant sources in Eusebius of Caesarea’s Vita Constantini 3.6 and Athanasius’ Apologia contra 
Arianos 7.2, both written in the late 330s. Even by the time of De decretis, however, Athanasius employs “ecumenical council” 
not as a technical term, but as (one) way to express the preeminent authority of the council due to its large size and theological 
importance. 
20 For the following discussion, cf. that of Anatolios 1998, 109-116, on Athanasius’ challenge to “Arian” mediatorial schemes, 
while still preserving a legitimate sense in which Son and Spirit can be said to “mediate” between God and the world through 
their immediate presence in it. 
21 Εἰ δὲ ὅτι μὴ ἐδύνατο τὰ λοιπὰ κτίσματα τῆς ἀκράτου χειρὸς τοῦ ἀγενήτου τὴν ἐργασίαν βαστάξαι, μόνος ὁ υἱὸς ὑπὸ μόνου 
τοῦ θεοῦ γέγονε, τὰ δ’ ἄλλα ὡς δι’ ὑπουργοῦ καὶ βοηθοῦ τοῦ υἱοῦ γέγονε· [...] πῶς αὐτὸς ἠδυνήθη γενέσθαι παρὰ μόνου τοῦ 
θεοῦ; καὶ εἰ ἵνα τὰ γενητὰ γένηται, μεσίτου γέγονε χρεία, γενητὸς δὲ καθ’ ὑμᾶς ἐστιν ὁ υἱός, ἔδει καὶ πρὸ αὐτοῦ μέσον τινὰ 
εἶναι, ἵνα κτισθῇ. τοῦ δὲ μεσίτου πάλιν καὶ αὐτοῦ κτίσματος τυγχάνοντος ἄραρεν ὅτι κἀκεῖνος ἐδέετο μεσίτου ἑτέρου πρὸς τὴν 
ἰδίαν σύστασιν. κἄν τις ἄλλον ἐπινοήσῃ, προεπινοήσει τὸν ἐκείνου μεσίτην, ὥστε καὶ εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκπεσεῖν. 
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clear and united order for the cosmos as a whole. Athanasius’ argument against this position is a 
straightforward reductio ad absurdum, contending that there seems to be no reason why such a space 
could not or should not be filled in with any number of entities, particularly if the justification for these 
beings’ existence is the need for an interposing presence to separate the one divine being from anyone 
or anything else. Why one Son, and not a thousand, or a million? Given the essentially infinite gap 
between God and creation, only an infinity of mediators would suffice—or the power of the one God 
himself. 
In this, it should be said, the underlying difference between Athanasius and Eusebius rests in the 
fact that, for Eusebius (and likewise for Constantine), the principal divine quality of the Father that must 
be protected is his absolutely free and unconditioned willing, and only then any metaphysical 
supremacy of divinity as such. As argued in previous chapters, a totally subordinate and consequent Son 
would preserve that unconditioned willing and commanding in a way in which the intrinsically multiple, 
co-existent, and so conflict-filled cosmos could not. For Athanasius, however, the supremacy of God 
over creation is conceived of almost entirely in metaphysical terms, through concepts of absolute versus 
contingent being and temporality versus eternity.22  
It is also, and just as importantly, conceived of in terms of divine goodness (ἀγαθόν), which for 
Athanasius is as intrinsic to the divine nature as transcendence. For Athanasius, any lack of concern for 
others (ἀμέλεια) in God—such as that allegedly expressed in Eusebius’ God’s unwillingness to directly 
create, care for, be present to, and save his creation—would be a manifestation, not of transcendent 
strength, but of either weakness (ἀσθένεια) or unfitting, un-divine pride (τῦφος).23 As Khaled Anatolios 
 
22 Cf. Anatolios 1998, 31: “[T]he radical opposition between created and uncreated [...] constitutes the fundamental elements in 
Athanasius’ ontology.” Likewise, Ayres 2004, 143, correctly highlights the importance of this basic metaphysics not only for 
Athanasius, but for later writers: “[T]he deployment of such a clear distinction between Creator and creation [...] will become a 
central plank of pro-Nicene theologies in the 360s.” 
23 For this point, see in particular De Incarnatione Verbi 6, Oratio contra Arianos 2.25, cf. Anatolios 1998, 43-44, 111-112. 
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has argued, then, while Eusebius of Caesarea stands in a broadly Middle Platonic tradition for which 
God’s transcendence was threatened by direct, immanent involvement in the cosmos—thus requiring 
the existence of lesser, mediatory beings to exemplify the cosmic and salvific aspects of divine 
activity24—the basic stance inherited by Athanasius from such previous Christian authors as Irenaeus of 
Lyons had striven, in opposition to Gnostic opponents, to turn divine imminence and activity into 
demonstrations of transcendence and goodness.25 It is this fundamental vision of absolute 
transcendence made manifest precisely through a miraculous lowering of the divine to the created that 
constitutes the core of Athanasius’ theology of the Son in the cosmic and divine orders.26 If the Son is 
God in the fullest sense, he has both the infinite power and the infinite goodwill necessary to bridge the 
infinite gap between divine and created being. If he is not, then no number of created Sons, no matter 
how obedient or exalted in relation to the rest of creation, could possibly suffice to fill in the space 
between existence and non-existence. In strong contradistinction to the views expressed by both 
Eusebius and Constantine, it is precisely the extent of the Son’s salvific and beneficent involvement with 
creation, extending even to direct participation in the degradation of human life and death, that for 
Athanasius proves his full divinity beyond doubt.27  
As for the Eusebian opposition to any form of divine multiplicity, this too rests for Athanasius on 
an ultimately metaphysical misunderstanding. Implicit in the theological systematizing of his opponents, 
Athanasius claims, is the idea that precedence in time or power is sufficient to generate a relationship 
between superior and inferior the same or similar to that between God and created being. For Eusebius 
 
24 Anatolios 1998, esp. 7-13. 
25 Anatolios 1998, esp. 13-25. 
26 Cf. Anatolios 1998, esp. 26-84. 
27 See Anatolios 1998, 41-44: “In short, both the difference between God and creation and the bridging of that distance have 




and Arius, Athanasius contends, the Son is fundamentally created, but nonetheless may be called God 
and even honored like him because of his role as the first and most powerful and most perfect creation 
involved in directly fashioning and ruling the created cosmos. It is this confusion of the gap between God 
and creation with the gap between one (divine or human) person and another that for Athanasius 
constitutes the essential error in their presentation of both the persons of the Trinity and human 
persons. For Athanasius, in contrast, the most determinative reality for any being is first and foremost 
its binary participation, along with other persons, in either created or uncreated being. As Khaled 
Anatolios notes, in De decretis and elsewhere, Athanasius thus begins to “de-emphasize[] the Origenian 
hierarchical conception of the universe in favor of a much more egalitarian view whereby the status of 
all created things is characterized principally by the common factor of being created, notwithstanding 
any distinctions within that common state.”28 As Athanasius is particularly eager to emphasize about Son 
and Father, such distinctions, while not denied outright, can exist only in a highly secondary, relativized 
sense, subordinate to the essential commonality of shared being. Given this basic orientation, 
Athanasius’ polemical attack on the concept of an intermediate space between God and creation takes 
on even greater importance, serving to deny his opponents any space whatsoever in which the 
absolutely one-sided, unconditioning, will-based relations key to Eusebius of Caesarea’s cosmos could 
actually exist.29 
If this “egalitarian” conception applies to created things in general, it applies even more strongly 
to the members of the human race. As Athanasius strongly argues, the mere fact that Adam was created 
first among human persons does not mean that he “possesses anything more than all human persons, or 
 
28 Anatolios 1998, 102. 
29 Though see Anatolios 1998, 116-120, for a discussion of the way in which, for Athanasius, the Son’s eternal pre-existence 
provides the true, eternal fulfillment, intrinsic to God’s own being, of the same creative, fruitful potential also manifest in his 
contingent, non-essential fashioning of the world by means of the Word.  
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is better than those who came into existence after him” (8.4).30 Even if (for the purposes of argument) 
Adam’s status as the first man were to be imagined as granting him some privilege compared to other 
human persons descended from him and sharing in the same nature, it could only be a difference “in 
honor, not in nature” (ἐν τιμῇ καὶ μὴ τῇ φύσει, 9.1)—since all human persons are in fact directly created 
by God through the Word, just like Adam (9), and since all those descended from Adam necessarily 
share precisely the same nature (8) and (at least for Christians) the same grace (6). The fundamental 
divide between cosmic superior and inferior simply cannot exist among entities sharing the same nature 
and the same binary cosmic position, whether the Father and the Son in heaven, or any human persons 
whatsoever on earth.31 The social and political implications of this claim are potentially vast, even if they 
are not immediately drawn out by Athanasius himself. Identity of nature rather than hierarchy of status 
or priority in willing has become the fundamental principle of cosmic order, and within such identities all 
distinctions of power, honor, or position must find their secondary and uncertain places. 
The authority compelling universal belief in this, his own highly complex and distinctive 
theology, Athanasius insists, and the key to overthrowing the un-Christian system of his “Arian” 
opponents, is the Creed of Nicaea, and in particular its use of the term ὁμοούσιος, which makes clear 
that there is only one singular divine essence, entirely separate from any created being, shared in by 
both Father and Son. In this highly novel and polemical characterization, acknowledging the authority of 
the Council of Nicaea requires explicitly confessing of a view of the cosmos where any intermediary 
realm between God and creation is rejected in favor of a simple identity of nature between all those 
sharing in either humanity or divinity. On this unequivocal assertion of a binary divide between created 
 
30 τὸν Ἀδὰμ πλέον τι τῶν πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἔχειν ἢ διαφέρειν τῶν μετ’ αὐτὸν. 
31 Cf. Anatolios 1998, 32: “It is the relation between God and specifically humanity that is most important for Athanasius, and 
which he believes is of primary significance in the objective order of things. [...] Athanasius’ cosmology seems to be conceived 
in function of his anthropology, rather than vice versa.”  
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and uncreated, divine and human, depends not only Athanasius’ victory against his theological 
opponents, but also that union between divine and human οὐσίαι, effected by the Incarnation of God 
the Son, that is for Athanasius absolutely essential to the stability and salvation of both individual 
persons and humanity as a whole.32 Although only implied in De decretis, such a belief also necessitates 
in Athanasius’ view unequivocal support for him against the accusations of treason brought by the 
Emperor Constantius, which are in reality part of a subversive campaign aimed at to overthrowing the 
doctrine of Nicaea and its chief supporters in favor of a view of God and man totally opposed to 
salvation as he conceives it. In human society as in the cosmos, there is ultimately no middle ground.33  
Timothy Barnes has argued, plausibly, that this work, sent to the influential Bishop of Rome on 
the eve of active ecclesiastical conflict, was the immediate cause of the outsized role that both the 
Creed of Nicaea and the term ὁμοούσιος would play in theological conflicts for the remainder of the 4th 
century.34 From henceforth, the defense of Athanasius and the Council of Nicaea as interpreted by 
Athanasius would be the dual rallying cries of networks of self-conscious “Nicenes” found most 
commonly in Athanasius’ Egypt and in the Latin West recently conquered by Constantius. 
In the short term, however, the theological and ecclesiastical strategy innovated in De decretis 
did not require any fundamental break with Constantius. Constans, the Emperor of the West, was gone, 
but in his place the bishop of Rome had emerged as the clear institutional leader of the pro-Athanasius 
 
32 Cf. Anatolios 1998, 35-38: “[W]hat is crucial is the convergence of divine transcendence and nearness. That is to say, that God 
acts to overcome the separation of natures, which would render knowledge of him and communication with him impossible.” 
33 Cf. Anatolios 1998, 36: “The essential principle is that there is no neutral mid-point in which humanity can ‘remain.’ The two 
fundamental ontological polarities are either God-ward or toward non-being; salvation history is preconfigured by these 
ontological polarities.” 
34 Barnes 1992, 110-12. However, as Barnes himself acknowledges (59-61), it seems to have been Julius of Rome who in his 
letter of 341 (Apologia contra Arianos 21-35, Letter 2 in the recent critical edition Thompson 2015, “to the Bishops assembled 
at Antioch”) first accused the Eastern bishops at large of disregarding the decisions of the “Catholic synod” (καθολικὴ σύνοδος, 
25.1/5) of Nicaea in their attacks on Athanasius and Marcellus of Ancyra, their continued tolerance of the practice of episcopal 
translation, and in their reception of Arius, Eusebius of Nicomedia, and others condemned at Nicaea back into communion (e.g. 
23-26/3-5)—without, however, making any use of the term ὁμοούσιος in his argument. 
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and anti-Eusebian networks Constans had once patronized. The rise to prominence of the bishop of 
Rome during this conflict has been narrated in more detail in past chapters; here it will suffice to say 
that an Imperial system that brought bishops together into sophisticated networks and used these 
networks as a prominent support for Imperial power could not fail to benefit bishops of sees that, like 
Rome and Alexandria, had developed significant episcopal networks of their own prior to the rise of 
Constantine. As already narrated in section 3.5, despite Athanasius’ condemnation at Sirmium 351 and 
his lack of any Imperial backer, Liberius was able to use his clout to negotiate with Constantius the 
holding of a council at Milan in Italy, to review the charges against Athanasius once again and pass final 
judgment. To this council he sent, as his personal representatives, the Roman priest Pancratius, the 
Roman deacon Hilary, and, as the leader of the legation, the bishop of Cagliari in Sardinia, Lucifer. 
As discussed above, this council, which met in 355 with Constantius present in person, quickly 
descended into open theological conflict, and resulted in both the condemnation of Athanasius on 
charges of treason and the exile of Pancratius, Hilary, Lucifer, their allies Dionysius of Milan and Eusebius 
of Vercelli, and other, absent bishops who had refused to accept the sentence, including one Hilary, 
bishop of Poitiers in Gaul.35 Having managed to flee Alexandria rather than be exiled along with his 
allies, Athanasius found himself in a drastically altered situation.   
Constantine had been sole ruler of the Empire and had exiled him—an exile with which he had 
complied obediently, and which most of his fellow bishops had passively accepted. Constantius, 
however, even as sole ruler of the Empire, was not Constantine.36 Not only did Constantius have far less 
personal prestige than his father and a far more unstable place as ruler of the Empire, having already 
 
35 See the discussion in section 5.1 below on the reasons for Hilary’s exile. As is discussed there, I substantially accept the thesis 
that he, along with others, was exiled for refusing to subscribe to the decrees of Milan circulated after these councils by 
Imperial officials.  
36 Cf. Drake 2000, 467: “Constantine’s position, by definition, was unique. It could not pass down to his successors.” 
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been threatened multiple times by civil wars and usurpations, but he had also managed to build up, in 
part by his own ineffectual pressure over the first decade of his joint reign with Constans, a far more 
determined and united episcopal opposition. The bishops exiled by Constantius, it turned out, did not 
need to rely simply on the hope of regaining Imperial patronage—they could, in fact, openly attack the 
Emperor and gain from it. In these bishops, with their own determined theological and polemical 
campaigns and their own extended networks of episcopal support and influence, Athanasius found a 
new power to draw on. 
This was, however, uncharted territory for all parties. As I will argue, Athanasius took a fair 
amount of time to join the new strategy, pioneered by Lucifer of Cagliari, of determined theological 
invective against Constantius. In the short term, the hope of regaining Imperial patronage loomed large.  
4.4:  
Apologia ad Constantium Imperatorem  
“Defense to the Emperor Constantius” 
This work, completed at the latest in the summer of 357,37 presents itself as a letter written by 
Athanasius to Constantius38 to defend himself against the charges responsible for his recent deposition. 
These charges, as Athanasius himself acknowledges, are not theological, but political in character—the 
most of explosive of which are without a doubt (1) having instigated Constans against Constantius and 
(2) having sided with Magnentius in the recent civil war. Theology, in fact, is almost entirely absent from 
this work, which is designed rather to assure Constantius of Athanasius’ innocence and loyalty than to 
bring about any sort of repentance or change of theology in the Emperor. Indeed, despite quoting two 
 
37 See the section on this work in Appendix B below. 
38 Gwynn 2006, 37-39, is the only author I have come across to suggest that the text, at least in its final form, was intended, not 
for Constantius himself, but for wider apologetic circulation—while he may be right that Athanasius edited an earlier apologia 
for wider circulation during his exile, I, like most scholars, find the claim that the address to Constantius is fictional highly 
unlikely given the text’s straightforwardness and rhetorical presentation. 
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lengthy letters (30, 31) in which Constantius condemns Athanasius harshly and orders his deposition, 
Athanasius ascribes no wrongdoing to the Emperor at all, instead blaming everything on his wicked 
advisers and subordinates, who had obviously exceeded their authority and acted without his 
knowledge. Though these enemies are described polemically as “heretics” (33, 34) and “Arians” (6, 11, 
22, 25, etc.), their identity and the nature of their heresy is not explained, and no attempt is made at 
sustained theological argumentation. 
In my view, the Apologia ad Constantium is in essence exactly what it claims to be: a letter by a 
condemned man appealing to the Emperor, the highest judge in the Empire, for clemency. The letter is 
panegyric in tone and in rhetorical approach, addressing Constantius solely with titles such as “most 
God-loving Augustus” (1.1, etc.)39 or “blessed and most God-loving Augustus” (34.3),40 and repeatedly 
declaiming belief in his “pious forbearance” (35.2),41 “philanthropy” (32.3),42 and the fact that he is 
without a doubt “a lover of God and of the truth” (1.4).43 It is on these positive Imperial virtues, both 
personal and dynastic, that Athanasius, like many Imperial petitioners before him, relies in making his 
defense against the criminal charges laid against him: “It is because I understand that you have been a 
Christian for many years, and know from your ancestors that you are a lover of God, that I now readily 
make my defense to the charges made about me.” (1.1).44  
 
39 θεοφιλέστατε Αὔγουστε. 
40 Ὦ μακάριε καὶ θεοφιλέστατε Αὔγουστε. 
41 ἡ σὴ θεοσεβὴς ἀνεξικακία. 
42 σου τὴν ἀνεξικακίαν και τὴν φιλανθρωπίαν. 
43 φιλαλήθης οὖσα καὶ φιλόθεος. 
44 ἐκ πολλῶν ἐτῶν ὄντα σε Χριστιανόν, καὶ ἐκ προγόνων φιλόθεον ἐπιστάμενος, εὐθύμως τὰ περὶ ἐμαυτοῦ νῦν ἀπολογοῦμαι.  
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The key term of Imperial praise for Athanasius in this letter is φιλόθεος (“God-loving”)—the 
declaration of a piety that is at once personal, dynastic, and, to a degree, inherent to the Imperial office 
itself, and which Athanasius no doubt hopes will be key to his own vindication as both a Christian bishop 
and a charismatic religious expert. This appeal to the piety of the Emperor had, of course, paid boons for 
Athanasius in the past, both in relation to Constantine and (especially) in relation to Constantine II and 
Constans.45 Whatever the “Arian” or  heretical status of the clerics responsible for the charges against 
Athanasius, the Emperor himself is not treated as a heretic—and perhaps cannot be. Constantine had 
received Arius into communion and exiled Athanasius at the instigation, purportedly, of the Eusebians; 
Athanasius, though, had never charged him with heresy. Likewise, even in the recounting of Imperial 
decrees and violence perpetrated by Imperial officials, Constantius remains (at least rhetorically) above 
reproach. This presentation is clearly shaped by the constraints of a judicial appeal, but also reflects, I 
believe, a fundamental orientation towards Imperial power and the person of the Emperor that is 
consistent with Athanasius’ tactics to this date. 
Of course, in the Apologia, not only would charging Constantius with heresy be rather unhelpful 
in gaining Athanasius’ desired result, but the actual charges have very little to do with theology anyway. 
As Athanasius acknowledges, these charges amount straightforwardly to treason, based not on 
Athanasius’ theological inclinations, but on his role, in the collaborative Constantinian system of the past 
decades, as supporter, religious adviser, and supplicant of Emperors. Until his death, the Western 
Augustus Constans had shown himself a resolute supporter of Athanasius against his brother, and had 
even managed to secure his return to Alexandria against the clear wishes of Constantius;46 given these 
 
45 Barnes 1993, 35-45, likewise argues, based on a few stray references in Apologia ad Constantium and elsewhere, for an 
abortive attempt by a council of bishops to depose Athanasius not long after Constantine’s death, which was ultimately undone 
by a personal appeal by Athanasius to Constantius at the Imperial Court in the winter of 337/8. If this is true, then Athanasius 
would have even more reason to try such a strategy again with Constantius. 
46 See the narrative in section 3.4 above, as well as the letter from Constans to Constantius preserved in Socrates Scholasticus 
2.22, which, as Barnes 1993, 89, notes, “contained an explicit threat of civil war.” This seemingly well-known fact—that 
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straightforward facts, the charge of having instigated conflict between the two brothers would seem, on 
the face of it, a conclusive one. In defending himself, however, Athanasius claims that on his initial 
journey to the West he had travelled directly to Rome to appeal to the bishop of Rome, and had only 
written to Constans later, after his accusers had written to the Emperor with their charges against him 
(4);47 moreover, he never spoke to Constans alone, but always in the presence of many witnesses, 
whose names Athanasius gives (3.5-7), and as these witnesses can attest, he never spoke badly or 
slanderously of Constantius in these meetings (3.1-4). Even accepted entirely at face value, these claims 
would not entirely mollify the charge that Athanasius had in fact, both directly and through 
intermediaries, made his case to Constans to oppose the deposition decreed by Constantius and so set 
one Imperial brother against the other. The force of Athanasius’ defense, however, is not so much in 
these matters of fact as in his own character and proven record of piety towards Imperial power, which 
would never permit him, under any circumstances, to speak badly of an absent Emperor to his brother:  
For that most Christ-loving brother of yours was not so unscrupulous nor was I a man of such a 
character that we should conspire together about such things and I should slander a brother to a 
brother, or speak evil of an Emperor in the presence of an Emperor. I am not insane, O Emperor, 
nor have I forgotten the divine Scripture which says, 'Do not curse the Emperor (βασιλεύς), even 
in your own thoughts, and do not curse a rich man even in your closed bedchamber: for a bird of 
heaven will carry away your voice, and one who has wings will announce your speech’ 
[Ecclesiastes 10:20]. If then those things which are spoken in secret against you that are 
Emperors are not hidden, it is not incredible that I should have spoken against you in the 
presence of an Emperor, and of so many bystanders? (3.4-5)48 
 
Constantius had allowed Athanasius to return to Alexandria only under threat of civil war by his brother—is acknowledged even 
by Athanasius’ strident partisan Lucifer of Cagliari in De Athanasio 1.29. 
47 This literal claim is likely true, and may even reflect, as Athanasius here maintains, a reverence for the episcopal authority of 
the bishop of Rome independent of the Emperor. It is worth noting, however, that while his movements in exile under 
Constantine were far more controlled, there is no record of Athanasius making such an appeal to the bishop of Rome during 
Constantine’s sole reign, and that his travelling to Rome first rather than to Constans’ court does not actually contradict the 
idea that his ultimate intention in travelling westward was to appeal to Constans’ authority. By the time he wrote the Apologia, 
however, the support of Julius and Liberius had taken on far greater, and more independent, importance for Athanasius. 
48 Οὐ γὰρ οὔτως ἦν εὐχερὴς ὁ φιλόχριστος ἐκεῖνος, οὐδὲ τηλικοῦτος ἤμην ἐγὼ ἵνα περὶ τοιούτων ἐκοινολογούμεθα, και 
ἀδελφὸν αδελφῷ διέβαλλον, ἢ παρὰ βασιλεῖ περὶ βασιλέως κακῶς μνημονεύσω. Οὐ μαίνομαι, βασιλεῦ, οὐδὲ ἐπελαθόμην τῆς 
θείας φωνῆς λεγούσης· <<Καί γε ἐν συνειδήσει σου βασιλέα μὴ καταράσῃ, καὶ ἐν ταμείοις κοιτῶνός σου μὴ καταράσῃ 
πλούσιον· ὃτι πετεινὸν τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἀποίσει σου τὴν φωνὴν καὶ ὁ τὰς πτέρυγας ἔχων ἀπαγγελεῖ λόγον σου>>. Εἰ δὲ καὶ τὰ 
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Far from having instigated Constans against Constantius, Athanasius insists that he is incapable 
of doing anything but praising one Emperor to the other, a fact that would be obvious to Constantius if 
he could only have been present in person for these conferences between exiled bishop and Emperor: 
“The Lord is my witness of how I spoke about your Piety, and I was saying such things as God will reveal 
to your soul, so that you may recognize the dishonesty of those who have accused me before you” 
(3.3).49 Far from being guilty of treason or political manipulation, Athanasius’ piety towards Emperors in 
general, and Constantius in particular, is at least rhetorically beyond dispute. 
 Athanasius was also accused of something more serious than speaking badly of Constantius, 
however: having been a correspondent and active supporter of the usurper Magnentius.50 Athanasius 
clearly recognizes the seriousness of this charge, and devotes a great deal of space to refuting it in the 
very strongest of terms.51 This charge is not only false, like that regarding Constans, but insane, absurd, 
shocking:  
The excessiveness of this accusation confounds me and causes me much uncertainty. Believe 
me, Most God-loving Emperor, often, thinking the matter over with myself, I have been in doubt 
whether someone was so truly mad as to tell lies like this. But when this also was babbled by the 
Arians, and when they boasted that they had given out a copy of the letter, I understood the 
matter better, and having spent many sleepless nights, I have contended with those now 
 
κατιδίαν λεγόμενα καθ΄ ὑμῶν τῶν βασιλέων οὐ κρύπτεται, πῶς οὐκ ἂπιστον εἰ παρόντος βασιλέως, καὶ τοσούτων ἑστώτων, 
ἒλεγον κατὰ σοῦ;  
49 μάρτυς ὁ Κύριος, ὅπως ἐμνημόνευον ἐγὼ τῆς σῆς θεοσεβείας, καὶ ταῦτα ἔλεγον ἅπερ ὁ θεὸς ἀποκαλύψει τῇ σῇ ψυχῇ, ἵνα 
καταγνῷς τῆς συκοφαντίας τῶν με διαβαλόντων παρὰ σοί. 
50 For the usurpation of Magnentius and his war with Constantius, see section 3.5 above. 
51 In an effective rhetorical flourish, at his first implied mention of Magnentius, Athanasius declares τοὔναμα γὰρ οὐδὲ λέγειν 
βούλομαι (6)—“I do not want to even mention his name”—and indeed mostly maintains this policy throughout the discussion, 
instead substituting such terms as ὀ τυράννος (“the tyrant”), τὸ θηρίον (“the beast”), or ὁ μιαρὸς (“the accursed one”). In the 
only two exceptions to this rule, the use of the name is hardly complimentary: Τὸν διάβολον Μαγνέντιον (6) (“the devil 
Magnentius”) and τοῦ δυσωνύμου Μαγνεντίου (20) (“Magnentius, whose name is ill-omened”). In this, Athanasius was 
deliberately echoing the programme of Constantius’ official propaganda, as expressed in contemporary panegyrics (Julian, 
Orationes 1; Themistius, Orationes 3), which emphasized Magnentius’ barbaric origins and consequent bestial character.  
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slandering me and have emitted sudden loud cries and, groaning aloud, have prayed with tears 
that I might find your ears kindly disposed towards me. (6.1-2)52  
Against this disturbing, scandalous, nonsensical charge, Athanasius offers three closely-related 
defenses: (1) the written correspondence between him and Magnentius produced by his accusers is a 
clever forgery, a fact confirmed by Athanasius’ servants and especially his amanuensis, who are all 
willing to testify in support of their master (11, 13); (2) since Magnentius had overthrown and murdered 
Constans and since Athanasius had been a great supporter and friend of Constans, it would make no 
sense for him to also be a supporter of Magnentius (6, 8); and (3) as a friend of Constans Athanasius was 
naturally a supporter of his brother Constantius, a fact to which Athanasius is able to call as witnesses all 
those who heard him publicly pray for Constantius’ victory during the civil war (10).53 
In making his rhetorical case, Athanasius’ horror over the killing of Constans by Magnentius is 
expressed in straightforwardly (and hyperbolically) Christian terms: “But he, like an accursed and 
diabolical demon, raged against him. And so this happened to the blessed one even to the point of 
martyrdom” (7.3).54 Remarkably, the political murder of Emperor by usurper is portrayed by Athanasius 
as martyrdom, while Constans is referred to as ὁ μακαρίτης (“the blessed one”), a term for the dead 
known in secular and pagan circles but in this context bearing an unavoidable association with the 
distinctive Christian veneration of those deceased persons murdered for the name of Christ. While 
praise for a murdered Emperor, and condemnation of his murderer, was certainly not new, this 
 
52 ἡ γὰρ ὑπερβολὴ τῆς διαβολῆς ἐξίστησί με, καὶ εἰς πολλὴν ασάφειαν ἄγει. Καὶ πίστευε, θεοφιλέστατε βασιλεῦ, πολλάκις κατ’ 
ἐμαυτὸν λογιζόμενος ἠπίστουν εἰ ἄρα τις ἐμάνη τοσοῦτον ὥστε καὶ τοιαῦτα ψεύσασθαι. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ παρὰ τῶν Ἀρειανῶν 
ἐθρυλεῖτο καὶ τοῦτο, καὶ ὡς αὐτοὶ δεδωκότες ἀντίγραφον ἐπιστολης ἐκαυχῶντο, ἐξιστάμην μειζόνως, καὶ ἀΰπνους νύκτας 
διατελῶν, ὡς πρὸς παρόντας τοὺς κατειπόντας ἐμαχόμην· καὶ κραυγὴν ἐξαπιναίως ἠφίειν μεγάλην, καὶ ηὐχόμην εὐθὺς 
στενάζων μετὰ δακρύων, εὑρεῖν τὰς σὰς ἀκοὰς εὐμενεῖς.  
53 How true or false this charge was in reality is difficult to discern. Barnes 1993, 102-104, offers a reasonable reconstruction of 
events, in which an Athanasius plausibly expected to side with Magnentius in the aftermath of his recent condemnation by the 
Council of Antioch in 349 was ultimately mollified by assurances from Constantius into offering public support for his legitimacy 
and victory. The question of what private correspondence may or may have not taken place between Athanasius and 
Magnentius is, of course, more difficult to resolve. 
54 ἀλλ’ ὡς δαίμων τις ἀλάστωρ καὶ διαβολικὸς ἐμάνη κατ’ αὐτοῦ. Τῷ μὲν οὖν μακαρίτῃ τοῦτο γέγονεν είς μαρτύριον. 
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equation between murdered Emperor and Christian martyr on the one hand, and usurper and demon on 
the other, represents a dramatic rhetorical innovation, using Christian terminology and theology to 
embellish a longstanding theme of political rhetoric in a way that would have been impossible prior to 
Constantine—and itself almost certainly based on Constantine’s rhetorical identification of Imperial 
illegitimacy with tyranny, demonic evil, and the persecution and martyrdom of Christians.  
This traditional Christian imagery, of Constans as a blessed martyr in heaven, is mingled by 
Athanasius with the eminently Constantinian rhetoric of familial and dynastic unity, and used to prove 
his own loyalty toward Constantius: “Or how, in praying for your safety, would I not consider that I was 
also seeing that blessed one? For brothers by nature (φύσις) are mirrors of one another. For this reason 
also, because I see you in him, I would never have slandered you, and because I likewise see him in you, 
I would never write to the one who had been against him, but rather I would be praying for your safety” 
(10.2).55 The two brothers are thereby established, precisely by a shared nature grounded in a 
relationship of origination, as rhetorically interchangeable, their very different relationships with 
Athanasius reduced to the single picture of pious, praying subordinate and God-loving superior. This is at 
the same time a political and indeed distinctively Constantian picture, highly reflective of the rhetorical 
and religious emphasis on the unity of the sons of Constantine through shared origination formerly 
employed by Constantius in his public acts and propaganda,56 and an echo of Athanasius’ developing 
Nicene theology of unity and equality through nature and origination in the divine realm, which made 
 
55 ἢ πῶς οὐχ ὑπὲρ <τῆς> σῆς σωτηρίας εὐχόμενος ἐνόμιζον καὶ τὸν μακαρίτην ἐκεῖνον ὁρᾶν; ἀδελφοὶ γὰρ διὰ τὴν φύσιν 
ἀλλήλων εἰσὶ κάτοπτρα· διὰ τοῦτο καὶ σὲ βλέπων ἐν ἐκείνῳ οὔ ποτε ἂν διέβαλον κἀκεῖνον ἐν σοὶ πάλιν ὁρῶν οὔ ποτε ἂν 
ἔγραψα τῷ κατ’ ἐκείνου γενομένῳ, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον περὶ τῆς σῆς σωτηρίας ηὐχόμην. 
56 Though as Omissi 2018, 177-179, notes, Constantius seems to have entirely abandoned such motifs following his brother’s 
death, with contemporary panegyrics (cf. Themistius, Orationes 2, Julian, Orationes 1, 2) consistently downplaying the death 
and even existence of Constans in favor of a general emphasis on the unworkability of the former regime of multiple rulers and 
the consequent good fortune brought to the Empire by Constantius’ assumption of sole monarchy without the need for 
fraternal bloodshed on his part. Athanasius is, then, either out of touch or deliberately provocative in his employment of the 
motifs of brotherly concord typical of the 340s in the period following Constantius’ assumption of sole power. 
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such shared origination the cause, not merely of kinship or similarity, but rather of total identity in 
nature and properties. While Constantius’ image of familial unity had been constructed in the highly 
hierarchical terms of Eusebian political theology and had therefore emphasized his own primacy in 
command over his brother, Athanasius in Apologia ad Constantium offers Constantius an alternative 
system of natural unity, mutuality, and interchangeability among Imperial and dynastic colleagues—one 
where divergence or conflict between the two brothers, such as that which Athanasius has been 
accused of instigating, is not just wrong, but inconceivable. By drawing on both his own theology and 
Constantius’ public propaganda, then, Athanasius paints a picture whereby the unity of the sons of 
Constantine, in relation to each other and to their loyal episcopal supporter Athanasius, is beyond 
question. 
As the summaries above indicate, in his response to all the charges against him, Athanasius’ 
focus on forensic verification through the use of witnesses, whose names he frequently gives and whom 
he offers to produce himself at a future trial, is notable. This, however, is only part of the overall 
rhetorical argument, which depends as much or more on Athanasius’ construction of his own character, 
grounded on a proven piety in relation to Emperors in general and the united, interchangeable sons of 
Constantine in particular. This Athanasius is without question incapable of attacking an absent Emperor 
to a present one, or supporting a usurper against a son of Constantine, or even of disobeying a single 
authorized Imperial command: “I did not resist the command of your Piety, God forbid. For I am not a 
man of such a character as to resist the λογιστής of a city,57 let alone so great an Emperor. On this topic 
not even this many words are necessary, since the whole city testifies on my behalf” (19.3).58 Even 
 
57 In the context of the late Empire, λογιστής refers to a civil magistrate, appointed from among the higher office-holders in a 
city and acting as overall head of the civil administration (see e.g. Salway 2014, 385). 
58  οὐκ ἀντέστην προστάγματι τῆς σῆς εὐσεβείας, μὴ γένοιτο· οὐ γὰρ τηλικοῦτος ἤμην, ἵνα καὶ λογιστῇ πόλεως ἀντιστῶ, μήτιγε 
τηλικούτῳ βασιλεῖ. καὶ περὶ τούτου ‹οὐ› τοσοῦτον δεῖ τῶν παρ’ ἐμοῦ λόγων, πᾶσα γὰρ ἡ πόλις μοι μαρτυρεῖ. 
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Athanasius’ expedients of not immediately giving up his episcopal position when ordered by Imperial 
magistrates, and then of fleeing rather than surrendering himself to Imperial judgment, were actually, in 
this reconstruction, based on the belief that these lower officials had acted without proper authorization 
and contrary to the wishes of the Emperor, and therefore the Emperor himself would doubtless prefer 
for him to avoid abandoning his flock or being subjected to unauthorized violence by surrendering (19-
26, 32, 34). In response to these abuses by rebellious officials and heretical enemies, the pious Imperial 
subject Athanasius now appeals directly to the Emperor. 
Constantine had established the precedent whereby even bishops accused of civil crimes were 
to be judged by councils of bishops rather than by the Emperor directly; yet, as I have argued in Chapter 
One, this basic precedent could be interpreted in multiple ways, depending on whether the legal basis 
for the judicial process was seen to emanate from the person of the Emperor himself, the supreme 
authority in Roman law, or from some other source, whatever that might be. At least at this point in his 
career, Athanasius is quite clear about his belief in the former alternative. As he had done with 
Constantine after the Council of Tyre, Athanasius once again appeals against an episcopal sentence 
passed by a council to the Emperor as an individual, as the sole, final court of appeals for both civil and 
ecclesiastical cases, the supreme authority capable of giving unappealable commands to both ordinary 
citizens and bishops alike.59 This is not a principle he attempts to hide, but one he articulates quite 
openly: “If I had been accused before anyone else, I would have appealed to your Piety, as the Apostle 
[Paul] once appealed to Caesar and so the plot against him by his enemies was halted. But since they 
have dared to accuse me before you, to whom will I appeal from you? Only to the Father of the one who 
 
59 It is worth nothing that this was by no means even at this time a universal belief among bishops. The bishop of Rome Julius 
had already in his letter of 341 (Apologia contra Arianos 21-35, Letter 2 in Thompson 2015) censured the Eastern bishops for 
attempting to impose a bishop on Alexandria by Imperial force and permitting Imperial officials to take part in ecclesiastical 
trials, thereby breaking “the canons of the Apostles” that required bishops to be exclusively chosen by the bishops of the local 
province and judged only by Christian clerics in the absence of Imperial judges (29-31/14-15) as well as violating a “tradition of 




said: ‘I am the Truth,’ so that he may incline your heart toward kindness” (12.1).60 Though Athanasius 
speaks of appealing to God, this appeal has no legal form or consequence. It is expressed, rather, in the 
simple expedient of praying to God to guide the deliberations of the highest earthly judge, against 
whom no legal appeal is possible. To make this clear, Athanasius goes so far as to write out a prayer, 
offered by him to God, for the softening of Constantius’ heart: 
Almighty Lord, Emperor (βασιλεύς) of the Ages, Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, you have given 
this Imperial power (βασιλεία) to your Servant Constantius: enlighten his heart so that knowing 
their dishonesty against us he might kindly receive this defense, and so cause all to know that 
his ears are steadfast in the truth according to what is written: ‘Only lips that are just are 
acceptable to the Emperor (βασιλεύς)’ [Proverbs 16:13]. For in this way, according to the writing 
of Solomon, you have caused ‘the throne of Imperial power (βασιλεία) to be established’ 
[Proverbs 25:5] (12.2).61 
This is a picture of the relationship between Emperor, God, and bishop that is not at all far from 
that found in Eusebius of Caesarea. The Constantinian Roman Emperor is in fact the unique Servant of 
God, whose Imperial power has been established directly by God in imitation of his own status as 
Emperor, and who shares with God a special relationship expressed in the interior enlightenment of 
earthly Emperor by heavenly. Of course, in this instance, these tropes are employed for a very pointed 
purpose: so that God would use his intimate relationship with Constantius to ensure his recognition of 
Athanasius’ innocence—or, at the very least, so that in reading this prayer, written out at length in the 
middle of a judicial appeal, Constantius would finally recognize Athanasius’ irreproachable piety and 
loyalty. 
 
60 Εἰ μὲν οὖν παρ’ ἄλλοις ἤμην διαβληθείς, τὴν σὴν εὐσέβειαν ἐπεκαλούμην, ὡς ὁ ἀπόστολος ἐπεκαλέσατο τότε τὸν Καίσαρα 
καὶ πέπαυται τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἡ κατ’ αὐτοῦ ἐπιβουλή· ἐπειδὴ δὲ παρὰ σοὶ τετολμήκασι κατειπεῖν, τίνα ἀπὸ σοῦ ἐπικαλέσομαι; τὸν 
πατέρα τοῦ λέγοντος «ἐγώ εἰμι ἡ ἀλήθεια», ἵνα σου τὴν καρδίαν εἰς εὐμένειαν κλίνῃ· 
61 δέσποτα παντοκράτορ, βασιλεῦ τῶν αἰώνων, ὁ πατὴρ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, σὺ διὰ τοῦ σοῦ λόγου τὴν βασιλείαν 
ταύτην τῷ σῷ θεράποντι Κωνσταντίῳ δέδωκας, σὺ λάμψον εἰς τὴν καρδίαν αὐτοῦ ἵνα γνοὺς τὴν καθ’ ἡμῶν συκοφαντίαν 
εὐμενῶς μὲν αὐτὸς δέξηται τὴν ἀπολογίαν, πάντας δὲ ποιήσῃ γνῶναι, ὅτι αἱ ἀκοαὶ αὐτοῦ ἠσφαλίσθησαν ἐν ἀληθείᾳ καὶ κατὰ 
τὸ γεγραμμένον «μόνα βασιλεῖ δεκτὰ χείλη δίκαιά» ἐστιν. οὕτω γὰρ καὶ «κατορθοῦσθαι τὸν θρόνον τῆς βασιλείας» διὰ 
Σολομῶντος λεχθῆναι πεποίηκας. 
412 
 
Still, for all these declarations, there are a small number of contrary indications that would come 
to loom larger in Athanasius’ other works throughout the 350s.62 For Constantius to affirm the episcopal 
proceedings against him, he makes clear, would be not only unjust, but actually contrary to established 
law, not only Roman law, but also “divine law”: “They did whatever they wanted by themselves, in our 
absence. But the divine law, first of all, and then also our laws, declare that such proceedings are unable 
to have any force at all” (1.4).63 The trial is not entirely a matter of Constantius’ will; he is constrained 
not only by Roman law and precedent, but also by a higher, divine authority that is also, in some sense, 
properly judicial and legal.  
This point is made even more directly by the comparison Athanasius draws between the 
accusations against him, and those delivered to other believing kings of the past: “They think their 
slanders are able to prevail before you. For once upon a time the slander of Doeg against the priests of 
God prevailed [1 Samuel 22:9]: but the one who listened to the slander was Saul, that unjust man. And 
Jezebel was able to harm the most God-loving Naboth by slandering him [1 Kings 21:10], but again the 
one who listened to her was Ahab, that wicked man, who was an apostate” (20.3).64 The analogy could 
hardly be more direct, or its purpose more pointed. Athanasius, like these ancient analogues, is a priest 
of God, a “God-loving” man, falsely accused by his enemies although undoubtedly innocent. If 
Constantius listens to these slanders and condemns him, the only possible conclusion is that he, like 
 
62 Almost all of these, notably, come in the latter sections of the work (22-35 and esp. 27-35), which in the view of some 
scholars should be seen as later additions to a more thoroughly apologetic text (see the discussion of this text in Appendix B 
below). 
63 ἀπόντων δὲ ἡμῶν κατὰ μόνας ἔπραξαν ἅπερ ἠθέλησαν. τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα προηγουμένως μὲν ὁ θεῖος νόμος, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ οἱ 
ἡμέτεροι νόμοι μηδεμίαν ἔχειν δύναμιν ἀπεφήναντο. 
64 νομίζουσι δύνασθαι τὰς διαβολὰς ἰσχύειν καὶ παρὰ σοί. ἴσχυσε γάρ ποτε ἡ τοῦ Δωὴκ κατὰ τῶν ἱερέων τοῦ θεοῦ· ἀλλ’ ὁ 
ἀκούσας Σαοὺλ ἦν ὁ ἄδικος. καὶ Ἰεζάβελ δὲ διαβαλοῦσα ἠδυνήθη βλάψαι τὸν θεοσεβέστατον Ναβουθαί, ἀλλὰ καὶ Ἀχαὰβ ὁ 
πονηρὸς καὶ ἀποστάτης ὁ ἀκούων. 
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Ahab or Saul, is unjust, wicked, and, like them, not a true Christian king, but an apostate.65 Nor is 
Athanasius alone in his innocent status and persecution, as Athanasius makes clear by listing the bishops 
who have been exiled, since the Council of Milan, for refusing to accept his condemnation, including 
Liberius, the bishop of Rome, and his personal representative Lucifer (27)—though even here, 
Athanasius places the blame on Constantius’ subordinates, charging them with going beyond his orders 
by exiling these bishops to dangerous and inhospitable areas to bring about their deaths (32).  
The highest pitch of rhetorical outrage and fury, however, is reserved by Athanasius for the 
violence allegedly perpetrated on the Alexandrian people by the Imperial officials who had installed 
George as bishop of Alexandria not long before. Even after exiling Athanasius in the latter part of his 
reign, Constantine had wisely refrained from trying to appoint a bishop to take his place. Constantius, 
however, had had no such scruples, and had already attempted such a move in the 340s, with 
predictably violent results.66 Now sole ruler of the Empire, Constantius had shown no hesitation in 
immediately imposing a new bishop on an Egyptian and Alexandrian populace more united than ever in 
its support for Athanasius. The violent events that followed would ultimately take on legendary 
proportions, and accounts of them are repeated, not only by Athanasius himself, but also by Lucifer of 
Cagliari, Hilary of Poitiers, and other Nicene bishops, both in the 350s and for centuries thereafter. In Ad 
Constantium, Athanasius focuses above all on the lurid violence allegedly carried out against the 
inviolate bodies of the consecrated virgins of his diocese, which he treats as a literal reenactment of the 
violence of Pilate against the body of Christ (33)—violence carried out against God by a Roman 
 
65 This rhetorical theme, including the central place given to analogies of Old Testament kings as negative exemplars for 
Constantius, would be expanded on significantly in Lucifer of Cagliari’s De regibus apostaticis.  Similarly, Athanasius’ claim that 
the proceedings against him were invalid because they were made in his absence would become the central argument of 
Lucifer’s De Athanasio. It is in my judgment highly likely that Lucifer had read and taken inspiration from at least some of 
Athanasius’ apologetic works in writing his own defenses of the condemned bishop. 
66 For the brief, abortive reign of Gregory, extending from Athanasius’ exile c. 339 to Gregory’s death c. 345, see in particular 
Barnes 1993, 46-50, 90, 94-96. For Athanasius’ accusations of violence by Gregory and the Imperial administration against his 
followers, see in particular Athanasius, Epistula Encyclica.   
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magistrate. Though Athanasius on the surface refuses to countenance the idea that this violence was 
ordered by Constantius, it is difficult not to read his remarks as containing a clear, implied threat:  
But their worst deed of all is that, when they were rebuked by all for such great cruelty, instead 
of being ashamed, they pleaded in excuse that this was a command of your Piety. They are so 
shameless in all things, and so wicked in their intentions, since not even in past persecutions is 
such a deed as this heard to have happened. But even if such a thing has happened at some 
time, it is not right that virginity should suffer such abuse and such dishonor while you, a 
Christian, reign, nor that these men should ascribe their own cruelty to your Piety. Such an evil 
deed is proper only to heretics: to dishonor the Son of God, and to commit violence against his 
holy virgins (33.4-5).67  
However exalted his position, if Constantius did in fact order and does in fact countenance the 
violent and unjust actions of his subordinates, then the Emperor is a heretic, a violator of God like 
Pontius Pilate and the pagan persecutors of the past. It is not clear, at least here, what political or 
religious consequences might be expected to follow from such a state of affairs; but however rhetorical 
Athanasius’ construction of events, such charges might well have explosive results.  
Though he never challenges, and indeed explicitly affirms, Constantius’ right to judge and 
depose and exile bishops as he wishes, though on a surface reading he goes out of his way to clear 
Constantius of all wrongdoing, and though he continually asserts his own unconditional piety and 
obedience towards the Emperor as supreme authority on earth, Athanasius begins, here and elsewhere, 
to suggest the possible conclusions and consequences that would follow if Constantius were, in fact, to 




67 ἀλλὰ καὶ τό γε χείριστον ὀνειδιζόμενοι παρὰ πάντων διὰ τὴν τοσαύτην ὠμότητα ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐρυθριᾶν προφασίζονται τοῦτο 
πρόσταγμα τῆς σῆς εὐσεβείας εἶναι. οὕτως εἰσὶ πρὸς πάντα τολμηροὶ καὶ τὴν προαίρεσιν πονηροί. οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδὲ ἐν τοῖς 
γενομένοις διωγμοῖς τοιοῦτον ἠκούσθη πραχθέν. εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐγεγόνει ποτὲ τοιοῦτον, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἔπρεπεν ἐπὶ σοῦ Χριστιανοῦ ὄντος 
οὔτε τὴν παρθενίαν τοσαύτην ὕβριν καὶ ἀτιμίαν παθεῖν οὔτε τούτους τὴν ἑαυτῶν ὠμότητα εἰς τὴν σὴν εὐσέβειαν ἐπιρρίπτειν· 






Athanasius’ attempt at appealing to the Emperor for a revision of sentence was met, rapidly, 
with unflinching rejection. As discussed above in section 3.5, down to the very end of his reign 
Constantius remained completely adamant about Athanasius’ status as rebel and outlaw, already 
deposed, proscribed, and replaced in his episcopal duties. Athanasius, meanwhile, would spend his exile 
at liberty and surrounded by his supporters, the monks of Upper Egypt, beyond the immediate reach of 
Imperial power. This was an exile quite different from that endured by most of his episcopal allies, 
judicial sentences overseen and enforced by Imperial officials, who had the ability not only to forcibly 
remove their victims far from their own lands and supporters, but also to add to their difficulties further 
through repeated relocation and various forms of enforced deprivation.68 Athanasius was clearly aware 
of the potential negative optics created by his own successful escape from Imperial authority—but also 
of the positive optics of his association with so many venerable bishops exiled and suffering deprivation 
(to at least some degree) for his sake. Soon after his escape,69 he wrote Apologia de fuga, a short 
defense of his own decision to flee rather than be captured by Imperial authorities that doubles as both 
a rhetorical glorification of the suffering of those bishops who had not fled and an attempt to associate 
these bishops and their sufferings inextricably with Athanasius himself. The bishops subjected to exile or 
punishment are martyrs, and Athanasius himself is like those martyrs who initially tried to escape 
persecution so as to not tempt God and continue to minister to their flocks (Apologia de fuga 22, 26, 
etc.). Though of course Constantius was responsible for all these punishments, carried out, in most 
cases, following a judicial condemnation from a council of bishops, little or no attention is given to the 
 
68 See in particular Lucifer’s claims in Moriundum esse pro Dei filio about the Imperial use of relocation—Lucifer himself was 
relocated three times in the space of about five years—and deprivation as a form of torture. As both Athanasius and Lucifer 
allude to, a number of the bishops exiled by Constantine and Constantius eventually died in exile. 
69 See Barnes 1993, 124, as well as Gwynn 2006, 39-40, both of whom date it 357 AD.  
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Emperor, who is overlooked or ignored in favor of the episcopal “Arian” persecutors, analogous to the 
pagan persecutors of the past, and extending without interruption from the time of Arius to the present. 
Likewise, in his Ad Episcopos Aegypti et Libyae, written around the same time70 in order to rally support 
among episcopal allies still in possession of their sees, Athanasius, in the course of attacking in the 
strongest terms the “Arian” heresy of Eusebius’ successor Acacius of Caesarea, continues to refer to 
Constantius in encomiastic terms while charging his rival bishops with treasonable opposition to the 
Emperor’s good intentions and Orthodox beliefs (5).  
As argued above, there was, in itself, no reason for Athanasius’ condemnation by the Emperor 
Constantius to lead to a fundamental change in attitude towards either the Emperor himself or the 
Constantinian system as a whole. As generations of pagans and Christians alike had recognized, it would 
be hard to think of anything more intrinsically futile than a direct rhetorical attack on the most powerful 
man in the world—if, indeed, such efforts did not directly backfire by driving away the support of 
bishops and others whose power was necessarily bound up, to some significant degree, with the overall 
Imperial system of which he was the head. No matter how obviously adversarial one’s relationship with 
the Emperor might have become, good sense dictated that a condemned man should continue playing 
the role of the loyal subject to the end, in the hope that this loyalty might be eventually noticed and 
rewarded, or, at the very least, out of a prudential desire to not make things worse. The Emperor could 
be overthrown by a rival claimant to throne, but not seriously challenged by anything else. 
 As it turned out, however, it would be the deposed and exiled bishops praised by Athanasius 
who would shortly demonstrate, under the very nose of Imperial officials, a far greater degree of liberty 
than the ostensibly free bishop of Alexandria. As will be argued in subsequent chapters, throughout the 
 
70 Cf. Gwynn 2006, 35-37, who argues convincingly that this text must be dated to the very beginning of Athanasius’ exile c.356, 
not c.361, as has sometimes been argued. 
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time of their exiles, these bishops would, together and apart, carry out a campaign of active resistance 
to Constantius’ religious policies, drastically modifying the rhetorical and institutional norms for 
relations between bishop and Emperor in the interests of a forthright opposition to “Arianism” in all its 
forms while beginning to articulate theories of the cosmic order, its relation to Emperor and bishops, 
and its immediate implications for their own situation that were decisively novel. Lucifer of Cagliari, 
whom Athanasius glorified in his writings during this period as a key supporter and a martyr for the true 
faith, would write blistering works of invective against the Emperor, in which he would ultimately deny 
him any kind of cosmic status and any kind of authority in ecclesiastical affairs while castigating him as 
an unrepentant heretic, murderous persecutor, and praecursor antichristi. Hilary of Poitiers, meanwhile, 
would be among the first to clearly recognize that if the exiled bishops were to successfully resist both 
their own Imperial condemnations and the new, more extreme doctrinal formulations supported by the 
Emperor, it would help a great deal if the bishops were themselves united, in essential belief and in 
institutional action. It is these exiled bishops to whom we will now turn. 
4.6:  
Summary and Conclusion 
 Athanasius of Alexandria’s life and career were defined by his intellectual abilities and his 
inherited status as bishop of the Church of Alexandria, an ancient and powerful institution with 
networks extending throughout Egypt. It was these commitments, more than anything else, that drew 
him into the conflicts with Meletians and Arians that would bedevil his career, as well as providing the 
basis for his philosophical and theological thought, shaped, like that of his rival Eusebius of Caesarea, by 
the predominant Origenist currents of Alexandrian Christianity.  
Following Constantius’ accession as sole ruler of the Roman Empire, efforts began at once to 
depose Athanasius under charges of treason for having pitted Constans and Constantius against one 
another and having sided with the usurper Magnentius. In an attempt to defend himself against these 
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new charges, Athanasius wrote the important theological work De decretis Concilii Nicaeae, in which he 
sought to portray recent condemnations of him as part of an attack on the decrees of the Council of 
Nicaea by “Arian” opponents. At the same time, he argued stridently for a theological position in which 
the Nicene ὁμοούσιος eliminated any possibility of a cosmic middle ground between the created and 
divine realms and so necessitated the full divinity of the Son in status, power, and honor, according to 
the same principle by which all human persons, regardless of their order in time or their degree of 
earthly honor, shared in one and the same human essence without distinction.  
Following his further condemnation at the Council of Milan, at which Lucifer of Cagliari and 
other Latin bishops were deposed and exiled for refusing to accept his condemnation, Athanasius at first 
sought to continue his strategy of appealing to the Emperor against conciliar decisions. This led to the 
remarkable Apologia ad Constantium Imperatorem, one last attempt to gain Constantius’ aid against the 
new charges brought against him that bears, in its portrayal of the relationship between bishop and 
Emperor, many similarities to the Eusebian corpus. Athanasius’ main strategy in this thoroughly 
panegyric work, apart from documentary refutations of particular charges, is to appeal to his own 
proven history of piety and obedience towards Imperial authority in general and the Constantinian 
dynasty in particular. In this document, Athanasius explicitly recognizes the Emperor as the final court of 
appeals for all judicial cases on earth, with whom God possesses a special relationship by which he may 
be expected to reveal to Constantius the truth of his own proven innocence. In the process, Athanasius 
appeals to the principle by which the members of the Constantinian dynasty, based on their shared 
origin from their pious father Constantine, are mirrors of one another, possessed of a shared nature 
toward which Athanasius bears nothing but reverence. At the same time, however, Athanasius appeals 
to the Emperor to remember both human and divine law and justice, and implicitly threatens him with 
consequences if he is found to be actually responsible for the acts of lurid violence allegedly carried out 
against the innocent population of Alexandria.  
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 Upon the failure of this desperate final effort to gain Imperial patronage, Athanasius retreated 
into exile, where he continued to defend himself in Epistula ad Monachos and Apologia de Fuga against 
the paired charges of treason against the Emperor and cowardice in fleeing rather than facing Imperial 
judgment. While praising Lucifer of Cagliaria and other bishops who had been exiled for refusing to 
agree to his condemnation, however, Athanasius continued to refrain from open attacks on the 
Emperor, almost certainly based on the hope of one day regaining Imperial patronage or at least not 
worsening his relationship with Constantius even further.  
 During the reign of Constantius, Athanasius was driven by both ideological and practical 
challenges to produce a remarkable theoretical synthesis by which the decrees of Nicaea were 
interpreted in such a way as to absolutely necessitate the precedence of unity of essence over all 
distinctions of status in both the divine and human realms. In practice, however, Athanasius continued 
to work within the overall Constantinian system, recognizing the unity of ecclesiastical and Imperial law 
in the person of the Emperor and focusing his efforts on the gaining and preservation of Imperial 
patronage. It would be left to younger bishops, exiled for their adherence to Athanasius’ claim that 
condemnation of him was equivalent to an attack on Nicaea, to apply his theology more directly to the 







Unum esse regnum 
Lucifer of Cagliari and the Eternal Emperor 
5.1: 
Lucifer and His Critics 
 Lucifer of Cagliari (died c. 370 AD) is an anomalous figure in many ways. The bishop of the city of 
Cagliari in Sardinia, he belonged to a generation of bishops who assumed office well after the Council of 
Nicaea, bishops who had not personally experienced the Persecution of Diocletian or indeed any other 
substantial persecution, whose early lives had instead been shaped by the peace and prestige of the 
Church during Constantine’s long reign. In spite of, or rather because of this relative lack of conflict, 
however, it was this generation of bishops, more than any other, who came to radically redefine the 
relationship between Emperor and bishops established under Constantine.  
Lucifer appears in the historical record only in 353 or 354, as bishop of Cagliari and the principal 
envoy of Liberius in his negotiations with the Emperor Constantius.1 This close association with Liberius 
and the Church of Rome is almost certainly the origin of both Lucifer’s polemical opposition to 
“Arianism” and his unwavering support of the innocence of Athanasius of Alexandria—both causes that 
at that point had been championed for many years by successive bishops of Rome. It was also thanks to 
this association that Lucifer, bishop of a famously poor and backward province of the Empire, was 
enabled to meet and interact with the man who would dominate and define his career as both cleric and 
 
11 Cf. Simonetti 1998a, 279, who suggests, based on Liberius’ letter written to Constantius on this occasion (preserved in Hilary, 
Adversus Valentem et Ursacium Series A 7), that it was Lucifer’s idea, upon arriving in Rome from Sardinia and hearing the 
latest ecclesiastical events, for the Pope to attempt to negotiate directly with the Emperor for the calling of a council. If true, 




writer: the Emperor Constantius II, “precursor of Antichrist” (Moriundum esse 1, De non parcendo 21, 
25, 31, etc.). 
During the period of his and Athanasius’ exile, from the Council of Milan in 355 until 
Constantius’ death in 361, Lucifer emerged in his own right as one of the most fervent defenders of the 
Creed of Nicaea and a strictly equal Trinitarianism, one of the small but fervent party of predominantly 
Western and Latin-speaking bishops who had come to regard any break from the οὐσία language of 
Nicaea and the assertion of a single divine substantia shared in fully by Father, Son, and Spirit as 
tantamount to “the Arian heresy.” Of all this party, however, Lucifer was perhaps the most unbending in 
his rejection of all attempts at compromise or clarification—in large part, I would argue, because unlike 
most of his prominent allies in the 350s (including such luminaries as Athanasius, Hilary of Poiters, 
Eusebius of Vercelli, and Gregory of Elvira) he seems to have paradoxically had relatively little training or 
interest in speculative theology.  
While there is no doubt that in comparison to the other thinkers profiled in this study, Lucifer is 
the least complex and innovative in his approach to the Christian doctrines of the Godhead, the 
frequent scholarly claims of Lucifer’s outright theological ignorance and incompetence2 are, in my 
judgment, greatly exaggerated. Lucifer, as might be expected for a man selected out of many candidates 
to act as the chief representative of the bishop of Rome at one of the most important councils of the 
350s, shows a clear and comprehensive knowledge both of the Creed of Nicaea and of the basic 
 
2 Cf. Frend 1984, 653, who, like many modern scholars interested in theology, deplores Lucifer’s lack of “doctrinal rigour,” as 
well as Simonetti 1998a, who comments on Lucifer’s lack of “un pacato e meditato apprezzeamento dei complicati termini della 
controversia ariana” (284) and refers to his “sostanziale poverta dottrinale” (286). Likewise, Hanson 1988, 508-515, deplores 
Lucifer’s “theology of slogans or catchphrases” (515) while repeatedly denigrating his intellectual abilities. The fundamental 
discussion of Lucifer’s theological views in the context of the theological debates of the 350s in East and West is probably still 
Simonetti 1998a, particularly 285-289—acknowledging Lucifer’s polemical focus and his consequent drastic simplification of the 
complex theological debates of the period to a simple binary. 
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theological position of the Church of Rome over the previous century.3 Indeed, so far as it can be 
constructed, Lucifer’s theology is very much in continuity with his Roman patrons, based around an 
emphatic “Monarchian” assertion of a single divinity of Father, Son, and Spirit—crystallized in the 3rd 
century formula unius substantiae (“of one substance”), which for Lucifer is simply equivalent to the 
Greek ὁμοούσιος4—buttressed by a countervailing acknowledgment of the distinctness and plurality of 
divine personae in opposition to monadic theologies such as those of Sabellius, Paul of Samosata, or 
Marcellus’ disciple Photinus of Sirmium.5 Though there is perhaps no theological figure in the 4th century 
so overtly reliant on traditional formulations to make his case known, this is in itself beneficial in 
allowing us a  glimpse into the basic institutional theological position of the Church of Rome and its 
accompanying episcopal networks in the mid-4th century, unmixed with the sort of speculative 
theologizing common in other authors.6 There can be no question, however, that Lucifer’s depiction of 
 
3 In the early 3rd century, both Hippolytus of Rome (Refutatio omnium haeresium 9.6-7) and Tertullian (Adversus praxean) had 
accused contemporary bishops of Rome of heretical “Monarchian” or “Sabellian” leanings manifested in a strong, public 
emphasis on the unity in divinity of Father, Son, and Spirit accompanied by polemical attacks against rivals as ditheists. Later in 
the 3rd century, in his public censuring of the bishop of Alexandria (also discussed in section 7.2 below) the bishop of Rome 
Dionysius had, while taking care to also condemn “Sabellian” belief in a total identification of Father, Son, and Spirit, asserted in 
emphatic terms the unity and eternity of the “Holy Trinity” expressed in the principle of μοναρχία (that is, of a single eternal 
ἀρχή possessed by Son and Spirit as well as Father) while censuring as tri-theists those who “divide and tear apart and so 
destroy the most revered proclamation of the Church of God, the μοναρχία, into three powers of some sort and divided 
ὑποστάσεις and three divinities” (τοὺς διαιροῦντας καὶ κατατέμνοντας καὶ ἀναιροῦντας τὸ σεμνότατον κήρυγμα τῆς ἐκκλησίας 
τοῦ θεοῦ, τὴν μοναρχίαν, εἰς τρεῖς δυνάμεις τινὰς καὶ μεμερισμένας ὑποστάσεις καὶ θεότητας τρεῖς, Epistula 1, frag. 1, quoted 
in Athanasius, De decretis 25.). 
4 Lucifer’s citing of this formula (almost always accompanied by the declaration that it is “what the Greeks call ὁμοούσιος”) is 
both frequent and polemical: see e.g. De Athanasio 2.11, De non parcendo 18, 24, 29, 35, Moriundum esse 4, 7. It is also 
frequently accompanied by the (Athanasian) assertion that the Son is “from the substance of the Father” (de substantia patris, 
De Athanasio 2.30, De non parcendo 18, 24, Moriundum esse 4). 
5 See in particular Lucifer’s condemnation, in the context of a larger heresiological aside also targeting Paul of Samosata and 
Photinus of Sirmium, of Sabellius for teaching “that Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are one person” (unam esse personam patrem 
et filium et spiritum sanctum, De non conveniendo 9) as well as his countervailing assertion at several points that “Father and 
Son are two persons” (sint duae personae pater et filius, De non conviendo 14, cf. Moriundum esse 3). As noted above in note 
86 in section 3.4, the basic formulation of una substantia, tres personae first appears in Tertullian’s Adversus Praxean 1 and is 
otherwise attested in other 4th century Latin authors, though none employ it with as much clarity and consistency as Lucifer. 
6 See in particular the evaluation of Hanson 1988, 508-515, which, although marred by numerous gratuitous expressions of 
personal dislike and denigration of Lucifer’s intellectual abilities, also concludes that “it is wholly likely that what we see in 
Lucifer is a [...] version of the theology of Liberius.” Hanson likewise notes that Lucifer shows himself well-informed about 
contemporary historical events, even those taking place in the East (511-512). 
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the beliefs of his theological opponents is both extremely bare and overtly polemical, focused almost 
entirely around the propositions anathematized at the Council of Nicaea and later polemical 
characterizations to the almost complete exclusion of the actual words or terminology of contemporary 
Eusebian, homoiousian, or homoian belief. Even this is not necessarily a sign of ignorance, however, so 
much as of priorities. Unlike Athanasius or Eusebius or even Hilary, Lucifer has no interest in quoting 
documents from his opponents or actively refuting their theologies: he is interested rather, in directly 
heresiological fashion, in exposing in them those heretical beliefs already definitively condemned by the 
authority of the Church at Nicaea and elsewhere. Quoting the actual words of the Creed of Sirmium in 
such a context would be little more than a distraction. 
Still, this pervasive heresiological polemicism and lack of interest in speculative theology does 
set Lucifer apart from practically every other prominent theological figure of his lifetime. Lucifer’s 
episcopal allies and enemies alike, in defining their status as defenders of the true Faith and public 
experts on theology, wrote lengthy treatises explaining in the most abstract detail the nature of being, 
divinity, the cosmos, and human salvation, treatises written in philosophical style and often with signs of 
philosophical education.7 No work by Lucifer has come down to us except invective, written in the 
strongest and most abusive of styles. If Lucifer is to be compared to a philosopher, he is to be classed 
among those cynics who devoted themselves solely to moral diatribe. 
This relative lack of theological sophistication, however, makes Lucifer’s unbending insistence 
on a clear standard of theological orthodoxy, and its application to the complex relationship between 
Emperor and bishop, all the more illuminating. For the most immediate and striking thing about Lucifer’s 
 
7 As Laconi 2004, 119-120, argues, while Lucifer shows clear signs of “un’istruzione elementare” (119) in Classical Latin authors 
including Cicero, as well as a comprehensive knowledge of the Bible (both likely obtained in Rome rather than in Sardinia, which 
was famously impoverished in this period), it is unlikely he received any more advanced training. Lucifer himself in Moriundum 
esse 11 rhetorically glories in this fact, asserting that while Constantius “has drunk up the whole art of Gentile letters” 
(litterarum ethnicalium plenam hausistis artem), he himself is “foreign to all the science of Gentile letters” (alieni ab omni 
scientia ethnicalium litterarum) and “knows only the Sacred Scriptures” (nos sumus tantum sacras scientes litteras). 
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corpus, as opposed to literally every other luminary of the incipient Nicene movement, is its obsessive 
focus on the position of Emperor in general, and Constantius in particular. All of Lucifer’s surviving 
works, with the exception of a few short letters, are addressed to Constantius in the second person, 
with periodic imagined interjections and responses by the Emperor. The “imagined audience” and even 
“imagined interlocutor” of his polemic is in every instance not learned theologians or fellow bishops, but 
the Emperor of Rome. Of course, the actual or perhaps even the intended audience of Lucifer’s works 
may have been different;8 but the Imperial focus of these works goes beyond their explicit address. 
Virtually every aspect of these works, whether considered as polemic or theology, revolves around the 
personal qualities and moral character of Constantius, and on his status as imperator and rex. In 
Lucifer’s view, Constantius is the only heretic that matters—very much unlike Athanasius, whose works, 
as we have seen, were largely dedicated to opposing the efforts of the shadowy “Eusebian” or “Arian” 
clerics intent on persecuting him and undermining Nicaea, or even Hilary, whose focus on his fellow 
bishops to the exclusion of all others is at times almost monomaniacal. In Manlio Simonetti’s striking 
phrase, in Lucifer’s corpus all figures besides the twin interlocutors Constantius and Lucifer are reduced 
to “pallide ombre,” mentioned only for the purposes of constructing the central relationship between 
Catholic bishop and heretical Emperor.9 Opposing bishops appear in Lucifer hardly at all, and always in a 
subservient position to Constantius himself, while all the decrees of the councils of the 340s and 350s, 
 
8 There exist a few letters, preserved in manuscript, that purport to be an exchange between Lucifer and Constantius’ secretary 
concerning his works. If authentic, these would indicate that Lucifer at least sent his works to the Emperor, though they do not 
necessarily mean that Constantius actually read them. This evidence is, however, consistent with that contained in Lucifer’s 
actual texts, which, in their frequent calls to personal repentance, their often obscure references to Lucifer and Constantius’ 
past interactions, and their treatment in later works of indications of Constantius’ knowledge and disapproval of Lucifer’s 
polemical activities, would seem to fit most naturally with a true intended address to Constantius. At the same time, though, 
the fact that (as argued below in section 5.3) Hilary of Poitiers had read some of Lucifer’s works makes it overwhelmingly 
probable that Lucifer also intended them for circulation among like-minded bishops. As Rosen 2001, 65, points out, the 
question of Lucifer’s intended audience does bear on the accuracy or inaccuracy of his characterization of Constantius’ words 
and sentiments, since clumsily mischaracterizing Constantius to his face would pose more obvious challenges than doing so to a 
hostile episcopal audience.  
9 “Di fronte a questi due protagonisti, tutti gli altri personaggi del variegato contesto storico di quegli anni sono ridotti a pallide 
ombre, nominati soltanto come testimoni, in positivo (Dionigi) e soprattutto in negativo (Eudossio, Giorgio), di questo o quel 
fatto.” (Simonetti 1998a, 283). 
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attended at times by hundreds of bishops, are treated by him as Imperial edicts, the work of Constantius 
himself acting (at best) through subordinate functionaries.  
Whether this is an accurate portrayal of events, a polemical strategy, or somewhere in between, 
Lucifer’s total eschewal of the tradition of inter-episcopal doctrinal conflict in favor of that of political 
invective is indicative of a radical shift in the relationship between bishops and Emperor, and in the very 
idea of a “Christian Emperor,” from the days of Constantine. That both Athanasius and Hilary would 
eventually, after numerous attempts at diplomatic rapprochement, follow Lucifer’s lead in writing works 
of invective against Constantius,10 only underscores that reality. Whatever script had been created by 
Constantine for how bishops and Emperor should interact, both as fellow Christians and as officials in 
the same overall Roman Imperial system, was clearly no longer functioning. A new set of relationships, 
and a very different set of norms, were being worked out, on the fly, through the efforts of a new 
generation of bishops. 
Lucifer’s reception has been drastically shaped, not only by the extreme dislike generally shown 
him by modern scholars,11 but also by the account, first suggested by Jerome (Altercatio luciferiani et 
 
10 While the question of whether any of these authors were directly influenced by each other in writing their polemic, or 
whether their similarities are due to other factors, is difficult to establish with certainty (cf. Flower 2013 123-124), Lucifer does I 
believe possess a clear priority both temporally and in the directness of his attacks. Hilary’s In Constantium, his only polemical 
attack on Constantius, has to have been written in 360 or later (see Flower 2016 29-31 as well as Appendix B below), and was 
preceded by a basically panegyrical appeal to Constantius, Ad Constantium. In addition, Lucifer directly attacked Hilary’s 
conciliatory De Synodis in what is probably one of his earliest invectives addressed to Constantius, De Athanasio 1.33, dated 
(see Appendix B) most likely to 357 or 358; and Hilary would later respond to Lucifer’s criticisms by name in Apologetica ad 
reprehensores libri De Synodis responsa 3, in the process revealing knowledge of at least part of Lucifer’s own corpus (see 
section 6.3 below). Athanasius’ main polemical work against Constantius, Historia Arianorum, while it can only be dated with 
confidence to the period of Athanasius’ exile between 356 and 362, should, I believe, be dated to the period of 360-361 (see 
Appendix B), and was preceded or paralleled by a much more conciliatory defense addressed to Constantius (Apologia ad 
Constantium Imperatorem). Athanasius also refers to Lucifer by name several times in Historia Arianorum (33.6, 41.1, 46.3, 
76.3), the later books of which use very similar terminology and themes in their characterization of Constantius (see section 7.3 
below). All this makes fairly clear, in my judgment, Lucifer’s importance as the primary innovator and driver behind direct 
attacks on Constantius and the Imperial office from the emerging Nicene episcopal party.  
11 For surveys of the pervasive negative animus against Lucifer shown by modern scholars, see in particular Castelli 1998, as 
well as Flowers 2013 85 n.26. This overwhelming negative consensus is perhaps best summed up by the bon mot of Hanson 
1988, n. 4: “Almost everybody who writes about Lucifer finds him an intolerable bore and bigot except G.F. Diercks”—a 
scholarly discipline of one added to in more recent years by the Italian scholar Sonia Laconi and Richard Flowers, all of whom 
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orthodoxi 20), that he broke communion with the main body of bishops after the reign of Constantius 
out of outrage over the rehabilitation, by the Council of Alexandria in 362, of bishops who had 
submitted to the formulas of Seleucia, Ariminum, and Constantinople. According to this narrative, 
Lucifer subsequently founded, or at least was associated with, a group called the “Luciferians,” 12 who 
appear in Western ecclesiastical sources in the 380s, solely or principally as a small body of schismatics 
present within the city of Rome and its immediate environs, and as such were attacked not only by 
Jerome but also by Ambrose (De excessu fratris sui Satyri 1.47) and Augustine (De haeresibus ad 
Quodvultdeum 81), though neither of them give a clear account of the group’s origins other than 
associating it with Lucifer.  
Later ecclesiastical historians offer a somewhat more complicated narrative. Rufinus, the 
earliest of the ecclesiastical historians to write about this period and the only one alive at the time of the 
actual events, reports that Lucifer’s representative at the Council of Alexandria did in fact subscribe to 
its acts, including its treatment of repentant bishops, and then merely goes on to state that Lucifer, 
while not explicitly disavowing his legate, “maintained a judgment (sententia) different from the rest, 
but pleasing to himself” (1.39),13 not changing his mind before his death less than ten years later. 
Though he goes on to treat this action of Lucifer’s as the origins of the schism of the Luciferians, Rufinus 
does not assert that Lucifer led such a schism personally. Socrates Scholasticus, whose account is 
dependent on Rufinus’, ascribes Lucifer’s displeasure over the Council of Alexandria merely to a grudge 
against his erstwhile ally Eusebius of Vercelli, and is explicit that Lucifer himself, although for a short 
 
will be frequently quoted in the pages below. Not only has this pervasive bias drastically reduced the amount of scholarship on 
Lucifer, it has also rendered much of this scholarship all but useless for anything but deprecatory purposes. 
12 It is worth pointing out, however, that according to one of our very few documents from the Luciferians of the 380s, they 
themselves rejected the name as a canard (Libellus precum 86). 
13 Erga caeteros sententiam disparem, sed sibi placitam custodiret. 
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period of time he broke communion with Eusebius and thereby originated the Luciferian schism, 
eventually let the subscription of his legate stand and submitted to the decisions of the council, 
remaining in communion with his fellow bishops and having no further association with the schismatic 
Luciferians (Historia ecclesiastica 3.9). 
The question of what association (if any) the later “Luciferians” had with Lucifer himself, as well 
as how the conflicting accounts of his conflicts with fellow Nicene bishops after the death of Constantius 
are to be understood and/or reconciled, continues to be a vexed one in scholarship.14 While resolving 
this question is well beyond the scope of the present study, there is in my judgment no conclusive 
reason, either from his corpus or out of it, to associate Lucifer with a marginal group attested well after 
his death outside the regions in which he was most active. Indeed, as we will see, for all his alleged 
reputation as the most radical and uncompromising of the Nicenes of the 350s, Lucifer’s emphasis on 
the authority and unity of the Church, reverence for Athanasius’ sanctity and judgment, conspicuous 
lack of interest in assigning responsibility or blame to episcopal opponents, and explicit, repeated 
emphasis on the perpetual possibility offered to even the most wicked heretics of true repentance 
leading to a restoration of grace and office, make any such conclusion in my view extremely unlikely.  
 
14 For general surveys of the evidence and scholarship, see Diercks 1978, xxxi-xxxv, Simonetti 1998a, 289-295, Shuve 2014, 254-
262, and Whiting 2019, 10-14. As Shuve 2014, 254-262, argues, the existence of a clear “Luciferian” faction can only be reliably 
attested during the 370s and 380s in the city of Rome and its immediate environs, supporting two successive schismatic bishops 
of Rome and appealing to the great figures of the past “Arian” struggle, including Lucifer of Cagliari and Gregory of Elvira, as 
indicators of their Orthodoxy. As Whiting 2019, 11-16, points out, most of the 5th century ecclesiastical historians are less 
interested in these (then-extinct) Luciferians as in Lucifer’s alleged responsibility for the continuance of the schism in Antioch, 
for which his association with another extinct schism elsewhere serves as a helpful (negative) contextualization for his actions. 
Notably, the Antiochene bishop Theodoret (Historia ecclesiastica 3.4-5), while he regards Lucifer as a heretic and the founder of 
the (now-extinct) Luciferians, does not mention the Council of Alexandria at all, or the issue of the acceptance or rejection of 
repentant bishops there, but focuses all his attention on what he regards as Lucifer’s responsibility for ordaining Paulinus at 
Antioch and so perpetuating the divide between Eustathians and followers of his hero Meletius. Given Meletius’ appointment 
by Constantius following the Council of Constantinople and the absence as of 362 of any evidence of even the limited 
“repentance” and adherence to a Nicene position demanded by the Council of Alexandria—a reality underscored by the 
eventual support offered to Paulinus’ claim by Athanasius, Jerome, the bishop of Rome Damasus, and the bulk of the Latin 
episcopate—Lucifer’s decision to ordain Paulinus in preference to Meletius need not be a sign of any particular radicalism on 
his part. In the context of the 5th century, however, Lucifer makes a helpful scapegoat for the whole affair. 
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Whatever the truth of Lucifer’s career following the death of his great enemy Constantius, 
however, the relevance of these later events to our topic is found in the straightforward fact that, very 
much unlike Hilary and Athanasius, who would be remembered as venerable saints and heroic Fathers 
of the Church, Lucifer would ultimately, on the basis of the authority of the great Latin Fathers of the 
next generation, go down in Christian history as a schismatic, the founder of a sect, outside the bounds 
of the ecclesia sancta and catholica fides his polemical works are dedicated to defending. The obscuring 
effect of this controversial legacy—combined with the general dislike of modern scholars for bishops 
writing political invective— has, I believe, gone a long way towards burying the true importance of 
Lucifer in the ecclesiastical conflicts of the 350s. It is my judgment, in fact, that in the context of the 350s 
Lucifer’s importance for the development of the new Nicene faction that would ultimately triumph, and 
of the theological and political norms that would govern that faction and therefore later generations of 
Christian bishops and Emperors, can hardly be overstated.15  
In this development, a central position must be given to the creation, by Lucifer and his 
contemporaries, of a totally new form of anti-Imperial invective16—a form by its very nature based 
around the offices and statuses of a Christian bishop relating to an at least nominally Christian 
Emperor.17 In attacking a sitting Emperor in print as a tyrannus morally unfit to rule due to his heretical 
 
15 Treatments of Lucifer’s importance in scholarship have generally followed the particular focus of the scholar in question: 
George Hunston Williams, focused on the evolution of the role of bishops and Church-State relations, grants Lucifer’s a central 
place in the debates of the 4th century (Williams 1951), as does Sonia Laconi, even in the larger context of the ideas of the 
relationship between Church and State throughout Christianity’s 2000-year history (Laconi 2001, esp. 62, Laconi 2004, passim); 
Manlio Simonetti, however, interested primarily in the substantive evolution of Trinitarian theology, gives him relatively short 
shrift (see Simonetti 1998a, Simonetti 1998b). 
16 As Richard Flower points out, prior to the reign of Constantius and the work of Lucifer and his contemporaries, there exist no 
extant examples of invective dedicated to attacking a living and reigning Emperor and addressed to him (Flower 2013, 123, 
Flower 2016, 37). 
17 As Laconi 2004, 87-88, 169-182, argues, while Lucifer’s invective is based to a degree on the Roman judicial form of the 
vituperatio (especially as made use of by Cicero and according to the Late Roman model of invective against Imperial usurpers), 
many of the distinctive elements of his rhetoric are drawn from the anti-heresiological and martyrological traditions of earlier 
Christian authors.  
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beliefs, vicious moral character, and legal violations, Lucifer was going literally where no man had gone 
before, and in the process directly contradicting many of the most basic assumed norms of Roman rule. 
As the author of a recent, comprehensive study of legitimacy in the Roman world has straightforwardly 
declared, in the complex web of negotiations that made up Roman Imperial power, “[n]o Roman writer 
could declare his own emperor illegitimate or question his right to rule”18 and “to criticize the emperor 
was an utter impossibility.”19 This Lucifer did—and has received little or no credit, either in Christian 
tradition or contemporary scholarship, for doing. 
A bishop allying with or advising the Emperor on the basis of his knowledge of the episcopate or 
of Christian theology, as many bishops had done over the previous decades, was one thing—a bishop as 
a public moral and theological (and hence unavoidably political) critic of the reigning Emperor is quite 
another. In the development of this radically novel political act and genre, Lucifer must be treated as of 
primary importance. Athanasius and Hilary, or Eusebius of Caesarea and Eusebius of Nicomedia, were 
better theologians, better potential advisers for an Emperor interested in skillfully managing the 
relationship between bishops and Emperor, Imperial office and theological doctrine. Lucifer, however, is 
dedicated to one thing and one thing only: authoritatively admonishing the Emperor for his sins. 
Indeed, the most immediately notable thing about Lucifer’s works of theological polemic is how 
little space he devotes to actually defending or explaining his own theological views or attacking those 
of his enemies; for Lucifer, the difference between heresy and catholica fides is straightforward enough 
that the necessity of holding to one and rejecting the other can be put almost entirely in moral terms. 
Lucifer does not seek to intellectually persuade Constantius to hold particular beliefs as opposed to 
others; he seeks rather to morally admonish him to stop sinning by agreeing with the Arriani haeretici 
 
18 Omissi 2018, 28. 
19 Omissi 2018, 32. 
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rather than the sancta ecclesia, to stop spreading that heresy and to stop persecuting him and his fellow 
Catholici. This unbending polemical focus is, I believe, actually enormously helpful for this study’s goal of 
discerning the connection between 4th century Christian theology and practical political life. For almost 
all of Lucifer’s efforts are focused on the question of the appropriate way for him, as both a bishop and a 
proponent of the true faith, to relate to Constantius, as both Emperor and heretic. Here, in these works, 
theology and practical politics become almost indistinguishable. If the question of how and in what 
terms and to what degree an Emperor ought to be obeyed is ultimately a theological or even ecclesial 
question, capable of being taught by bishops and put into effect immediately as a matter of 
straightforward religious duty, then the terms on which Roman Imperial authority, the delicate balance 
between rulers and subjects in the ancient world, is to be negotiated have radically and permanently 
shifted. No previous Roman or Christian precedent can fully account for this change.  
Nevertheless, I do in fact believe there is a clear, direct connection between Lucifer’s treatment 
of Imperial and episcopal authority and his rigid Nicene theology. Even in the passages where Lucifer 
describes the more abstract Nicene beliefs he is urging on Constantine, he does so in terms that are 
highly politically charged, focusing above all on the equality and fundamental oneness of the potestas 
and maiestas of Father and Son, and the closeness, presence, and urgency of the regnum, imperium, 
and lex of Christ (and therefore God) embodied in the Church, its bishops, and Lucifer himself. As I will 
argue in the pages below, Lucifer’s Nicene beliefs, as presented by the man himself, boil down to the 
frequent assertion of the total identity of the divine power shared in by multiple persons, and the direct 
presence of that power on earth through the Church and its functionaries. The power held by divine 
Father is not merely responsible for or analogous to that held by the Son: it is one and the same power, 
authority, divinity, and Empire, with no possibility of division or even distinction. This one cosmic and 
divine power is fully and immediately present on earth in the human Son and in his human and social 
and political institution the Church: and whatever power Lucifer and Constantius wield can exist only 
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within that singular kingdom, at the pleasure of its one, divine Emperor. Inasmuch as Constantius or 
Lucifer oppose that Emperor, transgress his laws, attack his majesty, their power ceases to have any real 
basis at all, becoming something that is not really political authority at all, but only its perverse, Satanic 
parody. 
This presentation of theology, it must be emphasized, is political not merely in its consequences, 
but in its fundamental nature. God the Father has a certain way of relating to the Son and Spirit, and 
therefore to the cosmos, human society, and human imperium; and within that cosmos, within that 
order and that set of relations, Lucifer and his opponent must find their respective places, as rebel, 
prophet, heretic, Emperor, bishop, tyrant, teacher, or martyr. 
5.2: 
Quia absentem nemo debet iudicare nec damnare sive De Athanasio20 
“That No One Ought to Judge or Condemn Anyone In Absentia, or, On Athanasius” 
Although Lucifer is often accused (not unjustly) of monotony in his numerous overlapping 
attacks on Constantius,21 there are, I would argue, important differences among, and an important 
logical progression through, the various works of his corpus, both in how the Emperor is characterized, 
and in how Lucifer characterizes himself and his own moral duties in response to purported Imperial 
heresy.22 
 
20 A variety of descriptive titles have been given to this work in manuscripts and printed editions (including not only these two 
but also Ad Constantium Imperatorem pro Athanasio, De Sancto Athanasio, and others). The normative use of these two titles, 
drawn from the two surviving codices, is established in the most recent critical edition, Diercks 1978. In the pages that follow, I 
will generally refer to this work by the shorter of the two titles, De Athanasio. 
21 Cf. Hanson 1988, 323, who complains that Lucifer writes in “one continued shrill monotone of abuse.” 
22 In examining these works, I will be following the basic ordering given in the manuscripts. Though my argument does not 
depend on it, I concur with the basic judgment of Diercks 1978, xxiv-xxv, that, with the possible exception of the placement of 
De Athanasio, which may be more thematic than literal, no compelling argument has yet been advanced that would reject the 
manuscript ordering as a basic chronological guideline. For a more detailed discussion of the chronology and ordering of all of 
Lucifer’s works, see Appendix B below. 
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The longest and most comprehensive of all of Lucifer’s works, De Athanasio provides a helpful 
lens with which to view his corpus and genre as a whole. Like the rest of Lucifer’s works, De Athanasio is 
presented not as an aggressive attack, but as a response to a quoted challenge put into the mouth of 
Constantius, then buttressed with further arguments and responses also presented, on a surface 
reading, as quotations of the Emperor. This basic Constantian challenge is never simpler than in De 
Athanasio, where it is put most immediately, not as an argument, but as a command: “You said: 
‘Condemn Athanasius.’” (1.6).23  
 The imagined dialogue between bishop and Emperor begins, then, with a scene that for all 
intents and purposes is entirely literal and historical: Lucifer, as representative of Liberius of Rome, in 
the Imperial palace of Milan and the personal presence of Constantius, with the Emperor commanding 
the condemnation of Athanasius and the Sardinian bishop refusing. This basic Imperial-episcopal 
dynamic in a sense does little more than recapitulate the basic ideology of precedence in will espoused 
by Constantine, Eusebius, and Constantius, and responded to in the same basic way by many clerics of 
the past decades, including not only Athanasius but Arius and Eusebius of Nicomedia. Refusal of the 
Emperor’s immediate commands, particularly in the context of an attempt to inform the Emperor more 
fully, need not constitute a denial of his authority, and might even lay the groundwork, as it had for 
Arius and Eusebius, for an eventual turnabout in one’s favor. Beginning in De Athanasio, however, 
Lucifer begins to lay the groundwork for an extremely different approach to construing and responding 
to Imperial power—one grounded in a highly different conceptualization of both human and divine 
willing and clerical and political authority.  
It is this immediate historical context of Lucifer and Constantius’ introduction at Milan that is 
largely responsible, I believe, for the most anomalous quality of De Athanasio within Lucifer’s corpus. It 
 
23 Dixisti: damnate Athanasium. 
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is here and here alone that we see the introduction of another foreground character into the otherwise 
intimate conversation between bishop and the Emperor of Rome, related in substantive ways with both 
Constantius and Lucifer: Athanasius of Alexandria. 
On a surface reading, De Athanasio is intended, like Apologia ad Constantium, to function as a 
legal defense of Athanasius against the charges brought against him by Constantius. In strong contrast 
to Athanasius’ earlier efforts at self-exculpation, however, Lucifer does not mention, let alone address, 
any of the actual charges made against him at any of his councils or trials over the preceding three 
decades. His only answer to these is the simple assertion, repeated without corroboration over and over 
again throughout both works, that Athanasius is an innocent man: “You say [...] ‘Condemn him whom 
you know to be innocent’” (1.7).24 Indeed, Lucifer ultimately spends the bulk of De Athanasio not 
defending Athanasius, but attacking Constantius, using numerous polemical means to characterize his 
proceedings as wicked, illegitimate, and even Satanic in motivations, methods, and outcome. This is 
certainly not the typical strategy for appeals to a sitting Emperor. 
In dealing with this Imperial and episcopal judicial proceeding, Lucifer appeals, not to the 
Emperor’s proven history of beneficence and justice, or even to the codices of Roman law, but to the 
Christian Scriptures. A large proportion of De Athanasio is taken up with extensive Scriptural quotations 
on the topics of justice and judgment, from the Law of Moses, Job, Tobit, and the Jewish Prophets.25 In 
this as in his other works, Lucifer gives pride of place to Scriptural passages that allow him to draw 
analogies, direct or implicit, between Constantius, Lucifer, and Athanasius on the one hand, and various 
 
24 dicas [...]: damnate eum, quem scitis innocentem. 
25 As Richard Flower points out, the use, in a new genre of Christian invective, of Scriptural quotations in the place of the 
pervasive classical allusions employed by previous generations of orators “united the author and his readership in a shared 
literary community that stretched across the empire; a community where the possession and display of this Christian literary 
learning acted as a new symbol of status and authority for a new Christian Empire” (Flower 2013, 18), while at the same time 
creating a new, Christian sense of the past to replace that used in pagan rhetoric (Flower 2013, 106-117).  
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exemplars, positive and negative, on the other.26 As Richard Flower has argued,27 this extensive use of 
Scripture—through direct quotations, explicit citations and comparisons, and indirect allusions—played 
an absolutely essential role for Lucifer and his fellow 4th century polemicists in associating their own 
personal authority, causes, arguments, and even literary works with the divine authority believed by 
Christians to inhere in the Bible: “[By] using the words of Scripture [...] they also became imitators of the 
authors of the Bible, by writing texts that were, at least to some extent, biblical.”28 Here and elsewhere, 
Lucifer’s Biblical quotations are organized essentially by book29—Lucifer drawing every possible relevant 
analogy from, say, the book of Habakkuk (1.35-36) before proceeding to Zephaniah (1.36) and then 
Zechariah (1.37) and so on—although Lucifer’s standards for “relevancy” are rather more promiscuous 
here than in any other book, as well as somewhat less polemical.  
The main argument that gradually emerges through the quotation and analysis of these 
passages is, put simply, that since Athanasius is in fact innocent, a holy man of God and a bishop 
appointed through his will, and since Constantius is clearly motivated in his persecution of this holy man 
by a desire to promote heresy, it is therefore wrong, a violation of divine law and a matter of grave 
sinfulness productive of divine wrath and disfavor both in this life and the next, for Constantius to 
charge Athanasius with wrongdoing, compel Lucifer and his fellow bishops to condemn him, and use 
violence to carry this sentence into effect—and it would be equally wrong for Lucifer and his fellow 
 
26 Regarding this prominent use of exempla and its roots in earlier non-Christian discourse, see in particular Flower 2013, 24-25, 
as well as Rapp 2010. 
27 See in general Flower 2013, 178-219, as well as further discussion throughout.  
28 Flower 2013, 183. 
29 As Diercks 1978, cv-cvi, and Flower 2013, 110-111, note, the citations in De Athanasio follow the order of the Old Testament, 
proceeding from the Torah through the historical books to the prophets, maintaining the order even of individual books. This 
makes De Athanasio a sort of “compendium” for Lucifer’s Scriptural exempla, as well as for the Vetus Latina text used by him. 




bishops to join with Constantius by condemning Athanasius under his orders. As an argument for 
Athanasius’ innocence, this is obviously circular. Yet Lucifer’s goal in quoting the Biblical counsels on 
justice is not to convince Constantius of Athanasius’ innocence, but rather to impress upon Constantius 
(and any other readers) the sheer gravity of the sin constituted by uncanonical proceedings against a 
innocent man of God, as well as the horror of the inevitable divine punishment sure to follow from it.  
Lucifer does, however, offer at least a sketch of a more judicial and legal (though equally 
partisan) case against the condemnation of Athanasius, one essentially identical to that offered by the 
successive bishops of Rome Julius and Liberius. His first point, and the one he repeats most often, is that 
the proceedings against Athanasius are immoral because bishops have been asked to condemn 
Athanasius “absent and unheard” (1.1, et passim)—that is, without being permitted to offer any word in 
his own defense.30  
As always, however, Lucifer’s Constantius is by no means a mere passive recipient of Lucifer’s 
teaching, but a pressing, insistent theological combatant in his own right. To Lucifer’s quotation of 
Scriptures and insistence on the illegitimacy of legal proceedings carried out in the absence of the 
accused, “Constantius” responds with Scriptural quotations of his own, pointing out that the Apostle 
Paul judged and punished a member of the Corinthian community while absent (1 Corinthians 5:1-5). To 
this challenge Lucifer in turn retorts that since both Constantius and his witnesses are heretics, 
motivated by personal hostility towards Athanasius and his doctrinal beliefs, their evidence and 
 
30 As Laconi 2004, 83-84, notes, by his extended emphasis on this point, Lucifer is not only strongly affirming long-standing 
practices of Roman legal procedure, but also explicitly backing up principles of Roman positive law with the authority of divine 
law: “pertanto, difendendo il diritto divino, Lucifero difendeva anche il diritto positivo” (84). Lucifer’s use of this legal principle 
as the crux of his defense of Athanasius was also likely influenced by his long association with the Church of Rome, where the 
same basic principle had been made a key part of the defense of Athanasius offered by successive bishops of Rome going back 
at least to the letter of Pope Julius I in 341 (given in Athanasius, Apologia contra Arianos 21-35 and as Letter 2 in the recent 
edition of Thompson 2015; see esp. section 27.4-5/10). 
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authority are inadmissible in a Catholic assembly (2.12).31 Underscoring the illegitimacy of Constantius’ 
case, Lucifer asserts that the Emperor is in truth seeking not merely Athanasius’ deposition, but his 
physical harm, even his murder: “Why, as though we were gladiators, not bishops, were you laboring so 
that we might be able, only for your desires, to kill the man for whose blood you had been thirsting after 
for a long time?” (2.12).32 Like Liberius at his interrogation, Lucifer straightforwardly charges Constantius 
with bias and personal animus against Athanasius—an animus only underscored by his apparent 
willingness to apply capital punishment to a Christian cleric and his followers. All of these irregularities 
render the episcopal and conciliar condemnations of Athanasius thus far, in Lucifer’s view, entirely null 
and void.  
These essentially legal obstacles can, however, be overcome. As Lucifer acknowledges, it would 
be possible to have a conciliar trial of Athanasius, with some form of involvement by Constantius, where 
proper procedure was observed and the outcome was valid: “You, darkness, why did you refuse us when 
we said ‘We will go, at our own expense, to the man himself, we will hear him in the midst of the people 
for whom he was divinely appointed, only provide Catholic accusers according to the commandment of 
the sacred law’?” (2.12).33 This is of course a reference to the proposal of Liberius of Rome, which Lucifer 
had personally presented to the Emperor at Milan, but which the Emperor had on this and other 
 
31 That Lucifer allows even the possibility of a comparison in the scope and nature of authority between Constantius the 
Emperor and the Apostle Paul is nonetheless striking, though here the comparison relies in part on the fact that, according to 
the norm established by Constantine, Constantius’ judicial authority over bishops is exercised only in tandem with, or by means 
of, an assembly of bishops. This is implicit even in Constantius’ imagined description of the event: dicis, credo: et ego idcirco 
uobis mandaueram damnare absentem, quia damnauerat et apostolus (2.12)—“You say, I believe: ‘I also for that reason have 
commanded you to condemn him while absent, because the Apostle also condemned a man while absent.’” Constantius 
commands (mandare) the assembly of bishops, but they are the ones who actually condemn (damnare). Still, both in its 
treatment of the Emperor as analogous to the Apostle Paul and in its portrayal of the Emperor acting by means of assemblies of 
bishops this picture hews closely to the Constantinian legal and theological picture examined in sections 1.4 and 1.5 above. 
32 cur, tamquam gladiatores non episcopi essemus, tantum iuxta uota tua quo possemus interficere eum, cuius tu olim sitiebas 
cruorem, operam dabas? 
33 tu, tenebra, cur nobis dicentibus: ad ipsum nos nostris inpendiis pergemus, in plebe cиi diuinitus constitutus est eundem 
audiemus, tantum da catholicos accusatores secundum sacrae legis mandatum, cur detrectasti? 
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occasions refused to countenance.34 In his basic case for Athanasius, then, Lucifer does little more than 
continue the institutional policy of his sponsor, repeating once again the basic proposal with which he 
had been entrusted prior to Milan. Like Liberius, Lucifer’s only immediate demand of Constantius is that 
he allow the bishops to judge their own, under the oversight of the bishop of Rome and the ultimate 
authority of God, without further interference. 
Likewise, in describing the illegitimacy and wickedness of Constantius’ methods, Lucifer focuses 
the bulk of his argumentation on a principle also central to Julius’ and Liberius’ cases: Athanasius’ status 
as a bishop. While Julius and Liberius had emphasized the special legal status this granted Athanasius, 
Lucifer’s emphasis is primarily moral and supernatural. In expositing Athanasius’ episcopal status, Lucifer 
shows a populist emphasis that is rather striking.35 As he argues, it is precisely the fact that the 
Alexandrians have shown their collective support for Athanasius and their collective opposition to 
Constantius’ introduction of George as bishop that proves that Athanasius is in fact the true bishop, 
George a false one, and Constantius’ actions directly opposed to the will of God: “Why have the sheep of 
God not followed the man guilty with you of sacrilege, George? Why do they follow him whom you are 
 
34 This basic proposal had been initially made by Julius in 341 (see the letter of Julius given in Apologia contra Arianos 21-35 and 
as Letter 2 in Thompson 2015) and more recently by Liberius in the negotiations leading up to the Council of Milan (see the 
letter preserved in Hilary, Adversus Valentem et Ursacium Series A 7) and then repeated by Liberius at his interrogation (see 
section 3.5 above).  
35 Williams 1951, 10-12, argues, correctly in my view, that one of the key characteristics of the emerging Nicene episcopal 
faction as a whole was their attempt to maintain or even expand on the close connection between bishop and populus that had 
characterized the 3rd century Church, a concern manifested in their general opposition to Constantius’ frequent calling of 
councils (requiring the extended absence of bishops from their sees), as well as to the practices of translation (i.e. a bishop 
moving from see to see, a practice condemned at Nicaea) and of de facto Imperial appointment of bishops. This difference is 
visible even in the surviving canons of the period, where the Council of Antioch in 328, presided over by Eusebius of Caesarea, 
seems to have been the first to grant authority over episcopal ordinations to metropolitan bishops and provincial synods rather 
than the people of the diocese (306-309), whereas the Western Council of Sardica absolutely forbade episcopal translation 
(Canon 1) and forbade any bishop from being absent for more than three Sundays from his diocese without grave cause (Canon 
4, cf. Gryson 1979, 309-312). This also reflects in part a division between the Eastern and Western Empire, since, as Gryson 
1980, 265-266, points out, there seems to have existed in the West no canonical expectation even of provincial or metropolitan 
involvement in the ordination of bishops prior to the Council of Rome in 381 (cf. Canon 18). Lucifer’s sarcastic references to 
Constantius’ “ordination” of heretical pseudo-bishops (e.g. De Athanasio 20, De non parcendo 6), contrasted with Athanasius’ 
divine, unbreakable bond with his diocese and people, whose direct election of him was equivalent to divine choice, is very 
much of piece with these concerns. 
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violently sorry is bishop of the Alexandrians? Why, except because God has indeed established him as 
bishop, but the Devil sent you and George to slaughter the sheep like bandits and thieves?” (2.25).36 
That Athanasius has been chosen and continually followed by the people of his diocese, and ordained 
bishop through the imposition of hands by Catholic bishops (1.9)—comparable to the ceremony by 
which Moses selected Joshua as his successor (Deuteronomy 34:9)—makes him worthy of far more 
respect than Constantius has shown him. This normatively popular and episcopal form of ordination, 
combined with the undeniable fact that, despite Constantius’ attempts at deposing and replacing him, 
Athanasius has retained his office and authority in the eyes of his own flock, make very clear that 
Athanasius’ status as bishop is derived directly from God, without any intervention by Imperial power. 
Athanasius serves, not at the pleasure of the Emperor, but at the will of God.  
The crime of persecuting a “man of God,” a prophet or priest directly granted authority by the 
divine, Lucifer argues, is no small one (1.13, etc.). Instead of doing so, instead of pursuing his vain and 
illegitimate efforts to judge Athanasius, an obviously holy and innocent man, Constantius ought to 
accept him and his divinely-granted role as privileged intercessor before God, the proper means by 
which God has willed to bestow the sacraments37 and salvation on all, including the Emperor: “It is 
useful to you, Constantius, to be a suppliant before God for your crimes by means of Athanasius, the 
priest of the Lord, through him to fulfill your vows, just as [the friends of Job] did through Job, and, 
through Athanasius or one of his fellow bishops, dedicate yourself to obtaining saving baptism” (1.41).38 
 
36 cur te uel consacrilegum tuum Georgium non sunt secutae oues dei? cur illum, quem esse Alexandrinorum fortissime es 
dolens episcopum, secuntur? nisi quia illum quidem instituerit illis episcopum deus, te uero atque Georgium ad mactandas ut 
latrones et fures inmiserit diabolus? 
37 See Williams 1951, 1-6, for a suggestive, if rather one-sided, discussion of the importance of bishops’ authority over the 
sacraments, particularly the Eucharist, to the Nicene party, at times accompanied by a denial of the possession of the 
sacraments to “Arian” opponents.  
38 utile est tibi, Constanti, ut per Athanasium domini sacerdotem pro facinoribus tuis sis supplex deo, per ipsum dirigas vota tua, 
sicuti et illi per lob; per Athanasium siue per coepiscopos eius des operam salutarem consequi baptismum. 
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Here we see the heart of Lucifer’s construction of Constantius’ relationship both with Athanasius and 
himself. Bishops are appointed by God himself through the Christian people and their fellow clerics, and 
possess by virtue of their office and personal holiness an intercessory and sacramental power of which 
the Emperor, as a man lacking such special access to the divine will or divine power, stands in dire need. 
Constantius’ lawless persecution of precisely those men granted by God the authority to teach and save 
him is, then, a direct reversal of the proper order of things.  
In De Athanasio, at least, this relationship between Emperor and bishops is not uniformly one-
sided or hostile, but reflects in substantive ways the norms of Imperial-episcopal collaboration 
established by Constantine. In particular, while Constantius clearly stands in need of holy bishops to 
teach and save him, he can in turn aid the bishops by playing a positive role, according to the norms 
established by God, in the ecclesiastical legal processes for punishing erring bishops. Though Lucifer 
resorts to numerous insults and highly negative comparisons, they do not detract from the essential fact 
that, in quoting Scriptural passages having to do with justice and judgment, Lucifer again and again 
grants Constantius a principal position both in the cause of attacking heresy and in the process of 
disciplining heretical bishops. Indeed, in one striking passage, Lucifer goes so far as to admit that, if 
Athanasius were in fact a heretic as Constantius charged him, and had been rightly deposed and exiled, 
he would be required to do whatever was necessary to keep him deposed and in exile, up to and 
including fighting a civil war with his brother:39 
Grant, as you wish, that Athanasius is a heretic: if he had been rightly sent into exile, why did 
you suffer him against the decisions of your father to receive the dignity which your father had 
decided to take away from him? 40 But you say: ‘It happened by the intervention of my brother 
 
39 Cf. Rosen 2001, 66-67, who discusses the sources on which Lucifer’s reconstruction is likely based and compliments him for 
his political acumen in interpreting them contrary to the official picture of perfect harmony between the two brothers 
(presented in totally straightforward terms in Athanasius’ Apologia ad Constantium discussed in section 4.4 above). 
40 Lucifer’s straightforward acknowledgement of Constantine’s role in the condemnation and exiling of Athanasius, without any 
of the exculpatory means employed by contemporary and later ecclesiastical authors, is closely connected with, and likely in 
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Constans.’ [...] But you say: ‘I was afraid that war would arise between us.’ [...] You see that you 
would not have acted as the Servant of God in receiving Athanasius and in recalling to his place 
one whom you knew had been removed for the sake of the faith: first, because you would have 
judged God powerless, as though he were not able to protect you who were guarding the truth, 
and resisting heretics; then, because you would have wished more for Constans to be well 
disposed to you than God. Indeed, if you had known that Constans had become a heretic by 
favoring Athanasius, a man whom you knew had been proven to be sacrilegious, not only would 
you have been obligated not to prefer your kingdom to God, but you would also have been 
obligated not to prefer even your own life to him (1.29).41 
Here, Lucifer grants Constantius not only a principal role in the punishing of heretical bishops, 
but also the Constantinian title Servant of God, both indicative of a basic acceptance of the Emperor’s 
importance within the Church. Constantius is not intrinsically in the wrong for taking an active part in 
deposing and exiling heretical bishops; in fact, to a certain degree, he is obligated to do so, even if this 
involves directly opposing the equally supreme and Imperial authority of his own brother.  
Still, this role is to be undertaken only within constraints and subject to an essential order.42 
Although Constantius has a duty to involve himself in the Church’s disciplining of heretical bishops, this 
duty is in the first instance subject to the clear commands and procedures found in God’s law,43 and in 
 
large part responsible for, his generally negative portrayal of Constantine as an unrepentant “Arian” heretic (see the further 
discussion in section 4.3 below). 
41 pone, ut vis, haereticum esse Athanasium; si recte fuerat missus ad exilium, cur eum passus es contra patris tui statuta 
recipere dignitatem quam ei se tulisse tuus arbitratus fuerat pater? sed inquis: fratris mei Constantis factum est interuentu. [...] 
Sed inquis: timui ne inter nos bella fuissent orta. [...] conspicis itaque non te egisse ut dei seruum suscipiendo eum et loco 
reuocando suo quem meminisses in causam fidei deportatum, primo quod inpotentem iudicaueris deum, tamquam te tueri non 
potuerit tuentem ueritatem, haereticis resistentem, deinde quod magis tibi propitium esse uolueris Constantem quam deum. 
quem utique Constantem regem si haereticum factum memineras fauendo Athanasio, quem tu iam probatum habebas 
sacrilegum, non solum non regnum tuum deo debueras praeponere, sed nec ipsam tuam animam. 
42 On this point, while Laconi 2004, 71-72, rightly points out Lucifer’s basic acceptance of Constantius’ authority in ecclesiastical 
matters in De Athanasio, and while even her counterfactual that, absent the charge of heresy, Lucifer would not have 
challenged Constantius merely for his claims to religious authority, is at least plausible, she goes rather too far in equating his 
position in this work with political theology of Eusebius of Caesarea. Even at his most generous, Lucifer’s complicated picture of 
various ordered forms of collaboration and obedience in judgments among kings, secular judges, and priests is a far cry from 
the clear cosmic and political hierarchy found in Eusebius. 
43 As Laconi, 2004, 74-77, correctly points out, Lucifer’s objection to the idea of law, whether political or religious, as merely 
subject to the Emperor’s will—rather than as binding and imposing duties even on the Emperor himself—has its echoes in 
previous Roman thought, particularly under the Principate (cf. Pliny, Panegyric 65.1), and will later be picked up by Ambrose of 
Milan under the specifically political form of the proper libertas favored by good Emperors (see e.g. Epistulae 40.2). Throughout 
his corpus, Lucifer’s constant treatment, in dialogue with Jewish tradition, of law as a direct manifestation of God’s supreme 
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the second necessarily carried out in tandem with—or rather subject to—bishops. After quoting a 
passage from Deuteronomy where obedience to the paired groups of the priests and the judge is 
mandated on pain of death (Deuteronomy 17: 8-13), Lucifer proceeds to both grant Constantius’ status 
as divinely-appointed judge and immediately put it in what he regards as its proper place: 
But you say: ‘In that place Moses, a man most devoted to God, in the same way as he made 
mention of priests, also made mention of a judge.’ Prove that you have been made judge over 
us, prove that you have been made Emperor for this purpose, that you might drive us with your 
weapons to fulfill all the will of your friend the Devil. Since you are not able to prove this, 
because it has not only not been commanded to you to be the master of (dominari) bishops, but 
in the same way it has even been commanded to you to obey their decisions, so that if you have 
tried to subvert their decrees, if you have been caught acting pridefully, you will be ordered to 
die the death, how will you be able to say that you are able to judge concerning bishops, whom, 
unless you obey them, already, at least before God, you deserve to be punished with the 
punishment of death? (1.7)44 
Constantius, then, whatever his judicial powers under normal circumstances, has no authority to 
abuse that God-given status for evil purposes, and even in principle, in the best of circumstances, has no 
jurisdiction to act as judge over bishops. It is worth pointing out that, in essence, this is a principle that 
would have been accepted in part by Constantius and the bishops opposed to Lucifer. As discussed in 
detail in Chapter Three, the Constantinian norm, whereby the Emperor in disciplining bishops acted 
normally in tandem with and following a judicial decision by a council of bishops, was generally followed 
by Constantius—with, however, notable exceptions that for Constantius would have been justified by 
the principle of the Emperor’s status as the divinely-sanctioned final court of appeals for all cases, 
ecclesiastical and civil, but which to Lucifer appear as straightforward violations of divine law. Similarly, 
 
kingship imposing often painful and burdensome duties on subordinate office-holders like kings and bishops is rather 
fundamentally opposed to any merely voluntaristic construal of either political or religious authority. 
44 Sed dicis: isto in loco deo deuotissimus Moyses quomodo sacerdotum fecit mentionem, sic et iudicis. proba te super nos 
factum iudicem, proba ad hoc te constitutum imperatorem, ut nos armis tuis ad omnem implendam uoluntatem amici tui 
diaboli perduceres. cum probare non possis, quia praeceptum sit tibi non solum non dominari episcopis, sed et ita eorum 
oboedire statutis, ut si subuertere eorum decreta temptaueris, si fueris in superbia conprehensus, morte mori iussus sis, 




while Lucifer clearly regarded Constantius’ efforts to achieve episcopal compliance and unity within 
conciliar processes (which had led to Lucifer’s own exile for refusing to accept the decrees of the Council 
of Milan) as illegitimate breaches, his basic contention that the Emperor ought not to act as sole judge 
of bishops without at least nominal episcopal concurrence was certainly not unique.45 Lucifer’s 
insistence on the necessity and gravity of the Emperor’s obedience to the decisions of bishops, however, 
even on the pain of (spiritual) death, remains striking, and will go on to play a larger role in later works.46 
For all of Lucifer’s efforts at distinguishing himself and Constantius, bishop and Emperor, 
perhaps what is most notable about De Athanasio in the fuller context of Lucifer’s corpus is the degree 
to which Constantius and Lucifer are associated and even equated, as office-holding judges and Christian 
moral actors. Both Constantius and Lucifer are persons burdened with divinely-sanctioned offices within 
the divine legal structure of the Church and tempted, by the Devil and wicked bishops and (in Lucifer’s 
case) Constantius himself, towards the grave sin of condemning and punishing a holy and innocent man 
of God. In this essential status and moral peril, they are straightforwardly the same.  
If most of Lucifer’s works present analogies aimed at heightening the division between Lucifer 
and Constantius, De Athanasio frequently blurs this line, presenting Scriptural analogies that are 
 
45 For an excellent recent discussion of Constantius’ policy of episcopal banishment as the sole allowable civil punishment for 
bishops, to be optionally carried out by the Emperor only following conciliar episcopal condemnation, treating both its essential 
continuity with Constantine’s policy and the discontinuity introduced by the increasing employment of Imperial pressure within 
and against councils, see Fournier 2018. 
46 Here, again, while Laconi 2004, 74-75, is right to point out that Lucifer’s objection is to the idea of Emperor as unequal 
dominus of the bishops, while continuing to allow for or even sanctioning some degree of Imperial participation, as a fellow 
servant of God, in ecclesiastical affairs, I would dispute her claim that the obedience he demands of Constantius is merely 
occasioned by the Emperor’s status as a heretic, and therefore “non vi e alcuna contraddizione tra il fatto che Lucifero accolga il 
ritratto del sovrano cristiano secondo l'ideale di matrice eusebiana” (74). Lucifer’s assertion is in fact of an inherent hierarchical 
and legal precedence of bishops in (at least some) ecclesiastical cases, granted by God and backed up by him with the threat of 
punishment. This distinction in roles, precedence, and authority, granted by God not only with but over the Emperor, certainly 
goes well beyond anything Eusebius explicitly asserts, and in fact constitutes at face value a clear contradiction of the overall 
unity of cosmic order, descending from God in monarchical fashion, that it is one of Eusebius’ main goals to assert and defend. 
Similarly, the position of Drake 2000, e.g. 467-469, that such episcopal self-understanding can be understood in analogy with 
the collegial and legitimating role played by the Senate under the Principate, such that, “like the senators before them, the 
bishops now made the standards of their order the criteria for a ‘good king’” (467), is not nearly strong enough in taking into 
account the clear divine precedence over the Emperor maintained by Lucifer here and even more forcefully elsewhere. 
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applicable to both men, and that are in fact applied, by Lucifer himself, to both men. One example will 
suffice here. When Lucifer first cites the story of Cain and Abel it is, paradoxically, to compare Cain to 
Athanasius, and Constantius to God, since God in charging Cain with the crime of murder at least gave 
him a chance to defend himself and be heard (1.2).47 The next time he cites the story, however, it is, as 
we might expect, to compare Constantius to Cain both in his (attempted) murder of a just man and in 
his being instigated to that deed by the Devil (2.2). The third time he cites the story, however, it is to 
compare himself, if he were to condemn Athanasius, to the archetypal murderer of the Scriptures: “How 
would I be filled with the God of justice because of my fruits, when this unjust deed would make me 
Cain, a fratricide?” (2.4)48 Of the three characters in the Scriptural story, only one (that of Abel) is 
relatively attached to Athanasius: the other two are freely and interchangeably applied to both Lucifer 
and Constantius, bishop and Emperor. 
There is an important difference, however, between Lucifer and Constantius in this work, 
though even this is not so fundamental as that elsewhere. This distinction can once again be elucidated 
by Lucifer’s analogy of Cain, the first murderer. The final time Lucifer cites this story, it is initially only to 
repeat the same comparisons made elsewhere: “When the glorious Apostle introduces the comparison 
with Cain and Abel [1 John 3:10-12], you seem to me to be Cain, and Athanasius Abel” (2.15).49 This 
assertion is, however, here parenthetical to Lucifer’s main point, which is to underscore the true gravity 
of what Constantius is trying to do to him, Lucifer, by forcing him to take part in the persecution of 
Athanasius: “Why were you compelling me to complete this deed, which would have made me Cain, a 
 
47 While God in this story is clearly an analogue for Constantius himself, Lucifer’s emphasis is more on the contrast in behavior 
than the similarity in status. Still, as we have seen, Lucifer does generally in this work grant Constantius an essentially sacral role 
as investigator and punisher of crimes, like the God of the Genesis story. 
48 Quo modo propter fructus iustitiae saturabor a deo, cum opus hoc iniustum faciat me Cain fratricidam? 
49 Cum enim gloriosus apostolus Cain et Abel introducit comparationem, tu mihi esse uideris Cain, Athanasius uero Abel. 
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fratricide, and a son of the Devil, which would have made me remain in eternal death? When you see 
that I have already made a journey from death to life, when God has already set me among those whom 
he thinks worthy to call sons, for what reason did you wish me to become Cain, that is, darkness and a 
son of the Devil?” (2.15).50 Here, then, we see the fundamentally personal, moral heart of Lucifer’s 
attack on Constantius. In the end, what is most significant about both Emperor and bishop is not their 
status as officeholders of various sorts, but their fundamentally identical status as Christians, raised 
from death to life and delivered from eternal damnation by Christ, and the threat to that status posed 
by sin.  
The primary sin in view in De Athanasio is not heresy as such, but the persecution and 
attempted murder of a holy bishop, analogous to Abel and the Prophets—a sin so grave as to imperil 
salvation for all those taking part in it. In the essential moral narrative presented by Lucifer, Constantius 
has already committed this sin, and now is trying to compel Lucifer to do the same. Lucifer has, so far, 
resisted; but the moment he bows to Constantius’ pressure, he will become, in every relevant moral 
dimension, equivalent to Constantius, guilty of the same sin, analogous to the same wicked exemplars, 
and inhabited by the same demonic spirit.51 This creates a striking dialectic between Lucifer’s threats 
and insults and his own self-portrayal: what Constantius is, Lucifer would be if he submitted to 
Constantius’ commands.  
This pattern extends the other way as well: the moment Constantius repents of his sinful action 
and returns to proper belief in the Trinity, he will become what Lucifer and Athanasius now are, servants 
of God, and so share in the eternal rewards promised by God. Of all Lucifer’s works, De Athanasio 
 
50 Cur me hoc opus implere compellebas, quod me ut Cain fecisset fratricidam et filium diaboli, quod me in mortem perpetuam 
fecisset manere? cum iam uideas me transitum fecisse de morte ad uitam, cum inter eos quos filios appellare dignatus est me 
iam constituerit deus, quam ob causam me Cain fieri uoluisti, tenebras etiam et filium diaboli? 
51 This equivalence extends even to the insults Lucifer employs. The same polemical titles, here and elsewhere, are used both of 
Constantius in reality, and of Lucifer in potentiality.  
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spends the most time describing not just the possibility of Constantius’ repentance, but the status and 
rewards that will be given to him afterwards, and the positive models he can emulate in making this 
change.  
In making this point, Lucifer, for one of the very few times in his entire corpus, has recourse to 
multiple positive exemplars for Constantius. The most mundane of these is Festus, the Roman judge of 
Paul in the Acts of the Apostles, who, although a mere Gentile, is commended for his impartiality and 
commitment to justice and compared favorably to Constantius the Christian Emperor: “A Gentile 
preserved the justice of equity, but you have destroyed it” (2.23).52 The most flattering, perhaps, is that 
of the Apostle Paul (2.33), whose journey from persecutor to repentant Apostle (presented also in De 
non parcendo) is held out to Constantius as a model to be imitated. Most striking for our purposes, 
however, is the fact that here, for the first and only time in Lucifer’s works, Constantius is presented 
with a positive royal exemplar, someone he is encouraged to emulate, seemingly, in assuming broad 
authority over the Church and using that power for positive purposes.53 This is King Jehoshaphat (1.21-
22), responsible for a sweeping reform of Jewish religious life praised in the historical books of the 
Hebrew Bible (e.g. 2 Chronicles 19:4-11). Jehoshaphat had ordered the priests of his kingdom on a 
mission to spread knowledge of the Law among the people and to root out idolatry, and this allows 
Lucifer to present him as an idealized model and rival for his own heretical ruler: “Whom were we 
bishops of God able to obey [...] whom, I say, should we obey, you or Jehoshaphat the chosen Man of 
God, who compels us to do what we knew God had commanded to be done?” (2.22).54 Once again, 
 
52 Gentilis seruauit aequitatis ius, tu uero destruxisti. 
53 Here I differ somewhat from Richard Flower, who emphasizes the importance of positive constructions of an ideal Emperor in 
Lucifer’s corpus alongside those of his contemporaries Hilary and Athanasius (Flower 2013 93, 96). In my judgment Lucifer’s 
almost total refusal, throughout the bulk of his corpus, to engage in the construction of the figure of an ideal ruler, let alone an 
ideal Christian Emperor, has to be counted among his most striking features both as a polemicist and as a political actor. 
54 Cui oboedire potueramus nos antistites dei [...] cui, inquam, oboediremus, tibine an Iosaphat dicato deo uiro, qui id nos 
facere conpelleret quod meminissemus fieri mandasse deum? 
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Lucifer makes explicit appeal to a central Constantinian title—that of “Man of God”—in order to 
contrast the proper status of a Christian Emperor with the illegitimate model followed by Constantius. 
Far from being rebels against Imperial authority, Lucifer and his fellow priests are rightly obedient to a 
pious ruler exercising authority over religious matters—and could be obedient to Constantius himself, if 
he were to imitate this model and act accordingly. This striking distinctive of De Athanasio implicitly 
grants Constantius a sort of authority elsewhere denied to him, and imagines a more positive and equal 
relationship between him as king and Lucifer and his fellows as bishops than at any other point in 
Lucifer’s corpus. Here, priest and king can and should act in tandem, under the authority of God but with 
the ruler in a proactive, commanding position, for a constructive purpose. This close pairing between 
priests and kings is undergirded by Lucifer’s quotation of numerous passages from the Mosaic Law and 
the Prophets where the two groups are associated by a shared status as judges and rulers of the people 
(1.35-37, etc.), a task capable of being carried out either righteously (leading to divine praise and 
reward) or wickedly (leading to condemnation and punishment). This close association of offices and 
roles allows Lucifer to harness a profusion of analogies from both Old and New Testaments, from 
passing references to pagan persecutors to clear-cut comparisons with priests, prophets, and Apostles, 
for the purpose of admonishing both Constantius and himself to, respectively, cease leading, and refrain 
from joining, the purported assault on Athanasius and the Nicene Faith. 
Lucifer portrays this assault, however, and its consequent effects on the moral character of 
those priests and kings caught up in it, in the very harshest of terms. Like the Arian heresy itself, it is 
inspired by the Devil, and is a form of slavery to the Antichrist (1.33). In joining in persecution of the 
righteous, those who participate in it become like Pharaoh, Nero, Herod Agrippa, and the other pagan 
tyrants responsible for the deaths of the Apostles (1.12, 1.34, 2.14, etc.), as well as like the Jewish kings 
guilty of persecuting the prophets (1.13, 1.18-20, etc.), and even the friends of Job who accused him 
falsely of crimes (1.41, etc.). In trying to persuade others to participate in their crimes, they become like 
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the Serpent in the Garden of Eden, tempting others to their destruction (1.1). In deliberately bearing 
false witness against their innocent neighbor, they become like the Jewish elders who tried to seduce 
the innocent woman Susannah and upon her refusal attempted to have her falsely condemned to death 
(2.7-11). In joining in the slaughter of innocents, they become like Herod the Great (2.3), and like Cain, 
the first murderer (1.2, 2.2, 2.4, 2.15, 2.27). In abandoning the Law of God and violating its 
commandments, finally, they become like the many ancient Israelite priests and Kings admonished by 
the Prophets (1.35-37, etc.), and like the Pharisees and priests admonished by Christ (2.4, 12, 21-22): 
guilty of perversion of judgment, the oppression of the poor, and the murder of the innocent, all 
brought together in the single crime of their condemnation of Athanasius.55 
If, on the other hand, these priestly and Imperial judges are obedient to the singular Law of God 
proclaimed alike in the Mosaic Law and the Beatitudes of the New Testament, if they obey the 
numerous divine injunctions to love their brothers in the Faith, if they follow the proper canonical 
procedures in judging a bishop, they will have the rewards promised to those who obey Christ, whose 
one, eternal Kingdom is destined to last forever:  
In this way also you will be able to go from being a persecutor, from being a criminal and a 
blasphemer, to being made blessed, a man truly very dear to God, if like Blessed Paul you come 
to believe that Jesus Christ is the true Son of God, if you confess that he has always reigned with 
the Father and will always reign, that is, without beginning and without end, if you have not 
denied that the Father and Son and Holy Spirit, as the Sacred Scriptures declare, have only one 
eternity, if finally you come to believe that the Father and Son and Holy Spirit have only one 
Godhead: believe me, you will be in the chorus of Patriarchs, Prophets, Apostles, and Martyrs 
(2.33).56  
 
55 See Flower 2013 183-196, for a general discussion of the use of Scriptural analogies in 4th century polemic to create a single 
universal image of the heretic and persecutor.  
56 Ita et tu ex persecutore, ex iniurioso et blasphemo beatus et uere deo carissimus effici poteris, si ut Paulus beatus uerum dei 
filium esse Iesum Christum credideris, si semper illum cum patre regnasse ac regnaturum, hoc est sine initio et sine fine 
confessus fueris, si unam aeternitatem habere patrem et filium et spiritum sanctum clamantibus sacris scripturis non restiteris, 
si denique unam habere deitatem patrem ac filium et spiritum sanctum credideris; crede mihi quod futurus sis in choro 
patriarcharum prophetarum apostolorum ac martyrum. 
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This is a clear and distinctively Nicene picture of the unity of the cosmos, here made not merely 
abstract, but directly practical for both Constantius and Lucifer. There is no cosmic hierarchy of rulers to 
mediate between the divine essence and created reality: there is simply one eternal divine kingdom of 
the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit,57 whose singular authority, expressed in the numerous 
Scriptural injunctions and regulations quoted throughout De Athanasio, unifies not only the divine 
realm, but the human realm as well. In this one, eternal Empire, Constantius is just another office-holder 
like Lucifer, capable of being saved or damned based on whether he accepts the eternal authority of the 
one Empire, carefully obeys its laws, respects its authorities, follows its procedures—or not. 
5.3: 
De regibus apostaticis58 
“On Apostate Kings” 
As mentioned above, Lucifer’s polemical works are generally structured around a purported 
saying of Constantius himself, addressed to Lucifer or at least to his critics. Over the course of each 
work, this saying is repeated, responded to, and embellished to in such a way that the voice and 
presence of Constantius, as interlocutor and adversary, is never allowed to fade from the reader’s mind. 
Though these dicta are obviously not literal quotations (a reality that is particularly clear in matters of 
 
57 It is worth nothing that, as emerges clearly both here and elsewhere (perhaps most emphatically in his heresiological 
accusation that the “Arians” believe that the Holy Spirit was made out of nothing, De regibus apostaticis 7), Lucifer is one of the 
most clear and strident of the Latin Nicenes of the 350s in his assertion of the total equality in divinity and power, not only of 
the Father and the Son, but also of the Holy Spirit. There are, I believe, several reasons for this clarity, apart from Lucifer’s 
reliance on the institutional theology of the Church of Rome: (1) unlike most other theologians of his time, Lucifer is less 
interested in precise metaphysical definitions and more directly dependent on traditional formulas, which in the Christian 
tradition had long made frequent use of the Trinity of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and (2) again unlike many of his fellow 
Nicenes, Lucifer is far less interested in defining a precise, characteristic relationship between persons (for which discussion of 
Father and Son generally sufficed) and more interested in the practical issue of the extension of the one kingdom of God onto 
earth through the Church and the sharing of divinity and power with Lucifer and his fellow bishops, for which the nature of the 
Holy Spirit as an additional divine person totally sharing in the substantia of God, as well as the charismatic role of the Spirit in 
making that power present on earth, are more directly relevant  
58 This is notably the only title to be given by Lucifer within the text of his works, rather than solely in the manuscript tradition; 
he refers to it under this name in Moriundum esse 12. 
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theology, where Lucifer’s recounting of Constantius’ beliefs is strictly polemical and heresiological59), all 
of the basic sentiments ascribed to Constantius in countering his critics are, in my view, perfectly 
plausible, and likely reflect, in however distorted a form, real sentiments expressed by Constantius 
before and at the Council of Milan and possibly even afterwards.60 For De regibus apostaticis, then, 
Lucifer once again begins with a challenge from his adversary:61 “’If the faith of Arius—that is, my faith—
were not Catholic, if it were not pleasing to God that I persecute that faith which was written against us 
at Nicaea, I would never be flourishing, even to the present, in my Imperial power’” (De regibus 1).62 
Abstracted from its polemical language, the central contention of Constantius that De regibus 
apostaticis aims to counter is that his success as Emperor is a clear sign that his religious policies and 
beliefs are those favored by God. 
This idea—that correct religious policy leads naturally to divine favor and Imperial success, while 
incorrect religious policy leads to disaster—was foundational to the Roman political tradition beginning 
with the Republican ideal of the pax deorum, and under the Roman Empire took on a new importance 
 
59 Cf. in particular the frequent assertion placed in Constantius’ mouth throughout the works that “there was a time when the 
Son was not”  and that “the Son was created from nothing” (e.g. De non parcendo 25), semi-direct quotes of the anathemas of 
Nicaea which by the 350s had been generally rejected in these extreme forms even by most non-Nicene thinkers in favor of 
more subtle arguments about the Father’s precedence over the Son and status as his ἀρχή (cf. Simonetti 1998a, 285). This 
should be seen, in my view, not as a “mistake” of Lucifer due to lack of theological sophistication, but as a heresiological 
attempt to both negatively characterize those “heretical” beliefs held by Constantius which he will have to explicitly reject in 
order to be saved—similar to the expedient of having Constantius constantly identify himself and his beliefs as “Arian,” 
something that no 4th century theologian, including close associates of Arius like Eusebius of Nicomedia or even Arius himself, 
would have been caught dead doing. 
60 Klaus Rosen discusses at length the possible sources by which utterances of Constantius might have come to Lucifer’s ears, 
namely (1) Lucifer’s actual face-to-face interactions with Constantius during his time as a papal legate, (2) Lucifer’s reading of 
Constantian writings, including most probably Imperial edicts, and (3) the reporting of Constantius’ speech or writings to him 
through intermediaries (Rosen 2001, 65). He concludes, on the basis of external and internal evidence, that Lucifer’s treatment 
of Constantius’ sentiments and arguments, abstracted from their polemical language and setting, remains well within the 
bounds of the probable (65). 
61 Cf. Rosen 2001, 68-69, for Rosen’s discussion of the similarity of this sentiment to that expressed in Constantius’ extant 
religious laws, as well as of precedent for Constantius’ use of the term catholicus to describe himself and his allies. 
62 Nisi catholica esset fides Arrii, hoc est mea, nisi placitum esset deo quod illam persequar fidem quam contra nos scripserint 
apud Niciam, numquam profecto adhuc in imperio florerem. 
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for Imperial policy during the reign of Decius, the 3rd century Emperor who was (among other things) the 
first to institute an Empire-wide persecution of Christianity. Based both on this tradition and also on the 
parallel ancient Israelite narratives of the success and failure of the people of God based on their 
righteousness or sins, this concept would shortly become a commonplace of Christian Imperial 
discourse, particularly in the later Byzantine period, where success or failure in battle against Persian or 
Islamic forces was frequently taken as a divine referendum on the Emperor’s orthodoxy. Indeed, this 
idea—that the gaining of divine favor was a key duty for the Emperor and a primary determinant of 
success or failure in political and military goals—was at times upheld even by bishops, for obvious 
reasons: if the Emperor was obliged to carefully weigh future divine favor or disfavor before undertaking 
important governmental actions and episcopal advisers were the “experts” in such matters, this could 
hardly fail to dramatically increase the prestige and power both of individual bishops and of the 
episcopal establishment as a whole. As argued in Chapters 1-3 above, this principle had formed a key 
part of the new Constantinian system of legitimacy, expressed in Constantine’s theological writings and 
grounded in his dramatic victories over pagan persecutors, and made if anything even more central for 
Constantius by the recent, religiously-charged victory over Magnentius. In forthrightly and 
comprehensively attacking this concept, Lucifer was striking close to the heart of both the dynasty of 
Constantine and the Roman Imperial system, which had from its beginning relied pervasively on the 
“signs” of victory in battle and material prosperity to justify its extension over the bulk of the 
Mediterranean, aggressive conflicts with foreign adversaries, and (increasingly) choice of leaders. 
For Lucifer, however, the essential problem, one shared in later centuries by many other 
bishops, was that in the present crisis the “signs” of divine favor were clearly not lining up with his and 
his party’s view of their true status. After his dramatic victories over the Persians and other foreign 
enemies, and even more dramatic victory over Magnentius, by the most immediate standards of success 
and power Constantius stood in divine favor; by the doctrinal and moral standards of Lucifer and his 
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associates, however, he was a “blasphemer and destroyer of the religion of God” (3)—and therefore the 
subject of God’s wrath, not his favor.  
Lucifer’s purpose in De regibus apostaticis, then, is to almost precisely reverse the divine 
valences of material prosperity and victory in battle by (1) providing numerous examples of Jewish rulers 
from the Old Testament who had prospered for long periods of time even after committing heinous sins 
against God, and then (2) providing a general theological justification both for these instances of the 
ancient past and for God’s seemingly inexplicable failure to punish Constantius in the present. This goal 
makes De regibus apostaticis the most properly (and innovatively) theological of Lucifer’s corpus. 
The bulk of the text, however, is once again taken up, not with theological explanations, but 
with the detailed exposition of Scriptural exemplars. To make his point, Lucifer proceeds to recount the 
misdeeds and lengthy reigns of practically all the “wicked kings” of Judah and Israel given in the Jewish 
traditions of Samuel and Kings, eleven in all.63 By drawing so pervasively from the ancient Jewish 
tradition, with its moralizing narratives of theocratic kings constantly undone by idolatry and personal 
sin, Lucifer is able to make a persuasive case that even manifest divine disfavor (as declared explicitly in 
the Sacred Scriptures) does not always or perhaps even often lead to disastrous punishment for rulers 
on earth. 
Not satisfied with this simple citing of contrary evidence, however, Lucifer goes on to draw 
numerous direct comparisons between these Jewish narratives and the present situation of the Roman 
Empire. These ancient kings had been attacked in the Hebrew Scriptural tradition for promoting or 
tolerating idolatry, the worship of gods other than the God of Israel—a charge that might well come as a 
surprise to Constantius, a very public Christian and among the first Christian Emperors to issue sweeping 
 
63 For those keeping track at home, the titular reges apostatici cited directly by Lucifer are Gideon, Saul, Solomon, Jereboam, 
Abijah, Baasha, Omri, Asa, Jehoshaphat, Ahab, and Manasseh. 
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decrees banning pagan sacrificial practices.64 Lucifer, however, is clear that the two misdeeds of heresy 
and idolatry are in reality morally equivalent, practically one and the same thing: “Come over to us 
Christians, for whom all heresies are like Baal. You heretics are now to us just like those who were 
sacrificing to idols were to the worshipers of God in those times. Believe me, through your heresy you 
are in our times what Ahab was in his” (6).65 If Constantius is just like the idolatrous Jewish kings of times 
past, then so too Lucifer and his associates, bishops of the Church, are perfectly analogous to the 
prophets who, inspired by God, had denounced these kings’ misdeeds in the strongest of terms: “As he 
[Ahab] loved those false prophets more than the true prophet of the Lord, so also you love your co-
heretics the Arians, you obey whatever they say, but you curse us, the priests of the Lord” (7).66  
This comparison between the status and activities of Lucifer and the members of his party, as 
bishops, with the Jewish prophets, having appeared briefly in De Athanasio, is very much expanded on 
here,67 and is obviously a key part of not only Lucifer’s theological argumentation, but also his attempt 
to craft a specific, ready-made relationship between himself and Constantius—a relationship in which 
Constantius is morally and religiously bound to listen to Lucifer and do what he says. This is strikingly 
different from the relationship created in De Athanasio, where Lucifer and Constantius were joined 
together, however unequally, in a common legal search for justice and a common need to avoid sin. 
 
64 See note 181 in section 3.5 above. 
65 Fac transitum ad nos Christianos, quibus sunt ita cunctae haereses ut est Baal. sic vos nunc nobis estis haeretici, ut illis illorum 
temporum dei cultoribus fuerint illi qui idolis immolabant; per hanc haeresim tuam mihi crede quod talis sis nostris temporibus, 
qualis fuerit et Achab. 
66 Ille magis diligebat eos pseudoprophetas quam uerum domini prophetam, ita et tu amas cohaereticos tuos Arrianos, ipsorum 
dictis obtemperas, nos omnes domini sacerdotes execraris. 
67 See Flower 2013, 196-200, for a discussion of the use of Biblical allusions to create an unbroken chain of continuity in status 
and virtues between Lucifer and his episcopal allies and the great Scriptural figures of the past. 
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Here, Lucifer is merely righteous, Constantius merely wicked, and the God-given duties of the two men 
are, respectively, to denounce sin and to repent of it. 
In Lucifer’s telling, this negative analogy between apostate Jewish king and heretical Roman 
Emperor applies to more than Constantius himself; it also applies to his far more respectable father, 
Constantine, the first Christian Emperor, whom Lucifer’s fellow Nicenes Hilary of Poitiers and Athanasius 
of Alexandria generally upheld as a positive exemplar of Christian political authority, but whom Lucifer 
treats straightforwardly as a wicked heretic who, like many of the Jewish kings he chronicles, passed on 
to his son along with his office a tradition of unrepentant sin: “Do not applaud yourself because your 
father handed over (tradere) his kingdom to you, saying: ‘Unless my father had done well in joining 
himself to the Arians, we his sons would not be reigning.’” (6).68 Not only, then, does Lucifer not offer in 
De regibus any positive exemplars of ancient Jewish kings—he explicitly denies as well the only possible 
positive exemplar of a Christian Emperor.69 Constantius is emphatically not an anomalous figure who 
only has to be removed from office to restore the Christian Empire to its proper state; he is, rather, like 
the wicked kings of Israel and Judah, one of a succession of evil rulers,70 guilty of the same sin, who have 
“gone in the way of their father” (6, cf. 1 Kings 15:3, 22:43-44). All this places Lucifer’s interactions with 
 
68 Ne itaque etiam in eo plaudeas, quod enim pater uester uobis tradiderit regnum, dicens: nisi pater meus bene fecisset 
conferre se ad Arrianos, non eius filii regnaremus. 
69 It would also be at least conceivable to use Constans as a foil for Constantius, like Athanasius in e.g. Apologia ad Constantium 
2-8. Lucifer, however, apart from one reference to Constans in De Athanasio 1.29 (discussed above), avoids so much as 
acknowledging his existence—in this reflecting Constantius’ own propaganda following his brother’s death, which had either 
erased him from existence altogether or else characterized him negatively (cf. Omissi 2018, 177-179). While Constans could 
function as a foil for his brother in works designed for other audiences, I would suggest, to use him in this way in works 
intended, however remotely, for Constantius’ own perusal would be at best foolhardy, at worst actively counterproductive.  
70 Cf. Flower 2013, 92-95, who notes the precedents for this theme in non-Christian invective, which sought “to sever or invert 
the ideological link of legitimacy that was a key theme of panegyric by creating a new association with recognised tyrants” (93). 
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the Christian Roman Empire in a radically different and more negative light than those of his fellow 
Nicenes.71 
If, however, the comparison with the prophets of Israel grants Lucifer and his associates a 
divinely-sanctioned status in relation to Constantius, so too Lucifer’s direct analogy between Constantius 
and the ancient theocratic Kings of Israel and Judah, present also in De Athanasio, cannot avoid granting 
Constantius a certain privileged status as well. Certainly any equation between a living ruler and 
Solomon, one of the most idealized figures in the Jewish monarchical tradition, could never be entirely 
negative. Even in his pervasive focus on negative exemplars, Lucifer acknowledges that several of these 
“wicked kings” were appointed by God himself, and did great good before their falls from grace; and 
even the most wicked of them possessed (in the eyes of their Jewish chroniclers) an essentially sacral 
status, with broad authority over the institutional structure of divine worship within their kingdoms. 
Then, too, these kings were, in Lucifer’s eyes, essentially Christian kings, kings of the single legitimate 
religio dei shared by Lucifer with Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and the ancient Jewish people.72 Constantius, 
even in his heresy, is granted his status as Christian Emperor, and compared, not with any pagan ruler 
(as he is at least glancingly at numerous points in De Athanasio), but solely with his fellows, past 
divinely-sanctioned rulers of the one true religion. Even in his sin, Constantius is no ordinary malefactor; 
 
71 Not only are all clear references to Constantine in Lucifer’s corpus negative, but at a number of points in other works (e.g., De 
Athanasio 2.2, De non parcendo 21) Lucifer goes so far as to refer to the Devil, rather than Constantine, as the father of 
Constantius. Because of this shared paternity, there are a number of references to Constantius’ “father” in Lucifer where it is 
difficult or impossible to tell which father is meant—Constantine or Satan (e.g. Moriendum esse 5, cf. Flower 2016, 158, n. 86, 
Diercks 1978, 475). None of this is exactly flattering for Constantine the Great, the first Christian Emperor. 
72 Lucifer is remarkably clear throughout all his works in his total identification of the religion and institutions of both the 
ancient Hebrew patriarchs and the Jewish priests, prophets, and kings referred to with his own contemporary (Nicene) 
Christianity, even going so far, elsewhere, as to assert that Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob all in some sense believed in and 
confessed the equal divinity of the Son (e.g. De non parcendo 13, cf. Flower 2013, 203). As Simonetti 1998a, 282, points out, 
this refusal to acknowledge any progression or clear distinction between the Old and New Testaments is striking from a 
theological point of view, especially in the context of the 4th century. In particular, Lucifer’s frequent straightforward appeals to 
the Law of Moses as normative for modern Christian belief and institutional structure stand in stark contrast with the view of 
Eusebius of Caesarea that the Torah, including both its legal framework and its direct assertions of monotheism, reflected a 
corrupted and imperfect revelation applicable only to the morally perverse Jewish people, in strong contrast to the pure natural 
religion of the Hebrew patriarchs now fulfilled in Christianity (see in particular note 206 in section 2.6 above). 
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he is the king of the people of the one true God.73 This is a striking distinctive of this work within 
Lucifer’s corpus, and constitutes in broad terms a clear gesture of respect for Constantius’ Christian 
beliefs and Imperial office—one here aimed at cementing the direct, personal relationship that Lucifer 
hopes for with his Emperor.74  
In a single move, however, Lucifer has declared the entire moralistic critique of the Jewish 
monarchy contained in the Hebrew Scriptures—a critique that made the kings of Israel and Judah 
responsible both for the sins of their people at large and for the eventual destruction of both kingdoms 
at the hands of Assyria and Babylon—totally applicable to Constantius and indeed any Christian ruler. A 
pagan Emperor, it should be noted, could never have been attacked in this way,75 nor were they, even 
during the periods of greatest Christian persecution. Here, though, was a new discourse, one carefully 
crafted for a state of affairs that the early Apologists simply never considered, or even considered 
impossible: the existence of a Christian Emperor, a human ruler of the New Testament with a status at 
least broadly analogous to the theocratic rulers of the Old Testament. By accepting this status, bringing 
to bear the possibility of idolatry and moral failure, and granting himself and his fellow bishops a broad, 
divinely-sanctioned prophetic authority to oppose and correct such lapses, Lucifer is striving to create a 
 
73 See Rapp 2010 for a discussion of the various roles that both positive and negative analogies would go on to play in Byzantine 
Imperial discourse, including a brief discussion of 4th century bishops’ use of negative Scriptural topoi for the purposes of 
attacking the Emperor, without, however, directly referencing Lucifer (191-192). 
74 Cf. Laconi 2004, 141, who speaks of “un certo distacco emotivo” in Lucifer’s rhetoric in this work as compared to his other 
pieces of invective. 
75 Cf. Flower 2013, 112, also in reference to Lucifer’s use of Jewish royal exempla: “Constantius’ status as a heretical emperor, 
rather than a pagan, opened up new possibilities for Christian invective.” See also Diefenbach 2015, 354: “Constantius II thus 
provides a perfect example of the disintegrating impact that Christian religious discourses could bring to bear on the Roman 
emperors: the religious persona of the emperor was open to criticism to a far greater extent than before the ‘Conversion of 
Constantine’; by appealing to biblical texts and martyr acts, Christian discourses tapped a new reservoir of cultural models that 
could be deployed to delegitimate the emperor.” 
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relationship between himself and Constantius, and between bishops and Emperors, that ultimately 
favors him and his fellows.76  
Constantine and Constantius had both been willing to grant bishops broad legal authority and a 
critical role in judging members of their flock and determining correct doctrine—but granting them the 
authority to directly and publicly admonish and defy Emperors for moral and religious lapses, as the 
Prophets of Israel and Judah had done, was another thing altogether. If the Christianity of Constantine 
and Constantius had granted them new powers, a new status, new influence with bishops and laity and 
the Empire as a whole, so too, had it granted them new vulnerabilities as well. A bishop looking to the 
Jewish prophetic tradition of furious criticism and blame of theocratic kings was not the same as a 
bishop acting as a helpful advisor or functionary for Imperial power. Bishops, even deposed, exiled 
bishops like Lucifer, had a new weapon.  
As for the reason behind God’s lack of action against Constantius, Lucifer is as always 
emphatically personal and moral in his interpretation of events. God’s refraining from punishing 
Constantius is neither an instance of nor an exception to any simple cosmic system of rewards or 
punishments, but a grace offered personally by God to Constantius in the hope that he will repent of his 
sins and so not suffer the eternal torments that are his due: “Do you not see, then, that you have been 
kept safe for this purpose, that you might correct your errors?” (7).77 This repentance is once again 
presented as a very real possibility—but so, too, are the eternal torments Constantius will endure if he 
fails to heed Lucifer’s warning.  
 
76 See Williams 1951, 9-10, on the assimilation, by Lucifer and his fellow Nicenes, of prophetic status and authority to episcopal 
office, as well as Flower 2013, 196-207, for a more general discussion of the use of Biblical figures to create a sense of rhetorical 
authority. 
77 Ad hoc ergo te reservatum, ut errores corrigeres tuos, non vides? 
457 
 
Here, Lucifer’s critique slips the bounds of the Jewish tradition, not only by the explicit threat of 
eternal punishment, but also by the even more explicit declaration that, in the eyes of God, Constantius 
is in fact far worse than the evil Jewish kings of old, and will be punished even more harshly. This 
spiritual and moral magnitude of Constantius as criminal and sinner is presented by Lucifer in 
straightforwardly political and even geographical terms. The Jewish kings sinned in a small kingdom, 
Constantius in a significantly larger one: “For that king [Manasseh] shed the blood of the just only within 
the borders of Jerusalem, but you have shed it and shed it now throughout the whole Roman Empire” 
(9).78 Because of the vastness of his royal power, Constantius begins, in this work, to take on vast, 
cosmic dimensions of wickedness: “Indeed you will be before all and greater than all even in those pains 
[of Hell]; for no one will be able to be found equal to you in wickedness, save the Devil alone” (11).79 The 
preeminence of the Emperor’s will argued for by Constantine and Eusebius, as a dominating, unifying 
force present in and responsible for the actions of all his subordinates, is broadly accepted, but 
transformed into far more a burden than a privilege. If Constantius is first and greatest in the first and 
greatest of earthly kingdoms, so, too, will he be the first and greatest in his punishment by God. Still, 
these punishments are, for the moment, only possibilities. For now, repentance and salvation are 
equally real: “Return with your whole heart to God [...] he will have mercy on you” (12).80 
Once again, we have a method of critiquing, and potentially influencing, a reigning Emperor that 
would have been inconceivable apart from the Constantinian status quo of an openly Christian ruler 
engaged in active collaboration with bishops. A bishop threatening a pagan ruler with eternal 
 
78 Quod enim ille tantum intra terminos Hierusalem sanguinem iustorum fuderit, tu autem toto fudisti ac fundis in regno 
Romano. 
79 Tu utique prior omnibus et maior etiam illic futurus in illis poenis ; neque enim quisquam in nequitiis tibi conpar inueniri 
poterit, nisi solus diabolus. 
80 Revertere toto corde ad deum [...] tui miserebitur. 
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punishment could hardly hope to meaningfully influence his ruler’s behavior; a bishop threatening a 
Christian ruler, though, could hope that the fear of eternal punishment might succeed where calmer 
counsel had failed. For Lucifer in particular, this hope would not pay off. Yet even the possibility that 
Constantius might be swayed by threats of Hell is enough to create a radically new dynamic in the 
relations between bishops and rulers, one that would continue in some form throughout Late Antiquity, 
during the Middle Ages, and even arguably into Modernity and Post-Modernity. In the context of the 4th 
century, it is only properly in Lucifer that we see this fundamental political and religious dynamic 
beginning to emerge, as part of the continual renegotiation of terms and rebalancing of powers 
between bishops and Emperor. 
5.4: 
De non conveniendo cum haereticis 
“On Not Associating with Heretics” 
 This work is notable among Lucifer’s corpus for its more personal focus, as opposed to the more 
directly political, legal, and theological arguments offered in De Athanasio and De regibus apostaticis. 
Once again, the work is focused on refuting a purported saying of Constantius:81 “You have said that we 
have been and are enemies of peace, enemies of unity, adversaries even of brotherly charity” (1).82 Later 
elaborations will make clear that the immediate focus of this accusation is the calling and aftermath of a 
council, which Lucifer seems to have left (12) or simply refused to attend (5), and whose decisions he 
rejected (1, 5, etc.), leading to his being sent into exile and/or put in prison (5).83 The question posed 
 
81 For discussion of the possible implications of these references for the dating of this work, see Appendix B below. 
82 Dixisti nos fuisse atque esse inimicos pacis, hostes unitatis, aduersarios etiam fraternae caritatis. 
83 From the context, where Lucifer sees this council as involving a definitive revelation of Constantius’ sentiments and a 
definitive affirmation of the “Arian faith” (1, 5, etc.), while Constantius views it as a largely successful effort at unification (6), 
this is almost certainly another reference to the Council of Milan in 355—or perhaps (if si tecum in concilio maledicto uestro 
mansissemus at 12, the only indication that Lucifer and Constantius were actually present at the Council, is taken less literally) 
perhaps one of the later councils of Constantius’ reign such as that of Ariminum in 359. While the Council of Milan is the most 
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and answered in this work is, then, whether or not Lucifer was right to refuse participation in 
Constantius’ conciliar projects, and hence whether Lucifer can or ought to unite with Constantius and his 
episcopal allies, in belief or even simply in the same assemblies and spaces of the same Church: “You 
said: ‘Make peace with the bishops of my Arian sect and be one with us’” (6).84 Lucifer’s task in this 
work, then, is to explain why he and his colleagues have refused to participate in the incipient universal 
Church structure established by Constantine and Constantius, embodied in episcopal councils backed 
with Imperial power. If, as argued in Chapter Three above, Constantius’ ecclesiastical goal during the 
350s was in fact the unification of the Church of the Roman Empire around his monarchical will, Lucifer 
in De non conviendo is compelled to offer a personal apologia for his total rejection of that unity. 
 In making his case, Lucifer once again turns to Scripture; but here, very much as opposed to De 
regibus apostaticis and De Athanasio, he largely avoids references to ancient Jewish kings. One 
exception to this rule is Ahab, the “apostate” king of Israel, who is again implicitly compared to 
Constantius—yet in De non conveniendo, the focus of Lucifer’s analogy is no longer the apostate king of 
Israel, but the believing king of Judah Jehoshaphat, who joins in a military alliance with Ahab and is 
punished for it by God with military failure and destruction (2 Chronicles 20:35-37). The target of this 
moralizing tale, then, is not Constantius, but Lucifer, a divinely-appointed ruler tempted, like 
Jehoshaphat, by an offer of alliance with an “enemy of God” (inimicus dei, 4). As discussed above, 
Jehoshaphat was the one and only positive model of a ruler held out to Constantius for imitation in De 
Athanasio; here, however, he is a model for Lucifer, not Constantius. This is a striking change.  
 
likely candidate, it should be noted that Lucifer’s writing is so frequently metaphorical and hyperbolic that specific indications 
of events are difficult at best. 
84 Dixisti: facite pacem cum episcopis sectae meae Arrianis, et estote in unum. 
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A second exception to the general avoidance of Jewish royal exemplars in De non conveniendo is 
the wicked king of Israel Jeroboam—and, again, the focus of the story Lucifer tells is not Jeroboam 
himself, but the prophet sent by God to rebuke him, who is tricked into eating and drinking with a fellow 
prophet “in a profane place among foreign people” (3)85 (that is, at the site of idolatrous cultic activity in 
the Kingdom of Israel at Bethel), and is punished by being immediately killed by a lion sent by God (1 
Kings 13:10-28). Though there clearly is an analogy to be drawn between Constantius and this wicked 
king of the less divinely favored and more idolatrous of the two kingdoms of the Old Testament, in his 
actual narration of events Lucifer directly compares Constantius not with Jeroboam, but with the 
Israelite prophet who falsely claims to have seen a vision telling his fellow prophet to dine with him, in 
contradiction of the command of God: “In the same way you have pretended you were a Man of God, 
when you said that you were making this peace for the sake of our salvation, just like that false prophet 
who was saying: ‘Return with me, because I am a prophet of the Lord, and an angel has spoken to me’ (1 
Kings 13:18)” (3).86  
Here, for the first time in Lucifer’s corpus, the Constantinian ideology of the Emperor as a “Man 
of God” blessed with divine inspiration—and therefore able to claim authority in theology and over 
assemblies of bishops—is directly targeted and challenged. The use of prophetic figures as analogues for 
the Emperor, previously reserved by Lucifer for bishops, is striking, and should be connected not only 
with the assertions elsewhere in Lucifer’ corpus that Constantius had claimed divine inspiration,87 but 
also and especially with the Constantinian and Eusebian picture of an intimate relationship between God 
and Emperor as cosmic superior and inferior expressed in the privileged revelation of God’s will to him 
 
85 In loco profano apud homines alienigenas. 
86 Sic mentitus es dei te fuisse hominem, quando hanc pacem facere te salutis nostrae causa dixisti, quomodo et ille 
pseudoprophetes qui dicebat: ‘Redi mecum, quia et ego prophetes sum domini, et dixit mihi angelus.’ 
87 See the further discussion in section 5.5 below. 
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through interior inspiration, dreams, and visions.88 As Lucifer has correctly intuited, the authority 
claimed by the Emperor over bishops and theology during the past decades had rested finally, not on 
the Emperor’s status as a Christian or even a Christian ruler, but on an essentially charismatic claim to 
divine favor and inspiration. If Constantine had in fact been selected by God as an eschatologically 
privileged agent tasked with unifying the human realm through victory in battle and ecclesiastical 
unification, and if this eschatological role had now passed to his son and sole successor Constantius, 
then Lucifer’s resistance to Constantius would be simply resistance to God. Lucifer feels the full force of 
this claim, and recognizes that it cannot be finally countered by the simple theological picture of 
numerous secular and priestly office-holders in one stable divine kingdom asserted in De Athanasio and 
De regibus apostaticis. If Lucifer is to hold his ground, Constantius can no longer be treated as a 
theocratic ruler, but as a false prophet. 
The melding of episcopal and Imperial models and exempla in De non conveniendo is not 
confined to Constantius. If Constantius in De non conviendo has taken on the formerly episcopal role of 
prophet, so too Lucifer and his fellow bishops have begun to assume truly royal dimensions of authority. 
As he had done with Jehoshaphat, Lucifer treats the fourth and final ancient Jewish king mentioned in 
this work, Amaziah of Judah, as an analogue for himself and his fellow bishops, not Constantius. In 
Lucifer’s characterization, the prophetic warnings to Amaziah that he will fail in all endeavors if God is 
not with him (2 Chronicles 25:7-8) are straightforwardly addressed to him (4), a warning to remain 
separate from Constantius and his wickedness.  
Through all these analogies, a basic reversal of roles is effected. Constantius is no longer a God-
appointed institutional ruler, but a charismatic outsider (falsely) claiming divine authority and mission, 
and a religious malefactor whose sin is so great that it can lead to death and punishment for innocent 
 
88 See the discussion of this principle at sections 1.4, 1.5, 2.5, and 2.7 above. 
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bystanders or even declared enemies who fail to separate themselves sufficiently from it. It is Lucifer, 
meanwhile, who is presented as the institutional holder of God-given political power, tasked by 
prophetic warnings with opposing the enemies of God. Whatever status the analogy with the ancient 
divinely-appointed kings of Judah and Israel had granted to Constantius the Emperor is now given 
instead to Lucifer and the bishops. 
The bulk of De non conveniendo is taken up with the exposition of this simple moral, reinforced 
by numerous Scriptural narratives in which the focus is emphatically Lucifer himself, his institutional 
status, expressed through prophetic, priestly, and royal exemplars, as a “Servant of God,” and his 
consequent duty to separate himself from the enemy of God Constantius and so protect himself from 
divine wrath. In Oratio ad Coetum Sanctorum and elsewhere, Constantine had used the analogy of 
Moses to portray himself as a charismatic and prophetic ruler, favored with divine victory and wisdom 
and unable to be swayed from his beneficent intentions by the recalcitrance of his people. For Lucifer, 
however, such comparisons, whether with ancient theocratic kings or Hebrew prophets, are far less 
flattering, and much more dangerous: for if Lucifer and his fellow bishops possess the divine authority of 
Moses, they also possess in Lucifer’s view an equally divine liability for punishment or reward according 
to the good or bad fulfillment of their duties. In De non conveniendo, then, it is emphatically Lucifer, and 
not the “Servant of God” Constantine, who is like Moses, who following the idolatry of the Golden Calf 
withdrew totally from the Israelite camp with the Ark of the Covenant to protect the people from being 
destroyed by God’s wrathful presence (Exodus 33:5-11). When Lucifer’s argumentative Constantius 
retorts that this was not a complete separation, since Moses continued to teach and correct the people, 
Lucifer responds that “neither are these people who have refused to get mixed up in your sacrilege 
failing in their duties; for you know that it is being said to you ‘Unless you correct your behavior, you will 
463 
 
perish forever’” (1).89 As Lucifer’s corpus as a whole strives to demonstrate, separation and rebuke are 
not always incompatible goals. 
This argument and set of analogies, it should be said, serve not only to characterize and delimit 
Lucifer’s own episcopal authority and duties, but also as his primary means of defining his literary task 
and new genre of Imperial invective. As it emerges, the core of Lucifer’s response to Constantius’ 
challenge rests in the repeated assertion that his own behavior towards the Emperor is not a mere 
matter of personal or political abuse, however merited, but of official duty and obedience to God. In his 
own characterization, Lucifer writes blistering works of invective directed at the sitting Emperor not (as 
most modern scholars would have it) to inflate his ego or vent his spleen, but because he is a bishop, 
tasked by God on pain of divine punishment with the pastoral duty of saving Constantius’ soul. Looked 
at from this perspective, Lucifer’s invectives take on enormous personal significance, as the principal 
(and indeed only) way available for this exiled bishop and envoy of the bishop of Rome to fulfill his God-
given mission toward the Emperor while at the same time maintaining sufficient distance to avoid the 
contagion of Constantius’ sin. Both sides of this picture are, in De non conveniendo, absolutely crucial for 
the avoidance of divine wrath and the salvation of Lucifer’s own soul.  
In making this case, Lucifer does not confine himself to associating Constantius with the chosen 
(if sinful) people of Israel—he is also like the Gentile peoples of Caanan,90 whom God commanded the 
Israelites to totally exterminate lest they be led into idolatry and exterminated by God in turn 
 
89 Nec hi qui tuo sacrilegio misceri recusauerunt desunt ab his officiis; dici etenim tibi cognoscis, nisi uias correxeris tuas, quod 
sis in aeternum periturus. 
90 As Williams 1951 23, n. 27 correctly notes, here and elsewhere Lucifer “tends to identify the heretics led by Constantius as 
the ethnici par excellence, quite overlooking the outright pagans.” Indeed, it is hardly too much to say that for Lucifer, 
contemporary pagans simply do not exist, with no place in his construction of contemporary Roman society or the cosmos. 
Reflecting this basic orientation Lucifer, in utilizing the Jewish/Scriptural terms ethnicus and gentilis (“Gentile”), applies them 
exclusively to Scriptural Gentiles and present-day heretics. Apart from a few vague references to pagans and Jews as classes, 
and a single reference to contemporary Persians “sacrificing to demons” in De Athanasio 29, everyone in the present, in the 
Roman Empire, is either a true Christian or a heretic. 
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(Deuteronomy 7:2-3). Lucifer dwells at great length on this analogy, giving multiple Scriptural passages 
to support it, including most notably the total, genocidal destruction of Jericho at the hands of the 
Israelites (2, cf. Joshua 6:24). This, Lucifer argues, is the proper way for the servants of God to avoid any 
contamination by sinful foreigners like Constantius: “When, therefore, you see all the inhabitants of the 
city of Jericho punished with the edge of the sword, the whole city burned, how did you think that we 
were able to associate with you, a heretic, since you and your people are even more worthy of 
anathema?” (2).91 
This appeal to scriptural violence against whole peoples might seem rather close to a call for 
open sedition, though Lucifer’s violence, here and elsewhere, is verbal and spiritual, not physical. Still, if 
Constantius is truly analogous to an enemy of God’s people for whom the only recourse is total physical 
separation and spiritual extermination, it is difficult to see how he could still function meaningfully as 
Emperor. The practical problem of governing the Roman Empire is not really, however, Lucifer’s focus—
and this becomes even clearer as he turns to a series of quotations from the Psalms, in which the 
Psalmist92 asks God not to destroy him along with those sinners subject to his wrath (5, 6, cf. Psalms 1, 
25, 27, 32), and describes his own efforts to remain separate from and punish sinners (7, cf. Psalms 100, 
118): “I have hated the unjust and loved your law” (7, Psalm 118:13).93 As Lucifer concludes from this 
citation: “It is right that you be hated by us” (7).94 This is, to say the least, a very different sentiment 
than that found in any previous Roman writing about sitting Emperors, Christian or pagan. 
 
91 Quando igitur uideas omnes in ciuitate Hiericho inhabitantes ore punitos gladii, omnem incensam ciuitatem, quomodo 
putasti nos potuisse tecum conuenire cum haeretico, quandoquidem plus te atque tuos dignos esse anathema[?] 
92 Described by Lucifer, conventionally, as David (5), making for yet another royal analogue for Lucifer himself. 
93 Iniques odio habui et legem tuam dilexi. 
94 Odiri uos oporteat a nobis. 
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This sentiment also has immediately ecclesiastical implications, since the heretic-Gentile 
Emperor, like the citizens of Jericho before him, is hardly alone in his wickedness. In De non 
conveniendo, for one of the very few times in his corpus, Lucifer cites and attacks by name a few of the 
prominent members of his rival episcopal party—but merely as associates of Constantius himself, led by 
him into sin and clearly subordinate to him in wickedness: “How could we be your familiar friends, like 
Valens, Ursacius, Epictetus, Saturninus, and the rest? Out of this number, even though they have seen 
into what pit they have fallen, still certain among them are choosing to perish with you, so long as they 
can enjoy with you the empty beauty of your kingdom” (7).95 Here, mentioned in an almost offhand 
manner, are some of the most important figures in the episcopal conflicts of the 340s and 350s, 
frequently cited by Athanasius and Hilary as the ringleaders of the “Arian” party responsible for twisting 
Constantius against the true Faith. Yet apart from a few glancing mentions elsewhere, 96 this is the only 
time they appear in Lucifer’s works, and in a clearly subordinate position, not leading Constantius into 
error, as Athanasius had argued, but rather tempted by him to destruction.  
If in De Athanasio and De regibus apostaticis, Constantius’ royal and Imperial office had granted 
him a certain God-given status as an office-holder in the kingdom of God, in De non conveniendo, this 
office, stripped of its sacral Jewish analogues, is treated almost solely according to the rubric of 
temptation, as an illusory means by which the heretic Constantius leads souls to destruction. Heretical 
bishops and episcopal councils alike are mere means, almost disguises, of the singular royal imperium: 
“This is the council which you have been accustomed to unite by means of all the violence of your 
 
95 Quomodo familiares amici, ut sunt Valens, Ursacius, Epictetus, Saturninus et ceteri? e quo numero tamenetsi uiderint in 
quam inciderint foueam, certi tamen tecum deligerent interire, dummodo regni tui inanem pulchritudinem una perfruantur 
tecum. 
96 Eudoxius of Germanicia/Antioch/Constantinople is mentioned at De Athanasio 1.9, 1.30 and Moriundum esse 11. Ursacius 
and Valens are mentioned again at De Athanasio 1.9. Epictetus is mentioned once more at Moriundum esse 7, and Saturninus at 
De Athanasio 2.18. Photinus of Sirmium is mentioned once in De non Conveniendo 9 and three times in De non Parcendo (18, 
26, 28). Finally, George of Alexandria is mentioned and attacked in Liber De Athanasio 1.9-10, 2.18, and 2.25. This exhausts the 
mentions by Lucifer of named contemporary episcopal opponents. 
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imperium, for this purpose, that all the authority of the Sacred Scriptures might be dissolved by the 
authority of your imperium [...] This is the truth of your meditation in that heinous council, united by 
your power” (5).97 Even in Hell, those poor souls who fell for Constantius’ depredations will lament not 
so much their own acceptance of heresy as their adhesion to Constantius: “Woe to us, who preferred 
Constantius the Emperor to God!” (6).98 For Lucifer, Constantius is no mere follower of bishops, but the 
chief instigator and protagonist of heresy on earth. 
 This is at once an affirmation and a striking reversal of the picture of the preeminence of 
Imperial willing found in Constantine, Eusebius, and Constantius. If in fact the Emperor is, as Constantine 
and Eusebius had claimed, the principle agent responsible for the unification of the Church and bishops 
around his singular will, and if, as Lucifer believes, this unification is in fact false, sinful, productive of 
divine wrath and damnation, then Constantius is without a doubt the most dangerous man in the world. 
In De non conveniendo, Lucifer’s picture both of Constantius and of his royal imperium begins to take on 
truly monstrous dimensions, defined by his overwhelming power to lead others into sin and eternal 
damnation. Indeed, Lucifer goes so far as to directly compare Constantius—by means of the “apple” of 
his Imperial edict99— to the very first and most famous Scriptural tempter, the Serpent responsible for 
leading all mankind into sin in the Garden of Eden: “You thought you would be able to ensnare us with 
the same subtlety which the serpent used to ensnare Adam and Eve, writing with outstanding words 
 
97 Hoc est concilium quod magnopere omnibus uiribus imperii tui solitus es adunare, ad hoc utique ut omnis auctoritas 
scripturarum sacrarum tui imperii auctoritate soluatur [...] uera haec sunt meditationis uestrae in illo egregio concilio per tuam 
adunato potentiam. 
98 Vae nobis qui Constantium imperatorem deo praeposuerimus. 
99 One would assume this is a reference to the edicts issued by Constantius to enforce the results of the Council of Milan—if it is 
not merely a sarcastic reference to the decrees of the council itself, which given Lucifer’s emphasis on Constantius’ sole 
responsibility for its results is not unlikely. If, as argued above in section 3.5, the decrees of the Council of Milan were actively 
circulated by Imperial officials for subscription on pain of exile, this would be an especially apt metaphor. 
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and very beautiful sentences an edict in which all the venom of your heresy is contained” (9).100 Perhaps 
even more offensive to Roman ears, Constantius can even be likened to the female temptresses and 
prostitutes against whom the author of Proverbs warned his son (6, cf. Proverbs 4:14-19, 5:3-5) and of 
whom the Apostle Paul warns that anyone who joins himself (iungere) to them becomes one body with 
them (11, cf. 2 Corinthians 6: 15-19).  
This literally obscene association of Roman Imperial power with sexual deviance101 is 
foregrounded with astonishing directness: “Then if every fornicator is sinning against his own body, how 
much more you, who are carrying out that work of the serpent not through the flesh alone, but also 
through the spirit?” (11).102 Not only is Constantius an adulter and fornicator committing fornication 
with the meretrix of the Arian heresy and with the Devil, but a temptress in his own right, enticing souls 
with pleasurable (Imperial) favors: “For it seems sweet to some people to be joined (iungere) to you, the 
king, in friendship,103 by receiving your heresy” (6).104 Constantius’ royal and Imperial power, formerly 
comparable to the sacral office held by David and Solomon, is now little more than a tool of seduction. 
Faced with this serpentine Imperial prostitute, Lucifer and his fellows can do little more than flee: “Since 
 
100 Circumscribere nos te potuisse arbitratus es subtilitate, qua serpens circumscripserit Adam et Euam, eximiis uerbis 
pulcherrimisque sensibus conscribens edictum, in quo omnia uenena tuae haeresis continentur. 
101 The association of wicked Emperors with sexual deviance was to a degree a commonplace of Roman historiography, most 
visible in accounts of Nero’s outrageous behavior (e.g. Suetonius, Life of Nero 29). Similarly, defeated usurpers could be and 
were accused of any number of sexual deviances (visible in Eusebius’ treatment of Constantine’s rival Emperors in Historia 
Ecclesiastica; see section 2.2 above). These depictions of (dead) Emperors’ abuses of absolute power and Imperial dignity are, 
however, very distinct from Lucifer’s comprehensive treatment of a living, reigning Emperor well-known for his personal sexual 
probity (see e.g. Ammianus 21.16.6-7) as a demonic temptress enticing others into sin through the allurements of the Imperial 
office—a picture with far more immediate and far-reaching political import. 
102 Deinde si qui fornicator in corpus suum est peccans, quanto magis tu, qui sis non per carnem tantum illud perficiens 
serpentis opus, sed et per ipsam animam? 
103 The verb iungere is frequently used to denote sexual intercourse (see TLL vol. 7 653-662), and is clearly used in this sense 
multiple times by Lucifer himself in these passages (6, 11). Amicitia, too, can refer not only to friendship, but romantic and 
sexual alliance (see TLL vol. 1 1891-1898). These word choices are neither accidental nor subtle. 
104 Dulce etenim quibusdam uidetur quod tibi regi in amicitias iungantur suscipiendo haeresim tuam. 
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indeed if we were to be joined to sacrilegious persons in the body of a prostitute, we would not merit to 
be servants of the Lord (but as you are now, servants of the Devil), we have decided that we must 
separate ourselves from you” (11).105  
The underlying goal of all this rhetoric is in itself quite straightforward: as he had made clear at 
Milan, Lucifer will not agree to the decrees of Sirmium or participate in any other Imperial-sponsored 
ecclesiastical council. Yet by reaching this point of invective, stripping every shred of personal dignity 
from his target and reducing the Imperial office itself to the allures of a prostitute, Lucifer is coming 
dangerously close to a frontal attack on, not just Constantius, but the entire Roman Imperial system. 
 While the first part of De non Conveniendo is largely focused on Old Testament exemplars 
involving physical violence or divine chastisement, the bulk of the last part of this work is devoted to 
more literal citations from the New Testament, particularly the Pauline and Deuteropauline Epistles, on 
the necessity of avoiding heretics. It is in the context of these more direct treatments of Christian heresy 
that Lucifer, as in De Athanasio, makes use of the Christian eschatological figure of Antichrist to 
condemn Constantius and his fellows: “How, I say, were we able to be joined with you, the servants of 
God with the servants of Antichrist?” (4).106  
The use of the distinctively Christian concept of “Antichrist” against a sitting Roman Emperor 
represents one of Lucifer’s most striking innovations. Lucifer derives this distinctive feature, not from 
any previous tradition of anti-Imperial polemic within Christianity, but from the heresiological tradition 
(the original source of the term and title),107 and in particular from the previous works of Athanasius 
 
105 Cum sacrilegis ne et ipsi facti in corpore meretricis non mereremur esse domini famuli, sed iam ut uos serui diaboli, 
censuimus recedendum fuisse a uobis. 
106 Quomodo, inquam, nos vobiscum esse potueramus dei servi cum servis antichristi? 
107 The term ἀντιχρίστος first appears in 1 John 2:18-22, 4:3, where it is used explicitly in reference to rival theological teachers. 
There are, however, other New Testament passages (2 Thessalonians 2:1-10, Revelation 13:1-10) portraying more royal-
political figures of eschatological evil derived from the Jewish apocalyptic and messianic traditions. While some early Christian 
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going back to before Nicaea, in which he had repeatedly portrayed, not Arius himself, but rather the 
”Arian heresy” as an eschatological “precursor of Antichrist” (πρόδρομος τοῦ ἀντιχρίστου).108 The 
polemical usages of Antichrist and his precursor from which Lucifer derives his own terminology were 
thus tied to Christian theology and directed characteristically against Christian clerics—not Roman 
Emperors.109 It is precisely, I would argue, the close association between Roman Emperor and Christian 
(clerical) theology and theologians forged by Constantine and Constantius (analyzed in Chapters One to 
Three above) that now allows the Christian Emperor to be attacked in terms once used against (clerical) 
heresy and heretics.  
Indeed, while Lucifer makes no use of the title Antichrist in De regibus apostaticis, concerned as 
he is with the Jewish tradition of political authority and Constantius’ status as a Christian ruler, his initial 
association of the title with Constantius in De Athanasio comes in the context of an attack on the larger 
class of “Arian antichrists” (1.23) and their founder. In De Athanasio, Constantius is accused, like Arius 
before him, of having come to believe in the singular Antichrist himself (1.33), and therefore having 
become one of the Antichrist’s famuli (“servants”) (1.33), his haereditas (“inheritance”) (1.36), dux 
 
texts continued to use the term ἀντιχρίστος solely for clerical-theological opponents (see in particular Polycarp, Epistula ad 
Philippianos 7), in others these texts and titles were conflated in various ways (see e.g. Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses 5.25-30, 
Tertullian, De Resurrectione 24, Hippolytus, De Antichristo, Origen, Contra Celsum 6.45-46). The complex Jewish-Christian 
apocalypse Ascension of Isaiah is the only source to clearly (if indirectly) identify one such eschatological figure of evil as the 
Roman Emperor Nero—without, however, actually employing the title “Antichrist.” 
108 See in particular the encyclical letter of Alexander of Alexandria likely ghost-written by Athanasius (see note 7 in section 4.2 
above) which accuses Arius and Eusebius of Nicomedia of “teaching an apostasy which someone would reasonably consider 
and call a precursor (πρόδρομος) of Antichrist” (διδάσκοντες ἀποστασίαν, ἣν εἰκότως ἄν τις πρόδρομον τοῦ ἀντιχρίστου 
ὑπονοήσειε καὶ καλέσειεν, Athanasius, De decretis 35.3); the same designation is made several times in Athanasius, Oratio I 
contra Arianos 1.3, 7.4. Cf. S. Parvis 2006a, 180-185. 
109 Indeed, both Irenaeus (Adversus Haereses 5.26) and Tertullian (De Resurrectione 24) had argued that the Roman Empire was 
the primary positive agent restraining the coming of Antichrist. In this schema, the Antichrist would come only after a 
disastrous political division of the present united Roman Empire into ten kingdoms. Similarly, Hippolytus of Rome asserted that 
the Antichrist would be Jewish (De Antichristo 6, 14) and that he would arise only after a disastrous political division of the 
Roman Empire (49), after which he would unify the world and “in the manner of Augustus, from whom also the Roman Empire 
arose, command and order and rule everything” (κατὰ τὸν Αὐγούστου νόμον, ἀφ’ οὗ καὶ ἡ βασιλεία Ῥωμαίων συνέστη, οὕτω 
καὶ αὐτὸς κελεύσει καὶ διατάξει, κυρῶν ἅπαντα, 49). While all these pictures possessed contemporary political overtones, they 




(“general”) (1.40), and mancipium (“property”) (2.16). This presentation is ultimately sharpened by 
means of a direct quotation of Athanasius, with Lucifer declaring Constantius himself, and not merely his 
heresy, praecursor Antichristi (“precursor of Antichrist”) (1.27, 1.40, 2.8, 2.11, 2.19).  
By this expedient, Lucifer presents a picture of Constantinian Emperor that is in a very real sense 
an ironic mirror of that once argued for by Eusebius of Caesarea. Eusebius had claimed for Constantine a 
truly eschatological status as an agent of the kingdom of Christ—and now, Lucifer has claimed for 
Constantius an equally eschatological status as an agent of the kingdom of Antichrist.  
Lucifer’s treatment of the title and concept of Antichrist is, then, doubly original. First, he takes a 
polemical tool previously characteristically employed against clerical, theological teaching and instead 
applies it to the political acts and person of the sitting Roman Emperor. Then, this refocalization from 
theology to politics is completed by a substantial theological and rhetorical elaboration of the figure of 
Antichrist, developed across nearly the whole of his corpus and centered on the Antichrist’s status as an 
apostate, non-clerical ruler interfering in the episcopal domain of the Church. In the final rhetoric of 
Lucifer, not only is Constantius associated with the eschatological evil of Antichrist, but the figure of 
Antichrist is, increasingly, made to conform to Constantius. This politicization of Antichrist must be seen 
as a key step in the development not only of Christian polemic and political thought, but also of 
Christian eschatology.  
It is likewise in the context of this innovative use of the heresiological tradition that Lucifer 
deploys what may be the harshest description of Constantius and his status: the comparison of Christian 
Emperor to a cancerous body part which must be (and indeed already in some sense has been) cut out 
of the living body of the Church, as well to a terminal victim of disease who must be avoided by 
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everyone not willing to suffer the same fate.110 “You will not be able to say that you have not grown the 
doctrine of Arius like a cancerous tumor, since the stench of your cancer has come to every part of your 
kingdom, and everyone has chosen to avoid you, lest they themselves grow cancerous with your Arian 
disease” (9).111 In this, Constantius alone (and not his episcopal allies) is comparable to Arius, Sabellius, 
Paul of Samosata, and Photinus, disease-ridden heretics cut out of the body of the Church for the safety 
of all (9). As discussed in section 1.3 above, accusations of heresy had always held within the Christian 
tradition a unique urgency grounded in the distinctively Christian ideology of universal uniformity of 
belief—and this urgency had in turn been used to justify the authority claimed by all who set themselves 
the task of correcting such lapses, whether episcopal councils or bishops of prominent sees or self-
appointed heresiologists. This outsized importance to the episcopal system of ensuring uniformity of 
belief by reliably detecting and punishing heresy had once enabled Constantine to insert himself, as a 
non-baptized Imperial outsider, into the very heart of Christian power. Now, however, it would justify 
Lucifer and his fellow bishops in superseding the Roman Imperial system altogether. If Constantius had 
claimed the right to judge bishops for heresy and deprive them of their place in the Church, so now 
Lucifer has claimed the right to do the same thing for the Christian Emperor himself.  
According to Lucifer, then, Constantius is, thanks to his heretical status and condemnation by 
Christian bishops, totally extra ecclesiam, deprived of his status as a Christian and his place within the 
Church. At the same time, it should be emphasized that, as Sonia Laconi correctly notes, Lucifer never in 
his corpus asserts or even suggests that being a heretic ipso facto removes Constantius’ temporal 
 
110 Cf. Laconi 2004, 110-112, points out the essential continuity between Lucifer’s image of Constantius and pagan Roman 
treatments of social and religious crime, with both centering on the concept of the criminal as polluted with a disease-like 
contagion which threatens cosmic order and peace with the divine and whose spread must be avoided at all costs via social 
exclusion. 
111 Nec poteris dicere te non Arrii cancerasse sermonem, cum fetor cancerationis tuae ad omnem peruenerit regni tui locum et 
cuncti te vitare statuerimus, ne et ipsi peste tua Arriana canceraremur. 
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juridical status, his membership in the Roman body politic, or his Imperial office.112 Indeed, I would 
suggest that it is precisely the close identification between Constantius and his office, which is not 
removed or even lessened by the fact that Constantius has been cast out of the body of the Church, that 
prevents Lucifer from cleanly separating the two and emphasizing, here or at any point in his corpus, the 
positive aspects of that office and of the larger Imperial system. Even as a heretic, even as the servant of 
Antichrist, Constantius remains the one and only Roman Emperor. 
Taken together, then, De non conveniendo reveals a picture of Lucifer’s relationship with both 
Constantius himself and the Imperial and episcopal system he supports that is much more pervasively 
negative than in his earlier works. The deceptive, anti-Christian seducer Constantius is using his Imperial 
blandishments to corrupt souls and bring them to destruction—and all Lucifer and his fellows can do is 
plug their fingers in their ears, run in the opposite direction, and do their best to escape harm. This is 
hardly the basis for a relationship of prophet and king, counselor and counseled, pastor and sheep, such 
as Lucifer had sought to establish, in different ways, in De Athanasio and De regibus apostaticis. Though 
Lucifer continues to call Constantius to repentance with threats and promises of future glory, closing his 
work with yet another warning of hellfire (15), the emphasis of De non conveniendo is less on 
Constantius’ salvation as on the urgent necessity of others doing as Lucifer has done: separating 
themselves totally from the Emperor, opposing him with all their powers, and so saving themselves from 
eternal damnation. To continue to be Christian, Lucifer and his fellows must extricate themselves, as 









De non parcendo in Deum delinquentibus 
“On Not Sparing Those Who Sin Against God” 
Lucifer’s De non parcendo is yet again structured around a (plausible, embellished) saying of 
Constantius. Constantius’ sentiment is again aimed directly at Lucifer: “You have said that you suffered 
and suffer abuse from us contrary to the commandments of the Sacred Scriptures; you say that we have 
been insolent to you, whom it was right for us to honor” (1).113 This accusation will later be elaborated in 
even more directly status-based fashion: “I, the Emperor himself, suffer injury from Lucifer, a worthless 
man” (33).114 Whether this sentiment is derived from the Emperor’s negotiations with Lucifer before or 
during the Council of Milan, or from some awareness by Constantius of Lucifer’s later polemical 
activities, it is certainly, from what we have seen of Lucifer’s treatment of the Emperor thus far, an 
understandable sentiment. 
This challenge sets the stage for a clearer and more direct showdown between the respective 
persons and statuses of Constantius and Lucifer, Emperor and bishop, than anywhere else in Lucifer’s 
corpus. According to Constantius, he is the Emperor, and Lucifer, as an inferior, is bound to respect him 
and obey him—not only by ordinary Roman standards of propriety, but also according to the Christian 
Scriptures. If the purpose of De regibus was to refute the idea that Imperial and royal success was an 
unfailing sign of divine favor and the purpose of De non conviendo to justify Lucifer’s refusal to 
participate in Constantius’ councils and other ecclesiastical projects, it is the purpose of De non 
parcendo to refute the idea that it is in any way inappropriate for Lucifer, as a bishop, to chastise, 
admonish, and even insult the Emperor. This is by necessity a rather more delicate task, not as prone to 
 
113 Dixisti passum te et pati a nobis contra monita sacrarum scriptarum contumeliam; dicis nos insolentes exstitisse circa te 
quem honorari decuerit. 
114 Iniuriam patior a Lucifero homine misero et utique imperator. 
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simple arguments from precedent. To achieve his goal, Lucifer will have to not only cite Scriptural 
examples, but also show precisely how they apply to his own extremely rhetorical project of Imperial 
invective. He will have to, in other words, justify the new genre he is in the process of creating, 
explaining it not only in ordinary literary or political or personal terms, but also in its religious and 
cosmic dimensions. This gives De non parcendo a special importance for scholars interested in the 
construction of Lucifer’s rhetoric and its relationship with his political theology. It is in De non parcendo 
that Lucifer is brought to offer his most direct counter to the monarchical, status-based cosmology and 
theology of Eusebius and Constantine, in which the Constantinian Emperor stood as the manifest 
superior of the human realm as a whole, owed honor and obedience by his multiple inferior 
functionaries. If this theology is correct, Lucifer is manifestly a violator of the order of the cosmos. If 
Lucifer wishes to pin this crime instead on Constantius, he will have to at least begin to articulate a very 
different political and cosmic model indeed. 
From the very beginning, then, De non parcendo centers the position and status of Lucifer 
himself. We begin in a similar place to De regibus apostaticis, with appeals to the Scriptures and the 
ancient Jewish opposition to idolatry, but with a very different emphasis. Moses, the Lawgiver of Israel, 
had violently punished the people following the idolatry of the Golden Calf, killing many of them; so too 
“we are abusive towards you just as Moses was towards that foolish people” (1).115 Lucifer’s immediate 
response to Constantius’ rebuke is not to downplay the allegedly harsh and authoritative tone of his 
rhetoric but rather to increase it by directly comparing himself, once again, to the Constantinian 
exemplar Moses, and his rhetorical project to a bloody (and divinely-sanctioned) massacre. This refusal 
to even slightly moderate the forcefulness of his attack on Constantius will only be reinforced as the 
work continues. 
 
115 Sumus tibi contumeliosi ut fuit Moses populo insulso illi. 
475 
 
As in De regibus apostaticis, Lucifer compares himself and his fellow Nicene bishops to multiple 
prophets in their dealings with wicked kings of Israel and Judah: Saul, Ahab, Jehoram, and Uzziah. Here, 
however, the analogy drawn between the prophets and Lucifer himself is even stronger, compounded of 
not merely incidental status (a righteous man admonishing an unrighteous, a Christian admonishing an 
apostate), but essential office. Lucifer refers to Samuel not only as prophet, but as sacerdos dei, a “priest 
of God,” and then immediately applies the same title to himself and his fellow bishops (4)—along the 
way noting significantly that Samuel was the one “through whom he himself [i.e. Saul] had been 
anointed king” (4).116 Samuel and the other prophets were in their day what Lucifer is in his, not just 
because both are inspired by God and given the task of rebuking sinners, but also because they hold, 
essentially, the same permanent office with the same responsibilities. 
 To make his case for episcopal authority, Lucifer in De non parcendo largely shifts the focus of 
his Scriptural analysis to cases where prophets and priests of God severely punished, not kings, but 
ordinary members of their flock117—a significant drop in status for Constantius. If, as Lucifer argues, the 
ancient prophets had resorted to outright violence to punish those subject to their spiritual authority, 
why should he be considered abusive merely for verbally attacking Constantius? “If you had been in the 
power of Mattathias, who was zealous towards God, or in the power of Phineas [...] without a doubt 
they would have killed you with the sword. They would have killed with the sword; am I, because I 
wound your mind, drenched with the blood of Christians, with a word, judged guilty of abusiveness by 
 
116 per quem et in regem unctus fuerat 
117 Including Moses’ order to the Levites to slaughter their kinsmen after the incident of the Golden Calf (Exodus 32:26-29), the 
priest Phineas’ zealous murder of a Jewish-Gentile couple during the Exodus (Numbers 25:10-13), Joshua’s stoning of Achan for 
greed in keeping back spoils for himself (Joshua 6:26-7:26), and Mattathias’ murder of a Jew for offering sacrifice to the Greek 
gods during the reign of Antiochus Ephiphanes (1 Maccabees 1:54-2:2). 
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you?” (13).118 In the face of the brutal, divinely-sanctioned violence of the Old Testament, Lucifer’s 
exercise of his priestly authority to correct and punish can only be moderate by comparison.  
Old Testament recourse to bloodshed is at best a distant analogy for Lucifer in his present 
position as exiled episcopal polemicist. In De non parcendo, then, Lucifer spends more time than ever 
before treating New Testament analogies, which he applies literally to his own situation and status. The 
Apostles refused to stop preaching the Gospel, even when ordered to do so by “your co-blasphemers 
the scribes, the Pharisees, the princes and the High Priest of the Jews” (17)119—and even when 
persecuted and martyred by the wicked king Herod. In comparing his disobedience to theirs, Lucifer 
makes his own the reported words of the Apostles: “Is it right to obey God or men?”120 (17, cf. Acts 
5:33). Just as the Apostles had received from God, by virtue of their office, the duty to preach the Word 
of God, so too Lucifer has received from God, by virtue of his office, the duty to admonish the erring 
members of his flock. In De non conveniendo, Lucifer as a pious Christian had been required by God to 
separate himself from Constantius and his fellow heretics. In De non parcendo, however, it is explicitly as 
a bishop, not only an analogue but a direct successor to both the priests and prophets of the Old 
Testament and the Apostles of the New, that Lucifer bears the responsibility, given to him by God, to 
verbally chastise and authoritatively teach all the members of his flock who are doing wrong—up to and 
including the Emperor himself. “It belongs to my office to inflict these things to you as a heretic” (13).121 
Drawing from both the Pastoral Epistles and the Prophet Jeremiah,122 Lucifer asserts his right and duty in 
 
118 Si fuisses inter manus Matathiae istius zelantis deum aut in manu Finees [...]sine dubio te gladio interficerent. illi te gladio 
fuerant interfecturi; ego, quia uerbo animum illum tuum cruore Christianorum madidatum uulnero, reus iudicor contumeliarum 
a te? 
119 comblasphemorum tuorum scribarum, Pharisaeorum, principum atque pontificis Iudaeorum 
120 Utrum oboedire oportet deo an hominibus? 
121 Est officii mei, ut haec ingeram tibi haeretico. 
122 Lucifer draws primarily on the description of the role and authority of clergy in the Pastoral Epistles, Jeremiah’s descriptions 
of God’s commands for prophets and shepherds, the account of the Good Sheperd in John 10:11-18, and, most strikingly, the 
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the strongest of terms: “For this very reason, God has given to us, his bishops, the power (potestas) to 
rebuke and teach you, the ones committed to us” (13).123 Perhaps, Lucifer admits, Constantius will say 
that it is wrong of Lucifer to teach and correct him “because you are a king” (quia rex sis, 13). In fact, 
however, after examining the Sacred Scriptures “you will not be able to discover that this is forbidden to 
me, but rather you will begin to discover that it has been commanded to me, to blame you and chastise 
you and exhort you and beg you and admonish you and provoke you to please God” (13).124 This 
responsibility was given by Christ to Peter, Lucifer asserts, with the command to “pasture my lambs” 
(John 21:15), commands and promises that apply fully to Lucifer and his fellow bishops as “successors 
[...] of Blessed Peter” (11),125 but are totally denied to Constantius and other Emperors: “He made a 
promise to his people through Jeremiah, saying: ‘And I will give you shepherds according to my own 
heart, and they will pasture you, pasturing with discipline’ [Jeremiah 3:15], and he did not say, ‘I will give 
you Constantius the Emperor, so he can make you prey for the Devil’” (11).126 
When his Constantian interlocutor replies to all this, finally, with a reference to the Pauline and 
Deutero-Pauline verses on obedience to the Emperor and those in authority,127 Lucifer responds not 
only with arguments that obedience to earthly rulers can never be allowed to contradict obedience to 
 
command to Peter at to “feed my lambs,” etc. (John 21:16-17). All these texts would over time become standard ones for 
describing and justifying clerical authority. 
123 Eo etenim usque nobis antistitibus suis dedit potestatem ad uos nobis commissos increpandos docendos. 
124 Non poteris mihi prohibitum, sed inuenire magis incipies mihi praeceptum, ut te arguam et increpem et exhorter et deprecer 
et admoneam atque prouocem ad deo placendum. 
125 successores [...] beato Petro 
126 Per Hieremiam promiserat populo suo dicens: et dabo uobis pastores secundum cor meum, et pascent uos pascentes cum 
disciplina, et non dixit: dabo uobis Constantium imperatorem, qui uos possit in diaboli uertere praedam. 
127 Lucifer cites in particular Titus 3:1-7. 
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God, but also with Scriptural citations of his own,128 buttressing an assertion that is breathtaking in its 
daring: that, in fact, while the Scriptures do not require Lucifer to be obedient and respectful to 
Constantius as a heretic commanding evil, they do command Constantius to obey those set in authority 
over him—that is, Lucifer and his fellow bishops. “But you pretend that you do not know what these 
verses command you to do, those which admonish you to be obedient to the priests of the Lord” (32).129 
Here we have, for the first time in Roman history, the author of political invective not only addressing 
himself directly to the sitting Emperor, but actually demanding that that Emperor obey him as the 
holder of a superior office. It is hard to overstate just how revolutionary this is, in terms both of the 4th 
century Roman Empire and of the general relationship between rulers and ruled in the Ancient 
Mediterranean.  
Not content merely with asserting his own authority, Lucifer goes on immediately to charge 
Constantius with sin, not just in his refusal to obey Lucifer and his fellow bishops, but in his assertion of 
a superior status over his fellow Christians by virtue of his possession of Imperial office: “These verses130 
urge that it is right for you to present yourself as merely one among all your fellow servants, and not to 
say you are superior to any of them if you wish to be found as the Servant of God” (32).131 This 
constitutes a strong challenge both to the status quo of Roman Imperial power and to a Eusebian 
theology that had centered its conceptualization of the moral duties of rulers and subjects on the 
acknowledgment of a monarchical chain of superiors and inferiors extending from heaven to earth. 
 
128 The only verses Lucifer directly quotes here are Titus 1:13 and 2:15, both of which, however, are commands to the pastor to 
correct his flock, not commands to the flock to obey. 
129 Quae vero te iubent facere illa fingis non nosse, illa quae te moneant domini sacerdotibus oboedire. 
130 Lucifer does not specify what verses he is thinking of here, but presumably has in mind Scriptural admonitions to charity and 
humility such as e.g. Philippians 2:3, Romans 11:18, etc. 




While Constantine had used the title Servant of God to assert his own unique authority, for Lucifer such 
a title principally denotes, not uniqueness and superiority, but equality among the numerous servants of 
the one Kingdom of Christ. An Emperor required by his religious beliefs not only to obey the moral 
counsels and teachings of bishops, but also to refrain from any declaration of superiority to any fellow 
Christian whatsoever has had his status, to say the least, dramatically reduced. In his final construction 
of political power, Lucifer allows no space for the overtly asymmetrical relationship between cosmic 
Emperor and human subject central to the Late Roman Empire—let alone a Eusebian cosmic hierarchy 
grounded at every level in strict precedence and command. 
 Still, if Lucifer can deny Constantius any status in a cosmic hierarchy, and even require 
obedience to himself as a bishop of the Church, he cannot entirely avoid the force of Constantius’ basic 
demand, buttressed by clear Scriptural citations, for respect and (limited) obedience. In dealing with this 
challenge, then, and in drawing further analogies from the Scriptures for his prophetic, priestly, and 
Apostolic authority, Lucifer begins in De non parcendo to portray Constantius in a light quite foreign to 
De apostaticis regibus: as a non-Christian, even pagan ruler. No longer is Constantius to be analogized to 
wicked but believing kings commanding idolatry—he is now in no sense a Christian at all.  
In Lucifer’s rhetoric, this assertion is closely connected to the foregoing arguments about the 
proper response of a Christian to priestly and episcopal authority: “If you had been a Christian, you 
would not have despised him whom God ordained to instruct his people” (32).132 Disobedience to 
episcopal authority is in itself evidence of non-Christian status.  
Lucifer buttresses this claim, however, with even more startling arguments. Most strikingly, 
Lucifer declares that Constantius is not a Christian because he sheds blood, because he has recourse to 
 
132 Si fuisses Christianus, non contempsisses eum quem deus ordinaverit ad instruendam plebem suam. 
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the sword at all, in contradiction to Christ’s commandment that “He who lives by the sword will die by 
the sword” (Matthew 26:52): “For I have said to you: It is not lawful for Christians to kill, for it is right 
that Christians should suffer injury, not give it, and be killed[, not kill]; [...] therefore I will not be able 
now to call you a Christian, but in truth a bandit or a gladiator” (25).133 This demand for absolute 
pacifism is striking not only for its contradiction of what would soon come to be the Christian consensus 
(although with numerous analogues in previous Christian thought),134 but also for the fact that, on its 
face, it would seem to render it impossible for any Emperor, no matter how orthodox, to be considered 
a Christian in Lucifer’s eyes.135 Of course, as Lucifer makes clear, Constantius’ crime is not just that he 
uses the sword, but against whom he uses it: “For you ought not to kill for Christ those who declare that 
they are Christians” (25).136 If Constantius is in fact a persecutor and killer of Christians, then he 
immediately becomes analogous to all those figures from Jewish and Christian history remembered as 
persecutors and tyrants. Strikingly, though, even here, Lucifer offers Constantius a choice of analogues: 
if he repents of his heresy and persecution, he can be compared to the Apostle Paul, the persecutor 
brought to repentance and turned into a hero of the Faith (26, 28). If he fails to take this offer, however, 
he will immediately become an analogue to a string of pagan tyrants, from Antiochus Ephiphanes, the 
 
133 Quia dixerim tibi: Christianis non licet interficere, quia pati non facere dignum sit iniuriam Christianos, interfici; [...] non te 
utique iam Christianum poterimus nuncupare, sed plane latronem uel gladiatorem. 
134 See e.g. Tertullian, De Corona, Origen, Contra Celsum 8.69-75.  
135 As Laconi 2001, 60, (cf. Laconi 2004, 115-118) notes, however, this doctrine also sets a strict upper limit to the possible 
means of resistance allowable to Lucifer and his fellow Nicenes. Constantius, even if he is the Antichrist himself, cannot be dealt 
with via tyrannicide, but only through non-violent disobedience, ecclesiastical sanction, and/or episcopal admonition. Likewise, 
Laconi 2004, 114-115 argues, correctly in my judgment, that despite the pitch of his rhetoric and his emphasis on ecclesiastical 
penalties Lucifer never allows for the possibility of the legal application to heretics of corporal punishment or death. The fact 
that it is Lucifer of Cagliari, out of all the bishops of the 4th century, who most clearly rejects any possibility of religious coercion 
should give pause to theses like those of Drake 2000, esp. 409-440, that Christian religious coercion can be explained by “the 
stilling of voices that might have spoken for moderation” (418) in favor of more “zealous” (420) voices and a “militant wing or 
faction” (438) within the Church. In the ecclesiastical conflicts of the 350s, it was frequently, and arguably normatively, the 
most zealous voices that opposed religious coercion and more moderate voices that favored and encouraged it in the interests 
of establishing unity in the context of larger and more heterogenous groups. 
136 Debes etenim pro Christo non Christianos se clamitantes interficere. 
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Gentile persecutor immortalized in the foundational martyr-narratives of the Maccabean Revolt (12, 22, 
etc.), to the Holofernes bloodily murdered by the Jewish heroine Judith (10-11),137 and, finally, and most 
importantly, to the Antichrist himself. 
 This conclusion relies in part on a parallel string of argumentation, one that again provisionally 
grants Constantius a certain religious authority of his own. Early on in De non parcendo, Lucifer 
rhetorically asks Constantius “by what authority” (qua auctoritate, 1) he has become an Arian, and 
immediately supplies an answer: “For whether you say that you have been admonished in a dream or 
that you wish as a prophet to instruct us, you are an enemy of God” (2).138 As in De non conveniendo, 
from Lucifer’s point of view it is quite possible that Constantius is in some sense a prophet, who is doing 
all that he does because “you were admonished and this was spoken to you in a dream” (1).139 If this is 
true, however, there can be no doubt about the source of such inspiration: “This was said to you by the 
Prince of Demons” (2).140 Again, the political-theological concept by which the ruler was able to receive 
special enlightenment from God, of crucial importance both for Eusebius’ system of monarchical cosmic 
order and for Constantine’s highly practical claims to speak on theology and wield authority over 
bishops, is accepted, but reimagined in a markedly negative direction. If this heretical ruler of a merely 
earthly kingdom is in fact inspired, it can only be by the Devil.  
In this ascription of diabolic inspiration to his opponent, Lucifer is once again bending 
heresiological norms in a highly political direction. If, as Lucifer believes, the Devil was the one who 
 
137 Judith has the dubious honor of being the only woman treated by Lucifer as a direct analogue for his own status and 
activities. This is partly by way of contrast, however: as he argues, if a woman was given by God the right to boldly kill an enemy 
of her people, how much more is it right for him, a bishop, to oppose Constantius with words? (11). 
138 Siue etenim te somnio dicas admonitum siue te prophetam uelis adstruere nobis, inimicus dei es. 
139 Somnio es admonitus et dictum est ad te. 
140 Hoc tibi a daemonum dictum est principe. 
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inspired Arius to concoct his heresy (1), and if Constantius in claiming divine enlightenment is in fact 
inspired by the Devil (2), then this Roman Emperor can be compared to a whole new range of analogues 
from the Scriptures: the false prophets whom Moses commands the people of Israel to stone to death 
(Deuteronomy 13:1-5), the evil shepherds, wolves not sparing the flock, that Paul warns his fellow 
pastors about just before his death (Acts 20:18-21), and, again, and most notably, the Antichrist himself. 
After all, if, as 1 John asserts, there are many Antichrists already in the world (1 John 2:18) and the spirit 
of God and the spirit of Antichrist are to be discerned based on whether they confess that Christ has 
come in the flesh (1 John 4:1-3), then Constantius’ claims to heretical inspiration can mean nothing 
other than that the spirit of Antichrist dwells within him: “When, finally, you try to destroy the 
ὁμοούσιος τῷ πατρί, as the Greeks say, while we Romans say ‘of one substance,’ you announce that you 
are among those false prophets and among the Antichrists” (24).141 The inspiring and enlightening 
presence of divine superior within earthly political ruler has become the physical incarnation of 
everything opposed to Christ. 
Τhis association with both the Antichrist and other pagan tyrant figures allows Lucifer to cite 
Daniel’s prophecy of the four beasts and compare Constantius with the fourth beast, which he 
understands to be the Antichrist himself.142 In this, Lucifer admittedly does not go so far as to assert 
absolutely that Constantius is the one and only Antichrist—though he does go quite far in that direction, 
farther than at any other point in his corpus. At the very least, Lucifer asserts, given his heresy, his 
persecution of Christians, and his pretensions to tyranny and prophecy, Constantius clearly possesses 
 
141 Cum denique homoousion to patri, quod dicunt Graeci, nos vero Romani dicimus unius substantiae cum patre, illum esse 
deestruere temptatis, utique et vos de illis esse pseudoprophetis et inter antichristos pronuntiaritis. 
142 The fourth beast is generally considered by modern scholarship to be a coded reference to Antiochus Ephiphanes—fitting 
given Lucifer’s prominent association of Constantius with Antiochus here and elsewhere. The association of this beast with the 
Antichrist, however, is something of a commonality in early Christian discourse (see e.g. Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses 5.25.3, 
5.26, Origen, Against Celsus 6.46). 
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the spirit of Antichrist and so “will not be able to be understood as anything other than either the 
precursor of the Antichrist, or the Antichrist himself” (31).143 Indeed, though Lucifer overwhelmingly 
favors the term antichristi praecursor while never explicitly addressing Constantius as the Antichrist 
himself, it is difficult to discover any real difference between the two: “You are not less in faithlessness, 
Constantius, than the Antichrist; for you do not stop devouring the servants of God with iron teeth” 
(31).144 It is precisely because Constantius, after being inspired by the Devil to profess heresy, has as 
Emperor been empowered to inflict large-scale violence on his ecclesiastical opponents that he can be 
identified only with the very worst of Christian analogues.145 
Here, as in De regibus apostaticis, the eschatological magnitude of Constantius’ crimes is 
reflective of the extent of his kingdom. In De non parcendo, for the first time in his corpus, Lucifer 
repeatedly asserts the universality of Constantius’ power, extending the effects of his evil to totus orbis, 
the whole world. This is a specific, and deliberate, echo of the cosmic and universalizing rhetoric favored 
by both Constantine and his son—though here the universality of Constantius’ authority is not a sign of 
his cosmic status and divine favor, but rather of their opposite. It is precisely the universality of his 
Empire, along with the fact that he is a Christian Emperor, ruling over Christians, that makes Constantius 
so much worse than all the past analogues of evil in the Scriptures: “But it is not difficult to judge how 
much greater you are in wickedness than Judas Iscariot, since indeed you have brought together the 
whole world to deny his divinity, while Judas only betrayed the Lord to those who had not yet come to 
believe in him; you, on the other hand, have thought it worthy even to provoke those who had already 
 
143 Poteris alius esse intellegi nisi aut praecursor antichristi aut antichristus. 
144 Non minor es, Constanti, incredulitate ab antichristo; nam dentibus ferreis dei servos devorando non desinis. 
145 Laconi 2001, 30 notes the rhetorical similarity between Lucifer’s use of the Christian “Antichrist”—the ultimate illegitimate 
political figure— as a point of comparison for an existing ruler with the use in Imperial panegyrics of negative figures of political 
usurpation or disorder such as Catiline (also implicitly compared to Constantius by Lucifer in Moriundum esse 12). 
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come to believe in him to deny his deity” (26).146 The two most religiously positive aspects of the 
Constantinian Empire in the eyes of most contemporaries—its universal extent and its pervasive public 
Christianity—have become in Lucifer’s hands signs of eschatological evil.  
All these factors make of Constantius, not merely a tyrannus such as those attacked by previous 
pagan orators, but rather the “tyrant of all tyrants” (3),147 far worse in both his political and religious 
crimes than any ruler before him. In this direct rhetorical equation of persecution of Christians, political 
tyranny, bestial character, and Satanic status, Lucifer is again employing a tradition of political rhetoric 
invented by Constantine himself, who in his public acts and speeches had pervasively associated tyranny 
with persecution of Christians while portraying his rivals as (serpentine and therefore Satanic) 
monstrous beasts overthrown by himself in parallel to Christ’s defeat of Satan.148 Lucifer has once again, 
then, taken the legitimizing rhetoric of the Constantinian Empire and turned it against itself. The 
universal subordinate ruler, appointed by God to govern the human realm, has become the universal 
traitor; the Christian Emperor has become, in only a few steps, the emblem of everything opposed to 
Christianity. A polemical precedent has thereby been created by which an Emperor, even a Christian, 
guilty in the eyes of his fellows of heresy can be publicly treated, not merely as an erring but believing 
king, but as the Satanic embodiment of all evil, to be opposed by every possible means.  
In all of this, Lucifer’s construction of his own priestly and episcopal role and authority relies on 
explicitly political language—not only potestas149 and oboedientia, seen above, but also the most 
 
146 Ceterum quantum in scelere sis eminentior ab Scarioth luda, non est laboris aestimare, quandoquidem tu ad eius 
diuinitatem negandam omnem conuocaueris orbem, ludas uero solis illis dominum tradiderit qui in eum necdum crediderant; 
tu contra etiam eos prouocare dignatus es ad negandam eius deitatem qui iam crediderant. 
147 Tyrannorum omnium tyrannum. 
148 Lenski 2016, 33-37. Such “bestial motifs” had been used even more recently by Constantius himself in his propaganda efforts 
against Magnentius (see e.g. Omissi 2018, 171-180). 
149 It is notable that in the next century, Pope Gelasius’ construction of a dyarchy between Church and State, Pope and 
Emperor, will rely on a carefully-demarcated distinction between the auctoritas possessed by bishops and the potestas of 
secular rulers and the Emperor (Gelasius, Epistula 12, also frequently cited by its incipit famuli vestrae potestatis). For Lucifer, 
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charged “Imperial” word of all: 150 “indeed you ought to obey me when I reproach you with all 
imperium” (23).151 Similar political language, in turn, is used by Lucifer in describing the nature of the 
crime committed by Constantius: “You are denying the eternal divine majesty of the only Son of God” 
(3).152 Lucifer’s account of the four beasts from Daniel, likewise, ends with a ringing affirmation of the 
rewards promised both to Christ and his servants: “And the kingdom and power and greatness of kings 
was given to the saints of the Most High God” (30, cf. Daniel 7:18).153 For Lucifer, he and Constantius, 
bishop and Emperor, share in essence the same sort of power and authority, which to be in any way 
legitimate must be ultimately derived from that possessed by God and shared in totally by his Son and 
Spirit. Constantius has the authority to act as he does either because he is a king, in which case his 
power is either that one power possessed by Christ and his saints or a Satanic counterfeit—or he is in 
some sense a prophet, in which case his power is still either that one power possessed by Christ and his 
saints or a Satanic counterfeit. If Lucifer is right about all this, right about the essential unity of divine 
and cosmic and religious and political power, right about his own episcopal authority, right about 
Constantius’ beliefs and actions, then it is difficult to see how Constantius can, in fact, be anything other 
than the Antichrist. That he himself is wrong is, of course, not a possibility Lucifer admits. 
 
 
however, no such clear distinction exists either in terminology or in thought; there is one form of power and command, deriving 
from the one kingdom of Christ and the Father, over which he and Constantius are essentially in competition. 
150 In context, this is an explicit reference to Lucifer’s Vetus Latina quotation of Titus 2:15: haec, inquit Tito beatus apostolus, 
loquere et exhortare et argue cum omni imperio; nemo te contemnat, with imperio used to translate the Greek ἐπιταγή, 
“command, injunction.” 
151 Utique me cum omni te corripientem imperio audire debes, non contemnere.  
152 Qui sis negans aeternam unici filii dei diuinam maiestatem. 






Moriundum esse pro Dei Filio 
“The Necessity of Dying for the Son of God” 
This is conventionally and logically dated as the last of Lucifer’s polemical works, and stands 
clearly apart from those we have examined thus far, in content, rhetoric, use of sources, and above all in 
its construction of the relationship between Lucifer and Constantius. In Lucifer’s recounting, 
“Constantius” has gone from making arguments to simply making threats: “You say: ‘Deny the Son of 
God, or the power of my kingship will kill you’” (11).154 Lucifer, too, is no longer attempting to craft any 
sort of positive, constructive relationship with his adversary, whether as prophet to sacral king or bishop 
to erring Christian. This Lucifer asserts at the very beginning of Moriundum esse, arguing that since the 
Scriptures command not to answer a fool in his folly (Proverbs 26:4), the best thing for him to do is to 
maintain total silence towards Constantius from now on. However, “Because I learned that you still 
applaud yourself for the power of your arms and the vain dominion of your imperium [...] I wished in this 
book to particularly make it known to your sacrilegious polluted mind that in all those things in which 
you think you are great you are actually wretched, and that all the frenzy of your torture (carnificina) is 
despised by the servants of God” (1).155 Lucifer’s main purpose in this work, then, is simply to assert, 
again and again, that he will not bend to threats or imprisonment or torture, that he and his fellows will 
reign with Christ in heaven, while both Constantius and the Empire of which he is the head will perish 
eternally: “We want you to have fixed and clear in your mind that you are going to pass away, along with 
 
154 Dicis: negate dei filium aut interficiet vos virtus regni mei. 
155 Quia adhuc de armorum tuorum potestate et uana imperii tui dominatione temet collegi plaudere [...] his omnibus quibus te 
putas magnum esse te miserum contemnique omnem carnificinae tuae rabiem a seruis dei uolui isto praesertim libro notum 
sacrilegio funestatae facere menti tuae. 
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your temporal fleeting fragile corruptible kingdom, and come to eternal pain (unless you provide for 
yourself while there is still room to do so), but the Christians will come to eternal rest, will obtain an 
incorruptible kingdom” (1).156 Now, more clearly than ever, there are simply two kingdoms, one of which 
will pass away, and one of which will endure forever.157 Between them there is little possibility of 
reconciliation. 
The starkness of Moriundum esse is derived in part, I believe, from a change in circumstances, as 
this is the only one of Lucifer’s works capable of being reliably dated to after Constantius’ promulgation 
of the ecumenical homoian creed at the Council of Constantinople. Far from listening to Lucifer’s 
admonitions and repenting, Constantius has gone even farther down the part of heresy and violence, 
and has caused the assembled bishops of the whole world to join him in his sin. Because of this change 
in circumstances, Lucifer has been or would be shortly joined in writing overtly anti-Imperial polemic by 
many of his fellow Nicenes, as the various factions of bishops angered by their overruling at the 
Emperor’s will, and soon empowered by the rebellion of Julian, began to openly agitate against 
Constantius and his authority. In this environment, Lucifer is no longer a lone voice in the wilderness, 
but a figure on the forefront of ecclesiastical and political affairs.  
This difference in circumstances is reflected strongly in Lucifer’s generic qualities. For the first 
time, he moves beyond the Scriptures to the (uncredited) use and wholesale quotation of works by 
other early Christian authors, in particular Lactantius’ Institutiones Divinae (“The Divine Institutes”) and 
De mortibus persecutorum (“On the Deaths of the Persecutors”) and several works by Cyprian of 
Carthage, including the (pseudonymous) De laude martyrii (“On the Praise of Martyrdom”) and a 
 
156 Te enim cum temporali caduco fragili corruptibili regno tuo transiturum et ad aeternam poenam, nisi tibi dum est locus 
prouideris, peruenturum, Christianos uero ad aeternam uenturos requiem, incorruptibile regnum consecuturos fixum 
manifestumque habere te uolumus. 
157 Cf. Laconi 2004, 80. 
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number of his letters.158 This reflects, in my judgment, both an elaboration of Lucifer’s writing style in 
the interest of reaching a wider audience,159 and also a convenient aid to him in drawing with the 
maximum of emphasis the analogy central to this work. Lucifer and his fellow persecuted Nicenes are, 
literally and unequivocally, martyrs;160 Constantius is therefore a pagan persecutor, like Nero or Decius 
or Diocletian or Galerius or the other figures against whom Cyprian and Lactantius had written in their 
own times.161  
It is in my judgment extremely notable that it is only here, in what is perhaps the last of Lucifer’s 
writings, that he employs within his new genre overt, literal martyr discourse. Indeed, in retrospect it is 
notable how totally he avoids, in his other works,162 comparisons with one of the most unifying and 
important set of discourses in early Christianity, the prototypical conflict between a wicked Emperor 
 
158 For a fuller list of citations, including a few more speculative ones, see Richard Flower’s recent translation of Moriundum 
esse pro dei filio in Flower 2016, 141-186, as well as his discussion of Moriundum esse in Flower 2013 163-177, and the 
extensive treatment of Moriundum esse in language and content in Laconi 2004, 153-169. 
159 Moriundum esse is by far the most rhetorically embellished of Lucifer’s works (as Ugenti 2001, 111, notes, Moriundum esse 
is “notoriamente il piu elaborato [...] tra gli opuscoli luciferiani”), with more use of stylistic features such as asyndeton and 
repetition (particularly in the emphatic deployment of long lists of parallel or synonymous terms), and more elaborate sentence 
structures. In contrast to the relatively straightforward and even conversational style of his other works, this lends Lucifer’s 
condemnations in Moriundum esse pro dei Filio a furious, breathless sense of urgency. For a study of the style of this text, 
focusing particularly on Lucifer’s extensive, albeit idiosyncratic, use of Latin prose rhythm and clausulae, see Ugenti 2001, while 
for a general overview of Lucifer’s Latin style, see Diercks 1978, lxxi-lxxxix. 
160 Cf. Richard Flower, who discusses the phenomenon of 4th century Christian bishops engaging in “auto-hagiography” by 
comparing themselves to Christian martyrs (Flower 2013 127-177), and does an excellent job of bringing out more indirect 
echoes of past martyr discourses in his section in Moriundum esse (Flower 2013 163-177). In this case, the trope of comparing 
the exiled bishops to martyrs is likely drawn from Lucifer’s patron Liberius of Rome, who had been among the first to clearly 
make this identification in a letter written to Lucifer, Eusebius of Vercelli, and Dionysius of Milan shortly after their exile at the 
Council of Milan (but before his own exile) in 355 (preserved in Hilary, Adversus Valentem et Ursacium Series B 7.2).  
161 Unlike in De Athanasio (1.12, 1.34), or even De non parcendo (21-23, etc.), however, these comparisons are only implicit, as 
Lucifer never directly cites any specific historical persecutors in Moriendum esse, Roman or otherwise. Yet this in a sense brings 
Lucifer even closer to the martyr-discourses he is imitating, since his focus is not on the characterization of Constantius the 
persecutor, but rather on the characterization and encouragement of Lucifer and his fellow “martyrs.” 
162 The closest Lucifer comes to this elsewhere, besides the few comparisons with pagan persecutors and judges in De 
Athanasio (1.12, 1.34, 2.23, etc.), is his crowning comparison of Constantius with Antiochus Ephiphanus in De non parcendo 21-
23, as well as his comparison of Constantius with the Pharisees and Jewish priests who had persecuted the first Apostles and 
killed Stephen at 16 and 22. In both cases, however, it is clear that a choice is being offered to Constantius between this 
comparison and others (most notably that with the persecutor-turned-Apostle Paul); and it is never directly asserted that 
Constantius is currently engaged in martyring Lucifer and his fellows. Still, this part of De non parcendo is a clear step towards 
the straightforward martyr discourse of Moriundum esse. 
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trying to compel belief and the faithful Christian suffering for failing to comply. The reasoning behind 
this forbearance is, I think, multiple. First, on a purely rhetorical basis, existing Christian martyr-
narratives and discourses did not provide a sufficient or immediately obvious model for invective against 
particular living Emperors, since they had not generally focused on or even included addresses to living 
persecutors. Their purpose, generally speaking, was rather to celebrate the courage of the martyrs and 
encourage fellow Christians to continue resisting than to condemn the actions of their persecutors, 
which were either taken for granted or else deplored as mistaken attacks on actually loyal citizens.163 
Then, of course, Constantius was a Christian Emperor, one who made his Christianity a sizeable part of 
his public presentation. He was one of the first such Emperors to ever exist and, as I have repeatedly 
emphasized, no rhetorical or theological system had existed prior to this for dealing with or even 
conceptualizing such a figure. That Lucifer would begin by effectively conceding Constantius’ established 
Imperial and Christian status is only natural, just as it is natural that it might take a great many steps of 
logical progression, the building up of a great deal of anger and hatred and the closing off of avenues of 
communication, for Lucifer to reach the point of simply and unequivocally labeling the Christian 
Emperor a pagan persecutor and maker of martyrs. I believe that in my discussion of Lucifer’s corpus I 
have rendered this progression more transparent than it might otherwise have been. Then, too, at least 
rhetorically, Lucifer in every one of his other works is engaged to a significant degree in the construction 
of an intellectual and moral relationship between himself and Constantius, one where Constantius is in 
some way compelled to respect and even obey him, repent of his sins according to Lucifer’s 
understanding of what those sins are, and subscribe to the Christian Faith according to Lucifer’s own 
understanding of that Faith. There is little or no relationship between a martyr and his persecutor 
besides a straightforward dialectic of force and resistance, assertion and non-compliance. In this 
 
163 Cf. Flower 2013, 61-68. 
490 
 
dialectic, the persecutor possesses greater power and is the one applying pressure, interrogating, 
questioning, acting on the martyr, whose basic response is resistance, noncompliance, rejection. This is 
a purely oppositional relationship, a narrative with only one acceptable ending—the death of the martyr 
and the eventual punishment, in heaven and/or on earth, of the persecutor. A Lucifer seeking actually to 
influence Constantius, direct him, teach him, command him, as a fellow judge and ruler, a bishop caring 
for his flock, or a prophet chastising his king, would not immediately seek out such narratives.  
In Moriundum esse, all this has changed. Lucifer is now quite explicit that, like the martyrs, his 
only recourse is resistance until death to the luridly-described violence and threats of Constantius the 
persecuting tyrant. This work contains numerous direct assertions that Constantius has murdered his 
religious enemies, exiled them, imprisoned them, and reduced them to extreme states of penury and 
hunger:  
But it is impossible to narrate what is being done by you to us, we who have wished you well 
and are now desiring that it turn out well for you, we who do not stop praying to God 
ceaselessly for you; you despoil us, you proscribe us, you slaughter us with the sword, you 
punish us in various ways, and do not let the bodies which you have decreed to tear apart be 
buried, you prevent us from receiving alms, you have filled all the mines and all the places which 
are thought worthy to be called places of exile with our number, the number of those who resist 
your cunning; even then you do not stop banishing us, who are innocent, again and again,164 you 
do not stop troubling us with hunger, thirst, nakedness (3).165  
For Lucifer, these state-sanctioned afflictions are little more than torture, designed to break the 
will and force the compliance of Constantius’ enemies. No longer a tempter enticing to sin with Imperial 
favors as in De non conveniendo, he is now little more than a common torturer (8), a demon-possessed 
 
164 A reference to the practice (apparently common under Constantius) of forcibly moving exiles from place to place, which 
Lucifer treats in Moriundum esse as a form of torture designed to increase hardship, deprivation, and isolation from allies and 
hence to break the will of the exile. Lucifer himself seems to have been exiled several successive times to different locations: as 
far as can be constructed, first to Germanicia in Syria, then to Eleutheropolis in Palestine, and finally to the Thebaid in Egypt (cf. 
Diercks 1978, xiii-xiv). 
165 Hoc uero inenarrabile est quod fit aduersum nos a te, qui tibi bene voluimus atque ut contingat desiderantes sumus 
deumque iugiter obsecrantes non desinimus; spolias, proscribis, mactas gladio, varie punis nec corpora quae laniare sanxisti 
sepeliri permittis, eleemosynam fieri prohibes, omnia metalla omniaque loca, exilia uocari quae putabantur digna, nostro tuae 
calliditati resistentium replesti numero; relegando insontes, fame siti nuditate uexando non desistis. 
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animal lacking reason and driven by a thirst for human blood:166 “Because the one who has taken 
possession of your mind [i.e. the Devil] is not able to bear the truth, he goads your bestial mind to 
trouble us as cruelly as possible, to torture us with exquisite kinds of pains” (3).167 The word carnificina, 
“flesh-carving, torture, execution,” occurs ten times in Moriundum esse, as opposed to a mere three 
times in the rest of Lucifer’s corpus. The physical, fleshly, bloody nature of Constantius’ crimes and of 
Lucifer’s sufferings plays in Moriundum esse a crucial rhetorical role168—one that ties Lucifer and his 
fellows not only to the Christian martyrs of past generations, but also to the sufferings of Christ himself 
(2).169  
Fittingly, then, the Scriptural citations and analogues that Lucifer brings forward in his work are 
exclusively confined to those immediately applicable to martyr narratives and discourses. The quotation 
of extended Scriptural narratives, so crucial to all of Lucifer’s other works, has largely disappeared. The 
only one offered in Moriundum esse is that of the rich man and Lazarus, whose meaning in this context 
is made very clear: “You will fall headlong and come more swiftly than speech to the deepest depths, 
from which without a doubt you will see those whom you now unjustly persecute, as then that rich man 
 
166 Cf. Laconi 2001, particularly 36-54, as well as Laconi 2004, 99-113, who notes Lucifer’s conflation of the Classical rhetorical 
and philosophical idea of the irrational animalistic furor of the tyrannus and other social deviants with the characteristically 
Jewish-Christian idea of demonic possession, and points out the importance of this conflation to the later juridical treatment of 
religious and social deviancy in the Codex Theodosianus. This confirms Lucifer’s status as an innovator of a new Christian 
rhetoric of political delegitimation and makes him a key link in the process of the integration of this rhetoric into the Roman 
juridical and legal realm. 
167 Quia sustinere ueritatem ille qui tuam obsedit mentem non potest, instigat tuum ferinum animum, ut nos quam acerrime 
vexes, exquisitis poenarum generibus excrucies. 
168 Laconi 2004, 150, highlights the enormous, almost overwhelming, variatio of terms for physical violence, weaponry, 
implements of torture, and bodily affliction that Lucifer makes use of in describing these tortures. 
169 It is worth noting here (cf. Laconi 2004, 125-127) that this emphasis on the imitation of Christ’s activities on earth, achieved 
through the imitation of martyrs who had themselves imitated Christ, provides a specifically theological lens through which to 
view Lucifer’s extensive use elsewhere in his works of positive and negative exemplars for himself and Constantius. While the 
use of exempla was of course a standard feature of Classical rhetoric, Lucifer’s emphasis in Moriundum esse on the 
achievement of salvation precisely through the imitation of and participation in Christ’s and the martyrs’ sufferings, glory, and 
eternal divine kingdom, like his emphasis elsewhere on Constantius’ actual inspiration by the same Devil that had inspired evil 
figures of the past, grants to his literary exemplars an active presence and importance that is distinctively Christian. 
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saw Lazarus, in the bosom of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, the friends of God, and of the prophets, 
Apostles, and martyrs” (14).170 Here, Constantius’s royal status is irrelevant, except inasmuch as it means 
that he, like the rich man in this parable, possessed greater power and security in life than those who, 
like Lazarus, endured suffering and deprivation at his hands. Otherwise, Lucifer simply cites verses on 
the rewards promised to those who faithfully suffer persecution for God and on the punishments 
promised to those who reject him.171 These verses are for the most part directed as exhortations to 
Lucifer himself and his fellows, not to Constantius. They are not attempts to create a constructive 
relationship between Emperor and bishop; they are reminders rather, for both Constantius and Lucifer, 
of their present situation and what awaits them, and encouragements, for Lucifer and his fellows, to 
stand firm like the martyrs of old and continue resisting until the end. In the hands of Lucifer, the 
ancient model of the suffering martyr resisting to the point of death takes on a new and deadly meaning 
of political delegitimation—one that stands in strong and irreconcilable contrast to the Constantinian 
emphasis on constructing legitimacy through victory in battle and the proactive dominance of one will 
over others.172 
Still, politics, and political theology in particular, is treated in very relevant ways in this work, 
more explicitly than in all the rest of Lucifer’s corpus. As already stated, the conflict between 
Constantius and his opponents is presented in Moriundum esse as a direct conflict between two 
 
170 Excidemini et praecipitati uenietis dicto citius in altitudinem profundam, unde uisurus sine dubio tu eos quos nunc iniuste 
persequeris, ut tunc ille uidit diues Lazarum in sinu Abrahae Isaac et Iacob amicorum dei et omnium prophetarum apostolorum 
ac martyrum. 
171 Including Matthew 5:11-12 (“Blessed are the persecuted,” etc.), Matthew 10:28 (“Fear not those who kill the body,” etc.), 
and others. 
172 Cf. Diefenbach 2015, 365 n. 53: “In particular, the cultural model of the martyr, which took shape during the empire, 
embodied a concept of Christian identity that manifested itself as a challenge to the social and political order. In contrast to the 
philosopher, who denounced occasional excesses of power as a topical victim of arbitrary tyranny yet indirectly confirmed 
monarchical rule, the model of the martyr was not principally affirmative[.] The questioning of power-relations as a legitimate 
principle of order, bound up in the model of the martyr, remained a formative element of discourse even after Constantine and 
stood in sharp contradiction to the logic of preserving the imperial order by demonstration of superior power.” For the 
importance of the figure of the martyr to Erik Peterson’s theology contra the political theology of Carl Schmitt, see Passos 2018. 
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kingdoms, two powers, and their attendant servants.173 As Sonia Laconi has argued, Lucifer’s polemical 
attack on Constantius is structured around “l’antitesi aeternus imperator-interea imperator, per 
delegittimare il potere temporale e per dichiarare la sua subordinazione a quello divino.”174 Both Christ 
and Constantius are, in a completely literal sense, Emperors, monarchical rulers of kingdoms. Or rather, 
given the ultimately univocal nature of power in Lucifer’s theology, Christ is the one and only Emperor, 
and Constantius, at best, his fleeting shadow. One Emperor and one Empire is eternal—the other is 
temporary, fleeting, fragile, illusory, and destined to pass away (1, etc.). In Moriundum esse, Lucifer’s 
use of Roman Imperial terminology and ideology takes on dimensions, not merely of denigration, but of 
deliberate, and deliberately ironic, negation.175 Throughout his corpus, Lucifer has constructed the 
singular authority of Father and Son in large part through terms and analogies drawn from the office and 
authority of the Roman Emperor. In Moriundum esse, it becomes clear that it is Christ, not Constantius, 
that is the sole proper referent of all these terms and the power they denote.  
As Lucifer asks rhetorically,  “If any one of your soldiers in this fragile imperium has kept faith 
with you, a mortal with a mortal [...], how much more ought we, the soldiers of his mercy, keep faith 
with God, the Eternal Emperor?” (11).176 This antithesis, as Laconi notes, shadows that used in previous 
Imperial panegyric between the legitimate Emperor and the illegitimate usurper, a theme that Lucifer 
uses to depict Constantius himself as an usurper, since he “pretende di esercitare un potere che non gli 
 
173 Cf. Williams 1951 16.  
174 Laconi 2001, 31, cf. Laconi 2004, 89. 
175 As Laconi 2001, 35-36, (cf. Laconi 2004, 92-93) notes, characteristic Roman terms denoting Imperial power and authority 
always appear with an attached adjective denoting fragility or temporariness or harmfulness—except, of course, when used in 
reference to divine power. This rhetoric clearly “esprimono condanna e volunta di delegittimazione” (35). Likewise, as Laconi 
2004, 90-91, points out, Lucifer in Moriendum esse makes solely ironic use of panegyrical titles (iustissimus, prudentissimus, 
etc.), while countering them with new titles expressive of, not the greatness of Imperial virtue, but rather the immensity of 
Imperial vice (crudelissimus, iniustissimus, etc.). 
176 si enim quilibet militum tuorum in hac fragili imperii tui militia tibi mortali mortalis fidem seruauerit [...] quanto magis deo 
aeterno imperatori fides est seruanda a nobis eius clementiae militibus? 
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compete, un potere che non puo venirgli da Dio, in quanto egli non solo e un trasgressore della legga 
divina, ma ha anche osato preporre il suo regno a Dio, sottomettendo al suo potere la Chiesa.”177 By 
attempting to give his essentially temporary and illusory kingship some grounding in eternity and the 
divine order, Constantius has acted just like a usurper trying to claim the Empire. He has pretended to 
exercise a form and degree of authority that is not his, but God’s178—and therefore, through God’s law 
and the Church, Lucifer’s as well. By his presumptuous, unrepentant wickedness, he has become, not 
merely anti-Christ, but anti-Emperor as well. 
The overall effect of all of this is to turn straightforward theological doctrine on the eternity of 
God over and against the fleetingness of earthly things into a potent weapon of political 
delegitimation—a weapon such as no previous pagan orator or Christian bishop had ever had recourse 
to in their dealings with a living Emperor. In Lucifer’s final, mocking treatment, the Emperor Constantius 
is little more than a parody of Christ the Emperor. 
This intermingling of theology and political rhetoric is underscored by Lucifer’s strident Nicene 
beliefs, reflected in a theory of divine and cosmic unity for which the one eternal divine Kingdom of 
Father, Son, and Spirit, expressed on earth through the Church and the bishops, is in a real sense the 
only kingdom there is. The perfect unity of Father, Son, and Spirit, Lucifer’s point of unbending 
insistence against all non-Nicenes, is described in Moriundum esse in starkly political terms, and closely 
linked to Lucifer’s threats of punishment against Constantius: “Now I want you to know that, unless you 
convert in time, unless you believe, as we do, that the only Son of God always has reigned with the 
 
177 Laconi 2001, 31. 
178 As Laconi 2004, 88-89, points out, this panegyric theme (of the sacrilegious wickedness of usurpation and opposition to 
Imperial power) itself depended upon a strong sense of the essential sacrality of the Emperor’s person and office. It is, to say 
the least, a dramatic rhetorical reversal for Lucifer to use this discourse to pervasively undermine Imperial sacrality and 
authority by portraying it as an attempted usurpation of the office of God himself—depicted, with Christ and the Holy Spirit, as 
a multi-personal, sacral ruler. 
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Father, and that the Father never existed without the Son, and that there is only one Kingdom of the 
Father and his only Son and that the Father and Son possess only one Deity, you will perish forever” 
(12).179 It is precisely this one kingdom, shared in equally by the Father and the Son, that Lucifer and his 
fellow martyrs, suffering with and for the Son of God, will possess as their own forever: “Do you believe, 
or do you not believe, that those who die because of the only Son of God will possess the Kingdom of 
Heaven? If you do believe, why do you compel us to deny his [or “its”] eternity?” (13).180 What is at 
stake in Constantius’ attacks on the unity and eternity of the Son of God, then, is precisely the status and 
hope of those Christians, including the martyrs, who hope to share in the one, eternal Kingdom that 
Christ shares with the Father. A Son who was not in the fullest sense king along with the Father could 
not give such kingship to others; a Son created in time, with a beginning and an end, could not give an 
eternal kingdom, with no beginning and no end (10). What is at stake in the Arian controversy, then, is 
not just the nature of God, or even human ecclesiastical and political structure, but salvation itself. 
Lucifer makes central to his argument the famous “Christ hymn” of Philippians 2:6-8, both in its 
discussion of Christ being “in the form of God” and equal to the Father (10), and in its central theme of 
Christ’s humility in lowering himself to human condition (12). Both themes are central not only to 
Lucifer’s argument that his theology is correct and Constantius’ is wrong, but even more to his 
contention that he and his fellow persecuted Nicenes, despite their humble and suffering condition, are 
in fact going to possess the same eternal Kingdom of the Father that the divine-human Christ possesses 
and has always possessed in eternity. In opposition to the new Imperial homoian theology, and in 
keeping with the arguments recently innovated by Hilary of Poitiers, Lucifer is adamant that Christ must 
 
179 Nunc illud te scire uolo, quia, nisi te mature conuerteris , nisi credideris, ut nos, unicum filium dei semper cum patre 
regnasse et numquam fuisse patrem sine filio, unum etiam esse regnum patris et unici eius filii unamque deitatem possidere 
patrem et filium, in aeternum te periturum. 
180 Morientes propter deum unicum filium credis an non credis regnum possessuros caelorum? si credis, cur ad eius 
aeternitatem nos inpellis negandam? 
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be declared not just similar, but totally equal to the Father, possessed of one and the same power and 
Kingdom: “The blessed Apostle says that the Son is equal (aequalis) to the Father, showing one Godhead 
of the Father and Son; and you dare, along with the accomplices of your sacrilegious shamelessness and 
the participants in your sacrilege, to say: 181 ‘We cannot make the Son equal (aequare) to the Father or 
compare the Father to the Son’” (10).182 That the Son is totally equal to the Father means, in the first 
place, that he shares totally in the Father’s omnipotence, a fact that for Lucifer is immediately relevant 
for himself and his colleagues in their present plight:  
You will not be able to deny this, when you see Christians throughout the whole world animated 
by an equal and similar ardor of virtue for waging the contest, when you see the uncorrupted 
firmness of faith of the soldiers of Christ, which your detestable charms will not deceive, nor the 
threats of your madness terrify, nor the tortures of your flesh-carving (carnificina) and the 
torments of your cruelty conquer, because indeed that one remains in us and stands with us 
always, who said to the blessed Apostles: ‘I am with you all days, even to the end of the world’ 
(Matthew 20:28). He is present everywhere, because the omnipotent Son is all-powerful, for 
whom there is only one eternity and only one divine power with the Father (4).183  
It is precisely the omnipotence of the suffering Son, equal to that of the Father, that underwrites 
Lucifer’s hope of successful resistance to Constantius. Because the Son is not only similar to, but actually 
equal to, the Father, so too all Christians on earth are empowered to participate in the singular divine 
power of Christ and Father, expressed most tangibly in their unfailing opposition to Constantius’ bloody 
 
181 This is possibly a reference to the creed adopted by the Council of Sirmium in 351, which in Hilary’s Latin translation (De 
synodis 38) reads Non enim exaequamus vel comparamus Filium Patri. Given Lucifer’s direct attacks elsewhere on De synodis 
(see the section on Apologetica responsa below) and the similarity in language, and given that the same article does not appear 
in Athanasius’ Greek version in his own De synodis 27, it is possible that Lucifer is in fact thinking of Hilary’s translation in 
particular. If so, this is the only clear citation of any non-Nicene creed or theological formula in Lucifer’s corpus, and almost the 
only acknowledgment of the literal content of the doctrine supported by Constantius at Sirmium and afterwards. 
182 Apostolus beatus aequalem filium patri dicit, unam deitatem manifestans patris et filii; et tu audes cum sacrilegae audaciae 
tuae satellitibus atque sacrilegii tui conparticipibus dicere: non enim nos possumus aequare aut parare filium patri. 
183 Haec ita esse negare non poteris, quando conspicias pari et simili calore uirtutis Christianos toto in orbe ad gerendum 
certamen animatos, quando uideas militum Christi incorruptam fidei firmitatem quod non detestandae tuae blanditiae 
decipiant, non minae furoris tui terreant, non cruciatus tuae carnificinae ac tormenta crudelitatis deuincant, illo uidelicet in 
nobis manente et nobiscum semper constituto qui ad beatos apostolos dixerit: uobiscum sum omnibus diebus usque ad 
consummationem saeculi. Est ubique praesens, quia omnipotentis sit Filius totum potens, cui cum patre una sit aeternitas 
atque potestas diuina. 
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heresy. It is this singular divine omnipotence that ultimately establishes the superiority of Lucifer’s 
episcopal status to the Imperial authority represented by Constantius, as well as the ultimate reversal of 
positions and power that Lucifer hopes for: “You know, therefore, that to us a greater power (potestas) 
has been divinely given, so that, while you think you are condemning us, we condemn you, while you 
presume to be able to punish us, we are punishing you, Constantius, guilty of sacrilege, since indeed he 
whom you deny thought it worthy to give to us bishops authority (auctoritas), so that whatever we bind 
on earth is bound in heaven” (14, 15).184 It is not the Roman Emperor Constantius, but the Christian 
bishop Lucifer, who holds an office with a clear and permanent basis in the cosmic order. If Constantius’ 
Imperial authority can be disregarded and mocked because of its purely temporary nature, its lack of 
grounding in the one Imperial power of the Son, then Lucifer’s episcopal authority, precisely for the 
same reasons, and even (or, given the power granted here to martyrdom and suffering, especially) in 
the total absence of earthly power, can and must be respected. Because the Son is totally equal to the 
Father, with one and the same divinity, power, and kingdom, Lucifer, the suffering bishop is, at least in 
the light of that eternal kingdom, greater and more powerful than Constantius, the reigning Emperor. 
The totally equal Son has established on earth his kingdom, the same kingdom he has shared 
with the Father in eternity, in and through the Church, which is ruled by the bishops; the Emperor, in 
contrast, rules nothing more than a fleeting temporary kingdom, with no divine power or authority to 
underwrite it whatsoever. Lucifer the exiled bishop can appeal to the very summit of cosmic and divine 
power, expressed in the omnipresent, omnipotent Son, who sanctifies Lucifer’s suffering and establishes 
Lucifer’s authority; Constantius can appeal to nothing more than human authority and the force of his 
arms. It is difficult to overstate the basic importance of this in the development of the Roman Imperial 
 
184 Nobis igitur scias magis datam diuinitus potestatem, ut te, dum damnare nos putas, damnemus, dum punire nos posse 
praesumis, te Constantium sacrilegum puniamus, siquidem ille quem negas dare nobis episcopis suis fuit dignatus auctoritatem, 
ut quae ligauerimus in terris sint ligata et in caelis. 
498 
 
office and the Christian Church alike: the human Emperor no longer has any essential status in the 
cosmic order. If this Emperor does wish to find his place in the one, eternal kingdom of the cosmos, he 
can do so only as part of the Church, as another repentant sinner, under the authority of Lucifer and his 
fellow bishops. The cosmic Emperor has been dethroned. 
5.7:  
Summary and Conclusion 
Among the most consequential figures of the 4th century Christian Church, Lucifer of Cagliari’s 
contribution to theology and politics have long been overlooked due to his reputation in later 
ecclesiastical authors as a schismatic and the more recent dislike shown him by modern scholars. 
Functioning as the primary legate for the bishop of Rome Liberius in his negotiations with the new sole 
ruler of the Roman Empire Constantius, Lucifer quickly distinguished himself as the leader of the 
opposition at the Council of Milan in 355. Following the council’s condemnation of Athanasius, Lucifer 
himself was exiled along with his close allies, and shortly began a remarkable career as an author.  
Unlike his fellow Nicene writers of the 4th century, Lucifer focused all his efforts on the Emperor 
Constantius, in the process creating a fundamentally new genre of anti-Imperial invective aimed at 
personally admonishing the reigning Emperor for his sins, urging him to repent and so be delivered from 
eternal punishment. In De Athanasio, Lucifer commands Constantius to cease his efforts to force him 
and other bishops to condemn the innocent Athanasius, denying the Emperor’s right to act as judge of 
bishops while nevertheless closely associating himself and the Emperor in their shared status as divinely-
appointed judges bound to carry out their duties according to divine law and moral actors tempted 
towards fratricide by the devil. In De regibus apostaticis, Lucifer argues passionately against Constantius’ 
belief that the success of his reign is proof of the correctness of his religious policies, copiously quoting 
stories of prophets and wicked kings of the Hebrew Scriptures to argue for a significant disjunct 
between earthly success and divine favor and craft a relationship between himself and Constantius 
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where Lucifer the bishop, as a divinely-empowered prophet, must be listened to and obeyed by the 
sinful Christian ruler Constantius. In De non conveniendo, Lucifer’s treatment of Constantius’ Imperial 
authority and Christian status takes a harsher turn, as he defends his refusal to participate in 
Constantius’ ecclesiastical projects by appealing to the necessity of avoiding all contact with those who, 
like Constantius and his fellow heretics, are cursed by God and due for divine punishment. At the same 
time, Lucifer portrays Constantius’ Imperial authority and the favors it brings as a deceptive means by 
which the Emperor, like the Serpent of Genesis or a prostitute, entices and seduces helpless bishops into 
sin and eternal damnation. In De non parcendo, Lucifer enters into a direct contest of power with the 
Emperor, arguing for the superiority of his Apostolic and episcopal authority, bestowed directly by God, 
to the merely earthly, transient power of the Empire, an authority which gives him both the right and 
the duty to command, admonish, and even punish the Emperor for his sins. In Moriundum esse, finally, 
Lucifer largely abandons his attempt to forge a constructive relationship with the Emperor in favor of a 
simple warning, based on the martyr-discourses of early Christianity, that Constantius’ earthly imperium 
is little more than an illusionary parody of the eternal kingdom of the omnipotent Christ, directly 
present on earth in the authority of suffering Christian bishops like Lucifer, who will one day share in 
Christ’s kingdom fully in heaven while Constantius’ meaningless power, founded on fundamentally un-
Christian violence, ceases to exist. 
Throughout these works, Lucifer argues for an unequivocal Nicene theology by which Christ 
possesses one and the same divinity, power, honor, and kingdom with the Father, a kingdom and power 
which he has directly established on earth through the Church, tasking subordinate office-holders like 
Lucifer and his fellow bishops with wielding Christ’s own power in the service of doctrinal definition and 
moral admonition. The Roman Emperor ruled over by Constantius, in contrast, has no clear or 
permanent sanction in the divine realm, nor does Constantius’ earthly position grant him any particular 
status in a cosmos dominated by a single kingdom shared in by Father, Son, Spirit, and Christian bishops. 
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The importance of Lucifer’s works in the larger context of the 4th century, however, is not 
merely his theology but his clear demonstration of rhetorical and the theological means by which 
bishops might, where necessary, speak to, directly challenge, and even claim authority over Emperors. 
Still, Lucifer’s narrow focus on individual bishop and individual Emperor made his efforts difficult to 
practically implement in actual social and political systems. It would be left to other bishops to enable 







Similes et Aequales 
Hilary of Poitiers and the Cosmic Unity of the Episcopate 
6.1:  
Hilary 
 In the case of Hilary of Poitiers (died AD 367/8),1 another key figure in the development of 
episcopal opposition to Constantius, the obvious similarities with Lucifer of Cagliari conceal far 
greater differences. Both were Latin-speaking bishops from the Western Empire, intransigent in 
their support for Nicene formulas, exiled by the Emperor Constantius II, and responsible for works of 
theological and political polemic—yet Hilary’s approach to all of these conflicts reveals a radically 
different theological orientation, personal temperament, and approach to the resolution of the 
conflicts of the 4th century. Although he was to be remembered by later generations as malleus 
Arianorum, the “hammer of the Arians,” throughout his career Hilary showed a far greater proclivity 
toward reconciliation and unity, buttressed by a much greater theological subtlety and precision, 
than his Sardinian ally. 
Hilary first appears in history in the mid-350s as the bishop of Poitiers2 in Gaul, involved in 
some sort of ecclesiastical conflict with his fellow Gallic bishop Saturninus of Arles, who had allied 
 
1 According to Jerome (Chronicon 47), Hilary died in the fourth year of the joint reign of Valentinian and Valens, while according 
to Sulpicius Severus (Chronica 2.45), he died in the sixth year after his return to Gaul. Borchardt 1966, 183, notes the divergence 
among scholars over whether this refers to late 367 or early 368. For a review of the available evidence arguing for the 
November 367 date, see Goemans 1968. 
2 The date of Hilary’s election as bishop of Poitiers has been variously given by scholars as 350, 353, and even 355 —based, 
however, on little or no evidence. As Borchardt 1966, 10, succinctly sums up, “it is clear that we do not know the exact date of 
Hilary’s election as bishop of Poitiers.” In the context of the 350s, however, he is clearly a bishop of the younger generation, not 
active at the time of Nicaea or even Serdica. Little or nothing is known about his background; although the 6th century 
hagiographer Venantius Fortunatus asserts his origin from a “noble” family (Vita Hilarii 6), this evidence has been strongly 
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with Constantius following his conquest of the West and thereafter played a key role in facilitating 
his will at the Council of Arles in 353. After a series of events that remain unclear,3 Hilary was exiled 
in 356.4 Like many of his fellow exiled bishops of the 350s, Hilary’s literary production seems to have 
been dramatically increased by the punishment, and practically all of his surviving works date to this 
period. While in exile in Asia Minor,5 Hilary not only produced numerous works of theology and 
polemic, but also managed to attend the Council of Seleucia, attempting in various formats to argue 
for his own (broadly Nicene) theology, refute those of his episcopal opponents, and—most 
ambitiously—reconcile the divided episcopate of the Roman Empire around a common confession 
of faith. In these efforts he met with highly mixed results, although, as we will see, the more 
 
questioned by Gilliard 1984, 165-166, who suggests that it at best refers to birth in the class of provincial landowners, and is 
outright rejected as a hagiographic trope by Doignon 1971, 73, n. 6. 
3 The basic division is between scholars who accept the account, given by Hilary himself in In Constantium 2, that he was exiled 
due to his Nicene beliefs and opposition to Saturninus of Arles, Ursacius, and Valens (e.g. Rocher 1987, 12-15, Borchardt 1966, 
24-31, Simonetti 1975, 220-221, Barnes 1992, Burns 1994, Laconi 2004, 39, Beckwith 2005), and those who connect his exile to 
some form of involvement with the political events of the period, in particular the attempted usurpation of Silvanus (e.g. esp. 
Brennecke 1984b, 223-243, as well as Chadwick 1959, Williams 1991, and Ayres 2004). In my judgment, the fragment of Hilary 
discovered by Smulders 1978 (see section 5.3 below) overwhelmingly tilts the case towards Hilary’s condemnation on a 
religious charge—though this was most likely, as Barnes 1992 and especially Burns 1994, 287-288, argue, only that of refusing 
to subscribe to the decrees of the Council of Milan, not of leading a substantial faction in Gaul. As the analysis of Eric Fournier 
on episcopal exile in Late Antiquity makes clear, however, in a proceeding that required both an episcopal council and active 
Imperial cooperation, and therefore made the position of an individual bishop dependent on his ability to “establish and 
maintain a strong network of support both among his peers and at the imperial court” (Fournier 2006, 166), no simple 
dichotomy between “political” and “religious” causes is possible. 
4 Rocher 1987, 52-54, speculates that Constantius’ Caesar Julian, rather than Constantius himself, may have been the one 
immediately responsible for the decree of exile against Hilary; Borchardt 1966, 28-30, however, argues strongly against this 
possibility, as well as against the supposition that Julian himself actually attended the council that sentenced Hilary.  
5 According to both Jerome (De viris illustribus 100) and Sulpicius Severus (Chronicon 2.42), Hilary spent the bulk of his exile in 
Phrygia, while Hilary himself (De synodis 63) describes himself simply as resident in “Asia.” Rocher 1987, 16, argues convincingly 
that, in comparison to the available evidence on the exiles of Lucifer of Cagliari and other bishops during this period, most of 
whom were moved repeatedly and probably subject to violence and many of whom actually died, Hilary’s exile seems to have 
been exceptional in the relative absence of punitive action or restriction. This is acknowledged by other scholars (e.g. 
Brennecke 1984b, 242, Williams 1991, 214-215, Flower 2013, 129), while Borchardt 1966, 38-39, argues that this may have 
been in part due to the fact that Hilary was never officially deposed from his office as bishop of Poitiers or replaced, allowing his 
diocese to continue funding his travel and activities even while in exile. 
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conciliatory theological approach adopted by Hilary would ultimately be crucial in paving the way for 
the eventual neo-Nicene consensus of the latter part of the 4th century.6 
In this chapter, I will be focusing only on Hilary’s more polemical and Imperial-focused 
works, as opposed to his more comprehensive theological texts such as the famous De Trinitate. The 
most striking thing about Hilary’s polemics, however, is the degree to which theology, including 
elaborate metaphysical theory and fine distinctions of terms and meaning, remains foregrounded 
even in the midst of debate and invective. Lucifer’s approach to theology in the context of invective 
is by design loose and generalized, relying on the assumed but unargued position that everyone 
falling short of the full clarity of his position is unequivocally committed to the Arian theology 
condemned at Nicaea. Hilary, by contrast, focuses on directly citing and interpreting the words and 
theological formulas of his opponents and relating them to his own developed theology in as 
detailed and unifying a manner as possible. If the goal of Lucifer’s polemic is to bring his opponents 
to moral repentance by denying their theological and ecclesiastical legitimacy and applying various 
forms of admonition and exclusion, Hilary’s goal is always to define, to produce consensus by 
crafting a theological position and set of formulas which, while excluding insufficient or false 
theologies, would actually serve to unite the body of the bishops of the Roman Empire. 
This relates to another foremost difference between Hilary and Lucifer. Lucifer’s polemical 
works are all addressed to the Emperor Constantius II, and their focus is always the explication of 
the direct, unmediated relationship between bishop and Emperor, Lucifer and Constantius, as 
individuals and office-holders and participants in the cosmic-Scriptural-theological drama of Christ 
 
6 See in particular Doignon 1971, who gives Hilary an important place as one of the first substantive mediators between the 
Greek and Latin theological traditions, and Simonetti 1998b, who sees Hilary as a key player in the development of the late-4th 
century “neo-Nicene” consensus of Nicene homoousianism combined with more explicit language to safeguard the distinction 
of the divine persons. 
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and Antichrist. Even in his works ostensibly addressed to Constantius, Hilary’s focus is always on the 
multipolar, collegial relationship among the bishops of the Church, imagined as a class of equal 
office-holders whose doctrinal and moral unity is of paramount importance for Church, Empire, and 
cosmos alike. Nearly all of Hilary’s works are addressed to his fratres charissimi, his “most dear 
brothers”; and even where he does address the Emperor directly, it is on behalf of this collegial, 
episcopal body and its unity that he pleads.  
While this focus remains constant, a dramatic shift is visible from Hilary’s earlier works to his 
later ones, precisely in his construction of the role of the Emperor in aiding or harming episcopal 
unity and concord. The Emperor who in De Synodis is a mere appendage to the evil of his named 
episcopal opponents, guilty of using the power of the well-intentioned but easily misled Constantius 
to spread discord and heresy, becomes in In Constantium the face of Antichrist himself, the primary 
agent of heresy and disunion, using his Imperial power to tear apart both the episcopate and the 
cosmos as a whole. It is almost certainly no coincidence, given the strong evidence for Hilary’s 
reading of Lucifer,7 that this eventual position tracks far more closely to that of Hilary’s Sardinian 
colleague. Still, in my judgment, this change reflects not only influence from Lucifer, or even 
alterations in practical circumstances, but also and predominantly a deliberate alteration by Hilary 
of his rhetorical (and political) strategy, his means of bringing about reconciliation among diverse 
factions of bishops. As we shall see, this goal will be pursued and accomplished, in the end, not only 
through theological precision and consensus-building but, increasingly, through the depiction and 









“On the Councils” 
Hilary’s De Synodis is one of the most singular documents to come out of the 4th century 
theological controversies, precisely because of its focus, not on controversy, but on reconciliation.8 
The purpose of this work, composed in 358 or early 359 AD9, is to take advantage of the recent 
appearance of the Statement of Sirmium to forge an alliance between the long-divided episcopates 
of East and West.10  
As discussed in section 3.6 above, in 357 a small gathering of bishops at Sirmium had gone 
considerably farther than the councils of the 340s and 350s in asserting the subordinate and inferior 
nature and status of the Son, condemning not only any use of the term ὁμοούσιος, but any use at all 
of the term οὐσία, directly stating that the Father was greater than the Son in honor, glory, and 
status, and strongly implying that the Son, unlike the Father, was intrinsically capable of change and 
suffering (11).11 In response to what they considered this drastic overreach, as well as to the public 
endorsement by the powerful new bishop of Antioch Eudoxius of both its results and the radical 
(and unpopular) anti-Nicene theologian Aetius, a larger body of Eastern bishops had met at Ancyra 
with the goal of condemning the doctrines of Sirmium and setting out in more detail a middle 
position aimed at preserving the Son’s divinity while maintaining a clear distinction between the two 
 
8 Given the importance of this work to politics and theology in the 4th century, it is remarkable that no modern critical edition 
yet exists: the Latin text given here is from Migne’s Patrologia Latina, itself a reprint of the text in Coustant 1693. 
9 This dating is based on the straightforward consideration that it must have been written between the Council of Ancyra in 
early 358 (cf. Barnes 1993, 139), whose decrees it quotes, and the Council of Seleucia in September 359, which drastically 
altered the episcopal situation and which Hilary describes in detail in In Constantium Imperatorem.  
10 While there are other gatherings and documents associated with the city of Sirmium (in particular the Council of Sirmium 
discussed in section 3.5 above) for the purposes of this section, all references to “Sirmium” are to the small group of bishops 
who produced the Statement of Sirmium in 357. 
11 For a fuller discussion of this statement and accompanying events, see section 3.6 above. 
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persons and continuing to exclude Western use of the ὁμοούσιος—an episcopal faction led here 
and elsewhere by the bishop of Ancyra Basil and generally known to modern scholars as 
“homoiousian.” In the short term, the bishops at Ancyra saw significant success, with their position 
endorsed publicly by no less than the Emperor himself, and Eudoxius and his allies publicly 
humiliated. For the first time since Serdica, a significant body of Eastern and Western bishops were 
united in their shared disapproval of a conciliar decision. 
Although ostensibly a deposed and exiled criminal, Hilary now found himself, thanks to his 
Gallic roots and contacts, strong command of Greek, and presence in Asia Minor near Basil of 
Ancyra’s episcopal see, in a unique position to perceive the commonalities among Eastern and 
Western bishops—never more clear than in the near-identical reactions of anger and condemnation 
with which the Statement of Sirmium had been greeted by both Basil of Ancyra and the bishops of 
Gaul. In these commonalities, visible to him but hidden from most of his fellow bishops by linguistic 
and cultural divides and decades of conflict, Hilary perceived a real and immediate chance at unity.  
For this unity to have any staying power, however, some way would have to be found to 
reconcile the intransigent homoousian (“of the same substance”) position of the majority of 
Western bishops with the more recent homoiousian (“of a similar substance”) position now being 
championed by many Eastern bishops. At the Council of Ancyra, Basil and his allies had taken 
substantial steps towards the Nicene position of Eastern Origenists like Athanasius, even while 
basing their case entirely on the authoritative “ecclesiastical tradition” found in the Eusebian 
councils of the previous few decades, to the pointed exclusion of the allegedly Sabellianizing Council 
of Nicaea.12 The task Hilary sets himself in De Synodis, then, is the reconciliation of two explicitly 
 
12 See the narrative of synodical tradition contained in the encyclical letter of Ancyra, found in Epiphanius, Panarion 73.2 (cf. 
Löhr 1993, 87-89).  
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opposed historical narratives, and two bodies of ecclesiastical and synodical tradition: the exclusive 
appeal to Nicaea against all Eastern and Constantian synods maintained in the West, and the 
exclusive appeal to said Eastern and Constantian synods against Nicaea upheld by the homoiousians.  
To this end, Hilary spends the bulk of the De Synodis quoting at length the prominent 
Eastern conciliar decrees of the past two decades, from the Dedication Council of Antioch in 341 to 
the Council of Ancyra in 358,13 and then sympathetically explaining why these documents are, 
understood properly, compatible with, if not essentially identical to, the homoousian faith of the 
West (10-63). At this point, after a brief statement of his own Trinitarian belief (64-65), he addresses 
himself directly to his fellow Western bishops (66-76), chastising them for their rigid insistence on 
the term ὁμοούσιος, which was properly a final conclusion of theology and not a first principle (70), 
and which could indeed be taken in heretical senses as the Eastern bishops had maintained (68). 
Then, Hilary addresses himself to the Eastern bishops in a similar fashion (78-91), chastising them 
for their assumption that the ὁμοιούσιος could not also be interpreted in a heretical way (89) and 
insisting not only that the ὁμοούσιος was fully orthodox, but also that its denial gave aid and 
comfort to “Arian” extremists like those at Sirmium while undermining the authority of the Council 
of Nicaea and therefore the whole edifice of ecclesiastical tradition and episcopal authority (91). 
With all this established, Hilary closes with an appeal to both parties for unity and charity, not only 
towards each other but towards him and his efforts at reconciliation (92). 
In De synodis, Hilary explicitly sets himself a goal that had eluded bishops and Emperors 
alike for decades: the full theological unity of East and West. To even begin this political and social 
task, however, he will have to first grapple with the abstract metaphysical one of proving that the 
 
13 As Borchardt 1966, 145, comments, however, in treating the anathemas of the Council of Ancyra, Hilary tactfully refrains 
from quoting or commenting on those that explicitly condemned the term ὁμοούσιος—a conciliatory touch that might be seen 
as somewhat dishonest by Hilary’s Latin interlocutors. 
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terms ὁμοούσιος and ὁμοιούσιος, at least when understood properly, are really philosophically and 
theologically equivalent. Hilary sets about this task with great aplomb, arguing not only for this 
terminological identity, but also for a large number of more general philosophical equivalencies on 
similarity, identity, and personhood. These equivalencies possess, I will argue, implications far 
beyond the divine realm. 
At the heart of Hilary’s metaphysical case is the idea of similitudo (“similarity, likeness”), a 
key Eusebian concept used in various forms throughout the Eastern councils of the 340s and the 
350s. Much of De Synodis is taken up with an analysis of this term, not only in the divine realm, but 
also in general philosophical terms and with reference to human society. What Hilary ultimately 
produces on this basis is a theory of the cosmos that is fundamentally egalitarian, or rather 
equalitarian.  
According to Hilary, the existence of true similarity, on any level, in whatever sphere, implies 
and necessitates both interpersonal equality and identity of essence: “There is no similarity except 
that arising from equality of nature; equality of nature, though, is not able to exist, unless there is 
one nature; one, however, not in unity of person, but in unity of kind” (76).14 As Hilary himself puts 
it, the goal of his argumentation throughout this work is to persuade his readers that the terms 
“similarity” and “equality” should be seen normatively as synonyms: “I speak of equality, that is, of 
total absence of difference in similarity, so that ‘similarity’ might be considered ‘equality’”(67).15 
This assertion has immediate implications for both human and divine society. 
 
14 cum similitudo nulla sit, nisi ex aequalitate naturae; aequalitas autem naturae non potest esse, nisi una sit; una vero non 
personae unitate, sed generis. 
15 Aequalitatem dico, id est, indifferentiam similitudinis, ut similitudo habeatur aequalitas. 
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In reinterpreting the various Eastern creeds, most of them, as discussed in Chapter Three, 
originally emanating from an Eusebian theological tradition very opposed to his own, Hilary makes 
central to his analysis the fact that the Father and Son are both referred to, in these creeds, by the 
terms God (θεός, translated by Hilary with the Latin deus), Lord (κύριος, dominus), and King 
(βασιλεύς, rex). As we have seen, the Eusebian theology behind these creeds normatively saw in the 
common use of such terms neither identity of essence nor equality of status (both for Eusebius of 
Caesarea essentially impossibilities), but rather a cosmic relationship between ruler and subordinate 
ruler, commanding superior and obedient inferior. 
As Hilary is at pains to make clear, however, under his philosophy of equality, this possibility 
is definitely and entirely ruled out. If the Father and Son are both properly called God, it can only be 
because they are truly similar, and therefore truly equal, in power, honor, majesty, glory, and 
essence. If the Father and Son are both called kings and lords, as they were in the creed of the 
Council of Antioch in 341, it can only be on the basis of total equality in power and rule:16 “’King 
from King’: The power (potestas) proclaimed here under one and the same name does not admit 
any dissimilarity in power. ‘Lord from Lord’: Lordship (dominatio) also is equal (aequatur) in the 
Lord: this lordship confessed without distinction in both does not permit any difference” (33).17 
Since for Hilary similarity normatively implies equality and so negates any difference whatsoever, 
the possibility of a cosmic hierarchy of similar, yet fundamentally unequal entities, all rightly 
referred to (in whatever sense) as God, Lord, or King, is totally excluded.  
 
16 In this, it should be noted, Hilary’s use of aequalis can be associated with, but goes well beyond the Imperial connotations of 
the term under the Principate, where the Emperor could style himself aequalis civilis (“equal citizen”) to associate himself with 
his subjects while not giving up any actual political power, let alone the status of absolutely supreme singular ruler (see in 
particular Wallace-Hadrill 1982 for the meaning and utility of such practices).  
17 Rex de Rege. Non admittit uno atque eodem nomine potestas connuncupata dissimilitudinem potestatis. Dominum de 
Domino. Dominatus quoque aequatur in Domino: nec recipit differentiam confessa in utroque sine diversitate dominatio. 
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In asserting this concept of similarity and making it the very core of his philosophical and 
theological analysis, Hilary is likewise intransigent that his theological system excludes not only any 
inequality of essence, power, or honor, but also any form of unity which would render either the 
Father or the Son singular, solitary, or alone. It is this consideration, above all, which makes him 
sympathetic to the homoiousian position of the Eastern bishops led by Basil of Ancyra, who were 
attempting, at least in Hilary’s sympathetic portrayal, to preserve the language of οὐσία while 
avoiding the assertion of monadic or mono-personal identity: “But if, therefore, the Father and Son 
are said to be of one substance, as though the one subsisting here, although under the signification 
of two names, is one and solitary: we do not in our conscience confess the Son by name, if in 
confessing one substance we say that he himself is both the Father and the Son, alone and singular 
for himself” (68).18 Hidden in the seemingly straightforward assertion of a single divine substantia, 
then, is a real and immediate danger: namely that the persons of Father and Son, deprived of 
metaphysical reality, will become little more than names for a single, solitary divine entity. This 
ultimate divine monism, the core in different ways not only of the Nicene position of Marcellus of 
Ancyra but also of the various theologies adopted throughout his lifetime by Constantine, is for 
Hilary entirely unthinkable. For Christian belief to have any meaning, Father and Son must be in a 
genuine sense not only one, but two. The goal of Hilary’s metaphysical speculations, then, as it 
emerges over the course of De Synodis, is to chart a middle course between these two extremes, 
precisely through the use of the language of inter-personal equality to explicate that of similarity 
and oneness of essence:  
How, I ask, am I able to make one equal to another except through similarity? Or surely it is 
not ‘one and the same thing’ to be similar because you are equals? If I say, ‘one,’ there is a 
suspicion that I am speaking of ‘only one’; if I say ‘similar,’ there is a comparison of what is 
 
18 At vero si idcirco unius substantiae Pater et Filius dicatur, ut hic subsistens, sub significatione licet duum nominum, unus ac 
solus sit: confessum nomine Filium conscientia non tenemus, si unam substantiam confitentes ipsum sibi unicum ac singularem 
et Patrem e se dicimus et Filium.   
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not different. What place, I ask, does ‘equal’ have between ‘similar’ and ‘one’? I ask also 
whether this is a matter of similarity or of solitude. There is not equality between the 
dissimilar, nor is there similarity within one. Or how do the similar and equal differ? And 
again, is the equal distinct from the one? Thus those who are dissimilar are not equal. And 
what can be similar, except equals, since there is no equality among those who are 
dissimilar? (72)19  
The concept of equality, then, is crucial for Hilary’s theology because it clarifies the two 
ambiguities present (in his view) in homoousian and homoiousian theology, making clear both that 
(1) the similarity of Father and Son is one that excludes all substantial differences whatsoever, and 
that (2) the Father and Son’s oneness of substantia is essentially and inescapably interpersonal, not 
solitary. This treatment of the term aequalitas and its derivatives as central to the relations of 
Father, Son, and Spirit represents is by far the most novel and original aspect of Hilary’s corpus, 
without clear precedent in previous Latinate or Greek theology. His foregrounding of this novel 
theological term is derived, I believe, not only from the Vetus Latina’s use of it as translation for the 
Greek ἴσος in such passages as the “Christ hymn” of Philippians 2:6-11, but also from its prevalence 
in the Roman political and social traditions, where it was employed to designate citizens “of the 
same age” (and therefore status) within the archaizing and gerontocratic Roman political system, as 
well in later juridical texts influenced by Stoicism to denote the bare legal rights possessed by all 
human persons in common thanks to the “natural law” of procreation.20 In both of these aspects—
the denial of precedence in existence and the assertion of identity in legal rights and status—the 
 
19 [Q]uaero quo modo possim alterum ad alium nis per similitudinem coaequare? Aut numquid non idem est, esse similes quod 
aequales? Si unum dico, habet et unici suspicionem: si similem dixero, habet indifferentis comparationem. Inter similem et 
unum quaero quem locum habeat aequalis: et interrogo utrum similitudinis potius, aut solitudinis res sit. Non est aequalitas in 
dissimilibus, nec similitudo est intra unum. Aut quid different similes, et aequales; et ab uno iterum discernatur aequalis? Non 
sunt itaque dissimiles aequales. Et quid aliud possunt esse similes quam aequales, cum in dissimilibus non sit aequalitas? 
20 To take the most striking example, Justinian’s Digests quotes the 3rd century Roman jurist Ulpian as allowing that “[i]n what 
pertains to civil law, slaves have no value; this is not the case, however, in natural law, since, in what pertains to natural law, all 
persons are equals (aequales)” (Digesta 50.17.32).  This equality has, however, by design, few real-world legal consequences, 
since for Ulpian natural law pertains only to those things human beings have in common with animals, that is, survival and 
procreation, and hence is superseded in more directly political matters by the distinctively human ius gentium and civil law. This 
concept of natural law and the natural obligations and rights deriving from it was employed both by Ulpian and by later Roman 
jurists to explicate those exceptional areas of Roman law where slaves were granted limited rights. 
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socio-political connotations of aequalitas serve Hilary’s purposes far better than the abstract 
concept of similitudo. Indeed, without these connotations, even aequalitas would be of little help, 
since in previous usages it could and had been employed, contrary to Hilary’s insistence, both for 
the absence of changes over time in one and the same entity, and to denote a bare concept of 
similarity in qualities or external appearance not at all different from similitudo.21 This usage would 
apply most naturally to theology as well, as Lucifer of Cagliari had made indicated when, in quoting 
Philippians 2:6-11 in De Athanasio, he had glossed the Vetus Latina’s aequalis with the more 
common cognate similis (1.33). 
It is by means of this directly social concept of equality, interposed into the metaphysical 
realm with the entirely novel meaning of “a relationship between two distinct entities sharing a 
single substance without essential differences,” that Hilary believes he can thread the metaphorical 
needle of reconciling the Eusebian theological terminology of the homoiousians with Western 
insistence on divine unity. In this, Hilary’s treatment of the divine relations takes on inescapably 
political valences absent in other, more univocal theologies of divine unity of essence. Given the 
interpersonal distinction implied by aequalitas, room is made for treatments of the divine relations 
that are far more directly social than those contained in Marcellus, Lucifer, or Athanasius. Most 
shocking, perhaps, from a Nicene point of view is Hilary’s admission that there is a sense in which 
the Son can be said to be subject (subiectus, used to translate the key Eusebian term ὑποτάσσειν) to 
the Father and obedient (oboedire) to him as to his progenitor (auctor). This subjection, however, as 
Hilary strives to make clear, does not depend upon, and in fact is ultimately incompatible with, any 
true difference in power or honor or essence:  
But the subjection of piety is not a diminution of essence, nor does the duty of reverence 
(religio) make nature inferior: since through the very fact that, although both the unborn 
 
21 For aequalis, see TLL vol. 1 993-1002. For aequalitas see TLL vol. 1 1002-1004. 
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Father is God and the only-begotten Son of God is God, nevertheless there is only one God, 
both the subjection of the Son is taught and his dignity. While the Son is subjected in being 
called by that very name, because he is the Son of God the Father, nevertheless this name 
belongs to him by nature. In possessing this name from him of whom he is the Son, he 
becomes subject both in obedience and in name to the Father; thus the subjection in name 
testifies to his possession of a natural name and of an essence which does not differ from 
the Father’s (51).22 
The social realities of subjection, religio, obedience, and pietas, then, exist most properly 
not between superiors and inferiors in essence, status, or power, but between those who are 
fundamentally the same in all these qualities. The Statement of Sirmium, in keeping with the basic 
Eusebian theology of hierarchical precedence between superior and inferior, archetype and image, 
had asserted that the Father was greater than the Son “in honor, dignity, glory, majesty,”23 a claim 
Hilary considers blasphemous to the extreme (11). At least in the divine realm, the assertion of 
equality has immediate and necessary implications not only for the essence of the Father and Son, 
but also for their natural power (virtus) and the degree of honor proper to them: “The power (virtus) 
of nature, which subjection has preserved, makes honor equal” (75).24 While human persons may 
differ with one another in non-essential attributes such as office and position, for the single divine 
substantia this is entirely impossible. Likewise, although there is a sense, Hilary recognizes, in which 
creation can be said to be subject to God, obedient to him, bound to him by religio, etc., this sense is 
totally inapplicable to Christ: “While the subjection of the Son is the piety of nature, the subjection 
of other things is the weakness of creation” (79).25 The relationship between God and creation, 
 
22 Sed pietatis subjectio non est essentiae diminutio, nec religionis officium degenerem efficit naturam: cum per id, quod cum 
et innascibilis pater Deus est, et unigenitus filius Dei Deus est, Deus tamen unus sit; et subiectio filii doceatur et dignitas, dum et 
ipsi illi nomini Filius nuncupandus subicitur, quod cum Dei patris sit, tamen sibi ex natura sit nomen. Habens nomen, sed eius 
cuius et filius est, fit Patri et obsequio subjectus et nomine; ita subiectio nominis proprietatem naturalis atque indifferentis 
testetur essentiae. 
23 honore, dignitate, claritate, maiestate 
24 Denique honorem, quem subiectio conservavit, naturae virtus aequavit. 
25 Cum subiectio Filii naturae pietas sit, subiectio autem caeterorum creationis infirmitas sit. 
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though it can be treated using the same terms applied to the relation of Father and Son, must be 
understand as totally unlike the relationship of pious obedience among naturally equal persons that 
Hilary is interested in exploring. For Hilary as for Athanasius, the fundamental error of Eusebius and 
his allied theologians is failing to recognize the true vastness of the difference between the 
interpersonal relationships among divine and created persons on the one hand, and the infinite 
divide between God and creation on the other. 
All this argumentation on the inter-relationship of divine persons is, as Hilary acknowledges, 
itself drawn by analogy from the world of human persons and societies, and therefore has 
immediate implications for how these relationships should be understood. In arguing for the 
equality of Father and Son in sharing one and the same nature, Hilary appeals to the testimony of 
Scripture to declare that, in just the same way, all human persons, and in particular human fathers 
and sons, are not only similar, but equal to one another:  
Similarity (similitudo) has the signification of perfect equality: and this is to be understood 
from the Sacred Scriptures. For we read, ‘Adam lived three hundred twenty years, and he 
begot a son according to his own image and according to his own likeness (similitudo), and 
he named him Seth’ [Genesis 5:3]. [...] The similarity of nature did not have, in Seth, a 
nature of a different kind, because Seth was not born of anyone else: thus similarity makes 
natural things equal, through the similarity of an essence that does not differ. Thus every 
son, according to natural birth, is the equality of his father, because he is also the likeness of 
his nature. And blessed John teaches that the same equality of nature, which Moses calls 
similarity in Seth and Adam, is in the nature of the Father and the Son, for he says: ‘For this 
reason the Jews were seeking the more to kill him, because not only was he violating the 
Sabbath, but also he was saying that God was his father, making himself equal to God’ [John 
5:18] (73)26 
 
26 Perfectae aequalitatis significantiam habet similitudo: et hoc ex sanctis Scripturis intelligendum est. Legimus namque Vixit 
autem Adam ducentis triginta annis, et genuit secundum effigiem suam et secundum similitudinem suam, et cognominavit 
nomen eius Seth [Genesis 5:3]. [...] Similitudo autem naturae non habuit in Seth alterius generis naturam, quia non aliunde Seth 
natus est: ita similitudo res ipsas naturalis coaequat, per similitudinem non indifferentis essentiae. Omnis itaque filius, 
secundum naturalem nativitatem, aequalitas patris est; quia est et similitudo naturae. Et beatus Ioannes docet in natura Patris 
et Filii, quam Moyses in Seth et Adam similitudinem dicit, hanc eamdem aequalitatem esse naturae, ait enim: Propter hoc eum 
magis quaerebant Iudaei interficere, quoniam non solum solvebat sabbatum, sed et patrem suum dicebat Deum, aequalem se 
faciens Deo [John 5:18]. 
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 Behind this passage lies a remarkable anthropology. For Hilary, a human person simply is an 
equality, constituted as an individual precisely by relation to other human persons and the common 
human essence transmitted through procreation. Equality, then, far from being, as it had been in 
the Greek and Roman political traditions, a relatively marginal concept with few practical 
consequences, is for Hilary the fundamental reality underlying not only all social and political 
relationships, but even the basic philosophical concepts of person and nature. Applied to the divine 
realm, this system makes Father and Son, not just accidentally, but definitionally what Athanasius of 
Alexandria had claimed they were: of one and the same essence, ὁμοούσιος, in the very strongest 
sense of that term. 
What Hilary ultimately forges in De synodis, then, is not just a theology, but a true 
metaphysics of unity, present in analogous ways in both the divine realm and the human world. This 
metaphysics, I would suggest, is closely related to Hilary’s viewpoint on the political and 
ecclesiastical conflicts of his time, which he portrays as a matter of negotiation between essentially 
equal colleagues, the bishops of the Church, putting forward essentially equal formulas (the 
ὁμοούσιος and the ὁμοιούσιος):  
I beg you, brothers, take away your suspicion, remove your excuse. Let us not condemn the 
ὁμοούσιος, so that the ὁμοιούσιος might be able to be approved. Let us consider so many 
holy priests now at rest: how will God judge us, if now they are anathematized by us? What 
will become of us, who have brought the matter to this point, that because they were not 
bishops, we also have begun not to be? For we were ordained by them, we are their 
successors. Let us renounce the episcopate, because we received its office from those who 
are anathema! Pardon, brothers, my sorrow: it is impious, what you are attempting (91).27 
 
27 Oro vos, Fratres, adimite suspicionem, excludite occasionem. Ut probari possit homoeusion, non improbemus homousion. 
Cogitemus tot sacerdotes sanctos et quiescentes: quid de nobis Dominus iudicabit, si nunc anathematizantur a nobis? Quid de 
nobis erit, qui rem eo deducimus, ut quia episcopi non fuerunt, nos quoque nec coeperimus? Ordinati enim ab his sumus, et 
eorum sumus successores. Renuntiemus episcopatui, quia officium eius ab anathemate sumpserimus. Date veniam, Fratres, 
dolori meo: impium est quod audetis. 
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The duty incumbent on all parties in the theological controversy, then, is a unity founded on 
recognition of the essential similarity and therefore equality both of Father and Son and also of 
these two theological formulas and the body of bishops as a whole. Like divine Father and Son, and 
like all human fathers and sons, all bishops are united by an essential oneness of faith and office 
grounded in a relationship of origination, with one bishop ordaining another as his equal successor. 
It is this sense not merely of generic collegiality, but rather of properly metaphysical unity that is, for 
Hilary, the principal reason why, no matter their objections, the Eastern bishops must rescind their 
condemnation of the ὁμοούσιος and accept the decision of Nicaea. A true bishop can no more reject 
his brothers and predecessors, sharers in one and the same episcopal faith and honor, than the Son 
can reject his Father. 
As Hilary acknowledges, however, in the present day this essential unity is threatened, not 
only by division and rancor among true bishops, but also by the existence of bishops, members of 
this body of equal colleagues, who are in fact heretics, deceivers, spreaders of disunity and discord 
and error. The present conflict in the Church is, in Hilary’s view, the result, not just of 
misunderstanding, but of the active malice and deceit of heretical bishops—among whom Hilary 
highlights Saturninus, Ursacius, and Valens as the primary movers of the evils of his time. In De 
Synodis, then, both the unity of the divine realm and the unity of bishops is defended not only 
through analyses of truthful theologies aimed at revealing their underlying unity, but also through 
analyses of heretical statements aimed at revealing the true, underlying dissimilarity and inequality 
of heretical belief and those who espouse it. These heretics, and the heresy they possess and 
preach, operate according to a dynamic that is deliberately opposite to that of the unification of 
equals expressed elsewhere in De Synodis: asserting the inequality and dissimilarity of Father and 
Son in heaven and so necessarily dividing the Church on earth. The equality of all true bishops within 
the Church is the result of a true identity of faith and teaching, honor and office. The seeming 
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similarity of heretics to Christian bishops and of heresy to the truth, is, however, expressive of the 
fact that, in some cases, an apparent similarity can conceal a far more fundamental divergence:  
But you say: the ambiguity of the ὁμοούσιος moves me to scandal. Listen again, I pray, 
without scandal: also the nakedness of the ὁμοιούσιος moves me. Many things which are 
similar often deceive. I fear the gold that is gold-plated, because what is within is able to 
deceive me: and nevertheless what is seen is similar to gold. I fear the similarity of milk, lest 
milk be offered to me which is not the milk of sheep: because cow’s milk also appears 
similar to it. For sheep’s milk to be similar to sheep’s milk, it cannot be similar unless it 
comes from a sheep. True similarity is in the truth of nature. But the truth of nature in both 
cannot be denied to be ὁμοούσιος. For this is similarity according to essence, if a lump of 
gold similar to a lump of gold does not deceive in its outer plating, if milk which is the same 
color is not different in taste. Nothing is able to be similar to gold, except gold: nothing will 
be able to be similar to milk except milk of the same kind. The color of wine has frequently 
deceived me: and yet, on tasting it, I recognized a liquid of a different kind. I have seen meat 
similar to other meat: but afterwards the taste revealed to me the dissimilarity of nature. It 
is these similarities which are not from the unity of nature that I fear (89).28 
 This fear of deceptive similarity applies, in the first place, to divine Father and the Son. If the 
Son is called God, is like God, but is not truly God, equal in essence, power, and honor to the Father 
without any dissimilarity, then Hilary and his fellow Christians have been lied to, tricked, in a 
deception unworthy of divinity. This principle applies also to the human realm, and in particular to 
the Church, where because of the efforts of heretics large parts of the Eastern Church now appear 
to be Christians, seem to believe in and know the Father and Son, but in reality do not:  
I do not speak of distant things, nor do I write of things I am ignorant of: I have heard and 
seen the vices of those here; not just of laymen, but of bishops. For apart from the bishop 
Eleusius and a few with him, the greater part of the ten provinces of Asia, in which I am 
 
28 Sed dicis: movet me cum scandalo homousii ambiguitas. Iterum audi, oro sine scandalo: et me movet homoeusii nuditas. 
Multa saepe fallunt, quae similia sunt. Timeo aurum bracteae, quia me fallere possit interius: et tamen auro simile est quod 
videtur. Timeo lactis similitudinem, ne oblatum mihi lac, non lac ovium sit: quia ei simile videatur et bubulum. Ut lac ovium lacti 
ovium simile sit, non potest simile esse, nisi ovis sit. Similitudo vera in veritate naturae est. Veritas autem in utroque naturae 
non negatur homousion. Haec est enim secundum essentiam similitudo, si massa massae consimilis non fallat in bractea, si lac 
quod concolor est, non diversum sit in sapore. Simile auro quidquam non potest esse, nisi aurum: simile lacti, nisi sui generis sit, 
esse non poterit. Fefellit me frequenter color vini: et tamen gustatu, alterius generis liquorem recognovi. Vidi carnes carnibus 




living, do not know God truly. And I wish they did not know him at all; for they would be 
ignorant of him with an easier pardon (63).29 
In Hilary’s understanding, the false faith of heretics is worse than total ignorance of God 
precisely because it adds to ignorance the moral faults of deception and untruthfulness. Hilary’s 
seemingly conciliatory metaphysics of unity through equality, then, is also capable of holding far 
more belligerent implications. For Hilary, to be a heretic is not merely to be (as Eusebius had treated 
Marcellus) a different, inferior sort of thing in a cosmic system made up precisely out of such 
inferiorities and differences, but to be a liar, possessed of a counterfeit faith that resembles, but is 
not truly the same as (because it does not originate from) the true faith handed on from antiquity 
through the succession of equal bishops. In strong distinction to the Constantinian system expressed 
in Oratio ad coetum sanctorum, where moral and metaphysical contrarieties are to be expected in a 
hierarchical cosmos defined by command and conflict, for Hilary neither lies nor those who espouse 
them have any place in the world. 
Still, Hilary’s theology has place for the less than morally (and metaphysically) perfect. While 
true bishops, in Hilary’s characterization the homoiousians remain culpable for their own form of 
deception, less serious than that of the actual heretics, but harmful enough in its own right: “You are 
not Arians: why, by denying the ὁμοούσιος, do you cause yourselves to be thought Arians?” (88).30 It 
is this essentially moral fault of deceptiveness, brought about by lack of dogmatic clarity and respect 
for fellow bishops, that is responsible in Hilary’s judgment for the division of the Church—a division 
that can only finally be undone by the bishops working together as a united body. In the end, then, 
Hilary’s pitch to his fellow bishops is just as, if not more, moralistic than Lucifer’s to his heretical 
 
29 Non peregrina loquor, neque ignorata scibo: audivi ac vidi vitia praesentium; non laicorum, sed episcoporum. Nam absque 
episcopo Eleusio et paucis cum eo, ex maiori parte Asianae decem provinciae, intra quas consisto, vere Deum nesciunt. Atque 
utinam penitus nescirent; cum procliviore enim venia ignorarent[.] 
30 Ariani non estis: cur negando homousion censemini Ariani?   
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Emperor. It is emphatically the responsibility of the bishops, and only the bishops, to clearly and 
publicly distinguish between the truly similar and equal on the one hand, and the falsely similar and 
deceptive on the other hand, in every part of the cosmos. By confessing the unity and equality of 
Father and Son, by discerning the true unity of the seemingly contrary homoousian and 
homoiousian confessions, and by exposing and condemning the counterfeit faith of heretics, the 
bishops will help to bring about the unity of the whole world. This is, to say the least, a difficult task, 
intertwining theology, philosophy, and social dynamics, all in the context of the bitter theological 
and political conflicts of mid-4th century Christianity.  
 As already mentioned, though Hilary’s theology here has clear social and rhetorical aspects, 
and therefore political implications, Hilary in De Synodis is almost totally focused on the inter-
ecclesiastical politics of unification among bishops, not the Roman Empire at large. The Emperor 
Constantius does have a small part to play, however, in the discourse of De Synodis, in a manner 
that is quite telling for Hilary’s general priorities and perspective on political power. In castigating 
the sins of the heretics, Hilary highlights in particular their illegitimate use of “public authority” and 
“the powers of this age” to spread their beliefs and oppose their fellow bishops: “But now heresy, 
bursting forth by the profession of public authority (publica auctoritas), although before it was 
whispering furtively, now was boasting, not at all in secret, that it was victorious. For by what 
tunnels has it not tried to creep into the Catholic Church? What powers of this age (saeculi 
potestates) has it not manipulated with the enticement of false religion?” (78).31 While Lucifer 
assumes a basic univocity of power in his one Empire of the cosmos, among Hilary’s first principles is 
a basic divide between the realm of the Church and divine Faith on the one hand, and that of merely 
 
31 At vero nunc publicae auctoritatis professione haeresis prorumpens, id quod antea furtim mussitabat, nunc non clam victrix 
gloriabatur. Quibus enim antea cuniculis in catholicam Ecclesiam non tentavit irrepere? Quas non exseruit, falsae religionis 
blandimento, saeculi potestates? 
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public and “secular” potestas and auctoritas on the other, which will be consistently maintained 
throughout his corpus. 
Though Hilary’s initial treatment of “secular power” is abstractly theological and extremely 
broad, this focus is shortly narrowed to a very particular target: the Emperor Constantius. In the 
larger context of De synodis, Hilary’s discussion of Constantius’ prominent part in endorsing and 
distributing the Statement of Sirmium functions for the most part simply as further attack on the 
character of Hilary’s opponents, whose bad faith is proven by their use of illegitimate, and indeed 
almost absurd, means to win over episcopal colleagues to their counterfeit faith. Consequently, 
Hilary’s rhetorical characterization places all responsibility on the bishops involved, who have 
maliciously manipulated an Emperor defined by his ignorance and near-total lack of agency: “For 
they have deceived an ignorant king, so that although occupied by wars he has expounded the faith 
of such faithlessness, and although not yet regenerated by baptism he has imposed a form of belief 
on the churches” (78).32  
Constantius here is very clearly not a member of the privileged class of those with the duty 
and ability to properly discern truth from falsehood and similarity from equality; and so, like an 
inexperienced man drinking bad wine, he has been easily misled. This lack of status and expertise, 
expressed most cogently in his lack of baptism, makes the Emperor in De synodis mostly irrelevant 
for Hilary’s purposes. As a non-baptized non-bishop, Constantius simply does not have, and perhaps 
cannot have, any real authority, or even any meaningful perspective or agency, in theological 
debates among bishops. Indeed, even when it comes to the punishments of exile carried out by the 
Emperor and his officials, Hilary again ascribes all agency, not to Constantius, but rather to heretical 
 
32 Fefellerunt enim ignorantem regem, ut istiusmodi perfidiae fidem bellis occupatus exponeret, et credendi formam Ecclesiis 
nondum regeneratus imponeret. 
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bishops: “By speaking against them, they have driven (coegerunt) bishops into exile” (78).33 The 
Emperor responsible for the actual sentences of exile, for Lucifer the sole, overwhelming actor 
seducing and compelling helpless clerics into sin, is for Hilary a tool so trivial that his participation 
can be entirely omitted. 
All is not lost, however, since an Emperor so easily manipulated by false bishops is equally 
susceptible to forceful correction by true bishops. Among Hilary’s highest points of praise for the 
Orthodox Eastern bishops is their success in rapidly walking Constantius back from the mistakes 
made on the authority of his wicked episcopal advisors: “For we give thanks that the Emperor has 
come to recognize his own ignorance through being admonished by you, and has recognized, not his 
own error, but the error of those advising him, through the judgments (sententiae) of your faith: and 
the envy of an impious will has removed itself from before God and men, since the Emperor, 
receiving your legation with honor, after he was compelled by you to profess his ignorance, has 
come to recognize the falsehood of those by whose authority (auctoritas) he was led to such ill-will” 
(78).34 Again, Constantius has here very little will of his own, and little even of recognizable Imperial 
power; it is bishops, and bishops alone, who advise, command, lead, compel, judge, and wield 
auctoritas over him. What one bishop does in leading the ignorant Emperor astray through his 
authority, another bishop can just as easily put right—with both relying on an essential Imperial 
ignorance and incapacity in matters of theology. The only role capable of being played by such an 
Emperor in conflicts among bishops is that of passive tool.35 
 
33 Contradicentes episcopos ad exsilium coegerunt. 
34 Domino enim gratias, quod ignorationem per vos admonitus Imperator agnovit, et errorem non suum, sed adhortantium, per 
has fidei vestrae sententias recognovit: et se invidia apud Deum atque homines impiae voluntatis exemit, cum legationem 
vestram honorifice habens, falsitatem eorum, quorum auctoritate in invidiam deducebatur, coacta a vobis ignorantiae suae 
professione, cognovit. 
35 This model, it should be emphasized, goes well beyond that spoken of by Drake 2000, 467-472, of the need for Emperors and 
bishops, like the Emperor and the Senators before them, “to find a common ground on which to meet as equals” (468). While 
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This picture of the Emperor is not accidentally but essentially tied to Hilary’s theology of 
Father and Son. For Eusebius, Constantine, Christ, and God were all in a true and proper sense 
Emperors: yet each was, despite this basic similarity, truly inferior in power, honor, and essential 
cosmic status to his superior. The burden of Hilary’s argument is to make this picture philosophically 
impossible, incapable of unifying any persons anywhere, let alone the cosmos as a whole. If the Son 
and the Father are really and truly similar, they must be equals in essence, and therefore in honor, 
power, and status. If they are in fact irreducibly unequal in substance, then they are not really 
similar at all, cannot be united, and cannot unify the divine realm or the cosmos.  
This model of unity, applied first in the divine realm, comes in Hilary’s developed argument 
to characterize relations on all levels. Equal bishops, joined in unity through the possession of one 
and the same faith and authority but divided by sin and the deceptive malice of heretics, struggle to 
reconcile theological formulae through the equality of a common faith and to expose the deceptive 
similitude of heresy. In this fundamentally episcopal process, both true, orthodox bishops and their 
heretical counterparts have appealed to the Emperor’s this-worldly power, using him as a passive 
tool to gain their designed results, which for the heretics involve nothing less than an overthrow of 







Eusebius of Caesarea might have valued such quasi-collegial interactions, for Hilary they are, seemingly, impossible, precisely 
because, on the grounds that truly matter for divine faith and salvation, the unbaptized Emperor entirely lacks the equal 




Apologetica ad reprehensores libri de synodis responsa 
“Defensive Responses to the Critics of the Book ‘On the Councils’”36 
If Hilary’s hope in writing De synodis had been that Eastern and Western bishops, thanks to 
the their divinely identical Faith and the urgency of opposing heresy, would quickly join in his efforts 
at unity, he was quickly disappointed. Apologetica ad reprehensores, it appears, was written 
following the less-than-warm reception that De synodis received among Hilary’s fellow Western 
Nicene exiles—in particular Lucifer of Cagliari.  
No full manuscript text of this work survives; rather, portions of it have been either 
appended as marginal comments or inserted into the main body of the text, always in the same 
places and sometimes with critical marks to distinguish them, in a total of 27 out of the 62 extant 
manuscripts containing portions of De synodis.37 While it has sometimes been supposed that these 
comments are fragments of an originally united work, Pierre Smulders has more plausibly suggested 
that these marginalia reflect the original form of the text as an edition of De synodis created by 
Hilary himself with his own defensive and explanatory comments appended, most likely for Lucifer 
of Cagliari’s personal perusal. These comments thus made their way into the manuscript tradition 
for De synodis, being haphazardly retained, excised, or re-added by later scribes engaged in making 
fresh collections of Hilary’s works.38 These marginalia, and their authorship by Hilary himself, were 
generally ignored by scholars before being compiled from multiple manuscripts and included as a 
separate section of the 1693 printed edition of De synodis edited by the French Benedictine scholar 
 
36 This title is entirely the invention of Pierre Coustant in his 1693 print edition—though it is, of course, a perfectly literal 
description of the text’s contents. 
37 Smulders 1978, 236-237. 
38 Smulders 1978 236-238, 242-243. 
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Pierre Coustant.39 Though Apologetica ad reprehensores has received only a small amount of 
attention from modern scholars,40 it has been generally accepted as a genuine work of Hilary 
himself, and additional fragments of what are clearly the same text have more recently been 
discovered in other manuscripts.41  
While necessarily fragmentary in form, more than enough of Hilary’s comments have 
survived to allow us to reconstruct the basic nature and context of the work as a whole. In 
appending comments to his original text, Hilary is clearly responding to attacks made on him by 
fellow Western Nicenes, including most immediately Lucifer of Cagliari and his associate the Roman 
deacon Hilary. The reason, I believe, for both this harsh criticism and Hilary’s decision to respond in 
print was not just the likelihood of an existing relationship between Hilary and Lucifer as two Latin-
speaking exiles resident in the East, but also the rapidly-changing nature of ecclesiastical events in 
the late 350s.  
De synodis had been written in a brief window where it seemed that the bulk of the Eastern 
episcopate, in league with the Emperor, were united in their disapproval of the more radical anti-
homoiousian stance of Sirmium. Hilary’s hope, clearly, was that, given some olive branches from 
Western Nicenes, the Eastern bishops (and their Imperial follower) might be brought en masse to 
accept the predominant Western use of ὁμοούσιος, unifying the bulk of the episcopate and bringing 
an end to decades of theological controversy. As it turned out, however, this hope proved in the 
 
39 Coustant 1693. 
40 No critical edition has yet been published. I use the text from Migne 1845 (Patrologia Latina vol. 10), the only generally 
available printed edition, supplemented by the new fragments contained in Smulders 1978, though as Smulders notes, Migne 
simply reproduces the text of the 1693 edition, without any additional critical work or reference to the manuscripts and with a 
few additional errors of his own. 
41 See Smulders 1978, who collects two additional passages and suggests there are likely more waiting to be discovered 
following a thorough critical perusal of the manuscripts of De synodis. 
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short term illusory, as the next series of councils convoked by Constantius, after a great deal of 
internal conflict and Imperial intervention, ended up affirming Sirmium’s condemnation of any and 
all οὐσία language while adopting instead a bare “homoian” stance (discussed in section 3.6 above). 
The fact that the events of 357, far from constituting a final defeat for Ursacius, Valens, and the 
other Imperial theologians resident at Sirmium, were instead merely the proverbial “first shot” in a 
larger campaign, must have become clear rather quickly after De synodis to both Hilary and his 
fellow Nicenes—many of whom had been in no mood to compromise even before Sirmium. In the 
context of a new homoian offensive, Hilary’s outright endorsement in De synodis not only of two 
decades of Constantian synods, but also of the language of similarity applied to Father and Son, was 
potentially very embarrassing indeed. While Hilary’s interest in qualifying his stance in De synodis is 
clear, it is nonetheless difficult to tell just how widespread criticism of his work actually was, apart 
from the attacks by Lucifer and Hilary the deacon addressed in the text. Judging by the surviving 
fragments, Lucifer appears to have been the primary (and perhaps sole) intended audience of 
Apologetica ad reprehensores, as he is the only person addressed at several points in the second 
person (2, 6). While Hilary may have intended these comments for wider circulation, this work 
allows an almost unique chance to gauge the direct, personal relationship between Hilary and 
Lucifer, and their respective allies, in the turbulent period of Ariminum and Seleucia. 
The burden of Hilary’s defense is that, despite his general assertion of the orthodoxy of the 
term ὁμοιούσιος and the Faith championed by Basil of Ancyra on the authority of the Eastern creeds 
of the past several decades, he did not, in fact, regard this term and these creeds as sufficient in 
themselves to guard against heresy, nor did he treat them as only susceptible of an orthodox 
interpretation: “I do not think anyone needs to be reminded, so as to judge what I wrote in this 
place, why I said that there was a pious interpretation of the ‘similar substance,’ unless it was 
because I understood that there was also an impious interpretation: and therefore, I said that 
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‘similar’ meant, not only ‘equal,’ but also ‘the same’ (idem), so that I might not also condemn that 
similarity which you, brother Lucifer, wanted to be preached;42 and nevertheless I was arguing that 
there was only one pious understanding of ‘similarity,’ the one which preaches unity of substance” 
(3, attached to De synodis 77).43 As this quote indicates, Hilary’s style of argument consists of short, 
dense glosses on particular passages in De synodis, offering explanations, apologies, and questions 
of his own to Lucifer and/or possibly other interlocutors. Some of the surviving glosses are so brief 
as to be almost taunts, as in that on De synodis 89: “Was I also negligent in dealing with similarity 
here?” (9).44  
In general, even in answering his critics in a vastly different climate, Hilary yields very little 
ground on his essential theological argument. Where he does seem to have shifted his views 
somewhat is in his judgment of the orthodoxy of the body of Eastern bishops, whom future events 
had shown perhaps not so amenable to unity with the Nicenes as he had hoped: “For I did not say 
that they had the true Faith, but the hope of regaining the true Faith: so that, in conformity with 
what I had heard about them, we might be able to be listened to against Valens and Ursacius, and a 
pleasant speech of exhortation, adapted to them, might escape nothing other than the foulness of 
 
42 Likely a reference to the one usage by Lucifer of the term similis in reference to the Father and Son in his corpus, De 
Athanasio 1.33: sit similis et aequalis patri filius. In the context of Lucifer’s original work, this is a gloss on Philippians 2:5-11, 
adding to the Vetus Latina’s aequalis the explanatory parallel term similis. This is as close a parallel as Hilary could have asked 
for to his own prominent use of the terms aequalis and similis as correlatives in De synodis—and indeed direct influence from 
Lucifer to Hilary prior to the writing of De synodis is by no means impossible. Apart from this Scriptural reference in De 
Athanasio, Lucifer does not use the term aequalis for Father and Son again until his final work Moriundum esse, where it is 
made key to the Nicene confession against Constantius’ homoianism (see e.g. filium aequalem dicimus patri, 10). Given Lucifer’s 
attested reading of Hilary’s De synodis and his general lack of recognizable theological formulas, influence from Hilary to Lucifer 
on this point is in my judgment overwhelmingly likely. Lucifer also mentions Hilary by name as an ally in De regibus apostaticis 
5. 
43 Non puto quemquam admonendum, in hoc loco ut expendat, quare dixerim similis substantiae piam intelligentiam, nisi quia 
intelligerem et impiam: et idcirco similem, non solum aequalem, sed etiam eamdem dixisse, ut neque similitudinem, quam tu, 
frater Lucifer, praedicari volueras, improbarem; et tamen solam piam esse similitudinis intelligentiam admonerem, quae 
unitatem substantiae praedicaret. 
44 Numquid et hic similitudine negligens fui? 
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wanton abuse: although I was about to bring forth stumbling-blocks hidden in their explanations, 
more bitterly and reprovingly in what follows” (4, attached to De synodis 78).45 Still, for all the 
disappointments of the period following the writing of De synodis, Hilary’s basic position has not 
changed, focused on the importance of preserving not only unity but also true distinction and 
equality, as well as on the ability of this belief to be expressed in more than one formula of words by 
more than one group of bishops. His defense of the orthodoxy of the basic ὁμοιούσιος formula, he 
insists, as explained in the light of the additional terms ὁμοούσιος and aequalitas, was genuine, and 
should not be taken as a carte blanche endorsement of any more elaborate theological position 
proclaimed by Eastern bishops then or since: “Do I seem to have been able to approve of what I did 
not know about? No indeed. But because the Catholic Faith ought not to believe in similarity except 
through unity, mentioning similarity only to exclude union (unio), not to divide unity (unitas):46 for 
this reason I said that I, even when I had not known the names ὁμοούσιος and ὁμοιούσιος, 
nevertheless had accepted similarity through unity” (12, attached to De synodis 91).47 
Perhaps the most important fragment for my present purposes, however, is one of the two 
more recently uncovered and published by Pierre Smulders. As Smulders notes,48 this fragment goes 
 
45 Non enim eos veram fidem, sed spem revocandae verae fidei attulisse dixi: ut sicut illi auditi sunt, ita et nos ex hoc contra 
Valentem et Ursacium possemus audiri, et coaptandus ad eos allocutionis sermo blandus nihil aliud quam procacium 
conviciorum effugeret foeditatem; cum amarius atque etiam probrosius in consequentibus, occulta expositionum essem 
scandala proditurus. 
46 This basic terminological distinction is present likewise in De synodis, where unio is always used negatively, as a synonym of 
solitudo, for a view that would make of Father and Son one and the same person, while unitas is used in several places in a 
positive sense of the substantial equality of Father and Son. 
47 Numquid videor quod nescivi probare potuisse? Non utique. Sed quia fides catholica non debeat nisi per unitatem 
similitudinem credere; ut similitudinem tantum ad excludendam unionem commemoret, non ad discidium unitatis: idcirco me 
dixi, cum nomina homousii atque homoesii nescissem, tamen per unitatem similitudinem recepisse. 
48 Smulders 1978, 240-241. I am not quite as confident as Smulders, however, that the term damnare here, which Hilary uses 
quite copiously in De synodis, necessarily refers to a “condemnation in the full sense” (241) of an ecclesiastical conciliar 
deposition such as those carried out against Athanasius. Not only would such a condemnation have been quite difficult for an 
exiled deacon and bishop to arrange, but a strong enough written attack, even one with only the implication that Hilary was a 
heretic and might properly be refused communion by Nicenes, might well be treated by Hilary as a condemnation given his 
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a long way toward clarifying the context for the work in a substantial attack by Lucifer and his allies 
on Hilary’s orthodoxy: “If this section had been more diligently read or understood by [the Roman 
deacon] Hilary,49 he would have known what it is to fight for the ὁμοούσιος and to condemn the 
Arians, nor would he, a mere deacon, have condemned me, a bishop, unheard and absent, although 
I am in exile because I tore apart the impious condemnation made against you both and because I 
defended the Faith of the Lord.”50 This passage has been taken by scholars as some of the strongest 
evidence of the context for Hilary’s initial exile,51 but its greatest importance for our thesis is that it 
represents conclusive evidence that Hilary had, in fact, read at least some of Lucifer’s polemic works 
directed against Constantius. As Smulders notes,52 Hilary’s language here, of a bishop being 
condemned (damnare) inauditum et absentem, can be nothing other than a deliberate (and ironic) 
rhetorical echo of the principal charge and repeated refrain of Lucifer’s De Athanasio, written in 358 
or early 359.53 In that work, Lucifer had again and again, almost to the point of tedium, repeated the 
claim that it was illegitimate for Constantius to ask an assembly of bishops to condemn and depose 
 
circumstances. An exiled Nicene bishop rejected even by his fellow exiled Nicenes could hardly hope to exercise any real 
influence within the episcopate.  
49 NOT Hilary of Poitiers, but the Roman deacon of the same name who had served along with Lucifer as a delegate of Liberius 
in his negotiations with Constantius and had been exiled along with him following the Council of Milan. As Smulders notes 
(1978, 239-241), this suggests that the impetus for the attack on the content of De synodis was from Lucifer’s associate rather 
than Lucifer directly, though the context of this passage and of Apologetica as a whole indicates that Lucifer had at least 
publicly accepted the substance of the attack. 
50 Given, with textual variants, at Smulders 1978, 239: Caput omne hoc si diligentius lectum ab Hilario esset vel intellectum, 
scisset quid esset pro omousion pugnare et arrianos damnare, neque me diaconus inauditum episcopum absentem rescissae 
impiae damnationis vestrae et defensae dominicae causa fidei exulantem damnasset. 
51 E.g. in both Barnes 1992, 137, and Burns 1994, 279-280. Not only is this a relatively straightforward declaration by Hilary that 
he was exiled due to his refusal to subscribe to the decrees of the Council of Milan, but it also comes in a context far less 
susceptible to deception than Hilary’s narration in In Constantium 2. Hilary might be able to get away with some amount of 
rhetorical fudging in a polemical tract, but it would be far harder for him to tell a bare lie in a defense of his honesty and 
character intended for the personal perusal of one of the fellow Latin-speaking bishops for whom he was supposedly exiled. 
52 Cf. Smulders 1978, 241, esp. n. 19: “That Hilary uses the same words can, of course, be hardly accidental.” 
53 See the discussion on the chronology of Lucifer’s works in Appendix B, as well as section 4.2 on De Athanasio above. 
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Athanasius of Alexandria, one of their own number, “absent and unheard,”54 without giving him a 
chance to defend himself in person. Here, Hilary deliberately throws that argument back in Lucifer’s 
face: if it was wrong for large numbers of assembled bishops to condemn Athanasius without giving 
him a chance to defend himself, how much more was it wrong for Lucifer to allow a mere deacon to 
condemn Hilary of Poitiers, a fellow Nicene bishop exiled precisely for his refusal to accept the 
condemnation of Lucifer and his fellows?  
If Hilary’s basic theological and social orientation has not changed, the conciliatory moment 
imagined in De synodis has clearly passed. Not only does Hilary find himself attacked by one of his 
foremost Western Nicene allies, but the Eastern conciliar project, which he had defended in De 
synodis as necessary to deal with the abundance of different heresies in the East, had moved even 
farther from the possibility of union. However these conflicting formulas were to be resolved, 
however the bishops of the Church were to be united, it was not going to be quite as simple as 
Hilary had imagined. 
6.4: 
Ad Constantium Imperatorem 
“Address to the Emperor Constantius” 
In De synodis, Hilary had criticized his episcopal opponents for appealing to, even 
manipulating, Imperial authority to gain their desired ends. However, as he had acknowledged 
implicitly in praising Basil of Ancyra’s canny countering of the Statement of Sirmium, a passive, 
influenceable Emperor could just as easily be utilized by orthodox homoiousians as by their “Arian” 
opponents. Whatever Hilary’s general beliefs on Imperial power and its relationship to the 
episcopate, such interventions could be as effective a tool for achieving Hilary’s desired results as 
 
54 Absentem et inauditum (De Athanasio 1.1, et passim). 
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those of his enemies. After the dramatic events of the Council of Seleucia in 359, Hilary found 
himself at the Imperial court of Constantinople along with numerous other bishops, including both 
allies and bitter enemies, brought to appeal to Constantius’ supreme authority to cement final 
victory over their rivals. In this highly charged atmosphere, dominated by the Imperial will, events 
soon proved beyond doubt that the authority of Basil and the homoiousians over Constantius was 
no longer the potent force it had seemed in the aftermath of the Council of Ancyra. Basil’s influence 
with the Emperor was clearly all but gone. Perhaps it was time for Hilary to take his place. 
We have from Hilary a written speech,55 or rather a panegyric appeal, designed to be 
delivered in the presence of the Emperor Constantius, and aimed at gaining his assistance in Hilary’s 
cause. This address situates itself in the context of a convocation of a large episcopal council, almost 
certainly the Council of Constantinople, which was held in the early months of 36056 —and in fact 
one of Hilary’s principal stated requests is for Constantius to permit him to take part in the synod as 
a full member, despite his exiled status (8). Hilary had already participated in the Council of Seleucia 
the year before, and, upon the collapse of that council into violent recrimination, had accompanied 
the legates of the homoiousian faction to Constantinople, first to negotiate with the Emperor, and 
then, after the submission of those legates to the homoian formula, to pursue his independent 
efforts and wait for the convocation of a new council.57 Although a number of the manuscripts 
 
55 By Ad Constantium Imperatorem I refer only to the so-called “second book” of the work as it exists in surviving manuscripts. 
That the works once treated as the two books of Ad Constantium Imperatorem are, in fact, originally unrelated compositions 
has long been recognized by scholars. The “first book” is more properly an out-of-context fragment or fragments, of which the 
original setting is impossible to reconstruct with total certainty, but which has been plausibly suggested to be a portion of the 
now fragmentary collection(s) of documents with commentary known to Jerome (De viris illustribus 100) as Adversus Valentem 
et Ursacium. This thesis was originally proposed by André Wilmart in Wilmart 1907, and was given its present prominence by its 
use in Feder 1916, LXII-LXIX. It has been generally accepted by more recent scholarship, e.g. Borchardt 1966, 1, Flower 2016, 28 
n. 133, Wickham 1997, 104-109.  
56 Cf. Borchardt 1966, 170, who argues that the work was written and presented while the council was ongoing, while Feder 
1916, LXIX, argues that it was written in the last months of 359, prior to the actual convocation of the council. 
57 Cf. Rocher 1987, 24, citing Sulpicius Severus, Chronicon 2.45. As Rocher notes, the very fact that Hilary was apparently 
allowed to spend an extended period in Constantinople, away from the site of his exile, and does not seem to have suffered the 
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declare it to have been actually presented (tradidit) by Hilary to Constantius at Constantinople, most 
scholars have assumed, logically given Constantius’ policies in this period, that Hilary did not in fact 
succeed in his efforts to receive an audience and so personally deliver the work to the Emperor.58 
Whether or not this is the case, Constantius remains the ostensible addressee of Ad Constantium, 
which at least on a surface reading presents itself as an immediate appeal to the Emperor. Its basic 
form is similar to that of Athanasius’ Apologia ad Constantium: a judicial appeal to the Emperor as 
supreme authority, asking him for deliverance from injustice, written in an appropriate rhetorical 
style, and with appropriate declarations not only of the privilege of the Emperor’s presence, but also 
of the general righteousness of Constantius himself. Even for so episcopal a bishop as Hilary, 
Imperial flattery was the natural path to results.  
Still, for an appeal to the Emperor, Ad Constantium is striking both for its rhetorical restraint 
and its overt theological focus. In many individual aspects, including most notably the basic language 
used to praise the Emperor, Ad Constantium is a straightforward example of its genre. When directly 
addressed, Hilary refers to Constantius by typical titles of the panegyric tradition, such as 
dignantissime imperator (4), optime ac religiosissime imperator (4), domine Constanti Imperator (8), 
and so forth.59 This praise is made in the context of a forthright appeal to Constantius’ authority, 
begging the Emperor to expose and reverse the wrongdoing of the petitioner’s enemies, deceptive 
 
penalties imposed on the homoiousians who would not submit to the homoian formula, indicates a remarkable degree of 
freedom conceded to him by the Imperial authorities. 
58 Feder 1916, LXIX, simply states that Hilary “gave” (dedisse) the book to Constantius in the final month of 359. Both Williams 
1992, 9-10 and Borchardt 1966, 170, treat Ad Constantium as a letter sent in written form to the Emperor, who may or may not 
have read it. Rocher 1987, 25, 45-46, believes Hilary made an effort to personally present the work in written form to 
Constantius, but nevertheless concludes that “Constance n'en prit sans doute jamais connaissance, car nous n'avons aucun 
écho des réactions impériales dans les oeuvres postérieures d'Hilaire” (25). 
59 As Rocher 1987, 44, points out, these and similar forms of address were used also by the Western bishops at Serdica and 
Ariminum and by the bishop of Rome Liberius, all strident opponents of Constantius’ religious project, and should be taken 
more as normal conventions of speech than as expressing “signification particulière pour ce qui concerne les qualités morales 
de la personnel.” 
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heretics responsible not only for crimes against doctrine and against Hilary personally, but also for 
slights against Constantius and his junior Emperor, Julian:60 “Trusting in the condition of my 
conscience, I will make clear that they have cheated you, Augustus, and made a mockery of your 
Caesar in these things, that I am commanded to bear something unworthy not only of the sanctity of 
a bishop, but even of the integrity of a layman, that I am not now expecting by pardon the 
priesthood, but I am growing old in a state of penitence like a layman” (2).61 Here, at the very high 
point of the Constantian conciliar project, Hilary aspires to achieve a goal that had eluded both 
Athanasius and Lucifer: to convince Constantius to undo both his own exile and the decrees of 
Imperial-sponsored councils. In aiming at this distant goal, Hilary strives, like Athanasius but very 
much unlike Lucifer, to present himself as yet another wronged petitioner, certain that the righteous 
Emperor will restore his fortunes and punish his adversaries. 
Even in its praise of Constantius, though, there is visible in Ad Constantium a novel quality 
that sets it apart from most Imperial appeals, even those delivered, like Athanasius’ Apologia, by 
bishops: Hilary’s exalted sense of his own episcopal status, which gives him license to speak, on at 
least some matters, with an authority greater than that of the Emperor himself. In bemoaning the 
fact that he, as a bishop, is suffering things unworthy of a layman, it could hardly fail to cross Hilary’s 
mind (as it explicitly had in De synodis) that Constantius was not only not a bishop, but not even in 
the strict sense a layman, but rather an unbaptized catechumen. Indeed, Hilary practically 
underscores this fact by making the core of his argument be precisely the Trinitarian formula 
 
60 The seemingly sympathetic mention of Julian here and in one other passage in Ad Constantium, where Hilary calls on Julian 
specifically as a “witness” (testis) (2.2) to his complaint, has long interested scholars—see for instance the thorough, if quite 
speculative, section on the relationship between Hilary and Julian in Rocher 1987, 51-56. 
61 Circumventum te Augustum, illusumque Caesarem tuum ea confidens conscientiae meae conditione patefaciam, ut si 
indignum aliquid non modo episcopi sanctitate, sed etiam laici integritate gesisse docear, non iam sacerdotium per veniam 
exspectem, sed intra poenitentiam laici consenescam.   
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confessed at baptism,62 making baptism according to a properly Trinitarian faith necessary for 
salvation:  
Recognize the Faith, which once, best and most religious Emperor, you wished to hear from 
bishops, and now not do not hear. [...] For it was right that every sacrament of divine 
knowledge, by the modesty of human infirmity, be held only within the bounds of its own 
understanding, the bounds within which it has been believed, nor is it right after the Faith 
‘in the name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit’ has been confessed and sworn to 
in baptism either to doubt about anything else or to try to innovate on it. But either the 
presumption of some people, or their heedlessness, or their error, has in part fraudulently 
confessed the unchangeable constitution of apostolic doctrine, in part shamelessly departed 
from it: while in the confession of Father and Son and Holy Spirit they have made a mockery 
of the truth of the natural signification, so that it no longer is confessed in that sense which 
must be confessed in the sacrament of regeneration (4).63  
However politely put, the implication of this line of argument is very clear and rather 
startling: if Constantius, presently unbaptized, wishes to be truly baptized and truly saved, it is 
necessary for him to confess the Trinity according to its “natural signification”—that is, according to 
Hilary’s own essentially Nicene view.64 If he does not, he will be unable to be baptized, and so 
unable to gain salvation. In the context of panegyric, this is certainly a very innovative form of 
persuasion to apply to a ruling Emperor: the threat by a petitioner of loss of Christian status and 
eternal life if his appeal is not granted.  
 
62 Besides underscoring Constantius’ own unbaptized status, this emphasis on baptismal confession may also be the result of 
Hilary’s status as an adult convert to Christianity, or at the very least an adult receiver of baptism—Borchardt 1966, 2-6, 
contains a good summary of the basic positions and evidence on this question. 
63 Recognosce fidem, quam olim, optime ac religiosissime imperator, ab episcopis optas audire, et non audis. [...] Oportuerat 
enim, humanae infirmitatis modestia, omne cognitionis divinae sacramentum illis tantum conscientiae suae finibus contineri 
quibus credidit, neque post confessam et iuratam in baptismo fidem in nomine Patris et filii et Spiritus sancti, quidquam aliud 
vel ambigere, vel innovare. Sed quorumdam aut praesumptio, aut facilitas, aut error, apostolicae doctrinae indemutabilem 
constitutionem partim fraudulenter confessa est, partim audacter egressa: dum in confessione Patris et Filii et Spiritus sancti 
veritatem naturalis significationis eludit, ne id maneret in sensu, quod in regenerationis sacramento est confitendum. 
64 This insistence on preserving the priority of the “natural signification” of the terms Father, Son, and Holy Spirit reflects a 
polemical tactic innovated by Basil of Ancyra and his fellow homoiousians in their attack on the Statement of Sirmium in the 
decrees of the Council of Ancyra (Epiphanius, Panarion 73.2-11, cf. Kopecek 1979, 155-172), which had angrily declared that “he 
did not say, ‘baptizing them in the name of the fleshless and the enfleshed or the immortal and the one who has received the 
trial of death or the ungenerated and the generated,’ but ‘in the name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit,’ in order 
that, listening to the natural signification of the names, we may think that the Father is the cause of an οὐσία like him” (73.3). 
This identical strategy can hardly be a coincidence, particularly after Hilary’s overt alliance with the homoiousians at Seleucia.  
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Hilary’s appeal is likewise made with a great degree of confidence in his own ability, as a 
bishop and so an authorized expert on “divine matters,” to dictate to the Emperor what is or is not 
acceptable faith. The goal of Hilary’s speech, as already mentioned, is for Constantius to not just 
reverse his exile, but also to allow him to present, before the Council of Constantinople and before 
Constantius himself, an exposition of the true faith. This exposition will be delivered with an 
authority that is truly divine, and which demands of Constantius not just attention, but submission: 
“Submit your ears to those things which I am going to speak from the Scriptures: direct your faith to 
God. Hear what profits for faith, for unity, for eternity. I am going to speak with you, with honor for 
your kingship and your Faith, all things leading to the peace of East and West, in public view, at a 
divided council, in a well-known quarrel” (9).65  
Even in the most immediately rhetorical sense, Hilary’s emphasis throughout the speech is 
far less on Constantius’ status and authority than on his own. Constantius, unbaptized and unable to 
judge properly concerning divine matters, has been seeking the true Faith from bishops, and has 
been misled by heretics. Now, however, Hilary has arrived, ready to serve as an accurate and 
authoritative teacher of the true Faith, and thereby secure his Emperor’s salvation: “You, the 
Emperor, are seeking after the Faith: hear it, then, not from novel scraps of paper, but from the 
Scriptures of God” (8).66 These “novel scraps of paper” are almost certainly the homoian creed first 
promulgated in Constantius’ presence at Sirmium and then foisted, at the cost of a great deal of 
time and effort, on the legates of the councils of Ariminum and Seleucia by the Emperor himself. 
Hilary’s request, then, far from a humble appeal to a superior authority, is in reality a rather bold 
 
65 Submitte ad ea, quae de libris locuturus sum, aures tuas: fidem tuam ad Deum erigas. Audi quod proficit ad fidem, ad 
unitatem, ad aeternitatem. Locuturus tecum sum cum honore regni et fidei tuae, omnia ad Orientis et Occidentis pacem 
proficientia, sub publica conscientia, sub synodo dissidenti, sub lite famosa. 
66 Fidem imperator quaeris: audi eam, non de novis chartulis, sed de Dei libris.    
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and bald-faced attempt to override the Emperor’s by this time quite clear beliefs and commands. In 
granting Hilary’s appeal, Constantius will immediately and totally reverse the outcome of his entire 
conciliar and creedal project, then accept and promulgate without question the true Faith to be 
presented to the Emperor and his assembled allies by a single exiled Gallic bishop. Constantius, as 
Emperor, can listen to, obey, and facilitate Hilary’s proclamation of the true Faith; he has, however, 
seemingly no other role to play in the understanding and defining of doctrine. For an Emperor who 
had recently played a vastly more consequential role in the events and aftermath of the Councils of 
Ariminum and Seleucia, this was unlikely to be a tempting offer. 
Most striking of all, perhaps, is the degree to which, for the bulk of the speech, Constantius 
drops out of view altogether in favor of a series of extended laments over the current state of the 
episcopate. In the end, both the panegyric picture of Constantius as benevolent Emperor and the 
less flattering image of Constantius as incompetent doctrinal facilitator are replaced by the same 
essentially collegial view of the episcopate presented in De synodis, and now extended more clearly 
to the baptized body of believers as a whole. Though speaking to the unbaptized Constantius, Hilary 
offers a lament entirely from the perspective of the baptized:  
The Faith, then, is sought after, as if there were no faith. The Faith must be written, as 
though it were not in the heart. Although we have been regenerated through faith, now we 
are taught the Faith, as though that regeneration were without the Faith. We learn about 
Christ after baptism, as though any baptism were able to exist without faith in Christ. We 
emend, as though there were pardon for a sin against the Holy Spirit (6).67  
Constantius forms no part of the “we” spoken of here. It is right for him to seek after the 
Faith, to have it taught to him, to have it explained to him, by Hilary and his fellow bishops—but not 
to do anything else. An essential unlikeness, an essential inferiority in status and ability, is here 
 
67 Fides deinde quaeritur, quasi fides nulla sit. Fides scribenda est, quasi in corde non sit. Regenerati per fidem nunc ad fidem 
docemur, quasi regeneratio illa sine fide sit. Christum post baptisma discimus, quasi baptisma aliquod esse possit sine Christi 
fide. Emendamus, quasi in spiritum sanctum peccasse sit venia. 
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taken for granted. As we have already seen in De synodis, however, among the body of bishops and 
truly believing Christians, Hilary’s insistence on unity through equality is absolute, and leads in Ad 
Constantium to a series of remarkable, extended lamentations over the current state of the Church 
and the bishops, divided into factions, pitted against one other, and therefore guilty of proclaiming 
contradictory faiths to those who, like Constantius, ought to be taught and baptized into the one 
true Faith. A longer quotation is necessary to give the full impact of these excurses, which together 
make up the bulk of this extremely unusual Imperial appeal:  
While there is fist-fighting with words, while there is questioning about novelties, while 
there is investigating about ambiguities, while there is complaining about authorities, while 
there is contesting about studies, while there is distress in agreement, while each person 
begins to be anathema to the other: now nearly no one belongs to Christ. For we are driven 
about by the uncertain wind of doctrines: and either when we teach, we disturb others, or 
when we are taught, we err. But the Faith which belongs to this most recent year, what 
does it have in itself of unchangeableness? First, there is the Faith which decrees that we 
must keep silent about the ὁμοούσιος: then again, there is the Faith which decrees and 
preaches the ὁμοούσιος; thirdly, then, there is the Faith which excuses, as an indulgence, 
the use of the term οὐσία, since it was simply presumed by the Fathers; finally, fourth, there 
is the Faith which does not excuse the use of the term οὐσία, but condemns it. And where 
has this led? To a state where nothing sacred to us or to those before us still remains sacred 
and inviolable. Because the Faith of our miserable time is about how similar the Son of God 
is to God the Father, whether he is totally similar, or only similar in part, we, the outstanding 
arbiters of the celestial Sacraments, bestowers of the invisible mysteries, in our professions 
commit slander about the Faith of God. We decree yearly and monthly Faiths of God, we 
change our minds about what we have decreed, we defend those who change their minds, 
we anathematize those we have defended; either we condemn in what is our own what 
belongs to others, or in what belongs to others we condemn what is our own; and in biting 
each other, we have already been slain by one another (5).68 
 
68 Dum in verbis pugna est, dum de novitatibus quaestio est, dum de ambiguis occasio est, dum de auctoribus querela est, dum 
de studiis certamen est, dum in consensu difficultas est, dum alter alteri anathema esse coepit: prope iam nemo Christi est. 
Incerto enim doctrinarum vento vagamur: et aut dum docemus, perturbamus; aut dum docemur, erramus. Iam vero proximi 
anni fides, quid iam de immutatione in se habet? Primum, quae homousion decernit taceri: sequens rursum, quae homousion 
decernit et praedicat: tertium deinceps, quae usiam simpliciter a patribus praesumptam, per indulgentiam excusat: postremum 
quartum, quae non excusat, sed condemnat. Et quo tandem processum est? Ut neque penes nos, neque penes quemquam ante 
nos, sanctum exinde aliquid atque inviolabile perseveret. De similitudine autem Dei filii ad Deum patrem quod si miserabilis 
nostri temporis fides est, ne non aut ex toto, aut tantum ex portione sit similis; egregii scilicet arbitri caelestium 
sacramentorum, conquisitores invisibilium mysteriorum, professionibus de fide Dei calumniamur. Annuas atque menstruas de 
Deo fides decernimus, decretis poenitemus, poenitentes defendimus, defensos anathematizamus; aut in nostris aliena, aut in 
alienis nostra damnamus; et mordentes invicem, iam absumpti sumus ab invicem. 
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The unity of the episcopate, the body of equal “arbiters of the celestial sacraments” and 
“bestowers of the invisible mysteries,” is for Hilary of the utmost importance—and important most 
of all for those who, like Constantius, are reliant on the bishops to teach them the true Faith which 
they must confess to be baptized and saved. In a world with four Faiths, and therefore four 
episcopates, salvation becomes impossible: “And since, according to ‘one God, one Lord, and one 
Baptism,’ there is also one Faith, we are withdrawing from that Faith, which is only one: and while 
more and more Faiths come into existence, it has begun to be the case that there is no Faith at all” 
(4).69 The only bridge between divine and human realms is the divine Faith and the divine 
sacraments taught and dispensed by numerous equal, united bishops. The “shipwrecks of the Faith” 
(6)70 visible in the discord of a divided episcopate are not only a threat to the bishops themselves, 
but to all people and the cosmos as a whole: “But now, because my fear is for the peril of the world, 
the responsibility of my silence, the judgment of God, my concern is for hope, for life, for 
immortality—not only my own immortality, but also yours, and the immortality of all people” (3).71 
If the bishops of the Christian Church can no longer proclaim a single divine Faith to all people, then 
the unity of divine with human expressed in Christian salvation and immortality is no longer 
possible.72 The cosmos without a united episcopate is not a cosmos at all.  
 
69 Et cum, secundum unum Deum et unum Dominum et unum baptisma, etiam fides una sit, excedimus ab ea fide quae sola est: 
et dum plures fiunt, ad id coeperunt esse, ne ulla sit. 
70 Fidei naufragia 
71 Nunc autem, quia mihi metus est de mundi periculo, de silentii mei reatu, de iudicio Dei, cura autem est de spe, de vita, de 
immortalitate non tam mea, quam tua universorumque. 
72 The political force of this claimed status for the episcopate is underscored by Drake 2000, 468, who points out that, while 
divine favor had long been seen as the basis for Imperial rule, “before Christianity [...] the divine had no institutional basis.” 
Even in appealing to the Emperor, Hilary is quite clear about his belief that the episcopate is simply and precisely the 
institutional representation of the divine within the Roman Empire and the human world. 
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Hilary is, then, far more interested in lamenting and counteracting the destruction of 
episcopal unity and the Faith than he is in praising the good qualities of the reigning Emperor. This 
panegyric petition is imbued at every point with the theology of unity in distinction that we have 
already seen exposited in De synodis—one where the Imperial authority of Constantius is radically 
relativized and subordinated to the one divine Faith authoritatively taught by the united body of 
bishops to all those, even the Emperor, who need to confess it, be baptized, and so attain salvation. 
 In the present crisis deplored by Hilary, the episcopate has been divided against itself by the 
proclamation of contradictory faiths, and the salvation of all is threatened. As Hilary implicitly 
acknowledges, however, the primary immediate threat to the salvation of the world is not any 
independent action of a heretical bishop, but the series of councils recently called and overseen by 
Constantius himself. Like Hilary, Constantius had sought to unite the episcopate of the whole Empire 
around a single confession of faith—and his means had been the twin Councils of Ariminum and 
Seleucia, which between them brought together more bishops than any conciliar project before 
them, even Nicaea. As discussed in section 3.6 above, these councils had ended in a capitulation by 
representatives of both councils to a homoian formula initially supported by only a small minority of 
bishops but clearly endorsed by the Emperor.  
Still, at least in the rhetorical world of Ad Constantium, all is not yet lost. There is still time 
for Constantius to put the brakes on his conciliar project and allow the episcopate to return to the 
simple (and substantially Nicene) faith expressed in the baptismal formulas. Manipulated as he 
might have been up to this point by deceptive bishops preaching a deceptive faith, it is still possible 
for the Emperor to play a positive role in the life of the Church, not on the basis of any authority of 
his own, but by listening and submitting to the unifying Faith preached by Hilary, and then 
facilitating the introduction of that saving Faith into the Council of Constantinople, where it will 
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bring about the unity, first of the episcopate, then of the baptized, and finally of the cosmos as a 
whole.73 
In sum, then, Ad Constantium represents a remarkable turn in the genre of panegyrical 
appeals to the Emperor, one that both compliments and contrasts the innovative approach of 
Eusebius of Caesarea a generation before. Eusebius had used the opportunity of praising the 
Emperor to articulate a theology of cosmic and divine unity where the Emperor himself was the 
most important figure, where at every point the power and goodness of Constantine was paralleled 
by the power and goodness of God the Father and his (separate, subordinate) Word. Hilary, in 
contrast, employs panegyric language and rhetoric for the purpose, not of affirming the Emperor’s 
cosmic importance, but rather of enlisting his aid in a clearly subordinate position to help Hilary 
himself heal a schism within the episcopate, whose common duty it is to bring about unity and 
salvation through confession of the true equality of Father, Son, and Spirit. Once again, theology, 
rhetoric, and political and social thought interact almost seamlessly, leading to a work that, if it is 
perhaps not a very successful example of the genre of appeals to monarchs (as it is nearly 
impossible to imagine it in fact gaining its intended result), remains a remarkable rhetorical and 







73 In my judgment, then, the statement of Laconi 2004, 70, that in Ad Constantium Hilary merely “sia pure non apertamente [...] 
insistette sul fatto che l’episcoplais doctrina possedeva una funzione di vigilanza anche su un imperatore cattolico,” is a 




In Constantium Imperatorem74 
“Against the Emperor Constantius” 
“The time has come for speaking: for now the time has passed for staying silent” (1).75 So, in 
suitably dramatic fashion, opens Hilary of Poitier’s only work of anti-Imperial invective. Gone is the 
attempt at rapprochement with Constantius that had characterized Ad Constantium; instead, bitter, 
wholesale polemic is the order of the day.  
The reason for this dramatic change in policy is primarily, I believe, a matter of time and 
context. Ad Constantium was written either just before or during the deliberations of the Council of 
Constantinople in January 360, at which Hilary had hoped to lead a reversal of the homoian 
capitulations of Ariminum and Seleucia the year before. In Constantium is written in the aftermath 
of this council, which had turned out to be little more than a ratification, by the Emperor and a small 
body of bishops, of the ecumenical homoian formula already endorsed by representatives of the 
Eastern and Western episcopate from Ariminum and Seleucia. In the aftermath of this event, the 
most prominent surviving leaders of the homoiousians, including many who had subscribed under 
compulsion to the new creed, were deposed, banished, and replaced by allies of their former rivals 
Acacius and Eudoxius, the new favored theologians of the Emperor. Constantius clearly regarded the 
matter as all but finished—and so Hilary’s rhetorical task shifts from that of persuading Constantius 
to rousing resistance to him among his fellow Christians in both East and West.  
Although this much is clear, the rest of the context for In Constantium is harder to discern. 
Jerome in his De viris illustribus states that it was published only after Constantius’ death, but since 
 
74 This work is referred to in the manuscripts both under the title Liber in Constantium Imperatorem and Liber contra 
Constantium Imperatorem. Both titles have been and continue to be used, though scholars (e.g. Williams 1992, 7 n. 2) have 
given a certain priority to In Constantium, the title used by Jerome when speaking of the work in De viris illustribus 100. 
75 Tempus est loquendi, quia iam praeteriit tempus tacendi. 
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the content of the book directly contradicts this idea at numerous points, it has been rejected by 
most modern scholars.76 Still, where, when, and to whom Hilary wrote this, the most unique text in 
his corpus, remain matters of debate, particularly given the rapid and tumultuous events of the year 
following the Council of Constantinople, including the rebellion of Constantius’ Western Caesar 
Julian in the early months of 360, Hilary’s return to his see in Gaul in mid-360,77 the campaign of 
conciliar statements and depositions begun shortly thereafter by Hilary and his fellow Nicenes in the 
West after his return, and finally the death of Constantius himself in November 361. However In 
Constantium is to be situated relative to these events,78 it is clear that Hilary’s hope in writing In 
Constantium was to rouse opposition to the Imperial-sponsored homoian belief of Ariminum, 
Seleucia, and Constantinople. In doing so, his strategy has shifted drastically from that of De synodis 
or Ad Constantium. It now involves not only invective, but invective aimed directly at the reigning 
Emperor. 
Given the late date of this work, as well as the evidence from Apologetica ad reprehensores 
for Hilary’s direct literary engagement with Lucifer of Cagliari,79 it seems overwhelmingly likely to me 
 
76 Cf. Williams 1992, Flower 2016, Borchardt 1966, 173-174, and Rocher 1987, 29-38, the last of whom, however, tries to 
preserve some veracity in Jerome’s report by proposing a complex division of the work itself, some of which was circulated 
prior to Constantius’ death in a relatively small circle, but which was not published in its final form until after Constantius’ 
death. Like both Williams and Flower, I regard this theory as ingenious, but unnecessary. 
77 Sulpicius Severus gives two different reasons for this return from exile in his different works, the one a desire on Constantius’ 
part to prevent Hilary from continuing to interfere in Eastern Church affairs (Chronicum 65.4), the other a latent repentance by 
Constantius for the exile itself (Vita Sancti Martini 6). Williams 1992, 10, does an excellent job of showing the lack of coherence 
in both of these alternatives (since Constantius had shown no other signs of such “repentance,” and since sending back a 
powerful enemy from under his thumb in Constantinople to a Gaul in open rebellion is a rather nonsensical strategy for 
quashing dissent), and in my judgment Williams’ alternative proposal, that Hilary returned on his own initiative thanks to the 
cover provided by Julian’s rebellion (10-14), remains by far the most convincing explanation. 
78 For instance, Rocher 1987, 29-38, sees In Constantium as having largely been written under Julian’s protection in Gaul, and 
only published in whole following Constantius’ death, while Williams 1992, 12-13, with whom I largely agree, instead argues 
that, given the urgent tone of the work and the total absence of reference to later events, In Constantium was most likely 
written and circulated very shortly after the Council of Constantinople in early 360. The general aporia of Borchardt 1966, 173-
174, on the question, should not, however, be discounted. 
79 See section 5.3 above. As Rocher 1987, 63, notes, Hilary also mentions Lucifer in In Constantium among the viri sancti, 
comparable to the martyrs of old, wrongfully exiled by Constantius (2). 
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that in In Constantium Hilary is deliberately appealing to and making use of Lucifer’s new generic 
model of Christian Imperial invective. The similarities between In Constantium and Lucifer’s corpus 
are numerous, ranging from strategy to comparanda to choice of insulting terminology.80 More 
striking for our purposes, however, are the differences, which speak both to Hilary’s different 
theological emphases and his rather different understanding of the political and theological 
situation of the early 360s.  
Lucifer had begun his campaign against Constantius several years earlier, starting with his 
efforts at the Council of Milan in 355 and taking written form at the latest by 358 or early 359 and 
likely even earlier,81 and in all of his works, he maintains a laser focus on the Emperor as the source 
and driver behind all the heresy of his time. Even in In Constantium, which directly mimics Lucifer’s 
style of 2nd-person anti-Imperial invective, Hilary does not lose sight of the rival bishops responsible, 
in his view, for Constantius’ recent descent into open heresy. Again, Lucifer primarily occupies 
himself with modeling the direct relationship between himself and Constantius, bishop and 
Emperor, through numerous Scriptural analogies, both constructive and adversarial, over the course 
of his five works. Even in In Constantium, the most important relationship remains that between 
Hilary and his fellow bishops, while his conflict with Constantius is treated solely in terms of the 
martyr-narratives used by Lucifer in De non parcendo and Moriundum esse, models which (as argued 
in section 5.6 above) aimed to sever rather than further relationship.  
Most importantly for understanding In Constantium, however, is the straightforward fact 
that Hilary’s work of Imperial invective is not actually addressed to Constantius or intended for his 
 
80 E.g. Constantius is addressed in the 2nd person, called the Antichrist, blamed for using his Imperial power to tempt bishops 
into sin, accused of martyring Christians, compared negatively to past pagan persecutors, characterized as a usurper, etc., etc. 
Many of these similarities are covered in detail in Flower 2007. 
81 See the section on the chronology of Lucifer’s works in Appendix B. 
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perusal.82 The addressee in the early sections of In Constantium is the 2nd-person Fratres, the equal 
“brother bishops” so prominent in all of Hilary’s writings,83 and for the bulk of the work, Constantius 
is described in the 3rd person, his wicked actions narrated for the benefit of a clearly episcopal 
audience. When Hilary begins addressing (or rather berating) the Emperor in the 2nd person, it is as a 
rhetorical device, expressing the depths of Hilary’s righteous anger and commitment through 
imitation of a Luciferian generic model. There is good reason, in contrast, to think that Lucifer’s 
works, which never stray from a tight 2nd-person address to the Emperor, were written with 
Constantius as at least one intended audience, with the genuine goal of admonishing him and 
converting him from error to truth.84 Hilary’s invective against the Emperor, in contrast, has as its 
goal not the conversion or correction of the Emperor but, like practically all of Hilary’s works, the 
persuasion and unification of his fellow bishops. This basic fact—that the person attacked by Hilary 
in In Constantium is not the same as the addressee—in my judgment greatly alters the way in which 
we ought to read Hilary’s polemic, both in terms of his actual or apparent goals and his actual or 
apparent harshness. Read in this light, In Constantium is not a dramatic break from Hilary’s earlier, 
conciliatory goal of episcopal reunification, but rather a furthering of that goal under a different 
strategy. 
This strategy is in the first place nothing less than a campaign of warfare against the reigning 
Emperor: “But now we are fighting against the deceptive persecutor, against the charming enemy 
(hostis), against Constantius the Antichrist” (5).85 Hilary’s description of Constantius in this work is 
 
82 Cf. Rocher 1987, 41: “L'ouvrage n'est pas destiné à l'empereur Constance.” 
83 The question of how wide an audience Hilary intended the work to be read by is unclear, and many different stances have 
been taken. Rocher 1987, 41-43, gives the most common opinion, that “Le livre [...] est donc destiné aux Églises des Gaules et 
plus particulièrement à leurs évêques.” 
84 See section 5.1 above. 
85 At nunc pugnamus contra persecutorem fallentem, contra hostem blandientem, contra Constantium antichristum. 
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very similar to that in Lucifer, both in the innovative use of the title of Antichrist as an insult for a 
reigning Christian Emperor and in the treatment of Imperial power as a tool for the seduction of 
bishops into sin and error. Somewhat amusingly, however, Hilary’s use of the title Antichrist for 
Constantius is rather less subtle than Lucifer’s, which even in the midst of furious polemic takes care 
to distinguish the Emperor’s status as one of many antichrists or a precursor to Antichrist from the 
actual eschatological figure: in Hilary, however, apart from a solitary reference to him as “coming 
before Antichrist” (7),86 Constantius is repeatedly referred to, simply and without elaboration, as 
antichristus. Far from avoiding or mitigating the implications of the term, Hilary begins his work on a 
deliberately eschatological note: “Let us expect Christ: for the Antichrist has prevailed” (1).87 Though 
all this can be taken in a sense more rhetorical than literal, the forcefulness of Hilary’s rhetoric is 
itself notable, and reflective not only of the new generic conventions for attacking a Christian 
Emperor already established by Lucifer, but also of the more violent degree of conflict reached in 
both Imperial and episcopal affairs in the early 360s. 
Similarly, Hilary’s description of Constantius as using Imperial power and money to seduce 
(blandire) and lead bishops into error is essentially identical to that of Lucifer in De non 
conveniendo,88 with an even higher pitch of rhetoric,89 as in the justly famous passage in which 
 
86 antichristum praevenis 
87 Christus exspectetur, quia obtinuit antichristus. 
88 It should be noted that De non conveniendo is likely one of Lucifer’s earlier polemics, and has been occasionally considered 
his earliest (see Appendix B for more discussion of the chronology of Lucifer’s works).  
89 In my evaluation of Hilary’s rhetoric in In Constantium, I differ from that of Rocher 1987, 46-51, who takes great pains to 
defend Hilary, not only against charges of inconsistency in his treatment of the Emperor, but also against the suggestion that 
Hilary is anything save “relativement modéré” (48) in comparison to other polemicists of his time—going so far as to argue that 
Constantius himself might well have enjoyed reading In Constantium, “à condition, bien sûr, qu'il fît preuve d'un minimum 
d'humour!” (51). Flower 2017, in contrast, provides an excellent analysis of the strength of Hilary’s rhetoric in comparison to his 
contemporaries Lucifer and Athanasius, but resolves the seeming conflict between Hilary’s polemic in In Constantium and his 
more conciliatory tone in Ad Constantium as due to “the malleability of imperial rhetoric, which could be directed to different 
audiences for different purposes” (29, n. 137). As I will argue, Hilary’s polemical attack in In Constantium is not only quite 
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Hilary highlights Constantius’ soul-corrupting tactics and contrasts them with the violent 
persecutions of Christians in the past:90  
But now we are fighting against the deceptive persecutor, against the charming enemy, 
against Constantius the Antichrist: who does not lacerate backs, but caresses bellies; does 
not proscribe men to life, but enriches them to death; does not slaughter men in prison for 
their liberty, but amidst the Palace honors them for their enslavement; does not torture 
men’s sides, but takes possession of their hearts; does not cut off heads with the sword, but 
kills souls with gold; does not publicly threaten with fire, but privately kindles Gehenna. He 
does not fight, lest he should be conquered; but he fawns that he may master. He confesses 
Christ, so as to deny him; he procures unity, so that there may not be peace; he restrains 
heresies, lest there should be Christians; he honors priests, lest they be should be bishops; 
he constructs buildings for the Church, so that he may destroy the Faith. He cheats you with 
words, cheats you with his mouth; he does everything, in all things, lest you, as you are God, 
should in the same way be believed to be a Father (5).91 
Present in this dense passage are the key hallmarks of Hilary’s emerging anti-Imperial 
rhetoric. First and foremost, like Lucifer in De non parcendo and Moriundum esse, Hilary makes 
pervasive use of the martyr-narratives of the past to shape his presentation of his own relationship 
with Constantius. Here, many of Hilary’s barbs might well have been taken directly from Moriundum 
esse:92 “I proclaim to you, Constantius, what I would have said to Nero, what Decius and Maximianus 
would have heard from me: you are fighting against God, you are acting like a wild beast toward the 
 
strong, even by comparison to Lucifer of Cagliari, but also substantially in accord with his goals and methods in more outwardly 
“moderate” works such as De synodis. 
90 Relatively little stylistic study has been devoted to Hilary’s polemical works. Doignon 1968, in a general summation of Hilary’s 
style, gives short shrift to polemic in comparison to Hilary’s theological and exegetical works, but nonetheless argues 
persuasively for Hilary’s primary reliance on a quasi-judicial or forensic style, closely related to that found in Roman school 
textbooks but relying primarily on pathos, particularly expressions of outrage or anger rather than humor or irony, and making 
extensive use of hyperbole, conciseness, and homoteleuton (275, 283-285). The recent works by Richard Flower (Flower 2013, 
Flower 2017) address primarily Hilary’s rhetorical tactics, with little attention paid to his Latin style. 
91 At nunc pugnamus contra persecutorem fallentem, contra hostem blandientem, contra Constantium antichristum, qui non 
dorsa caedit sed ventrem palpat, non proscribit ad vitam sed ditat in mortem, non trudit carcere ad libertatem sed intra 
palatium onerat ad servitutem; non latera vexat sed cor occupat, non caput gladio desecat sed animam auro occidit, non ignes 
publice minatur sed gehennam privatim accendit. Non contendit ne vincatur, sed adulatur ut dominetur; Christum confitetur ut 
neget, unitatem procurat ne pax sit; haereses conprimit ne christiani sint, sacerdotes honorat ne episcopi sint, ecclesiae tecta 
struit ut fidem destruat. Te in verbis, te in ore circumfert, et omnia omnino agit, ne tu ut Deus, ita ut pater, esse credaris. 
92 For more discussion of the rhetorical meaning and uses of these appeals to martyrdom, see sections 4.5 and 4.6 on Lucifer’s 
De non parcendo and Moriundum esse above, as well as Flower 2013, esp. 127-177, for a thorough discussion of the rhetorical 
uses of these narratives in the context of the 4th century and older traditions of Roman rhetoric. 
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Church, you are persecuting the Saints, you hate the preachers of Christ, you are destroying religion, 
you are a now a tyrant not of human things, but of divine things” (7).93 Like Lucifer, Hilary directly 
associates Constantius with those Imperial persecutors attacked in past Christian martyr-narratives 
and in the writings of the Emperor Constantine, who had used the preeminent violence of the 
Persecution of Diocletian to argue for his own legitimacy as the divinely-appointed avenger of these 
unprecedented crimes. In attacking the son of Constantine, however, Hilary repeatedly emphasizes 
that this non-persecuting Christian Emperor is not just as bad as, but actually worse than, any 
persecuting pagan Emperor of the past. In an effective rhetorical flourish, Hilary turns directly from 
berating Constantius to addressing the great persecuting Emperors of the past, not to attack them, 
but rather to praise them for the glorious, life-giving consequences of their violent crimes:  
We owe more to your cruelty, Nero, Decius, and Maximian: for we conquered the Devil 
through you. The holy blood of the blessed Martyrs was everywhere shed, and their 
venerable bones are a daily testimony: while the demons moan at them, while sicknesses 
are driven away by them, while miracles are witnessed with wonder: bodies are raised up 
without ropes, and when women are hung up by their feet, their clothes do not fall over 
their faces, spirits burn without fires, the tormented confess without being questioned (8).94  
This direct comparison between Constantius and the great Roman Imperial persecutors of 
the past constitutes the polemical core of Hilary’s strategy in In Constantium. In this comparison, 
Constantius is at every point worse than his pagan predecessors, not although but because he 
refrains from violent persecution and the killing of his enemies, because he is a Christian Emperor 
rather than a pagan, because he showers the Church with material beneficence, and because he 
involves himself in the deliberations of bishops to bring about unity. These are all attributes that, 
 
93 Proclamo tibi, Constanti, quod Neroni locutus fuissem, quod ex me Decius et Maximianus audirent: Contra Deum pugnas, 
contra Ecclesiam saevis, sanctos persequeris, praedicatores Christi odis, religionem tollis, tyrannus non iam humanorum, sed 
divinorum es. 
94 Plus crudelitati vestrae, Nero, Deci, Maximiane, debemus. Diabolum enim per vos vicimus. Sanctus ubique beatorum 
Martyrum sanguis exceptus est, et veneranda ossa cottidie testimonio sunt: dum in his daemones mugiunt, dum aegritudines 
depelluntur, dum admirationem opera cernuntur: elevari sine laqueis corpora, et suspensis pede feminis vestes non defluere in 
faciem, uri sine ignibus spiritus, confiteri sine interrogatione vexatos[.] 
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seen from a slightly different perspective, might be taken as positives. Indeed, these are precisely 
those characteristics of the new Christian Empire that Eusebius and Constantine had repeatedly and 
publicly trumpeted as signs of divine favor and eschatological peace.  
To make his case against the Christian Empire of Constantius, then, Hilary is brought to 
innovate a distinctively Christian rhetoric based around a near-total reversal of the immediate 
connotations of violence and nonviolence, poverty and abundance, life and death. While Lucifer’s 
use of martyr-narratives had been relatively straightforward, emphasizing the fleshly carnificina 
inflicted by Constantius on his victims, Hilary transfers Constantius’ violence almost entirely from 
the physical to the spiritual plane, from bodies to souls. For Hilary, it is precisely the clarity and 
physicality of the persecutions of past pagan Emperors that is responsible for the miraculous, 
supernatural effects made starkly visible in the relics of the saints, whereas the non-physical, 
persuasive quality of Constantius’ persecutions makes them in reality far more destructive: “Most 
wicked of mortals, you lessen all the evils of persecution, so that you may remove the possibility of 
pardon in sin, and martyrdom in confession” (8).95 While the pagan persecuting Empire of the past 
had brought life by the shedding of Christian blood, Constantius’ peaceful Christian Empire brings 
spiritual death. 
In this highly paradoxical assault, Hilary blames Constantius not only for his malicious 
refraining from violent persecution, but also for his unprecedented bestowal of wealth and 
privileges on the Church. In Eusebius’ schema, Imperial favor towards the Church had constituted 
the normative state of affairs not only during Constantine’s lifetime, but even under the earlier, 
pagan Empire of the 3rd century. For Hilary, however, such Imperial beneficence is in reality not a 
 




material blessing, but a violent spiritual assault upon the Church, used by the Antichrist Constantius 
to divide bishop from bishop and lead souls into Imperial-sponsored sin. In this, Hilary is targeting 
not just the institutional policy of the dynasty of Constantine, but also the long-standing ideology of 
the Roman state. The beneficence of the Emperor, expressed in the bestowal of material 
abundance, gold and food and honor and health, was central to Roman conceptualizations of power, 
expressed frequently in Imperial art, in court rituals and panegyrics, and in the works of Constantine 
and Constantius discussed in Chapters One and Three. In contrast to this, enemies of the Emperor 
were characteristically tyrannical and doomed to defeat, destruction, and death, serving in this way 
as signs of the Emperor’s divinely-bestowed power. As it emerges through repeated rhetorical 
assaults, Hilary’s overriding goal to directly reverse the prevailing symbolic discourse of Imperial 
power on the basis of a resolutely supernaturalist and eschatological viewpoint. It is the dead bodies 
of the Emperor’s enemies that bear sacred power, bringing health and victory over demonic 
enemies; it is the Emperor’s ability to bestow material wealth and honors that brings slavery and 
death. It is not despite, but because he spares his enemies and provides for his people that 
Constantius is a greater tyrant than Nero. 
In In Constantium, Hilary has reached the furthest point thus far in the development of 
means for the criticism and delegitimization of a Christian Emperor. In this new and distinctively 
Christian anti-Imperial rhetoric, those actions and qualities of an Emperor which in typical Roman 
discourse had been seen as positive (forbearance in punishment, generosity in bestowing material 
goods) can instead be portrayed as signs of preeminent evil. Similarly, Hilary’s model of anti-Imperial 
invective directly counters the political-theological stance of Eusebius of Caesarea, taking those 
factors which for Eusebius had constituted signs of the culmination of Christian history in the 
eschatological kingdom of Christ and instead employing them as signs of the kingdom of Antichrist. 
Finally, and most importantly for the purposes of this study, Hilary’s arguments in In Constantium 
549 
 
directly undercut the legitimizing rhetoric employed over the previous decades by the Constantinian 
dynasty. In both word and deed, Constantine had based the moral case for his rise to sole power on 
the piety and divine favor visible in his halting of persecution and beneficence towards the Church. 
In entirely denying both the premises and conclusions of this argument, Hilary has struck at the very 
heart of the Constantinian Settlement. 
As already mentioned, however, even in writing anti-Imperial invective Hilary retains his 
overriding focus on theology and on episcopal harmony or discord. As quickly becomes clear, Hilary 
is ultimately less concerned with the fact of what Constantius has or has not done to his subjects or 
his enemies as in his participation, as Christian Emperor, in the conciliar process that had led to the 
homoian formula of Ariminum, Seleucia, and Constantinople, and in his legal, Imperial endorsement 
of its results. In his treatment of these councils and their aftermath, there is implicit a sort of 
doubling of Hilary and Constantius, a relationship very different from the various adversarial stances 
adopted by Lucifer in his relations with the Emperor.96 As of the writing of In Constantium, 
Constantius had succeeded where Hilary in De synodis had failed, bringing unity to the bishops of 
East and West through the assertion of similarity between Father and Son and the deemphasizing of 
controversial language. It is this doubling, I would suggest, that is in part responsible for the fury of 
Hilary’s polemic in In Constantium, the goal of which is not just to delegitimize Constantius as a 
Christian ruler, but also to clearly distinguish, in beliefs, methods, and essential nature, Constantius’ 
program of episcopal unity from Hilary’s. In Hilary’s ultimate characterization, Constantius’ efforts at 
episcopal unity are different from his own both because of the radically perverse theology from 
which they arise, and because of the fundamental and inescapable fact that Constantius is not a 
 
96 Though somewhat reminiscent of Lucifer’s treatment of Constantius’ and his own paired roles in the judgment of Athanasius 
in De Athanasio, which also features an implicit doubling of Lucifer and Constantius as judges and (potential or actual) 
malefactors: see section 4.2 above. 
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bishop, but the one and only Roman Emperor, without the collegial status and doctrinal authority of 
Hilary and his fellows, but with the vast material resources and immediate recourse to coercion that 
such a status implies.  
Hilary’s general attack on Constantius is thus quickly sharpened into a direct focus on the 
homoian formula and the means by which Constantius had assured its adoption by the bishops of 
East and West. In a striking, central passage, Hilary drops the generic features of Imperial invective 
entirely to give an extended account of his experience attending the Council of Seleucia in 359.97 
Hilary’s account of these events is replete with descriptions of his personal shock and horror at both 
the episcopal disarray and the doctrinal equivocation present at the council—a shock and horror 
made more poignant by their contrast with the more hopeful picture of De synodis.  
According to Hilary, upon the initial assembling of the council, there had been 105 bishops 
of the homoiousian party, 19 of the so-called “anomoiousian” party,98 and an unknown number of 
Egyptian bishops who confessed the ὁμοούσιος. As his efforts in De synodis would suggest, Hilary 
seems to have associated himself not only with the few homoousians, but also with the much larger 
homoiousian party, whose arguments at the council he praises as “pious” (13).99 Despite the efforts 
 
97 Rocher 1987, 22-23, acknowledges the general surprise among scholars that the exiled Hilary would be allowed to attend the 
council, but suggests that, in contrast to the impression given by later chroniclers and hagiographers, he probably played a fairly 
minor role in its deliberations. Similarly Borchardt 1966, 166, mentions the hypothesis that Basil of Ancyra, the leader of the 
homoiousian faction, was responsible for Hilary’s presence, but acknowledges that there is no real evidence for this position. 
Hilary himself, it should be noted, does not ascribe any great effect to his actions at the Council, presenting himself mostly as an 
observer of the conflict between the two dominant homoiousian and anomoiousian factions. 
98 It should be noted that despite the surface similarity of language, the bishops of whom Hilary merely says 
anomoeusion...profitentur (not a description but a negation: “those who profess the not-ὁμοιούσιος”) would not have been 
confined to the radical party known in scholarship as anomoians, heterousians, or “neo-Arians.” Hilary is, understandably, not 
particularly attuned to the differences within the non-Nicene camp that distinguished the followers of “anomoian” thinkers 
such as Aetius and Eunomius from their more moderate “homoian” colleagues—particularly since, as discussed in note 276 in 
section 3.6 above, these two factions seem to have acted in almost perfect concert during the events of the council and its 
aftermath. 
99 Weedman 2007 has recently emphasized Hilary’s close connection not just in episcopal politics, but in theology with Basil of 
Ancyra, the leader of the homoiousians. 
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of this pious majority, however, the assembly quickly descended into a virtual free-for-all between 
the homoiousians and their Imperial-sponsored rivals. Amidst this fracas, Hilary singles out a speech 
read aloud in the assembly and attributed to Eudoxius:  
I am telling to you what I myself heard recited publicly in the meeting, understood to be an 
excerpt of a sermon preached by the bishop of Antioch. [...] ‘God was what he is, he was not 
a father, because neither does he have a son: for if he has a son, it is necessary that there 
also be a woman, and spoken conversation, and conjugal union, and alluring words, and 
finally the natural means for generation.’ O my wretched ears, which heard the sound of so 
poisonous a voice, which heard these things said by a man about God, and preached about 
Christ in the Church! And after many impieties of this sort, when he had compared the 
Father and Son according to their names rather than according to nature, he said: ‘For 
however much the Son extends himself so as to know the Father, the Father extends himself 
the same distance so that he may not be known by the Son.’ When these things had been 
recited, a violent commotion arose (13).100 
Whether or not this is an accurate description of Eudoxius’ thought, it certainly reflects both 
Hilary’s and the homoiousian’s overt disgust at both the persons and theology of their rivals. Despite 
these violent objections, however, the anomoiousian party remained in clear control of the council’s 
agenda. In Hilary’s narration, after the rejection of the Dated Creed by the council, the 
anomoiousians leaders instead proposed a “compromise” formula that would proscribe not just the 
ὁμοούσιος and ὁμοιούσιος, but also the term ἀνόμοιος (“unlike”) used by Aetius and his allies. Such 
a tactic was, however, absolutely unacceptable to Hilary, precisely because in his judgment it was 
not a compromise at all—and would not even successfully target the actual beliefs of the radicals 
Aetius and Eunomius.101 To prove his point, Hilary recounts a conversation with a member of the 
 
100 Loquor autem vobis quod ego ipse recitari in conventu publice audivi, quod praedicatum episcopo Antiochiae exceptum 
habebatur. [...] ‘Erat Deus quod est, pater non erat, quia neque ei filius: nam si filius, necesse est ut et femina sit et conloquium 
sermonis et coniunctio coniugalis et verbi blandimentum et postremum ad generandum naturalis machinula.’ O miseras aures 
meas, quae tam funestae vocis sonum audierunt, haec de Deo ab homine dici et de Christo in ecclesia praedicari! Post multas 
autem istius modi inpietates, cum Patrem et Filium ex nominibus potius quam ex natura comparasset, ait: ‘Quantum enim filius 
se extendit cognoscere patrem, tantum pater superextendit se ne cognitus filio sit.’ Quibus recitatis, tumultus exortus est. 
101 Cf. Kopecek 202-213, who argues that this was to some extent a pre-arranged strategy which Aetius himself had approved, 
as he seems to have begun deliberately refraining from using this expression shortly prior to the council.  
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anomoiousian party perfectly willing to confess the similarity of Father to the Son, and condemn the 
term ἀνόμοιος—but in such a fashion as to in no way alter his own position. 
Since this condemnation seemed self-contradictory in the opinion of those hearing it, I 
myself, as though I were ignorant of what had been done, questioned one of those who 
happened to have approached me intending to persuade me, about why he, speaking for 
himself, wanted everyone who had condemned the statement ‘that there is one substance 
of the Son with the Father,’ or who had denied the statement ‘there is a similar substance,’ 
to also condemn ‘dissimilarity.’ Then he said to me that Christ is not similar to God, but he is 
similar to the Father. This seemed even more obscure to me. When I asked him about it, this 
is what he said: ‘I say that he, although dissimilar to God, is able to be understood to be 
similar to the Father, because the Father willed to create a creature of this sort, one who 
would will similar things to what he himself willed, and for this reason he is similar to the 
Father, because he is the Son of his will, rather than of his divinity; but he is dissimilar to 
God, because neither is he God, nor was he born of God, that is, of the substance of God.’ 
Hearing these things, I was astounded, and did not believe them, until the time when I 
heard the reasoning of this profane similarity preached publicly by the consent of them all 
(14).102 
Whether or not Hilary is faithfully reporting the position of his interlocutor, the presentation 
is, at the very least, internally consistent. While Eusebius of Caesarea had been willing to concede to 
the Son some sort of metaphysical similarity to the Father, expressed not only through a special 
closeness with the Father’s will but also through a unique status as the image of God, in the more 
radical “Neo-Arian” thinkers of the 350s this position had been sharpened further based on a more 
Nicene emphasis on the ontological gap between divine and created.103 Even in the thought of 
 
102 Quod cum contrarium ipsis sensu audientium esset: ipse ego quendam eorum qui forte ad me pertemptandum accesserat, 
quasi ignorans rerum gestarum percontatus sum quid sibi vellet istud, ut qui unam substantiam Filii esse cum Patre 
damnassent, vel esse similis substantiae denegassent, dissimilitudinem damnarent. Tunc mihi ait Christum Deo similem non 
esse, sed similem Patri esse. Rursus hoc obscurius mihi adhuc videbatur. De quo cum iterum interrogarem, tunc haec ita locutus 
est: Dico eum dissimilem Deo esse, similem Patri posse intelligi, quia Pater voluisset creaturam istius modi creare, quae similia 
sui vellet, et idcirco similem Patri esse, quia voluntatis esset potius filius, quam divinitatis; dissimilem autem Deo esse, quia 
neque Deus esset, neque ex Deo, id est, de substantia Dei, natus esset.’ Haec audiens hebui neque credidi, donec cum publice 
ex consensu omnium eorum profanissimae huius similitudinis ratio praedicaretur. 
103 Rocher 1987, 243, treats this passage as a fairly straightforward explication of the doctrine of Eunomius, a leader of the 
more radical anti-Nicene party in this period. For a fuller exposition of the “Neo-Arian” stance that made of the term “Father” 
properly a designation not of God’s οὐσία but of the divine will and activity, thereby allowing the Son to be truly like the 
“Father” (i.e. the divine will) but not God himself, see Kopecek 1979, 184-193, esp. 192. In a sense, this mature position made 
of the Father what Constantine had once made of the Son in his early theology: a figurative term for the divine βούλησις visible 
in its action on and through inferior οὐσίαι like that of the Son.  
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Eusebius of Caesarea, however, the Son, although retaining a unique similarity and connection to 
the Father, had ultimately stood, with creation as a whole, apart and at a great distance from the 
one true God. Hilary had once proposed a compromise by which both the ὁμοούσιος and the 
ὁμοιούσιος could be affirmed as representing the same underlying truth—but this had depended on 
an unequivocal metaphysics of distinct persons unified by equal participation in a single shared 
substance. In Hilary’s final judgment, then, any position that forbade the assertion of the actual 
existence of a divine οὐσία or substantia would inevitably favor the subordinationist and 
hierarchical theology of his opponents, no matter what other terminology was negated along with 
it. To unify the cosmos and the Church, binding, positive assertions of equality and similarity and 
oneness of substance were absolutely necessary. 
According to Hilary, this proposed compromise formula was regarded in essentially the 
same way by the homoiousian majority—as a way to condemn their own position without 
substantively touching that of their opponents. With the failure of this last-ditch effort, the council 
predictably split into two, at which point, according to Hilary, the minority of anomoiuosians made 
the move that in Hilary’s portrayal constituted nothing less than a betrayal of the unity and equality 
of the episcopate: they appealed to the Emperor. 
But those who were preaching the ὁμοιούσιος condemned all those who were saying these 
things so shamelessly without any shame in their impiety. After being condemned, they flew 
to their king,104 and having been rescued, they honorably confirmed their impieties with as 
much ambition as they were able, denying that he is similar to God, or born of God, or is a 
natural son. A few bishops dominated many. Constantius by the fear of exile extorted the 
content of his blasphemy. Having boasted that now he had conquered the Eastern bishops, 
because he had subjugated ten legates to his will, having threatened the people through the 
Prefect and the bishops himself within the palace, through most of the cities of the East he 
confirmed those heretical bishops put in place by the heretical communion. What he did 
 
104 With this one phrase, regem suum, Hilary effectively expresses his rhetorical contempt for both Constantius and his 
episcopal allies. On the one hand, Constantius is their king, the king of heretics, not Hilary’s or the Church’s or the Empire’s; on 
the other hand, these heretical bishops belong to and appeal to a king other than Christ, a heretical king. Hilary’s and his allies’ 
own past efforts to appeal to Constantius are (at least rhetorically) of a completely different sort. 
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was nothing other than to give the whole world, for which Christ suffered, over to the Devil 
(15).105 
 What was ultimately adopted at the instigation of Constantius was the so-called “homoian” 
formula, which declared the Son to be “similar” (ὅμοιος) to the Father while condemning all 
language of οὐσία or ὑπόστασις applied to God. To counter this belief, Hilary turns for a brief period 
from anti-Imperial invective to directly theological polemic—a doctrinal challenge nonetheless all 
but inextricable from the larger political context of In Constantium. Even in engaging in theological 
argumentation, Hilary takes care to introduce his case with, first, an attack on Constantius himself, 
and, second, a highly polemical account of the (violent, illegitimate) manner in which the homoian 
formula was forced on the collegial body of the bishops by an outsider, a non-bishop, exercising 
unequal power over them. For Hilary, such an imposition is literally unthinkable: “Who is this who 
gives commands to bishops? Who imposes a veto on the form of Apostolic preaching?” (16).106 The 
illegitimacy of the ὅμοιος, then, is not merely a matter of its technical theological incorrectness; it is 
just as much a matter of its source (Constantius the Antichrist) and manner of origination (illicit 
Imperial intervention). If in De synodis the homoiousian and homoousian formulas had both been 
legitimate because of their origins in the true Faith of equal bishops, the ὅμοιος is tarred as the 
unlike and unequal offspring of a political and theological tyrant. 
 As for the ὅμοιος itself, Hilary’s arguments are at once a repetition and evolution of those 
put forward De synodis. Affirming the similarity of the Son to the Father is good, but must include 
 
105 Hi autem, qui omoeusion praedicebant, omnes eos qui maxime sine aliquo impietatis pudore inpudentissime haec 
loquebantur, condemnaverunt. Condemnati ad regem suum advolaverunt exceptique honorifice impietates suas quanta 
potuerunt ambitione confirmarunt, similem Deo esse, vel ex Deo natum, vel naturalem esse filium denegantes. Pauci plurium 
dominati sunt. Constantius res blasphemiae suae metu exilii extorsit. Vicisse se iam Orientales gloriatus, quia decem legatos 
voluntati suae subdidisset, comminatus et populo per praefectum et episcopis intra palatium, per maximas Orientis civitates 
haereticos episcopos subrogatos communione haeretica munivit. Nihil prorsus aliud egit quam ut orbem terrarum, pro quo 
Christus passus est, diabolo condonaret. 
106 quis episcopis iubeat? Et quis apostolicae praedicationis vetet formam? 
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the acknowledgement both that this similarity is according to substance and not merely according to 
will and that this similarity means true equality and nothing else. The Creed of Constantinople had 
made much of the fact that the term οὐσία was not Scriptural—but why then, Hilary argues, did 
Constantius then go on to adopt the term ὅμοιος, which, unlike aequalis, was also never applied to 
the relationship of Son to Father in the Scriptures? This lapse, Hilary believes, can only belie 
deliberate deception, particularly since the Scriptures do use the term similitudo to describe a rather 
different relationship altogether: “What, then, is the clever profession of your religion, to say ‘the 
Son is similar to the Father according to the Scriptures’; when man alone was made ‘in the image 
and likeness (similitudo)’ [Genesis 1:26] of God? Why, then, do you deceive with words? Why do you 
play games with your craftiness? Why do you not piously say (for this is according to the Scriptures) 
that the Son is equal to God? (21).”107 By employing the term ὅμοιος, Hilary accuses, Constantius 
and his allies have made of the Son a creature in no fundamental way different from a human 
person. In Hilary’s hostile construction, if the Son can be called God and worshiped on the basis of 
mere surface similarity to God, there is little reason why any human person could not be treated just 
the same. If the formula of Seleucia, Ariminum, and Constantinople is correct, there is no 
fundamental difference between the relationship claimed to God the Father by Constantius and that 
claimed by the Son—except the relative degree of power, honor, and similarity possessed by each 
one. 
The burden of Hilary’s argument in De synodis had been that there was a fundamental 
difference between the type of obedience and subjection offered by the Son to the Father, based on 
a strict equality of nature, honor, and power, and the type given by creatures to God, based instead 
 
107 Quae ergo callida religionis tuae professio est, similem secundum Scripturas Patri Filium dicere; cum ad imaginem et 
similitudinem Dei homo tantum factus sit? Quid itaque verbis fallis? Quid arte eludis? Cur non aequalem Deo (hoc enim 
secudundum Scripturas) pie dicis? 
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on “the weakness of creation,” inequality, and dissimilarity. What Constantius and his allies have 
done, Hilary argues, is to radically conflate the two by asserting that the Son is not equal to the 
Father, not possessed of the same honor or power or essence, but only similar to him, like any man. 
In De synodis, Hilary had likened the equal relationship of Father and Son both to the relationship of 
natural human fathers and sons, and to the relationship among bishops, both systems in which 
distinct persons are unified by an essential likeness grounded in origination. If Constantius is correct, 
however, then the fundamental metaphysical archetype for all such relationships is not equal 
participation in a shared substantia, but the radical subjection of one unequal entity to another—an 
archetype fittingly exemplified by the recent actions of Constantius, who, although not a bishop or 
even a baptized Christian, has used his Imperial power to force the Christian bishops to accept the 
radical inequality of Father and Son and the subjugation of Son to Father. In the extreme context of 
In Constantium, even Hilary’s theological doctrine is ultimately the basis for one more attack on 
Constantius—who in Hilary’s final characterization emerges as not just another persecutor or 
tempter or Antichrist, but the absolutely preeminent adversary of all unity whatsoever, in heaven 
and on earth:108 
Other mortals indeed have always waged war with the living, since there is no cause for 
hostility of one man with another man beyond death: but to you there is no end to enmity. 
For you tear apart our fathers, already received into eternal rest, and you perversely assault 
their decrees. The Apostle taught us to ‘keep communion with the memory of the Saints’ 
[Romans 12:13]; you force us to condemn them. Is there some mortal today either living or 
dead whose words you have not torn to pieces? The episcopal offices themselves, which 
now appear to exist, you have torn up by the roots: because there is no one now who has 
not been condemned by himself, and who has not now also himself condemned the one 
from whom he received the priesthood. To whom now will the memory of the Saints be 
communicated? The three hundred eighteen bishops at Nicaea are anathema to you: then 
too all the bishops are anathema, who took part in various expositions of the Faith 
 
108 See Humphries 1997, as well as Flower 2013, 89-97, on the rhetorical uses and precedents for the negative comparison of 
Constantius with Constantine, as well as the rhetorical construction of a “diabolical ancestry” (Humphries 1997, 460) linking 
Constantius to past tyrants and/or the Devil himself.  
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afterwards.109 Also your father himself, long since dead, is anathema to you, responsible for 
the Nicene Synod, which you defame and overthrow with false opinions, and which, 
contrary to human and divine judgment, you profanely assault with your few minions 
(27).110 
The principle expressed in De synodis, by which a breaking of the bond of unity and equality 
between episcopal predecessor and successor destroys the episcopal office itself, is here strikingly 
applied by Hilary to political rule and the Imperial office. Guilty of attacking his own father and so 
undoing his own Imperial office, Constantius is thus not a legitimate Emperor, but a usurper: 
“Understand that you are an enemy (hostis) of the divine religion, and an opponent (inimicus) of the 
memorials of the saints, and a rebel against your father’s piety” (27).111 In a sign of things to come, 
the Late Roman distinction between legitimate Emperor and illegitimate usurper is here arbitrated 
based not on bloodlines or victory in battle, but on the relationship between Emperor and correct 
Christian doctrine. Still, this claim is for Hilary part and parcel with the assertion that all human 
institutions and societies, up to and including the Roman Empire, ultimately depend on the sort of 
generative relationships among equals sharing in a single substance upheld by Nicene theology. 
Constantius is an illegitimate Emperor not only because he has denied the Father and the Son, but 
because in doing so he has denied the continuity and equality of all fathers and sons, all 
predecessors and successors, and so the only possible basis for his own position. 
 
109 A reference to the various councils in the decades since Nicaea, including those defended in De synodis, most of which, both 
Nicene and non-Nicene, had used the term οὐσία in explicating the relationship between Son and Father in the manner 
explicitly condemned at Seleucia, Ariminum, and Constantinople. 
110 Et ceteri quidem mortales semper cum vivis bella gesserunt, dum homini ad hominem ultra mortem nihil causae est: tibi 
vero inimicitiarum nullus est finis. Receptos enim iam in aeternam quietem patres nostros lacessis, et in decreta eorum 
perversus irrumpis. Apostolus communicare nos sanctorum memoriis docuit; tu eas damnare coegisti. Estne aliquis hodie aut 
vivus aut mortuus cuius tu dicta non rescideris? Episcopatus ipsos, qui nunc videntur, sustulisti penitus: quia nemo non iam per 
se damnatus est, et eum, a quo sacerdotium sumpsit, non iam et ipse damnavit. Cui nunc sanctorum memoriae 
communicabitur? Anathema tibi trecenti decem et octo convenientes apud Nicaeam episcopi sunt: anathema deinde omnes, 
qui variis exinde expositionibus adfuerunt. Ipse quoque pridem iam mortuus anthema tibi pater tuus est, cui Nicaena synodus 
fuit curae, quam tu falsis opinionibus infamatam perturbas, et contra humanum divinumque iudicium cum paucis satellitibus 
tuis profanus impugnas. 
111 intellige te divinae religionis hostem, et inimicum memoriis sanctorum, et paternae pietatis rebellem. 
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What ultimately ties the theological and political polemic of In Constantium together, then, 
is a fundamental challenge offered by Hilary to what he sees as a Constantian or homoian model of 
unification. For Hilary, such a model, whether applied to the body of the episcopate, the Roman 
Empire, or the cosmos itself, can never truly unify, but only divide and destroy. In its final form, 
Hilary’s portrait of Constantius constitutes an almost direct mirror of Eusebius of Caearea’s vision of 
Constantine as a cosmic monarch unifying the human realm through the imposition of his one 
clearly higher will onto divided, multiple inferiors brought by their equal status into conflict with one 
another. For Hilary, it is precisely through his efforts to vindicate hierarchy over equality and impose 
one will on many that Constantius the Emperor has become an eschatological tyrant engaged in 
systematically tearing apart all the generative, substantial, equal relationships on which both Church 
and cosmos, and human and divine society, depend. To submit to Constantius’s project of 
ecclesiastical and political unification is to participate in the violent dissolution of all things. He must 
be stopped.112 
In opposition to this apocalyptic threat, Hilary puts forward the same essential strategy for 
the unification of Church and cosmos found in De synodis, with one significant wrinkle. Once again, 
unity must be brought to both the body of the episcopate and the divine realm by the affirmation of 
commonality and equality in theological formulas and episcopal relations past and present. This 
unity, however, is not quite as pacific as it might at first appear—for, as in De synodis this unity had 
depended on the ability of bishops in East and West to reject the “blasphemy of Sirmium” and its 
 
112 As Williams 1992, 13-14, points out, this argument for Constantius’ political illegitimacy is also effectively a call for civil 
disobedience of Constantius’ commands—at least those having to do with the Church. Whether they could be taken as a call for 
political rebellion depends in part on what relationship In Constantium is imagined to have with Julian’s rebellion against 
Constantius. Though Hilary elsewhere refers to Julian positively (Ad Constantium 2.2), and though Williams 1992, 11-12, argues 
that Julian had for some time been cultivating ties with Nicene bishops hostile to Constantius, there is in my judgment not 
enough direct evidence to treat Hilary, in In Constantium or elsewhere, as an active supporter of Julian’s rebellion or any other 
concrete plans for overthrowing Constantius. The delegitimizing rhetoric of In Constantium would, however, certainly have 
been welcome to Julian, as would his later campaigns against homoian (and therefore pro-Constantian) bishops in the West. 
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deceptive, fundamentally unlike and unequal (heretical) episcopal architects, so in In Constantium 
this unity depends just as much, if not more, on the bishops joining together to oppose the 
deceptive, fundamentally unlike and unequal (Antichrist) Constantius. It is the threat of Constantius 
which will now unify the bishops of the world. By coming together to resist the Roman Emperor, 
portrayed in lurid terms as the ultimate anti-Christian, anti-episcopal ‘other,’ the Church can be 
made whole again.  
In Constantium is thus an urgent call to arms for bishops in both East and West to reject the 
homoian formula endorsed at Ariminum, Seleucia, and Constantinople and systematically resist the 
Imperial authority responsible for imposing and upholding it. Depending on exactly when it was 
written, Hilary was either already in the process of, or was about to begin a campaign of conciliar 
statements and episcopal depositions designed to cleanse the Church in the West of all trace of 
homoian belief.113 This campaign would be carried out under the cover given by, and perhaps even 
with the endorsement of, the Caesar Julian and his rebellion against the reigning Augustus 
Constantius.114 It is impossible here to draw strict distinctions between theology and politics.115 
There is, to say the least, a rather unmistakable convenience in Hilary making Constantius personally 
responsible for the conflicts and chaos of Church and Empire at the same time as the Nicenes were 
engaged in an active campaign against their own episcopal opponents under the cover of an 
Imperial usurpation. If the episcopate were to be ultimately unified around a basically Nicene belief, 
 
113 See Williams 1992, esp. 14-22, for an excellent reconstruction of Hilary’s participation in this campaign in Gaul and Italy. 
114 See the discussion of Julian’s rebellion in section 3.6 above. As pointed out above, the fact that actively homoian bishops 
would have been in most cases allies of Constantius (and according to Hilary, often directly appointed by him to take the place 
of exiled Nicenes) would have made their removal very amenable to Julian’s efforts. 
115 Here, it should be clear, I differ strongly from Borchardt 1966, 176-177, who argues that in In Constantium “[t]here is only 
one sentence which might in any way suggest Hilary was thinking of the relation between the emperor and the Church,” and 
even that he “does not say anything of the relation between Church and State.” In Constantium is certainly not a treatise on 
Church and State in the abstract modern sense of those terms, but it is, as I have argued, fundamentally concerned with the 
nature and structure of authority in Church, Empire, and cosmos. 
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as Hilary hoped, this would happen in large part through Hilary’s (and Lucifer’s, and Athanasius’) 
expedient of painting Constantius as the non-episcopal tyrant responsible for the homoian formula 
submitted to, at the three councils of 359 and 360, by the bulk of the episcopate in both East and 
West. For a brief moment, under Constantius’ guidance, Church and Empire had appeared united 
under one Emperor in a common confession of Christian Faith. This moment lasted less than a year, 
and would not come again for decades. 
The very fact that Hilary’s basic approach—unifying homoousians and homoiousians 
through nuanced theological presentation and shared opposition to more radical non-Nicene 
positions and the Emperor—would ultimately succeed in the latter part of the 4th century should not 
remove our sense of its boldness and tenuousness, particularly in the context of the political and 
ecclesiastical tumult of the 350s. When, in 366, after a series of councils throughout the Eastern 
Mediterranean at which the Creed of Nicaea had been affirmed in direct opposition to the new 
homoian Emperor Valens, the staunchly Nicene Bishop of Rome Liberius received a delegation of 
prominent Eastern bishops of the homoiousian party and, after a brief negotiation during which 
they subscribed to the Creed of Nicaea, entered into communion with them without further ado,116 
it was clear to all parties that the ecclesiastical situation, and the strategy of its major actors, had 
fundamentally altered. Within perhaps a year, Hilary was dead. 
Even before this, of course, and very shortly after the writing of In Constantium, an 
unforeseeable event had occurred that drastically changed the fortunes of Hilary, his allies, and his 
enemies alike: Constantius died unexpectedly, and Julian, a pagan, became Emperor in his place. 
 
116 Cf. Socrates Scholasticus, Ecclesiastical History 4.12, where letters from both parties are quoted. Very much in line with 
Hilary’s policy in De synodis, this did not represent a total capitulation of the homoiousians, but an at least partial compromise. 
This can be seen most clearly in the fact that, in his letter declaring the orthodoxy of the former homoiousians, Liberius 
explicitly affirms the legitimacy not only of the term ὁμοούσιος, but also of the term ὑπόστασις as an equivalent of the Latin 
divine personae (See Ayres 2004, 159-160, Simonetti 1998b, as well as further discussion below at note 31 in Epilogue below).  
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Hilary’s one foray into anti-Imperial invective became obsolete almost as soon as it was written—
though not, as we shall see, his approach to Church and Empire, Father and Son and Holy Spirit. 
6.6:  
Summary and Conclusion 
 Hilary of Poitiers, like Lucifer and Athanasius, was exiled shortly after the Council of Milan 
and spent his exile building a reputation for himself as a defender of Nicaea. Unlike his allies, 
however, Hilary focused his efforts not on exposing the malicious tactics of episcopal enemies or 
admonishing the Emperor, but on building doctrinal consensus across the divide between Greek and 
Latin Christianity.  
 In De synodis, Hilary focuses on forging a relationship between the homoiousian party in the 
East and their Nicene brothers in the West. The conciliar project of the previous decades since 
Nicaea, treated by Athanasius and Lucifer as a legacy of unrepentant heresy, is reinterpreted by 
Hilary as a fundamentally orthodox series of attempts to resolve the paradoxical distinction and 
equality of the divine persons while defending against errors on both sides. Similarity of essence, as 
argued for by the homoiousians, was in reality identical to the concept of inter-personal equality, 
which necessarily negated all differences in divinity, essence, power, and honor. What distinctions 
did exist in the divine realm due to the presence of order, subjection, and obedience among the 
divine persons could only be understood in social terms, in light of this fundamental metaphysics of 
unity through equality expressed in the sharing of a single substance. In the same way, apparent 
differences and conflicts between Nicenes and homoiousians could only be understood in light of 
their fundamental equality as brothers in possession of a shared divine faith and office handed 
down in its totality from their predecessors, including most notably the bishops at Nicaea. By 
recognizing this and rejecting any form of deceptive similarity in either the relationship between 
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Father and Son or the counterfeit faith put forward by the heretics responsible for the statement of 
Sirmium 357, unity could be restored to the episcopate and the cosmos alike. 
 Hilary’s olive branch in De synodis predictably led to harsh criticism from some of his Nicene 
allies, including most notably Lucifer of Cagliari. In response to these attacks, Hilary wrote 
Apologetica ad reprehensores, defending his efforts at reconciliation while charging Lucifer with 
failing to heed his own writings’ warnings about rash condemnation of fellow bishops. 
 Following his initial efforts at rapproachment, Hilary was able to secure a place for himself 
at the Council of Seleucia, one of two large-scale councils (along with Ariminum in the West) 
summoned by Constantius in 359 to settle ecclesiastical conflicts once and for all. There, he acted in 
tandem with his homoiousian allies in opposing the allies of Eudoxius before Constantius’ 
intervention brought about the submission of the legates of the council to his new, ecumenical 
homoian creed. In Apologia ad Constantium, written shortly after the capitulation of the delegates 
of Seleucia, Hilary appeals to the Emperor, who had now definitively rejected the homoiousian 
faction and its leader Basil of Ancyra, to accept him as authoritative doctrinal advisor for the 
Emperor’s baptism and the Council of Constantinople. While making use of the generic conventions 
of a panegyric appeal, Hilary nonetheless highlights the superiority of his status as a baptized bishop 
to the catechumen Constantius, incapable of competent judgment in religious matters and totally 
dependent on bishops to deliver the true Faith to him and enable his baptism and salvation. The 
bulk of this work is given over to an extended lament for the current state of the Church and the 
episcopate, riven by factional conflict and afflicted with false, deceptive teaching put forward by 
false, heretical bishops. This situation, Hilary argues, is a threat not merely to the Church, but to the 
cosmos a whole, totally dependent on a united episcopate to bring about the unity and immortality 
in divine faith of all people.  
563 
 
 Following the failure of this effort and the proclamation at the Council of Constantinople of 
a single, ecumenical homoian faith for the whole Empire, Hilary was finally brought to imitate 
Lucifer of Cagliari and devote himself to anti-Imperial invective. In Constantium Imperatorem, 
however, retained Hilary’s normative address to his fellow bishops and his focus on episcopal unity 
while incorporating extended passages of Luciferean 2nd-person attacks on the Emperor. 
Constantius, Hilary insists, is in reality an eschatological Antichrist responsible for a frontal assault 
on Christ and the Church. By refraining from violent persecution and using his Imperial power to 
bestow earthly goods with the goal of seducing bishops from the true Faith, Constantius is a tyrant 
far worse than the past Imperial persecutors of the Church. Likewise, by his attempts as a non-
episcopal outsider to violently impose homoianism on the bishops, Constantius has made clear that 
homoianism is essence an attempt to found the unity of the cosmos on a deceptive violence 
expressed in a meaningless similarity and fundamental inequality between Father and Son in heaven 
and all human persons on earth. Since Godhead, Church, and human society alike depend upon the 
existence of generative relationships among equal persons sharing in a single substance, 
Constantius’ attempts to undo all such relationships everywhere in favor of his singular will can only 
spell the destruction of all things.  
Throughout his works, then, Hilary strives to make clear the direct connection between the 
presence, in the divine realm, of a principle of fundamental inter-personal equality among divine 
persons, founded on a shared divine substance and relationships of origination, and an identical 
principle present in the relationship of bishops on earth, possessed of a fundamental equality 
founded on possession of a shared divine faith and office and the origination of one bishop from 
another. His importance in the larger context of the 4th century, however, lies not merely in these 
abstract beliefs, but in his practical application of them to the dealings between bishops of different 
regions and factions. It was this above all else, along with the Luciferean expedient of making the 
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Emperor Constantius a common enemy for members of all factions, that enabled the formation of 







Ἐβιάζετο τὸν θρόνον 
Athanasius and the Homoiusians Against the Antichrist 
7.1:  
Athanasius and the Exiles 
 To conclude my narrative of the emerging Nicene resistance to Constantius, I will return to 
the bishop whose efforts to escape deposition and exile have run like a thread through the narrative 
of the previous chapters. The Athanasius of the late 350s and 360s, however, was one whose beliefs 
on both doctrine and Empire had begun to change drastically. In all substantive points, these 
changes would bring Athanasius closer to the programs of the exiled Latin bishops chronicled in 
Chapters Five and Six. The bishop who since the 330s had devoted himself to pleading his case 
against a vague mass of episcopal enemies that included, in principle, any bishop at any of the 
Eastern councils that had condemned him, would now come to endorse a theological alliance with 
Basil of Ancyra substantially identical to that proposed by Hilary of Poitiers. The bishop who since 
before his accession had endorsed and worked within the Imperial-episcopal system set up by 
Constantine would now come to reject that system almost entirely in favor of a view of episcopal 
sacrosanctity and authority substantially identical to that professed by Lucifer of Cagliari. The 
controversies of the 4th century had entered a new phase, one where Athanasius was more follower 
than innovator—but also one where his institutional and individual prestige, his theological ability 
and power, and his historical memory extending back over decades could be of great use to the 
emerging Nicene faction. If a new, truly Empire-wide episcopal network was now in the process of 
emerging based on an alliance against the homoian formula and the Emperor who supported it, the 
shape of this network, in both its doctrinal and historical dimensions, was still very much in 
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question. In the final years of the reign of Constantius II, Athanasius found himself, more than ever 
before, in a position to play a decisive role in determining the shape of the future. The bishop who 
over the nearly three decades of his episcopate had been driven about from Emperor to Emperor 
and East to West would now be equipped to act on his own authority. 
7.2: 
De synodis Arimini in Italia et Seleuciae in Isauria 
“On the Councils of Ariminum in Italy and Seleucia in Isauria” 
Athanasius’ De Synodis was written at least several years following Hilary’s, though the precise 
relationship between these two works, and the two men themselves, is difficult to construct with 
certainty.1 Notably, Athanasius never mentions Hilary in any of his works, even when giving lengthy lists 
of bishops exiled for their orthodoxy. This oversight may be explained in two essentially contradictory 
ways: either based on the alleged insignificance of Hilary and his writings,2 or based on some conflict or 
lack of agreement between the two men. After all, Hilary’s De Synodis, in the process of going through 
and sympathetically interpreting several decades worth of Greek synodal decrees, had given a whole-
hearted defense of multiple Eusebian councils at which Athanasius himself had been condemned and 
deposed.3 While Hilary may have been eventually brought to change his mind about these councils and 
 
1 Borchardt 1966, 159-165, for instance, states that “it is obvious that the De Synodis of Athanasius [...] should be compared 
with that of Hilary” (159) and points to the “many resemblances” (161) between the two works in goals, methods, and doctrinal 
viewpoint, with the principal differences ascribed merely to the different context in which Athanasius wrote (162). He does not, 
however, offer any explanation for these resemblances, whether direct literary engagement or mere coincidence. Many other 
prominent discussions of Athanasius’ De Synodis do not refer to Hilary at all (see in particular Martin and Morales 2013, Barnes 
1993). This strikes me as a significant oversight. 
2 Given the obscurity of many of the other bishops mentioned by Athanasius, particularly in his listing of exiles in Historia 
Arianorum; given the evidence for Hilary’s substantial importance to Latin and especially Gallic theology and anti-Arian efforts 
during this period (see e.g. Barnes 1993, 141-143, Simonetti 1998b, Williams 1992); given Athanasius’ mentions of and close 
interactions with Hilary’s interlocutors and close allies Eusebius of Vercelli and Lucifer of Cagliari; and especially given Hilary’s 
residence in Asia Minor and his attendance at the Council of Seleucia (which a party of Egyptian bishops attended), the 
supposition that Athanasius had simply never heard of him or regarded him as too obscure to mention strikes me as 
exceptionally improbable.  
3 This is the thesis of Barnes 1993, 150. It is also possible, as Borchardt 1966, 21-22, suggests (though also as he correctly notes, 
“impossible to establish without any doubt” (21)) that Hilary had even attended and subscribed to the council held at Arles by 
the bishops of Gaul in 353, where Athanasius had been condemned.  
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their condemnations,4 his lack of attested interest for much of his career in treating Athanasius as a 
martyr for the Nicene cause, combined with this highly public defense of two decades of Eusebian and 
anti-Athanasian councils, would seem to indicate at the very least a willingness to sacrifice Athanasius in 
the interests of securing episcopal peace. Such a willingness would certainly not have earned 
Athanasius’ approbation, any more than it had that of Lucifer, a fervent defender of both Athanasius 
and Nicaea who, as discussed in section 6.3 above, had harshly attacked Hilary’s De synodis shortly after 
its publication. All in all, Hilary’s career was by no means easy to fit into the narrative slots granted to 
fellow Nicene bishops in Athanasius’ surviving works, focused on the intimate connection between their 
steadfast orthodoxy and their equally steadfast support for Athanasius.5 That Athanasius’ 
disapprobation extends even to the point of excluding Hilary from the glancing lists of bishops exiled for 
their orthodoxy remains striking, however, particularly in regard to a bishop who would eventually 
become known in hagiography as the “Athanasius of the West.”  
 Whatever the reasons for Athanasius’ silence about his Gallic counterpart, there is no denying 
the numerous resemblances between Hilary’s and Athanasius’ De synodis. Both consist largely of 
quotations, with analysis, of theological documents and synodal decrees extending over the previous 
decades. Athanasius himself quotes, with one exception and many additions, documents from all the 
councils discussed by Hilary.6 The overall goal of both works is also essentially the same: to unite the 
 
4 In the surviving fragments of what is likely one of the later parts of Adversus Valentem et Ursacium published perhaps c. 357/8 
(cf. Barnes 1993, 141), Hilary refers to his belief that the efforts to gain universal condemnation of Athanasius prior to and 
including the Council of Milan had in fact been a mask for an attack on theological truth (Adversus Valentem et Ursacium Series 
B 1.4-5; cf. e.g. Borchardt 1966, 14, Barnes 1993, 141), and concludes that, due to the irregularity of the judicial process against 
Athanasius and his acceptance into communion by prominent bishops such as Hosius of Cordoba and the bishop of Rome Julius, 
“Athanasius can be held guilty of none of those crimes which were brought against him” (Adversus Valentem et Ursacium Series 
B 2. 5.3). Even this is somewhat carefully worded, however. 
5 Admittedly, as Athanasius himself acknowledges, several of the persecuted bishops profiled in Historia Arianorum and other 
works eventually agreed under pressure to his condemnation—but even in these cases Athanasius makes much of the coerced 
nature of these concessions in contrast with their earlier intransigent support for him. This would not have been a possible 
strategy for dealing with Hilary.  
6 Athanasius quotes the so-called “Dated Creed” of 359 as well as documents from the Councils of Jerusalem (336), Antioch 
(341), Serdica (343) in its extended form of the “Creed of Long Lines” (344), Sirmium (351), Sirmium (357), Ariminum (359), 
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bishops of East and West, Nicenes and homoiousians, around a moderate Nicene position cemented by 
common opposition to the homoian position endorsed by Constantius and his allies.7 In delineating this 
theological alliance, Athanasius appeals to metaphysical arguments on the nature of similarity and 
identity, essence and nature, that are themselves highly similar to Hilary’s. Finally, both works end with 
a practically identical appeal to Basil of Ancyra and his allies: that given that they are in reality fully 
orthodox in their beliefs, they should recognize that the term ὁμοούσιος expresses the same essential 
truth as their own formulas while safeguarding against “Arianism” (41).  
This conciliatory approach represented a remarkable and unprecedented change of strategy for 
Athanasius, who, as Timothy Barnes points out, was now “ready to cooperate with men who had 
deposed him”8—including most notably Basil of Ancyra himself, a longstanding member of Eusebian 
episcopal networks who had been appointed c. 336 to replace Athanasius’ close ally Marcellus of Ancyra 
and thereafter taken active part in the Dedication Council, Serdica East, and the Council of Sirmium 351, 
at all of which Athanasius had been attacked and condemned by name.9 It is difficult to imagine 
 
Seleucia (359), and Constantinople (360). Hilary quotes documents from the Councils of Nicaea (325), Antioch (341), Serdica 
(343), Sirmium (351), Sirmium (357), and Ancyra (358). Given the earlier date of Hilary’s work, it would of course have been 
impossible for him to quote documents from 359 and 360. 
7 Different scholars have, however, taken different positions on the precise intended audience—and therefore purpose—of De 
synodis. Martin and Morales 2013, 155-157, 165-166, assume that the primary intended audience is the bishops of Egypt—“et 
peut-être aussi ceux d’Orient” (155) at large—who were not present at Ariminum and Seleucia, and therefore were susceptible 
to being deceived about the (ongoing) events of both councils. Gwynn 2006, 42-45, similarly argues that the primary intended 
audience was Egyptian bishops who were already supporters of Athanasius, not the homoiousians themselves. Barnes 1993, 
133, however, sees the work as an urgent attempt to “make common cause with the homoeousians of Asia Minor,” and 
therefore intended for their actual perusal. 
8 Barnes 1993, 135. 
9 It should be emphasized that, however much Athanasius’ intransigence and tendentiousness has been emphasized in modern 
scholarship, his olive branch here does not merely represent, as Ayres 2004, 172, puts it, “for him a charitable reading”—it is, 
rather, in its context perhaps the most striking attempt at theological and personal conciliation in the 4th century. Hilary of 
Poitiers had been conciliatory at an earlier date and (arguably) to a greater degree, but from the standpoint of a young Latin 
bishop with far fewer personal and theological stakes in the Eastern conflicts of the previous decades. Basil of Ancyra had been 
a rival of Athanasius for decades, and had personally participated in multiple attempts to depose and exile him, all while 
continuing to explicitly condemn the terminology of Athanasius, his fellow Nicenes, and the Council of Nicaea. Athanasius’ 
willingness to overlook all this and attempt to give a conciliatory reading of a theological position very different in goals and 
origins from his own is, in the context of the acrimonious conflicts of the decades following Nicaea, without parallel. 
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Athanasius ever making this move apart from the radical shift in the state of theological and episcopal 
relations brought about both by the efforts of the exiled bishops of the past 5 years and by Constantius’ 
forceful endorsement of the homoian formula, which had already made de facto allies of homoousians 
and homoiousians at Seleucia and elsewhere.10 
While Hilary’s narrative of the Eastern synods of the past decades is designed to argue for their 
essential orthodoxy, even if ultimately insufficient as a response to Arianism, Athanasius’ historical 
narrative has the exact opposite purpose: to unite all these synods (with one notable exception) into a 
single story in which malicious Arians use inconsistent, ever-changing conciliar proceedings and 
doctrinal formulas to persecute Athanasius and Nicaea. “Although they have been continuously making 
synods against the one Ecumenical Synod, they have not yet grown tired of it” (21.1).11 It is the absence 
of a single synod, quoted at length by Hilary, from Athanasius’ account that is perhaps the most telling 
as to his overall goal: the recent Council of Ancyra, which Hilary had highlighted as a clear and orthodox 
response to the “blasphemy of Sirmium” and as principal proof for the true Orthodoxy of the Eastern 
episcopate, but which Athanasius avoids attacking by not referencing at all, even while praising its 
architect Basil of Ancyra. That the eventual goal of Athanasius’ work is to unite Eastern and Western 
bishops makes it rather puzzling that his means to that end is to castigate over three decades of non-
Nicene conciliar statements produced by Eastern bishops, including many of his would-be allies. When 
we recall, however, the original context of these councils, presided over by Eusebius of Nicomedia, 
Eusebius of Caesarea, and their successors with the explicit goals of ratifying their own theology and 
 
10 As Martin and Morales 2013, 173, correctly point out, Athanasius’ endorsement of an alliance with the homoousians, unlike 
Hilary’s, came only after that alliance had already been “nouée de facto” at Seleucia, where the Egyptian homoousians and the 
homoiousians had, without Athanasius’ direct participation, argued and voted in tandem in opposing Acacius and Eudoxius and 
their homoian formula. Athanasius’ De synodis, then, should be seen less as a cause of the alliance’s formation as an attempt to 
cement and extend it beyond its immediate conciliar context—as well as to shape its theological and historical commitments.  
11 Πλὴν ὅτι συνόδους συνεχεῖς κατὰ τῆς οἰκουμενικῆς ποιοῦντες οὐδέπω κεκμήκασι. 
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condemning Athanasius and his exiled allies, it becomes somewhat less puzzling—as it does, too, when 
we remember the great change in circumstances between the writing of Hilary’s De Synodis and 
Athanasius’ similar work. With the formal introduction and forcible imposition of the homoian formula, 
unacceptable alike both to Nicenes and homoiousians, an even stronger opportunity had been granted 
for union between these two episcopal factions: one, however, no longer quite as dependent on 
universal acceptance of any particular conciliar statement of the past decades.  
In the early years of the 360s, bishops throughout the Empire had begun to clear away the 
theological detritus of the past several decades, forming new syntheses that would have been 
inconceivable at any time before. In this new status quo, the majority of the conciliar statements of the 
past decades, composed in response to a radically different ecclesiastical, political, and theological 
situation, were already all but defunct. Newly self-conscious “Nicenes” in East and West asserted the 
supreme authority of the Council of Nicaea; but many had long been, and would continue to be, 
suspicious of the more recent gatherings at which, as Latin bishops had long charged, Eastern bishops 
led by “Arian” heretics had diluted and superseded its doctrine. Homoiousians would defend the 
content and proceedings of the recent Council of Ancyra, which had forcefully laid down their own 
position, as well as the Dedication Creed on which that position was purportedly grounded—but not 
necessarily the other Eastern creeds in whose composition Acacius of Caesarea, Ursacius and Valens, 
Eudoxius, and Constantius had played key roles. Faced with a new Imperial orthodoxy mandated by the 
same bishops and the same Emperor who had directed the Dedication Council against Julius of Rome, 
dictated to the Eastern delegation at Serdica, and promulgated the decrees of Sirmium 351, these 
councils might seem even to the most thoroughly anti-Nicene homoiousian what they had once seemed 
to Julius and his allies: conspiratorial attempts by a scheming, heretical minority to fatally compromise 
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Orthodoxy and ecclesiastical independence.12 The East-West conflict of the 340s had been made 
possible by the clear divide between Constans and Constantius, enabling each body of bishops to appeal 
to their own councils, backed by their own Emperor, against those of their rivals. Now, however, the 
endorsement by “their” Emperor of the homoian formula had effectively pulled the ground out from 
under the bishops of the East, who found themselves in a position far more like that of their Western 
colleagues in the period after the defeat of Magnentius: trapped between adherence to an Imperial-
sponsored formula which they found unacceptable and the dangers of open defiance of the Emperor. 
Meanwhile, the bishops now supporting the homoian compromise had, precisely by virtue of that 
support, already implicitly abandoned nearly all these councils, including those in which they themselves 
had taken part, for their use of the newly-proscribed terms οὐσία and ὑπόστασις. In his usual canny 
way, Athanasius had correctly understood, and was well prepared to make the most of, the 
uncomfortable reality of his fellow bishops’ position. In a united Constantian Empire endorsing a single 
doctrine, non-homoians had to look for allies wherever they could. 
In my judgment, and the judgment of most scholars, the bulk of this work dates to 359, to a 
period when the Councils of Seleucia and Ariminum were ongoing and their final outcomes were still in 
doubt.13 The present frame for Athanasius’ attempts at conciliation, then, is bitter intra-episcopal 
conflict at two large-scale councils at which allies of Athanasius and Basil opposed advocates of the new 
Imperial Orthodoxy. In such an atmosphere, Athanasius argues, the unity of both East and West around 
a common confession of faith is urgently needed, precisely so as to enable a more united and effective 
front against the homoian formula and its advocates. The bishops of both East and West must now 
 
12 The drastic shift in homoiousian argument from 358 to 359, in which an attempt to exclusively claim all Eastern synods of the 
previous decades is replaced by a singular appeal to the Dedication Creed of Antioch as interpreted by Basil and his allies, is 
noted by e.g. Löhr 1993, 87-91.  
13 See the discussion in Appendix B below. 
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make absolutely clear, once and for all, that the theology of the homoian advocates Acacius, Eudoxius, 
Ursacius, and Valens is not the “ecclesiastical theology” that Eusebius of Caesarea had claimed, but the 
position of a tiny minority of “Arian” heretics. In service of this agenda, Athanasius explains to his 
present-day allies that what they are experiencing at Ariminum and Seleucia is in reality nothing new: it 
is merely one in a long line of dishonest, equivocating strategies of the “Arians,” who for the past four 
decades have striven with all their might to persecute both him and the Council of Nicaea. This “Arian 
heresy,” a deceptive, fundamentally un-Christian work of the devil, has constituted the true, preeminent 
threat to the Church as a whole throughout Athanasius’ life, extending without a break from his youth to 
old age. 
It is this sense of living memory, stretching back over decades to a period when few of his fellow 
bishops had held office, that above all else defines the narrative portions of De Synodis. Unlike the vast 
majority of his interlocutors, Athanasius’ viewpoint on the events of the previous decades both begins 
with and remains fundamentally grounded in the pre-Nicaea conflicts between allies of Alexander and 
Arius. While his fellow bishops had encountered the “Arian” monstrosity only in its senile old age, 
Athanasius contends, he had been present at its birth, witnessing the profane teachings of Asterius and 
the conflicts between Arius and his bishop.  
Not content with dividing the Church of Alexandria, Arius had gone on to forge an unholy 
alliance of bishops and clerics extending throughout the East, led by Eusebius Nicomedia and Eusebius 
of Caesarea and dedicated to defending Arius and each other. Here Athanasius has not only his own 
memory but also numerous, carefully-preserved documents (including many quoted in the chapters 
above) to present, documents in which these men, future grandees of the Eastern Church, quite openly 
affirm their support for Arius’ doctrine and person against the “heresy” of Alexander. Although this 
unholy alliance was dealt what should have been a definitive defeat at Nicaea, in the three decades 
since it has tried again and again, with little success, to craft an ambiguous conciliar statement that 
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would overturn Nicaea and ensure its own victory. In his recounting, Athanasius makes much of the 
numerous contradictions and conflicts among the statements of the councils he assembles—clear signs, 
in this retelling, of the inconsistency and dishonesty of the one “Arian” faction. Likewise, Athanasius 
makes much of the constant revisions and re-revisions Constantius’ allies had recently gone through to 
produce their present formulation, contradicting not only past generations, but even themselves in an 
effort to gain consensus. The reality that even the members of the pre-Nicaea alliance had at times 
differed among themselves, while many later conciliar statements had been crafted through large, 
heterogenous assemblies, with Imperial involvement, and extending over several successive 
generations, finds relatively little acknowledgement in Athanasius’ telling.  
Still, Athanasius does make effective polemical use of this “generation gap” to deride the 
advocates of the present homoian proposal, and in particular its alleged architect Acacius of Caesarea. 
Acacius’ endorsement of the new homoian position, Athanasius points out, would logically involve a 
rejection not only of Nicaea, but also of practically all the councils of the past decades in which Acacius 
had participated. Indeed, taken literally, it would necessitate the condemnation even of Acacius’ revered 
teacher and predecessor Eusebius of Caesarea, who had made extensive use of the proscribed terms 
οὐσία and ὑπόστασις in his theological works and even publicly submitted to the ὁμοούσιος at Nicaea 
(37, cf. 13). While Athanasius continues to follow the teachings and policies of his predecessor 
Alexander, then, Acacius has openly denied his. In the institutional conflict between Alexandria and 
Caesarea extending back to the time of Origen, Alexandria has found a worthy successor, and Caesarea a 
dishonest traitor.  
In Athanasius’ hostile characterization, the “Arians” and their doctrine are a welter of 
dishonesty, ambiguity, and contradiction—very much opposed to the singular clarity of Nicene belief. 
That clarity is, however, made possible only because of the “re-set” Athanasius proposes in this 
document, whereby practically every conciliar statement of the past three decades is consigned to the 
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dustbin of history, with only Nicaea itself remaining. It is also made possible by his own reinterpretation 
of Nicaea, now pitted directly against Constantius’ ecumenical homoian creed as the true, definitive 
statement of Christian belief for all time. For all its roots in the period prior to Nicaea, this was truly, as 
Manlio Simonetti has convincingly argued,14 a “Neo-Nicene” belief—cutting away decades of theological 
discussion by a newly definitive appeal to the Creed of Nicaea while interpreting that creed and its 
language in a distinctively new fashion based on the theological developments of those decades. 
While in fundamental continuity with his doctrine in De decretis, Athanasius’ theological 
presentation in De synodis represents a significant evolution in both terminology and application. Most 
notably, Athanasius is brought like Hilary before him to argue for the true unity of homoousian and 
homoiousian theology based on appeal to a common metaphysics of similarity, identity, and substance. 
This presentation is, however, as diplomatic as it is theological, as Athanasius begins his account by 
explicitly distinguishing the homoiousians—and indeed all those doubtful about the ὁμοούσιος—from 
the “Arians” responsible, in his view, for the evils of the proceeding decades: “But about those who 
accept everything else written at Nicaea but only dispute about the ὁμοούσιος, it is right to not deal 
with them as though with enemies. For we do not see them as we do the Ariomaniacs nor do we 
consider that they are fighting against the Fathers, but we are dialoguing with them as brothers 
speaking to brothers, who hold the same understanding as we do, but only differ with us about 
terminology” (41.1).15 This olive branch represents not only, as argued above, a remarkable personal 
concession on Athanasius’ part, but also a reflection of the new sense of episcopal collegiality and unity 
argued for by Hilary. For Athanasius, this generous concession is paid for, so to speak, by the preceding 
 
14 Cf. Simonetti 1998b. 
15 πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀποδεχομένους τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα τῶν ἐν Νικαίᾳ γραφέντων, περὶ δὲ μόνον τὸ ὁμοούσιον ἀμφιβάλλοντας χρὴ 
μὴ ὡς πρὸς ἐχθροὺς διακεῖσθαι. καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἡμεῖς οὐχ ὡς πρὸς Ἀρειομανίτας οὐδ’ ὡς μαχομένους πρὸς τοὺς πατέρας 




narrative, with its consignment of decades of Eastern theological statements—and accompanying 
condemnations of Athanasius—to the historical dustbin helpfully provided by Constantius. With the 
homoian formula as the new, singular target of episcopal wrath, there is little need for quibbling among 
brothers. 
Like Hilary, Athanasius centers his attack on homoianism on the possibility of false similarity 
present even where similarity is, in some sense, “according to essence” (κατ’ οὐσίαν): “For tin is only 
similar to silver, and a wolf to a dog, and bronze plated with gold to true gold, but tin does not originate 
from silver, nor is a wolf considered to be the son of a dog” (41.3-4).16 As for Hilary, too, what ultimately 
defines true as opposed to false similarity is the sharing in a single substance by entities related through 
birth and origination. It is such substantial, generative relationships, and not any similarity in will or 
attributes, that ultimately constitute the metaphysical basis for both divine and human society:17 “For 
you yourselves know that someone does not apply the term ‘similar’ to οὐσίαι, but ‘similar’ is said of 
properties and qualities. For not similarity, but identity should be said of οὐσίαι. Thus, a human person 
is said to be ‘similar’ to another human person not according to οὐσία, but according to mannerisms 
and character: in οὐσία they are of one and the same nature (ὁμοφυεῖς)” (53.2-3).18 Similarity is not 
enough: Father and Son, and all human persons, must be confessed to be ὁμοούσιος.19 
 
16 καὶ γὰρ καὶ κασσίτερος ὅμοιός ἐστι μόνος τῷ ἀργύρῳ καὶ λύκος τῷ κυνὶ καὶ χαλκὸς χρυσίζων τῷ ἀληθινῷ χρυσῷ, οὔτε δὲ 
κασσίτερος ἐκ τοῦ ἀργύρου τυγχάνει οὔτε λύκος ὡς υἱὸς τοῦ κυνὸς ἂν νομισθείη. 
17 As Kopecek 1979, 224-225, notes, this position also represents an evolution of the metaphysics implied by Athanasius’ own 
past custom of referring to Father and Son as similar in οὐσία, as in Orationes contra Arianos 1.20-1, 3.66—a move made likely 
in response to the greater dialectic subtlety employed by Aetius, Eunomius, and the other more syllogistic opponents of the 
350s.  
18 οἴδατε γὰρ καὶ ὑμεῖς καὶ οὐδ’ ἄν τις ἀμφιβάλλοι ὅτι τὸ ὅμοιον οὐκ ἐπὶ τῶν οὐσιῶν, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ σχημάτων καὶ ποιοτήτων λέγεται 
ὅμοιον· ἐπὶ γὰρ τῶν οὐσιῶν οὐχ ὁμοιότης, ἀλλὰ ταυτότης ἂν λεχθείη. ἄνθρωπος γοῦν ἀνθρώπῳ ὅμοιος λέγεται οὐ κατὰ τὴν 
οὐσίαν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ σχῆμα καὶ τὸν χαρακτῆρα· τῇ γὰρ οὐσίᾳ ὁμοφυεῖς εἰσι. 
19 Athanasius is consistent in this work in treating οὐσία and φύσις, and therefore ὁμοφυής and ὁμοούσιος, as correlative and 
synonymous terms, as in e.g. 52.3-4: τί γάρ ἐστι τὸ οὕτως ὁμοφυὲς τῷ πατρὶ ἢ ὁμοούσιον αὐτοῦ; 
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Present in De synodis, then, is a wide-ranging theory of identity and similarity that applies as 
much to human as divine persons. All human persons share, not merely similar or equal natures, but 
one and the same οὐσία, differing only in non-essential properties such as physical and temporal 
characteristics, mannerisms, or moral character. What distinguishes God from man is not, as for 
Constantine and Eusebius, the difference between absolutely free, unconditioned solitude and mutual, 
multiple interdependency, but the basic metaphysical fact that the divine οὐσία, although shared in like 
human nature by multiple, interrelated persons, does not and cannot admit any of those differences in 
properties and status that define human relationships: “But we know that there is one and only one 
divinity, the divinity of the Father, and that the Son is his Word and Wisdom, and by believing thus we 
do not speak of two Gods, nor of a oneness of the Son with the Father by means of a similarity of 
teaching, but we attribute oneness according to οὐσία and in truth, so that, for this reason, we do not 
speak of two Gods, but of one God, of one Form of divinity, like the light and its radiance” (52.1-2).20 
Human beings can and do differ from one another in time, space, and nonessential properties, and so 
constitute separate entities; God cannot. Father and Son are united by possession of the sole divine 
οὐσία in a manner that is fundamentally analogous to that by which one human person is united to 
another—but to a degree totally impossible for any created being. 
This perfect unity of the divine realm comes, however, at the expense of a far clearer and more 
drastic separation from the cosmos of created things. Athanasius goes on to attack, more forthrightly 
than ever before, the proposition, fundamental to the theory of Eusebius of Caesarea, that it is possible 
to speak either of a “divinity” or of a true “similarity” with God possessed by an entity that does not 
share, in the fullest possible sense, in the one divine οὐσία. Athanasius argues strongly that such a 
 
20 εἰ δὲ μίαν οἴδαμεν καὶ μόνην θεότητα τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς τούτου τε λόγον καὶ σοφίαν εἶναι τὸν υἱὸν καὶ οὕτω πιστεύοντες οὐ 
λέγομεν δύο θεοὺς τήν τε ἑνότητα τοῦ υἱοῦ πρὸς τὸν πατέρα οὐχ ὁμοιώσει διδασκαλίας, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ ἀληθείᾳ 




concept is blasphemous, tantamount to pagan idolatry: “For we must be very careful lest, by 
transferring the properties of the Father to something not ὁμοούσιος with him, and ascribing the 
divinity of the Father to something of a different origin and another οὐσία, we introduce another, 
foreign οὐσία, a recipient of the properties of the first οὐσία, and are put to shame by what God himself 
said, ‘I will not give my glory to another,’ and are found to be worshiping another god” (50.2).21 This is a 
direct reversal of the argument, found throughout Eusebius’ anti-Marcellan writings, that the only way 
to preserve monotheism given the existence of both Father and Son is to maintain a strict superiority in 
power, honor, and status, a strict precedence in existence, and a strict hierarchy in will of Father to Son. 
It is grounded, too, in those Scriptural discourses which Eusebius had found hardest to explain in De 
ecclesiastica theologia, direct Old Testament declarations of God’s uniqueness and condemnations of 
the worship of any other being. Although responsive to the same basic set of Christian and Scriptural 
concerns, Athanasius’ final claim is precisely the opposite of Eusebius’: that the only way to preserve 
monotheism is for both Father and Son to be divine in the fullest sense, excluding all differences in 
power, honor, status, existence, and will, and so demarcating a clear and absolute boundary between 
the one divine οὐσία and all other things. The idea of an entity, called God and honored as such by 
Christians, but in any sense whatsoever a separate, inferior servant of the Father, is for Athanasius, 
strictly impossible: “God did not receive the Son to himself as a stranger, as though he needed an 
assistant, nor are created things equal in value (ἰσάξια) to the one who created them, so that they might 
be honored like him and might consider themselves one with the Father” (52.4).22 If mere closeness or 
harmony in will between superior Father and inferior Son were sufficient to allow the Son to be called 
 
21 εὐλαβητέον γὰρ μὴ τὰ τοῦ πατρὸς ἴδια μεταφέροντες ἐπὶ τὸ ἀνομοιοούσιον αὐτῷ καὶ ἐν ἀνομοιογενεῖ καὶ ἀλλοτριοουσίῳ 
χαρακτηρίζοντες τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς θεότητα, ξένην μὲν ἄλλην εἰσάξωμεν οὐσίαν, δεκτικὴν τῶν τῆς πρώτης οὐσίας ἰδιωμάτων, 
ἐντραπῶμεν δὲ ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ λέγοντος· «τὴν δόξαν μου ἑτέρῳ οὐ δώσω» καὶ εὑρεθῶμεν προσκυνοῦντες τῷ ἀλλοτρίῳ. 
22 οὐ γὰρ ἀλλότριον ὡς ὑπουργοῦ δεόμενος προσελάβετο ὁ θεὸς τὸν υἱὸν οὐδὲ τὰ ποιήματα ἰσάξια τοῦ κτίσαντος, ὥστε 
τιμᾶσθαι ταῦτα ὡς ἐκεῖνον ἢ νομίζειν ὅτι ταῦτα καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ἕν εἰσιν. 
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God and worshipped as divine, then a straightforward reductio ad absurdam is possible: “Therefore, if 
the Father and the Son are one by means of harmony (συμφωνία), all created things in harmony with 
God would each also be able to say: ‘I and the Father are one.’ [...] This would be utter madness” (48.4-
5).23 The only two alternatives, then, are either to grant the Son full, eternal possession of the one 
unique οὐσία of God, or to grant in principle both divinity and worship to any created thing. 
So great does this absolute divide between divine and created οὐσίαι loom in Athanasius’ 
mature theology that it becomes difficult even to speak of a single “cosmos” containing both human and 
divine realms and entities. There is rather on the one hand the created order as a whole, including the 
human world, and on the other hand the singular divine essence, which bears no true similarity to 
anything else at all. In Athanasius’ final characterization, συμφωνία (“harmony, agreement”) is the most 
that can be ascribed to any entity not sharing fully in the divine οὐσία. To ascribe to any other entity 
even a bare similarity of properties to God is for Athanasius both impossible and blasphemous. If the 
Son is anything less than the one eternal God, then Aetius and Eunomius would be emphatically right, 
and the οὐσία of the Son would, in fact, be “entirely unlike” (ξέναι [...] παντάπασιν) that of the Father 
(52.1).24 The fundamental, underlying conception of the cosmos as a single uniform space, extending 
with numerous gradations from heaven to earth, from the one to the many, and from superior to 
inferior, has been superseded. 
Although defined by the assertion of a single, unbridgeable gulf between divine and created, 
this theological conception creates at the same time a paradigm for unity that applies to both created 
and divine persons: identity of essence grounded in origination. Athanasius’ positive judgment of the 
 
23 οὐκοῦν εἰ διὰ τὴν συμφωνίαν ἕν ἐστιν ὁ πατὴρ καὶ ὁ υἱός, εἴη ἂν καὶ τῶν γενητῶν τὰ συμφωνοῦντα οὕτω πρὸς τὸν θεὸν καὶ 
εἴποι ἂν ἕκαστος· «ἐγὼ καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ἕν ἐσμεν». [...] ἄτοπον γάρ ἐστιν ἀληθῶς· 
24 For the importance to Athanasius of affirmation of radical unlikeness between God and any created thing whatsoever, 
buttressed, however, by a strong emphasis on the active, beneficent activity of God, see in particular Anatolios 1998, 100-109. 
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homoiousians is based, then, not just on their use of the term ὁμοιούσιος, but on their willingness to 
confess that the Son is “from the οὐσία of the Father” (ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ πατρὸς).25 It is this, according 
to Athanasius, that actually makes clear that the homoiousians view the Son as truly God, originating 
from his Father’s essence and sharing in it totally just as human children do with their parents. It is this, 
too, which allows Athanasius to make a straightforward equation between the terminology of Nicaea 
and that intended, at one time, to take its place: “Since they have confessed that the Son is ‘from the 
οὐσία’ and ‘ὁμοιούσιος,’ what else do they signify by these things but the ὁμοούσιος? For as the one 
who says only ὁμοιούσιος does not fully confess also the ‘from the οὐσία,’ so the one who says 
ὁμοούσιος signifies his understanding of both the ὁμοιούσιος and the ‘from the οὐσία’” (41.4-5).26 
When these principles are properly understood and applied, it becomes clear that, just as Son and 
Father are united by their possession of one and the same divine οὐσία while remaining truly distinct 
persons, so too these two factions of bishops are ultimately united by their shared possession of one 
and the same divine Faith, expressed in different words that nonetheless denote the same underlying 
reality. 
For Athanasius in De Synodis, neither in the created realm nor in the divine realm is there the 
possibility of a true unity comprised merely by the presence of command and obedience among 
essentially different entities. It is this, in his judgment, which constitutes the fundamental error of the 
homoian position in both divine and human matters: that it tries to establish unity between 
fundamentally different things (uncreated Father and created Son, true Nicene Faith and Arian heresy) 
 
25 As Ayres 2004, 172-173, notes, however, this phrase does not occur in any surviving homoiousian document. While it is 
possible that Athanasius derived this phrase from a source that is now lost, it may also be the case that Athanasius is simply 
reading between the lines, “accurately read[ing] Basil as following a theological path increasingly parallel to his own and [...] 
prepared to look beyond the large terminological difference between them” (173). 
26 ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ ‘ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας’ καὶ ‘ὁμοιοούσιον’ αὐτὸν εἰρήκασι, τί ἕτερον σημαίνουσιν ἐκ τούτων ἢ τὸ ὁμοούσιον; καὶ γὰρ 
ὥσπερ ὁ λέγων μόνον ‘ὁμοιοούσιον’ οὐ πάντως καὶ τὸ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας γνωρίζει οὕτως ὁ λέγων ὁμοούσιον ἀμφοτέρων τοῦ τε 
ὁμοιοουσίου καὶ τοῦ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας σημαίνει τὴν διάνοιαν. 
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through ambiguous similarity in mere properties, buttressed by (Imperial) will, but without a true 
identity of essence and origination. This is not a means by which anything—God or human society, 
Church or Empire—can be united. Even the unification between human and divine that Athanasius takes 
to have been established by the Incarnation of the Son is not a matter of mere obedience, but of a 
participation (μετέχειν, e.g 51.1, 53.4)27 in the singular οὐσία of God that divinizes human beings 
through immediate contact with the one divinity of the Incarnate Son of God. As Athanasius argues, if 
the Incarnate Son were not intrinsic to the divine existence, and did not possess the one οὐσία of the 
Father in its totality as his own, then it would be impossible for him to truly bestow divinity on human 
beings (51).28 Only a God in full possession of both divine and human οὐσίαι, Athanasius argues, has the 
power to bring human persons into unity with himself. Salvation is only possible, in the final balance, 
inasmuch as it takes place internally to both God and man.29  
The form of unity between divine and human preached by Athanasius—created by the 
immediate presence of the one οὐσία of God within human nature, human society, and even individual 
human persons–is hence intrinsically incapable of being managed by a cosmic order of superior and 
inferior natures. Authority over the process of transmitting the essence of the true Faith of the Incarnate 
God to others belongs, rather, to the bishops, multiple human actors sharing, through clear genealogies 
of origination, one and the same human nature and one and the same divinizing Faith. It is this process 
 
27 For the importance of the Platonic concept of participation to Athanasius’ theology here and elsewhere, see Anatolios 1998, 
50-53, 137-138. 
28 For a full analysis and defense of this principle within Athanasius, see Anatolios 1998, 125-133. 
29 For an extensive treatment of the somewhat paradoxical Christology of Athanasius in light of these concepts, which 
emphasized the action of the Divine Word both on and through his receptive humanity, see Anatolios 138-161. 
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of the transmission of divine life through the authority and teaching of bishops that the bulk of De 
Synodis is dedicated to explicating.30 
As already argued, the distinctness and unity of Father and Son is made clear both by the 
identity of their one, non-material οὐσία and by their relationship of origination of one person from the 
other. In an analogous way, the bishops of the Church are fundamentally brothers, united by possession 
of one and the same Faith and office handed down from their predecessors. The unity of the episcopate 
extends, then, not only across the barriers of East and West or Latin and Greek, but also across time to 
the previous generations of Fathers from whom both the authority and the doctrine of modern-day 
bishops has originated. As Athanasius ultimately concludes in his argument, the task of determining the 
true doctrine, like that of determining the nature and degree of unity between Father and Son, is a 
matter not primarily of abstract debate, but of pedigree. The true belief is that handed down from ‘the 
Fathers’ by an unbroken line of bishops, while the “Arians” cannot stop condemning and contradicting, 
not only previous generations of bishops, but even previous generations of “Arians,” and themselves:  
How will they call their predecessors ‘Fathers,’ whose beliefs they deny? [...] What will they 
teach the people to be taught by them? Will they teach them that the Fathers were in error? 
And how will they themselves be believed by those whom they now teach to not listen to those 
who taught them? [...] Or how are they still able to be bishops, if they were ordained by 
heretics, as they themselves allege? But if the Fathers thought evil things and by their writings 
deceived the whole world, let also your memory of them wholly cease. And if their writings are 
cast out, go, cast out their remains from the cemeteries, so that all may know that they were 
deceivers, and you are patricides (13.4-5).31  
 
30 My belief in the intimate connection between the theological and ecclesiastical expositions within De synodis provides a 
counterbalance to Anatolios assertion that in Athanasius “we look in vain for any consideration of a creaturely principle of 
mediation between divine activity and human passivity” (127) and that “Athanasius is concerned fundamentally with the divine 
agent or source of creative and saving activity rather than with its inner-worldly mediation” (128). In fact, much of De synodis is 
dedicated to chronicling precisely the active, authoritative mediation of divine life by human bishops and the Church as a 
whole. Even this presentation is, however, radically conditioned by the fact that, as Anatolios correctly notes, “the overriding 
framework remains in which both creatures are primarily receivers and only God is ultimately the Giver” (128). It is precisely, 
then, active, generative receptivity to the divine action present in the Scriptures and the authoritative traditions of the Church 
that for Athanasius defines episcopal status and allows true bishops to be distinguished from heretics. 
31 ἢ πῶς ‘πατέρας’ ὀνομάζουσιν οὓς διεδέξαντο, ὧν αὐτοὶ τῆς γνώμης κατήγοροι γίνονται; [...] τί ἄρα καὶ διδάξουσι τοὺς λαοὺς 
τοὺς παρ’ ἐκείνων διδαχθέντας; ὅτι ἐσφάλησαν οἱ πατέρες; καὶ πῶς αὐτοὶ πιστευθήσονται παρ’ αὐτοῖς οὓς διδάσκουσι 
παρακούειν τῶν διδασκάλων; [...] ἢ πῶς αὐτοὶ ἔτι δύνανται εἶναι ἐπίσκοποι, εἰ παρ’ αἱρετικῶν, ὡς αὐτοὶ διαβάλλουσι, 
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Seen in this light, De synodis itself constitutes a genealogy of belief, sketching over the course of 
decades both a contradictory, patricidal Arian lineage, and a true, faithful Orthodox one. As with Father 
and Son, the true test of legitimacy, and the true basis of unity, is paternity. The Council of Nicaea was a 
true council faithfully transmitting the true substance of Christian belief; the councils since Nicaea have 
been spurious councils called by bastard Arians to put forth illegitimate creeds that contradict the Faith 
both of Nicaea and their own predecessors. The homoiousians and the homoousians are both Orthodox 
because both originate from the same Fathers (and the same Father), whom they continue to accept 
and reverence32—while the “Arians” are heretics because they originate from a corrupt lineage 
stretching back merely to the rebel priest Arius, a line marked at every step by patricide against the true, 
Orthodox Fathers, their own heretical parents, and God.  
As Athanasius himself acknowledges, this requirement of strict continuity in origination poses a 
substantial challenge not just for the modern homoians, but also for his own developed theological 
position, since the term ὁμοούσιος had been rejected not only by Basil of Ancyra and his contemporary 
allies, but also by many of the councils of the preceding decades since Nicaea—and most importantly, by 
the 3rd century council held to condemn the controversial bishop Paul of Samosata. The councils of the 
decades since Nicaea could be ascribed to the conspiratorial, self-undermining efforts of the “Arian” 
heretics and so disregarded, but not a council of “the Fathers” almost a century old. By its very 
existence, this council’s ruling called into question the true paternity of Nicaea itself.  
 
κατεστάθησαν; εἰ δὲ καὶ κακῶς ἐφρόνησαν καὶ γράψαντες ἐπλάνησαν τὴν οἰκουμένην, παυθήτω τέλεον καὶ ἡ περὶ τούτων 
μνήμη. καὶ εἰ τὰ γράμματα αὐτῶν ἐκβάλλεται, ἐκβάλλετε ὑμεῖς ἀπελθόντες ἀπὸ τῶν κοιμητηρίων τὰ λείψανα τούτων, ἵνα 
γνῶσιν ἅπαντες ἐκείνους μὲν πλάνους, ὑμᾶς δὲ πατροκτόνους. 
32 Ayres 2004, 163, as well as n. 94, argues, based on Socrates Scholasticus 2.39-40, that this argument reflects but modifies the 
actual position of the homoiousian party at Seleucia, who sought to present themselves as maintainers of the unaltered Faith 
presented (albeit not without imperfections of terminology) at both Nicaea and Antioch (341), in opposition to the introduction 
of the new, discontinuous homoian creed. 
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Athanasius takes this charge very seriously, and counters it by citing another venerable example 
of ‘the Fathers’ using ὁμοούσιος as a test of orthodoxy: the famous exchange in which the Bishop of 
Alexandria Dionysius was publicly rebuked by the Bishop of Rome Dionysius for the former’s alleged 
treatment of the Son as a creature rather than God.33 As Athanasius points out via extensive quotations, 
not only did Dionysius of Rome, backed by a local synod, use the term ὁμοούσιος in rebuking the 
Alexandrian bishop, but Dionysius of Alexandria, in his extensive retraction and defense, had then 
explicitly affirmed the term as a sign of his agreement with the doctrine taught by Rome. This incident, 
which took place several decades before Paul of Samosata’s condemnation, allows Athanasius to treat 
the seeming contradiction between two authorities in the same way as the seeming contradiction 
between contemporary homoousians and homoiousians: a mere matter of surface appearances and 
properties, not of underlying substance. Paul of Samosata, according to Athanasius, had been 
condemned for a whole gamut of heretical beliefs, including denying Christ’s pre-existence before his 
birth from Mary. That he had used the term ὁμοούσιος in explicating these beliefs meant that it was 
perfectly legitimate of the Fathers to condemn the term as he used it, while its use by Dionysius of Rome 
showed that it could also be used in a correct and Orthodox sense (45). The doctrine of Nicaea 
possesses, then, a spotless pedigree. The “Fathers of Nicaea,” among whom had been both the young 
 
33 The authenticity of these documents, which are quoted in other 4th century texts, was challenged by Abramowski 1982, who 
argued that they derived from a forged work of Dionysius of Alexandria composed c. 340 AD, allegedly in an attempt to 
reconcile the theologies of Eusebius of Caesarea and Marcellus of Ancyra (both of whom seem to allude to or quote this text, 
but who according to this theory are in fact its sources) to bring peace to a divided Church. This rather bizarre hypothesis has 
found relatively little support among scholars, and was comprehensively answered by e.g. Simonetti 1989, Pietras 1991. It was 
then reiterated in a modified form by Heil 1999, who pointed out that none of Abramowski’s indications bore on the 
authenticity of existing fragments of Dionysius of Rome, which were clearly not by the same author, but used stylistic 
considerations to argue that the forged work of Dionysius of Alexandria was a purely Eusebian document later minimally 
interpolated by Athanasius. This modified case was again answered by Simonetti 2001, and then by Morales 2006, esp. 26-29, 
who in seconding Simonetti’s arguments points out the implausibility of Heil’s proposed Athanasian interpolations while 
mustering additional evidence for the document’s origins in 3rd century Alexandria and the influence of these documents on 
Athanasius’ theology throughout his career. 
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deacon Athanasius and his predecessor Alexander, had in fact been faithful to their own predecessors, 
and had thus handed on the one true essence of the Faith. 
In the present, however, this essence is challenged by a bastardized counterfeit visible in the 
homoian Orthodoxy of Acacius. In this atmosphere of conflict, it is absolutely imperative that all bishops 
of a true, non-Arian genealogy, homoiousian and homoousian alike, openly and publicly confess the 
unity of their Faith in fidelity to their predecessors: not the bishops at any of the various Councils of 
Antioch from the 330s to the 350s, or those at the Council of Sirmium in 351 at which Athanasius had 
been condemned, or those at the Council of Serdica in 343 which had divided the Church between East 
and West, but simply and solely the three hundred bishops at Nicaea, preeminent guarantors for all time 
of the pristine genealogy of the one true Faith. 
7.3: 
Historia Arianorum 
“History of the Arians”  
If theological consensus was to occur between homoiousians and homoοousians, as now 
seemed possible, it was up to the bishops alone, without recourse to the now definitively homoian 
Emperor, to define precisely what that consensus would include, and what it would not. Athanasius was 
in a unique position to help shape that emerging consensus.  
In De synodis, Athanasius had begun to sketch not only a theological case, but also a historical 
narrative of the events of his lifetime—one defined by two, intertwined genealogies of true divine Faith 
and patricidal heresy. Historia Arianorum presents a further evolution of this narrative. Its goal, like that 
of De Synodis, is to construct a singular “history” extending from Arius himself to a point near the end of 
the reign of Constantius, in which a consistent set of principles governs the actions and beliefs of each of 
the two essentialized parties, “Arian” and “Orthodox.” This effort is not necessarily dishonest, either in 
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intention or in execution—but it is intensely biased and rhetorical,34 presenting the final evolution of 
Athanasius’ own views, in dialogue with bishops who had assumed office in the 350s and had no 
memory of Arius or Eusebius, as the basis for the interpretation and explanation of events going back 
decades.  
 Among the texts of Athanasius’ corpus, relatively little scholarly attention has been directed to 
Historia Arianorum.35 In part because of historians’ overt hostility to its contents, this text is notoriously 
difficult to date with certainty: though it clearly stems from Athanasius’ second exile under Constantius 
(355-361), the question remains at which point in this exile it should be positioned. Its dating also 
impinges on the even more difficult questions of the audience and process of composition of this highly 
singular work, the only example of Imperial invective in Athanasius’ corpus. While most scholars have 
accepted a date relatively early in Athanasius’ exile, in my judgment this work in its final extant form 
should be dated to around the same time as Lucifer and Hilary’s final polemics Moriundum esse and In 
Constantium Imperatorem, that is, to the period between the Councils of Ariminum and Seleucia in mid-
359 and the death of Constantius in November 361.36 Even if this thesis is incorrect, and the whole of 
our present text dates from earlier in Athanasius’ exile, the dramatic shift found here in Athanasius’ 
portrayal of Emperor and Church should still, I believe, be read very much in the context of the 
polemical efforts of Athanasius’ fellow bishops. 
 
34 As Drake 2000, 413-414, correctly points out, “it is important to remember when reading” Athanasius’ historical works “that 
he did not pen them for modern historians [...] but to rally his followers.” 
35 This is clearly in part due to the fact that, like other polemical texts from this period, it has provoked significant dislike among 
scholars (see for instance the comment of Roberts 1892, lvii, that Historia Arianorum is “the solitary monument of a less noble 
spirit which Athanasius has left us, the one work which we would gladly believe to have come from any other pen”). The 
standard critical text is De Gruyter’s Athanasius: Werke edition (Opitz 1935-1941). For a recent general introduction to the text, 
its dating, context, etc. see the relatively short discussion of Werner Portmann in the Athanasius Handbuch (Portmann 2011). 
The recent English translation and introduction in Flower 2017, while helpful on many individual points, focuses on rhetorical 
issues, not the dating or composition of the text itself or its theological or political content. 
36 See the section on Historia Arianorum in Appendix B for a more detailed argument for this hypothesis and discussion of the 
text’s likely chronology and process of composition. 
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Historia Arianorum is closely related to Lucifer’s brand of 2nd-person anti-Imperial invective, with 
a similar roster of historical, theological, and eschatological comparanda and insults, and similar 
techniques of inventing nicknames for his opponents and using imagined speeches and dialogues to put 
unflattering words in their mouths.37 These rhetorical techniques are not general features of Athanasius’ 
polemic, but are found in Lucifer so frequently that they may be treated as generic features. While it 
must remain speculative, direct influence is neither impossible nor unlikely.  
On a number of other points, however, Historia Arianorum stands clearly apart from Lucifer’s 
writings. The most consequential difference, as with Hilary’s In Constantium, is its intended and 
imagined audience, which in Athanasius’ case includes not even the rhetorical pretense of a 2nd person 
address to the Emperor. Athanasius writes, rather, to an undifferentiated (but clearly sympathetic) 
audience—most likely not a monastic one, as has been occasionally argued, but, given both the parallels 
with In Constantium and the resolutely episcopal focus of most of Athanasius’ narratives and arguments, 
one consisting primarily of bishops at least potentially amenable to the idea that Constantius had 
infringed on their own authority and status. Unlike Lucifer, Athanasius is at this stage entirely 
uninterested in dealing directly with Constantius, let alone bringing about a change of heart and a 
conversion to the true Faith in the ruler of the Roman Empire. Athanasius’ task is not to convert or teach 
or even merely insult Constantius, but rather to explain to his fellow Christians, through an intensely 
rhetorical and theological re-contextualization of recent history, precisely who Constantius is, what he 
has done, and why. Constantius’ actions, Athanasius insists, exist in a larger historical context, one 
stretching back through decades of wicked, Imperial persecutions by Arian heretics, and a larger 
theological context, where Arians are naturally driven by their beliefs to violate the sanctity and unity of 
the Church by the intrusion of Imperial power, just as they had already violated the sanctity and unity of 
 
37 Cf. Portmann 2011, 187, Barnes 1993, 130-131. As Barnes acknowledges, there has been an occasional but unfortunate 
tendency in scholarship to take these “quotations” at face value.  
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the divine οὐσία by their attacks on the Son. Theology, historiography, and invective find here their 
closest unity in all of Athanasius’ corpus—and all are aimed squarely at the Emperor Constantius. 
 In reconstructing the Arian controversy in the context of the latter part of Constantius’ reign, 
Athanasius labors to make clear that what has always, from the very beginning, characterized the 
“Arians” as opposed to the Orthodox is their exaltation of Imperial authority over that of bishops and 
their recourse to Imperial violence against their enemies. The same bishop who had in Apologia ad 
Constantium gone out of his way to deny that he had in fact been deposed under the command of the 
Emperor now rhetorically glories in that fact: “They added, to inspire fear in those who were listening: 
‘The Emperor has commanded this.’ [...] From this is it not clearly manifest to everyone that, because of 
my piety towards Christ, both at that time I suffered, and now I am persecuted, not according to an 
ecclesiastical judgment, but because of the boast of an Emperor?” (1.2).38 At a time of close episcopal 
and Imperial cooperation as had existed under Constantine, this “defense” would make little sense; 
during the open conflict of the latter part of Constantius’ reign, however, it serves almost in itself to 
justify the embattled bishop of Alexandria against decades of charges and depositions. Both with 
Constantine after the Council of Tyre and with Constantius after the Council of Milan, Athanasius had 
labored to make clear that, though he was perfectly willing to overlook the sentence of an episcopal 
council as merely provisional, he would regard the judgment of the Emperor as final. Now, however, the 
balance is entirely reversed: like Lucifer, Athanasius boasts of persecution by the Emperor while 
reserving his piety and obedience for those truly free and ecclesiastical councils and bishops who had 
supported him. This reflects a radically different basic context, where Athanasius could no longer expect 
 
38 προστιθέντες πρὸς φόβον τῶν ἀκουόντων ὅτι ‘τοῦτο γὰρ βασιλεὺς προσέταξεν’. ἆρ’ οὖν οὐχὶ καὶ ἐκ τούτου πᾶσιν ἄντικρυς 




help from any Emperor, but could look to a sizeable group of potential episcopal supporters willing, like 
him, to disregard or directly oppose Constantius’ authority.  
Despite this arguably self-interested background, Athanasius in Historia Arianorum is at pains to 
assert that his treatment of Church and Empire here represents not a mere change in tactics, but a 
(belated) acknowledgment of fundamental realities visible throughout the history of the previous 
decades. For Athanasius at this stage of his career, respect for the primacy of ecclesiastical authority and 
tradition, without any interference whatsoever from the Emperor, represents an essential facet of what 
it means to be an Orthodox Nicene, while the reliance of the “Arians” on Imperial authority and Imperial 
violence belongs to the very core of their heresy: 
For if this was a judgment of bishops, what does the Emperor have to do with it? But if it is a 
boast of an Emperor, what need is there for those who are called ‘bishops’? Were such things 
ever heard of before? Has a judgment of the Church ever had its authority from the Emperor, or 
has such a decree ever even been known?  Many synods have occurred before this, many 
judgments of the Church have been made, but the Fathers never obeyed the Emperor about 
these things, nor did the Emperor ever meddle in the affairs of the Church. Paul the Apostle had 
friends who were of the household of Caesar, and in his letters he greeted those of them among 
the Philippians, but he did not accept them as partners in judgment. But now there is a new 
spectacle, and this is the invention of the Arian heresy: for heretics have assembled in council 
with the Emperor Constantius, so that he might, with the bishops as smokescreen, act with 
authority against whomever he wishes, and in persecuting not be called a persecutor (52.3-5).39 
According to Athanasius, then, the Emperor’s participation in and management of episcopal 
councils is fundamentally an innovation, not of the Emperor Constantine and the other bishops of his 
generation, but of the heretical, anti-episcopal “Arians.” Perhaps the most uncomfortable aspect of this 
“Neo-Nicene” position on the relationship between Church and Empire is its bearing on the Council of 
 
39 εἰ γὰρ ἐπισκόπων ἐστὶ κρίσις, τί κοινὸν ἔχει πρὸς ταύτην βασιλεύς; εἰ δὲ βασιλέως ἐστὶν ἀπειλή, τίς ἐνταῦθα χρεία τῶν 
λεγομένων ἐπισκόπων; πότε γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ αἰῶνος ἠκούσθη τοιαῦτα; πότε κρίσις ἐκκλησίας παρὰ βασιλέως ἔσχε τὸ κῦρος ἢ ὅλως 
ἐγνώσθη τοῦτο τὸ κρῖμα; πολλαὶ σύνοδοι πρὸ τούτου γεγόνασι, πολλὰ κρίματα τῆς ἐκκλησίας γέγονεν, ἀλλ’ οὔτε οἱ πατέρες 
ἔπεισάν ποτε περὶ τούτων βασιλέα οὔτε βασιλεὺς τὰ τῆς ἐκκλησίας περιειργάσατο. Παῦλος ἀπόστολος εἶχε φίλους τοὺς τῆς 
τοῦ Καίσαρος οἰκίας καὶ γράφων ἠσπάζετο τοὺς Φιλιππησίους ἀπὸ τούτων, ἀλλ’ οὐκ εἰς κρίματα τούτους κοινωνοὺς 
παρελάμβανε. νῦν δὲ θέαμα καινὸν καὶ τοῦτο τῆς ἀρειανῆς αἱρέσεώς ἐστιν εὕρημα. συνῆλθον γὰρ αἱρετικοὶ καὶ βασιλεὺς 




Nicaea itself, which (as discussed in sections 1.3, 1.4, and 2.7 above) Constantine had summoned, at 
whose deliberations he had been personally present, and following which he had used his Imperial 
authority to exile those few bishops who refused to subscribe to its definition. How precisely such 
Imperial-episcopal collaboration is to be fit into Athanasius’ polemical picture is, to say the least, 
unclear.  
Still, while it may be tempting to dismiss the forthrightness of Athanasius anti-Imperial theology 
and polemic here as little more than the dishonest, self-serving self-justification of a bishop willing to 
distort the truth and alter his own theology and rhetoric for personal gain,40 this is, I believe, to a large 
degree to misunderstand the actual significance of Historia Arianorum within its context. The fascination 
of Athanasius’ colorful personality should not have the effect, as it often has done, of obscuring the 
larger contexts and networks within which he operated. Athanasius had been seeking to discredit the 
charges against him, and oppose what he saw as the “Arian heresy,” for decades by the time he wrote 
Historia Arianorum. Never before, however, had he openly attacked the sitting Emperor, associated 
“Arianism” indelibly with Imperial power, or denied the right of the Emperor to act as a partner to the 
bishops or even the final court of appeals in the Imperial-episcopal judicial system. However dishonest 
we imagine Athanasius being, that he would even try such a tactic reveals how drastically the exiled 
bishops had shifted the terms of theological and political debate over the course of the 350s. Lucifer of 
 
40 See in particular Barnes 1993, 126-132, who argues forcefully that Historia Arianorum “is a systematically deceptive work” 
(129) where “Athanasius’ primary techniques [...] are suppression and distortion” (128). Barnes is correct about the openly 
polemical nature of the text, in which Athanasius’ opponents and their viewpoints are both essentialized and ruthlessly 
caricatured, and he also picks out accurately the large number of instances where Athanasius’ own past appeals to and 
manipulations of Imperial power are omitted or explained away. In my judgment, however, his hostile characterization of the 
text as a whole fails to take into account its theological and polemical nature and larger context, and so presents an Athanasius 
that is more intentionally deceptive than is necessary. Portmann 2011, 187, has more recently presented a more moderate 
position, merely stating that, although “das Misstrauen der modernen Forschung gegenüber der Darstellung des Athanasius ist 
groß,” given the lack of other evidence it is impossible to definitively establish or reject Athanasius’ historical reliability, 
especially since the narratives he offers in Historia Arianorum are often “sehr vage.” Athanasius’ goal in Historia Arianorum is 
not so much to offer precise historical facts for later scholars as to provide a clear theological-political interpretation of the 
events of the previous decades for the benefit of his fellow opponents of Constantius. 
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Cagliari had shown that it was possible for a bishop to criticize the reigning Emperor from a standpoint 
of not merely respectful παρρησία, but profound superiority, as a divinely-empowered agent of the 
single eternal kingdom of Christ. Hilary of Poitiers had argued that a Nicene equality of Son and Father 
demanded a system of earthly authority in which equal, collegial bishops governed the totality of the 
Church, with the Emperor at best an ignorant, incompetent assistant, and, at worst, a fundamentally 
unequal, deceptive, intruding Antichrist.  
Still, Athanasius’ new treatment of bishops and Emperor need not be ascribed merely to 
influence from his fellow exiles. Athanasius had over the course of his career appealed to multiple 
Emperors against his episcopal enemies, making use of a reasonable and effective strategy shared by 
these opponents themselves. These appeals, though, had hardly ended well for the bishop of 
Alexandria, who (as argued in Chapters One and Three above) had spent the previous three decades 
being repeatedly cleared and condemned, praised and cursed, assured of perpetual safety and 
sentenced to permanent exile by Emperors according to the immediate political context. Athanasius had 
been first threatened, then deposed, then provisionally cleared, then condemned and exiled by 
Constantine; then used as a barely-disguised tool for brotherly competition and civil war by 
Constantine’s sons; and finally, when the dust of the bloodiest civil war in Roman history had settled, 
found himself the bitter personal adversary of the sole Augustus of the Roman world, forced to flee into 
the desert under threat of capital punishment. Through all these changes of fortune, his only consistent 
allies had been his fellow bishops, beginning with Julius of Rome and extending to those Latin bishops 
recently exiled for refusing to accept his condemnation at Sirmium and Milan, who had again and again 
shown themselves willing to defy Imperial authority and suffer Imperial punishment to secure what they 
regarded as an impartial trial for their colleague. It would be strange indeed if these events had not led 
to some change in Athanasius’ opinions on the relative benefits of Empire and episcopate. 
591 
 
In Historia Arianorum, however, Athanasius’ case against the Emperor’s interventions in the 
Church is for the first time treated not as a matter of historical circumstance, but of fundamental 
theological principle. Throughout the pages of Historia Arianorum, Athanasius is quite clear that to be 
Orthodox means not only belief in the equal majesty and singular divine substance of Father and Son, 
but also belief in the independence and inviolability of the Church in relation to Imperial power. In the 
emerging Nicene consensus, theology, rhetoric, and politics have been joined together as never before. 
To be “Nicene” is no longer merely to agree with the language of one Imperial-sponsored council against 
its Imperial-sponsored rivals or back one Emperor against another: it is to take part in a unified 
theological, political, and rhetorical discourse where the unity of the Church expressed in an equal body 
of bishops independent of the Emperor is as central to Orthodoxy as the unity of the divine realm 
expressed in an equal Father and Son independent of creation. In Historia Arianorum, Athanasius goes 
well beyond simply trying one more political or rhetorical strategy to best his enemies. He tells the 
whole story of the theological, judicial, and political conflicts of the past thirty years over again as a 
narrative where only one thing matters: the independence of the Christian Church against the Roman 
Emperor. 
Eusebius of Caesarea had presented a progressive narrative of history in which the 
Constantinian age represented the quasi-eschatological culmination of Christian history up to that point. 
For the new, Nicene historiography of Athanasius, however, this presentation is all but reversed. The 
centuries in which Christians had no legal standing and were subject to persecution are treated as a 
golden age of ecclesiastical independence and Imperial non-interference, upset by the essentially 
Constantinian practice of collaboration between Emperor and bishops, which in Athanasius’ new 
characterization is little more than a farce: “One might see this synod as a comedy performed by them 
on a stage, with those called ‘bishops’ as actors, while Constantius orchestrates their parts and gives 
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them commands” (52.6).41  If episcopal judgment is to be ultimately subject to Imperial commands, the 
episcopate has no true existence at all. A related claim, that Christian truth could be, if not commanded, 
at least served and furthered by Imperial power, is addressed as well, with Athanasius arguing in strong 
terms against any use of coercion to ensure belief:  
For the truth is not proclaimed by swords or darts nor by means of soldiers, but it persuades by 
common counsel. What sort of persuasion can there be where there is fear of the Emperor? Or 
what kind of common counsel can there be, where anyone who contradicts the Emperor is 
punished in the end with exile and death? [...] But this Emperor, who does not have reason, with 
his authority coerces everyone, so that it might be revealed to all that their thinking is not 
according to God, but human, and that those who believe in the teachings of Arius in reality 
‘have no king but Caesar’ [John 19:15] (33.3, 5-6).42 
Such a position, it should be said, all but upends the Constantinian settlement of limited 
cooperation between Emperor and bishops in the interests of ecclesiastical order,43 a state of affairs 
expressed most notably in Constantine’s expedient of exiling all those who would not agree to the Creed 
 
41 τοῦτο δὲ ὡς ἐπὶ σκηνῆς ἄν τις ἴδοι κωμῳδούμενον παρ’ αὐτοῖς, καὶ τοὺς μὲν λεγομένους ἐπισκόπους ὑποκρινομένους, τὸν 
δὲ Κωνστάντιον τὰ ἐκείνων ἐνεργοῦντα καὶ πάλιν ἐπαγγελλόμενον μὲν τοῦτον, ὡς Ἡρώδης τῇ Ἡρωδιάδι, τούτους δὲ πάλιν 
ὀρχουμένους τὰς διαβολὰς ἐπὶ ἐξορισμῷ καὶ θανάτῳ τῶν εἰς τὸν κύριον εὐσεβούντων. 
42 οὐ γὰρ ξίφεσιν ἢ βέλεσιν οὐδὲ διὰ στρατιωτῶν ἡ ἀλήθεια καταγγέλλεται, ἀλλὰ πειθοῖ καὶ συμβουλίᾳ. ποία οὖν πειθώ, ἔνθα 
βασιλέως φόβος; ἢ ποία συμβουλία, ἐν ᾗ ὁ ἀντιλέγων τὸ τέλος ἐξορισμὸν ἔχει καὶ θάνατον; [...] αὐτὸς δὲ τὸν λόγον οὐκ ἔχων 
μετ’ ἐξουσίας πάντας βιάζεται, ἵνα δειχθῇ πᾶσιν ὅτι ἡ φρόνησις αὐτῶν οὐκ ἔστι κατὰ θεόν, ἀλλ’ ἀνθρωπίνη, καὶ ὅτι οἱ τὰ 
Ἀρείου φρονοῦντες ‘οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἀληθῶς βασιλέα εἰ μὴ Καίσαρα’. 
43 My interpretation of this passage is thus both similar and distinct to that of Drake 2000, 407-408, who correctly points to it as 
evidence of the continuing force of arguments against religious coercion among bishops, but implausibly sees it “as proof of the 
staying power of the Constantinian consensus” (407) which “confirms the potency of the Constantinian settlement, with its 
specific denial of coercion in matters of religion” (408). This statement is in my judgment straightforwardly backwards, since, as 
I have argued (see in particular sections 1.4-1.5), Constantine’s settlement relied pervasively on the coercive power of the 
Imperial office, not merely for the everyday operations of the Empire, but as the specific means to enforce religious unity within 
the Church and cement his own legitimacy through “signs” consisting precisely of justified religious violence against internal 
and external enemies. 
593 
 
of Nicaea.44 Unlike the position taken around the same time by Lucifer of Cagliari,45 however, Athanasius 
does not condemn or declare un-Christian the ordinary coercion of the Imperial office. Still, Athanasius’ 
denial that military power could play any role in establishing the truth does serve as a pointed counter 
not just to Constantius’ recent interventions into episcopal councils, but also to his father Constantine’s 
more general case for his own religious authority based on the divine “signs” of the punishment of 
persecutors and the forcible bringing to Faith of barbarians—both feats accomplished precisely by 
means of soldiers, darts, and the fear of the Emperor. If the Emperor wishes to claim authority over or 
within the Church, it will have to be on a very different basis. 
Read backwards in the light of all these principles, the “History of the Arians” emerges as a 
consistent campaign46 in which, over the course of several generations, heretics with “no king but 
Caesar” [John 19:15] again and again appeal illegitimately to Imperial power against episcopal and 
ecclesiastical authority. Because of this distinctively “Arian” characteristic, from the time of Constantine 
 
44 Expressed episcopal discomfort with the sentencing of bishops to the Imperial punishment of exile dates back at least to the 
letter of Julius of Rome to the Dedication Council of Antioch in 341 (given in Athanasius, Apologia contra Arianos 21-35 and as 
Letter 2 in the recent edition of Thompson 2015), where Julius, in the course of criticizing what he sees as numerous abuses of 
canon law in the processes against Athanasius and the other exiled bishops, angrily declares: “Enough has happened already: it 
is enough that bishops have been sentenced to exile in the presence of bishops. It is hardly necessary to go into more detail 
about this, lest those who were present at such events think we are treating them with bias. For if it is necessary to speak the 
truth, it was not right to go so far or to arrive at such a degree of pettiness. [...] Beloved, judgments are no longer made 
according to the Gospel, but for exile and death.” (ἀρκεῖ γὰρ τὰ γενόμενα· ἀρκεῖ ὅτι παρόντων ἐπισκόπων ἐπίσκοποι 
ἐξωρίζοντο. περὶ οὗ οὐδὲ μακρηγορεῖν δεῖ, ἵνα μὴ βαρεῖσθαι οἱ παρόντες τότε δοκῶσιν. εἰ γὰρ δεῖ τἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν, οὐκ ἔδει 
μέχρι τούτων φθάσαι οὐδὲ εἰς τοσοῦτον ἐλθεῖν τὰς μικροψυχίας. [...] ὦ ἀγαπητοί, οὐκέτι κατὰ τὸ εὐαγγέλιον, ἀλλὰ λοιπὸν ἐπὶ 
ἐξορισμῷ καὶ θανάτῳ αἱ κρίσεις τῆς ἐκκλησίας εἰσίν, 35.1-2,3/21-22). 
45 See section 5.6 above. 
46 Barnes 1993, 132, however, rather implausibly charges Athanasius’ treatment of Imperial power in Historia Arianorum with 
inconsistency, arguing that the narrative “is not in fact directed against interference as such, but against imperial actions of 
which he disapproves” (132). In fact internal inconsistency is perhaps the only crime with which one cannot charge Athanasius’ 
stridently repetitive and didactic narrative. Barnes’ only contrary example is the fact that Athanasius approves of the 
restoration of exiled bishops by the Emperor after the death of Constantine (8), which, according to Barnes, was uncanonical 
since these bishops had been exiled by episcopal councils, meaning that even in Historia Arianorum Athanasius “implicitly 
asserts that emperors have a right to overrule church councils” (132). This highly tendentious claim, however, misreads the 
clear thrust of Athanasius’ narrative argument, which is that these bishops had all been illegitimately and uncanonically 
deposed through Imperial interference, with the restoration merely a (belated) recognition of this fact by the sons of 
Constantine. Whether or not this was actually true, or to what degree Athanasius’ arguments were actually believed or 
reflected in his behavior, is of course a distinct question. 
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until now, there has been, according to Athanasius, an almost total identification between the statuses 
of favored episcopal ally of the Emperor and “Arian heretic”: “For the friend and partner in impiety of 
these men, although he happens to be liable for ten thousand other crimes and accusations, even if 
there are the plainest proofs and declarations of his guilt, is honored by them and immediately becomes 
a friend of the Emperor, with his impiety as his recommendation” (2.1).47 Meanwhile, bishops who are 
Orthodox have crimes invented against them and are condemned and expelled, not by ecclesiastical 
sentences, but solely on the basis of Imperial power (2). Considered as a social and political 
phenomenon, “Arianism” is simply the illegitimate confluence of Empire and Church. 
In defending himself once again from the criminal charges that had pursued him since the 330s, 
Athanasius has the great advantage of being able to directly equate himself with other bishops who 
have been condemned and exiled, over the last several decades, for undoubtedly religious reasons: “Let 
it be granted, they have charged Athanasius with crimes. What, then, have these other bishops done? 
What motives did they have for their crimes, or what dead body of Arsenius was found in their 
possession? What priest named Makarios and what chalice was forged for them? What Melitian gave a 
performance for them?48 Rather, as is reasonable, from the cases of these bishops it has become clear 
that the charges against Athanasius were false” (3.2).49 Much of the length of Historia Arianorum is 
 
47 ὁ μὲν γὰρ φίλος καὶ συνασεβῶν ἐκείνοις, κἂν ἐν ἄλλοις πλημμελήμασι καὶ μυρίοις ἐγκλήμασιν ὑπεύθυνος τυγχάνῃ, κἂν ἔχῃ 
τοὺς ἐλέγχους καὶ τὰς ἀποδείξεις λευκοτάτας, οὗτος δόκιμος παρ’ αὐτοῖς καὶ βασιλέως εὐθὺς γίνεται φίλος ἔχων τὴν σύστασιν 
ἐκ τῆς ἀσεβείας. 
48 These are all references to the accusations made against Athanasius in the 330s and 340s, among which were the charge of 
having (through intermediaries) murdered a priest named Arsenius, having sent a priest to assault a Melitian priest named 
Makarios while he was celebrating the liturgy, leading to the breaking of a sacred chalice and the profanation of the Eucharist, 
and in general having orchestrated acts of criminal violence against the Melitians, a faction of Egyptian Christians who had 
broken away from the authority of the Alexandrian Patriarch. For further discussion of these charges, see section 4.2 above, 
esp. note 14. That Athanasius feels comfortable speaking so flippantly of them is a good indication of his changed position 
during this exile, where such charges were no longer of immediate relevance even for his enemies, who had since accused him 
of the far more serious crime of treason against the Emperor (cf. Apologia ad Constantium, discussed in section 4.4 above). 
49 ἔστω γάρ, Ἀθανάσιον ᾐτιάσαντο· τί καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πεποιήκασιν ἐπίσκοποι; ποίας ἄρα προφάσεις εἶχον ἢ ποῖος ἄρα κἀκεῖ 
νεκρὸς Ἀρσένιος εὑρέθη; ποῖος παρ’ αὐτοῖς Μακάριος πρεσβύτερος καὶ ποτήριον πέπλασται; ποῖος Μελιτιανὸς ὑπεκρίνετο; 
ἀλλ’ ὡς ἔοικεν ἐξ ἐκείνων καὶ τὰ κατὰ Ἀθανάσιον δείκνυται ψευδῆ. 
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consequently taken up with detailed accounts of the persecution and exile of various prominent bishops 
in the decades since the Council of Nicaea at the hands either of Eusebius of Nicomedia and his allies or 
of Constantius himself.50 These bishops are portrayed, to a man, as heroic defenders not only of 
theological Orthodoxy, but of the rights of the Church against interference by the Empire, as in 
Athanasius’ recounting of the protest of Lucifer of Cagliari and his allies at the Council of Milan:51  
Hearing these things, the bishops were greatly amazed, and stretching out their hands to God, 
with great boldness they proclaimed with rational arguments, as teachers, that this Imperial 
power did not belong to Constantius, but to God who had given it to him, and that he ought to 
fear God lest he suddenly take that Imperial power away from him. And they were threatening 
him with the day of judgment, and were advising him not to destroy the ecclesiastical realm (τὰ 
ἐκκλησιαστικὰ), or mix the Roman Empire with the order of the Church, or introduce the Arian 
heresy into the Church of God (34.1).52  
The threat posed by Constantius is not merely the introduction of “Arianism,” then, but also and 
inextricably the adulterous “mixing” of the naturally separate domains of Empire and Church. In 
highlighting Orthodox opposition to this mingling, Athanasius pays special regard to the bishops of Rome 
Julius and Liberius, who had insisted not only on the innocence of Athanasius, but also on the need for 
Church councils to be held in a state of episcopal liberty, with no threatening presence or involvement 
 
50 The bishops mentioned as deposed during the reign of Constantine are, besides Athanasius himself, Eustathius of Antioch, 
Eutropius of Adrianopole, Euphration of Balanea, Kymatius of Paltus, Carterius of Antaradus, Asclepas of Gaza, Cyrus of Berœa 
in Syria, Diodorus of Asia, Domnion of Sirmium, Ellanicus of Tripolis, and Marcellus of Ancyra. Those from the reign of 
Constantius outside of Egypt are Paul of Constantinople, Lucius of Adrianopole, Diodorus, Olympius of Æni, Theodulus of 
Trajanople, Stephanus of Antioch, Paulinus of Treveri, Lucifer of Cagliari, Eusebius of Vercelli, Dionysius of Milan, Liberius of 
Rome, and Hosius of Cordoba. The Egyptian bishops mentioned as deposed or exiled by Constantius are Sarapammon, 
Potammon, Ammonius, Hermes, Anagamphus, Marcus, Muis, Psenosiris, Nilammon, Plenes, Marcus, Athenodorus, Dracontius, 
Philo, Adelphius, Ammonius, Agathus, Agathodæmon, Apollonius, Eulogius, Apollos, Paphnutius, Gaius, Flavius, Dioscorus, 
Ammonius, Heraclides, and Psais. 
51 It is worth noting that Athanasius’ characterization of this protest tracks closely with the actual arguments made by Lucifer of 
Cagliari in his published works. Direct influence is, again, not at all unlikely, though admittedly difficult to prove. 
52 Ταῦτα ἀκούσαντες οἱ ἐπίσκοποι πάνυ γε θαυμάσαντες καὶ τὰς χεῖρας ἀνατείναντες πρὸς τὸν θεὸν πολλῇ τῇ κατ’ αὐτοῦ 
παρρησίᾳ μετὰ λόγων ἐχρήσαντο διδάσκοντες, μὴ εἶναι τὴν βασιλείαν αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ τοῦ δεδωκότος θεοῦ, ὃν καὶ φοβεῖσθαι 
αὐτὸν ἠξίουν, μὴ ἐξαίφνης αὐτὴν ἀφέληται· ἠπείλουν τε τὴν ἡμέραν τῆς κρίσεως καὶ συνεβούλευον αὐτῷ, μὴ διαφθείρειν τὰ 
ἐκκλησιαστικὰ μηδὲ ἐγκαταμίσγειν τὴν ῥωμαικὴν ἀρχὴν τῇ τῆς ἐκκλησίας διαταγῇ μηδὲ τὴν ἀρειανὴν αἵρεσιν εἰσάγειν εἰς τὴν 
ἐκκλησίαν τοῦ θεοῦ. 
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from the Emperor and his officials at all (36).53 Similarly, Hosius of Cordoba, a close episcopal ally of 
Constantine during the early part of his reign, is presented in glowing terms as a confessor and the 
“father of the bishops” (πατήρ [...] τῶν ἐπισκόπων, 42.1), and a full transcript is given of a letter 
purportedly written to Constantius that chides him in the strongest of terms both for his persecution of 
Athanasius and for his illegitimate Imperial intervention in the Church:54 
Do not insert yourself into the ecclesiastical realm (τὰ ἐκκλησιαστικά), nor give orders to us 
about these things, but rather learn these things from us. God has entrusted Imperial power to 
you, to us he has entrusted the affairs of the Church. And just as the one who usurps your 
Empire (ἀρχή) resists the one set in his place by God, so be afraid lest you, by drawing the affairs 
of the Church onto yourself, become liable for a great charge. It is written: “Render unto Caesar 
the things that are Caesars, and to God the things that are God’s” [Matthew 22:21]. It is indeed 
not permitted for us to rule (ἄρχειν) on earth, nor do you have authority to burn incense, O 
Emperor (44.7-8).55  
Even in listing the purported crimes of Imperial power against the Church, Athanasius’ 
treatment of Constantine and Constantius remains strikingly different—a legacy of the complex 
relationship of the episcopate with the first Christian Emperor. Though Athanasius blames the “Arians” 
of Constantine’s time for using the authority of the Emperor to exile Orthodox bishops, and though he 
straightforwardly narrates Constantine favoring “Arianism” and persecuting Orthodox martyrs in its 
interests, he nonetheless avoids direct negative characterization of the Emperor, even going so far as to 
 
53 This concern for the holding of councils apart from Imperial coercion or (presumptively unbaptized and pagan) Imperial 
officials is in fact reflected in surviving communications from these bishops of Rome (see e.g. see the letter of Julius to the 
Dedication Council of Antioch preserved given in Athanasius, Apologia contra Arianos 21-35 and as Letter 2 in the recent edition 
of Thompson 2015, esp. 15/31, as well as the letter of Liberius to Constantius preserved in Hilary, Adversus Valentem et 
Ursacium Series A 7, esp. 2, 4, and the interrogation of Liberius discussed in section 3.5 above. 
54 This very famous document, dating most likely before Lucifer’s entire corpus, has been frequently quoted in discussions of 
“Church and State” ever since (e.g. Simonetti 1975, 223-4, who calls it “un momento importante nella storia del rapporto 
imperio/chiesa nel IV secolo,” as well as Rahner 1992, 55), though as Portmann 2011, 186, notes, there have also been 
occasional doubts raised about its authenticity. 
55 μὴ τίθει σεαυτὸν εἰς τὰ ἐκκλησιαστικά, μηδὲ σὺ περὶ τούτων ἡμῖν παρακελεύου, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον παρ’ ἡμῶν σὺ μάνθανε ταῦτα. 
σοὶ βασιλείαν ὁ θεὸς ἐνεχείρισεν, ἡμῖν τὰ τῆς ἐκκλησίας ἐπίστευσε. καὶ ὥσπερ ὁ τὴν σὴν ἀρχὴν ὑποκλέπτων ἀντιλέγει τῷ 
διαταξαμένῳ θεῷ, οὕτω φοβήθητι, μὴ καὶ σὺ τὰ τῆς ἐκκλησίας εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἕλκων ὑπεύθυνος ἐγκλήματι μεγάλῳ γένῃ. 
«ἀπόδοτε», γέγραπται, «τὰ Καίσαρος Καίσαρι καὶ τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ τῷ θεῷ». οὔτε τοίνυν ἡμῖν ἄρχειν ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ἔξεστιν οὔτε σὺ 
τοῦ θυμιᾶν ἐξουσίαν ἔχεις, βασιλεῦ. 
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cite him as a witness of the dishonest, manipulative tactics of his own “Arian” subordinates (8). The 
reasons for this are, I would suggest, fourfold. First, Constantine was, in fact, the first Christian Emperor, 
the rescuer of the Church from Imperial persecution and a great benefactor of the Church in 
straightforward material and institutional terms, and so a unique figure even in the context of the 4th 
century. Then, too, Athanasius had, during the reign of Constantine, himself accepted the Emperor’s 
authority over ecclesiastical affairs and avoided attacks on him, so that his continuation of this policy 
retains a certain logic even in this drastically different context. Then, of course, Constantine had been 
intimately associated with the Council of Nicaea, which Athanasius and his allies were insistent upon 
regarding as the exemplar of a free, ecclesiastical council laying down a final judgment against 
“Arianism,” so that attacks on Constantine as a heretic could easily prove counterproductive. Finally, 
Constantine was, of course, dead—and so, attacking him would gain Athanasius very little rhetorically, 
while potentially risking much. In general, it was far safer to continue the policy, already prominent 
during Constantine’s reign, of blaming Eusebius of Nicomedia and his allies, even while altering the focus 
of that blame from purported manipulation of episcopal councils (against which Athanasius had once 
appealed directly to the Emperor) to purported use of Imperial power. 
Constantius shared none of these advantages with his father. If my chronology is correct, by the 
time Athanasius wrote the final sections of Historia Arianorum, Lucifer, Hilary, and the other exiled 
Nicenes had been for several years carrying out a remarkable campaign of personal, political, and 
theological invective against Constantius, with the goal of stigmatizing and delegitimizing him as a moral 
actor, a Christian, and a Roman Emperor. Historia Arianorum is the crystallization of this entire 
campaign, re-reading the rhetorical fruits of the early 360s into the totality of the reign of Constantius II, 
treated from beginning to end as a usurper, tyrant, heretic, persecutor, and Antichrist.  
Even by the standard set by Lucifer, Athanasius’ rhetoric is extreme. This is not merely an attack 
on Constantius’ religious policies or his status as a Christian, but on his very person, his human and 
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moral qualities. Throughout his whole life, Constantius has been characterized by murderousness and 
lack of human feeling: “But what wonder is it if, after being seduced into heresy, he is so cruel towards 
the bishops, when he did not, like a human being, spare even his own flesh and blood: for he 
slaughtered his uncles, and his cousins he murdered” (69.1).56 Here we see the first introduction into 
anti-Imperial invective of the “massacre of princes,” in which, allegedly on Constantius’ orders, nearly all 
close male relatives of Constantine had been systematically killed apart from the brothers Constantius, 
Constans, and Constantine and their much younger cousins Julian and Gallus.57 As discussed in section 
3.6 above, this incident loomed large in the writings and propaganda of Constantius’ rebel Caesar and 
eventual successor Julian58—and it is not a coincidence that, on my hypothesis, Historia Arianorum was 
written during Julian’s rebellion. In the larger rhetorical context of Historia Arianorum, however, the 
massacre serves to stigmatize Constantius as not merely personally cruel and inhuman, but also a 
usurper, come to power through unnatural bloodshed against family members.59 It is this characteristic 
violence against his own flesh and blood that for Athanasius contextualizes Constantius’ embrace of an 
“Arian” heresy defined precisely by violent attacks on the fatherhood of God—an underlying proclivity 
also expressed in the influence of eunuchs at Constantius’ court:  
It was the eunuchs who instigated both these charges and the charges against all [the bishops]. 
For this is the incredible thing about this conspiracy, that the Arian heresy which denies the Son 
 
56 Τί δὲ θαυμαστόν, εἰ πλανηθεὶς εἰς ἀσέβειαν οὕτω κατὰ τῶν ἐπισκόπων ἐστιν ὠμός, ὅπου γε οὐδὲ τῆς ἰδίας συγγενείας ὡς 
ἄνθρωπος ἐφείσατο; τοὺς μὲν γὰρ θείους κατέσφαξε καὶ τοὺς ἀνεψίους ἀνεῖλε. 
57 For the massacre in general, see Burgess 2008 as well as note 16 in 3.2 above. As Burgess notes (15-16), this text of 
Athanasius’ is perhaps the first source to directly state that Constantius had been the active architect behind the massacre, 
rather than merely responsible for failing to stop it or supporting it by his passive acquiescence (although see Appendix B below 
for my own proposed redating of Historia Arianorum to 360/361). As Burges notes, Athanasius had been present at the court of 
Constantine II at the time of the massacre and had visited Constantinople shortly thereafter, giving his statement here 
something approaching eyewitness status.  
58 Most notably in Julian’s Epistula ad Athenaeos, written in 361 during his revolt against Constantius and quoted in section 3.6 
above, where he openly accuses Constantius of having murdered without trial his father, brothers, uncle, and six of his cousins, 
and in Libanius’ Oration 18, a panegyrical funeral oration for Julian himself, in which he likewise treats Constantius 
straightforwardly as the murderer of his kin.   
59 Cf. Flower 2013, 2017. 
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of God receives aid from eunuchs, who, because they are like Arians in their physical nature and 
are sterile in their soul in regard to virtue, are unable to bear even hearing about a son. The 
Ethiopian eunuch, although he did not understand what he was reading, obeyed Philip when he 
taught him about the Savior [Acts 8:26-40]: but these castrati of Constantius accept not even the 
confession of Peter,60 but reject the Father when he reveals the Son and rage like madmen 
against those who say that there is a legitimate Son of God, vindicating the heresy of castrati: 
that there is no legitimate and true son born of the Father (38.3-5).61 
Like Hilary in In Constantium, then, Athanasius draws a direct connection between the denial of 
equal, generative relationships in the divine realm and moral violence on earth. Athanasius’ other 
attacks on the personal character of the Emperor also track closely with the rhetorical picture of his 
allies Lucifer and Hilary of Poitiers, portraying Constantius as a wild beast prone to inhuman violence 
who in supporting “Arianism” and persecuting the Orthodox has become a tyrant similar to, but far 
worse than, the pagan persecutors of the past, and hence a true “precursor of Antichrist” (cf. e.g. 46, 70, 
71, 74). Like Lucifer, Athanasius uses a number of negative Scriptural exemplars, including Ahab (45, 53, 
68), Saul (67), Darius (45), Belshazzar (45), Herod (45), the Pharaoh of the Exodus (34, 68), and Pontius 
Pilate (68), to get his point across; and like Hilary, he dwells on negative Roman and pagan exemplars 
not merely to associate them with Constantius, but also to positively contrast their moral character with 
his own (40). In fact, in a startling passage, Athanasius both associates Constantius with Maximian, a key 
participant in the Diocletianic persecution, by referring to him rhetorically as Constantius’ “grandfather,” 
but also directly contrasts the goodness and heroism of Greco-Roman pagans with the cruelty and 
inhumanity of the “Arians”:  
 
60 I.e. Liberius of Rome, in the account of whose deposition this excursus occurs, and who is here rhetorically exalted against 
the minor Apostle Philip: if the Ethiopian eunuch had believed the Gospel on the word of Philip, how much more should 
Constantius’ eunuchs have believed in the Gospel when proclaimed to them by Peter? 
61 εὐνοῦχοι δὲ ἦσαν οἱ καὶ ταῦτα καὶ τὰ κατὰ πάντων κινοῦντες. καὶ τὸ παράδοξον τῆς ἐπιβουλῆς τοῦτό ἐστιν, ὅτι ἡ ἀρειανὴ 
αἵρεσις ἀρνουμένη τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ θεοῦ ἐξ εὐνούχων ἔχει τὴν βοήθειαν, οἵτινες ὡς τῇ φύσει οὕτως καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀρετῆς ἄγονοι 
τυγχάνοντες οὐ φέρουσιν ἀκούειν ὅλως περὶ υἱοῦ. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐκ τῆς Αἰθιοπίας εὐνοῦχος μὴ νοῶν ἃ ἀνεγίνωσκεν ἐπείσθη τῷ 
Φιλίππῳ διδάσκοντι περὶ τοῦ σωτῆρος ὁ οἱ δὲ τοῦ Κωνσταντίου σπάδοντες οὔτε τοῦ Πέτρου ὁμολογοῦντος ἀνέχονται, ἀλλὰ 
καὶ τὸν πατέρα δεικνύντα τὸν υἱὸν ἀποστρέφονται καὶ μαίνονται κατὰ τῶν λεγόντων γνήσιον εἶναι τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ θεοῦ 
ἐκδικοῦντες σπαδόντων αἵρεσιν, μηδὲν εἶναι γνήσιον καὶ ἀληθινὸν ἐκ τοῦ πατρός. 
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They are much worse than pagans, and are very far from being like them. For I myself have 
heard from my fathers, and I believe their account is reliable, that when persecution first arose 
under Maximian, the “grandfather” of Constantius, pagans would hide our Christian brothers 
when they were searched for. And often these pagans themselves lost their property and 
suffered in prison, only so that they might not become traitors to those who were fleeing 
persecution. For they were carefully watching over these fugitives as over themselves, and they 
were willing to run the risk in their place. But now these incredible people, the contrivers of the 
Arian heresy, known by nothing but their treachery, act in all things in the exact opposite 
manner (64.2-3).62   
 As with Lucifer and Hilary, this essential thesis—that heretics are worse than pagans, precisely 
because of their inhuman violence against their “kin,” fellow Christians—finds its most striking form in 
the portrayal of the Christian Emperor Constantius as the precursor of the Antichrist, a figure far more 
negative than any Roman persecutor. Though Athanasius has a far fuller rogues’ gallery of named 
episcopal opponents granted far greater agency than Lucifer, his portrayal of “Arianism” as a whole, like 
Lucifer’s, is ultimately crystallized into an almost total identification of the heresy with Constantius 
himself: “What was it proper for this heresy to do but what was contrary to the Savior, since it enrolled 
as the leader of its impiety Constantius, who is the Antichrist?” (67.3).63 This overtly eschatological 
association, identical to that made use of by Hilary in In Constantium, grants to Athanasius’ historical 
narrative of crimes and persecutions a rhetorical pitch far beyond the ordinary course of human events 
or human history. Constantius is far more than merely another persecuting Roman Emperor: “This is a 
new form of uncleanness. It is not simply persecution, but is more than persecution: it is the prelude and 
preparation of the Antichrist” (71.1).64 The Historia Arianorum presents itself as documentary, narrative 
 
62 Ἑλλήνων γὰρ πολὺ δεύτεροι, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ μακρὰν αὐτῶν τυγχάνουσιν. ἐγὼ γὰρ ἤκουσα τῶν πατέρων καὶ πιστὸν ἡγοῦμαι 
τὸν ἐκείνων λόγον ὅτι τὸ πρῶτον, ὅτε γέγονε καὶ ἐπὶ Μαξιμιανῷ τῷ πάππῳ Κωνσταντίου διωγμός, Ἕλληνες ἔκρυπτον τοὺς 
ἀδελφοὺς ἡμῶν τοὺς Χριστιανοὺς ζητουμένους. καὶ πολλάκις ἀπώλεσαν αὐτοὶ χρήματα δεσμωτηρίων τε ἐπειράθησαν, ἵνα 
μόνον τῶν φευγόντων μὴ γένωνται προδόται, ὡς γὰρ ἑαυτοὺς ἐφύλαττον τοὺς προσφεύγοντας καὶ κινδυνεύειν πρὸ αὐτῶν 
ἐβουλεύοντο. ἀλλὰ νῦν οἱ θαυμαστοὶ οὗτοι, οἱ τῆς νέας αἱρέσεως ἐφευρεταί, ἐκ μηδενὸς ἑτέρου ἢ ἐκ τοῦ ἐπιβουλεύειν 
ἐπιγινωσκόμενοι πάντα τἀναντία πράττουσιν. 
63 τί ποιεῖν αὐτὴν ἐχρῆν ἢ τἀναντία τοῦ σωτῆρος ὡς χριστομάχον ἡγεμόνα τῆς ἀσεβείας ἐπιγραφομένην Κωνστάντιον ὡς αὐτὸν 
τὸν ἀντίχριστον; 
64 καινόν ἐστι τοῦτο μύσος· οὐκ ἔστιν ἁπλῶς διωγμός, ἀλλὰ διωγμοῦ μὲν πλέον, προοίμιον δὲ καὶ παρασκευὴ τοῦ ἀντιχρίστου. 
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historiography, but the events it narrates, by its own admission, are more than historical. They 
represent, at least in incipient or archetypal form, a final battle between good and evil in a conflict 
between Constantius and the bishops, the Empire and the Church. 
 From this eschatological point of view, what emerges most strikingly from Athanasius’ portrayal 
of Constantius is how much his status as Antichrist is grounded directly in his interference in the order of 
the Church, his claiming of authority as a Christian Emperor to judge cases and participate in decisions of 
doctrine: “What, then, has this man left for the Antichrist to do? Or what more, when he comes, will the 
Antichrist do than this man? Or how will the Antichrist, when he comes, not find the way prepared for 
him by this man for an easy deception? For he summons all cases to the palace, to himself, rather than 
to the Churches; and he himself presides over them” (76.1-2).65 This Imperial commonplace— the 
Emperor presiding over judgment in his palace—is transformed by Athanasius into an image of violation 
and defilement that is apocalyptic in its scope: “What person who saw him presiding over his so-called 
‘bishops’ and sitting as judge over ecclesiastical cases would not immediately say that this is that 
‘abomination of desolation’ [Daniel 9:27] spoken of by Daniel? For putting on the disguise of 
Christianity, and coming to the holy places, and standing in them he lays waste the Churches, dissolving 
their canons and violating them to possess what is theirs” (77.1).66 This apocalyptic image from the Book 
of Daniel, of the violation of a holy place by ritual uncleanness,67 is here given a specifically political or 
 
65 Τί οὖν οὗτος τοῦ ἀντιχρίστου παραλέλοιπεν; ἢ τί πλέον ἐκεῖνος ἐλθὼν τούτου ποιήσειεν; ἢ πῶς ἐκεῖνος ἐλθὼν οὐχ εὑρήσει 
πρὸς ἀπάτην εὔκολον προετοιμασθεῖσαν αὐτῷ παρὰ τούτου τὴν ὁδόν; καὶ γὰρ πάλιν ἀντὶ τῶν ἐκκλησιῶν εἰς τὰ παλάτια πρὸς 
ἑαυτὸν τὰς κρίσεις προκαλεῖται. καὶ τούτων μὲν αὐτὸς ἐξάρχει. 
66 τίς γὰρ βλέπων αὐτὸν ἐξάρχοντα τῶν νομιζομένων ἐπισκόπων καὶ προκαθήμενον τῶν ἐκκλησιαστικῶν κρίσεων οὐκ 
ἀκολούθως ἂν εἴποι τοῦτ’ εἶναι τὸ διὰ τοῦ Δανιὴλ εἰρημένον «βδέλυγμα τῆς ἐρημώσεως»; τὸν γὰρ Χριστιανισμὸν 
περιβεβλημένος καὶ εἰς τοὺς ἁγίους τόπους εἰσερχόμενος ἑστηκώς τε ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐρημοῖ τὰς ἐκκλησίας, παραλύων τοὺς τούτων 
κανόνας καὶ τὰ ἴδια κρατεῖν βιαζόμενος. 
67 Applied most notably in the Jewish tradition to the defilement of the Jerusalem Temple by Antiochus Ephiphanes with images 
of Hellenistic gods in the 3rd century BC, and in the New Testament to the destruction of the Jerusalem Temple by the Romans 
in AD 70.  
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even juridical form. The uncleanness introduced into the Church of God is simply Constantius himself, 
the Roman Emperor, and the ritual violation is his use of the ordinary power of his office to override the 
divinely-instituted order of the Church, with its own leaders, the bishops, and its own divine laws, the 
“canons.” The Church, with its own authorities and laws and networks, had existed for centuries in a 
state of relative independence from the Empire and Imperial law and authority. The collaborative 
integration of these two systems, which for many bishops in the reigns of Constantine and Constantius 
could be seen as a positive development or even an eschatological fulfillment, is in Historia Arianorum a 
violation and nothing more. The starkness of Athanasius’ attack on Constantius, then, is ultimately made 
possible not just by existing Roman rhetorical tropes for portraying illegal or tyrannical actions, but even 
more so by Athanasius’ stringent Nicene assertion of the totally independent, divinely-granted sanctity 
and authority of the Church, its office-holders, and its property. In perhaps the most often-quoted 
passage from Historia Arianorum, Constantius is presented as responding to a challenge from Lucifer 
and his allies at the Council of Milan with the declaration: “’Let whatever I will be judged a canon. For 
those called ‘bishops’ in Syria tolerate me speaking like this. So either obey me, or you yourselves will be 
made exiles’” (33.7).68 Removed from its clearly polemical context and wording and recast in a more 
sympathetic light,69 this could be no more than a straightforward assertion of the unity of Roman 
Imperial law, in both its divine and human aspects, around the ultimate authority of the Emperor. Yet it 
is precisely this incipient unity between Church and Empire, Christian canon and Roman law, that in 
Athanasius’ retelling sets this persecution and this persecutor apart from all others, and makes the 
 
68 ‘ἀλλ’ ὅπερ ἐγὼ βούλομαι, τοῦτο κανών’, ἔλεγε· νομιζέσθω· οὕτω γάρ μου λέγοντος ἀνέχονται οἱ τῆς Συρίας λεγόμενοι 
ἐπίσκοποι. ἢ τοίνυν πείσθητε ἢ καὶ ὑμεῖς ὑπερόριοι γενήσεσθε’. 
69 That these words, and others put in the mouth of Constantius by Athanasius in Historia Arianorum, are not a direct quote, let 
alone an accurate description of how bishop and Emperors typically related in this period, has not always been recognized with 
sufficient clarity by scholars interested in “Church and State” in this period and beyond (cf. e.g. Mommsen 1910, Setton 1941, 
86-87, Greenslade 1954, 25, Schneemelcher 1970, Laconi 2004, 74). 
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events he narrates, not merely a record of political or religious wrongs, but signs of the coming of 
Antichrist.  
This legal-juridical picture of the violation of sacred things ultimately gives way to more literal 
forms of violence. In the latter part of his narrative, Athanasius turns from accounts of the depositions 
of bishops to a lengthy, graphic recounting of acts allegedly committed against Athanasius’ lay and 
clerical followers in Egypt and Alexandria. Even here, however, the depredations of Constantius’ soldiers 
and heretical allies are presented, not merely as tyrannical violence or persecution, but as rebellious, 
usurping acts against divine authority. In one of the most striking stories in his entire corpus, Athanasius 
turns immediately from Imperial violence against human bodies to a narrative of sacrilege and divine 
violence that in his hands bears a clear, striking meaning:  
But the Divine Justice reproved their wickedness, and worked a great and outstanding sign to 
show clearly to all also through this that, just as by their heresy they had committed outrages 
against none other but the Lord, so by doing these things they were again laying hands to 
commit ὕβρις against what is his. Some very young man from among these brutal people ran 
into the Church and dared to sit in the episcopal throne. And after sitting down, the wretched 
man raspingly sang a pornographic song. Then standing up, he used violence against the throne, 
to draw it away and drag it after him, not realizing that he was drawing down judgment upon 
himself. For as once the inhabitants of Ashdod, having dared to touch the Ark, which it was not 
lawful for them to so much as look upon, were immediately destroyed by it, suffering torments 
in their rear ends [1 Samuel 5],70 in the same way also this wretched man had only presumed to 
drag away the throne and drew what he was dragging down upon himself, and, as though the 
divine justice itself was directing it, the wood of the chair struck his belly, and, instead of the 
episcopal throne, he dragged out his own entrails, and the throne, rather than being drawn 
away by him, drew away this man’s life. Then his intestines poured out, as is written concerning 
Judas [Acts 1:18], and he fell down, was carried off, and died after a day (57.1-4).71 
 
70 In this story from the Old Testament, the Philistines, having captured the ark of the Covenant and brought it into one of their 
temples at Ashdod, suffer a plague that was interpreted in antiquity as hemorrhoids—clearly Athanasius’ belief here, where it is 
rhetorically and digestively connected to the death of Judas and (implicitly) to that of Arius himself (cf. Epistula 54), which 
occurred allegedly while he was suffering from digestive problems on the toilet. 
71 θεία δὲ δίκη τὴν πονηρίαν τούτων ἤλεγξε καὶ σημεῖόν τι μέγα καὶ ἐξαίρετον εἰργάσατο δεικνύουσα καὶ διὰ τούτου πᾶσι 
φανερῶς, ὅτι ὥσπερ ἀσεβοῦντες οὐκ εἰς ἄλλον ἀλλ’ εἰς τὸν κύριον τολμῶσιν, οὕτω ταῦτα ποιοῦντες εἰς αὐτοῦ πάλιν ὕβριν 
ἐπεχείρησαν πρᾶξαι· [...] τῶν ἀσελγῶν γάρ τις νεώτερος εἰσδραμὼν καὶ τολμήσας ἐπεκάθισε τῷ θρόνῳ. καὶ καθίσας διὰ τῶν 
ῥινῶν τι πορνικὸν ἀπήχησεν ὁ ἄθλιος. εἶτα ἀναστὰς ἐβιάζετο τὸν θρόνον ἀποσπᾶν καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἕλκειν, ἠγνόει δὲ καθ’ 
ἑαυτοῦ τὴν δίκην ἐπισπώμενος. ὡς γὰρ οἱ τότε τὴν Ἄζωτον κατοικοῦντες τολμήσαντες ἅψασθαι τῆς κιβωτοῦ, ᾗ κἂν 
προσβλέψαι θέμις οὐκ ἦν αὐτοῖς, παρ’ αὐτῆς εὐθὺς ἀπώλλυντο πρότερον διαφθειρόμενοι ταῖς βασάνοις τὰς ἕδρας, οὕτως καὶ 
οὗτος ὁ ἄθλιος μόνον ἐτόλμησεν ἕλκειν καί, ὅπερ εἷλκεν εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἐπεσπάσατο, καὶ ὡς ἀντιπεμπούσης τῆς δίκης τὸ ξύλον ἐν 
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Here, ancient Greek and Roman beliefs on the consequences of human ὕβρις against divinity 
and ancient Jewish beliefs on the punishment of sacrilege are given a strikingly new ecclesiastical and 
political form. The locus of sacred power here is not an altar or the Ark of the Covenant, means of 
sacred worship, but the episcopal throne, a judicial and political seat of office. The violation of this seat 
by one who has no right to possess it, sit in it, or touch it is punished as graphically as any ritual violation 
in the Roman or Jewish traditions, with a gruesome form of death reserved for malefactors against the 
divine like Judas or (in Athanasius’ earlier retelling72) Arius. Judas had betrayed Christ in the flesh and 
Arius had denied Christ’s divinity, while this youth had merely touched the symbol of Athanasius’ 
episcopal authority—their crimes, however, are treated identically by Athanasius and, implicitly, by God. 
It is very likely, in fact, that, in Athanasius’ telling, this “youth” is intended as a straightforward analogy 
for Constantius himself,73 with his actions symbolic of the Emperor’s purported crimes of usurping 
episcopal authority (sitting in the throne), preaching “Arian” doctrines (singing a “pornographic song”), 
and trying to draw bishops after himself (attempting to drag the throne away). If this is so, then the 
story predicts an imminent fate for the ruler of the Roman world: stabbed in the gut by the bishops 
whose support he had sought.  
The implications of this story within the larger narrative of Historia Arianorum could not be 
clearer. For anyone, even the Emperor, to challenge or usurp the sole authority of the bishops over the 
Church, doctrine, and ecclesiastical judgment is to commit both ὕβρις and sacrilege, and to invite 
terrible, divine punishment. As Lucifer had argued stridently throughout his corpus, upholding Christ’s 
 
αὐτῷ τὴν ἰδίαν κοιλίαν ἔπληξε, καὶ ἀντὶ τοῦ θρόνου τῇ πληγῇ τὰ ἴδια ἐξήνεγκεν ἔντερα, καὶ μᾶλλον ὁ θρόνος ἐκείνου τὸ ζῆν 
ἀπέσπασεν ἢ αὐτὸς ἀπεσπάσθη παρ’ ἐκείνου. ἐξεχύθη γοῦν, ὡς γέγραπται κατὰ τὸν Ἰούδαν, τοῖς σπλάγχνοις καὶ καταπεσὼν 
ἐβαστάχθη καὶ μετὰ μίαν ἡμέραν ἀπώλετο. 
72 Cf. Athanasius, Epistula 54. 
73 It is also possible that the nearer target is George, the bishop sent by Constantius to replace Athanasius—in Historia 
Arianorum, however, Constantius is pervasively held responsible for the actions of his episcopal ally. 
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divinity and divine authority also requires upholding the sacrosanctity of episcopal authority—an 
authority which, very much unlike the fragile temporality of Imperial power, comes not through any 
mediate hierarchy of substances but from the immediate presence of the divine οὐσία in the human 
world. Athanasius had once been accused before Constantine of threatening to use his authority as 
bishop of Alexandria to delay the grain barges on which Constantinople depended, a clear act of 
rebellion against Imperial power;74 later, he had been accused by Constantius of conspiring to set 
Emperor against Emperor and usurper against legitimate ruler, both acts of treason against the Empire. 
In Historia Arianorum, Athanasius is no longer attempting to deny charges of rebellion and treason: he 
is, rather, doing his best to earn them. On the most straightforward reading, Historia Arianorum is a call 
for disobedience and resistance at the least, rebellion at the most. That it is a call for rebellion 
buttressed by appeals to divine authority and divine law as embodied in the canons and traditions of an 
Empire-spanning institutional Church ruled by bishops does not reduce this reality, but sharpens it. 
 By the time Constantius himself died in November 361, Athanasius and his allies in both East 
and West were poised to act on the program developed during the years since Milan. Almost as soon as 
the news of the Emperor’s death reached him, Athanasius left his self-imposed exile and returned to 
Alexandria, where his rival bishop George had already been lynched by a mob spurred by both religious 
and political motivations,75 to resume his position without challenge.76 He was quickly joined by 
Eusebius of Vercelli, one of the most prominent of the exiled Latin bishops and a close ally of both Hilary 
 
74 cf. Socrates Scholasticus, Ecclesiastical History 1.35. 
75 While Julian implied in his letter to Alexandria shortly thereafter (Epistula 60, preserved in Socrates Scholasticus 3.3) that 
local pagans acting in response to George’s religious and civil crimes had been responsible, Barnes 1993, 155, plausibly argues 
that Julian’s assertion of the unimpeachably pagan character of the populace in this letter was at best wishful thinking, at worst 
active distortion. As Barnes argues, it is overwhelmingly likely that partisans of Athanasius played at least some role in George’s 
demise, as they had in the previous mob efforts that had forced him to spend most of his career as bishop of Alexandria outside 
the city. 
76 See Historia Acephela 3.3. 
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of Poitiers and Lucifer of Cagliari (who also sent his own delegate), as well as by other bishops from both 
East and West. Their target now was not their fellow bishops, not even those who had submitted to the 
homoian formulas at Ariminum and Seleucia: it was, rather, the Constantian project as a whole.77 
Presiding on their own authority over an entirely episcopal council—organized not with Imperial 
resources, but through the newly connected and empowered networks of bishops encompassing not 
only the exiled bishops, but also members of the former homoiousian party, formerly uninvolved 
bishops radicalized by the events of Ariminum and Seleucia,78 and the significant episcopal networks 
influenced by the bishop of Rome Liberius79—Athanasius and company did not, as might have been 
expected from his earlier writings, take revenge on the vast numbers of purportedly “Arian” bishops 
who had joined in his condemnation at the various Eastern councils of the 340s and 350s. In keeping 
with the policy of Julius at Serdica, the council censured only a very few bishops, the new, smaller core 
of “Arians” picked out in both Historia Arianorum and De synodis, allies of Constantius equally hated by 
the Eastern homoiousians whose doctrinal viewpoints they had recently overruled and proscribed. The 
vast numbers of bishops who had submitted to Constantius and the homoian formula were enjoined to 
do penance, but allowed to retain their offices with no censure at all. At the same time, the council 
produced a statement of faith that, in addition to upholding the Creed of Nicaea, also modified it with 
language designed to assuage the concerns of those Eastern bishops like Basil of Ancyra who had joined 
in Eusebian networks and conciliar projects over the previous decades. The use of the term οὐσία was 
 
77 For various sources on the council, see Socrates Scholasticus 3.7-8, Rufinus 10:29-30, Sozomen 5.12. 
78 According to Athanasius, Epistula ad Rufinum, councils promulgating an almost identical policy were held around the same 
time in Greece, Spain, and Gaul.  
79 A letter is extant by Liberius of Rome from 362 or 363 (preserved in Hilary, Adversus Valentem et Ursacium Series B 4.1-2), 
promulgating for Latin bishops who had subscribed to the decrees of Ariminium an essentially identical policy to that adopted 
at Alexandria. Liberius had long been a close ally of Athanasius and the Latin Nicenes, and had likely conferred with Hilary on his 




upheld, but also censured for the possibility of confusion it introduced about the proper distinction 
between the divine persons—and the use of the term ὑπόστασις for the individual divine persons, long 
a hallmark of Origenian theology and employed not only by Athanasius’ predecessors Origen and 
Alexander, but also and more prominently by Arius, Eusebius of Caesarea, and the homoiousians, was 
formally sanctioned as a legitimate means of making clear that the three persons were not merely 
modes or parts of one divine, quasi-physical substance, but truly distinct subsistences of a single divine 
nature.80 Lucifer of Cagliari was allegedly scandalized by at least some of these results; and it would be 
some time before this compromise found its full effect in the Latin section of the Empire. Still, this was 
not a mere “triumph of Nicene Orthodoxy,” but a substantial compromise between former enemies who 
now, as the result of both the doctrinal, rhetorical, and political work of the exiled bishops and of shared 
opposition to Constantius’ homoian formula, now found themselves unlikely allies. This remarkable 
spectacle, of bishops who had been deposed by councils and exiled by the Emperor now presiding as 
revered authorities over a diverse council of former episcopal rivals, brought together without Imperial 
participation on the strength of doctrinal arguments and shared opposition to an Imperial formula, and 
presuming, in coordination with the bishop of Rome in the West, to legislate for the whole Church, 
represented a moment without parallel in the past history of Christianity—one very much in conflict 
with the norms of the Constantinian and Constantian ecclesiastical orders. Something new had begun. 
 
80 This compromise, it should be noted, represented a significant concession to Eastern sentiment, even while in practice it 
served to cement the theology of equality demanded by Latin Nicenes. While Hilary and Lucifer both naturally saw the Greek 
οὐσία as equivalent to the Latin substantia, persona, a term employed in Latin theology for Father, Son, and Spirit since at least 
the early 3rd century, had no common equivalent in Greek theology. Though Arius himself had spoken of three ὑποστάσεις 
(Letter to Alexander 6.13.7), though both Marcellus of Ancyra and the Western Council of Serdica had asserted only one divine 
ὑποστάσις, and though the term had been frequently used, even in the 350s, as a synonym of οὐσία, it was both the 
longstanding Origenism of Athanasius of Alexandria and the recent defense of this terminology by the homoiousians (cf. in 
particular George of Laodicaea in Panarion 73.16) that, given the perceived urgency of the alliance between Nicenes and 
homoiousians, necessitated a clear endorsement of such language by the leaders of the Nicene party. Perhaps the earliest 
indicator of this shift is Hilary’s sympathetic interpretation in De Synodis 32 of Eastern talk of three ὑποστάσεις (translated by 




That this wide-ranging, entirely episcopal, compromise between former enemies would have 
been unthinkable without Constantius and his efforts at Imperial-sponsored unity and conformity was 
almost certainly not acknowledged by the assembled bishops. Constantius was a dead heretic. The 
episcopal alliance that would dominate the rest of the 4th century was, in a very real sense, consecrated 
over his bones. 
7.4:  
Summary and Conclusion 
In the latter part of his exile, Athanasius came to espouse viewpoints on the unity of the 
episcopate and the Imperial relationship with the Church that brought him far closer to Lucifer and 
Hilary.  
Athanasius’ De Synodis, written during the proceedings of the Councils of Seleucia and 
Ariminum in 359, represents a detailed historical and theological narrative only possible from someone 
like Athanasius, a theologically literate bishop with both personal memories and detailed documentary 
evidence extending back through forty years of theological debate. These efforts are now applied, 
however, in the service of furthering and shaping an alliance with the homoiousians and their leader 
Basil of Ancyra, who had for decades been among those heretical “Arian” opponents attacked in 
Athanasius’ polemical works. Basil and his followers are now, however, seen as fundamentally orthodox, 
and their ongoing resistance to the homoian belief is praised in the strongest of terms. In appealing to 
his fellow bishops for unity, Athanasius takes the opportunity to provide a genealogical narrative of the 
councils of the previous decades in which all are represented as deceptive attempts on the part of the 
patricidal, inconsistent “Arian” faction to undermine the faith of Nicaea. Like Hilary, Athanasius argues 
for an episcopal unity founded on possession of a single divine faith and office passed down faithfully 
from predecessor to successor, and like him uses this principle to argue for the necessity of accepting 
the decrees of Nicaea as the key point connecting present-day bishops with the true, faithful episcopal 
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and doctrinal lineage of the Catholic Church. The singular divine οὐσία, not part of an overall cosmic 
system but rather totally separate from and unlike any created thing, is shared in totally by both Father 
and Son, and this divine essence has been brought into direct contact with humanity through the 
Incarnation, giving to the united body of bishops the authority to faithfully administer and communicate 
this participation in divinity to the rest of humanity. Nicaea itself had faithfully received and passed on 
this divine faith, while the “Arians,” born of an illegitimate, patricidal lineage, had constantly 
contradicted both themselves and their own episcopal forebears. By disregarding the corrupt councils of 
the previous decades and acknowledging the authority of Nicaea, as interpreted by Athanasius and his 
allies, the homoiousians could further the unity of episcopate, Church, and cosmos alike. 
Like Hilary, Athanasius seems to have responded to the failure of the bishops of Ariminum and 
Seleucia to hold the line by turning to directly Luciferean anti-Imperial invective. In the fragmentary 
Historia Arianorum, Athanasius again offers a reinterpreted history of the previous decades, in which 
wicked “Arians” seek to overturn the true faith and the unity of the Church. Here, however, the 
emphasis is overwhelmingly on the intrinsic connection between Nicene belief and the inviolability of 
episcopal authority on the one hand, and “Arian” heresy and the illegitimate intrusion of Imperial power 
into the Church on the other. The “Arians,” Athanasius now insists, have always been friends of the 
Emperor, and have always used his profane power to coercively overthrow the Church’s divine faith, 
divine authorities, and divine laws. The mingling of Christian Church and Roman Empire under the 
Constantinian settlement is inherently adulterous, while the mere participation of the Emperor in 
episcopal councils and cases is an act of violent eschatological profanation, the “abomination of 
desolation.” Constantius, then, can be nothing other than the direct precursor of Antichrist, preparing 
the way for the end of the world by assaulting Christ’s divinity and its manifestation in the world in the 
Church’s divine authorities and institutions. This assault is portrayed narratively through accounts of the 
persecution and exile of bishops, all of whom are unanimous in both their Nicene beliefs and their belief 
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in Athanasius’ innocence, as well as in accounts of the lurid violence committed by Constantius against 
the innocent believers of Alexandria and Egypt. The conclusion could hardly be clearer, or more in 
keeping both with Lucifer’s and Hilary’s final positions on the relationship between Church and Emperor: 
the Christian Emperor Constantius is a tyrant far worse than any pagan persecutor, an eschatological 
Antichhrist who must be resisted by every possible means by the united body of Christian believers, 
joined together in their confession of Christ’s divinity and their respect for the sacred episcopal 
authority which he himself instituted and defends on earth. 
Following the unexpected death of Constantius in November of 361, Athanasius and the Latin 
Nicene exiles, in coordination with the bishop of Rome in the West, summoned on their own authority 
the Council of Alexandria, where they sought to cement a new, theological and political alliance 
between all bishops united by opposition to Constantius and the homoian formula—an alliance that 







Κοινώνει τῆς στάσεως 
Jovian, the Valentiniani, and the Theodosian Settlement 
 
 Our study thus far has concluded with the death of Constantius II on 3 November 361 and the 
extinction of the Constantinian dynasty three years later with the death of his cousin Julian on June 26, 
363.1 It is difficult to conceive of events more favorable to the growth and development of the “Nicene” 
theological, ecclesiastical, and political consensus sketched in the preceding chapters. Julian’s revolt 
provided a key break in Constantius’ power at precisely the moment when that power was, so to speak, 
stretched to its fullest extent in the attempt to impose a settlement on the episcopate against near-
universal opposition. In the short term, Latin Nicenes once again possessed a safe haven in the West 
from which to launch attacks against Constantius and his allies, as well as a nominal Imperial sponsor for 
their overtly anti-Constantian ecclesiastical policy. As I have suggested, it is highly probable that the 
sequence of anti-homoian councils in the West in 360/361 owed their existence to at least the passive 
tolerance, if not the active patronage, of a Julian who, like Constans before him, was naturally interested 
in undermining his relative’s legitimacy in preparation for civil war.2 When Constantius himself died 
suddenly and unexpectedly at the outset of that civil war, many of his episcopal opponents likely 
anticipated the imminent victory of their cause in that of their apparent ally Julian. 
 
1 See e.g. Socrates Scholasticus 3.21.17, cf. Lenski 2002, 14. 
2 Cf. Barnes 1993, 152-154. 
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When Julian instead declared himself a pagan ruling at the command of the ancient gods and 
began to implement various legal measures aimed at curtailing the power and influence of Christians, 
this certainly posed numerous practical challenges for the bishops of the Empire, but once again was 
probably beneficial for the emerging Nicene faction as a whole. As I have argued, the coherence and 
unity of that faction across theological, political, cultural, and linguistic borders, and therefore its claim 
to represent the totality of the “Catholic Church” on earth, had come to depend to a great extent on the 
use of the Emperor as a unifying adversary for the episcopate as a whole. Perhaps the only more 
unifying antagonist than a Christian Emperor attempting to impose an unpopular creed on all bishops 
everywhere was a pagan Emperor attempting, in however feeble a fashion,3 to once again persecute 
Christians in the name of the ancient gods of the Roman state. The novel rhetorical figure of the 
Imperial Antichrist, only recently created based on heresiological models and applied to Constantius, 
could be easily (albeit less explicitly) extended to the new Constantinian ruler, who, as hostile bishops 
would strive to make clear over the three years of his reign and beyond, was not merely a pagan like 
Nero or Diocletian, but an apostate Christian. Anti-heresiological models could thus be combined with 
former anti-pagan ones to craft the figure of an Emperor destined, like Constantius, to unify the Church 
precisely by representing in every sphere the anti-Christian and anti-ecclesial “other.” 4 As if Julian’s 
status as a pagan, apostate Christian, nephew of Constantine, and cousin of Constantius were not 
enough, he also helpfully took the trouble to try (and fail) to arrest Athanasius of Alexandria once again.5 
 
3 For Julian’s measures against Christians, which consisted of the cancelling of all Constantinian legal and institutional favors, 
various legal efforts to disrupt Christian networks and disfavor Christians in education and Imperial administration, and 
concomitant efforts to favor and promote paganism, see e.g. Barnes 1993, 154-155. 
4 Hence, of course, his being known to history, even down to the present day, by the sobriquet “Julian the Apostate.” For the 
Christian response to Julian, see in particular the sections of the 5th century ecclesiastical historians covering his reign (Rufinus 
10.27-40, Socrates Scholasticus 3.1-21, Sozomen 5.1-6.2, Theodoret 3), as well as Gregory Nazianzus, Contra Julianum 
Imperatorem. 
5 Cf. Barnes 1993, 158-159. Julian’s letter to the prefect Ecdicius complaining of the Alexandrian and Egyptian administration’s 
lack of cooperation in apprehending their bishop contains a somewhat hysterical subscription in the Emperor’s own hand 
declaring that “Being disregarded greatly angers me! [...] By all the gods, there is nothing I would rather see or hear with more 
pleasure as accomplished by you than that Athanasius has been driven out of Egypt!” (Epistulae 112). Athanasius, meanwhile, 
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The conflict in Lucifer and Hilary between Catholic Nicene and heretical Imperial, recast in a somewhat 
less eschatological light, could be extended to more and more bishops throughout the Empire, and the 
remaining homoians castigated and hounded out of existence, both with the help of the ostensibly 
pagan Emperor.6 
This state of affairs was not, however, to last long. Upon Julian’s death after barely two years in 
office, Jovian, a primicerius from the Imperial guard and a native of the same Illyrian region that had 
once given rise to the dynasty of Constantine, rapidly ascended the throne thanks to the support of the 
army,7 which was once again revealed as the core of the Imperial system, underlying particular dynasties 
and constructions of legitimacy alike. Very much in contrast to the Emperors before and after him, 
Jovian is remembered by the ecclesiastical historians of the 5th century as a staunchly “Nicene” ruler.8 
Yet, as scholars have argued, little evidence survives, even in ecclesiastical authors, of any real 
theological passion, interest, or belief in Jovian himself.9 What is certain is that Jovian, in assuming the 
purple, appealed not only to his support by the Imperial army but also to his status as a Christian,10 after 
 
famously dismissed Julian’s ineffectual efforts as ”a little cloud which will pass” (νεφύδριον γάρ ἐστι καὶ παρέρχεται, Socrates 
Scholasticus 3.14.1, Sozomen 5.15.3, Rufinus 10.35). 
6 Cf. Barnes 1993, 158: “Julian realised too late that his subversion of homoean predominance in the East was not weakening 
the Christian church as he hoped, but strengthening those parts of it which had shown themselves most capable of resisting 
imperial power.” 
7 See e.g. Lenski 2002, 14-17, Omissi 2018, 224-228. As Lenski notes, Jovian’s status as a protector domesticus, his origins in 
Illyricum, and his appointment at the instigation of the army all represented throwbacks to the Imperial politics of the 3rd 
century: Diocletian, Constantius I, and Maximinus Dia had all been protectores, and all of the original four Tetrarchs had been of 
Illyrian origins.  
8 See Rufinus 11.1, Socrates Scholasticus 2.22, 24-26, Sozomen 6.3-6, Theodoret 4.1-5. Philostorgius, however, (8.1-8) seems to 
have regarded Jovian’s theological beliefs as in flux at the time of his death, asserting that in response to petitions by the allies 
of Aetius against Athanasius, the Emperor did not dismiss them, but rather reserved them for a future tribunal where (we are 
invited to imagine) they may well have been vindicated after all. 
9 See e.g. Lenski 2002, 236-238. 
10 See e.g. the incident preserved in Socrates Scholasticus 3.22.4-5, Sozomen 6.3.1, Theodoret 4.1.4-6, and Rufinus 11.1 by 
which Jovian initially rejected the army’s acclamation of him as Augustus because of his disdain for the “apostasy” of the 
Imperial military under Julian before being reassured by acclamations that the soldiers too were faithful Christians. While this 
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which he received Athanasius when he came as a petitioner to the Imperial court, recognizing him as the 
legitimate bishop of Alexandria while somewhat theatrically rebuffing the petitioners against him. This 
was a wise move for an unstable regime only recently come to power, which would certainly not benefit 
from a reopening of direct conflict between the Imperial military and the inhabitants of the most 
populous and important Eastern province.11 That these few actions were enough to grant him a 
hallowed status as a champion of orthodoxy is a strong indication of the political development of Nicene 
belief over the previous decades: in the post-Constantian world of Imperial-ecclesiastical politics, an 
indifferent Christian Emperor generally willing to leave the bishops alone was in most ways that 
mattered a Nicene. In the most immediate sense, at least, his public support of Christianity and lack of 
theological interests gave the bishop of Rome in the West and Athanasius and his allies in the East all 
the cover they needed to continue their own campaigns.12 Given the overtly anti-Imperial shape Nicene 
ideology had come to assume in conflict with Constantius and Julian, this was perhaps the most to be 
asked of any Emperor.  
 
was almost certainly a staged incident, it highlights the importance of Jovian’s Christianity to his public presentation and 
relationship with the soldiery at large. 
11 Cf. Barnes 1993, 159-160, Lenski 2002, 237-238: “Of course, Jovian was well aware that Athanasius’ support in Alexandria 
was by this time overwhelming [...] The emperor would surely have been undermining his self-proclaimed pursuit of concord 
had he not approved Athanasius’ control of the Egyptian metropolis. This, rather than his love of Nicene orthodoxy, explains 
why he did so” (238). Underscoring the basic pragmatism of his approach, Jovian at the same time declined to receive the 
petitions proffered by Athanasius’ new allies, former homoiousians whose requests for aid against their adversaries would 
almost certainly cause more trouble than they were worth. 
12 The most notable event brought about by Jovian’s alleged “Nicene” leanings was the conversion of Meletius, the bishop 
appointed by Constantius to take the place of Eudoxius in Antioch during the initial triumph of homoianism but deposed the 
next year in favor of Euzoius, to a publicly pro-Nicene stance (Cf. Zachhuber 2000). During Jovian’s visit to the city, Meletius 
held a council where he and twenty-six other bishops (including most notably Acacius of Caesarea, once again adopting his 
predecessor Eusebius’ expedient of bowing to the language of Nicaea when circumstances demanded) publicly subscribed to 
the Creed of Nicaea while praising harmony and concord among bishops everywhere (see Socrates Scholasticus 3.25.6-21, 
Sozomen 6.4.5-10, Rufinus 10.31). I would suggest that this synod and its timing was less a nod to any belief among Meletius 
and his allies that Jovian was on the verge of persecuting homoians as testament to the success of the strategy developed by 
Nicenes to portray a (theologically broad) adherence to the Creed of Nicaea as the only position capable of bringing together 
bishops throughout the Empire—and therefore the proper belief to profess under an Emperor apparently uninterested in 
taking a leading part in theological debates among bishops. In such a context, and dogged by the challenge of his 




With Jovian’s death after barely eight months of rule, the way was paved for the ascent of a new 
dynasty, one that would do its best to connect its regime to the most recent and successful model of a 
legitimized usurper: Constantine. Nevertheless, after his appointment by a consistorium of court and 
military officials,13 the new Augustus Valentinian rapidly proceeded to do the one thing most anathema 
to the final Imperial theology of Constantine and Constantius: appoint a co-Augustus, his brother Valens, 
and set him to rule the Eastern Empire in his absence. According to surviving sources, this expedient was 
suggested by Valentinian’s soldiers,14 and, I would suggest, in itself represented an eminently logical 
deduction from the turbulence of the previous decades. During the long reign of Constantius, it had 
been again and again demonstrated that, however ideologically potent or desirable the rule of a single 
man might be, the size of the Empire and the threats on its various borders all but required more than 
one bearer of Imperial authority. Also during the reign of Constantius, the only multi-Emperor 
arrangement not to result in civil war had been that in which Constantius and Constans had divided the 
Empire East-to-West as two equal Augusti bound by fraternal ties of blood. While this arrangement had 
(as discussed in Chapter Three) led to ecclesiastical conflict and various more-or-less-disguised forms of 
competition, it had not expended the Empire’s soldiery as had the East-West war with Magnentius or 
the other usurpations of Constantius’ reign. Given the high cost of the war with Magnentius in 
particular, it is eminently reasonable that the soldiers of the Empire would make it among their first 
priorities to prevent any such event from occurring ever again.  
Whatever its exact origins, this arrangement did not prevent either Valentinian’s continuing 
dominance or overtly political-theological interpretations of the new dynasty, whose concordia was 
 
13 Lenski 2002, 20-23, Omissi 2018, 228. As Omissi notes, this unusually orderly succession of power “may be explained by the 
fact that the majority of the Empire’s military forces were, at this point, relatively concentrated” in the aftermath of Julian’s 
Persian campaigns.  
14 Ammianus 26.3-4.  
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grounded in the eyes of contemporaries not only on the (Athanasius-approved) natural unity among 
brothers15 but also on the (eminently Eusebian) resemblance between the new, Valentinian-dominated 
Imperial college and the Trinity in heaven.16  
The religious policies of the Valentinianic Emperors, too, can be most naturally understood as a 
response to the successes and failures of the long reign of Constantius. Both Valentinian and Valens 
were Christians hailing from the Pannonian region long dominated by the Imperial theologians Valens, 
Ursacius, and Germinius, and there is significant evidence that the Christianity they would have been 
most familiar with both in Pannonia and in the army under Constantius, was, even on the popular level, 
a stridently anti-Nicene one.17 Nevertheless, in his decade as ruler of the Western Empire, the senior 
Augustus Valentinian seems to have been viewed, and indeed largely presented himself, as a “Nicene” 
according to the radically reduced rubric of Imperial-episcopal relations innovated under Jovian. As with 
Jovian, however, this Nicene Imperial theology seems to have been the result more of a pragmatic 
decision to avoid participation in ecclesiastical affairs than of personal agreement with the beliefs of his 
Western subjects.18 In an anecdote gleefully recorded in later Nicene sources, a Valentinian approached 
by a group of Thracian bishops with a request to hold a council, as part of the general move of former 
 
15 See esp. Themistius Orationes 6.28-30, cf. Lenski 2002, 28-32. 
16 See esp. Ausonius, Versus paschales 4.2.24-28, where this analogy is directly made. While this Trinitarian schema was 
possible only after the appointment of Valentinian’s eight-year-old (and hence powerless) son Gratian to the rank of Augustus 
in 367, Themistius Orationes 6.76b had already emphasized publicly that Valentinian was not only Valens’ brother ἐκ τῆς 
φύσεως, but also his father inasmuch as he had made him Emperor. As Lenski 2002, 30-35, notes, such rhetoric inevitably 
emphasized Valentinian’s dominance and the subordination of his junior Emperors, and just as inevitably led to “a remarkably 
Arian-sounding scheme” of the Trinity (32). None of this should be surprising to readers of the present study.  
17 See Lenski 2002, 240-242, cf. in particular Altercatio Heracliani, a vivid contemporary account of an altercation between 
Germinius of Sirmium and three Nicene laymen, as well as Sulpicius Severus Vita Martini 6.4. 
18 Cf. Lenski 2002, 238-242, McLynn 1994, 80-84: “No regime in the Christian empire was less priest-ridden than that of 
Valentinian I” (80). As McLynn notes, Valentinian’s attempt to avoid entanglement with ecclesiastical issues extended as far as 
publicly fining a Gallic bishop who had shown the temerity to appeal to his judgment (Codex Theodosianus 11.36.20). 
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homoiousians towards the Nicene consensus,19 were met with the carefully-worded statement “It is not 
lawful (θέμις) for me, a man ranked (τάσσειν) with the laity, to concern myself about such things. But let 
the priests, whose business this is, assemble wherever they want” (6.7.2).20 Here, expressed in 
characteristically Constantinian vocabulary, we have a sentiment about the relations and relative 
rankings of bishops and Emperors that would have satisfied even Lucifer of Cagliari. While there is 
reason to believe Valentinian’s personal thoughts on the relationship between Father and Son may have 
tended in a more homoian direction,21 such highly public acts all but ensured his popular and episcopal 
approbation as a faithful Nicene. 
While not inevitable, such a policy was certainly the path of least resistance in the aftermath of 
Constantius’ turbulent relationship with the Latin-speaking regions of the Empire in general and their 
bishops in particular. As discussed above, Constantius’ attested episcopal allies in the West can be 
counted on two hands, of whom the majority were Imperial appointees from Illyricum or the East.22 
Gaul and Italy in particular had shown themselves to be both intransigent in their profession of the 
Creed of Nicaea, and the cradles of repeated usurpations and revolts. For a Western Emperor to attempt 
 
19 For the Council of Lampsacus, which condemned the homoian formula of Constantinople, attacked Eudoxius of 
Constantinople, and affirmed the homoiousian theology of Basil of Ancyra, see Sozomen 6.7, Socrates Scholasticus 4.2 (though 
Socrates, as opposed to Sozomen, wrongly ascribes the reply to Valens rather than Valentinian; see Lenski 2002, 239 n.153, 
Urbainczyk 1997, 359-362). While the council did not explicitly affirm the Creed of Nicaea, it did make common cause with the 
Western bishops who had done so while expressing a theology all but identical to the consensus between homoiousians and 
homoousians argued for Hilary, Athanasius, etc. 
20 «ἐμοὶ μέν», ἔφη, «μετὰ λαοῦ τεταγμένῳ οὐ θέμις τοιαῦτα πολυπραγμονεῖν· οἱ δὲ ἱερεῖς, οἷς τούτου μέλει, καθ’ ἑαυτοὺς ὅπῃ 
βούλονται συνίτωσαν.» 
21 This is suggested not only by his Pannonian background but also by his overt favoring of the hated Cappadocian, Constantius-
appointed homoian Auxentius, bishop of the Imperial court city of Milan. As McLynn 2004, 251-252, notes, Valentinian himself 
is attested (Hilary, Contra Auxentium 9) as participating in the services of and receiving communion from Auxentius, whom he 
not only protected from deposition (see note 23 below) but also implicitly vindicated by acting as a chain of communion 
between him and his rival bishops in the West: “[T]he bishops of the successive cities where he established his court were 
implicitly accepting Auxentius as a colleague every time they received the emperor for communion, despite the fact that they 
had solemnly voted to depose the bishop of Milan a few years previously” (252). 




once again to impose a homoian settlement on these provinces would have been to all but invite 
rebellion. Constans had allied with the bishops of his domains against Constantius, and while by all 
accounts Valentinian’s relationship with the Western bishops was far more distant, and his relationship 
with his brother far more pacific, there was every reason for Valentinian to generally let the Nicene 
episcopal networks led by the energetic new bishop of Rome Damasus do as they wanted.23 
The Eastern Emperor Valens, however, was in a far different position, and followed a very 
different policy. Like Constantius, he has gone down in our sources as a resolutely “Arian” Emperor—
without, however, any of the extreme anti-Imperial polemic or castigation as Antichrist that marked 
Constantius’ later years. While the absence of such invective has been seen as a relative mystery,24 it can 
in my judgment be explained by the vastly stronger and more stable position held by Nicenes under 
Valens than under Constantius. Nicene bishops were not only well-organized and dominant in the 
Western Empire, in firm possession of an Imperial safe haven and therefore facing no existential threat 
anywhere close to Constantius’ Empire-wide imposition of homoianism, but were actually helped to a 
degree by Valens’ official homoianism in their continuing efforts to cement a doctrinal Nicene consensus 
across the cultural and political borders of the Empire. It is no accident, I believe, that it was the reign of 
Valens in particular that saw the definitive rise to power of a well-connected and explicitly Nicene 
faction not only in Egypt, but even in the formerly Eusebian strongholds of Constantinople and 
Cappadocia, led by the brilliant (and politically and socially well-connected) Cappadocian Fathers. By 
 
23 The greatest exception to this general policy was Valentinian’s refusal to back up the deposition—first through episcopal 
processes spearheaded by Hilary of Poitiers and then by a council held at Rome by Damasus in 371 (cf. Hilary, Contra Auxentium 
7-15, Sozomen 6.23.5-15, Theodoret 2.22.1-12, as well as the conciliar document from the Verona Codex 3.459-460 known as 
Confidimus quidem)—of Auxentius of Milan, who was instead vindicated by a specially-assembled Imperial tribunal consisting of 
the Emperor’s quaestor and magister officiorum. Auxentius was no doubt aided not only by Valentinian’s desire for concord (cf. 
Lenski 2002, 239), but also by his status as an Imperial-appointed holder of the see of Valentinian’s court at Milan.  
24 See in particular Flower 2013, 224-229, who runs through a number of possible explanations for the lack of explicit anti-
Imperial invective under Valens (including those I appeal to here), but concludes that this phenomenon may be merely “a quirk 
of textual survival” and that any explanations “must, of course, remain highly speculative” (228). 
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keeping alive the specter of Imperial homoianism, Valens provided a common enemy against which 
bishops of different theological factions could rally—without, however, openly attacking an Emperor 
with whom limited cooperation was still both possible and practically desirable. It was precisely, I would 
argue, the general anti-Imperial valences of the Nicene theology innovated by Lucifer, Hilary, and 
Athanasius that allowed Nicene bishops to co-exist with a heretical Emperor without regarding it as a 
matter of cosmic concern. 
Still, Valens’ decision to back the Imperial homoian creed ratified by Constantius at the Council 
of Constantinople and the few bishops associated with it posed any number of practical problems for 
bishops under his authority. As already mentioned, as a native of the Illyrian province of Ursacius and 
Valens, Valens had every reason to regard these bishops and the theology they championed with favor. 
As in the general triumph of this faction in 359/60, however, it was the wily Eudoxius of 
Germanicia/Antioch/Constantinople who gained the most, being granted the honor of baptizing Valens 
in 36625 and afterwards serving as his main ally in ecclesiastical matters. As I have argued before, 
however, ascribing an Emperor’s theological acts solely to influence from allegedly canny episcopal 
advisors can only ever possess limited explanatory power. Valens’ choice to embrace a manifestly failed 
policy of his Constantinian predecessor also has other, more directly Imperial-theological valences.26 
As members of a new dynasty following more than a half-century of Constantinian rule, 
Valentinian and Valens had every reason to seek ways to legitimize their position by connecting 
 
25 See note 71 below. 
26 Here I differ somewhat with the argument of Lenski 2002, 243-246, that Valens’ adherence to homoianism can be explained 
sufficiently by his Pannonian background and by the fact that in defending Constantius II’s homoian settlement, he was merely 
“upholding the status quo” of homoian dominance created by the Council of Constantinople in 360. In fact, as we have seen, 
Constantius’ attempt to impose homoianism was not only essentially unprecedented in terms of the ecclesiastical-Imperial 
politics of the 4th century, but also far from effective even in the East, where the homoiousians had shown their position to be 
far more popular and more entrenched within the episcopate. In establishing homoianism as the Imperial Orthodoxy of the 
East, Valens was not maintaining the status quo, but rather choosing against widespread opposition to resurrect a broadly 
unpopular set of policies. 
620 
 
themselves to the preceding dynasty. It is as one of a number of pro-Constantinian acts of Valentinian 
and Valens, including the explicit return to Christianity as the basis of rule, the (partial) reinstatement of 
Constantinian measures favoring the Church27 and attacking pagans,28 and multiple marriages with 
surviving female relatives of Constantius,29 that the explicit return by Valens to the homoian creed 
promulgated by Constantius should be seen. For Valens, I believe, this unexpected move to make 
common cause with some of the few surviving episcopal allies of, and embrace a theology promulgated 
by, the last Christian member of the Constantinian dynasty, was primarily an attempt to claim continuity 
with that dynasty and thereby enhance the legitimacy of his own rule after the model provided by the 
political theology of Constantine and Constantius. Valens’ actions can, in fact, be seen as almost directly 
parallel to those of Constantius early in his reign. In attempting to rule a divided Eastern Empire from a 
position of unsteady legitimacy, both men publicly embraced what they saw as the ecclesiastical faction 
most associated with the former ruler: for Constantius, the Eusebians under Eusebius of Nicomedia, and 
for Valens, the homoians under Eudoxius. As with Constantius and Eusebius, this alliance included as a 
necessary component Imperial aid in purging the Eastern episcopate of rivals, and consequently one of 
Valens’ first acts as ruler was to publicly rebuff the homoiousians of the Council of Lampsacus and send 
many of them into exile, followed several years later by a decree reinstating all sentences against 
bishops deposed and exiled by Constantius but restored under Julian. 
 
27 In particular the financial and curial exemptions enjoyed by Christian clerics (Codex Theodosianus 16.2.17-24), albeit in a 
much more restricted form than under Constantine and Constantius (cf. Lenski 2016, 201-205). While these privileges were 
certainly helpful to Christian clergy, they also gave the Emperor greater leverage and were as such selectively wielded by Valens 
in his efforts to delegitimize and disable Nicene clergy. 
28 For Valentinian and Valens’ complex relationship with pagans, which included both a reinstatement of Constantinian and 
Constantinian measures against temples and pagan rites in more restricted forms and a series of highly-publicized prosecutions 
against the political-religious crime of “magic,” see Lenski 2002, 211-234. 
29 See note 291 in section 3.6 above. 
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If Valens’ hope was to shore up his own legitimacy and control of the East through Eudoxius’ 
(Constantinian) theology and connections, however, he had drastically overrated the effectiveness of 
both. Indeed, in the short term, the principal effect of his return to Constantius’ homoian creed seems 
to have been to convince many Eastern bishops of the position already argued for in the 350s by Hilary 
of Poitiers and Athanasius: that the only way to resist the radical “Arianism” promoted by a heretical 
Emperor was to come to an explicit theological understanding with their homoousian episcopal 
counterparts in the West. In 364, councils were held in Smyrna, Pisidia, Isauria, Pamphylia, and Lycia to 
rally opposition to Valens and his theology, after which a delegation was sent to Rome to come to terms 
with the bishop of Rome Liberius and the Western Church represented by him. As mentioned above, the 
rapid result of this negotiation was the affirmation by the delegates of the Creed of Nicaea in the 
presence of Liberius, inaugurating for the first time since the Council of Serdica a formal theological and 
ecclesiastical alliance between large networks of bishops in both East and West.30 Bearing a letter from 
the bishop of Rome—the institutional leader of Western Nicene networks since the 340s—addressed to 
sixty-six Eastern bishops and “all the orthodox bishops of the East” and praising their faith and fidelity,31 
the now-homoousian delegates returned to the East to hold yet another council at Tyana at which the 
alliance with the West was affirmed and further cemented by the bishops’ decision to do as Alexander 
and Constantius had before them and circulate a document in which bishops throughout the Eastern 
Empire were informed of recent events and invited to signify by subscription their agreement and 
 
30 See e.g. Socrates Scholasticus 4.12.2-40, 5.4.1, 5.8.7-8, Sozomen 6.10.3-6.12.5, 7.2.2, cf. Barnes 1993, 161-162, Lenski 2002, 
247-249. Lenski’s chronology of these events is preferable. 
31 This letter is given in full at Socrates Scholasticus 4.12.22-37. Notably for the preceding theological discussion, Liberius 
strongly affirms not only the creed of Nicaea, but also the use of the (Origenian) term ὑπόστασις, declaring that “this faith, 
which is contained in the ὑπόστασις and in the term ὁμοούσιος, like a strong and impregnable fortress nullifies and overturns 
all the slanders and machinations of the Arian heresy” (ἥτις πίστις ἐν τῇ ὑποστάσει καὶ τῷ ὀνόματι τοῦ ὁμοουσίου 
περιεχομένη, ὥσπερ ἔρυμα ὀχυρὸν καὶ ἄμαχον πάσας τὰς προσβολὰς καὶ τὰς κακομηχανίας τῆς Ἀρείου κακοδοξίας καθαιρεῖ 
τε καὶ ἀποτρέπεται, 4.12.30). The document presented to Liberius and affirmed by him as orthodox is given in Socrates 4.12.10-
20, and, like the letter of Liberius, associates its affirmation of the creed of Nicaea (which it quotes in full while singling out the 
term ὁμοούσιος for explicit approbation) with an utter rejection and anathematization of the councils and creeds of Ariminum, 
Seleucia, and Constantinople. 
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communion with Liberius and his allies.32 While Valens was able for the moment to forestall plans for a 
massive Council of Tarsus at which Nicaea and the alliance with Liberius would be affirmed in the name 
of the entire Eastern Church,33 and while the rebellion of Procopius34 shortly thereafter seems to have 
provided a brief platform for the few remaining anti-Nicene homoiousians,35 neither event would prove 
effective at halting the continuing spread of Nicene networks in the East.36 In all these instances, 
 
32 See in particular Sozomen 6.12.3, which describes in detail (almost certainly based on documentary evidence) the three 
proposals made by the council in this circulating document: (1) to read both the documents of the recent assemblies in the East 
and also other attached documents in which the beliefs of the bishop of Rome Liberius and various assemblies of bishops in 
Italy, Africa, Gaul, and Sicily were set forth; (2) to submit to the will of this vast episcopal consensus by affirming in writing their 
agreement with its doctrines and their communion with its bishops; and then (3) to come to a planned council at Tarsus at 
which this faith would be definitively promulgated. This model of unification, it should be said, is highly reflective of the Nicene 
ideology of episcopal consensus in the absence of Imperial power put forward by Hilary and Athanasius in the 350s. It is also 
indicative of the bishops’ confidence in the broad appeal of their new theological/ecclesiastical position, as such a general 
subscription had not been attempted in the East in the absence of Imperial power since Alexander of Alexandria, who had used 
it prior to Nicaea as a means to demonstrate and make use of the clear majority status of his allies in the East (cf. S. Parvis 
2006a, 68-76). 
33 See e.g. Socrates Scholasticus 4.12.40, Sozomen 6.12.5. Notably, while both men ascribe this intervention to the influence of 
Eudoxius, Sozomen indicates that the Emperor personally “wrote and made a threat about this synod” (γράψας περὶ τούτου καὶ 
ἀπειλὴν ἐπιθείς). 
34 For the usurpation of Procopius, a high official under Julian who seems to have based his claims to legitimacy on his 
connections with and deliberate hearkening back to the former Constantinian dynasty—including an alleged blood relation 
through Julian’s mother reinforced by constant public association with Constantius’ surviving wife and daughter, whom he even 
took on campaign with him—see Omissi 2018, 229-233. 
35 In early 366, thirty-four bishops met in Caria in Asia Minor and, in response to the recent affirmation of the Creed of Nicaea 
by the Council of Tyana, reiterated their own opposition to this creed and reaffirmed the Dedication Creed of 341 as the 
standard of the Church’s orthodoxy (Sozomen 6.12.4). As Lenski 2002, 248-249, argues, this event would have taken place in 
territory controlled by the usurper Procopius, a reality that helps to explain the last-minute decision of this small party of 
bishops to dissent from the previous decisions of the councils of 364-366 and attempt to hold the line on the original 
homoiousian position. The burden of the consensus Nicene position was that there was no alternative between submission to 
the Emperor Valens and adherence to the Western Nicenes. Procopius’ revolt, however, would have presented bishops in his 
territories with a third alternative: support of a usurper potentially able to make their faction once again the dominant one in 
the East. Basil of Ancyra had similarly attempted to use Imperial patronage to cement the homoiousians as a distinct faction 
against both Eastern radicals and Western homoousians in the late 350s. The fact that this small faction of bishops met in Asia 
Minor is also likely indicative of continuing influence from allies of Basil and/or residual anti-Marcellan sentiment. 
36 The development of these Nicene networks seems to have been accompanied by breakdowns of the homoian networks on 
which the Emperor Valens had hoped to depend. Hilary of Poitiers preserves a series of documents from c. 366 in which 
Germinius of Sirmium, a key grandee of the homoian party under Constantius but also a political subject of Valentinian and 
therefore, like Photinus before him, extremely vulnerable to Western ecclesiastical attacks, sets forth a moderate position on 
the Father and Son’s similarity per omnia (Hilary, Adversus Valentem et Ursacium Series A 3), is attacked by Ursacius and Valens 
and other homoians for having violated the doctrine professed by him at Ariminum through a doctrine all-but-identical to that 
of the condemned Basil of Ancyra (Series B 5), and responds in turn in a far from conciliatory manner, asserting in very strong 
terms the Son’s equality with the Father by possession of the fullness of divinity while reminding Ursacius and Valens that they 
themselves, along with Basil, had signed the Dated Creed which stated the Son’s similarity to the Father in all things (Series B 6). 
For discussion of this intriguing exchange, see in particular Williams 1996, though in my judgment Williams’ sketchy attempts to 
argue that these beliefs of Germinius reflected not a later innovation, but rather his true, original beliefs going back to the reign 
of Constantius are untenable. While Germinius does not explicitly use the term substantia or subscribe to the Creed of Nicaea 
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affirmation of the Creed of Nicaea was explicitly associated with the absolute rejection and 
anathematization of the Constantinian councils of Ariminum, Seleucia, and Constantinople and the 
Imperial ecumenical creed produced by them—a creed currently affirmed as the standard of orthodoxy 
by the Emperor Valens and the bishop of Constantinople Eudoxius. Even beyond the grave, Constantius’ 
Imperial-ecclesiastical project had the power to bring bishops together. During the reign of Valens, the 
dream of Hilary of Poitiers was being realized, thanks to the ineffectual efforts of yet another homoian 
Emperor. 
The spread of Nicene networks in the East was also aided by the fact that, very much unlike 
Constantius, Valens’ efforts to enforce his official Imperial theology were for much of his reign notable 
for their relative mildness.37 While the decree banishing those exiled by Constantius led to one more 
flight for Athanasius in October 366, further demonstrations of Athanasius’ unbreakable hold over the 
populace of Egypt, along with the rebellion of Procopius shortly thereafter, rapidly led to his 
reinstatement after only four months.38 When Athanasius’ homoian-appointed rival Lucius attempted 
his own independent move shortly thereafter, it was Imperial soldiers who escorted him politely but 
 
in extant documents, he also does not in any way attack such a position, nor does he affirm the authority of Ariminum and 
Seleucia. More to the point, Ursacius and Valens, with whom Germinius had closely collaborated in the past, can hardly be 
supposed to have been ignorant of his true beliefs prior to this, and clearly regarded his new position as both a break from his 
prior teachings and entirely beyond what the homoian creed allowed. Indeed, in the Altercatio Heracliani only months before, 
Germinius had asserted a very different and much starker homoian theology—textual evidence that Williams acknowledges but 
ascribes to unproven Nicene interpolations. In my judgment, then, this incident is much more comprehensible in light of a 
broader Eastern movement towards a consensus Nicene position, which here comes by way of affirmation of the Son’s 
similarity with the Father in all things, with “similarity” understood, as in Hilary’s De synodis, as requiring a true identity in 
essence and properties. 
37 Cf. Lenski 2002, 242-255, Barnes 1993, 160-164. 
38 See Socrates Scholasticus 4.13.4, Sozomen 6.12.12, Historia Acephela 5.1-7, cf. Barnes 1993, 163, Lenski 2002, 246-247. As 
Barnes and Lenski both suggest, Valens was essentially following Constantius’ precedent during the revolt of Magnentius in 
allowing Athanasius to maintain his position in exchange for support against the usurper.  
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firmly out of Egypt and its capital, securing Athanasius’ position but also sparing Lucius a bloody death at 
the hands of the mob surrounding his residence.39  
When Athanasius died in 373, under an officially homoian Emperor, his position as bishop of 
Alexandria had never been more secure. If his long career had demonstrated one thing without 
question, it was that a bishop could retain his hold on power, based on direct relationships with the 
Christian populace of his diocese and broader networks within the episcopate, even in the face of near-
constant Imperial hostility. As argued above, this reality seems to have taken Athanasius by surprise as 
much as anyone. From the 320s to the 350s, Athanasius had spent enormous amounts of time and 
energy trying to win over Constantine, Constans, and Constantius, all in the clear belief that an Emperor 
resolutely opposed to his theology or position would render that position and that theology untenable. 
Thanks to the new Nicene theology of Church and Empire, however, and the newly robust episcopal and 
popular networks of support associated with it, Valens’ status as an unrepentant heretic was, by the last 
years of Athanasius’ life, a matter of only theoretical concern.40 
With Athanasius’ death in 373, however, the stage was set for one final confrontation between 
the Imperial theology of Valens and that of the bulk of the bishops of the Empire. The immediate 
instigation was Valens’ desire, following the death of the popular bishop of Alexandria, to impose his 
homoian rival Lucius by force—a decision that inevitably led to popular violence and bloody reprisals by 
the Imperial military against the churches and people of Egypt, including the arrest of numerous priests, 
deacons, and monks and at least eleven bishops. Once again, however, Athanasius’ handpicked 
 
39 Historia Acephela 5.11-14, cf. Barnes 1993, 163. 
40 As Lenski 2002, 250, points out, Athanasius’ letters during this period (Epistula ad Epictetum, Epistula ad Adelphium, Epistula 
ad Maximum, plus the festal letters discussed in Martin 1996) show no sign of any disturbance from the Imperial 
administration; as Barnes 1993, 163-164, argues, while Athanasius was widely lauded in his last years as a hero and confessor of 
the true faith by bishops in both East and West, he seems to have deliberately avoided active involvement in broader 
ecclesiastical affairs or Imperial politics, instead focusing his attention on local building projects within his diocese and on the 
editing and revision of his works. 
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successor Peter was able to escape arrest, fleeing to Rome to appeal, as Athanasius had done, to the 
Western Emperor and bishop of Rome in person.41 This violence in Egypt turned out to be only the 
beginning of a larger attempt, in Constantian style but with far less skill, at applying Imperial coercion to 
the forcible unification of the Church under homoian doctrine and the will of the Emperor.42 This 
campaign included the deposition and exile of numerous Eastern Nicene bishops as well as legal 
harassment by which Nicene priests and bishops were selectively targeted by laws forcing them to 
return to their curial duties.43 During the same period Valens also turned his wrath against a new and 
more diffuse source of popular support for the Nicene cause: monks and other ascetic men and women 
throughout the Empire, many of whom based their way of life on imitation of Athanasius’ Egyptian 
supporters as presented in texts like Athanasius’ own Vita Sancti Antonii.44 Like the populist bishops of 
an earlier generation, these showy ascetics possessed significant sway with the people of the Empire, 
influence that could not easily be overruled or rooted out even by Imperial decrees or main Imperial 
force. 
Unfortunately for Valens, but fortunately for the continuing success of the Nicene consensus, 
the Illyrian Emperor’s brief career as a would-be Constantius ended in 378 with his own violent death in 
the military disaster of Adrianopole. Valens had committed a few eye-catching atrocities against 
Nicenes, roused Nicene feeling by exiling locally popular priests, bishops, and monks, made numerous 
Nicene “martyrs” and “confessors,” and then suddenly reversed course, restored all exiled Nicene 
 
41 These numbers are from the account given by Peter of Alexandria in the letter preserved in Theodoret 4.21.1-22.36. While 
Peter is of course a biased source, Lenski 2002, 255-256, points out the corroboration both of the general scale of violence and 
of specific incidents in contemporary sources.  
42 See Lenski 2002, 255-261, for a fuller account of this campaign. 
43 See Basil, Epistula 237, cf. Lenski 2002, 258-259. 
44 See e.g. Jerome, Chronicum 375, Rufinus 11.4, Basil, Epistula 257. 
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bishops to their positions,45 and immediately died in a disaster so extreme that even Lucifer of Cagliari 
might have regarded it as divine punishment.46 While the Battle of Adrianople is remembered to this day 
as the beginning of the end for the Roman Empire, for the new Nicene Church it was undoubtedly a 
stroke of drastic good fortune—good fortune which they were ready and able to exploit to the fullest 
thanks to the doctrinal and political strategies innovated by Athanasius, Lucifer, and Hilary, and the 
accompanying slow, painstaking process of building up theological consensus and episcopal networks 
carried out over the previous decades.47  
With Valens’ death, the Empire passed to his nephew Gratian, who, unlike his father and uncle, 
had spent virtually his entire life in the Nicene Church of the Western Empire, and whose willingness to 
cultivate closer ties with Nicene bishops was likely cemented by the highly public divine sign of Valens’ 
bloody defeat.48 In 379, faced like his predecessors with the difficult task of managing a vast Empire 
fighting wars on multiple fronts, he appointed the Spanish general Theodosius co-Augustus and ruler of 
the East. In 381, Theodosius issued, seemingly on his own initiative and in clear contradiction to the 
 
45 See Lenski 2002, 261, who collects various sources (e.g. Rufinus 11.13, Jerome, Chronicum 378) indicating a general decree of 
restoration in 377 just prior to Valens’ campaigns against the Goths. As Lenski notes, this move almost certainly represented a 
belated realization of the general failure of his tactics and a recognition that continuing anti-Nicene actions in the middle of a 
military crisis “would have been destabilizing to his own empire.” 
46 For the Battle of Adrianopole, see Lenski 2002, 320-367. 
47 Contra e.g. Lenski 2002, esp. 261-263, who in my judgment underrates the extent and effectiveness of Nicene episcopal and 
ecclesiastical networks and ideology and hence makes their victory following Valens’ death more a matter of agentless chance 
and circumstance than is warranted. What can be said, however, is that while Valens’ bloody death does not seem to have 
greatly altered the basic ecclesiastical situation or associated inter-episcopal dynamics, it did likely facilitate the coming 
settlement with the Emperors Gratian and Theodosius by providing a directly Imperial (and Constantinian) justification for 
political support for Nicene theology and bishops. 
48 See most notably Ambrose, De Fide 2.136-143, where, in a work addressed to Gratian, the Nicene bishop treats the defeat at 
Adrianopole as a punishment for Valens’ persecutions (cf. Williams 1995, 130-184, Lenski 2002, 262). For a more general survey 
of Gratian’s religious policies, which seem to have, like his father’s, included both Illyrian homoian and Western Nicene contacts 
and networks, see McLynn 1994, 79-157. 
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policy of ecclesiastical non-confrontation advertised by his senior Augustus,49 the Edict of Thessalonika, 
conventionally treated as the end of the “Arian controversy” proper.  
This decree—one of the most famous documents from the 4th century—has commonly been 
seen as marking a transition to Christianity being the “state religion” or “state Church” of the Empire. In 
my judgment, this is doubly misguided. Whatever precisely a “state religion” is understood to entail, 
Constantine had already vaulted the Christian Church to the position of officially state-supported and 
state-funded institution while using its theology and symbolism as a pervasive ideological basis for his 
rule. The idea of a “state Church” or Reichskirche, a model derived from European Protestant and 
Catholic regimes of the Early Modern period, is in my judgment inapplicable to the complex relations 
between bishops and Emperor at any stage of the 4th century. While the decree arguably presaged an 
intensification of measures directed against deviant religious groups,50 such laws and campaigns were by 
no means absent from the regimes of Constantine and his sons.51 Similarly, decrees overtly favoring 
Christian clerics and institutions in law and finance were most frequent and extreme during the reign of 
Constantine himself, after which they had been abolished and then readopted in a drastically reduced 
form under Valens and Valentinian, a status quo maintained under Theodosius.52 
 
49 See in particular McLynn 2004, 106-112.  
50 See sections 16.5 (De haereticis) and 16.10 (De paganis, sacrificiis, et templis) of Codex Theodosianus. While the number of 
laws recorded on these topics is greater post-Thessalonika, they are preceded by similar laws from Constantine, Constantius, 
and the Valentiniani. Even the greater number of such laws is arguably explainable by the general chronological bias of the 
Codex Theodosianus towards more recent laws. This viewpoint is strongly asserted by McLynn 1994, 330-333, who argues that 
the anti-pagan laws of the reign of Theodosius I, far from reflecting a “comprehensive programme,” are better understood as 
ad hoc responses to local issues and “casual rubber-stamping of [anti-sacrificial laws] already possessing, in theory, universal 
validity” (332). Since the first legal prohibitions of sacrifice were, by Theodosius’ accession in 379, nearly forty or perhaps more 
than fifty years old (see note 88 in section 1.4 and note 181 in section 3.5 above), it could hardly be otherwise. In my judgment 
the viewpoint that the reign of Theodosius constitutes the turning point in Christian “intolerance” or “persecution” can be 
maintained only by largely ignoring the previous history of the 4th century. 
51 See note 88 in section 1.4 and note 181 in section 3.5 above. 
52 See Codex Theodosianus 16.2.17-28, as well as note 34 in section 1.2 above (cf. Lenski 2016, 197-206). 
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The transition truly marked by the Edict of Thessalonika and Theodosius’ reign more generally, I 
believe, should be seen less in the context of these broad (and anachronistic) concepts as in the 
theological and ideological terms of the preceding study: namely, as marking a novel settlement 
between Emperor and bishops on the level of political theology, a renegotiation of terms, positions, and 
fundamental legitimating ideology made necessary by the failure of the Constantinian Settlement and 
the gradual victory of broadly anti-Imperial Nicene networks. In the aftermath of the defeat of Valens, 
the new (and extraordinarily weak) Eastern Emperor Theodosius was eager, like Constantine and 
Constantius before him, to stabilize his own position as Eastern Emperor and set the stage for broader 
influence throughout the whole Empire—and as with Constantine, an alliance with the powerful 
religious ideology and imposing institutional networks of the Christian Church was the natural answer. 
Yet in the intervening period, thanks to the efforts of bishops and Emperors alike, the norms and 
relationships established by Constantine had drastically deteriorated, and a new consensus Christian 
theology, ideology, and institutional network had come to the fore, forged in dialogue and bitter conflict 
with Imperial power. If Theodosius wished to benefit as Constantine had done from the legitimating seal 
of Christianity, he would have to give up far more—at least on the level of ideology and theology—than 
Constantine ever had.53 He would have to acknowledge, not only the truths of divine providence or 
Christian incarnation, but the truth of Nicene theology, and the authority of Nicene bishops: 
Edict of the Emperors Gratian, Valentinian, and Theodosius to the people of the city of 
Constantinople: 
We will that all peoples which the moderation of our clemency rules should live in that religion 
which the Divine Apostle Peter handed down to the Romans, the religion which has been 
publicly conveyed by him even to the present time, which it is publicly manifest that the Pontiff 
Damasus and Peter the bishop of Alexandria, a man of Apostolic holiness, follow—that is, that 
we may believe according to the Apostolic discipline and evangelical teaching that there is one 
deity of the Father and Son and Holy Spirit with equal majesty and in a pious Trinity. 
 
53 Cf. McLynn 1994, 109: “Few emperors had come to power in such a position of dependence. [...] His generosity was therefore 
conditioned by an urgent need to establish himself, and his publicity was also driven by the need for self-assertion.” 
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Those following this law we order to embrace the name of Catholic Christians, but the rest, 
whom we judge to be demented and insane, we order to bear the infamy of heretical dogma 
and for their gatherings to not receive the name of churches, to be punished first with the divine 
vengeance and then also by the avenging power of our decision, which we have obtained by 
heavenly judgment (Codex Theodosianus 16.1.2).54  
Here we see vocabulary and concepts straight from existing Imperial ideology and Constantinian 
precedent, in particular the appeal to Imperial commands as arising from divine instigation, with a clear 
descending movement from divine will to Imperial law to earthly punishment. What is manifestly 
missing, however, is the overt Constantinian emphasis on the unique status of the ruler as the 
preeminent conduit for the divine will on earth, uniquely favored with knowledge and inspiration. 
Whatever divine knowledge is contained in this decree is in fact explicitly asserted to come to the 
Emperor from God through another class of human persons: the bishops. The fundamental principle of 
Eusebian theology and political theory alike, of a single monarchical hierarchy grounded on absolute 
precedence in will and command, has been replaced by a cosmos in which a God consisting of three 
equal persons gives the truth about himself to the Apostles to hand on (through a succession of equal 
predecessors and successors) to the bishops of the Church, whose task it is to publicly follow and 
proclaim this truth to the human world as a whole while the three Augusti of the Roman Empire support 
it with the force of their arms. This is a somewhat more complex picture of the cosmos and of human 
society than that advanced by Constantine and Eusebius.   
By the Decree of Thessalonika, then, one of the Emperors of Rome publicly declared that their 
own legitimacy as rulers ruling at the command of the divine realm was dependent on the authorizing 
 
54 Imppp. Gratianus, Valentinianus et Theodosius aaa. edictum ad populum urbis Constantinopolitanae. 
pr. Cunctos populos, quos clementiae nostrae regit temperamentum, in tali volumus religione versari, quam divinum petrum 
apostolum tradidisse Romanis religio usque ad nunc ab ipso insinuata declarat quamque pontificem Damasum sequi claret et 
Petrum Alexandriae episcopum virum apostolicae sanctitatis, hoc est, ut secundum apostolicam disciplinam evangelicamque 
doctrinam patris et filii et spiritus sancti unam deitatem sub parili maiestate et sub pia trinitate credamus. Hanc legem 
sequentes christianorum catholicorum nomen iubemus amplecti, reliquos vero dementes vesanosque iudicantes haeretici 
dogmatis infamiam sustinere nec conciliabula eorum ecclesiarum nomen accipere, divina primum vindicta, post etiam motus 
nostri, quem ex caelesti arbitrio sumpserimus, ultione plectendos. 
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power of the bishops of the Christian Church.55 This represents a fundamental shift in the history of the 
Roman Empire and the Imperial office. Constantine had appealed to the Christian God and even 
Christian theology to justify his legitimacy as ruler—while at the same time proclaiming his own favored, 
inspired status and relating to the bishops as allies, models, assistants, and subordinates. According to 
Theodosius, in contrast, the right to define, transmit, and authorize the single, public truth about God, 
the cosmos, and human authority—a right which, as we have seen, Constantine himself had jealously 
guarded and employed on his own behalf—belongs not to him, but to the locally-promoted holders of 
institutional offices which for most of their existence had openly defied the Emperor, his religious laws, 
and his theology. The doctrine now upheld and enforced by the Emperor, of a divine unity grounded in a 
diversity of persons of equal majesty, comes to him through and is authorized by the bishops—in 
particular the bishop of Rome, for generations the institutional leader of Nicene episcopal networks and 
an institutional thorn in the side of the Emperor, and his ally the handpicked successor of the Imperial 
bête noire Athanasius of Alexandria.56 Both these Emperors, and any Emperor to come, will have to, in 
order to be considered legitimate, rely on and so come to terms with these institutional office-holders—
or risk being written out of the Church and the cosmos like the Antichrist Constantius or the defeated 
pariah Valens. The Emperor will rule not only at the will of God, but under the authority of the Church. 
Of course, this revolutionary giving up of place and position in the cosmos comes in the context 
of what is at the same time a re-insertion of the Emperor into the Church, its structures, and its 
 
55 This distinction is related to, but by no means the same as, that made in the next century by Pope Gelasius I (Epistulae 12) in 
his famous distinction between the auctoritas of Christian priests and the potestas of Emperors. While Theodosius and Gratian 
were by no means surrendering their auctoritas to Christian bishops wholesale, they were making that auctoritas and its 
legitimacy dependent on the theology, structures, and rituals presided over and authorized by bishops. 
56 As McLynn 1994, 108, notes, this unilateral declaration of the preeminent authority of the bishop of Rome would not 
necessarily have been welcome even to many Eastern Nicene bishops, who would intermittently clash with Damasus over the 
next decades about such issues as the legitimate bishop of Antioch. Theodosius’ decision to highlight Damasus’ authority may 
reflect not only the prominence the bishop of Rome had come to assume as the institutional leader of Nicene networks in East 
and West, but also his own Western origins—and perhaps also a desire to cultivate support among Western Nicene subjects of 
his co-Emperor Gratian.  
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doctrines. Like Constantine, Theodosius offers the (Nicene) bishops of the Emperor both theoretical and 
practical advantages in exchange for the bishops’ cooperation in legitimizing his shaky position and 
managing an increasingly unstable Empire. Like Constantine, too, he offers his own help in dealing with 
the pesky problems of ecclesial unification and the judicial punishment of heresy and wrongdoing within 
the episcopate,57 albeit on terms less likely, at least in theory, to lead to events like the purges under 
Constantine and Constantius. This settlement, while carried out on different terms than that of 
Constantine, is just as much a settlement between Church and Empire, Emperor and bishops—one that 
will be continually renegotiated and debated over the following centuries. 
For the present, however, this new Theodosian Settlement seems to have been instrumental in 
the rise of its main architect from the role of junior partner to that of quasi-Constantinian ruler of the 
entire Roman Empire58 and founder of a new dynasty that would rule in the East for nearly eighty 
years—a rise aided enormously first by Gratian’s ambiguous theological position and lack of control over 
ecclesiastical affairs59 and then by the high-profile confrontations between the Nicene court bishop 
Ambrose of Milan and the officially homoian court of Valentinian II.60 While not sufficient in itself to 
explain his rise to power, it is clear in my judgment that Theodosius, like Constantine before him, 
 
57 This edict seems to have been followed, naturally enough, by several successive attempts by Theodosius to settle the 
doctrinal conflicts of the past decades in a Nicene direction, culminating in the Council of Constantinople of 381—plans set in 
direct competition to the attempt by Gratian to advertise his own authority as senior Emperor by summoning a large council of 
both Eastern and Western bishops to Aquileia (see e.g. McLynn 1994, 111-128). Emperors were now overtly competing to act as 
sponsors and assistants for what were in both cases entirely Nicene-dominated assemblies. 
58 For Theodosius’ rise to supreme power, the result of multiple civil wars, see e.g. Omissi 2018, 255-289, Errington 1996, 
McLynn 1994,  
59 Cf. McLynn 1994, 79-157: “No emperor was ever fully in control of his empire; but Gratian, fatally, was seen to have lost his 
grip. [...] Theodosius’ declaration of ecclesiastical independence was only part of a general consolidation of his own autonomy 
in the east” (154). 
60 For this conflict in general, see McLynn 1994, 170-219, cf. McLynn 2004, 262-263, for the ritually delegitimizing valences of 
this incident: “The dynasty which had been inaugurated when Valens was raised to the Purple on Palm Sunday 364 was 
effectively overthrown on Palm Sunday 386, when Ambrose refused to make a basilica available for imperial use” (262). Shortly 
thereafter, Valentinian II was driven out of Milan by the usurper Magnus Maximus, rescued by Theodosius, and exiled to a 
powerless post at Vienne before his untimely death at the hands of yet another usurper in 392.    
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benefited in his conflicts with fellow Emperors from the simple fact that he offered the bishops of the 
Empire—and in particular the bishops of the squabbling but increasingly dominant Nicene networks—a 
far better deal than his rivals. Having proclaimed his new settlement initially as the recently-appointed 
junior Emperor bogged down in constant warfare in Thessalonika, Theodosius lived to implement it 
throughout the whole Roman Empire. 
It is de rigeur to end any study of 4th century “Church and State” with at least a nod to the 
famous confrontation between Ambrose of Milan and the Emperor Theodosius over the massacre of 
Thessalonika. This incident, while it has gone down in history as an encapsulation of the roles and 
conflicts of “Church” and “State,” is, as H.A. Drake has pointed out, far more emblematic of the newly 
positive and collaborative relationship between bishops and Emperor under the Theodosian 
Settlement.61 Ambrose, it is true, received from this incident an explicit Imperial acknowledgment of his 
own position as the natural mediator both between God and the Emperor and between the Emperor 
and the people. Yet Theodosius received in turn a clear pathway to recovery from what had already 
become a major political crisis, turning a public demonstration of “tyrannical” qualities into a public 
affirmation of his status as a pious Christian and so more than restoring his tarnished legitimacy. 
However personally humiliating it may have been for the Emperor to take his place as one penitent 
among many in the cathedral of Milan, publicly bewailing and atoning for his sins under the direction of 
the bishop, it was also undeniably good politics.62 What the Theodosian Settlement in general, and this 
incident in particular, in fact demonstrates are the genuine advantages offered to the Roman Imperial 
 
61 Drake 2000, 443-444, 472-478. Cf. McLynn 1994, 315-330. 
62 Cf. Drake 2000, 476: “Ambrose offered a lifeline, carefully orchestrated to spare the emperor all but the bare minimum of 
disgrace. [...] By focusing on the emperor’s remorse, the scene deflected attention from a political disaster of the highest 
magnitude.” Cf. McLynn 1994, 323: “[Ambrose] turned the catastrophe into a public relations triumph for the emperor.” 
633 
 
system by this new, more collaborative arrangement. By giving up the mediatory role in the cosmos to 
the bishops, Emperors could receive in exchange things they needed far more urgently. 
For the purposes of this study, another, less well-known incident from the complex, theatrical 
relationship between Ambrose and Theodosius, pious Emperor and savvy bishop, is a more appropriate 
note to close on. This event, recounted (in somewhat different forms) in the ecclesiastical historians of 
the 5th century, presages far better both the revolutionary nature of the Theodosian settlement and the 
unsteady future of relations between bishops and Emperor:  
From among the notable deeds of Ambrose we have also learned this one. It was the custom of 
the Emperors, because of their preeminence, to worship in church within the sanctuary, apart 
from the boundaries marked off for the laity. But Ambrose, understanding that this was the 
result either of flattery or of disorder (ἀταξία), ordered (τάσσειν) that the place of the Emperor 
in churches be the one in front of the railing of the sanctuary, with the result that the ruler over 
the laity possesses the foremost seat among the laity, but the priests are seated in front of him. 
Theodosius the Emperor judged this to be the best tradition and those after him obeyed it, and 
we see it being followed from that time until now (Sozomen 7.25.8-10).63  
 In a somewhat more dramatic version of the same event, Theodoret (5.18.20-24) records 
Ambrose actually confronting the Emperor in the aftermath of the massacre of Thessalonika and 
ordering him out of the sanctuary with the memorable tag: “Go out and share in the standing (στάσις) of 
the others. For purple makes Emperors, not priests” (5.18.21).64 In Theodoret’s account, too, Theodosius 
initially defends himself by pointing out that having the Emperor worship within the sanctuary was the 
custom he had followed while ruling in Constantinople—a reality confirmed by Gregory Nazianzus.65 As 
 
63 τῶν δ’ αὖ ἐπισημοτάτων αὐτοῦ ἔργων καὶ τοῦτο ἐπυθόμην. ἔθος ἦν τοὺς βασιλέας ἐν τῷ ἱερατείῳ ἐκκλησιάζειν κατ’ ἐξοχὴν 
τῶν ὁρίων τοῦ λαοῦ κεχωρισμένους· κολακείας δὲ ἢ ἀταξίας εἶναι τοῦτο συνιδὼν τόπον εἶναι βασιλέως ἐν ἐκκλησίαις τέταχε 
τὸν πρὸ τῶν δρυφάκτων τοῦ ἱερατείου, ὥστε τοῦ μὲν λαοῦ τὸν κρατοῦντα τὴν προεδρίαν ἔχειν, αὐτοῦ δὲ τοὺς ἱερέας 
προκαθῆσθαι. ταύτην δὲ τὴν  ἀρίστην παράδοσιν ἐπῄνεσε Θεοδόσιος ὁ βασιλεὺς καὶ οἱ μετὰ ταῦτα ἐκράτυναν, καὶ ἐξ ἐκείνου 
νυνὶ φυλαττομένην ὁρῶμεν. 
64 Ἔξιθι τοίνυν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις κοινώνει τῆς στάσεως· ἁλουργὶς γὰρ βασιλέας, οὐχ ἱερέας ποιεῖ.   
65 De vita sua 1360–1. 
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Neil McLynn has pointed out,66 the decision of Nectarius, the freshly-appointed Nicene bishop of 
Constantinople, to welcome the Emperor into the ritual space of the sanctuary was itself a savvy move 
for a Constantinopolitan Nicene faction that for most of the city’s history had faced brutal repression at 
the hands of the Emperor and local clergy. Theodosius’ habit, as a baptized Spaniard, of attending 
church every Sunday in the cathedral of Constantinople ensured that the populace of the Imperial 
capitol would see their new Emperor most often in close association with precisely those clerics who 
had until recently been castigated and persecuted as enemies of the Emperor. While Ambrose’s decision 
to exile the Emperor from the sanctuary represented yet another assertion of his own role (and those of 
his fellow bishops) as sole mediating authority between God and Emperor, the decision of the Nicene 
clergy of Constantinople represented an alternative approach for a faction equally Nicene in belief, but 
much more directly dependent on Imperial authorization for position. One could well see in this a 
foretelling of later divergences between Latin and Byzantine Christianity. 
 The importance of this incident as a concluding note for our study, however, consists not just in 
its content but its larger context: the Emperor had firmly taken his place within the ritual cosmos of the 
Christian Church. The story told in the preceding historical narrative, of debates over the place within 
the cosmos of Emperor and bishops, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, could be told just as easily, and 
perhaps more cogently, as a battle over ceremonial role and ritual space.67  
As mentioned above in Chapter One, in asserting his own status as the Servant of God, 
Constantine seems to have carefully avoided any attendance at the Christian ceremonies carried out by 
 
66 McLynn 2004, 261-262: “By associating the emperor so visibly with the clergy he ensured that Theodosius was identified, as 
no emperor had been before, with a single doctrinal faction in the church” (261-262). 
67 The fundamental study of Imperial Church attendance in the 4th century is McLynn 2004. I have drawn liberally from his 
account in the following, while supplementing it with my own analysis. 
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Christian priests and bishops in their own ritual spaces.68 While clearly comfortable supporting and 
making his mark on Christian ritual through the building of churches, Constantine seems to have 
preferred to remain within the world of Imperial cult and court ceremonial, which he gradually shaped 
to conform to the Christian calendar of festivals and into which he grafted Christian priests and bishops 
as subordinate ceremonial actors. The heart of this ritual space, however, at once the focus of its acts of 
ritual homage and its principal ceremonial actor, remained the Emperor. Even when, in the central 
ecclesiastical showcase of reign, Constantine took his place among the bishops of the Empire at Nicaea, 
he did so, as we have seen, by inviting them into the Imperial palace and grafting the procedures of a 
Christian episcopal council onto an extended ritual of Imperial adventus. As discussed in Chapter Three, 
Constantius seems to have followed this model as much as possible, avoiding any presence at regular 
Christian services while exercising an even stronger degree of control over Christian ritual spaces 
through his building of churches and calling and managing of councils held in both palaces and 
churches.69 When the bishop of Rome Liberius was brought before the Emperor for judgment, he was 
first carefully removed from his accompanying clergy and the ritual spaces of the Roman Church and 
brought into the Imperial palace, where the Emperor presided surrounded by his own clerics and 
officials. It was this dominance of space and ritual, I would suggest, more than almost anything else, that 
reinforced Constantius’ imagined status as cosmic ruler and allowed him so much success in practically 
enforcing his will on bishops.  
 This ritual dominance did not last, and perhaps could not last so long as it was based on the 
Christian Emperor’s strict separation from the rituals, clergy, and people of the Christian Church. 
Whatever his precise theological beliefs, Valentinian had been a baptized Christian layman before his 
 
68 cf. McLynn 2004, 236-242, Drake 2000, 460-461, as well as note 249 in section 2.7 above.  
69 cf. McLynn 2004, 242-250, as well as note 54 in section 3.4 and note 11 in section 3.1 above. 
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accession,70 and naturally expected to continue to participate in the central ceremonies of his religion as 
Emperor. Unlike Constantine, he was hardly in a position to feel such sharp exclusion, even self-
exclusion, from Christian sacrament as expressing power and precedence. It was this basic logic, I would 
suggest, that led in time to the almost complete undoing of the Constantinian concept of the Christian 
Emperor. Whatever beliefs the Emperor or those around him might hold about his own cosmic and 
religious status, those beliefs would be effectively inoperative without some form of expression in what 
were rapidly becoming the principal religious and social rituals of the Empire. Even Valens, whatever his 
desire to imitate Constantius in theological policy, had accepted baptism early in his reign from the 
favored homoian bishop Eudoxius,71 and thereafter taken regular part in Christian rituals in 
Constantinople and elsewhere.72 By the time Theodosius rose to power, his status as a believing 
Christian was supplemented by his expectation, as a lifelong Nicene layman, of participating every week 
in the Christian sacramental ceremonies73 that he just as naturally expected to be presided over by 
those priests and bishops whom he had legally declared to possess sole authority over the transmission 
of the truth about the divine realm.  
If the cosmos as Eusebius had imagined it was in essence a gradated, hierarchical space within 
which each individual entity found its appropriate place, Theodosius and his successors had inextricably 
 
70 See e.g. Ambrose, Epistula 75.5, Hilary, Contra Auxentium. 
71 For the dating of this event, see Woods 1994. Otherwise see Lenski 2002, 243-246, who emphasizes (as suggested by 
Socrates 4.1.6, Sozomen 6.6.10) the influence of Eudoxius in Valens’ decision to accept baptism, thereby placing the Emperor 
under the homoian’s religious and ritual power, while McLynn 2004, 252-253, suggests that it was likely also the result in part 
of the humiliating and exclusionary valences of previous participation in the Christian rituals frequented by his senior Augustus 
Valentinian: “[A]t any joint appearance in church during the Easter season, his status as the junior partner will have been made 
visible when he was compelled to withdraw” (252). In an Empire divided between multiple Augusti, and where Imperial 
churchgoing had become the norm, Constantine-style refusal to accept baptism was effectively no longer an option. There is 
even evidence (Collectio Avellana 40.1, cf. Omissi 2018, 281-282) that the Western (Nicene) usurper Maximus combined his 
accession as Emperor in 383 with an immediate rite of baptism, a sign of the growing importance of participation in the 
sacraments to legitimizing Imperial rule.  
72 See McLynn 2004, 253-258, which also covers the reign of Valentinian. 
73 Cf. McLynn 2004, 258-265. 
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taken their place in a cosmos of a different sort. Rather than an indeterminate space defined by will and 
precedence and divided between a divine and human realm, in the view of the triumphant Nicene 
faction the Church encompassed the mysterious unification between binary human and divine οὐσίαι in 
the singular person of the Incarnate Son, a unification effected on earth through the doctrines and 
sacraments authoritatively and universally taught and enacted by the sole Christian ritual actors: priests 
and bishops. Within the cosmos of Eusebius, the Emperor had found a natural (and flattering) position 
as the final link in a chain of command descending from monarchical Father to monarchical Son to 
monarchical Constantine. Within the new cosmos of the Church, however, as both Lucifer of Cagliari and 
Hilary of Poitiers had, in their respective ways, intuited, the Emperor’s position was far more uncertain. 
That he could occupy a position such as that which Constantine had coveted—a monarch bearing the 
image of the mediatory ruler the Son and unifying all others by his singular will—was, within the ritual 
space of the Church, simply out of the question. There was no place in Christian ritual for such an entity.  
As the history of following centuries would show, however, while this revolutionary transition 
seemingly helped to resolve the immediate political crisis of legitimacy and so set the stage both for the 
new political paradigms of the Early Medieval West and for a vastly more stable era of Imperial power in 
the Byzantine East,74 it had by no means resolved every question implicit in the relationship between 
bishops and Emperor, Christian belief and political authority. The framework within such conflicts would 
be contested, however, was now firmly that of Christian ritual and doctrine, the unification of human 
 
74 As Omissi 2018, 297-300, points out in the conclusion of his own study of the crisis of legitimacy in the Late Roman Empire, 
while the Western Empire fell into a military death spiral, from the reign of Theodosius onwards there would not be a 
successful military usurpation in the Byzantine Empire until AD 602. While Omissi ascribes this drastic stabilization in part to the 
withdrawal of the Byzantine Emperor into the defensible and self-contained world of the Imperial court at Constantinople, now 
the sole locus of legitimacy in the Empire, he also acknowledges the importance to this state of affairs of a new construction of 
Imperial power, almost completely “divorced from the emperor’s fourth-century role as itinerant general and eternal 
triumphator,” which allowed Imperial power to be expressed and enacted in a more stable and “increasingly Christianized and 
demilitarized ritual idiom” (298).  
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and divine in the singular Christ and his Church.75 As both Ambrose and Nectarius had recognized, even 
within the world of Christian ritual and organization the Emperor was by no means an easy figure to 
accommodate. As there remained more or less flattering places for the Emperor within the Christian 
cosmos, so too there remained plenty of opportunities for the application of his own highly practical 
power to matters of doctrine and discipline alike. Though more than fifteen-hundred years have passed 
since the days of Constantine, Athanasius, and Eusebius, the question of the relationship between 






75 It is, I believe, no accident that this led almost immediately to fierce theological debates in the 5th century concerning the 
relationship of the divinity and humanity of Christ, debates in which multiple Emperors (and Empresses) played outsize roles. 
Given that Christ and the Church now represented the sole terrain on which the unification of divine and human was to be 
effected, the precise relationship between divinity and humanity within this new cosmic order was naturally of very great 
importance to bishops and Emperor alike. 
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APPENDIX A: TIMELINE OF EPISCOPAL COUNCILS 
Major Councils During the Reign of Constantine (306-337): 
Council of Ancyra (314): Assembly held at Ancyra in Asia Minor under the presidency of 
Marcellus of Ancyra. This council adopted a large number of disciplinary canons aimed at 
restoring and reforming Church order following the Persecution of Diocletian.  
Council of Antioch (324): Assembly of fifty-nine bishops held at Antioch under the presidency of 
Hosius of Cordoba and Eustathius of Antioch. Three bishops, including Eusebius of Caesarea, 
were interrogated on suspicion of heresy for their support of Arius and provisionally 
excommunicated. 
Council of Nicaea (325): Empire-wide assembly of around three hundred and twenty bishops in 
Asia Minor at which the Emperor Constantine was personally present. Produced the Creed of 
Nicaea and anathematized Arius and his theology, after which Constantine exiled the 
Alexandrian priest. Also adopted decrees aiming at creating a common date of Easter, as well as 
disciplinary canons that included an absolute ban on the translation of bishops. 
Council of Nicomedia (327/8): Assembly held in modern-day Asia Minor, likely under the 
presidency of Eusebius of Nicomedia after his return from exile, that anathematized the 
doctrine of Nicaea and/or Alexander of Alexandria and rehabilitated Arius. May have featured 
some form of direct participation and/or sanction from Constantine. Also may have 
promulgated a creed intended to take the place of that of Nicaea (perhaps identical to the later 
“Dedication Creed”). 
Council of Antioch (328): Assembly in Antioch in Syria in the aftermath of the deposition of 
Eustathius of Antioch at which numerous disciplinary canons were adopted aimed at cementing 
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metropolitan control over local churches. Also attempted to appoint Eusebius of Caesarea as 
bishop of Antioch but was vetoed by Constantine. 
Council of Tyre (335): Assembly in modern-day Lebanon under the direction of Eusebius of 
Nicomedia and Eusebius of Caesaea at which Athanasius was condemned and deposed from 
office. This was followed by a direct appeal to Constantine in Constantinople, which led to a trial 
before the Emperor and an eventual reiteration of council’s sentence and exile to Gaul. 
Council of Jerusalem (335): Large assembly held shortly after and/or in the interval between the 
sessions at Tyre to celebrate the dedication of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. At this 
assembly, in obedience to letters from the Emperor, Arius was formally rehabilitated and 
enabled to share communion with the assembly.  
Council of Constantinople (336): Assembly in the Imperial capital during the celebrations of the 
thirtieth anniversary of Constantine’s reign at which Marcellus of Ancyra was deposed and 
exiled. 
Major Councils During the Reign of Constantius II (337-361): 
Council of Antioch (341), also known as the “Dedication Council”: Major assembly at Antioch in 
Syria in celebration of the dedication of the Domus Aurea or Great Church of Antioch, under the 
presidency of Eusebius of Nicomedia and in the presence of the Eastern Emperor Constantius II. 
Rejected Julius of Rome’s offer of participation in a larger council at Rome and maintained the 
previous depositions of Athanasius of Alexandria, Marcellus of Ancyra, and other exiled bishops. 
Produced a defiant synodal letter to Julius of Rome and several creedal statements, including 
the Dedication Creed of Antioch. 
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Council of Rome (341): Assembly of about fifty bishops at Rome in Italy under the presidency of 
Julius of Rome. While initially intended to include Eastern representation, the council was held 
with only Western participation following the Dedication Council’s defiance of Julius’ summons. 
In the aftermath, Julius of Rome addressed a letter to the bishops assembled at Antioch severely 
criticizing them for having breached canonical order and disregarded the authority of Nicaea in 
their processes against the exiled bishops. 
Council of Serdica (343): Assembly in modern-day Bulgaria which split into two separate 
councils, one Eastern and one Western, based on the political division between Constans and 
Constantius. Both assemblies produced encyclical letters and creeds. The Western assembly, 
under the presidency of Hosius of Cordoba, Protogenes of Serdica, and legates sent by Julius of 
Rome, produced a synodal letter vindicating the Eastern exiles and anathematizing several 
Eastern bishops, as well as the Creed of Western Serdica, a document that was later disavowed 
by Athanasius and which may never have been formally promulgated. The Eastern assembly 
produced a synodal letter restating the condemnations of the exiles and formally breaking 
communion with Julius of Rome and the entire Western Church, as well as the Creed of Eastern 
Serdica, a document based on the so-called Fourth Creed of Antioch and later expanded into the 
Creed of Long Lines.  
Council of Sirmium (351): Assembly in modern-day Serbia at the wartime Imperial court of 
Constantius, which deposed the bishop of Sirmium Photinus, condemned Athanasius for 
treason, and produced the Creed of Sirmium. 
Council of Arles (353): Council in Gaul, held after the conclusion of the war with Magnentius at 
the roving Imperial court of Constantius, at which Western bishops were asked to subscribe to 
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the decrees of Sirmium, including the doctrinal creed and the accompanying condemnation of 
Athanasius. 
Council of Milan (355): Assembly in Milan in Italy assembled by Liberius of Rome and 
Constantius acting in concert. Lucifer of Cagliari, along with the Roman priest Pancratius and the 
deacon Hilary, attended as Liberius’ representatives. Following an intervention by Constantius, 
the council condemned Athanasius and exiled Lucifer, the deacon Hilary, Eusebius of Vercelli, 
and Dionysius of Milan for refusing to subscribe to the council’s decrees. In the aftermath these 
decrees seem to have been widely circulated for subscription on pain of exile. 
Council of Beziers (356): Assembly in Gaul following which Hilary of Poitiers was exiled. Little 
other information survives about the assembly. 
Council of Antioch (357): Assembly under the presidency of Eudoxius at Antioch at which the 
authors of the recent Statement of Sirmium (357), a document produced at the Imperial court 
by Ursacius, Valens, and Germinius, were praised for their service to the truth. 
Council of Ancyra (358): Assembly in Asia Minor under the presidency of Basil of Ancyra, the 
leader of the homoiousian episcopal faction. The council condemned the Statement of Sirmium 
(357), condemned Eudoxius of Antioch and the priest Aetius, and produced the Creed of Ancyra, 
which sought to chart a middle ground between Western homoousianism and the radical “Neo-
Arianism” of Aetius. Although not involved in the assembly, following the council Constantius 
was brought to endorse the basic homoiousian formula.  
Council of Ariminum (359), also known as the Council of Rimini: One of the “twin councils” along 
with Seleucia summoned by Constantius in the late 350s in lieu of a single ecumenical council. 
This very large assembly of about four hundred bishops met in modern-day Rimini in Italy and 
initially rejected the Dated Creed promulgated not long before at the Imperial court in Sirmium 
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in favor of a reaffirmation of the Creed of Nicaea. However, following several interventions by 
Constantius, a delegation of bishops sent to the Emperor was brought to accept a modified 
homoian formula at Nike, and after a seven-month detainment in Ariminum this creed was 
finally subscribed to by at least the majority of the council. 
Council of Seleucia (359): The other “twin council,” held at Seleucia in Asia Minor. This large 
assembly of about one hundred and seventy bishops also initially rejected Constantius’ Dated 
Creed in favor of a re-affirmation of the Dedication Creed of Antioch and the homoiousian 
position of the Council of Ancyra. Following several interventions by Constantius, a delegation of 
bishops sent to the Emperor at Constantinople was brought to accept the same modified 
homoian formula already subscribed to at Ariminum. 
Council of Constantinople (360): Small assembly of bishops which, in the presence of 
Constantius, promulgated a slightly modified version of the Dated Creed of Ariminum and 
Seleucia as the official doctrine of the Roman Empire. Also deposed and exiled Basil of Ancyra, 
the leader of the homoiousian party, and a number of his close allies. 
Major Councils Following the Reign of Constantius: 
Council of Alexandria (362): Assembly in Egypt which met shortly after the death of Constantius. 
Led by Athanasius of Alexandria and Eusebius of Vercelli, and included participation by former 
homoiousians and a personal delegate of Lucifer of Cagliari. Promulgated in common with 
Liberius of Rome in the West a policy allowing bishops who had subscribed to Ariminum or 
Seleucia to retain their sees after doing penance. Also produced other theological documents 
setting forth a compromise position intended to reconcile Nicenes with homoiousians. 
Council of Lampsacus (364/5): Assembly held in Thrace in the early reign of Valentinian I and 
Valens. After receiving permission from Valentinian to hold a council, condemned the homoian 
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formula of Constantinople, attacked Eudoxius of Constantinople, and reaffirmed the 
homoiousian theology of Basil of Ancyra. 
Council of Tyana (366): Large assembly held in Asia Minor to affirm the results of negotiations 
held between a delegation of Eastern bishops and Liberius of Rome, negotiations which 
themselves were the result of a series of councils held in Smyrna, Pisidia, Isauria, Pamphylia, and 
Lycia. Explicitly affirmed the ὁμοούσιος and communion with Liberius and the homoousians of 
the West, and produced a circular document asking Eastern bishops to affirm their agreement 
and communion in writing and then come to a proposed larger council at Tarsus, which was, 
however, forcibly prevented from meeting by the Emperor Valens. 
Council of Caria (366): Small assembly of thirty-four bishops held in Asia Minor in the territory 
controlled by the usurper Procopius. In response to the Council of Tyana, attacked both the 
ὁμοούσιος and homoianism and reiterated the homoiousian position of Basil of Ancyra. 
Council of Rome (371): Council held in Rome under the presidency of Damasus. Anathematized 
the Council of Ariminum for its heretical teachings and failure to consult the bishop of Rome. 
Council of Aquileia (381): Small assembly of Western bishops called by the Western Emperor 
Gratian and presided over by Ambrose of Milan. Called for the holding of a large council 
involving both Eastern and Western bishops. 
Council of Constantinople (381): Large assembly of Eastern bishops held under the authority of 
the Eastern Emperor Theodosius I in place of the proposal of the Council of Aquileia for a large 
council involving both Eastern and Western bishops. Cemented the transfer of the See of 
Constantinople from the homoian Demophilus to the Nicenes Gregory Nazianzus and (following 




Council of Rome (382): Large assembly held under the authority of the bishop of Rome Damasus 
I. Promulgated theological documents and canons intended to cement Nicene belief and the 
authority of the bishop of Rome.
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APPENDIX B: AUTHENTICITY AND DATING OF KEY TEXTS 
 Information on the dating, composition, audience, and other principal characteristics of 
discussed texts have been given in the main text above and/or in footnotes wherever this could be 
briefly done. Many of the key texts used in this study have, however, been the subject of significant 
study and controversy. Discussion of these issues is contained in this appendix. 
Constantine 
Epistula ad Arium et Arrianos 
There is a great deal of debate over the precise dating of this document. The main text is given 
in the documentary appendix to Athanasius’ De decretis Nicaenae synodi and is preceded by a brief edict 
calling for the destruction of Arius’ written works that shares a single heading with the letter. While the 
5th century ecclesiastical historians who quote portions of both documents (Socrates 1.9.29–31, 64; 
Sozomen, 1.21.4) clearly connect them both with Arius’ exile following the Council of Nicaea in 325, 
modern scholars, following Schwartz 1959, 188-264, have generally dated it much later, to 333. The 
basis of this dating is a brief note appended to the end of the letter that states that “this document also 
was conveyed by means of the agentes in rebus Syncletius and Gaudentius, when Paterius was Prefect 
of Egypt, and was read in the Palace” (De decretis 40.39, Διὰ Συγκλητίου καὶ Γαυδεντίου μαγιστριανῶν 
ἐκομίσθη καὶ ταῦτα, ὅτε Πατέριος ἦν ἔπαρχος Αἰγύπτου, καὶ ἀνεγνώσθη ἐν τῷ παλατίῳ). Modern 
reconstructions of the terms of office of prefects of Egypt show one Paterius holding the office of 
prefect in 333 before being replaced in 334 (see e.g. Schwartz 1959, 76, 202, 246; Barnes 2009, 116-119, 
both of whom base their case on the prefects mentioned as being in office during each Easter in 
Athanasius’ Epistulae Festales for the years 329-373).  
Relying on this single chronological detail, modern scholars have created an elaborate timeline 
of the events after Nicaea in which Arius was recalled from exile c. 327, but later grew impatient with 
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Constantine’s failure to secure his return to Alexandria and wrote the petition that led to his furious 
theological denunciation by Constantine in the letter in question, and was then almost immediately 
restored to Constantine’s favor once again in time for his admittance to communion by the Council of 
Jerusalem in 335. The main alternative to this proposal has been that of Martin 1989, who dated the 
edict to the period immediately following Nicaea but argued for only one much later reinstatement 
following the letter c. 333—an argument belied by many pieces of evidence, including most notably the 
clear statements by Athanasius in Apologia contra Arianos 59, where he quotes a letter from 
Constantine to himself ordering the bishop of Alexandria to receive Arius and his followers back into 
communion almost immediately upon his accession to office c. 328 and prior to any attempt to depose 
him. Brennecke et al. 2007, xxxvi–xxxviii, have more recently argued for a redating of the letter to c. 327, 
prior to Arius’ one and only rehabilitation, on the basis of a gap in attested prefects for Egypt between 
the reinstatement of the office in 324 and the beginning of the Epistulae Festales in 329 that would 
allow for an earlier term of Paterius around this time. This hypothesis was almost immediately attacked 
by Barnes 2009, who brought together an array of papyrological evidence to attempt to fill this gap with 
individuals “either certainly or probably attested” (114) as prefects of Egypt for the years 324-327. 
Barnes also, however, agreed with Brennecke 2007 and Martin 1989 that the associated edict calling for 
the destruction of Arius’ writings would make far more sense as an initial measure following the Council 
of Nicaea c. 325-327 and so attempted to redate the edict, but not the letter itself, to those years.  
Yet Barnes’ attempt to separate the two documents is strictly impossible on the evidence he 
adduces. While it is true that the two documents are primarily connected by the shared heading 
“Ἀντίγραφον ὧν ἐκόμισαν Συγκλήτιος καὶ Γαυδέντιος μαγιστριανοί,” Barnes’ attempt (127-128) to 
argue that this heading is an error by a later scribe and that the annotation after the letter applies only 
to the letter and not to the previous edict is flatly belied by that annotation’s statement that “this 
document also” (καὶ ταῦτα) was conveyed by Syncletius and Gaudentius, which in context can only be a 
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reference back to the previous edict and its attached heading. In other words, if the shared heading is to 
be rejected a later, erroneous comment by a non-Athanasian editor, then so too must the remark 
attesting the letter as being put forward during the prefecture of Paterius on which Barnes’ 
chronological case is based.  
Furthermore, the mention of both the edict and the letter as carried by Syncletius and 
Gaudentius would naturally connect it to the letter of Constantine sent immediately after Athanasius’ 
accession c. 328 (from Apologia contra Arianos 59, mentioned above), which, as Athanasius specifically 
notes, was delivered to him by precisely these two couriers. As Barnes 2009, 113 n. 12 notes, both men 
are otherwise unattested in any source, and it seems intrinsically more likely that the same two agentes 
in rebus would deliver two documents to Alexandria in relatively rapid succession c. 325-328 than over 
an intervening gap of five years or more.  
In terms of the focus of this study, the theology put forward in the letter, with its close 
connections to that in Epistula ad Nicomedienses (discussed in section 1.4 above) and its total lack of 
influence by anything resembling Eusebian theology, fits more logically c. 325-327, prior to 
Constantine’s rapprochement with Arius, Eusebius of Nicomedia, and Eusebius of Caesarea, than c. 333, 
though there are in principle enough minor differences to allow a gap of some years. What seems even 
more unlikely than a Constantine whose theology had remained unaffected by his episcopal allies for 
some six years, however, is the idea that Constantine could have already received Arius at court, 
recalled him from exile, and been allegedly tricked by him into affirming his innocence for an extended 
period of years without this fact being in any way alluded to in the text of the letter—as a similar 
situation was in the text of the Epistola ad Nicomedienses—and without this in any way affecting the 
claims made in the letter’s closing passages in regard to Constantine’s infallible ability to read the 
secrets of Arius’ heart and the correctness of his theology through personal contact and examination. 
The most straightforward reading of all these passages is that Constantine had not, in fact, previously 
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had the opportunity to cross-examine Arius in person, but is now eager to do so for the first and only 
time. 
For all these reasons, a dating between the Council of Nicaea and Arius’ rehabilitation 327/8 
seems to me more likely and better supported by the majority of textual evidence. A later dating would 
not be inconsistent with the overall thesis argued for here, however, even if it would necessitate a 
somewhat slower progression of Constantine’s theological views. 
Oratio ad Coetum Sanctorum  
While the authenticity of this speech has occasionally been doubted (see Heikel 1911, Hanson 
1973, both of whom are discussed and refuted in Barnes 1976, 415-416), like the rest of the documents 
preserved in Eusebius it received a significant boost in scholarly approbation after the discovery in 1950 
of a papyrus containing fragments of Constantine’s letter to the Eastern provincials also preserved in 
Vita Constantini, and has since been overwhelmingly treated as authentic. Presumably due to the 
difficulty and theological orientation of the text itself, however, the bulk of scholarly attention has been 
paid not to the text’s content but rather to establishing a precise date for its delivery.  
 Given that the proem of the extant text alludes to what seems to be the occasion of Good 
Friday, most identifications have been based around calculations of Easter for particular years within 
Constantine’s reign. Norden 1923 argued for the identification of the “assembly of saints” with the 
Council of Nicaea, even though the council was not in fact in session at Easter. Kurfess 1950 argued for a 
very early date of March 29, 313, immediately after the Battle of the Milvian Bridge, while Piganiol 1932 
believed that its clearly Christian content required a later delivery and pushed for a date of April 5, 323. 
This basic argument has more recently been employed by Bleckmann 1996 to date the speech to 327 or 
328 at the Council of Nicomedia held by Eusebius of Nicomedia upon his return from exile (for which see 
note 160 in section 1.4 above). Barnes 1976 argued for a precise date of April 12, 317 on the basis of 
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relatively weak evidence: he assumed that the title of the work in manuscripts was appended by 
Constantine himself, that the speech must have been delivered in the “great city” referred to in its later 
sections, and that the “great city” in question was not Rome, but Serdica—all these assumptions are 
well refuted in Drake 1985, 339-341. Later, however, he amended his own hypothesis (in Barnes 2001) 
and argued for a later date of April 325 in Eusebius’ diocese of Nicomedia just prior to Nicaea. Barnes 
has been more recently followed by S. Parvis 2006a, 83, who uses his dating to argue for a brief period 
of theological influence by Eusebius of Nicomedia prior to the Council of Nicaea.  
Given the numerous contradictions on theological positions large and small here from the 
position found in Constantine’s writings immediately after Nicaea, however, I find a dating to 325 highly 
unlikely. Such a dating, as both Barnes and Parvis acknowledge, relies on what I regard as an extremely 
exaggerated belief in the finality and authority of Nicaea in the decades immediately thereafter.1 In his 
most recent study, Timothy Barnes bases his argument for a date of precisely 325 on the alleged facts 
that “while Eusebius did not change his basic theology, he carefully avoided language that could be 
construed as implying the inferiority of the Son after the Council” and that therefore “use of the phrase 
‘second God’” in Oratio ad Coetum Sanctorum “excludes any date after the Council of Nicaea.”2 In the 
present study I have established that Eusebius of Caesarea did continue to clearly speak of two οὐσίαι 
and of the distance and subordination of Son to the Father for the remainder of Constantine’s reign—
most notably in De laudibus Constantini, on a highly public, Imperial occasion, in Constantine’s own 
presence, and in the very late year 336. 
 
1 S. Parvis 2006a, 83, n. 206: “Constantine, like everyone else, would have avoided speaking with approbation of two οὐσίαι 
after Nicaea” cf. Rist 1981, 155-158, Barnes 2001, 34-36, Barnes 2011, 113-120. 
2 Barnes 2011, 117. 
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Given the broader case made in the main text above, I believe that the only period in 
Constantine’s reign in which such strong and pervasive influence from Eusebian theology in a public 
address is likely is after his rapprochement with Arius, Eusebius of Caesarea, and Eusebius of Nicomedia 
c. 327. As argued in section 1.3 above, while there is no evidence for Constantine’s possession of any 
detailed theology of Father and Son prior to Nicaea, and while immediately post-Nicaea Constantine 
clearly articulated a drastically different theology of divine unity, there is evidence that Constantine both 
heard in detail and explicitly favored the theologies of Arius and Eusebius of Caesarea in the latter part 
of his reign. The burden of proof, therefore, is in my judgment overwhelmingly on those who would 
date the work to any period other than the period c. 327-337, where other contacts with and influence 
from Eusebian theology is readily demonstrable.  
Overall, as stated in the main text above, I largely agree with the contentions of Drake 1985, 
both that “when [...] such meticulous scholars arrive at such contradictory conclusions, caution, if not 
despair, is advisable,”3 and that “concern to find an exact date may itself be profoundly misleading,”4 
since as argued in Drake 2000 Oratio ad coetum sanctorum may well have been re-edited and delivered 
on multiple occasions, culminating in an extant text dating to near the end Constantine’s reign.5 My own 
study supports a date later in Constantine’s reign for the speech in its final form—most likely fairly late, 
when his theological interests had overcome his early concern with theological quibbling and become 
crystallized into a definitely “Eusebian” form (found among the possibilities cautiously suggested by 
Drake 1985, 346-349). It is not, however, in principle incompatible with any of the above dating 
schemes, though some would require overcoming greater interpretative challenges than others. 
 
3 Drake 1985, 340. 
4 Drake 1985, 335. 
5 Drake 2000, 295-296. 
652 
 
Eusebius of Caesarea 
Historia Ecclesiastica 
The dating of Historia Ecclesiastica is particularly complex both because of the numerous 
manuscripts with clear differences (particularly in their treatment of Licinius, Constantine’s onetime co-
Emperor) and because of the intrinsic probability of a long process of composition for such a complex 
work. The basic manuscript evidence is laid out in Barnes 1980, 196-198, on the basis of which 
hypotheses have been proposed for various stages of composition, redaction, and publication. One 
longstanding thesis, with many minor variations, has posited a first edition published c. 311 and 
consisting of books 1-8, followed by subsequent editions adding books 9 (c. 315) and 10 (c.324) (see e.g. 
Schwartz 1903-1909, Lawlor 1912, Grant 1980, Tabernee 1997). A similar but distinct proposal argues 
for a first edition c. 295 featuring books 1-7, followed by a second edition c. 313 featuring books 1-9 
with a few omissions, a third edition c. 315 featuring books 1-10 but with only part of the present book 
10, and a final edition c. 324 completing book 10 and editing out references to Licinius in earlier books 
(see Barnes 1980, cf. Laqueur 1929, Cameron 1983). More recently, a simple two-step process of 
publication has gained influence among scholars, consisting of one publication of books 1-9, then a 
second and final edition adding book 10 and making other changes (see e.g. Louth 1990, Burgess 1997). 
Finally, Johnson 2014, 105-111, has argued for a single-edition publication, following a lengthy process 
of composition, in 324/5—though as he himself acknowledges, at the time of his publication “no serious 
scholar” (110) seems to have ever taken such a position. For my purposes, the differences between 
these hypotheses are relatively minor, though it seems clear to me, in fundamental harmony with more 
recent hypotheses, that the narrative of our surviving text shows clear and pervasive signs of being 




Lucifer of Cagliari 
The question of the internal dating of Lucifer’s corpus poses an obvious issue, one that has, 
however, been given as relatively little attention as Lucifer himself.6 Lucifer first appears in the historical 
record as an envoy of Pope Liberius in AD 353 or 354,7 though given the explicit and implicit references 
throughout his works, they have all generally been dated posterior to his exile following the Council of 
Milan in 355. Given the addressee of all of these works, it is also logical for them all to have been written 
prior to the death of Constantius II on November 3, 361. This leaves a fairly short window for Lucifer’s 
public career as a writer, but does not help with the internal ordering of the works, where other internal 
and external evidence must be applied.  
In the first place, the two surviving manuscripts both order his works identically: De Athanasio 
libri duo, followed by De regibus apostaticis, De non conveniendo haereticis, De non parcendo in deum 
delinquentibus, and finally Moriundum esse pro dei filio. That the placement of Moriundum esse in fact 
reflects its place as the chronologically last of Lucifer’s works is suggested both by the singular content 
and style of the work and by the fact that Moriundum esse is the only one of Lucifer’s works to refer by 
name to a prior book, De regibus apostaticis.8 Most conclusively, Moriundum esse attacks Constantius’ 
appointment of Eudoxius of Germanicia/Antioch as bishop of Constantinople in January 360.9 This 
reference allows Moriundum esse be dated fairly precisely within the last two years of Constantius’ 
reign, and make it highly likely that it is in fact the latest work in Lucifer’s corpus.  
 
6 The primary discussion on the dating of Lucifer’s works that I have consulted is Diercks 1978, xviii-xxv. 
7 Cf. Flower 2016, 31, cf. Hilary, Adversus Valentem et Ursacium Series A.7 and Jerome, De Viris Illustribus 95.1. 
8 Moriundum esse 12, cf. Diercks 1978, xix. 
9 Moriundum esse 11, cf. Diercks 1978, xix. 
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Beyond this, however, things become quite a bit murkier. While Lucifer in De non parcendo 
refers to multiple previous books written against Constantius (requiring De non parcendo to be at least 
the third of Lucifer’s five-member corpus), he does not specify either their titles or their topics (beyond 
the general and indeed universal one of threatening Constantius with divine punishment).10 Both De 
regibus and Moriundum esse refer explicitly to Constantius’ forcible expulsion of Athanasius from 
Alexandria, and the attendant violence perpetrated on the populace, in February 356.11 De Athanasio 
also contains references to the episcopal careers of George, the bishop of Alexandria appointed to 
replace Athanasius in 356 or 357, and Eudoxius, bishop consecutively of Germanicia, Antioch, and 
Constantinople, that together require a date for the final version of this work between mid-357 and 
January 360.12 De Athanasio is, however, by far the longest of Lucifer’s works and constitutes something 
of a compendium of his arguments and Scriptural references, making it likely, in my judgment, that it 
was written and revised over an extended period of time. Otherwise, there are only a few vague 
possible allusions to events of Constantius’ reign to guide dating and chronological ordering.13 The most 
notable is perhaps the reference to war with Persia as being waged nunc at De Athanasio 1.29. By typical 
 
10 De non parcendo 21, cf. Diercks 1978, xix. 
11 De regibus 7, Moriundum esse, 2, 8, cf. Diercks 1978, xxiii-xxiv. 
12 1. 9, 1.30, 2.18, 2.25, cf. Diercks 1978, xx-xi. Diercks’ account, however, is at a few points more confident than the evidence 
can bear. For instance, while George does not seem to have officially entered Alexandria until February 357 (see Simonetti 
1975, 226), he was likely appointed by Constantius to that position somewhat earlier, making Lucifer’s vague references to 
George as bishop of Alexandria insufficient to generate a clear terminus post quem. Likewise, while George was nominally 
condemned and deposed by the Council of Seleucia in 359, the sentence was not put into effect by Constantius, giving Lucifer 
no reason to mention it and again depriving us of a clear terminus ante quem. For the general problem of dating Eudoxius’ 
various appointments and depositions, see note 36 below, but here let it suffice it to say that while it is reasonable to connect 
Lucifer’s charge in De Athanasio 1.30 that Constantius has shown inconsistency in alternately praising and condemning 
Eudoxius in letters written to the church of Antioch to the events surrounding the Council of Ancyra in 358 (discussed in section 
3.6 above), this is made less certain by Lucifer’s general and indeed pervasive lack of precision. What can be concluded is that 
De Athanasio must have been written following Eudoxius’ appointment as bishop of Antioch, which itself can be dated only 
loosely between mid-357 and spring 358, as well as prior to his appointment as bishop of Constantinople in January 360. 
Together, these references most likely suggest a date in 358, as Diercks argues, but they strictly require one only between mid-
357 and January 360. All this, of course, assumes that the two books of De Athanasio, together by far the longest of Lucifer’s 
works, were not written and/or revised over a longer period of time. 
13 These are all given, with references, at Diercks 1978, xix-xxiii.  
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reckonings Shapur II initially broached hostilities with Constantius in late 357 or early 358 before 
invading Armenia in the summer of 359. This might suggest a date c. 359, though as Diercks correctly 
notes,14 given the fact that sporadic fighting took place already in 358, Lucifer was perfectly capable of 
treating the war as having begun with Shapur’s public ultimatum rather than the full-scale invasion. 
Indeed, intermittent warfare with Shapur represented one of the longest-standing features of 
Constantius’ reign, beginning with his resumption of power in 337 and continuing in one form or other 
to the end of his reign. In De non parcendo 26 Lucifer refers to the recent calling together of the whole 
world by Constantius to deny Christ’s divinity, which might indicate the councils of Ariminum and 
Seleucia in 359—or, given Lucifer’s characteristic hyperbole, simply the general Constantian project of 
the last several decades.15 This comment, along with others in De non conveniendo concerning a recent 
synod at which Lucifer and/or Constantius were (perhaps) personally present, has also been applied to 
the Council of Milan in 35516 and used as the basis for an argument that De non conveniendo is in fact 
the earliest work in Lucifer’s corpus.17 All this illustrates well the numerous difficulties with fixing 
absolute dates to Lucifer’s works. In all these cases, dating is made more difficult by his lack of interest 
in anything outside the direct, argumentative relationship between him and Constantius. In the 
construction of the ongoing conversation between Emperor and bishop, historical events and figures are 
referred to not according to any chronological or narrative ordering, but according to their immediate 
relevance to Lucifer’s arguments. 
 
14 Diercks 1978, xx. 
15 See Diercks 1978, xix-xx, as well as  
16 See Rosen 2001 67-68, who compares these references to the extant sources on the Council of Milan. 
17 See in particular Hartel 1886, Hanson 1988, 510. 
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As argued in the main text above, I believe various logical progressions are able to be 
documented in Lucifer’s arguments and attitudes across the course of his corpus. With one partial 
exception, these progressions favor the manuscript ordering as a basic chronological guideline. This 
exception is De Athanasio, which due to its unprecedented length, compendious nature, and 
hodgepodge shifts in argumentation likely possessed a longer and more complex process of composition 
than Lucifer’s other works. While it is possible that in its basic argumentative core (focused on Scriptural 
norms for justice and judgment applied to the procedures against Athanasius) De Athanasio was in fact 
Lucifer’s earliest written effort—and may even have dated in some form to before the Council of 
Milan—it also shows signs of having taken on many of the rhetorical and argumentative aspects of 
Lucifer’s later works as these were composed. To clearly establish this case would, however, require 
detailed textual and manuscript analysis outside the scope of the present study. Barring such analysis, 
the dating and ordering of Lucifer’s works must remain largely hypothetical.  
Athanasius of Alexandria 
Apologia ad Constantium Imperatorem 
Various hypotheses have been proposed for the precise dating and redaction of this text. Most 
of these break the document into two parts, written at different times and with slightly different 
purposes. Archibald Robertson, proposing a hypothesis that has received broad acceptance since, 
divided the work between sections 1-26 and 27-35, based on the supposition that the earlier sections, 
dating from 356, were written by Athanasius prior to his actual flight from Alexandria, as described in 
the final sections.18 Jan Szymusiak,19 on the other hand, supported more recently with additional 
 
18 Robertson 1892, 236. 
19 Szymusiak 1958, 30, 55, 59-63. 
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arguments by David Gwynn,20 divided it into sections 1-21, comprising a defense written between 353 
and 355 before any attempt had been made to arrest or dislodge him, and 22-35, in which the various 
attempts to do so, culminating in his flight, are described c. 357. Timothy Barnes, finally, has proposed 
an ingenious, but not entirely convincing, theory whereby sections 1-18, with the exception of 13, were 
composed in the early months of 353 in response to the summons by Constantius described in 19-21, 
while 13 and 19-35 were added while in exile in 357.21 Whichever of these theories is accepted, the 
difference for my thesis is slight. Though there is certainly a notable increase in the pitch of rhetoric and 
(muted) warnings to Constantius in the final sections of the work, and though Athanasius seems to have 
shown a marked penchant for continuing to modify and add to his works to update them for later 
events and even additional audiences, it nonetheless remains possible to read the work as a continuous 
whole. 
De synodis 
This text in its present form presents a significant puzzle in regards to its dating. Throughout 
most of the text of De Synodis, Athanasius presents the Councils of Ariminum as possessed of strong 
majorities of pious bishops clearly and resolutely opposed to the new homoian belief which Constantius, 
goaded by a small faction of renegades, was attempting to impose on them by force. Such unreserved 
praise for the bishops at councils that would shortly be castigated by Nicenes and homoiousians alike as 
the final triumph of evil would be very much out of place even in 360 or 361, as a comparison with Hilary 
of Poitiers’ works of the same years indicates. The work also features a “post-script” that seems to imply 
even more strongly that the Council of Ariminum is still ongoing, or at least that news of its closing (with 
a final capitulation by the bishops to the homoian formula) had not yet reached Athanasius: “After I had 
 
20 Gwynn 2006, 37-39. 
21 Barnes 1993, 196-197. 
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written these things about the Synods, I learned that the most impious Constantius had written to the 
bishops remaining in Ariminum. And I expended much effort to acquire copies from trustworthy 
brothers and to send to you also the replies from the bishops, that you might know the impious trickery 
of the Emperor and the unwavering steadfastness of the bishops in their judgment about the truth” 
(55).22 That Athanasius would waste his energy attempting to conceal this council’s very public 
endorsement of homoian formulas, immediately trumpeted across the Empire, is hardly plausible. A 
seemingly straightforward dating to Fall 359, contemporary with the Council of Seleucia, with the post-
script added after the closing of this council but before the capitulation of the homoiousian delegates on 
the last day of 359, is, however, contradicted by two sections of the work (30-31), where, in a brief 
epilogue to the narrative, he mentions not only the final capitulation of the bishops at Ariminum, but 
also the death of Constantius in November 361. How to reconcile this contradiction has long occupied 
scholars. The main positions are either that the work as a whole was in fact written in late 361 or early 
362, with the treatment of Ariminum and Seleucia in most of the work merely an extreme rhetorical 
effect,23 or that the bulk of it was in fact written in 359, before the capitulation of the Seleucian 
delegates and the bishops at Ariminum, with the two contrary sections another “post-script” inserted 
 
22 Μετὰ τὸ γράψαι με τὰ περὶ τῶν συνόδων ἔγνων γράψαντα τὸν ἀσεβέστατον Κωνστάντιον πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Ἀριμήνῳ μείναντας 
ἐπισκόπους. καὶ σπουδὴν ἔσχον λαβεῖν τὰ ἀντίγραφα παρὰ γνησίων ἀδελφῶν καὶ ἀποστεῖλαι ὑμῖν καὶ τὰ παρὰ τῶν ἐπισκόπων 
ἀντιγραφέντα, ἵνα γνῶτε τοῦ μὲν βασιλέως τὴν ἀσεβῆ πανουργίαν τῶν δὲ ἐπισκόπων τὸ ἑδραῖον καὶ ἀκλινὲς τῆς πρὸς τὴν 
ἀλήθειαν γνώμης. 
23 This opinion is notably argued for by Opitz 1935-1941, 231, 258, as well as Brennecke 1984, 275.  
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following Constantius’ death as an acknowledgment of rapidly changing events.24 In general, the latter 
thesis seems to me, as it has to most recent scholars,25 far more persuasive. 
Historia Arianorum  
This work’s dating, audience, and process of composition have all posed difficulties for scholars. 
The text as it exists now is seemingly fragmentary, beginning in medias res,26 and covers events from 
335 AD to mid-357—but this is not, in my judgment, conclusive evidence that it was written only shortly 
after the latter date, as has been sometimes assumed.27 Once it reaches the events surrounding 
Athanasius’ second exile under Constantius, the work ceases to follow a conventional chronological 
structure altogether, breaking out instead into multiple parallel narratives, each covering numerous 
years of persecution under Constantius.28 That two of these narratives (those of Liberius and Hosius) 
happen to terminate in mid-357 does not necessitate, as it might for a more chronologically-structured 
history, that this had occurred only shortly prior to composition.  
Another, directly contrary consideration is the idea that, given the directly seditious and indeed 
treasonous anti-Constantian rhetoric found in Historia Arianorum, it would be reasonable to assume 
 
24 See recently Martin and Morales 2013, 159-168, who argue that most sections of the work were written in the fall of 359, 
based on information from bishops returning from Seleucia, but before the negotiations between the small group of episcopal 
delegates and Constantius had led to capitulation, whereas sections 30-31 were added in 362 with the purpose of furthering 
the alliance with the homoiousians deposed by Constantius at Seleucia in preparation for the forthcoming Council of 
Alexandria.  
25 E.g. Martin and Morales 2013, Gwynn 2006, 42-45, Simonetti 1975, 346, Barnes 1992, 133-135, Heil 2011, 222, Martin 1997, 
531, and Kopecek 1979, 216. 
26 Cf. Portmann 2011, 184-185, Barnes 1992, 126, Opitz 1935-1941, 183. 
27 Cf. Portmann 2011, 185, Barnes 1992, 126, Flower 2017, 24-26, all, however, with admissions of the tenuousness of the 
identification (Portmann: “mit einiger Wahrscheinlichkeit” Barnes: “may be assigned”), with Flower going only so far as to say 
that it was “probably written relatively early” (24) in Athanasius’ exile, while also suggesting that “it [...] would be sensible to 
assume that it came into the possession of a larger number of people only once Constantius was safely dead” (i.e. c. 361).  
28 As Portmann 2011, 185, points out, although the narrative stretches back to 335, more than half of the text (33-80) is 
devoted to covering events during and after 355, a clear indication of Athanasius’ focus. 
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that the text, whenever it was composed, was only circulated, if at all, after the Emperor’s death in 
361.29 Given the parallel existence and likely circulation of Lucifer’s and Hilary’s equally treasonous 
works prior to Constantius’ death, however, including evidence for Lucifer’s reading of Hilary and 
Hilary’s of Lucifer while both were in exile,30 this is not, in my judgment, a compelling argument. In the 
context of the latter part of Constantius’ reign, it is clear that polemically anti-Imperial texts could be 
and were circulated, at least among limited networks of sympathetic bishops. Indeed, both the 
existence of these texts and my study as a whole indicates that the only period during which such 
extreme anti-Imperial invectives had reason to be produced and circulated was before Constantius’ 
death.  
The only other possible basis for dating is, I would suggest, the rhetorical nature of the work, its 
close melding of theological rejection of Imperial interference in Church affairs with open denunciations 
of Constantius as the Antichrist and a maker of martyrs. Even if the Historia Arianorum were the first of 
such works to be written (an idea I find unlikely given Athanasius’ history), Athanasius was certainly not 
working in a vacuum, but in a context where Nicene theology was being more and more closely linked 
with both theological opposition to unitary Imperial models of the cosmos and political opposition to 
Constantius by exiled bishops in both East and West. In this respect, as Richard Flower has recently 
recognized, Historia Arianorum bears close, pervasive similarities to works by Lucifer of Cagliari and 
Hilary of Poitiers that date from the last year or two of Constantius reign, 360 and early 361.31 These 
were works intended to rally all-out episcopal opposition to the triumphant Constantian project 
 
29 Cf. in particular Flower 2017, 26. 
30 See in particular section 6.3 above. 
31 That is, to Moriundum esse pro dei Filio and In Constantium Imperatorem (see sections 4.6 and 5.5 above). Cf. Flower 2017 
and Flower 2013, in both of which the rhetoric of these three works in particular is directly compared and often equated. Key 
similarities with these particular works include the straightforward identification of Constantius with the Antichrist, the focus 
on martyrdom to the exclusion of any other model of Imperial-episcopal relations and direct comparisons of Constantius with 
pagan persecutors.  
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cemented by the Councils of Ariminum, Seleucia, and Constantinople in 359 and 360 in the context of an 
open political rebellion by Julian in the West.  
Similarly, Richard Burgess has noted the direct concurrence between Athanasius in Historia 
Arianorum (69.1) and the propaganda of Julian during his revolt (Epistula ad Athenaeos 270, 281), in 
particular in the open declaration of Constantius as the murderous architect behind the “massacre of 
the princes” of 337.32 As Burgess notes, despite the near-total suppression prior to the Julian’s revolt of 
public indications that Constantius had instigated the event and the presence in all previous sources of 
exculpatory explanations or outright denials, “Athanasius clearly expects all his readers to know and 
understand”33 both the broad contours of the massacre and that Constantius was personally and 
directly responsible for the event. While Burgess himself accepts the established dating of Historia 
Arianorum, such a total lack of argumentation or context for such an incendiary claim—indeed, 
Athanasius treats Constantius’ guilt not as an argumentative conclusion, but as an established fact 
employed as a premise for his further argument that Constantius lacked human feeling— is, I would 
argue, out of place in a document composed c. 357, and cannot be fully accounted for either by the 
hypothesis that despite the near-total suppression of accounts of the event by the Imperial 
administration Constantius’ responsibility had somehow become and remained widely known and 
accepted two decades after the fact, or by the suggestion of Burgess himself that since the Historia 
Arianorum was intended only for private circulation34 Athanasius could assume that his highly select 
audience would accept the reference without further explanation or justification.35 To be coherent, 
 
32 Burgess 1997, 15-17. 
33 Burgess 1997, 16. 
34 A claim with which I do not entirely concur: see section 7.3 above. 
35 Burgess 1997, 16. 
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Athanasius’ comment requires the existence of an established, widely-circulated narrative whereby 
Constantius had directly murdered his kin upon his accession. Positioned in 360/361, this assumption 
fits perfectly with the already-discussed concurrence between the anti-Constantian propaganda of the 
Nicene bishops and the cause of Julian in the West.  
There are, however, two difficulties with this proposed dating. The first, and most substantial, is 
a single reference in the early sections of the work that refers to Eudoxius as Bishop of Germanicia and 
to Leontius as being “now” (νῦν) Bishop of Antioch (4), a comment which must have been written prior 
to the death of the latter and the appointment of the former as his successor sometime between 357 
and early 358.36 Yet given the placement of this reference at the very beginning of a fragmentary work 
of substantial length which may have never been fully revised for publication,37 this can provide no more 
than a shaky terminus ante quem for these early sections.38 The other is that even in the latter sections 
dealing with Constantius Athanasius, while attacking in broad terms his abuse of conciliar processes, 
does not identifiably reference either the Councils of Ariminum and Seleucia or the homoian formula 
imposed at them, as Hilary does in In Constantium. These councils and their formula, however, are 
likewise not directly mentioned by Lucifer in Moriundum esse, a text which can be securely dated to 360 
or early 361, and which, like Historia Arianorum, is focused, not on a detailed refutation of homoian 
 
36 The precise timing of this event is also, however, uncertain, since Eudoxius’ episcopal career is notoriously difficult to date 
thanks to his multiple transfers among different sees and his multiple depositions at different councils. Socrates Scholasticus 
gives his account of Leontius’ death and Eudoxius’ transfer from Germanicia to Antioch (2.37) as “about the same time as” the 
Council of Milan in 355. In Socrates’ actual account, however, Eudoxius heard the news of Leontius’ death and returned to 
Antioch to assume the position while he was with Constantius in Rome (and hence presumably mid-357), while Sozomen (4.12) 
merely states that he was with Constantius “in the West” (i.e. 353-357). Eudoxius must, however, have fully assumed this 
position prior to the spring of 358, when he was attacked by name as bishop of Antioch and then deposed from his position in 
the proceedings of the Council of Ancyra (cf. Sozomen 4.13-14). Despite this event, however, Eudoxius attended the Council of 
Seleucia as the bishop of Antioch in mid-359, where he was deposed again from the same position before being finally 
appointed bishop of Constantinople in January 360. 
37 Cf. Barnes 1993, 126, who proposes that Historia Arianorum “is the surviving part of a work which Athanasius never 
completed or intended to publish in its present form.” 
38 Cf. Portmann 2011, 184, who also suggests that the early sections of the work on the reign of Constantine should be dated 
earlier than the rest of the work.  
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theology, but simply and solely on recounting and condemning, in the most violent manner possible, 
Constantius’ eschatologically violent persecution of the Church. Indeed, explicit identifications aside, the 
pitch of Athanasius’ rhetoric about Constantius’ intrusion into the Church and imposition of “Arian” 
theology through councils is highly consonant both with Lucifer’s Moriundum esse and Hilary’s In 
Constantium.  
It is my admittedly speculative judgment, then, that the bulk of Historia Arianorum, at least in its 
extant form and in its sections focused on Constantius, can be fitted most logically into 360 or 361, as 
part of the larger, coordinated series of attacks, following their defeat in the Councils of 359, by a 
radicalized Nicene faction that had given up any hope of peaceful coexistence with Constantius. In this 
context, I believe that our present edition of Historia Arianorum should be seen as a partially 
fragmentary text, most likely intended in its initial stages of composition merely as a continuation of 
Apologia contra Arianos, an apologetic historical narrative that Athanasius had been adding to for 
decades,39 but sharpened into a directly political tract and circulated among bishops sympathetic to the 





39 See Barnes 1993, 126, as well as Portmann 2011, 184-186, who also points out the overlap between the two works in the 
citation of five of the same sources. It is important to note, however, that Apologia contra Arianos itself has been notoriously 
difficult to date, and appears to have been composed and edited in numerous distinct stages over the course of several 
decades. According to Gwynn 2006, 16-19, parts of the document were referenced in a synodal letter as early as 338, while the 
majority of the extant text seems situated in the period between 347-351 AD—apart from one brief reference to Hosius’ and 
Liberius’ purported recantations (89-90) that would place it, like Historia Arianorum, in or after 357. While both Barnes and 
Gwynn treat this as a later edit to a narrative largely finalized c.351, it remains evidence that Athanasius was actively engaged 
in reviewing and editing his earlier historical narratives during his exile, and contributes to my speculative thesis that Historia 
Arianorum was begun c. 357 as a continued apologetic historical narrative, and that, like Athanasius’ earlier histories, it passed 
through multiple stages of composition and editing to reach its final form c. 360. Apologia contra Arianos, it should be noted, 
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